Copyright © 2010 Stephen A. Carpenter

All rights reserved.

ISBN: 1450528589

ISBN-13: 9781450528580

E-Book ISBN: 978-1-4392-8253-3

DEDICATION

Then I heard the voice of the Lord saying, “Whom shall I send? And who will go for us?” And I said, “Here am I. Send me!” Isaiah 6:8

“Boots on the Ground” is a work of love. It is my gift to all those men who volunteered and served with Project Delta; and to those they have left behind. It was a hell of a ride.

I dedicate this book:

To my wonderful wife of forty years, Paula. You are the love of my life and my best friend.

To my son, Steve. You are already a better man than me.

To my daughter, Debbie Burke. Your journey inspires me, your love makes me smile.

To my mother, Margaret A. Carpenter. The hardest thing I ever had to do was kiss you goodbye.

To my Dad, Wilbur A. Carpenter; my nephew, Cody Miller; my brother Craig, a fellow Army vet; my sister Amy Jo, the sweetest kid in the world; and my brother Derick, a fellow Delta Recon man. You were all taken too soon.

“To the children and the grandchildren of these great men:

I hope you know,

and that the future generations of your family would know,

that your father and your grandfather was,

and is,

a hero of our nation.”

Lt. General Robert W. Wagner

October 24th, 2008

Project Delta Memorial Stone Dedication Ceremony

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page

Copyright Page

About the Book

Chapter I: Origin of a Mission

Chapter II: The Situation

Chapter III: Leaping Lena

Chapter IV: Revitalization; Continue the Mission

Chapter V: Vung Ro Bay; Changing the Tides of War

Chapter VI: 1965; Ramping Up

Chapter VII: 1966; Counter Offensive

Chapter VIII: Regroup and Recovery

Chapter IX: Counterinsurgency

Chapter X: 1966; Disaster at Khe Sanh

Chapter XI: 1967; Back to the An Lao Valley

Chapter XII: Back to the Ashau

Chapter XIII: Major Bruiser Allen, Break Contact, Continue Mission

Chapter XIV: 1968; Tet

Chapter XV: Tet Counteroffensive

Chapter XVI: The Beginning of the End

Chapter XVII: The Ashau, Again

Chapter XVIII: The Last Hurrah

Appendix I: Unit Citations

Appendix II: Acronyms and Abbreviations

Appendix III: Debriefing, Ranger Operations 1966

Appendix IV: Battle of Hue

Appendix V: Tips of the Trade

ABOUT THE BOOK

On October 24th, 2008, a memorial stone was dedicated in the Memorial Plaza at the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) headquarters at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The stone memorializes a small unit known as Detachment B-52, Project Delta, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces. Project Delta operated from 1964 through 1970 in the Republic of South Vietnam. The unit conducted operations and missions that remained classified until 1996. Project Delta was not a unit that was conceived and born from some blueprint for clandestine operations. It was a unit that evolved over its entire existence and not only defined and developed the basis for small unit tactics in Vietnam, but coincidentally had a profound effect on the prosecution of the war. Lt. General Robert W. Wagner, USASOC Commander, at the dedication ceremony proclaimed, “Today we honor you, the members of this heroic unit in Vietnam. Your accomplishments were invaluable. You operated at the tip of the spear before the term was coined.”

General Wagner also alluded to the idea that someone should undertake the task of recording the history of Project Delta before all of the unit’s institutional memory was in the grave. Long time Project Delta member Jim Tolbert had a vision of creating a “coffee table” book about Project Delta that would contain the Project’s history, anecdotal accounts from Delta men and as many pictures as he could find. He established a website as a collection point for material and contacted as many men as he could for information. Unfortunately, Jim passed away before he could really get started. I volunteered to pick up the project and began to search for records to begin the background work. I obtained over three thousand pages of After Action Reports (AARs) and went through them word by word several times. They are noticeably devoid of team debriefings and personnel identification. I decided to pursue the book from a purely historical perspective and preserve the legacy of the unit for the survivors of those who served in it. The book does not chronicle the many adventures of the men on stand down from operations. It does not contain a roster of individuals who served in Project Delta or attempt to identify personal awards for valor. Lists exist, but they are corrupted by missing information and confused by listings of personnel mistakenly identified as having been assigned to Delta.

Since 1996 much has been written and reported about the sister units that were modeled largely after Delta and operated under the auspices of MACV’s Study and Observations Group (SOG). These units operated in Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Their exploits have been memorialized by former SOG members John Plaster, Frank Greco, Ernie Acre, and John Meyer, to name a few. Their works are all well worth the read and do a great job of chronicling their unit exploits, victories and tragedies. Little has been written about Project Delta. In researching for this book, I confirmed what I already knew: the small group of men that were Project Delta are taciturn, humble, and truly reluctant to speak about themselves or their exploits. This is not to say that this was ever a quiet and tame group. Raucous and bawdy behavior defined this outfit at play just as the term “Quiet Professionals” defined them at work.

Project Delta was born from a need for solid, verifiable, “seen with my own eyes” intelligence from across the border as well as from within Vietnam. There is no substitute for “boots on the ground”. Project Delta was not the first attempt at gathering useful information. Previous efforts by CIA and Special Forces trained indigenous personnel had varied levels of success, but ultimately did not supply needed information in useful and entirely credible fashion. Project Delta was the first successful intelligence gathering unit in the growing U.S. military presence in South Vietnam.

Project Delta’s success did not come without a price. The unit developed methods and techniques through trial and error, through critical self evaluations after every mission and through the resourcefulness and intuition born of hard experience. Many of these developments followed the Delta men as they were called upon to provide the initial staffing and training for the MACV SOG units, conventional unit LRRP companies and the specialized units of other branches of the military.

There are very few of these men left, but there were few to begin with. From the best efforts to gather records about this group, it is estimated that approximately 6oo men were assigned to Project Delta, of which some 250 were “boots on the ground” operators. Most ran reconnaissance; many advised the Rangers or commanded the Nungs or Roadrunners. A few were assigned from the Korean ROK, the Australian SAS and the TASS units as FACs. As with any military unit, the men on the ground would not succeed without a myriad of support functions being performed flawlessly. The operations and intelligence men, the communications crews, the supply and logistics people and, of course, the aviation units that supported Project Delta all contributed significantly and vitally to the missions of the unit. Individuals from these support groups performed valiantly in combat situations that were outside their normal duties, volunteers all. The aviation units, from the Vietnamese crews and aircraft first assigned to the Project to the units attached for individual operations along the way, all performed to the best of their ability. The 281st Assault Helicopter Company with its absorbed units, the 145th and 171st ALCs, was the longest serving helicopter support unit over the Project’s history. Ask any Delta man and he’ll tell you that the 281st would get you out or crash beside you trying. The 281st lost many aircraft, pilots and crew heroically supporting Project Delta. All of these people are deserving of a recorded history of their own. I must apologize to all of the deserving men who served in these attached and support capacities for not including them in this historical perspective. There is not enough room to detail their significant and heroic contributions to the success of Project Delta. A second apology goes to all Delta men whose names are not mentioned and to those who I did not contact for interviews. One conclusion I arrived at early in my research was that not every story could be told and not every voice could be heard. There has to be a point at which there is enough to get the basic job of presenting a true historically accurate document about Project Delta. I chose a point and began to write. Every mission was an adventure and a story in itself. This compilation of historical fact is about the men on the ground. For all of these men, this war was up close and personal. The nature of the missions forged a brotherhood that is as strong today as it was forty plus years ago.

The history of the Vietnam conflict has been invented by media pundits and misrepresented from the very beginning. Our own brothers and sisters were poisoned by the myths of this war that were presented as fact for years. Only with the prosecution of the first Gulf War in 1991 did the Vietnam veterans finally gain some measure of respect for their efforts. In fact, the Vietnam War became quite popular. The following was researched by Capt. Marshal Hanson, U.S.N.R (Ret.) and Capt. Scott Beaton, Statistical Source. This research effort was duplicated by B.G. Burkett in his book “Stolen Valor.[105]

- 9,087,000 military personnel served on active duty during the official Vietnam era from August 5, 1964 to May 7, 1975.

- 2,709,918 Americans served in uniform in Vietnam

- 58,148 were killed in Vietnam

- As of January 15, 2004, there are 1,875 Americans still unaccounted for from the Vietnam War

- 1,713,823 of those who served in Vietnam were still alive as of August, 1995 (census figures).

- During that same Census count, the number of Americans falsely claiming to have served in-country was: 9,492,958.

- As of the current Census taken during August, 2000, the surviving U.S. Vietnam Veteran population estimate is: 1,002,511. During this Census count, the number of Americans falsely claiming to have served in-country is: 13,853,027. By this census, four out of five who claim to be Vietnam vets are not.

- 97% of Vietnam Veterans were honorably discharged, 91% of Vietnam Veterans say they are glad they served, 74% say they would serve again, even knowing the outcome

- Common Belief is that most Vietnam veterans were drafted. 2/3 of the men who served in Vietnam were volunteers. 2/3 of the men who served in World War II were drafted. Approximately 70% of those killed in Vietnam were volunteers.

- Common belief is that a disproportionate number of blacks were killed in the Vietnam War. 86% of the men who died in Vietnam were Caucasians, 12.5% were black, 1.2% were other races. Sociologists Charles C. Moskos and John Sibley Butler, in their recently published book “All That We Can Be,” said they analyzed the claim that blacks were used like cannon fodder during Vietnam “and can report definitely that this charge is untrue. Black fatalities amounted to 12 percent of all Americans killed in Southeast Asia, a figure proportional to the number of blacks in the U.S. population at the time and slightly lower than the proportion of blacks in the Army at the close of the war.”

- The Common belief is that the domino theory was proved false. The domino theory was accurate. The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand stayed free of Communism because of the U.S. commitment to Vietnam. The Indonesians threw the Soviets out in 1966 because of America’s commitment in Vietnam. Without that commitment, Communism would have swept all the way to the Malacca Straits that is south of Singapore and of great strategic importance to the free world. If you ask people who live in these countries who won the war in Vietnam, they have a different opinion from the American news media. The Vietnam War was the turning point for Communism.

- The American military was not defeated in Vietnam. The American military did not lose a battle of any consequence. From a military standpoint, it was almost an unprecedented performance. General Westmoreland quoting Douglas Pike, a professor at the University of California, Berkley, “… a major military defeat for the VC and NVA.”

- The fall of Saigon happened 30 April 1975, two years AFTER the American military left Vietnam. The last American troops departed in their entirety 29 March 1973. The U.S. fought to an agreed stalemate. The peace settlement was signed in Paris on 27 January 1973. It called for release of all U.S. prisoners, withdrawal of U.S. forces, limitation of both sides’ forces inside South Vietnam and a commitment to peaceful reunification. The 140,000 evacuees in April 1975 during the fall of Saigon consisted almost entirely of civilians and Vietnamese military, NOT American military running for their lives. There were almost twice as many casualties in Southeast Asia (primarily Cambodia) the first two years after the fall of Saigon in 1975 then there were during the ten years the U.S. was involved in Vietnam. Thanks for the perceived loss and the countless assassinations and torture visited upon Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians goes mainly to the American media and their undying support of misrepresentation made by the anti-War movement in the United States.

- As with much of the Vietnam War, the news media misreported and misinterpreted the 1968 Tet Offensive. It was reported as an overwhelming success for the Communist forces and a decided defeat for the U.S. forces. Nothing could be further from the truth. Despite initial victories by the Communists forces, the Tet Offensive resulted in a major defeat of those forces. General Vo Nguyen Giap, the designer of the Tet Offensive, is considered by some as ranking with Wellington, Grant, Lee and MacArthur as a great commander. His folly during Tet of 1968 serves to dispel that myth as well. Militarily, the Tet Offensive was a total defeat of the Communist forces on all fronts. It resulted in the death of some 45,000 NVA troops and the complete, if not total destruction of the Viet Cong elements in South Vietnam. The Organization of the Viet Cong Units in the South never recovered. The Tet Offensive succeeded on only one front and that was the media/ political arena. This was another example in the Vietnam War of inaccuracy becoming the perceived truth. However, inaccurately reported, the News Media made the Tet Offensive famous.”[104]

The sad truth is that the media, perhaps to curry favor among the liberal anti-war delegation in Washington, did not record history, they invented it. It is small comfort to those left living, who made history, to finally be able to set the historical record straight. There is no accurate and complete record of all those who served in Project Delta. Likewise there is no complete and accurate record of each and every mission run in the Project. Every mission was an adventure and it would be impossible to chronicle them all. Not every man who served in Project Delta is given his due in this record, again, an impossibility. For that I offer a humble apology. The story of Project Delta is about the unit, not the individual. That’s the way it was then and that’s the way it is today.

The military, like most government bureaucracies, thrives on abbreviations and acronyms. Those of us who spent even a small amount of time using them have little trouble remembering them or figuring them out. For the rest of us I have included a list of acronyms and abbreviations used in this text as Appendix II.

CHAPTER I: ORIGIN OF A MISSION

The art and science of long range reconnaissance within conventional units is nothing new to the history of warfare. It made sense, even in ancient times, for each side to evaluate the opposition before committing to battle. Vietnam presented unique challenges both military and political. Early on, it became obvious that the North Vietnamese were supplying cadre, weapons and supplies to the VC paramilitary in the South. Much of this came across the borders to the west, from the sovereign and neutral nations of Laos and Cambodia. The U.S. and South Vietnamese made several attempts at collecting intelligence by using indigenous people crossing the borders. The ultimate result was the inception of Project Delta with the plan of running all indigenous teams across international borders for the purpose of gaining precious information. The cross border operations were short lived and Project Delta emerged as the in-country intelligence gathering arm of the joint US/RVSN effort. Conceived in secrecy because of cross border operations, Project Delta remained a classified special operations unit for the remainder of its life, mainly because the unit was utilized primarily to locate and identify enemy units far from friendly operations. Once identified, the coalition would commit a conventional force to conduct operations against the newly located enemy. The plan was to keep Project Delta a secret so that the enemy wouldn’t know how they had been discovered. Once the conventional units assumed the responsibility for operations against the enemy they would rely on their own reconnaissance elements to supply real time information. Another little known aspect of Project Delta’s operations was that they were often conducted in conjunction with the cross border operations of its sister units that comprised SOG. Both Project Delta and the SOG units came under the auspices of the 5th Special Forces Group’s Special Operations Augmentation, although the SOG units were kept separate and distinct from any reporting or organizational responsibility to 5th Group. The intelligence term for this is compartmentalization. They reported directly to MACV in Saigon. Both units were a single layer away from Capitol Hill in their reporting structure, a move specifically designed to prevent either group from being able to compromise the other. The net effect was that Project Delta and SOG collected intelligence on both sides of the border areas at the same time resulting in collection of intelligence over a significantly larger contiguous Area of Operations.

As the war effort evolved in response to the ever changing tactical and political situations, the tactics and strategies employed by Project Delta reconnaissance teams also evolved. Trial and error was a big part of the learning curve. Team sizes and constituency varied over time and reflected the changes in the nature of missions, the availability of troops and advisors, improved communications and technology, availability of troop transports and even the whim of the current commander. By the time LTC Jack Warren relinquished his command in late 1966, Project Delta had assumed the basic form that would identify operations for the duration of its existence. This is not to assume that all things were set in stone and everyone knew everything about everything. Hardly the case, as the organization would continue to evolve and mature. The reconnaissance element had evolved to a point where certain procedures were developed and adhered to and standards had been set for operations.

Recon men were of necessity a clannish bunch. Because each of their lives depended upon the reliability of the man next to him, it was a difficult fraternity to join. Each man who came to Project Delta Recon was a multiple volunteer. He had volunteered for service, volunteered for airborne status, volunteered for Special Forces training, volunteered for Vietnam and volunteered for Project Delta. If selected for a recon assignment he would continue to volunteer for every mission. If he decided it wasn’t for him, there was no shame in leaving. A reluctant recon man or a man without the requisite combination of balls and common sense would be a dangerous burden. Once interviewed by the SGM, the CO and the Recon NCOIC, a candidate was given a thumbs up or assigned elsewhere in the Project or 5th Group. After passing the initial interview a candidate who was well known to other members of the Project might be assigned to a recon team leader for orientation and preparation for a mission. An untested or unknown candidate would be put through a training course initially developed by Project Delta to train conventional reconnaissance troops. The course evolved into the MACV RECONDO school. Once through the training that included intense physical training, classroom instruction, live fire drills, and a live fire graduation mission conducted in hostile territory, the candidate would be assigned to a recon team leader for mentoring and preparation for his first Delta mission. It is important to bear in mind that all of these volunteers had completed intense qualifications at the Special Forces Training Group, Ranger School other Army specialty schools, or completed previous tours in Vietnam. They would now be exposed to a different set of conditions and operational guidelines and put into situations where they would have to improvise solutions to seemingly impossible situations. Once the candidate had passed all of the screening and prerequisite qualifications the seasoned recon team leaders would share the responsibility of teaching the new guys the way that business was conducted. One man would take responsibility for instructing the new guy on how to handle field communications with the available radios. He would teach the intricacies of the constantly changing communications code book: how to tether it to the field uniform, how to compose a SITREP and transmit it in a low whisper, how to construct an emergency antenna or change batteries, how to position the radio so that frequencies could be changed by reaching over the shoulder without seeing the dials, and what to do if the codes became compromised by being lost or captured. Once the training was complete the Team Leader would let the new guy digest it for a while and then show up unannounced for a practical demonstration which amounted to a closed book exam. If necessary, a critique would follow, corrections would be noted, and a follow up conducted. Nobody would be allowed in the field that didn’t have a grasp of the basics. Other Team Leaders would advise the new guy about call signs, introduce him to the FAC pilots, talk about Operational Security, run through mock operation orders and brief backs, explain the maps that were carried and what could be written on them and what could not, how to use the cameras on a mission, when and how to get a “fix” from the FAC, schedules for communications, and what uniforms and equipment to carry. The detailed information exchange continued until the man was deemed ready to join a team and go along on his first mission.

A new man was sometimes taken out with others on a shakedown mission by a senior recon man or by the recon NCOIC himself. More often he would be assigned as the third American on a team and replace one of the Vietnamese team members. Each team leader had his own variation of Standard Operating Procedures for his team and mission preparation included rehearsing order of march, immediate action drills, overnight positions and precautions, prisoner snatches, insertion and exfiltration procedures, emergency escape and evasion procedures, and methods for signaling and communicating among the team members in silence. The existence of Project Delta and its mission were classified and the desire was to maintain its anonymity. To the extent possible, the missions were conducted as sterile. Uniforms bore no markings or insignia that showed their origin or the origins of the wearer to be the U.S. In the earlier days, the Delta men wore the uniforms that the Vietnamese wore, a mottled brown and green camouflage pattern that didn’t really do a good job. Tiger stripe fatigues in different fabric weights became the norm, but varied greatly in quality and durability depending on their source. Many men complained that the tiger stripes ran in the wrong direction and were great for concealment in a standing position but not laying down, or vice versa. Some said they were good for bamboo foliage or elephant grass, but not for deciduous environments. The newer all-purpose camouflaged jungle fatigues worn by other U.S. troops became popular but suffered the same inadequacies as regular jungle fatigues; they were too open at the top and between the shirt and pants, too loose fitting and outfitted with buttons instead of zippers which allowed land leeches access to sensitive body parts. Many recon men took a set of camouflaged jungle fatigues to the Indian tailor at the end of the Delta compound and were fitted with a tailored jump suit that was loose enough to allow freedom of movement, but was closed at the waist and had a continuous zipper up the front. There were pluses and minuses to all the available options, but it became a personal choice. Other variations included spray painting black patterns on olive drab fatigues. The tailor would also fashion camouflaged boonie hats for the men in whatever pattern they chose.

Each team leader likewise had preferences for the equipment and munitions carried by the team as a whole. It was important to balance ease of movement, weight and firepower. Some team leaders preferred to carry one or more claymore mines, some preferred not to have a mini gun M-79 along, some chose to carry anti personnel mines or tear gas powder, some missions required the team to carry special equipment to test, or equipment for wire taps or night surveillance. Many factors were considered but generally the team leader carried the PRC 25 radio, the second man carried the extra batteries; the team leader specified the specific weapons and special equipment to be carried and divided the load; and the individual team members took responsibility for the rest. Every team member knew the location of each piece of equipment in each man’s load in case it became necessary to strip it from his body.

Individual team members chose their personal weapon from a variety of weapons available to them. The Delta arsenal included Sten guns, AK 47s, shotguns, suppressed .22 handguns, .45s, .38s, 9 mm hand guns and machine guns, and the most often carried M-16 and its carbine variant CAR-15. The recon men soon experimented with the standard issue M-79 grenade launcher and discovered that the stocks could be cut down to make the grenade launcher into a mini pistol. The barrel length was ultimately determined to be a minimum length of around 11 inches in order for the projectile to arm itself. The holsters were fashioned from leather or canvas and equipped to hang from a fabricated shoulder rig. The mini pistols were almost always tethered to the carrier in case it had to be dropped quickly in favor of the CAR-15.

Other weaponry included personal hand guns, a heavy combat knife of some sort, and an assortment of high explosives fragmentation grenades in the conventional oval shape, a baseball shape and a newer small round grenade called a cherry grenade. Some grenades were attached to the front of the web gear with green duct tape for easy access, while a supply was placed in an ammo pouch or a canteen pouch on the web gear. The web gear was an over-both-shoulders suspended harness attached to a web belt around the waist. The heavy canvas unit distributed the weight of ammo pouches and canteens across the carriers’ shoulders. Each man chose the arrangement of pouches on his belt. Most men carried at least twenty 20 round magazines that he had personally loaded. Most loaded their magazines to a maximum 18 rounds so as not to stress the magazine spring and cause weak feeding. Some men alternated tracer rounds at some frequency, some made the last three rounds in each magazine tracer rounds and some men carried a full magazine of tracer rounds in case they needed to mark a target or use it for the FAC to locate them. The amount of water a person carried was dictated by his own conditioning, metabolism and experience as well as the availability of water in the AO. On average about six quarts would be carried for a five day mission. Each man would also carry smoke grenades of different colors for marking target locations and their own location. Most men opted to carry a white phosphorous grenade (Willy Peter) attached to their web gear. It was effective for breaking contact, especially at night when it would blind the enemy as well as cause serious burn damage. WP was also useful for destroying caches of food, munitions and enemy shelters.

The front straps on the web gear were the standard place to attach a pressure bandage, a pill kit, and morphine syrettes. A pill kit was issued by the Delta medics and contained some combination of the following: An anti-malarial pill, dapsone, a small white pill taken daily; a weekly anti-malarial pill, Chloroquine/Primaquine, which was a large orange colored pill; several Lomotil tablets (a combination of atropine and diphenoxlate), which was used to treat diarrhea and also used to prevent bowel movements (no shit pills) as no one really wanted to be caught with their pants down in the VC/NVA back yard; polymagma, a pink pill for upset stomach and diarrhea; salt tablets; codeine tablets to control a cough; several aspirin for minor pain and/or fever; Dextroamphetamine sulfate, 15 mg capsules, which helped depress the appetite and could keep people awake and alert; Benadryl capsules for allergic reactions to insect bites or poisonous vegetation; iodine tablets to treat water; two ¼ grain morphine Syrettes for serious pain due to wounds or injury; some team members also carried a can of Albumin to be used for blood loss. Ranger advisors all carried a can of Albumin taped to their web gear. Inside of the olive drab colored metal can was a glass bottle of Serum Albumin, a rubber tube, and a large needle used to intravenously dispense the Serum Albumin.

It was the custom of some to place an individual battle dressing in the bottom of their ammo pouches (canteen covers were also used as ammo pouches as they held more magazines) for two reasons; to raise the magazines for easier access, and to have more dressings in case of need.

Each man also carried a combination of signal devices to indicate his location to aircraft. It was critical that the FAC and gunships knew the exact location of a team or team members before expending ordnance. Devices included fluorescent panels, a strobe light, signal mirror and pen flare. The panels, like the smoke grenades, came in multiple colors, the panels being pink on one side and orange on the other. The VC and NVA were quick to understand many of the extraction and emergency procedures employed by the teams and would attempt to mimic them in hopes of drawing helicopters in close enough to shoot down. The team would flash a panel or pop a smoke grenade and ask the FAC or gunship to identify the marker. If the answer was a good one then the extraction or gun run would continue. In the shirt pockets designated by the team SOP went the communications code book, the map of the AO and any notes taken by a team member. They would be attached by a lanyard and be easily located and accessible if they needed to be removed from his body.

An emergency radio was also carried. Called an URC 10, it was small in size and transmitted on a single frequency that was monitored by multiple services.

Strobe Light & Case

After equipment was designated for each team member, it was prepared for the mission. It was important to silence everything to keep it from rattling during a mission. All moving parts on weapons, such as sling swivels, dust covers, lanyards and ammunition were immobilized with green duct tape or other means. The dust covers on the CAR 15s would have a cigarette filter taped to them so that they were silenced if they fell open during movement. Magazines were loaded tightly together; hard items were wrapped in soft items; the muzzles of weapons were taped to prevent being obstructed by debris; weapons were cleaned, assembled and test fired.

The remainder of a recon man’s load consisted of his rations and personal comfort items. Army issue ponchos were useful items back at the FOB when it rained, but were far too cumbersome and noisy for use in an environment where stealth was the rule. Many recon men took their ponchos to the Indian tailor and had a rain jacket fashioned complete with a couple of side pockets. Most also had the inside lined with the quilted camouflage nylon poncho liners that provided some additional warmth. Some recon men carried an olive drab nylon jungle sweater to wear at night. Even in the warmest weather the temperature could drop forty or fifty degrees at night. A man who had humped sixty to a hundred pounds of weapons, web gear and rucksack through the jungle all day would be sweat soaked from dawn until dusk. The wet uniform combined with the dropping temperatures could cause severe discomfort and hypothermia, even though the temperatures might not drop below seventy degrees. Most men carried a pair of dry socks, although some wore no socks at all. Many found that underwear would become soaked and would ball up or chafe during the mission and chose not to wear any. Extra clothing represented extra weight and was kept to an absolute minimum. On a mission it was standard procedure to keep the same clothing on for the duration and to remove rucksacks and web gear as a last resort. Most men slept in a semi-recumbent position leaning back against their rucksacks so that they never took them off. Tom Carpenter recalls that in one after-mission discussion in the FOB beer tent, one of the recon men suggested that a man could remove his web gear and wear it backwards to reduce the discomfort from leaning on the ammo pouches and canteens attached all the way around it. If the team was compromised during the night the man could still become instantly mobile with easy access to his necessities.

Recon missions were normally planned to last for five days. Many, if not most, lasted less than that, but some also lasted for seven to ten days depending on a variety of factors. A recon man’s menu for an operation was not so much planned as it was strategized. The strategy actually began days and weeks before a mission. A man’s diet influences the scent of his breath, the odor of his body, the frequency and consistency of his bodily excretions and the odor of his urine and feces. Many a recon mission has been salvaged because an American advisor detected the distinctive odor of an enemy soldier, his waste, his cigarette smoke or his food. Likewise, I am sure a good number of Americans compromised themselves in the same fashion. Most recon men chose to abandon mess hall cooking while at the FOB. While many showed up for a breakfast of eggs and coffee, most other meals were prepared in the recon tents over a small hot fire of C-4 explosive. Some men would indulge in the dehydrated LRRP rations or heat up some C Rations, but many relied on cooking indigenous noodles or rice with vegetables and some form of local meat.

Dried fish, indigenous sausage, squid from Korean rations, crawfish from the local market, and, yes, mystery meat from some small village might go into the soup pot. Recon men had a variety of soup pots and usually made a batch that was big enough for several people. It would be a soup like affair liberally seasoned with local hot peppers. Some men professed a taste for the infamous nuoc mam sauce derived from the fermented parts of fish. Most recognized that it was not as important to smell like the enemy as it was to not smell distinctively American and chose to forego the fish sauce. The change in diet would also help to make bowel movements less frequent and less voluminous, a sad testament to American indulgence. It also helped to substantially change the odor and appearance of any bowel movement that might be discovered in the jungle. The object was not to be put in that particular compromising position if at all possible, thus the liberal dispensing of “no shit” pills before a mission. Some men preferred to take dried LRRP rations into the hole with them. These could be quickly hydrated and had a very high caloric value. Some men carried the cans of fruit from C Rations into the hole because they were a pleasant variation from the norm and because they contained extra liquid. Again, weight was an issue as was the issue of empty containers. It was a solid rule that no empty containers, cans, bags or otherwise, were to be left behind, buried or not. When they were carried out they had the potential to be noisy and retain odors. Most found the answer to be simple. They would mix a simple ration of prepared indigenous rice, dried fish, and raisins in a single quart size plastic bag, add a spoon and slip it into the cargo pocket on the pant leg of their uniform. It was easily accessible, filling, quiet and stayed as fresh as it would ever be for five days. It made it possible to have several small meals every day and still maintain a reasonable energy level. If for some reason a man became separated from his pack he still had some food to sustain him on the run for his life.

Recon missions didn’t just come about randomly. Each recon mission was derived from a combination of factors. The overall tactical situation was monitored closely by the Military Assistance Command Vietnam – MACV- in Saigon. Virtually all conventional and unconventional units reported their activities routinely through this centralized command. These reports contained bits and pieces of information gained from clandestine cross border missions (SOG), from conventional unit operations, from agents among the populace, from aerial over flights, from electronic communications intercepts and a variety of other sources. Intelligence officers put as much of this information together quickly and continuously as they could. Having this much information inevitably led to the knowledge that there were huge gaps in intelligence about enemy units and certain denied or unexploited areas in the country. Invariably a conventional unit would be tasked with conducting an operation with little knowledge of what was in the area. Without having a physical presence in the area they had neither the resources nor the skill set required to conduct a meaningful assessment. This was precisely what Project Delta was tasked with doing. Delta would be attached through 5th Group as Operational Contingent (OPCON) to a conventional unit or to the Commander of the Corps area in question. The assignment would come in the form of a classified Operations Order (OPORD) addressed to the Project Delta commander. The OPORD would detail the support groups that would be attached or assigned to participate in the operation. It would detail air assets available to provide combat air support. It would specify the nature of the overall mission; for example, it might say to locate enemy base camps, identify the unit and its strength and destroy them with tactical air. The OPORD would contain the known intelligence gathered to date and might outline what the intelligence staff speculated was going on in the way of troop buildups and material transportation and storage. The OPORD would detail the boundaries of the Area of Operations (AO), describe the general terrain and weather patterns and request that features such as streams, roads, trails and potential LZs be mapped. Project Delta’s commanding officer would assemble his staff and depart for a meeting with the commanding officer of the unit the Project would be OPCON to. After a detailed briefing by the unit commander the location of the FOB was decided and the logistics required to move the Project and its assets arranged. Most operations were expected to begin within days in order to preserve Operational Security (OPSEC) as much as possible. Many times the Delta operators did not know their destination until they were headed for the airstrip. The Delta commander and his operations (S-2) and intelligence (S-3) officers would precede the main party by a few days and coordinate any Mission Support Site (MSS) that needed to be established away from the FOB. In concert with the Recon NCOIC they would conduct a pre-operation over flight to familiarize themselves with the AO.

The Forward Operations Base (FOB) was located at or near an air strip capable of landing aircraft from small O-2 Bird Dogs to C-130 cargo planes. It was preferable to have the supporting helicopter unit adjacent to the FOB for practical purposes. The FOB was established by a few advance party Delta men with the assistance of some Rangers for security and some local laborers to fill sand bags. Perimeters were established with stacked rolls of concertina wire and fortified defensive firing positions. Once the local laborers were gone claymore mines and noise makers would be placed with trip wires outside the wire. This was to prevent the locals from mapping the defenses. General Purpose (GP) medium tents were erected to house the Delta personnel, the communications equipment, medical facility, the Tactical Operations Center (TOC), mess facilities and, of course, the beer tent. Generators supplied electricity and water had to be found locally. The tents were fortified with sandbags and fighting trenches were dug for personnel to man when the FOB came under attack. A mortar pit was dug close to the recon quarters. Usually a horseshoe pit and volleyball net were set up. The men slept on army cots and might have a sleeping bag or a poncho liner for cover. Mosquito netting was sometimes available to be erected like a miniature tent around a cot. Each man kept his weapons and web gear at the ready beside his bed. At many FOBs the crews of the C-130s would allow Delta guys to pilfer the aluminum cargo pallets from the aircraft to be used to place the cots on. This kept the cots out of the mud and the gear drier. It also had the unfortunate consequence of providing shelter for venomous snakes and insects during the rainy season.

Once the Project leadership had flown their aerial reconnaissance of the entire AO they would formulate a plan with the unit to which it was OPCON. Since the areas that Delta was requested to work in were quite large, it was sound practice to divide them into zones so that each zone would be worked in some order. This allowed the teams to be working in closer proximity to each other so that air support wouldn’t be compromised if more than one team was in trouble at the same time. It also allowed much easier radio communication for the FACs if teams weren’t separated by land features that restricted line of sight communication. Delta recon teams normally operated very close to the flight time limitations of the helicopters used for insertions and extractions. It was normal for a team to be inserted forty or fifty miles from the nearest support facility or the FOB. Time on station for helicopters might be only fifteen minutes or so. After reviewing the plan the operations and intelligence staff formulated briefings for each area to be assigned to a recon team, a Ranger company or the BDA platoon. The briefing was presented to the recon team leaders, both U.S. and his VN counterpart, the FAC and the helicopter flight crew in the form of a warning order. Armed with the limited information about suspected enemy activity in his reconnaissance zone, the team leader would arrange an aerial reconnaissance, usually with the FAC pilot. The aerial reconnaissance was conducted from an altitude high enough not to alert the enemy but low enough to give the team leader an opportunity to select suitable LZs, register significant land features, map a mission route and plan for emergency contingencies such as rally points and escape and evasion (E&E) routes. While the team leader flew his aerial mission the remainder of the team members were alerted to an imminent mission and began preparing their gear, cleaning and test firing their weapons and practicing immediate action drills.

The team leaders formulated a detailed plan that met the requirements for performing the assigned mission, whether it was for area reconnaissance, prisoner snatch, wire tap or other interdiction. The team leaders would conduct a mission brief-back with all members of the team, the helicopter pilots, the FAC and the Project leadership in attendance. The mission briefings were held in the Tactical Operations Center and attendance was strictly limited in the interest of security. The briefings were very detailed and were conducted in both English and Vietnamese. The team’s plan was scrutinized by everyone in attendance and refined as necessary to a finished product. The time from issuance of the warning order until insertion of a team varied from a few hours to forty eight hours, many times depending on the weather. When the 281st AHC was attached for mission support, the helicopter crew that inserted the team was also responsible for extracting them. The time between the final brief back and insertion was spent preparing equipment, checking communications, mentally rehearsing aspects of the mission, practicing maneuvers such as stream or trail crossing, prisoner snatches, quick reaction to enemy ambush from different directions, night positions and small things like being able to locate and extract any single item from a rucksack without taking it off. Beards were allowed to grow to reduce the shine from bare skin, dog tags, jewelry and personal items were stowed in a safe place. Camouflage paint was applied to all exposed skin and carried in a shirt pocket for easy re-application in the field. Departure time, either at first or last light, came quickly.

Teams that were departing for a mission were invariably accompanied to the helicopters by the Recon NCOIC, many other recon men and even the detachment commander. These men, often rowdy in their displays of bravado in rear areas, were typically quiet and all business when seeing a team off, offering firm handshakes, words of caution and encouragement and a steady gaze into their eyes that said simply, “You are my brother. Come back.”

CHAPTER II: THE U.S. SITUATION

The Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 established the 17th parallel as the dividing line between North and South Vietnam. The accords also called for the North to cease all aggression and allow the South to effectively “sort out” its destiny free and secure from outside aggression and threats. In 1960 the Viet Cong (VC) stepped up its effort to destroy orderly government in South Vietnam through acts of terrorism. They routinely attacked the fragile infrastructure of local governments by killing and beating village leaders, clergy and the educated. They accomplished much of their reign of terror by utilizing old weapons buried from the French Indochina War period and from makeshift weapons crudely fashioned in their own shops. After the United States became involved in 1961 at the request of the South Vietnamese government, there was a noticeable increase in the numbers and quality of weapons used by the VC.[3] The organization of the VC changed tremendously under the direction of military cadre infiltrated from the North. The transformation from loosely connected regional and district guerrilla bands to a coordinated paramilitary force boasting regimental sized headquarters was accomplished over a five year period under the nose of the Vietnamese government and largely through routes established in then neutral Laos.[4] Between 1961 and 1965 the estimated VC strength rose from 2 regimental headquarters to 5, from 25 battalions to 50 battalions, and from 20,000 regular hardcore VC to around 32,000. It is estimated that there were another 60,000 to 80,000 “part time” VC.[3] Increasing numbers of weapons appeared in 1964 that were of modern vintage from Communist China and other Communist Bloc countries. The ammunition for these weapons was 7.62 mm, not available in South Vietnam, thus making the VC even more dependent on the North. [3]

The first named campaign of the Vietnam War was “Advisory”, 15 March 1962 - 7 March 1965. During this period, direct U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict increased steadily as U.S. trained Vietnamese pilots moved Vietnamese helicopter units into and out of combat. Ultimately the United States hoped that a strong Vietnamese government would result in improved internal security and national defense. The number of U.S. advisors in the field rose from 746 in January 1962 to over 3,400 by June; the entire U.S. commitment by the end of the year was 11,000, which included 29 U.S. Army Special Forces detachments. These advisory and support elements operated under the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, a position established 8 February 1962. The object of American military assistance was to counter the threat to the government of the Republic of Vietnam posed by the insurgency of an estimated 30,000 regular communist Viet Cong and civilian sympathizers among the population.[65]

Many of the advisors in Vietnam were CIA operatives who, in conjunction with U.S. Special Forces advisors, trained the CIA sponsored paramilitary Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG). Concurrently, the U.S. Special Forces advisors were also engaged in training their Vietnamese counterparts.[4] These largely ethnic Vietnamese originally came under the auspices of the Presidential Liaison Office, which was renamed the Presidential Survey Office in early 1962. In March 1963, after evidence of misuse by President Ngo Dinh Diem, they came under control of the military Joint Staff and were known as Luc Luong Dac Biet (LLDB), Vietnamese Special Forces.[4] All of these were separate and distinct from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, or ARVN. To complicate matters, many of the groups were comprised of ethnic minorities; the various Montagnard tribes, Chinese Nungs, Hmong, Laotians and others, with a long enmity toward the ethnic Vietnamese that made up the ARVN and LLDB. From these early groups came several attempts at border and cross-border surveillance.[4] The relative success of these early efforts is difficult to assess. The units operated in various strengths; without specific targets or objectives; without the benefit of air support; without reliable communication; and without the presence of advisory personnel on the ground. Many of these efforts involved simply drawing indigenous personnel from within target areas, briefing them, and sending them home to gather information.[5]

Despite what appeared to be considerable successes in consolidating the population into organized local paramilitary defense forces to defend a series of strategic hamlets, the U.S. equipped Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) repeatedly demonstrated an unwillingness to close with the enemy. A corrupt government and bitterly contending Vietnamese political factions further hampered a cohesive prosecution of the war.[65]

While the international community cast a blind eye to the growing involvement of the North, the South Vietnamese government, under President Ngo Dinh Diem, became increasingly more concerned with domestic unrest than with issues of national security, border surveillance and prosecution of a war. Diem’s brother and chief political advisor, Ngo Dinh Nhu, had commandeered the LLDB under his personal control and used them as his personal security force. On August 21st, 1963, several Special Forces ranger companies, acting on Nhu’s orders, attacked pagodas across the country and arrested more than 1400 Buddhists; many were beaten. Initially, the blame was placed on the Vietnamese Army because some of the rangers had worn borrowed ARVN paratrooper uniforms. When the truth became known, the LLDB took the heat. Not all of the ranger units had been involved, but all LLDB units were stood down and confined to base for a month while investigations continued. Washington, incensed by these abuses, applied pressure to Diem. The Pentagon recommended withholding of funds for any ranger unit remaining close to Saigon. They also recommended that the LLDB be relocated to Nha Trang under new orders to act as direct counterparts to the increasing U.S. Special Forces command there. Those ranger companies still close to Saigon were disbanded. Others that were not located near Saigon were not disbanded, but ordered to be rehabilitated. The overthrow of the Diem government in November, 1963 launched a revolving-door series of military led coalition governments. [4]

Cross border forays, effectively stalled for several months, once again came under consideration. Between November, 1963 and May 1964, The U.S. position on cross border missions alternated between approvals and disapprovals. This vacillation resulted from the conflicting positions of diplomats and the military on the manner in which a war should be prosecuted. The Joint Chiefs of Staff finally authorized MACV to begin planning jointly with the South Vietnamese for cross border operations.[4]

What emerged was an ambitious MACV program called OPLAN 98-64. The plan called not only for aggressive covert ground patrolling in pursuit of evidence that the Communists were indeed using Laos as a primary means for infiltration, but it also called for interdiction tactics. In another interesting turn, MACV targeted the Tchepone area previously opposed by the United States Ambassador to Laos as a primary target area for intelligence gathering.[4] MACV, through the LLDB Liaison Office, asked for volunteers from the Vietnamese Special Forces to man ten eight-man teams to conduct a thirty day operation in Laos. The volunteers were selected from a unit known as Group 31, a Vietnamese unit that was commanded by Major Pham Duy Tat. Group 31 had been training in the Da Nang area in preparation to participate in border surveillance operations. Four ranger companies that had been relocated or ‘rehabilitated’ after the coup in November 1963 were assigned as a regional reaction force near Dong Ba Thin, and would act as a reaction force for the reconnaissance elements as part of their duties. These four companies had been resurrected as the 11th Airborne Ranger Battalion and were commanded by Major Tran Ninh Huy. In late March, 1964, Captain William Richardson, MACV’s Special Forces Liaison for the teams working in III Corps, was approached by Major Mike Healy, 5th Special Forces Group Operations Officer, about becoming involved in the new project. [5]

Captain Richardson, a former prisoner of war in Korea and a veteran of the White Star program in Laos, was selected for the Project because of his wide range of experience and his demonstrated determination in completing difficult tasks. After the initial contact, Captain Richardson met with 5th Group Commanding Officer, Colonel Leonard, and his Deputy, LT Col. Vining. Richardson was tasked with putting together a camp to house the unit; selecting advisory staff to train and accompany cross border reconnaissance and interdiction teams; accomplishing the necessary training to insert the teams by parachute drop wearing protective smoke jumper clothing; and to be ready to go operational in one month. Richardson pointed out the aggressive time frame and insisted that insertion by helicopter would be much better operationally and logistically. He was directed that the infiltrations would be by parachute. After the requisite discussions, Richardson accepted the challenge and became the first member and commander of the new unit. Captain Richardson recognized that his new command was to be the first of its kind in this conflict and was expected to be truly representative of a modern diverse clandestine force capable of conducting its missions from the land, air and sea. Just as the three lightning bolts on the U.S. Army Special Forces insignia represented these avenues of infiltration, so, reasoned Richardson, did the three points of a triangle. He named the new unit Project Delta. [5]

CHAPTER III: LEAPING LENA

Captain Richardson attacked this new responsibility with his trademark determination. He was given half an A-Team from Okinawa and supplanted those men with another half dozen men already in-country with the 5th Special Forces Group. Rapid construction began on a compound located at the end of the runway at Nha Trang. [5]

Along with the advisors, Captain Richardson received five Sikorsky H-34 helicopters and two C-47 aircraft assigned permanently to the Project. These aircraft were piloted by some of the finest pilots to be found anywhere. Trained by the U.S., these pilots were primarily Vietnamese, but also included at least one North Korean and one Chinese, who flew the C-47’s.

Two U.S. SF personnel were assigned to each Vietnamese team and conducted vigorous training for the mission that included parachute drops into dense triple canopy jungle with all combat equipment, followed by several days of live fire patrolling exercises.

These parachute insertions were accomplished utilizing old T- 7 type parachutes, which offered limited maneuverability. The team’s bulky and heavy radio equipment, which included a generator, was bundled and dropped in a separate parachute. It became immediately obvious that the team and its equipment were at the mercy of the wind and assembly on the ground became a significant challenge.[5],[6] The aerial photography of drop zones was also subject to misinterpretation, as well. What appeared to be triple canopy jungle might well be knee high scrub, and vice versa. Several injuries and at least one death occurred as a result of these mis-reads. Captain Richardson sent SFC Gerald DeLong to Saigon to work with the Research and Development group to develop a solution. With the aid of a group of Filipino technicians, a system was devised whereby a length of copper wire with a radio frequency transponder was rigged to the equipment parachute so that it would stretch the length of the risers when the chute deployed. Several inexpensive transistor radios were tuned to the transponder frequency and given to the team members. Once on the ground, they could use the radios as directional signal trackers and move to the equipment bundle to assemble for the mission. The transistor radios doubled as receivers for coded messages composed at headquarters in Saigon and transmitted from the local radio station in Saigon.[6] During this brief period of preparation, the priority that was assigned to the mission was exemplified by the speed with which requests for assistance and equipment were answered. On one occasion, a request for karabiners was sent to Saigon and within a few days a C130 arrived in Nha Trang from Japan carrying nothing except two boxes of the snap links.[5] The team members were also provided a money belt with a number of gold coins should they encounter a situation where they might have to barter their way out. Throughout the first few months of its existence, reports on Project Delta’s progress went directly to the White House every 24 hours.[5],[6]

Captain Richardson argued with Headquarters long and hard that helicopter insertion was more controllable and safer. His arguments drew the ire of those who considered the parachute infiltration as their own brain child and he was told to relent or be replaced. Having seen the Project this far, Captain Richardson relented and chose to see his investment through to the end. Having exhausted the allotted time for preparation, Captain Richardson declared the teams ready for the operation, now code named Leaping Lena. There was one more blow to be dealt before the operation commenced. Because the U.S. advisors had been training with the teams and had accompanied them on the various training missions, they assumed that they would be accompanying them on the cross border missions. Headquarters ordered that no Americans were to cross the border under any circumstances. The LLDB were understandably demoralized by this change of plans. They viewed the American presence on the ground as reassurance that the power to command air assets and fire support would be at their disposal. They felt they were being committed with no power. To their credit, all 40 volunteers stayed with the plan.[5],[6]

On the night of June 24, 1964, Teams 1 and 2 boarded C-47’s and prepared for their night insertions along Route 9 near Tchepone, Laos. Team 1 departed the aircraft at an altitude of approximately 400 feet and, clad in bulky smokejumper suits, descended into the trees. The team leader, SGT He, landed in a tree and lowered himself to the ground only to find that his second in command was missing and the remainder of the team was scattered across the jungle.[4] After assembling his team, SGT He attempted to make radio contact with Captain Richardson’s command group, which had set up in Khe Sanh. Communications were unsuccessful. Team 2 aborted due to poor navigation. The next night Teams 2, 3, and 4 boarded the C-47’s and were inserted south of Route 9. Again, radio communication was attempted. The only communication received was a single transmission from Team 2. Two nights later Team 5 was inserted just north of Moung Nong and immediately made contact with enemy forces. The team leader was killed at once and the rest of the team scattered and ran for the border. On that same day, Team 1 made contact with the enemy and also evaded toward the border.[4],[5],[6]

Captain Richardson continued efforts to establish communications with the teams with little success. One team did make contact through Saigon and requested a re-supply to include several bottles of wine. Saigon immediately contacted Captain Richardson and questioned him about the wine. Captain Richardson set a standard for future Command and Control policy when he told Saigon that it didn’t matter what the people on the ground asked for, or what they wanted it for-the important thing was to get it to them.[5] Richardson returned to Nha Trang to accompany the resupply mission. An Air Force LT Colonel asked to accompany him on the mission and Richardson welcomed him aboard. The C- 47 made several passes amidst a violent series of thunderstorms at low altitude in an attempt to find the team. The aircraft was thrown violently in the turbulence and was in real danger of breaking apart. The team was located and the drop was accomplished. Back in Nha Trang the Air Force officer informed Captain Richardson that they were all crazy and he certainly didn’t want any more air time with this group. Shortly thereafter communications with all of the teams failed and Captain Richardson launched an intense search effort along the border. He organized an effort to patrol the border with his staff by air and with the aid of local villagers to try and locate any survivors who might successfully escape to the border.[5],[6]

Several days later Captain Richardson recovered four members of Team 1, including SGT He. A couple of days after that, two members of Team 5 made it to the border. History remains unclear as to the number of men who made it out of Laos. Of forty infiltrators, between five and nine returned.[4],[5],[6] One member, the Team Leader of Team 5, was confirmed dead and the remaining thirty were presumed captured or missing. Much later Captain Richardson was able to piece together several scenarios from CIA and other intelligence reports. At least one team member crashed through the roof of a house on landing; another landed in dense scrub and was killed on impact. Several members attempted to buy their way to freedom with their gold coins and were promptly turned over to the enemy after paying the local villagers. One team decided to take offensive action and ambushed a convoy of seven vehicles. After successfully destroying the convoy, the team was pursued relentlessly and eventually captured. Each team’s mission was to collect information on enemy activity, to include movement of trucks, artillery, and heavy equipment. They were to look for any signs of troop movements of intact units such as companies or battalions.[5]

Although Leaping Lena was classified a failure, the intelligence developed or generated from the team members who returned was much more than MACV had prior to that time. It was determined the area was alive with enemy ground forces, and many were equipped with NVA uniforms. Every culvert on every road, and every bridge had a minimum of two enemy personnel guarding it. Additional roads, not detectable by air, were discovered and the movement of convoys noted.[4],[5],[6] The teams found these through visual observation on the ground. Units as large as battalion-size were observed, including one that was in the act of crossing into Vietnam west of Khe Sanh. This sighting was confirmed by a helicopter crew sent out to search for the teams. Team members also reported approximately 30 sampans being used simultaneously to cross company size units. This same information was repeated by several members of different teams. There was high density enemy activity throughout the area astride Highway 9 and west of the international boundary. One of the hard learned lessons of Leaping Lena was that it was unrealistic to expect any team to survive for a long period of time while engaged in these activities. The original mission was conceptualized at thirty days.[5],[6] Within nine days all the teams had been compromised, captured or killed. From that point forward, the planned duration of these missions was seven days, or less, with the optimum number being in the three to five day range.

When Captain Richardson returned to Nha Trang he found that SF Detachments B1/110, which had arrived from Okinawa on June 12th, 1964, was assigned to take over Project Delta. He relinquished command and returned to his regular assignment. During his tenure with Project Delta, Captain Richardson had established a firm foundation from which a functional clandestine force could be built. In his after action report, he recommended strongly that Delta would be better utilized if the teams were accompanied by American advisors, were inserted by helicopter, had better communications capabilities, and operations were conducted inside Vietnam away from interference from political influence and with availability of direct mission support.

The new team of advisors at Delta continued with training, but not without significant difficulty. The horrendous losses suffered during Leaping Lena, coupled with a lack of trust and familiarity with the new advisors was a cause for dissent and dissatisfaction among the LLDB. At one point in late July, the LLDB refused to participate in any more training and forced an armed standoff with U.S. SF personnel. The Project was stalled in its tracks.

CHAPTER IV: REVITALIZATION; CONTINUE MISSION

Within a month, Captain Richardson was called in for a meeting with Col. John Spears, the new Commanding Officer of the 5th Special Forces Group. Col. Spears briefed Richardson on the new urgency assigned to intelligence gathering, ostensibly because of the events in the Gulf of Tonkin in early August 1964. He called upon Richardson to re-invigorate Project Delta. He attempted to entice him to return by conceptualizing different missions. One such mission would be to stage a raid on the oil field in the Gulf of Tonkin and destroy it. No such mission ever came about, but it serves to demonstrate the level of competence that was expected of a revitalized Project Delta.[5] Negotiating from a position of advantage, Captain Richardson was not shy about setting conditions for his reassignment as the Commanding Officer of Project Delta. A directive from General Westmoreland was issued that focused Delta’s mission on in-country operations, just as Richardson had recommended, and authorized U.S. advisory personnel to accompany these missions. Captain Richardson would establish the methods for infiltration, meaning that the Project would abandon the foolish practice of night jumps into enemy controlled territory. Operations would focus on surveillance and interdiction on the Vietnamese side of the border, catching the enemy as he entered or returned from Laos. Research and development assets would be made available to assist advisors in improving equipment and techniques. Richardson would report directly to Saigon and would have access to the personnel of his choosing to staff the Project. U.S. personnel would accompany the teams on the ground. In short, the Project would receive all the attention and priority that this new urgency demanded. In mid-August, Richardson resumed command of Project Delta. He then called on his right hand man, Paul Payne, who was the first Sergeant Major of Project Delta, and selected his team. The high priority assigned to the Project enabled them to choose from personnel currently assigned to the Project, already in country, in the U.S. and in Okinawa. These handpicked volunteers were assembled in a matter of days. He got every single man he requested. He sat his new staff down and gave them a pointed ‘this is the way it is’ speech and offered the option of leaving to any man who didn’t want to operate in accordance with his plan. No one left. One of his first acts was to establish a mess hall and staff it with the widows and families of the men lost on Leaping Lena. They received a fair wage from the now seemingly unlimited funds available to Captain Richardson.[5],[6]

In the ensuing weeks, training resumed and lessons learned from the first training exercises and the disastrous first missions were addressed. Morale among the LLDB improved dramatically. Helicopter insertion techniques were developed in concert with the Vietnamese pilots. The insertion helicopter flew in a straight line formation with four other ships that were used as decoys and to mask the sound of the actual insertion. Variations on this theme became standard operating procedure in Delta and other units throughout the course of the conflict.[6] The 11th Airborne Ranger Battalion stationed at Dong Ba Thin as a regional reaction force was permanently assigned to Project Delta. Training continued in preparation for its initial missions as an immediate reaction force under the tutelage of an A Team headed by LT Dick Kamerling and Warrant Officer (WO) Jim Garvey. The ranger companies were organized along ethnic lines, one each being of Thai, Nung and Vietnamese heritage.[5] Half the Nung Ranger Company pulled security around the Project Delta camp at Dong Ba Thin. The other half moved to Nha Trang and assumed the security responsibility there. The rangers were designated the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion in November, 1964. The U.S. staffing level rose from about twelve to approximately thirty two. The type of autonomy that Captain Richardson enjoyed during this time was unheard of, especially for a man of his rank.[6] At a time when a command the size of Project Delta would ordinarily be staffed by a Major or Lieutenant Colonel reporting directly to 5th Group, Captain Richardson retained only one other officer, LT Paul O’Neal, on his staff and routinely met with General Officers and senior embassy personnel. He also had his own paymaster who would go to Headquarters in Saigon, fill his satchel with money and deliver it to whomever Captain Richardson designated.[5] Part of this money was in the form of payoffs involved in setting up an intelligence network. Captain Richardson was instrumental in setting up an intel net right out of the Special Forces Handbook. His only contact, by design, was an ARVN Major whose initial information checked out well. When he passed on an enemy plan for attacking Ton San Nhut air base, Richardson immediately went to Saigon and relayed it to a Brigadier General who shall remain unnamed. The General asked Richardson what or who the source was for this information, and, in accordance with accepted intelligence protocol, Captain Richardson refused to compromise his contact. He was chastised and chased from the office with various insults and threats leveled at his back. Sure enough, Ton San Nhut was attacked in precisely the manner and with the number of troops that had been divulged. Disappointed that his information had been waylaid, Richardson was compelled to contact the intelligence community and report it. He was instructed to go to a restaurant in Saigon and take a seat. He did and was joined by two operatives in civilian dress and from that point forward, he reported his intel net findings directly to them. [5]

Captain Richardson made the trip to Saigon once a month and gave his reports directly to headquarters. At the same time, MACV would give him six or seven areas they wanted intelligence gathered from and let him pick and choose his next area of operation. Captain Richardson would evaluate the requests and negotiate his conditions for committing his troops. At this point in the evolution of the Project, Forward Operating Bases were not set up. The operations usually required only a handful of teams and they were reliant on the host units for logistical support. The one exception was that Captain Richardson demanded that Project Delta’s own 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion would be the immediate reaction force should a team request one. He did not want to leave the fate of a small group of fighters in someone else’s hands. This early in the escalation of the war, air assets were at a premium. Captain Richardson went back channel and made arrangements with several aircraft unit commanders for priority air support, not only for transportation of the unit, but also for tactical air support. The primary source of air support was through the LLDB utilizing the assigned H 34’s and C 47’s. The second source was from the 5th Special Forces Group’s attached and assigned air commands.[5],[6]

In September of 1964, the Montagnards from the CIDG force at the Buon Sa Par Special Forces Camp revolted against the Vietnamese LLDB and took several hostage. Brigadier General William DePuy, MACV J-3, called on Project Delta to provide a show of force in resolving the situation. Code named Operation Snatch, volunteers from the Project landed 500 meters outside the camp while negotiators, led by DePuy, arranged for release of the hostages. After the successful conclusion of the situation, the task force returned to Nha Trang. The 91st Ranger Battalion at Dong Ba Thin remained on alert throughout the negotiations, but was not deployed. [6]

Toward the end of 1964, the training missions and lessons learned from early excursions resulted in a Project Delta that was prepared to conduct reconnaissance missions with small teams consisting of two U.S. advisors and either four or six LLDB, depending on the nature of the mission. Infiltration techniques had been developed with the assigned air assets and the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion was trained and ready to respond to any contingencies.

Over a period of a few days commencing December 9, 1964, an Area of Operations (AO), on the peninsula running east and south from the village of Ninh Hoa was infiltrated by three Project Delta recon teams. The area lies just north of Project Delta’s home base in Nha Trang. Operation 12-64 commenced with insertion of the three teams at first light. Two of the teams made contact with superior forces and began evasive action. The third team made contact, captured a prisoner, and was successfully exfiltrated.[9]

After making initial contact with an estimated enemy company at 1600 hours on the 9th, Team 1 called for an immediate extraction, but the rescue ship was driven off by heavy fire. Two men became separated from the team, but the split team managed to outmaneuver the enemy and reunite on an alternate Landing Zone (LZ) for extraction. The LZ was situated on a steep hillside and the Vietnamese pilot had to rest one of the H 34’s wheels on the hillside and avoid smashing the rotors into the mountain as the crew simultaneously engaged heavy sniper fire and pulled the team aboard. Despite being shot out of their AO, the team returned with valuable information that helped to identify the enemy unit and its strength. [9]

On December 11th, Team # 2, meanwhile, had broken contact and descended to the valley floor to an exfiltration point. As the helicopter prepared to land it was driven off by pursuing forces. The team took cover behind a dike in a rice paddy where three of its members, two U.S. advisors and one wounded LLDB, were pinned under a withering enemy fire. The other three team members witnessed the barrage and, assuming that the three in the paddy had been killed, fled from the area. While darkness and torrential rain on the 11th covered all noise of movement the three separated team members crawled from the rice paddy. They crept until almost daylight, when they found that they had penetrated the outer perimeter of the enemy base camp. Throughout the day the three hid in thick cover. At one point, a VC search party stopped for a break for nearly 30 minutes within arm’s reach of the three. That night the three crawled back out of the enemy camp and made radio contact. They were directed to the only available LZ located 50 meters on the opposite side of a village held by two reinforced VC platoons. At 0500 hours on December 14th, the three stood. Supporting the wounded LLDB between them, the two U.S. advisors strode through the half light toward the village. They waved casually at a VC guard smoking a cigarette. The guard returned the wave and the three exited the far side of the village undetected. They hid in the undergrowth until the weather lifted enough for a helicopter to effect an extraction. The rescue ship drew fire, but the extraction was successful. The teams called in airstrikes on the identified enemy locations resulting in 16 VC killed, 17 wounded and 4 captured. A company of Rangers was committed and the total enemy casualties rose by another 39 killed, 2 squads captured and 22 tons of rice captured. The operation was an outstanding success. The Americans and Vietnamese coordinated beautifully. Project Delta penetrated right into enemy camps under the VC’s noses and then wreaked havoc, using the VC’s own tactics.

Vietnamese troops and aircraft performed well, indicative of a well coordinated effort by a well trained force. This operation served to give a psychological boost to the ARVN by revealing the enemy’s vulnerability.[9]

This otherwise successful operation was marred only by the unwieldy process required to commit the ARVN Rangers. The rangers were originally under the direct command of the LLDB. This, it was reasoned, was because the original mission of the rangers was as a regional reaction force to support other LLDB units. A subsequent decision was made that once an operation was approved and teams were committed, the use of the Rangers became the prerogative of the VN/US field commanders.[5]

Early in January, 1965, 5th SFG(A) PCS detachment B5/220, under Major Art Strange, took over Project DELTA. PCS Detachment A-511, under Captain Thomas Pusser, and TDY Detachment A-132, Okinawa, under Captain Paul Smith, shared the Ranger and Recon responsibilities.

Project Delta conducted several reconnaissance missions near the resort city of Vung Tau, located on the coast approximately 130 kilometers from Saigon. Two teams were inserted north of the city on January 15th, where two VC battalions were suspected to be located. On January17th, Team #1 found a battalion sized unit base camp strategically placed within a village. The village street had been fortified on both sides such that emplaced gun positions were offset, thus enabling cross fire on any attackers. Team #2, in a separate action, made contact with an enemy force of unknown size resulting in two VC KIA. Both teams avoided further contact and were exfiltrated on January 19th. On January 21st, a team advised by SFC Eddie Adams assaulted a house guarded by a VC platoon. The house had been the center of activity for a VC battalion that had moved toward the coast. The Delta force was met with automatic weapons fire but managed to rout the enemy from their positions, capturing a prisoner and numerous weapons and documents. Meanwhile, a second Delta team encountered an element of the moving battalion and discovered they had penetrated the enemy’s perimeter. They sat tight, observing the enemy activity and managed to kill a perimeter guard and successfully evade pursuit to an extraction point. The reconnaissance elements of Project Delta had evolved into a meaningful force with field tested protocols that would continue to be built upon for the duration of the Project.[10]

CHAPTER V: VUNG RO BAY; CHANGING THE TIDES OF WAR

Throughout its involvement, the United States had repeatedly stated its willingness to scale down its involvement in Vietnam if aggression from the North was checked and peace restored. In spite of mounting evidence to the contrary, the world community didn’t acknowledge the increased involvement of the North until February, 1965.[3] On February 16th, 1965, a U.S. Army officer flying his helicopter along the coast of central South Vietnam suddenly spotted a large, camouflaged vessel perpendicular to the shore. Cargo was being unloaded and stacked on the beach at Vung Ro, an isolated bay on the rocky coast. The pilot immediately radioed his sighting to the Senior Advisor to the South Vietnamese 2nd Coastal District, headquartered in Nha Trang, who in turn notified the coastal district commander, Lieutenant Commander Ho Van Ky Thoai. Thoai dispatched South Vietnamese A-1 Sky Raiders to the bay where they attacked, capsized and sank the ship in shallow water.[3]

Project Delta was alerted to the mission in Nha Trang and prepared to mobilize elements of the Airborne Ranger Battalion from Nha Trang and Dong Ba Thin. The briefing the American advisors received prior to being deployed from Nha Trang indicated that an unidentified ship had been sunk at Vung Ro Bay.[2] The mission, assigned to 2nd Company, was to move to an area near the ship and then move to the area immediately surrounding the ship and secure it. This involved being transported by helicopter to a point several kilometers southwest of the ship location. From there, the company had to board an LSM (Landing Ship Medium), move to a point somewhere near the innermost point of Vung Ro Cove, make a beach assault, and move south and west toward the ship itself. At approximately 1300 hours on the 19th of February, the company was lifted by helicopter to Dai- Lanh, approximately seven (7) kilometers from the objective. Later that afternoon, the company boarded LSM # 405 and moved to sea. The decision was made to postpone the beach landing until the following morning.

There were two acceptable sites for beach landings. The Americans preferred to hit the beach closest to the target area. The Vietnamese Flagship Commander and the Vietnamese Company commander felt that the fire would be too heavy on the beach closest to the objective and the far beach was chosen. An uneventful night was spent aboard the LSM. The LSM was accompanied by a Patrol Craft (PC) and a Patrol Craft Escort (PCE), the PCE being the flagship. At 0930 hours the next morning, the three ships began moving for the objective. All three ships were firing. Their armament consisted of 40mm cannons, 20mm guns, and one five inch gun on each of the escort craft. The ships were brought under a crossfire of small arms and automatic weapons from unidentified enemy locations.

As the ships continued toward their objective, the LSM received a considerable number of hits and one Vietnamese 20mm gunner aboard the LSM was shot in the head. He fell to the floor and SSG James Malia rushed to his position, fully exposing himself to the fire, and pulled the mortally-wounded gunner to a safe position.

Shortly afterward the ships withdrew. At the insistence of all of the American advisors, the attack was again launched at 1045 hours. The ships again encountered a cross-fire, but continued toward the beach. The company was in an assault position near the front of the LSM as the ship prepared to drop the ramp. During this assault the Vietnamese personnel aboard the naval vessels suffered three more wounded and one more KIA. The outer gates of the ship swung open, and the ramp slowly lowered to the beach, which, by this time, was only a few meters away. As the ramp reached a level position, the troops, including the officers, began moving rapidly backward until only one thin line of troops extended down each side of the ship. As the ramp touched the sand, the troops momentarily froze.

SSG Malia, who had been positioned several troops back from the lead man with his platoon leader, immediately seized the initiative, leaped to the front of the ramp, began firing and led the men onto the beach. This galvanized the entire company into action. They quickly established fire superiority over the Viet Cong, and a successful and vigorous beach assault was made with no further casualties suffered by the friendly forces. By 1100 hours, the beach had been secured. The troops then spread out in a near-horseshoe shape against the bases of Vung Ro and Hon Ra mountains. The Company Commander, contrary to orders issued to him from the Vietnamese Special Forces High Command, elected to assault the mountain to the right (Vung Ro Mountain). The U.S. advisors persuaded the commander to drive directly toward the objective, and the column moved out along the base on Hon Ba Mountain. Here, the column encountered mortar fire from a 60mm mortar. The first two rounds hit directly in the column wounding four Vietnamese Airborne Rangers. Several more rounds stalled the progress of the Rangers.

The Naval ships brought fire upon Vung Ro Mountain and the mortar was momentarily silenced. Far greater casualties were prevented by the presence of boulders which surrounded the troops in the lead platoon. The column again moved out and discovered a cache which included two VC houses, several boats, rafts, Chinese anti-aircraft sights for a 50 caliber machine gun, and seven belts of 50 caliber armor piercing tracer ammunition, totaling 350 rounds. While the cache was being destroyed, the lead elements encountered enemy resistance and killed four Viet Cong.

By this time, the Vietnamese had received intelligence stating that a light machine gun would be encountered, either imminently, or within the next several hundred meters. The movement of the column virtually halted as the word spread down the column. SSG Malia took the point and kept the unit moving. At 1630 hours, the troops moved onto the fringes of the second beach. Here, still several meters ahead of the next man, he noticed footprints leading into the dense undergrowth a few meters from the water’s edge. He investigated these, just as the lead element reached the edge of the beach. SSG Malia found an enormous cache of weapons, medicines and munitions, and rushed out to tell the Company Commander. However, the Viet Cong guarding the cache opened fire, and the Vietnamese immediately retreated to the safety of the rocks; SSG Malia and a platoon leader, 2nd LT Bay, then led a personal charge across an open beach, directly in the face of enemy fire. Men who had just retreated left their positions and joined the charge across the beach, laying down a heavy barrage of small arms fire. The Viet Cong immediately broke contact and the beach was secured.

Throughout the rest of the day the Rangers and their advisors moved ammunition, rifles, medicines, and explosives to the beach. The cache proved to be the largest found in the Vietnamese war to date. It totaled nearly 100 tons of explosives, recoilless-rifle ammunition, hand-grenades, .50 caliber ammunition similar to that found in the first cache; and very large quantities of high-quality critical medical items including Japanese blood plasma, Bulgarian penicillin and Streptomycin, and various North Vietnamese, Chinese and Russian medicines. Included were tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition made in Russia. More than 2000 Mauser 98’s were found, plus substantial quantities of Chinese “Burp” guns and Russian Light Machine Guns.[2]

Late on the afternoon of the assault, the U.S. Special Forces advisors were informed by the Ranger Company Commander that there had been a coup in Saigon and that all military operations were to cease. The advisors elected to stay with the cache that night and set up a small Command Post among some large boulders. The Rangers were unsettled by news of the coup and did not follow good procedure and ignored security concerns. The Delta advisors radioed their situation to Delta headquarters in Nha Trang and were advised to sit tight since all aircraft were grounded. The next day a landing craft arrived and the Delta Rangers loaded as many of the weapons as they could and put out to sea. The Vietnamese commander would not allow the advisors to burn or blow the remaining cache. Later that night the Ranger Company was ordered to assault the beach again; retake it and hold it until members of the International Control Commission and the press arrived. In the mean time, the rest of the Ranger battalion was deployed inland from the coast in a mop up operation. On the morning of the 21st, the 2nd Company assaulted the beach and retook it without resistance. This constituted the second amphibious combat assault on a beach in Vietnam that involved U.S. troops, weeks ahead of the unopposed landing of the Marines at China Beach in March. On a much more somber note, Major Strange informed the Special Forces advisors that their teammate, Sp5 Ron Gaffney, had been killed by small arms fire on the inland patrol. He was the first U.S. casualty in Project Delta.[2]

The name of Specialist Fifth Class Ronald Gaffney is inscribed on Panel 01E, Line 93 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

Major Strange accompanied the ICC (International Control Commission) representatives, along with the new President of South Vietnam, Dr. Phan Huy Quat, and an entourage of press, to Vung Ro Bay. On the next day, the Rangers loaded all the ammo, medical supplies, and weapons on board the landing craft and were returned to Nha Trang by helicopters.[2]

The discovery of this enormous arms shipment had a monumental effect on the course of the war. The ship itself was fairly new and had been manufactured in Communist China. Documents recovered on board included three North Vietnamese nautical charts, military health records of North Vietnamese soldiers, a Haiphong newspaper dated January 25, 1965, and North Vietnamese identification cards recovered from the bodies of crewman. Confronted with this overwhelming evidence, the United Nations investigated the incident and issued a ‘White Paper’ acknowledging and condemning the overt North Vietnamese involvement in the South. The United States State Department prepared a report at the end of February, 1965, that describes the Vung Ro Bay findings as incontrovertible evidence of the North’s continued aggression in the South and goes on to call it a threat to the freedom and security of South Vietnam.[3] The stage was set for an escalation in U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

CHAPTER VI: 1965; RAMPING UP

The second named campaign of the Vietnam War was “Defense”, 8 March 1965 - 24 December 1965. During this campaign the U.S. objective was to hold off the enemy while gaining time needed to build base camps and logistical facilities. The U.S. also attempted to consolidate its ground operations more efficiently. For this purpose, it organized the U.S. Army Vietnam (USARV). U.S. support in the I Corps tactical zone, composed of five northernmost provinces, was to be primarily a Marine Corps responsibility; the U.S. Army was to operate mainly in the II and III Corps tactical zones which comprised the Central highlands, adjacent coastal regions, and the area around Saigon; and ARVN troops were to retain primary responsibility for the Delta region of the IV Corps.

On 19 October 1965. three VC regiments totaling 6,000 men attacked a Civil Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) - U.S. Special Forces at Plei Me, near the entrance to the Ia Drang Valley, in what purported to be the start of a thrust to cut the country in half.

With the assistance of massive air strikes, elements of the newly arrived 1st Cavalry Division thwarted the enemy in a battle that lasted nearly a month and included several engagements. The Ia Drang Valley action was the costliest in terms of casualties to date. The successful defense of the region improved security in and around the Central Highlands and raised the morale of the soldiers involved.[65]

This shifting of gears for the U.S. involvement in Vietnam would require that security be established for the coming construction of facilities to support the growing U.S. presence. Reports of enemy strongholds, way stations and infiltration routes needed to be verified. Areas designated for construction of major support facilities, such as the airfields planned for Phan Rang and Phu Cat, needed to be secured for construction units. Under Major Strange, Project Delta conducted a series of operations in early 1965 that further defined the unit’s role as a versatile reconnaissance tool.

The following message was sent to the C Detachment Commanders sometime in 1965. It was intended to alert them to the availability of Project Delta for specific mission purposes.

SUBJECT: Capabilities and Employment of Project Delta Assets

TO: All “C” Detachment Commanders, VNSF and USASF

1. This letter outlines the concept of operation for expanded employment and further exploitation of the Delta assets in conjunction with the VNSF/USSF/CIDG Program.

2. The operations of Project Delta assets are potentially of great value to the counter-insurgency effort throughout RVN. The operations to date have these three effects upon the VC effort: deep penetration into hitherto “inviolate” VC zones, the inflicting of casualties upon the VC in his supposedly “safe” zones, and the psychological effect upon the VC of realizing that the RVN forces are capable of undertaking such operations, “turning the tables on the VC.”

3. Project Delta Mission.

a. Reconnaissance: To reconnoiter areas of suspected enemy activity and to determine the reaction force necessary to exploit any targets located. This mission does not include employment in reconnoitering a general area to fulfill an area study.

b. Reaction: To conduct quick-reaction operations against targets selected as a result of reconnaissance. Such operations would include raids, ambushes, “snatch” operations, and rescue operations in denied areas. This mission does not include employment as conventional infantry in area searches, search and destroy operations, and village sweeps.

4. Concept of Operations: Small reconnaissance teams are deployed against areas of suspected enemy activity. These teams are capable of selecting targets and calling in the necessary reaction force to destroy the target.

a. All assets are capable of infiltrating an area by land, by air landing, rope ladder, or rappelling, by water, and by parachute, to include “blind” jumps into trees.

b. The reconnaissance teams have a hunter/killer capability. They are normally committed for a period of five days, the amount of time the teams can operate without resupply or undue fatigue.

c. The teams have the following options for exploitation of targets:

(1) Exfiltration to the operations base to give the intelligence and assist in planning the attack.

(2) Remain in the area, receive the reaction force, and guide the force to the target or be evacuated after receiving the force.

(3) Exploit the target themselves.

(4) Call for artillery and air strikes.

(5) After directing the reaction force, move to another area to seek new targets.

d. The value of the reaction force depends upon two factors:

(1) The airlift capability to transport the necessary troops in one lift, thus avoiding piecemeal commitment and loss of surprise and shock action.

(2) The ability to formulate and execute a plan in time to exploit a target while it is still available.

5. Organization: Project Delta is organized into three elements for its operations.

a. Headquarters and TOC: responsible for planning and controlling the activities of the assets. It contains the necessary administrative section, a planning and operations section, a communications section, and an aviation section.

b. Reconnaissance element: this element consists of six teams, each made up of eight VNSF and two USSF advisors. The teams are responsible for the reconnaissance of selected targets, and are capable of engaging targets if deemed suitable.

c. Reaction force: the force consists of three Airborne Ranger companies, each containing approximately 115 VNSF and four USSF advisors. (CIDG forces may be available in the operational area to augment this force.)

6. Operational Control: Project Delta operates under the control of the C-Detachment of the particular CTZ within which it may be operating. In certain instances, it may be feasible to extend operational control to the B-Detachment responsible for the operational area.

7. Aircraft Capabilities and Requirements:

a. Organic aircraft assigned to Project Delta are as follows:

(1) Two C-47’s.

(2) Four CH-34’s.

(3) These aircraft are from the Vietnamese Air Force and have their own hand-picked crews and pilots.

b. With these assets, Project Delta is capable of air-landing fifty VN personnel, adequate for the support of the operations of the recon teams.

c. In order to employ at least one Ranger Company in a single lift, at least ten helicopters, HU-1B, or six helicopters, CH-34, are required if the organic assets are employed also. For an airborne operation involving one Ranger Company, three C-123’s would be required.

8. Security Requirements:

a. Physical Security: Project Delta maintains personnel sufficient to provide for the security of its operational base.

b. Planning Security: the operations of which Project Delta are capable are of a type whose method is highly subject to compromise. For this reason, Project Delta staff and USSF advisors prefer that operational planning and preparation be conducted on a level which permits the minimum essential number of personnel to become involved in this operation.

c. Operational Security: It has been shown in previous operations that the maximum length of time for which these operations can be conducted in a given operational area is two weeks. Beyond this time, the Viet Cong are capable of deducing our methods of operation and the limits of the operational area, thereby compromising the effort & exposing the assets to unacceptable risks.

9. Deviations from the foregoing concepts will not be approved by local commanders without prior approval of Vietnamese Special Forces High Command & Hq 5th Special Forces Group (Abn).

Early in 1965 the 5th Special Forces Group mobilized in its entirety from Fort Bragg to Nha Trang. MACV remained very much involved in determining Project Delta’s activities; however, 5th Group assumed a more direct oversight role. The days of autonomy enjoyed by Captain Richardson went quickly by the wayside. The Project still occupied the tent city at the end of the runway in Nha Trang. Living conditions remained primitive and a very wet monsoon season left the area a complete mud hole. Many of the U.S. advisors abandoned the camp to the LLDB and obtained a beachside villa for their use between operations. They set up comfortable quarters for themselves and, away from the eyes of authority, turned the villa into a money making proposition through sale of food and beverages.[7]

Training continued throughout the winter and spring, albeit at reduced levels for the lack of presence of the U.S. advisors and the wet weather. During March and April of 1965, Delta was tasked with reconnaissance in several areas of the country. The mode of operation became one where efficiency of motion was the objective. To accomplish this, a small number of teams were mobilized to a Forward Operations Base (FOB), along with a Company of Rangers, as a reaction force, and enough men to staff a Tactical Operations Center (TOC). The size of the teams was once again eight LLDB and two U.S. advisors, and it became accepted practice to operate smaller patrols from a patrol base during the missions. The team size enabled the team to become as much a ‘hunter/killer’ team as a recon team.[7]

An operation was conducted from March 13th through March 20th, 1965, in the area around Hue. The advance coordinating elements departed Nha Trang on the 13th, followed by four recon teams, four H 34 helicopters, and the 1st Airborne Ranger Company on the 14th. On the 15th, two aerial reconnaissance flights were made, the second of which departed at 1420 hours. Three recon teams, designated Teams 3, 4, and 6, were infiltrated beginning at 1638 hours the same day. All of the teams reported finding indications that the areas were used as way stations for infiltrating Viet Cong and discovered many fortifications, man traps and foxholes. On the 18th, Team 3 encountered a single man in thick brush who ran downhill from them upon discovery. The team sergeant and team medic broke ranks and went crashing downhill after him. A series of about 20 shots, later described by the U.S. advisors as outgoing rounds, were fired. The VN team leader followed down the hill and another series of shots was heard. The team leader and medic emerged with the weapon and pack belonging to the team sergeant and proceeded up the hill. The U.S. advisors asked about the team sergeant and received a curt “He dead,” in response. Shortly thereafter, all three teams were exfiltrated without incident. The team leader may have reacted to the team sergeant’s undisciplined charge down the hill with his own undisciplined punishment. The record is notably silent on this matter except for the fact that the After Action Report (AAR) filed with 5th Group headquarters strongly recommended that the VN team leader be relieved. The 1st Ranger Company was inserted on the 20th to search for the missing team sergeant’s body. They were accompanied by members of Team 3, but were not successful. They came under sporadic sniper fire and lost one Ranger, who died of his wounds. [11]

On March 25th, a few short days after the Hue operation, Teams 1, 2, and 5 were dispatched to Phan Rang to determine enemy activity in three operational areas. The 1st and 2nd Companies of Airborne Rangers also mobilized. All three recon teams infiltrated the night of March 29th. Team 1 made contact with an enemy squad on the 30th and continued the mission until they were relieved on an LZ by the 1st Ranger Company on April 1st. Team 2 observed some enemy activity and was relieved on the LZ by the 2nd Ranger Company. Team 5 observed what they believed to be ten VC engaged in uncovering a cache. The team captured the ten unarmed men but did not locate any cache. They called for an exfiltration and the prisoners were exfiltrated by H 34s while the team continued the mission. The team decided to take the captured sampan and float the river to the village of Ba Ngoi and get transportation back to Dong Ba Thin. While these missions were anything but ‘dry holes’, they yielded little useful information except that there was probably a company sized VC unit that lacked real organization that was operating in the area.[12]

Project Delta was alerted on April 12th for an operation to be conducted from Pleiku. Four recon teams were inserted on April 14th and all four teams confirmed that at least three battalions of the enemy had passed through the area in the preceding two weeks. The information gathered on these four missions pointed to very strong evidence that the enemy troops were regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA). The positions had been well placed and camouflaged on the military crests and had been virtually undamaged by heavy bombing. The few troops observed in the area were in platoon sized units and wore khaki uniforms. This proved to be the first hard intelligence indicating an organized offensive from the North was underway.[13]

In early June, 1965, Project Delta was alerted for a mission from Phu Cat in the coastal area north of Nha Trang and near Qui Nhon. There were reports that a Prisoner of War (POW) camp was located nearby. After a two day delay caused by unavailability of support assets from II Corps, four recon teams were committed to different areas in the Area of Operations (AO). One team was successful in locating the POW camp, but found it had been vacated very recently. Another team observed enemy troop movements and called for air support. This proved to be the first successful use of air bombardment directed from the ground by Project Delta personnel.[14] The Phu Cat operation was cut short and pre-empted by a higher priority mission in III Corps. The Project immediately packed up and moved to Bien Hoa.[15]The reconnaissance was conducted in two phases, each consisting of three teams. One team was tasked with surveilling a rubber plantation. After locating and approaching the plantation, the team observed two companies of enemy wearing blue uniforms. The team placed an experimental beacon transmitter, backed off, and requested an air strike. The Command and Control (C&C) element flew over the team in an H 34 and advised them to move further from the target. The team complied and established contact with the Forward Air Controller (FAC) who would direct the incoming aircraft. The team gave detailed instructions for the bombing runs and waited as the aircraft came in and dumped their ordnance. Immediately upon delivery of the bombs, the area around the team came alive with enemy fleeing the target in small groups. Remaining hidden overnight, the team proceeded to the plantation to assess the bomb damage. They discovered two things; first, the bombs had missed their targets by at least a hundred meters; and, second, there were now troops in battalion strength mustered in the area. The team called for another air strike. As soon as the bombing began, the enemy again scattered in small groups throughout the jungle. The team evaded the enemy troops with the noise from the bombing masking their noise and by using travel routes through dry stream beds and thick vegetation. They found that they were being followed and paralleled in their movements. They were extracted under heavy enemy small arms fire. Another team in a nearby AO heard the bombing at the plantation and over the course of two days heard bugles blowing followed by the sound of many men engaged in laughing and talking. The team split and sent a small unit, the LLDB team leader and two LLDB, to have a look. Shortly after the recon element departed, an enemy soldier stumbled into the team’s perimeter and was taken captive. The next morning, in order to prevent compromise, the team moved toward the agreed upon rally point, an exfiltration LZ. Upon arrival, two men, one U.S. advisor and one LLDB, were sent to circle the LZ and make sure it was secure, thus splitting the team yet again. After several hours, the two men had not returned, and neither had the three man recon element that had departed the day before. The senior U.S. advisor and the remaining four LLDB were extracted along with their VC prisoner. Two days later the wounded U.S. advisor, SGT Morley, and his LLDB teammate were picked up two kilometers from the LZ and medevaced. The other three team members were not recovered. [15]

It is important to note that several themes began to emerge from these five operations. First, all of the U.S. advisors in the two operations agreed that team field discipline was poor, team security was lax, and there appeared to be a lack of determination on the part of the LLDB to complete the mission. Second, communication with the FOB and with the aircraft was unreliable. Every team was plagued with periods of little or no radio contact and times when the relay aircraft noise overshadowed good communication. Ultimately this led to the observation that the assumption of failure of the equipment caused the teams to ignore routine communications. Third, the rapid mobilization of a minimal number of assets, originally hailed as a strong point, quickly became identified as the cause for poor pre-mission intelligence dissemination and insufficient team preparation. Fourth, to further complicate matters, it seemed that once MACV made the assignment for Delta assets they didn’t follow through with coordination with the Corps commanders and local units. As a result sufficient support from local air commands, artillery batteries, and other logistical centers was not forthcoming. Fifth, and of even greater concern, it was felt that the POW camp was compromised as a target by having too many personnel aware of it, leaving maps and documents uncovered for too long, and having the extra delay time between target identification and infiltration of the teams. Sixth, the practice of splitting teams into smaller units while on a mission invited disaster. Reuniting separated elements often called for unnecessary expenditure of air assets and made unreliable communication even less reliable. [14],[15]

These operations did, however, yield much useful information. In addition to identifying enemy units and strength, the teams were able to discern enemy tactics that were practiced and disciplined. They learned that when the battalion sized unit was attacked at the rubber plantation, the troops evacuated in an organized manner, under the cover of jungle canopy along dry stream beds, to prepared positions in the surrounding areas. This indicated a level of organization of local guerrilla forces not seen before. Once the enemy was aware that a team was in the area, they would engage in a disciplined tracking and observation operation. Several times the teams indicated that they could have been engaged by the enemy, but were not. It was apparent that the enemy’s priority was to capture, rather than kill, the entire team. Failing that, they would then attempt to kill the team at or near the extraction LZ and try to shoot down the aircraft. [14],[15]

Several recommendations came out of these learning experiences. First, better communication between the teams and air elements is a must. Second, a quieter fixed wing aircraft such as the U1B Otter should be used for air relay. Third, better use of the Rangers as a reaction force or as a blocking force could have inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy when they fled bombing runs. Fourth, poor LZ selection caused aircraft damage and endangered all personnel involved. Alternative methods needed to be developed for extraction of troops under fire.[14],[15]

The Detachment Sergeant Major, Charles T. McGuire, was instrumental in resolving part of this problem. Many of the techniques for successful insertions and extractions of personnel under varied terrain conditions and different tactical situations were born from the ingenuity of Project Delta NCOs and constantly improved over time. Vietnam introduced the helicopter as a primary method of transporting troops to and from the battlefield. Each of the different models of helicopters had their own capabilities and limitations. Fuel capacities limited time on station for Delta teams operating far beyond normal distances; power of individual models limited lifting capacities; helicopter size and maneuverability limited the ability to set down in smaller LZs. A combination of options needed to be developed to address all of the tactical situations that would be encountered. Ideally, a helicopter could swoop into an LZ, offload a team and lift off again in a matter of seconds while decoy ships leap frogged from formation to perform mock insertions and confuse the enemy. For LZs that were too tight for a landing or had obstacles on them, rope ladders were in use early on. These early ladders were light in weight and comprised of flexible nylon rope with narrow span climbing steps. They required the climber to negotiate the steps from an attitude diagonal to the ladder to avoid flexing the ladder too far from the weight of the climber and his combat load. Rappelling was a viable option for insertion and was practiced and utilized early on. An LZ that was accessed by rappelling was usually too restrictive to allow use of ladders for extraction. Because Delta recon teams often operated in thick triple jungle canopy, a method for extraction needed to be devised. A jungle penetrator that resembled a large anchor had been used for a period of time with limited success. The penetrator was attached to an electric hoist installed on the helicopter and often snagged or became entangled in the jungle foliage and operated only at the limited speed of the hoist.

Project Delta’s Sergeant Major Charles McGuire came up with an idea that was put into use and was an immediate success. Named in his honor, the McGuire rig was the method used to extract a team by rope when the extraction helicopter could not descend low enough to either sit down, low hover, or utilize its two 35’ ladders. A McGuire rig was simply a 15’ x 3” nylon strap (type A7A) fashioned into a loop large enough for a man to sit in tied to the outside (running) end of a 120 foot ½ inch nylon rope and stowed on the left side of the helicopter inside a Griswold container (a thick canvas weapons container). If the helicopter could descend down to at least 100 feet altitude above the team, McGuire rigs were dropped to the team and they were extracted by rope.[91]

The nylon rope was S folded and secured by rubber bands to two canvas strips that had been sewn into the inside of the Griswold container. The Griswold container performed three functions: to keep the rope from fouling, to protect the rope when walked on, and to protect the rope from the sharp outer edge of the helicopter floor. The inside (standing) end of the rope was clove hitched to an 6”x 6”x 5’ teak wood yoke in the center of the helicopter floor and secured by snap link to at least three anchor rings in the floor of the helicopter. The yoke had three large “O” rings bolted into its side and was snap linked by these “O” rings to floor anchor rings on the right side of the helicopter. A sandbag weighing about 20 to 30 pounds was tied to the bottom of the A7A strap loop and tucked up under the outside end of the Griswold container. Three McGuire rigs were usually installed in each helicopter.[91]

The heart and soul of the McGuire rig system were its ropes, and good rope maintenance was crucial to the dependability of McGuire rigs. The ½ inch nylon ropes were rated at 3600 pounds. After each use, ropes were carefully inspected, and if even one thread in a rope had been damaged, it was discarded. Each thread ran the entire length of the rope and if even one thread was damaged, the entire rope was weakened. In the life of these 120-foot ropes, there was a 20% stretch factor before they were no longer safe to use. Each time a rope was used, it was stretched a little bit longer until it had lost all of its elasticity at about 140 feet, and before this happened, it was replaced. But this created a problem with varying lengths of rope. If a new 120-foot rope was used to replace a damaged rope, it would be shorter than the other two McGuire rig ropes and its rider would ride possibly 10-feet higher than the other two riders. To correct this, the new rope was tied between the bumpers of two vehicles and the rope was stretched until its length matched the other two. Another significant improvement to the rigs occurred in 1967 when Norm Doney suggested a nylon wrist strap be sewn into the top of the A7A seat so that the rider would have another measure of protection from being knocked from the seat during extraction or from falling out from unconsciousness due to loss of blood. [91]

As the McGuire Rig evolved with improvements, so did the rope ladders. Norm Doney had observed rope ladders constructed of wire rope and aluminum steps being used by conventional units elsewhere in Vietnam. He sent Gary Nichols to “obtain” some for use in the Project. They proved to be much easier to climb, less prone to tangles and sturdier in construction than the older rope ladders. In order to have all of the options available to any team from a single aircraft, the bulkiness of the ladders needed to be taken into consideration when rigging the rescue ships. The 80 foot ladders were arranged so that 35 feet could be deployed from each door, allowing for faster deployment and extraction of team members.[30]

After the McGuire rigs had been installed in the floor of the helicopter, the 80-foot aluminum and steel cable ladder was installed on top of them, with 35 feet of the ladder rolled up and secured between the skid and the troop deck on each side of the helicopter. The center of the ladder was snap linked to anchor rings in the helicopter’s floor, and the ladder rolls were attached to floor anchor rings with standard aircraft seatbelts. To release the ladders, the seatbelt releases were “kicked” open, and of course, the order to release the ladders was “Kick the Ladders.” After the ladders had been lowered, they could be pulled back up to the helicopter by a rope that ran the entire length of the ladder.[91]

When the decision was made to employ the McGuire rigs, the rolled up ladder on the left side of the helicopter was pulled inside and stowed on the right side. To protect the ropes from the sharp outer edge of the helicopter floor, the Recovery NCO would unfold the Griswold containers and slide the outer end of the containers over this area, making sure that the thick canvas fabric of the container was between the ropes and the floor edge.[91]

As soon as the helicopter had descended to less than 100 feet above the Recon team, the Recovery NCO would pick up each sandbag and toss them out and over the skid. The weight of the sandbag pulled the McGuire rig and rope out of the Griswold container and down to the ground below at a high rate of speed. It was up to the Recon team to dodge the sandbags.[91]

On July 5th, 1965, Project Delta received a warning order for an operation to be conducted from Pleiku, in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. The operation was in support of a major initiative by the 173rd Airborne Brigade to clear Highway 19 of insurgents. The major offensive was scheduled to begin on July 16th. Project Delta was to insert two teams on July 11th and to insert three more teams and a company of Rangers beginning July 16th. The recon teams were operating at a team strength of two U.S. advisors and eight LLDB. The mission was to locate enemy units responsible for disruption of traffic on Highway 19. One aspect of each team’s mission was to locate and document Landing Zones (LZ) sufficient to accommodate landing a Ranger Company as a reaction force in the event of discovery of enemy units. These missions were planned for a duration of nine days. Teams 2 and 5 were inserted last light on July 11th.

Team 5 observed enemy movements of squad and platoon size on each of the first two days. On the 13th a smaller element consisting of one U.S. advisor and two LLDB separated from the team and searched for huts that had been spotted from the air. They became disoriented in the thick vegetation and were forced to remain overnight (RON) at some distance from the rest of the team. They had their location fixed by aircraft the next day and rejoined the team late on the 14th. On the 15th the team was instructed to abandon its recon mission and move speedily to a location some 10 kilometers away to secure an LZ for the Rangers. The team sped recklessly along trails and open areas to try and meet the time deadline set by headquarters. Five hours past their deadline they were still 1,500 meters short of their target. They contacted headquarters and were instructed to change direction and find an LZ for extraction. This was accomplished on the 16th.[16]

Team 2 infiltrated without incident and stopped for the night a short distance from their insertion point. On the 12th the team had two separate encounters with local forces. The first was with two women who fled shouting and the second was with three armed VC. No gunfire was exchanged and the team moved to an overnight location. On the 13th the team reported escaping an ambush and encountered increasing evidence of the presence of a large enemy force. The team prepared to send out a smaller three man recon group to investigate a series of newly thatched huts. As the team prepared to split they were attacked by an estimated company sized force. During the initial barrage, MSG Henry J. Gallant was wounded in the stomach and was last seen being assisted in a run for cover by SSG Fred Taylor. The team returned fire and fled in different directions. Team member SGT Bang was wounded in the chest and fled with another LLDB team member, LT Cuong, and the LLDB team leader. They hid in the jungle and were joined by another team member, Cpl. Hung, at about midnight. On the 14th the four were surrounded by an unknown number of enemy while trying to make radio contact. In the ensuing firefight the group became separated again. After 40 minutes the team leader again joined with SGT Bang, who had sustained a wound to the head, and Cpl. Hung. LT Cuong was killed in the exchange of fire. Meanwhile radio contact was established with two additional LLDB team members, each in different locations. The separated team members remained hidden through the remainder of the 14th and all of the 15th. On July 16th the group of three survivors and one additional individual team member were extracted. The final team member was located and picked up on July 17th. Major Strange requested additional forces from II Corps to assist in the search. Three CIDG Companies performed a search in the vicinity of the Escape and Evasion (E&E) route preplanned by the team. Additional forces were requested to search the area in which the team was operating but the Airborne Brigade would not allow commitment of those troops into its area of operation. Airborne searches were made on successive days through the 23rd to no avail. One half of Team 2, two U.S. advisors and three LLDB, was gone.[16]

The three remaining teams were infiltrated on the 16th and 17th and remained on the ground for periods ranging from five to ten days. Enemy contact was made but no casualties were sustained. The first planned deployment of any element of the Ranger Battalion as other than a reaction force took place on this operation. The 1st Airborne Ranger Company of the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion was deployed on a ten day mission to screen potential enemy travel routes. The Company was advised by Cpt. Tom Pusser and three enlisted U.S. personnel. The 1st Company successfully completed its mission and identified the main travel routes as directed. In his after action report Captain Pusser demonstrated his critical leadership skills in identifying strengths and weaknesses and making recommendations for corrections.[16]

Major Strange hailed the operation a success. Project Delta had worked a major initiative with a conventional unit and completed its assigned tasks. Of major concern to Strange was the fact that the experienced pilots had been transferred from Delta prior to this operation in order to support the growing MACV Studies and Observation Group (SOG). The less experienced pilots assigned in their place proved to be prone to navigational errors.[16]

On July 19th, 1965, a Board of Inquiry was held to determine the status of MSG Henry Gallant and SSG Fred Taylor. After reviewing the eyewitness accounts and other evidence the Board determined that both men should continue to be carried as Missing in Action (MIA). One year later a second Board convened and determined that, in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary, the status of both men would be changed to Killed in Action (KIA) Body Not Recovered (BNR).

Master Sergeant Henry Gallant’s name is inscribed on Panel 02E, Line

36 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial. Staff Sergeant Fred Taylor’s name is inscribed on Panel 02E, Line

37 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

Project Delta returned to Nha Trang to regroup. The LLDB retreated to their homes and to the Tent City in the Delta compound. Many of the U.S. advisors took comfort at the Jockey Club, their beachfront villa. This is where their new commander, Major Charlie Beckwith, found them on a quiet Monday morning. “Chargin’ Charlie” had been diverted from a non-Special Forces advisory billet to the 5th Group by its Commanding Officer, Col. Bill McKean. McKean assigned Beckwith to Project Delta with the admonishment that he hoped the Project would do better.[1] Major Beckwith demanded that the thirty members of the Project be assembled back at the Delta compound to stand in formation while he addressed them. Beckwith has been described in a number of ways but the consensus is that you either loved the guy or you hated him. A lot of that had to do with his aggressive nature in attacking situations, a style that some considered reckless and self serving. When he confronted the troops at the Jockey Club he received a response that suggested a conciliatory meeting be held at the Club accompanied by a few beers and some female companionship. Beckwith pulled no punches and had his men standing in formation at the Delta Compound in short order. There he read them the riot act and declared the Jockey Club off limits to all Delta personnel. He further told them that they were there to kill the enemy, not to make money, and anyone who could not embrace that philosophy had better leave. All but seven left. Beckwith’s Executive Officer (XO), Major Thompson, retrieved a few of the men he considered salvageable. Left extremely shorthanded Major Beck-with considered the squalid and muddy conditions that led the men to seek alternative housing and he approached Col. McKean with a proposition. He would be allowed to build a better compound and staff it with personnel he personally selected. In return he promised to rebuild an elite covert reconnaissance unit. McKean quickly agreed. “Chargin’ Charlie” sat down that night and drafted a call for volunteers that went to virtually all of the Special Forces camps in Vietnam. It read, “WANTED: Volunteers for Project Delta. Will guarantee you a medal, a body bag, or both.”[1] The response was tremendous.

Beckwith set criteria for screening that included requirements for at least six months in Vietnam, the individual must already have earned a Combat Infantryman’s Badge (CIB), he had to have attained the rank of at least Sergeant E-5, and he had to be a volunteer. The ranks quickly filled and a series of operations soon followed.[1] While the operational teams were being built the new Delta compound came under construction across the road from the Tent City. Construction was supervised by SFC Gerald Parmentier who had already built several A-Camps.[7]

On August 9th, 1965, Project Delta received a warning order for a limited recon operation to be run out of Pleiku. Three teams were inserted on August 11th and two more were inserted on August 13th. No significant intelligence came from this operation except that several company sized units were observed at different times that were dressed in khaki uniforms. Most observations pointed to recent movement of larger forces through the area.[17] One significant aspect of the operation was that Team 6 was lead by Major Beckwith and SFC Norbert Weber. Beckwith figured that the best way to learn his new business was to experience it firsthand. His trip into the “hole” proved to him the tremendous amount of vigilance and skill required of the men on the ground. He experienced the frustration of poor communication, less than ideal operating conditions, and the frustration of dealing with air assets that belonged to another unit. He gained a real appreciation for the self reliance necessary for survival. His mission was what the experienced men termed a “dry hole”, meaning no enemy contact was made, and it only lasted two nights. In his typical critical style, Beckwith recommended that more autonomy be granted the Project. He made a strong case for better advance planning that would include input from Delta before it was committed. He also demanded authority to control the Airborne Ranger assets without concurrence from any other command. Beckwith went on to point out that the recent loss of experienced Vietnamese pilots to other commands was leading to mistakes in execution of missions.[1],[17]

On October 9th,1965, Project Delta was deployed to Phu Cat located in the coastal area near Qui Nhon, north of Nha Trang. The operation was to be a small one consisting of five recon teams. The mission was severely hampered by heavy rain and low clouds. SSG Donald Hannah was slightly wounded by friendly helicopter fire on one mission. All the teams were collected before the scheduled end of the operation in order to support an emergent situation at the Plei Me CIDG camp in the central highlands.[18] The CIDG camp at Plei Me was located on National Route 6C approximately 25 miles southwest of Pleiku. It was manned by about 400 Montagnards and their families and advised by a Special Forces A-Team of 12 U.S. advisors and their LLDB counterparts. On the evening of October 19th, 1965, an estimated three regiments of hardcore VC surrounded the camp. They entrenched themselves in a manner that suggested that they intended to fight it out with whatever the Plei Me forces could throw at them. This represented a significant departure from the typical small force hit and run tactics experienced to date. The attack, in fact, was the spear head of a major effort by North Vietnam to divide the South in half using the conventional North Vietnamese Army (NVA).[1]

Coincidental with October 20th order to mobilize to Pleiku, Major Beckwith finally got his authorization to commit two Airborne Ranger Companies without concurrence from any other command. Although still under the command of the LLDB, they were now considered a wholly owned asset of the Project. Beckwith asked for volunteers from his command that were not committed on the Phu Cat operation. He gathered fifteen men and the two Airborne Ranger Companies and shuttled to Qui Nhon. At Qui Nhon there ensued a discussion of how best to utilize the Delta force. Various plans were considered including a parachute assault. It was finally decided that an airmobile operation using the helicopter assets of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) to an infiltration point approximately 7 kilometers from the besieged camp was the best option. Another discussion took place wherein the 1st Cavalry was forced to rearrange its priorities in order to support the operation. The LZ was prepped by airstrikes and the assault by the two Ranger companies and fifteen Delta volunteers took place on October 21st. The LLDB commander, Major Tat, agreed with Major Beckwith that the movement should be slow and cautious. Four hours into the march the lead element surprised and killed three enemy troops. Two were armed and the other carried 75mm recoilless rifle ammunition. The LLDB searched the enemy for documents and learned that they were not hardcore VC, but were NVA regulars. This information made the Rangers very nervous and Major Tat informed Beckwith that he was taking the two companies and turning back. Beckwith told him to do whatever he wanted, but his mission was to relieve the camp and he would do it with or without the Rangers. A few hours later, Tat and the Rangers returned saying that they would lose face if they didn’t continue. Early on the morning of the 22nd, Project Delta’s force made a 400 meter dash down the entrance road to the camp. One LLDB lieutenant was killed, two U.S. advisors were wounded, and one American civilian photographer was killed. Major Beckwith assumed command of Plei Me. Later that same day, both Ranger Companies conducted sweeping assaults outside the gates to try and clear the area of the heaviest concentrations of fire. Captain Thomas W. Pusser chose to accompany what he considered to be the weaker of the two companies, reasoning that he could be a positive leadership influence in case they should falter. This company attacked the northern slope from which sustained heavy enemy fire had rained down on the camp. When the company came under heavy machine gun fire the Rangers became confused and disoriented. In an attempt to assist the Company Commander in bringing order to the situation Captain Pusser directed the movement of several wounded to the rear and assumed a lead position in assaulting the machine gun. Captain Pusser was fatally wounded 25 meters in front of the gun position. The Rangers regrouped inside the compound.

During the next 48 hours the NVA bombarded the camp relentlessly with recoilless rifle and mortar attacks. The camp had become a hideous stockpile of killed and wounded, both friendly and enemy. The stench of death was overpowering and Beckwith sought to bring some semblance of order to the camp. He called for evacuation of the dead and wounded and could get no volunteers from the 1st Cavalry to fly into the camp. Finally, on the third day, LT Khoi, a Vietnamese pilot assigned to Delta, made two flights into Plei Me in his H-34 and left with full loads of dead and wounded. On one of his runs he was accompanied by a young medic, SSG Jimmie McBynum, from the C-Team, who had volunteered to come in and help. SSG McBynum was struck by enemy fire and killed before he could exit the helicopter. On October 23rd and 24th over 100 sorties were flown in support of the camp. Major Thompson, the departing Delta XO, directed continuous air strikes around the clock. High explosive ordnance, cluster bombs and napalm turned the landscape into a smoldering black moonscape. The NVA departed.

On October 25th, armored reinforcements arrived at the camp and set up defensive positions outside the perimeter. Major Beckwith assembled a team to recover the bodies of Captain Pusser and the other Rangers killed in the assault on the 22nd. To show his great respect and gratitude to Captain Pusser, the Ranger Commander, Major Tat, said no, he would recover the bodies. Captain Pusser had been one of them that day. War and the jungle elements are not kind to the remains of soldiers, making recovery of remains a gruesome task. Captain Pusser’s body was recovered by Major Tat, identified, and prepared for the long journey home.[1],[19]

On October 25th, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) arrived at Plei Me to assume the recovery operation. Major Beckwith directed them to an area of concentration of enemy bodies. It was estimated that nearly 1,000 enemy lay dead outside the camp. Some were found chained to their machine guns. Bulldozers were eventually brought in to cover everything over.[1]

Major Beckwith was critical of the lack of support he had received from the 1st Cavalry Division.[1] He could not have been overjoyed at being assigned another mission in support of that unit in Pleiku in early November. This time, in a departure from established protocol, Delta would operate from the 1st Cavalry’s Huey UH1D aircraft with any necessary reaction forces to be supplied by the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) instead of the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion, still combat weary from the Plei Me operation.[1],[20] Use of these smaller aircraft mandated insertion of smaller teams. In his After Action Report (AAR) for this operation, Major Beckwith specifically identifies the team composition as being three U.S. advisors and two Nungs.[20] This is also a significant departure from the ten man teams comprised of two U.S. advisors and eight ethnic Vietnamese LLDB. In another bold move, Delta committed five teams into the Area of Operations (AO) at one time. To date the Project had cautiously kept the maximum number of teams on the ground at one time to three, reflecting the limited rescue capabilities of the attached Vietnamese air element. The five teams were inserted on November 1st, 1965 and extracted on November 4th, 1965. Evidence of recent activity by a large force was discovered without incident. In his AAR Major Beckwith was critical of the pilots in that all five teams were inserted on the wrong LZs, but was encouraged that the UH1D helicopters handled the five man teams with no problems.[20] Beckwith also pointed out that the 1st Cavalry did not have an understanding of Delta’s capabilities and limitations and recommended that future operations be coordinated at a higher level than the conventional unit Brigade level.[20] Major Beckwith had come to the realization that he commanded a unit with unique capabilities that required the attention of the upper echelons of the military command in order to be properly deployed with continued success. The operations at Plei Me and Pleiku were a prelude to the battle for the Ia Drang Valley that commenced on November 14th.

1965 ended with consecutive operations conducted in III Corps in support if the U.S. Army’s 1st Infantry Division.[21],[22],[23] The first of these operations was conducted from Bien Hoa with helicopter support and an immediate reaction force provided by the 1st Division. While enemy presence was observed and documented, and there were contacts made with the enemy, Major Beckwith was frustrated by the use of the Project for such routine work. One source of his frustration was that the teams had identified targets for artillery and air strikes but could not get the necessary Forward Air Control (FAC) support to effect the attacks. He strongly recommended that all infantry units of Brigade strength or greater be required to develop their own long range patrol capability. He was again critical of the lack of training of pilots in conventional units for flying covert missions and demanded that Delta be assigned its own air assets. In an interesting turn, the final operation of 1965, again in support of the 1st Infantry Division, involved only two recon teams, neither of which ran a mission. The UH1D on the first insertion crashed on the LZ for unknown reasons, injuring four people, including one 1st Division infantryman assigned as part of the recon team. The second team’s helicopter ran low on fuel circling the crash site and aborted the mission. From this operation came a pledge that Project Delta would have its own U.S. air assets by the time the new year rolled around.[21],[22],[23]

CHAPTER VII: 1966; COUNTER OFFENSIVE

The third named campaign of the Vietnam War was “Counteroffensive”, 25 December 1965 - 30 June 1966. Following the U.S. victory in the Ia Drang Valley, American forces for the remainder of 1965 and well into 1966 sought to keep the enemy off balance while building base camps and logistical installations. This involved search and destroy operations to protect the logistical bases under construction along the coast and the base camps for incoming U.S. units in the provinces near Saigon.

Also of particular concern to the American military mission was the protection of the government and the people of South Vietnam. To accomplish the tasks outlined U.S. efforts were concentrated in the most vital and heavily populated regions. The III Marine Amphibious Force supported the South Vietnamese I Corps in the northern provinces; the I Field Force supported the Vietnamese II Corps in the central region; and the II Field Force supported the South Vietnamese III Corps around Saigon. Consequently, the major battles of the year occurred in these critical areas. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, the Korean 2d Marine Brigade, and the ARVN 47th Regiment began Operation VAN BUREN on 19 January to locate and destroy the North Vietnamese 95th Regiment, which was believed to be in the Tuy Hoa Valley. Their mission included protecting the rice harvest produced in the coastal region. The successful execution of these assignments resulted in serious enemy losses. During 20-23 January, a temporary cease fire was proclaimed in honor of the lunar new year (Tet), although minor clashes continued throughout this period.

During February and March, U.S. intelligence reported heavy North Vietnamese Army infiltration from Laos and across the demilitarized zone into Quang Tri Province. Only the South Vietnamese 1st Division and a single U.S. marine battalion were deployed to the province. However, to defend against this threatened invasion the bulk of the U.S. 3d Marine Division and the first U.S. Army combat units, the 173d Airborne Brigade, were moved into the northern provinces. On April 12, U.S. B-52s based on Guam bombed infiltration routes near the Laos border in the first use of these weapons against NVA . Throughout this phase of the campaign, the enemy continued to take refuge in Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam. Driving the enemy back removed the threat of harassment of the populace by North Vietnamese regular forces and curbed local guerrilla activity.[65]

Since much of the planned construction was to be around populated areas many of the efforts to clear the enemy concentrated around cities and the transportation routes near them. On December 29th, 1965, Project Delta was alerted to assist the U.S. 1st Infantry Division on Operation Crimp to clear an area around Cu Chi, near Saigon. Three recon teams were initially sent to the area but were soon diverted to support Operation Mallet, an effort to clear Highway 15 from Bien Hoa to Vung Tau.[24] Three additional Delta recon teams were sent to the FOB at Di An on January 4th, 1966. Project Delta had been in the process of training soldiers from the 1st Infantry Division in long range reconnaissance techniques at the Delta compound in Nha Trang. It was determined that these personnel would participate in Operation Mallet as part of Delta’s recon force. For this operation the first six teams inserted consisted of U.S. advisors and Nungs from Project Delta. Three additional teams were made up of Project Delta team leaders and 1st Infantry Division soldiers. All of these teams were comprised of five men or less and only two indigenous, at most, were on any given team.

Major Beckwith had formed a less than flattering opinion of the abilities of his Vietnamese counterparts and was leaning strongly toward running all American teams. The 145th Aviation Platoon from Nha Trang was assigned to support Project Delta on a permanent basis. Also temporarily attached to the Project were two Forward Air Controllers (FACs) from the 21st Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS), Captains Ken Kerr and Jim Ahmann. Absent on this operation were the 91st Airborne Rangers. The 1st Infantry Division’s 2nd Brigade provided an immediate action force to respond in case a recon team needed to be extracted by a larger force. On January 8th, Team 1 (Marcus Huston, Robert Price, Robert Whitis and two Nungs) was inserted on an LZ 2,500 meters from the intended LZ and were forced to cover a lot of ground in order to get into their own AO. They observed some enemy activity and were extracted on January 12th. Also on January 8th, Teams 2 (David Disharoon, Billy Mckeith, Norman Dupuis and two Nungs) and 3 (Brooke Bell, Guy Holland, Charles McDonald and one Nung) were inserted. Team 2 discovered a VC platoon and, utilizing the newly assigned FAC, called in a successful airstrike on the enemy, killing fifteen. They then encountered six VC and killed five of them in a brief firefight before seeking an LZ for extraction. The team estimated fifty VC had surrounded the LZ at the time of extraction and they called for another airstrike. They estimated twenty five enemy killed by air. Team 3 made contact with an estimated force of two platoons of VC and called for an air strike. The airstrike was delivered and an estimated twenty VC were killed. Teams 4 (Marlin Cook, Agostino Chiarello, Donald Stultz and one Nung), 5 (George Hoagland, Charles Hiner, Donald Dotson and one Nung), and 6 (Frank Badolati, Ronald Terry, Charles McDonald and two Nungs) were inserted on January 10th. All three teams reported signs of recent activity but no contact with the enemy, other than visual, occurred. Teams 7 (Lucius Untalan and Charles Gray from Delta, John Sanders, Richard Finlan and William Allen from 1st Division), 8 (Lloyd Fisher and Guy Holland from Delta, Walter Korber, Clarence Pitts and Howard Stanfield from 1st Division) and 9 (Walter Shumate and Marlin Cook from Delta, Frederick Evans, Donald Wombaugh and Willis Conley from 1st Division) were inserted on January 15th. All three teams reported no enemy activity and were extracted on the 17th due to uncoordinated air, artillery and foot patrols by the 1st Infantry Division into the recon teams’ Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). Overall, the operation was a success. Attachment of the FACs had immediate and positive effect on the Project’s ability to complete their missions. Attachment of the 145th Aviation Platoon provided an opportunity for Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) to be developed for insertions, extractions, and emergent situations. The attached personnel from the 1st Infantry Division performed efficiently in the field after receiving training in long range patrolling from Project Delta. LT Guy Holland, assigned as the Officer In Charge (OIC) of Recon, became the first officer to perform as a regular member of a recon team.[24]

From January 26th to March 6th, 1966, an operation was conducted by the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) on the Bong Son Plain to search out and destroy NVA and VC strongholds and encampments. The operation was initially called Operation Masher but the name was subsequently changed to the less aggressive Operation White Wing by President Johnson. The area of the operation included the An Lao Valley, historically an impenetrable enemy stronghold with very strong local support from the inhabitants. Project Delta was tasked with performing reconnaissance missions to locate the enemy and direct air attacks upon them. This operation proved to be one of the darkest in Project Delta’s history.

From the statement of Captain A.J. “Bo” Baker:[25]

“On 24 January 1966, Project Delta was given the mission by Field Forces Vietnam of supporting the 1st Air Cavalry Division with reconnaissance teams during Operation “Masher” in Binh Dinh Province. In coordination with the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry, it was decided that Project Delta would be given a TAOR in the northern end of the An Lao Valley. The mission of the Project was to surveil the main routes leading into this area to determine if Viet Cong or North Vietnamese units were using them to reinforce or to withdraw from the US Marine force pushing south toward the valley and from the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry and the Vietnamese Airborne Brigade pushing north. Intelligence on the TAOR assigned the Project was limited; available information came from unconfirmed agent reports. Red Haze missions could not be flown because of bad weather. However, we knew that the Viet Cong were in complete control of the valley and that the population supported them completely. It was also learned that the last time a friendly unit had operated in this area was 1958. ARVN personnel at the 22nd Division Headquarters in Qui Nhon felt that at least 2 regiments would have to be used in order to go into the An Lao Valley. Bad weather was forecast for the time period that the teams would be operating in the valley; this would severely limit air support and communications for these teams.

The Delta staff, after considering these intelligence factors, decided to brief the members of the reconnaissance section on the situation and to ask for volunteers for the mission. After briefing the men on the situation, 3 teams of 17 men volunteered to go on this mission. Each of the 3 teams was infiltrated into its operational area by a single helicopter at last light, the night of 27 January 1966.

Team One made contact with a 3-man Viet Cong patrol at 0930 hours on the 28th. Casualties were listed as 1 VC KIA, 2 VC WIA, 1 American wounded. Because the team’s presence in the area had been compromised, Team One was exfiltrated at 1620 hours on the 28th.

Team Two, at 1040 hours 29 January, while stopped to listen, was attacked by a Viet Cong force of unknown strength. Of the 6 team members, 2 were killed and 2 wounded in the initial burst of heavy automatic fire. After 4 hours of fighting, airstrikes forced the Viet Cong to break contact, leaving 4 Americans dead and 2 wounded. The wounded and bodies were exfiltrated at 1500 hours.

Team Three first engaged the enemy at 0930 on the 28th. The team was hit a second time at 1230 and one American was wounded (he died 5 hours later from loss of blood). Later that day, the team was hit a third time and was split into 2 three-man groups. On the 29th one of these groups made contact with base and was exfiltrated at 1630 hours. The remaining 3 men were hit by a VC force at 1600 hours and 2 of the men are now Missing in Action and believed to be dead. The third man continued to evade. On the 30th, he engaged the VC 3 more times before being exfiltrated at 1730 hours. Casualties were 9 VC KIA, 7 VC WIA, 1 American dead and 2 missing.

Casualty totals for the 17 Americans committed were 5 KIA, 3 WIA, 2 MIA. Team Composition:

Team 1: *Keating, Henry A. SFC, Whitis, Robert P. SFC, Dupuis, Norman C. SSG WIA, Bell, Brooke A. SSG, Chiarello, Agostino, SSG

Team 2: *Webber, Frank J. Jr. SFC WIA, Cook, Marlin C. SFC KIA, Dotson, Donald L. SSG KIA, Hoagland, George A. SSG KIA, Hancock, Jesse L. SFC KIA, Hiner, Charles F. SSG WIA

Team 3: *Huston, Marcus L. SFC, McKeith, Billy A. SSG, Gray, Wiley W. MSG, Terry, Ronald T. SSG MIA, Hodgson, Cecil J. SFC MIA, Badolati, Frank N. SSG KIA

*Team Leader”[25]

Author’s Note:

In many of the descriptions of missions conducted by Project Delta, various locations are described by the use of six and eight digit coordinates such as BS746197. For the purpose of this explanation, ignore the letters and focus on the numbers. They represent positions on the east-west axis and the north-south axis of the 1:50,000 scale topographic map. Each square on the map represents 1 kilometer in distance. Thus, 746 represents a point 6/10 of the distance between the 74 and 75 lines on the map. The 197 represents a point 7/10 of the distance between the 19 and 20 lines on the map. Where the two intersect is the identified location on the ground.

Likewise, many times that are recorded are represented by a Date Time Group (DTG). These will appear in a format such as 271858. Normally recorded as military time using a 24 hour clock, 271858 would be interpreted as the 27th day of the current month at 6:58 PM. In reports such as team debriefings, the month was normally omitted. In other reports, the month was included in the DTG as a suffix, such as 271858 Jan.

SFC Henry Keating was the Team Leader of Team 1, code named Eskimo.[25] Keating recalls the team’s mission in the An Lao Valley: “Team “Eskimo” was infiltrated into the operational area at last light 271858, Team members were: SFC Keating (Team Leader), SFC Whitis, SSG Bell, SSG Dupuis and SFC Chiariello. From the infiltration point which was at coordinates BS746197, we moved into on the west side of the LZ and moved north about 300 meters, where we stopped for the night. At 280650, we moved northeast to coordinates BS737204, which we reached at 0850 hours. I climbed a tree so I could observe the valley to the east. From this position, I was able to observe the valley from coordinates BS745204 to coordinates BS743211.

“The trails shown on the map appeared well used, the rice paddies were under cultivation, however, I saw no people. The fog closed into the valley at 0920 hours, so I decided to move north to coordinate BS747210, where we would be close enough to the trails in the valley to hear any movement on them. At 280930 hours, SSG Dupuis who was my point man and I saw three VC about 16 meters to our left front (coordinates BS736202). One VC was carrying a US Carbine and when he started to raise his weapon, we brought him under fire, we hit the one carrying the carbine and when he fell, one of the others picked it up and fired one or two shots. At this time, SSG Dupuis threw a grenade and the firing ceased. I also threw another grenade and saw the wounded man fall out of the bush and into the trail. At this time, I sent two of my men around the right flank of the VC and we moved into their position.

“The VC laying in the trail was dead and we found two trails of blood leading away from the area so we decided that we had wounded the other two. One of the VC was wearing khaki shorts with a black cotton top, the others were wearing complete black pajamas. None of them had any web equipment of any kind. I checked the dead man and he had nothing at all on his person. I decided to move north and start evading in case there were any more in the area.

“SSG Dupuis informed me that he had been hit in the head. I found that he had a piece of shrapnel in head above his left ear. He said that it was making him dizzy so I moved SSG Bell up to the point. We moved about 500 meters to coordinates BS744207, we stopped to listen for any movement to our rear. Hearing none, I decided to send a spot report back to FOB. I was unable to make contact, so we moved on to the North. As we moved north, we started seeing a lot of trails that had been well used. These trails ran generally northeast to Southwest. I decided to move to the West side of the ridge to try and get away from all these trails. We crossed the ridge at coordinates BS733206 and moved to coordinate BS730206, where I again stopped and tried to make radio contact without success.

“From this position, I was able to observe in the valley to the West. I saw that the rice paddies were under cultivation and that the houses shown on the map at coordinates BS725208 were there, but I saw no people. We moved north to coordinate BS729208, the time was 1200 hours. I again tried to make radio contact with FOB. I made contact with the air relay and sent our report, at this time, he tried to locate our position on the ground. They tried for about two hours without success due to poor weather. They informed me that they had to refuel, but would be back in 45 minutes.

“When they returned, the weather had cleared enough for them to locate our panel. They then directed us to an LZ about 400 meters away to the South. We moved to that location and found it to be too steep for an LZ plus having Elephant grass about eight feet high. There was a ridge about 300 meters from us and I told the Aircraft that we would move to the ridge as it was pretty flat, however, it had high grass also, so I requested a rope ladder. Four of the men were exfiltrated in this manner at 1610 hours at coordinates BS728204, I was exfiltrated in the same manner at 1620 hours from same location.”[25]

Team 2, code named Capitol, was led by SFC Frank Webber. The following is the unedited statement of SSG Charles Hiner. He and SFC Webber were the only survivors of this mission:[25] “Team Capitol was infiltrated into the operational area at last light 271853 hours at coordinates BS766198. From the infiltration site, the team moved approximately four hundred meters to the west-northwest and spent the night.

“The team was ready to move at first light on the morning of 28 January. We made radio contact on schedule at 280730 hours and reported negative traffic. Above our location, approximately 75 meters, ran a trail running from southwest to northeast. Our plan was to observe this trail, which we did after making radio contact. We found the trail to be larger than we expected, as we had discussed this trail during the briefing prior to infiltration. We found the trail to be about one meter wide and well used. The trail had been used during the night of 27 January while we were in the area. A light rain had fallen during the night and the tracks were real fresh. The team moved across the trail moving in a southeastern direction for approximately 600 meters when we came upon an area that was crisscrossed with trails and appeared to have been well used within the last 24 hours. In this area, the jungle canopy was approximately 150 feet high, but under the canopy, it was fairly clean and clear with very little undergrowth. From this location, we decided to move to the southwest into thicker jungle.

“After we started moving again, we still encountered numerous trails leading to high ground. The trails all seemed to lead from the valley floor. All the trails we crossed or observed had been used within the last 24 hours. At 281130 hours, the team came upon an old hut that was partially torn down, with a trail running by it. The hut appeared not to have been used recently. We continued on down, moving parallel to this trail, until we came to a position overlooking a stream at coordinates BS763187. At this location, we decided to stop for our noon meal and make radio contact. After eating, we made contact and sent message number one.

“We continued on down still moving parallel to the trail and after about 20 minutes, the jungle started clearing up. I, being the point man, saw four woodcutters working. They were wearing black shorts and shirts and had a cart with two water buffalo. About the same time I saw them, they seemed to pause for a second with their work and then started back to work. I gave the signal for the rest of the team to fade back into the jungle. Immediately the woodcutters seemed to start working towards the top of the hill until they were out of sight. It seemed that the closer they got to the top of the hill, the faster they were going. The team discussed the possibility of being seen by the woodcutters and felt that we had been compromised. We decided to head for high ground as fast as we could. We moved out hitting real heavy undergrowth and at times, we were crawling through undergrowth on our hands and knees. Suddenly we broke through the undergrowth and came to what seemed to be a “buffalo wallow”.

“The area was well worn with trails running in all directions with buffalo tracks and fresh buffalo droppings. There was no jungle canopy here, only scrub trees about 10 feet high, this was at coordinates BS178184. The team moved right through the middle of this area as fast as possible in order to clear it and get back into thicker jungle. Almost as soon as we got through this area, we hit some banana trees and heard a dog barking and figured that we were close to a village. We then decided to move north away from where the dog was barking. Also, as soon as the dog started barking, we heard someone start banging on what sounded like a tin wash basin about 200 meters away. We don’t know if this was some sort of signal or not, but it had a pattern to it. He would bang for a minute or so then wait for a few seconds and then start again. This was continued until we were out of hearing. This was at coordinates BS755185.

“After we started moving again, we started hitting freshly cut trails. These trails were so fresh that the leaves on the brush were still green and not wilted. The only tracks on these trails were those of the people who had been working on them. These trails averaged in width from about two to three meters wide in some places and were coming up from the valley floor. All these trails were generally north to south. We hit this area about 1600 hours on 28 January. We discussed our situation and decided to start hunting for a good area to spend the night since we were in an area with so many trails and also since we felt we had been seen by the woodcutters. We had to have a site with plenty of cover and concealment. After selecting our camp site, we again discussed our situation and decided that since we had really seen nothing but numerous trails in the area, that the next morning we would move across the main trail that runs from north to south and turn south until we reached a point above a village located at coordinates BS756178. At this point, our intention was to split the team. One half was to stay in that location and observe the village and the other half was to move further south to coordinates BS751172 and observe the general area. We also figured that since we were so close to the valley floor that if we got into trouble, we could use one of the rice paddies for an exfiltration point.

“The team was ready to move out at first light on 29 January. The weather was very bad with heavy rains and fog lying right on the ground. At 0730 hours, we made radio contact with base and reported negative traffic. After leaving this location, we encountered very difficult terrain, heavy undergrowth and rocks. At approximately 1000 hours, we stopped and took a chow break as we had had no breakfast. After we finished eating, we moved for no more than 30 feet until we came to the main trail running north and south. (The undergrowth was so thick in this area that we couldn’t see the main trail, although we were only 30 feet from it when we stopped to eat.) This trail averaged in width from about two to four feet in some places and had been used within the last 24 hours by a lot of people. We crossed the trail and turned south until we hit a real bad area with a rock cliff. When we hit this, we turned west again in order to avoid this.

“The going was through real heavy undergrowth again and we were on our hands and knees breaking a trail to get through. All of a sudden, we broke out of this undergrowth into a clearing at coordinates BS75183. This area was approximately 20 meters long and 10 meters wide with fairly clean undergrowth and rocks that averaged in size from about three to four feet long and about the same in height. During the movement into this area, due to bad weather, our hearing had been very bad so we decided to stop, take a five minute break and see if we could hear anything.

“Our order of march throughout the entire patrol was as follows: SSG Hiner on point, SFC Hancock, SFC Webber, SFC Cook, SSG Dotson, and SSG Hoagland. We entered the clearing in this order. This was at approximately 291040 hours. As soon as we entered the area and we took up positions. The team had no more than sat down after taking up defensive positions when an unknown force opened fire from the Southeast. The undergrowth was so thick all around this clearing we could see nothing.

“I estimate that the force was of about platoon strength and all weapons appeared to be either SMG’s or M 1 Carbines, US make. In the initial burst of fire, SGT’s Hoagland, Hancock, Cook, and Webber were hit. SGT Hoagland was hit so bad that he never moved. He fell on his back, but I don’t think he died right away. Hancock, I think, was killed in the initial burst of fire. SGT Cook was hit in the back and fell on his stomach, he called and said that he couldn’t move from the waist down. SGT Cook started returning fire from where he lay although he was badly wounded and couldn’t move. SGT Webber’s left arm was shattered from the elbow down. The only two not hit in the initial burst of fire were SGT Dotson and myself. I moved as fast up the hill as I could, (this was to the north) to cover from this direction.

When I reached the top, SGT Cook called to me and said to come back and get the radio out of his pack. I then called to SGT Webber to cover me as I came back down the hill to where Cook lay. When I started down the hill, SGT Webber put out a heavy volume of fire in the direction of the heaviest fire. When I reached Cook who was still on his stomach and still firing, I took the radio out of his pack and moved back over to SGT Webber’s position behind the rock. (I did not try to move Cook at this time because he was lying beside a tree.) I set up the radio and started calling anyone who would answer me.

“While I was on the radio, SGT Webber moved over to the edge of the clearing to where he could put out a better volume of fire, he moved in front of where SGT Cook lay. The first call I put out was answered by a C-47. After SGT Webber took up his new position, I called to SGT Dotson to move up to where I had been previously and cover from that direction. He started to move and got about ten feet and was hit in the chest and fell back. I think he was killed instantly. He got off one round while falling. After I made contact with the C-47, the C-47 made contact with the FAC (Robin one) who then made contact with me and requested my location. I gave him my coordinates and reported the situation as best I could under the circumstances. The FAC stated that he had two gunships on the way to our location. I threw red smoke to mark our position. After the FAC found my position; he said that he would have to leave to lead the gunships back to my position due to bad weather. When the gun-ships arrived, they wanted me to mark our area. I threw another smoke (yellow) and they couldn’t see it so I threw another red, they marked and wanted to know where I wanted the ordnance. I told them 50 meters all around the position.

“All during this, the VC fire was sporadic. After the gunships made the first pass, the fire from the VC quit for about two or three minutes, then broke out again, very heavy, from the South, West, and East. At this time, I called the FAC and told him to tell the gunships to make a run right over the top of us. At this time, the gunships came in and expended their ordnance right through the middle of our position. After this pass, the FAC informed me that the gunships were out of ordnance and that other gunships were on the way. (I was wounded in the head on this pass.)

“The FAC asked me if we could move to an LZ. I told him negative, because we were all either dead or wounded and unable to move. I then requested an air strike using napalm to try and burn an LZ next to our position. At this time the FAC said something about B-57’s in the pass or something I don’t remember exactly what. When I made this request, the FAC stated that the ceiling was too low for Air Force aircraft and that he was afraid of collisions over the area. I then requested a reaction force of any kind to try to get to us because we were unable to move.

At this time, small arms fire broke out again from the southeast corner of the perimeter. I informed the FAC, and he told me that no gunships were available at the moment but he would buzz the area. He continued this until the gunships were in the valley, then left to lead them to our location. At this time, SGT Webber started firing and called grenade and pointed in the direction the grenade came from. I took up the fire and tried to lay down a cross fire. SGT Webber saw one man throw a grenade; this man was wearing a khaki baseball type hat with a red star in the center. (This was the only man seen during the entire action.) We received a total of three hand grenades during the entire action and all three went off. They were of the “potato masher type”. After this fire, SGT Webber moved back from the edge of the clearing and as he came by Cook, he picked him up and dragged him back over by the rock where I was. Cook was still alive at this time but unable to talk. After he lay Cook down, SGT Webber moved back around the rock to where I was with the radio and gave Cook a shot of morphine and took one himself.

“SGT Webber was getting pretty weak from the loss of blood, and I put a dressing on his arm. By this time, the FAC was back over the area with the gunships and I requested another run around the position. The gunships wanted me to mark for them and I informed them to wait for a minute or so that I was out of grenades and would check one of the bodies for a grenade. (A total of four gunships arrived this time.) I ran over to SGT Hancock’s body and got a grenade from his pack as he was lying on his stomach and was easy to get to from my position. After I threw the grenade, I told the gunships to hit fifty meters from the center of my position in a 360 degree circle. The gunships came in this order: one from the North, another from the West and one from the South. The ship that came from the East must have misjudged, because he came right down through the middle of our position. We figured this was when SGT Cook died. SGT Webber and I were down behind a big rock and we think this is what saved our lives.

“From this point on I thought we were finished, I estimate the time to have been around 1230 hours. I again asked for help. The FAC (Robin One) was requesting help, telling someone we were hurt bad and needed help. I don’t remember who he was calling. We were told by him that a reaction force was on the way before this, but by this time, we had just about given up hope. By this time, all firing had stopped. SGT Webber was very weak from the loss of blood and I was losing blood from the wound in my head and starting to have faint spells. I then got up and moved among the bodies and checked them. I also collected ammunition off the bodies and brought this back to where SGT Webber and I were behind the rock because we were expecting more fire and figured we had had it as far as getting out. When I got back to the rock, I got back on the radio and gave the FAC a complete report on the situation. He in turn started calling for a reaction force. From here on for a few minutes things were blank because I had a faint dizzy spell.

“When I came around, I heard the FAC say over the radio that the reaction force was on the way. I informed him that if they would use rope ladders that they could let down right in our position. The FAC informed me that Lieutenant Holland was on the ground and working toward my position. The reaction force got within 300 meters of our position and wanted us to throw smoke and fire three rounds in the air. I threw the smoke and SGT Webber fired the shots. I also tried to make radio contact with the reaction force but with negative results.

“At this time, the FAC had a chopper from the 1st Cavalry come in and hover over our position for about five minutes. SGT Webber told me to move out into the clearing and wave to the gunners to let them know we were still there. I did this and the gunners pointed towards the reaction force. About ten minutes later, the reaction force broke through the clearing.”[25]

Captain Ken Kerr was the Forward Air Controller (FAC) who acted as the radio relay, directed air support and guided the recovery effort. He recalled the mission as follows:[25] “At approximately 291040 hours, I Kenneth L. Kerr Capt USAF was scrambled to work as a FAC in support of a Project Delta Team, which had been hit by a VC Force. At the time the only contact with the Team was by FM radio, which SSG Hiner was the operator. SSG Hiner upon my arrival informed me that the VC were on all four sides of his position. He also informed me that he had two KIA and two WIA. He also estimated the VC strength at about platoon size. I then informed SSG Hiner that I could not call in any Air Force Aircraft due to bad weather. (The ceiling averaged from three to five hundred feet.) I then told him that two rocket Helicopters were on the way to his position, he then requested they make runs to the South and East of his position.

“At this time, he marked his position with yellow smoke, after the rocket ships made the first run, he requested that they be brought in closer to his position. The ships made the second run and he reported they were on target, by this time the ships were out of ordnance and had to leave, also two more ships were on station in the valley and on the way to the target. Upon arrival, the two second ships made two runs each over the target. “These ships made runs over the same area as the first two ships. At this time, SSG Hiner informed me that the VC had ceased fire. I then held the third two ships that were on station in the valley for approximately 15 minutes, then Hiner called me and said that he was again receiving fire from the East. (I could hear the fire over the radio.) He asked me at this time if I could direct the Rockets in a little closer to his position because he felt that the VC were preparing to overrun his position. I told him yes, but I also reminded him of the danger in bringing them in any closer. He then told me that he wanted them in closer. I then told the rockets where he wanted the fire, and the ships made a run right over the top of his position, then made the second pass over the same position as the first.

“At this time Hiner called and told me to pull the ships out a little as the rockets were hitting right on top of them. He also said he thought the VC were pulling back. (He didn’t explain why he thought this.) At this time, I get a call from Delta’s FOB asking if the Team could move to an LZ, I then ask Hiner if this was possible. He replied no and informed me that he had four KIA and two WIA, at this time his voice seem to fade or get weaker over the radio. He also stated that a reaction force would have to come in to relieve them. I then asked SSG Hiner what he estimated the VC strength to be. He estimated their strength at Platoon size. I then informed Delta’s FOB that a reaction force of about 10 to 15 men could relieve these people. The FOB then informed me that they had 15 men standing by and ready to go. I then informed SGT Hiner that the reaction force was on the way to his location. SGT Hiner informed me that the VC had started to fire again. I then asked for more smoke to mark with, he then threw a red smoke. As soon as I saw the smoke, I called the rocket ships who were standing by to come on in.

“At this time, I made tree top level passes over his position to ensure I had his exact location and try to scare the VC away from his position. I continued to buzz his position for approximately five minutes until the rocket ships got into position to fire. I then fired two smoke rockets into the VC position as directed by SGT Hiner. After I marked, the rocket ships made two runs each, approximately 20 to 30 meters out from SGT Hiner position. After these two runs, SGT Hiner informed me that the fire from the VC had ceased. (About 25 minutes had passed since I had informed SGT Hiner that a reaction force was on the way.) He also asked me where the reaction force was. I then called back to Delta’s FOB and asked where the reaction force was, and they informed me that a reaction force was on the way to the helicopters and would be at my location in approximately 30 minutes.

“For the next 30 minutes or so, there was a lull in radio communication with SGT Hiner. At the end of this time, MAJ Murphy (the commander of the 1st Cavalry flight group) came on the air and informed me that he was airborne and was going to try and come in from the north. I told him that it was impossible to get in from that direction due to bad weather, that he would have to come up the valley. MAJ Murphy informed me that he had tried to come in that way but had drawn a lot of ground fire. I then told him that I had made several trips up and down the valley to guide the rocket ships in and that he would have to come up this way. He came back and said that he was on the way. At this time, I informed SGT Hiner to hang on a little longer that the reaction force was in the air and would be at his location shortly. At this time, the helicopters informed me that they were at 2500 feet above the clouds and wanted me to find a hole in the clouds to lead them through. At this time, I informed SGT Hiner that I would have to leave for a few minutes to guide the helicopters in.

“After I picked up the helicopters and brought them into the general area, I fired my last two smoke rockets into an LZ I selected for the reaction force. As soon as the reaction force landed, I told MAJ Murphy to take his helicopters to the south side of the valley, because another reaction force was coming in on the north side of the valley. The reaction force under LT Holland from Project Delta threw a yellow smoke grenade on the LZ and informed me that he was on the ground and didn’t want any shooting in the general area, and that the LZ was secured for the second reaction force. (The second reaction force was from the 1st Cav.) I passed this information on to CAPT Carter from Project Delta who was with the second reaction force. I then told LT Holland to take a heading of 360 degrees to SGT Hiner’s position.

“At this time, I received a call from SGT Hiner stating that he was again being fired upon by the VC from the southwest. At this time, I started buzzing to the southwest of his position at tree top level trying to scare the VC off. I remained above his position for an unknown length of time, then I couldn’t raise SGT Hiner on the radio, I then tried to make radio contact with LT Holland without success, then I was able to make contact with CAPT Carter. CAPT Carter informed me that his reaction force was on the ground and had the LZ secured and would remain on the LZ until LT Holland needed him or called for help. About this time, I received a call from LT Holland asking me how far away they were from SGT Hiner’s position. I then asked LT Holland to mark his position with smoke, after the smoke I told him to take a heading of zero three zero degrees and he started moving again. I then informed CAPT Carter that I had located an LZ to the north of his position approximately 150 meters that one helicopter could get in and out and could be used to exfiltrate the dead and wounded. He acknowledged this and said he would move north and secure it.

“SGT Hiner came back up on the radio and asked where the reaction force was, and how soon it would reach him. I then informed him that the reaction force was approximately 200 meters from his position, moving on a heading of zero three zero degrees. SGT Hiner also informed me that he was not receiving any fire from the VC at this time. At this time, LT Holland marked his position again with smoke and I directed him on a new heading of zero five zero degrees and told him that he was approximately 100 meters from SGT Hiner’s position. I then passed this information on to SGT Hiner. Hiner at this time faded out on the radio. LT Holland told me to tell Hiner to throw a smoke grenade and fire three shots into the air to mark with. SGT Hiner replied that he would. I passed this on to LT Holland, by this time, I could see LT Holland’s force closing on the team’s position. LT Holland requested that I buzz the team position and cut my engine when I was over the position, this I did for approximately 5 minutes. Then I called a helicopter in and had him to hover over the position for approximately 10 minutes. This guided LT Holland force to the team’s exact location and linkup was effected at approximately 1430 hours.”[25]

Team 3, code named Roadrunner, was led by SFC Marcus Huston. Huston recalls the mission as follows:[25] “Team #3 “Roadrunner” was infiltrated into the operational area at last light 271900. We moved northeast for approximately 200 meters and I decided to stop because the going was rough and it was dark. We remained here and made contact by radio at 280720 at which time, I reported my location, negative contact and direction of movement. At 280730 we began moving northeast and moved in this general direction until we came to a stream. We stopped just short of the stream where we observed a trail running along the side of this stream. I also noticed fresh dirt a few feet back in the woods. I wanted to check these holes and the area farther back up the hill. I posted SFC Hodgson about 20 meters further down the hill and just off the trail to observe same, so that we would not be surprised by someone coming up the trail.

“The other men then took up positions along the trail to cover while I checked the hill for more positions. I told SGT Badolati to come with me to check the hill as he was second in command, experienced and I respected his judgment. We found the hill saturated with holes approximately 2 feet deep and a foot wide. All the dirt was fresh as if the holes had been dug the previous day. SGT Badolati and I returned to the edge of the trail and had no sooner joined the remainder of the team when SFC Hodgson began firing to his front down the trail. I immediately pulled him back past us and then SGT Badolati and I sprayed the area down the trail in case there were more VC. (This took place at coordinates BS715170, time 280930.) I quickly conferred with SFC Hodgson and he stated that he had killed the first two VC and wounded the third. I heard what I thought was voices and more movement back down the trail so I told the team to move out fast across the stream and up the hill on the other side. I did not lead at this time as I wanted to make sure we weren’t being followed and attempt to cover our trail.

“If there were more VC on the trail, they did not pursue us immediately. I felt at this time that we had been compromised but, was not certain at this time that I would ask for exfiltration. We continued moving up the hill and observed freshly dug holes (foxholes) saturating the whole area. We also noticed a couple of machine gun positions, clothes and rice baskets. I immediately told the team not to pick up anything as it may be booby trapped. From this hill, SSG Terry informed me that he saw a large force (estimated at thirty to forty) of VC moving towards the hill.

“From this point on, there was no doubt that we had been compromised and that we had to move fast and try to evade the VC. We moved until approximately 1200 hours, at which time I wanted to make radio contact and request exfiltration. We hadn’t been stopped more than five minutes when we received a hail of fire from about 20 meters away and from above us. SSG Badolati was hit in the left upper arm with such force that it looked like it almost severed his arm. When he was hit, it knocked him back past me. He remained on his feet and continued back through the woods. At the same time that SSG Badolati was hit, a round knocked SFC Hodgson’s weapon from his hands with such force that it knocked him back past me where he landed on his back. I asked him if he was hit and he said no so I told him to move out.

“During this time, the other men and myself returned the fire. After SSG Badolati and SFC Hodgson moved to the rear, I sprayed the area through the woods as I could as I could see no one. I then began pulling back and SSG McKeith covered me as I did so. We moved approximately 30 meters and seeing that we were all together, I told SFC Hodgson to assist SSG Badolati as SFC Hodgson was unarmed. SFC Hodgson applied a tourniquet to SSG Badolati’s arm and we began moving again. We moved on for another four or five hundred meters and stopped to attempt radio contact with anyone. At this time, I saw that the only radio we had was an HT-1. I began calling “Flaming Arrow”. The only reply I heard was “Alpha Mike”. I gave the radio to MSG Gray and told the others we had to keep moving. SFC Hodgson told me that SSG Badolati was still losing blood so I told him to put two tourniquets on his arm, which he did, and SSG Badolati asked for morphine. To the best of my knowledge, morphine was administered four times.

“We continued to move generally north, out of our TAOR. My plan was to move north, then West and finally South to re-enter our TAOR and get to the emergency RV point. We continued on for about two hundred meters coming to a wall made out of rock. This wall was approximately three feet high and 18 inches thick and ran as far as we could see through the woods. I felt that this wall not only afforded us a position where we could stop to attend to SSG Badolati’s arm but a fairly good defensive position as well. I hoped that we could ambush them and hurt them bad enough that they would stop pursuit. We had no more than got settled in this position when a hail of fire came at us through the woods. We immediately returned the fire, and I turned and told SSG Badolati to start moving and we would catch him. I turned back to fire again and saw that the other three men were gone. (MSG Gray, SSG Terry, and SFC Hodgson who were closer to the wall than I when the firing broke out.) I then sprayed the area again above the wall and began moving back. SSG McKeith, who was behind me, covered me and we joined SSG Badolati and continued to move. I asked SSG McKeith if he had seen the other three men, and he stated that he had seen them leave the wall and start up the hill away from us. I then remembered the CS grenade I had and gave it to SSG McKeith to throw behind us, which he did. We did not hear any more movement behind us after he threw the grenade.

“We, SSG Badolati, SSG McKeith and I, continued to move until we came to a stream bed. I decided to use this stream bed to cover our trail and try to lose the VC if they were still following. At this point, we observed a helicopter coming up the valley and at the same time approximately 30 to 50 VC moved out into the open and fired on the helicopter. These VC were well armed, equipped with complete web equipment and caps. They looked to be PAVN. We continued to move for about 50 meters when SSG Badolati said he could go no further and asked us to leave him. At this point we, SSG McKeith and myself, knew we had to stop.

“We selected a position about two or three feet up the bank which was fairly well concealed with shrubs and boulders. We were right on the bend in the stream and felt that if they were following that we might be able to kill enough that they would leave us alone. SSG McKeith and I positioned ourselves on each side of SSG Badolati and laid out our extra magazines and hand grenades and planned on taking a “few” with us. We arrived at this location at approximately 1500 hours and remained there until 1730 hours. During this time, we continually checked SSG Badolati and it seemed that he had lost all the blood he was going to lose, as the bleeding had stopped. We thought that he had died several times between 1700 and 1715 hours and at 1715 we were sure tha the was gone. We remained until 1730 hours discussing our plans. I thought it best to move as high as we could get, as fast as we could go and take the most difficult route getting there. (We left SSG Badolati’s body along the edge of the stream at a junction. The junction was very prominent forming a Y. The body was left about 3 to 4 feet up the bank in shrubbery and boulders. Directly above the spot is a house about 10 to 15 feet from the bank.)

“We moved until it got so dark that we couldn’t see and decided to stop for the night. We began moving at about 290600 and moved uphill until about 1510 hours. We wanted to continue moving South towards our emergency RV point, but decided that since we were on a hill and it was open (elephant grass) that we might be able to attract the attention of somebody flying over. A few minutes later, we could hear an L-19 in the area and saw him flying off to the north of us. After about five passes, he finally turned straight toward us and spotted our panel. We knew then that he would be calling back for a helicopter. At about 1610 hours, firing broke out about 100 meters to the East of us and slightly down the hill. The rounds were snapping pretty close to us and we thought they were after us. (I later found out it was my other three men when MSG Gray was picked up.) We considered running again, but knew that if we moved from this spot we might never get picked up. We quickly decided it was either here or nowhere for a pickup.

“During this firing, it sounded like someone was firing back at the VC, whom we could hear shouting further down the hill. We thought it might be our other three men and I told SSG McKeith to get on the chopper first, as we could hear it coming. I got a red smoke grenade ready to throw as soon as I got on the chopper. Once I was on the chopper, I told the pilots and gunners that there were VC on the ground firing. I threw the smoke as we flew down the hill. I waited a while in case it was our men back up the hill. I wanted to make sure I didn’t throw red smoke on them. SSG McKeith and I were returned to base, and we immediately informed TOC about the fire fight and that it might be our men. They returned to the area and checked but could not find them. After checking with MSG Gray, he confirmed that it was him and the other two men who were being chased by the VC.

“During this entire patrol, voices could be heard in the valley and they seemed to be directing others. I feel that about ninety percent of the people there are people who live in the valley and the other ten percent are units that are passing through. From the moment that SSG Badolati was hit, he seemed to sense that he was not going to make it and he told me so. I told him that we would make it out but he wanted me to leave him even before the team was split. He said the team would have a better chance of getting out if we left him. He continued begging me to leave him and save ourselves. He then stated that he knew he was going to die and that he didn’t want to take us with him. The last words I recall him saying were “save yourselves”. SSG Badolati knew that if he stopped, we all would stop and we couldn’t afford to do this. I feel that SSG Badolati saved my team from complete annihilation by his determination to keep going and save us.”[25]

Master Sergeant Wiley Gray’s account is as follows:[25] “After being hit at the stone wall by the VC for the second time, SGT Terry and I fired one magazine each, then seeing SFC Hodgson moving out to the West, we followed him thinking the rest of the team was also moving. SGTs Huston, McKeith and Badolati were to our rear when the firing started and we couldn’t see them. We took it for granted when we saw SFC Hodgson moving out that the rest of the team was also moving. After about 15 minutes, we stopped and discovered that the rest of the team was split.

“A few minutes later, we heard firing to the North in the valley and assumed that the rear or other half of the team was being exfiltrated. We moved about 100 yards further West and came across a trail junction. One foxhole was located above the junction with good fields of fire down both trails. We remained here until about 1900 hours in a position where we could observe this foxhole. About 1845 hours, we saw two VN wearing black pass by, one had a light weight poncho (Delta type). I figured that this came from some of the equipment that we dropped during the first fire fight. These two men were moving north. At 1900 hours, we moved South and then West and spent the night. During the night we heard troop movements below us and dogs barking.

“At first light on the 29th, we moved West until we crossed a trail in the vicinity of coordinates BS719172 at approximately 0800 hours. After crossing this trail, we crawled into the elephant grass to observe the trail facing North. We were all facing the North and within arm’s reach of one another. Once during the day, we heard troops behind us. Around 1600 hours, I observed three VC dressed in black in the prone position and four standing, two in gray or Khaki uniform, all within four feet of us on the right or right rear. I tapped SGT Terry on the left leg and told him VC and to fire at which time I grabbed my M-16 which was on my left side and came up on one knee and starting firing at the VC standing. Three of these fell. I heard SGT Terry yell that he was hit. I looked down and saw him holding his right side with both hands and blood coming through his fingers. I then saw his body hump again like he took another round and then he lay still. I looked behind me and saw that SFC Hodgson was gone.

“I ran to the West for about 20 feet through the elephant grass and fell down facing to the East and waited in ambush for the VC to follow me. At this time, I heard one pistol shot, which I believe to have been made by a 9mm pistol. This shot came from directly across the trail from me, and someone gasped. Approximately one minute later, I heard a burst of three shots and then two that sounded like they came from an M-16 rifle. They sounded like they came from where I had left SGT Terry’s body. At this time, armed helicopters starting firing in that direction and the VC stopped firing. (I later found out the choppers were exfiltrating SFC Huston and SSG McKeith whom had heard us firing and told the gunners to fire in that direction. I know that the firing from the choppers saved my life.)

“After about five minutes, the choppers left the area and I could hear the VC cutting poles. I assumed this was to carry their dead and wounded off on litters. Around 1200 hours, I heard movement to my rear and saw five people within five feet of me. I cut loose with one magazine and then rolled down the hill for approximately 30 feet and waited in ambush. About 5 minutes later, I heard movement coming down the path I had made when I dived off the hill. I saw two men armed, in khaki or gray with gray hats on. I let them get within six feet of me and I shot both of them and started rolling down the hill again. At this time, the VC opened up with everything they had for approximately three minutes. I waited in ambush again and I heard someone issuing orders in a real sharp voice at my previous position and then again I heard movement and saw two more men dressed in gray coming down the path I had made. I again let them get within six feet of me and killed them both. One of these men had on a “SAM BROWN” type belt with a shoulder strap. I then rolled down the hill again only this time I crawled under some grass and as I went into the grass, I pulled the grass in behind me. In about 15 minutes, I heard more orders being given and then saw movement on both sides of me and to the rear. I then heard noises I thought to be them setting up some type of crew served weapon off to the West of my position. I heard someone above me say two words in English, “American and Officer”.

“For about two hours, I heard them moving about and talking all around me, then I heard someone above me giving orders over a radio. I remained in this position for about two more hours and then started moving toward the area I had picked on the map for a pick up. I arrived just above this area and about 1700 hours a FAC flew over and I fired a white flare at him. At approximately 1730 I saw four armed helicopters flying in the area and I then fired two white and two red flares at them. I also threw a yellow smoke grenade into the clearing at which time the chopper came in and exfiltrated me.”[25]

During all of this activity air operations were extremely dangerous and limited by heavy rain and low cloud cover. Major Beckwith, in his infamous style, reasoned that if he could get on the ground with one of the teams then Project Delta would have more leverage to get the support that was not forthcoming from the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).[1] At the first opportunity, he boarded a helicopter and flew at treetop level into the team areas. Forced to fly low by the cloud cover he became first, an easy target and second, a casualty of heavy ground fire. He sustained a wound through his abdomen from a machine gun round. Grievously wounded, Major Beckwith was evacuated and spent many long months recuperating.[1] Air and ground searches were conducted for the missing men and for SSG Frank Badolati’s body to no avail.

Frank Badolati’s name is inscribed on Panel 04E, Line 105 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

Marlin Cook’s name is inscribed on Panel 04E, Line 106 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

Donald Dotson’s name is inscribed on Panel 04E, Line 107 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

The names of Cecil Hodgson, Jesse Hancock and George Hoagland are inscribed on Panel 04E, Line 109 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

Ronald Terry’s name is inscribed on Panel 04E, Line 116 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

CHAPTER VIII: REGROUP AND RECOVERY

On February 1st, what was left of Project Delta returned to Nha Trang to regroup and rebuild. The devastating losses of Operation Masher/White Wing would have a lasting effect on the way Project Delta conducted business. Over the course of the next six operations, Lieutenant Colonel Jack Warren would take Project Delta through its last major developmental evolution to assume the form and organization that would define it for the rest of its existence. During the next few months Project Delta grew to perhaps its largest size in terms of numbers of U.S advisors assigned.

After one month of rebuilding, Project Delta undertook an operation in support of the 23rd ARVN Division at Ban Me Thuot.[26] In the intervening month since the Bong Son operation the 145th Airlift Platoon (UH-1B Slicks) was consolidated with the 6th Aviation Platoon (UH-1B Gunships) to form the 2nd Platoon, 171st Aviation Company. The 171st AC was attached to 5th Special Forces Group, Nha Trang, The primary mission of the 2nd Platoon became supporting Project Delta and its reconnaissance training activity conducted from Delta’s headquarters in Nha Trang. Delta continued to have Captains Kerr and Ahmann attached as FACs. LT Col. Warren, determined not to repeat mistakes recognized from previous operations, played a key role in determining areas of operation, methods of operation, deployment of troops, and identification of key support functions for immediate reaction forces. Project Delta deployed two Airborne Ranger Companies, one with a reconnaissance in force mission, the other with immediate reaction responsibility for any recon team needing assistance. The recon team size was reestablished at two U.S. advisors and six indigenous personnel. In a move reminiscent of the early days of Leaping Lena, several recon teams consisting of all indigenous personnel were formed. These four man teams were dressed and armed like the enemy[26] and had the capability of communicating with headquarters to call for air assistance. These teams were called Roadrunners.

On March 7th, 1966, Teams 7 (SFC Paul Tracy and CPL Joe Alderman), 8 (SSG Charles Gray and SFC Austin Bounds), and 11 (SSG Donald Hannah and SSG Clarence Lovejoy) were inserted into their respective AOs northeast of Ban Me Thuot. All three teams were extracted on the 11th. No enemy contacts or sightings occurred although plentiful evidence existed of past occupation by sizeable forces.[26] The 3rd Company, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion conducted a reconnaissance in force on March 9th and 10th with no contact made with the enemy. Three Roadrunner teams were inserted on March 10th with one day missions planned. These early Roadrunner missions involved insertion early in the morning with plans to follow a set path of march and be extracted in the afternoon.

Teams 1 and 2 completed their mission without any enemy sightings. Team 3 made contact with the enemy a total of three times resulting in three enemy KIA. The third contact was with an unknown number of soldiers outside an encampment of an estimated 100 to 200 enemy. This contact caused the team to split. The point man was picked up later on the 10th and another man was picked up on the morning of the 11th. The other two team members were never found. The operation was terminated by a message from MACV ordering the Project to remove all assets from the field and report to I Corps to support Camp Ashau, which had come under enemy attack.[26]

Mere mention of the Ashau Valley will often evoke little more than solemn looks and silent headshakes from those who served there during the course of the war. Bounded by sheer slopes and knife peaked ridges and covered by dense high foliage, the Ashau proved to be an ideal and nearly impenetrable fortress for the invaders from the north. Convenient to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, it served as a base and assembly point for amassing troops for a major offensive into South Vietnam’s Hue-Phu Bai area, a move that could split the country in two.

Poised at the southeast end of the valley was a small Special Forces CIDG camp, A-102. Alerted to an impending enemy offensive, the camp was reinforced with a regional mobile strike force (Mike Force) on March 8th, 1966. On March 9th, the NVA attacked in force aided by low cloud cover and heavy rain which prevented effective use of air strikes. Despite inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy, the camp was abandoned and overrun on March 10th with heavy losses sustained. By the time Project Delta closed on the Forward Operations Base (FOB) at Phu Bai on the 12th, the Ashau belonged to the enemy.[27]

Because the area had been overrun the mission became one to assess the ability and likelihood of the enemy to continue northeast toward Hue and capture the city. The reconnaissance missions focused on the areas the enemy would most likely choose to accomplish this. Because of the urgency of the situation visual aerial reconnaissance was hurriedly conducted. What followed was a series of aborted insertions because the high altitude selection of LZs precluded detection of enemy encampments, dead trees, huts, and personnel on and around the intended landing areas. Team 1 (Roland Marquis and Audley Mills) attempted a last light insertion on March 15th but could not find the LZ due to darkness. The team was inserted on March 18th on the wrong LZ. They had to move 4,000 to 5,000 meters to get into their own AO. They were extracted on March 18th, having observed small Montagnard units.[27] Team 9, (Walt Shumate and Rolf Raines) aborted infiltration on March 15th due to the presence of dead trees in the middle of the LZ that prevented helicopter approach. The team was successfully inserted on the 17th and was extracted on the 20th without incident.[27]

Team 12 (Robert Wren and Don Landrum) attempted an insertion on March 15th and were met with enemy fire on the LZ. The helicopter engine caught fire and the pilot managed to crash land it in a nearby clearing. The team quickly gathered the helicopter crew and set up a perimeter. A rescue helicopter landed near the crashed ship and the air crew and recon team quickly boarded, with Wren on the right skid and two LLDB (Team Leader and one Team Member) on the left skid. The helicopter took off following a dry stream bed to gain altitude and when SFC Wren climbed aboard he discovered that the two LLDB had fallen from the skid. The pilot later reported that the ship was at 500 foot altitude when they fell.[27]

Team 10 (Chooch Chiarello and Harry Jones) infiltrated on March 17th. The LLDB Team Sergeant sprained his ankle when the team was forced to jump from the helicopter at a height of 14 feet above the LZ. On the 18th the team called for a medevac of two LLDB team members for sprained ankles and elected to continue the mission after the evacuation took place. They were extracted on the 20th without incident.[27]

Team 2 (Paul Sheppard and Richard Delaney) were inserted on the wrong LZ on March 18th but continued their mission until extracted on March 22nd.[27] Team 4 twice attempted insertions; on the 21st (Robert Wren and Don Landrum), and again on the 22nd (Chooch Chiarello and Harry Jones). On the 24th Team 4 (Chiarello, Jones) was shot down while inserting on the LZ. The team evacuated the crew and weapons and called for a recovery ship. The downed ship was destroyed with fragmentation grenades and the air crew and team were extracted under heavy fire. No one was injured.[27]

Team 3 (Charles Harper and Joe Alderman) was inserted successfully on March 21st. On the 22nd, SFC Harper collapsed from heat exhaustion and the team was extracted without incident. The team was redeployed on March 24th with Roland Marquis taking the place of Harper. The insertion was aborted due to the redirection of air assets to support the helicopter crash of Team 4.[27]

Team 6 (Charles Gray and Austin Bounds) was inserted on March 23rd. On the 25th the team discovered an unknown size force and called two separate air strikes on their location. The team was extracted on the 26th.[27]

Team 5 (Don Hannah and Clarence Lovejoy) unsuccessfully attempted insertions on March 23rd and at first light on the 24th but could find no suitable LZs. They were finally inserted at last light on the 24th at which time SSG Hannah sustained an injury to his leg while jumping from the helicopter. The team continued the mission through the 26th and became aware that they were being followed by the enemy. Hindered by the injured Hannah, the team called for extraction. Some confusion with the message coding had the extraction set up for the 27th instead of the 26th. The team hid out for the night and waited for the weather to clear on the 27th. When the recovery helicopter (a UH-1B) arrived they threw a rope ladder. Misunderstanding the radio transmission, the entire team climbed onto the ladder. Normally the team would be extracted in two lifts due to load constraints on the B-Model Hueys. The helicopter struggled to gain altitude and dragged the ladder through the trees at approximately 100 feet from the ground. The rope ladder broke, sending the two U.S. advisors and two LLDB crashing to the ground about 150 meters from the LZ. A third LLDB fell off the ladder some distance from the others. One LLDB was killed and the other badly injured. SSG Hannah was badly battered but able to administer aid to SSG Lovejoy, who was unable to walk. SSG Rolfe Raines and SSG Charles Gray descended a ladder from another helicopter and assisted with Lovejoy and the critically injured LLDB. On the 28th Gray and Raines called for stretchers to be dropped so they could carry the injured to the LZ. After making their way through the thick jungle with the injured men on stretchers, the exhausted Gray and Raines were able to have the men hoisted on stretchers and transported to the U.S. medical facility at Phu Bai.[27]

The 2nd and 3rd Companies, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion conducted two search and destroy missions each. Captain Holland “Time Bomb” Bynam, Senior Ranger Advisor, accompanied all four Ranger missions. 2nd Company (Bynam, LT Hamilton, SFC Scooter Davis and SSG Musselwhite) departed on the mission in a vehicle convoy. They encountered small groups of enemy and engaged them with small arms fire and air strikes.[27] 3rd Company (Bynam, LT Turner, SSG Coelho and SGT Benjamin) departed the FOB by wheeled vehicle on March 20th and began their mission upon reaching their departure point. The Rangers encountered small groups of enemy and engaged them, killing one and wounding four. The encountered a group of farmers and detained one for questioning. They were extracted by U.S. Marine helicopters on the 25th27. 2nd Company (Bynam, SFC Davis and SSG Musselwhite) departed the FOB by helicopter on March 23rd. They encountered two enemy and engaged them resulting in two enemy killed. They were extracted by helicopter on March 26th.[27] 3rd Company (Bynam, LT Turner, SFC Flores and SGT Benjamin) departed the FOB by helicopter on March 26th. The Rangers fired upon a squad of enemy resulting in one enemy wounded. They called an air strike on an estimated ten enemy with no confirmed killed. The company was extracted by helicopter on March 26th.[27]

A total of five Roadrunner missions were conducted between March 20th and March 23rd. Each mission was to be for one day. Two teams moved all day and were extracted with no enemy contacts or sightings. Two teams became disoriented and did not accomplish their missions before being extracted. The fifth team made contact with nine enemy while walking on a trail. They received small arms fire and fled. They evaded the enemy for the rest of the day until they were picked up by helicopter.[27]

III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) assigned the 1st Marine Division to conduct a large scale clearing operation with the 2nd ARVN Infantry Division near Chu Lai in April, 1966. Project Delta was tasked with reconnaissance of the area to provide intelligence on enemy locations and movements. They were requested by MAF to avoid any contact that might alert the enemy to an impending attack and cause them to alter their routines. MAF also assigned one flight of Marine Corps A-4 fighter aircraft to support the Project, but warned that they would not be used except for emergency extractions of teams in contact. This was another step toward maintaining the operational security of the planned clearing operation.[28]

Project Delta mobilized to Chu Lai on April 13th and 14th and prepared to insert Teams 3, 4, and 7 on the 15th. Teams 3 and 7 were inserted but Team 4 aborted after detecting activity on both their primary and secondary LZs. On April 17th attempts were made to insert Teams 8, 9, and 11. The LLDB team leaders aborted on all primary LZs, claiming the presence of enemy, campfires, or huts. The sightings were not verified by the U.S. advisors. Nonetheless, the LLDB commander refused to attempt further infiltrations into these areas claiming that they had all been compromised. LT COL. Warren unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the LLDB commander to change his mind. He then issued an order for all Project Delta personnel remaining in Nha Trang to mobilize to FOB Chu Lai and be prepared to form all U.S. teams to complete the mission. Despite the ongoing refusal of the LLDB to participate on the recon teams, two Roadrunner teams were inserted on April 18th. On the 18th seven recon teams were formed consisting of one U.S. officer and five U.S. Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs). Later in the day on the 18th the LLDB commander received orders from his high command that directed him to proceed with the planned insertions of mixed U.S./LLDB teams.[28]

Meanwhile, Team 3 reported significant enemy sightings on April 18th and 19th and reported capturing two prisoners. They requested immediate extraction. They were engaged by the enemy and the team split. At 1800 hours on the 19th part of Team 3 including one U.S. advisor, two LLDB, and two prisoners was extracted on a UH1B. A Marine H-34 attempted to pick up the remaining team members but was too large for the LZ. They lowered a hoist and secured one LLDB but were unable to stay on station because of equipment problems. The remaining U.S advisor and one LLDB were extracted the following morning.

Team 7 was compromised by an estimated two squads of VC on April 20th. They were extracted as they called an airstrike on the enemy position.[28]

Essentially all of the teams from that point forward attempted insertions and aborted multiple times before being successful. Once on the ground they invariably made contact with the enemy or were compromised and forced to be exfiltrated early. There were a total of six Roadrunner missions planned but only two occurred. On April 22nd the Roadrunners refused to participate in further missions. They were disarmed and transported back to Nha Trang to be inducted into the regular ARVN.

The last recon mission on this operation was conducted by Team 10 with LTC Warren tagging along as an observer. Jack Warren had a reputation of being a good guy, close to his troops, and known to carouse with them on occasion. He approached Roland Marquis about accompanying his team into the hole and was politely rebuffed. He quickly approached Team 10, whose members’ names have been lost in history, and was accepted as a straphanger third American. The team prepared for infiltration and headed for their LZ atop a hill at last light. The team exited one side of the helicopter and Warren exited the other. Once assembled on the ground the team leader noticed that Warren was missing and assumed that he had simply changed his mind and stayed on the helicopter. Two days later two Montagnards suspected of being VC were detained by the team, along with their families.[28] As the team prepared for extraction the S-3 officer at the FOB, CPT Walters, asked to speak with LTC Warren, call sign Buzzard 6. The team, after a lengthy pause, reported that Buzzard 6 was not with them and had not been with them for the entire mission. Panic ensued at the FOB. The Commanding Officer of a classified intelligence gathering organization was missing in hostile country. Warren’s loss would have huge recriminations in the war effort. A search was immediately launched in conjunction with Team 10’s recovery and Warren was found signaling with his fluorescent panel and mirror close to where he had departed from the helicopter. None the worse for wear, he had holed up without a radio assuming that sooner or later someone would miss him. He definitely needed a drink back at the FOB.[92]

Between May 5th and May 12th, 1966 Project Delta was requested to perform flank surveillance for the 1st U.S. Infantry Division during an operation they were conducting near Tay Ninh. A total of six recon teams were inserted. Teams 2 and 11 were extracted after making contact with the enemy. Team 7 was compromised by an estimated VC battalion. Under heavy enemy fire the U.S advisors, Norm Doney and Charlie Telfair, directed a 44 sortie airstrike, killing an estimated 150 enemy.[29],[30] These impressive results served to further gain the attention of the higher echelons of command in Vietnam.

When General Westmoreland recognized the unique capabilities of Project Delta he was given a briefing at the Delta compound in Nha Trang and provided with a close look at the gear carried into the field by a recon man. Joe Alderman was selected to demonstrate for the General.

Project Delta’s next assignment was scheduled to be a two phase mission in support of the 25th Infantry Division. The FOB was set up at Fire Base Oasis in II Corps. Mission Support Sites (MSSs) were established at Pleiku and Plei Me. The 281st Assault Helicopter Company (AHC) absorbed the 2nd Platoon, 171st Aviation Company and was operationally attached to Project Delta. Quartered in the 5th Special Forces Group compound in Nha Trang, the 281st would continue to provide primary support to Project Delta and the soon-to-be formed Recondo School. During this operation another twist was added. Three mixed U.S./VN teams were attached Operational Contingent (OPCON) to Project Delta from Team C-5, the Special Forces C-Team designated for special operations. During this operation Project Delta recon teams conducted 19 missions, Delta Roadrunners conducted 3 missions, and the C-5 teams conducted 3 missions. The Rangers were deployed as camp security but did not participate in field operations. The areas of operation were on fairly flat and open ground which allowed rapid movement through the reconnaissance zones. Three battalions of enemy troops were observed as they moved freely into Cambodia. Contact was limited to just a few firefights. One prisoner was captured as he was moving toward Cambodia and his interrogation yielded valuable information about the presence and identification of units in and around the border areas.

Observations indicated that the enemy were well dressed, well armed, and well organized. A way station was found that showed signs of recent use. The prisoner revealed that he was traveling from one way station, probably the one found by the recon team, to another in Cambodia, indicating that travel routes were well used and well known. It was estimated that a large NVA force was staged in Cambodia and was capable of infiltrating across the entire area in a period of a day or less.[31] Phase II of this operation was cancelled.

Project Delta was called to Dong Tre in support of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Operation Nathan Hale. The original request called for six recon teams to be inserted in support of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division but was quickly changed to request an additional four teams to support the 1st Brigade. One company from Delta’s 91st Airborne Rangers was tasked with FOB security and immediate action responsibility with no field operations planned.

Upon arrival at the FOB the Project Delta Commander, LTC Jack Warren, and his staff flew an overview of the AO in preparation for the operation. The C&C ship was accompanied by two gunships from the 281st AHC Wolfpack. One of the gunships spotted a lone man standing in a field waving at the helicopters. The gunship flew a quick flight around the man and ascertained that he was alone and unarmed. A slick with the command team aboard swooped in and someone jumped out and gathered the man and put him aboard. He had a .50 caliber ammo box with him that contained two old PRC 6 radio batteries and a pressure bandage. His pockets were stuffed with Chieu Hoi (open arms) leaflets that he immediately began to hand out to LTC Warren and each of the other crew members and occupants. After returning to the FOB, the captive VC explained that his area had been recently subjected to operations conducted by both the 1st Cavalry Division and the 101st Airborne Division. He had sustained multiple fragmentation wounds from the persistent bombing and had had enough.

Project Delta again demonstrated its flexibility in responding to requests for insertion of the Rangers on short notice to conduct a combat assault on troop concentrations identified by recon elements. One of Project Delta’s recon teams identified a large enemy presence and called for elements of the 1st Cavalry to conduct a combat operation. Quick response by that unit resulted in the enemy force breaking up into small groups and scattering into hiding rather than engaging the U.S. forces. An unarmed prisoner was captured by a 281st AHC crew and questioned. He identified a number of NVA and VC units operating in the area and revealed that their standing orders were to avoid contact and to break into smaller groups to evade the U.S forces. He further indicated that the goal of the local units was to wait until the conventional units departed to launch an attack on the Dong Tre Special Forces CIDG camp.[32] Operation 8-66 in support of Operation Nathan Hale lasted one week, from June 25th through July 2nd, 1966.

CHAPTER IX: COUNTERINSURGENCY

The fourth named campaign of the Vietnam War was “Counteroffensive, Phase II”, 1 July 1966 - 31 May 1967. United States operations after 1 July 1966 were a continuation of the earlier counteroffensive campaign. Recognizing the interdependence of political, economic, sociological, and military factors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that American military objectives should be to cause North Vietnam to cease its control and support of the insurgency in South Vietnam and Laos, to assist South Vietnam in defeating Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, and to assist South Vietnam in pacification extending governmental control over its territory.

North Vietnam continued to build its own forces inside South Vietnam. At first this was done by continued infiltration by sea and along the Ho Chi Minh trail and then, in early 1966, through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). U.S. air elements received permission to conduct reconnaissance bombing raids, and tactical air strikes into North Vietnam just north of the DMZ, but ground forces were denied authority to conduct reconnaissance patrols in the northern portion of the DMZ and inside North Vietnam. Confined to South Vietnamese territory U.S. ground forces fought a war of attrition against the enemy, relying for a time on body counts as one standard indicator for measuring successful progress for winning the war.

During 1966 there were eighteen major operations, the most successful of these being Operation WHITE WING (MASHER). During this operation, the 1st Cavalry Division, Korean units, and ARVN forces cleared the northern half of Binh Dinh Province on the central coast. In the process they decimated a division, later designated the North Vietnamese 3d Division. The U.S. 3d Marine Division was moved into the area of the two northern provinces and in concert with South Vietnamese Army and other Marine Corps units, conducted Operation HASTINGS against enemy infiltrators across the DMZ.

The largest sweep of 1966 took place northwest of Saigon in Operation ATTLE-BORO, involving 22,000 American and South Vietnamese troops pitted against the VC 9th Division and a NVA regiment. The Allies defeated the enemy and, in what became a frequent occurrence, forced him back to his havens in Cambodia or Laos.

By 31 December 1966, U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam numbered 385,300. Enemy forces also increased substantially, so that for the same period, total enemy strength was in excess of 282,000 in addition to an estimated 80,000 political cadres. By 30 June 1967, total U.S. forces in SVN had risen to 448,800, but enemy strength had increased as well.

On 8 January U.S. and South Vietnamese troops launched separate drives against two major VC strongholds in South Vietnam in the so-called “Iron Triangle” about 25 miles northwest of Saigon. For years this area had been under development as a VC logistics base and headquarters to control enemy activity in and around Saigon. The Allies captured huge caches of rice and other foodstuffs, destroyed a mammoth system of tunnels, and seized documents of considerable intelligence value.

In February, the same U.S. forces that had cleared the “Iron Triangle”, were committed with other units in the largest allied operation of the war to date, JUNCTION CITY. Over 22 U.S. and four ARVN battalions engaged the enemy, killing 2,728. After clearing this area, the Allies constructed three airfields; erected a bridge and fortified two camps in which CIDG garrisons remained as the other allied forces withdrew.[65]

Two weeks after leaving Dong Tre Project Delta was requested to again support the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), this time from an FOB at Buon Blech in II Corps. A total of ten recon teams and two Roadrunner teams were deployed. Recon Team 8 encountered a squad of eight enemy and initiated contact, killing three. Roadrunner Team 102 was fired upon by a single enemy soldier and successfully evaded and continued the mission. Except for these two contacts no enemy were detected in the area of operation that stretched along the Cambodian border. Heavy rains had flooded the streams and erased any recent signs of travel. This short operation began on July 15th and ended on July 29th. Major Luttrell assumed command of Project Delta during this operation.[33]

Operation 10-66 was conducted in two phases between August 9th and September 5th, 1966. The first phase was conducted from an FOB at Song Be and Delta was placed OPCON to the Vietnamese III Corps. The second phase was conducted from an FOB established at Tay Ninh on August 23rd where Delta operated OPCON to the U.S. II Field Force Vietnam (FFV), and in cooperation with the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Brigade, 196th Light Infantry Brigade. Ten Delta Recon Teams, Five Roadrunner Teams and two Ranger operations were conducted from FOB Song Be. The missions started off quietly enough with only minimal enemy sightings in the first two days. On the third day, August 13th, Team 11 called in an air strike on two buildings and seven enemy, destroying both buildings and killing five enemy. On the 14th the 2nd Company, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion (U.S. advisors: LT Deaton, LT Hamilton, SFC Winder, SSG Musselwhite, SSG Raines) conducted a sweep of the village of Phuc Hanh. The Rangers encountered an estimated company of NVA deployed as a delaying force to cover the retreat of a larger force. The Rangers suffered two killed and eight wounded but succeeded in driving the enemy off with air support. The houses in the village each had a bunker beneath it. The rapid deployment of the enemy force led U.S. advisors to believe that the enemy had advance knowledge of the Ranger sweep. This was confirmed when three refugees, discovered hiding in a tunnel in the village, revealed that they had been warned by the NVA the night before to leave because a force of 100 VN and Americans was coming to the village. (Author’s note: In researching this operation I came across one of the more humorous transposition errors in the 10-66 AAR. When referring to this suspicion the author, or typist, under “Conclusions and Recommendations” documents the following: “Recommend that planning of future operations be conducted with minimum U.S. and VC personnel.”[34] The Rangers continued onward to perform a Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA). Next to one bomb crater the Rangers found two dead NVA, a severed human arm and several weapons.[34] On August 17th Team 7, led by Norm Doney, called in air strikes on an estimated 150 enemy resulting in an estimated 95 killed. Doney returned to the area after the team was extracted to assist the FAC (LT John Flanagan) in directing more strikes. It was estimated that this mission destroyed an NVA regiment.[36] Norm Doney was awarded the Silver Star for his actions that day. Team 3 observed an estimated 250 NVA in khaki uniforms on August 20th and called in air strikes on their position. On the last mission from Song Be Team 9 requested helicopter gunships to fire upon two enemy platoons and cover their extraction under fire. The first rescue ship into the LZ was shot down by enemy automatic weapons fire. The crew was gathered up by the team and secured in the midst of a 35 minute firefight until two additional rescue ships effected the extraction.[34] On August 23rd the FOB at Song Be closed out and Delta relocated to the FOB at Tay Ninh.

The first team inserted from Tay Ninh was Team 2, advised by SGT Eugene Moreau and SGT Johnny Varner, on August 25th, 1966. On the 26th Team 2 requested an air strike on an unknown number of enemy. The team had observed many enemy moving in small groups of two or three. Ten 500 pound bombs were dropped, five of which were duds. Unfortunately, this would serve as a prelude to disaster. On August 27th the Army radio relay aircraft attempted to contact Team 2 for a routine situation report without success. Team 2 had been attacked from the rear by a platoon sized force. The team was split during the firefight with both advisors and two LLDB forced into a small clearing. The enemy opened fire and hit both Americans and one LLDB. The enemy continued to fire from the tree line but did not attempt to overrun the disabled team. The Forward Air Controller (FAC) flew over the area with the Project Delta commanding officer and spotted a red signal panel and red smoke on the ground. They also saw a flashing signal mirror some 700 meters from the smoke and panel. The FAC flew over the smoke at tree top level and reported seeing one man lying face down and one man lying face up in a small clearing. He immediately called for a rescue ship. The rescue ship arrived on location with SGT Tim O’Connor, Delta medic, on board. O’Connor carried SGT Varner to the helicopter and placed him inside. SGT Varner was wounded in the chest and thigh. SGT O’ Connor returned to try and retrieve SGT Moreau but came under enemy fire and was wounded in the leg. He was forced to return to the helicopter without the body of SGT Moreau, who had died of his wounds. One LLDB emerged from the tree line and entered the helicopter. Another was discovered some distance from the casualties and lifted by McGuire rig. The 4th Ranger Company (U.S. advisors: LT Deaton, LT Hamilton, SSG Munoz, SSG Raines) was alerted and transported to the AO within two hours. They secured the body of SGT Moreau and that of LLDB CPL Mo and set up a perimeter for the night. On August 28th the bodies of SGT Moreau and CPL Mo were retrieved and the 4th Company was returned to FOB. While the recovery mission was being conducted the FAC, Lt Skinner Simpson, was flying around the AO with a Tom Carpenter in the back seat. They spotted ten to fifteen enemy soldiers and immediately dived on them to an altitude of 100 feet. Carpenter opened fire with an M-79 grenade launcher and killed three enemy.[34] Upon returning to the FOB the Air Force ALO, Airman Rudy Bishop, painted three stick figures on the fuselage of the O2 Bird Dog, reminiscent of the WWI aces.

Team 5 encountered a lone enemy soldier who was quickly killed. Among the items recovered from the soldier were a message control book and two encoded messages. Nearly all of the teams committed from Tay Ninh encountered and engaged the enemy. Team 6, Leo Kelland and Burhl Cunningham, was pursued by the enemy from the time of insertion and attempted to evade for two days before they were able to observe a road and trail intersection. They observed a platoon sized element travel down the road and take a break at the intersection with the trail. Soon another platoon came down the trail and joined the first platoon. Soon after that a third platoon came down the road and joined the first two. The group was commanded by a female VC. Kelland called for an air strike on the group and advised the FAC that they would have to be extracted immediately because the enemy force would likely scatter in their direction and they would be in an untenable situation. The FAC advised them that there was a small LZ some 75 meters to their rear. Kelland instructed the FAC to have the jets prep the LZ with napalm simultaneously with the bombing runs to clear the tall grass and allow the helicopters to set down for a swift extraction. The plan was executed and the team ran for the LZ. As they approached the helicopters the 281st door gunner and the Delta recon man riding recovery opened fire over their heads and killed several VC who had shed their equipment and were sprinting after the team in an effort to capture them. Leo Kelland, known as a fit soldier and a fierce warrior, would comment that he could hardly imagine what the outcome would be if one of those wiry little guys managed to tackle one of our guys burdened with web gear and rucksack and exhausted from days on patrol.[92]

One Roadrunner team encountered an enemy company and requested an air strike as they ran for an LZ. On the way to the LZ they observed a bunker equipped with typewriters, stacks of documents, khaki uniforms, and occupied by one soldier. They destroyed the bunker with hand grenades and made their way to an LZ.

The last team extracted was Team 12, Tom Carpenter and Mike Stanfield, which was surrounded by enemy troops and could not proceed. SFC Charles Harper was wounded in the chest and leg during this engagement and mede-vaced to Cu Chi.[34],[92] The FOB at Tay Ninh was closed out on September 5th, 1966 and the Project returned to Nha Trang.

The name of Eugene Moreau is inscribed on Panel 10E, Line 50 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

Operation 11-66 was a one day operation conducted from Cam Ranh Bay. One team of seven U.S. advisors and two LLDB was inserted to look for the wreckage of a F-4C aircraft belonging to the 12th Tactical Fighter Wing. The team searched the area without finding any sign of either the wreckage or any Air Force survivors.[35]

On September 25th, 1966 Project Delta returned to Tay Ninh and was placed under OPCON to the Commanding General, III Corps. Between September 25th and October 4th four recon missions, two Roadrunner missions and six Ranger operations were conducted. These operations were conducted in cooperation with the CIDG force located at Trai Bi Special Forces Camp. Two companies of the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion staged at Trai Bi and conducted operations from there. Four Roadrunner teams co-located with the Rangers in preparation for stay behind missions where they would accompany the Rangers on an operation and then separate to conduct their own reconnaissance.[37] The Recon men of Project Delta were confused by the mission. They had successfully located large enemy concentrations in this area only a month before and were being asked to go back and verify their findings. Given the numerous enemy contacts from previous missions, and the loss of SGT Moreau, they could not be blamed for being affronted at being second guessed. True professionals, they accepted the missions and went again.[36]

Recon Teams 3 and 9 were inserted at last light on September 26th. On the 27th Team 9, Joel Schenkelberger, another American, and Australian SAS team member Jewell, discovered a battalion base camp. The troops were assembled in bleachers and were being instructed by an NVA NCO, who was demonstrating the nomenclature and assembly of the AK 47. Schenk quietly whispered the team’s findings to the FAC and requested an air strike. An excited C&C ship persistently broke into the radio communication and repeatedly asked, “What are they doing now?” Schenk calmly directed the air strike and observed the damage before running toward an LZ. Again the C&C ship interrupted with, “What are they doing now?” In a deadpan voice Schenk calmly replied, “Now they’re conducting first aid class.” LT Flanagan, the FAC, reported large secondary explosions and fires after the attack.[36],[92]

Team 3 made contact with an unknown size enemy force on September 28th and successfully broke contact and continued the mission. The next day the team detected three NVA tracking them toward their LZ. Team 3 called for an airstrike on their pursuers and a pair of jets delivered napalm on the targets. Upon reaching the LZ the team leader proceeded to brief the FAC on targets they had observed over the course of their mission. As Team 3 was extracted the FAC (LT Flanagan) directed air strikes on the identified targets resulting in several enemy killed and numerous secondary explosions.

On October 1st Team 11, Burhl Cunningham and another American advisor, observed an estimated company of NVA performing calisthenics in a bivouac area and called for an air strike. Again an excited C&C ship repeatedly interrupted radio communications with, “What are they doing now?” After the air strikes Cunningham borrowed a phrase from his friend Schenk and reported that “Now they’re conducting first aid class.” It became a standard catch-all for “ the air strike was right on the money.” Enemy casualties were estimated to be 43 killed by air.36,37.92

As successful as the recon teams were in identifying targets and directing air attacks on them, the Rangers had the opportunity to demonstrate their ability to engage the enemy in force with multiple Ranger companies and even with an outside CIDG force. Six Ranger operations were conducted, three of which involved more than one company. On September 29th and 30th, and on October 2nd and 3rd, 1966 the 3rd, 1st and 5th Companies of the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion conducted an operation to explore the estimated battalion sized base camp discovered by recon Team 9. The debriefing report that accompanied the After Action Report for these missions can be found in Appendix III.[37]

As a direct result of the information gathered by Project Delta, the combined U.S. and South Vietnamese forces conducted the largest U.S. operation to date to find and destroy all enemy troops west of the Michelin rubber plantation near Tay Ninh. Dubbed Operation Attleboro, it began on October 15th, 1966 with combined forces of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the U.S 1st and 25th Infantry divisions, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, and at least two ARVN battalions totaling 20,000 troops at the height of the fighting. The fighting continued through the middle of November and was met with strong resistance from the 9th Viet Cong Division, one of the best trained Communist units in South Vietnam. Communist resistance was strong because the Tay Ninh area contained the principal VC comand center and the central office for the National Liberation Front known as the Central Organization for South Viet Nam (COSVN). By the end of the campaign over 2130 VC and NVA were confirmed killed. Over the course of the operations conducted from Song Be and Tay Ninh Project Delta provided ample intelligence to indicate that enemy troops were present in organized regimental strength and were committed to maintaining their strength in the area along the Cambodian border. The Allies defeated the enemy and, in what became a frequent occurrence, forced him back to his havens in Cambodia or Laos. [37]

The otherwise successful operation was marred by a tragic accident on September 28th when an L-19 air relay aircraft belonging to the 184th Aviation Company crashed on the FOB runway, killing the pilot. The Project Delta observer in the back seat of the L-19 was SFC Loy Brydon. He suffered two fractured legs and multiple lacerations to his neck and chest. He was medevaced to Cu Chi and on to Tan Son Nhut.[37]

CHAPTER X: 1966; DISASTER AT KHE SANH

Project Delta closed out 1966 with an operation conducted in two phases from an FOB in Khe Sanh. The Project was OPCON to the III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), 3rd Marine Division. The first phase of the operation was conducted between October 14th and November 18th, 1966. During Phase I six Delta recon team missions, seven Roadrunner team missions, two Ranger missions and one mission involving CIDG personnel from Special Forces Camp Khe Sanh took place. The area of operations had been identified as having heavy concentrations of enemy troops by U.S. conventional units working there over the previous months. Project Delta recon teams found ample evidence of recent activity but observed no notable current activity. The Marines were conducting operations to the north of the recon area and it was surmised that the recent activity could have been reinforcements enroute to those battles. The significant engagement of this operation involved the 4th Airborne Ranger Company (LT Deaton, LT Lewis, SGT Spencer, SGT Dyer) on November 8th and 9th. On a routine search and destroy mission the 4th Company discovered a Montagnard village. Upon entering the village they came under fire. They returned fire, causing the Montagnards to drop their weapons and flee. A search of the village revealed several squad sized huts with reinforced bunkers beneath them. Hidden in the walls of the huts were ammunition and mines which exploded when the huts were burned. They also found women’s wigs and dresses, but no other indication that women had been present in the village. The village appeared to have been there for a long time and was probably a way station for troops in transit. The Rangers destroyed a large cache of rice and other food items and departed the village. They were taken under fire by an enemy platoon sized ambush. They immediately called for tactical air support and directed it at the enemy position. The enemy ambush site was well fortified with machine gun bunkers, trenches and huts. The enemy broke contact under intense air attack and the Rangers moved to an LZ for extraction. In the mean time, LT Col. Hayes and Major Tat (LLDB CO) led a force of CIDG into the area and linked with 4th Company. The next morning the Rangers returned to the village and completed the mission by burning the remaining huts and bunkers.[38]

On November 9th, 1966 Air Force Captain Charles Swope, the newly arrived FAC pilot for the Project, departed the air field for a routine check on the teams. In the back seat was SFC Art Glidden, a Delta recon man. Ten minutes after takeoff radio communication with Captain Swope was lost. Two hours later a massive air search was begun. Late in the afternoon the wreckage of the O1E was spotted in the jungle, a puff of black smoke breaking through the trees. The Air Force pilot who discovered the wreckage reported that the plane was essentially intact but had been burned from rear of the windows forward and out a couple of feet on the wings. A recovery party led by SSG Tom Carpenter and SSG Tim O’Connor was quickly dispatched to the crash site. The pair were inserted without a radio due to a critical shortage. Their only contingency plan, thrown together on short notice with LT Flanagan, was that the pair would throw a WP grenade toward any enemy they encountered and mark their own position with a smoke grenade. That would give the FAC two points of reference to line up the jets or gunships for close air support. Fortunately no contact was made. The recovery team found SFC Glidden’s body about six feet from the aircraft near the right wing. Captain Swope’s body was still in the pilot’s seat. Both were badly burned. The recovery team secured the bodies as well as they could and placed them in body bags for the flight to Khe Sanh.[38],[36],[92] Because of their limited time on the ground the recovery team was unable to conduct an extensive examination of the aircraft to determine any cause for the crash. On November 13th LT Col. Hayes, LT Lewis, SFC Winder, and SSG Spencer took a group of 14 CIDG into the crash site but were withdrawn almost immediately upon arrival because of bad weather. Nearly a month later, during Phase II of the operation, the wreckage was recovered and examined. There were numerous small holes in the fuselage that were .22 caliber or smaller. It was theorized that the NVA had fired a canister or fleshette round from a 75mm recoilless rifle, or something similar.[36],[39]

Arthur Glidden’s name is inscribed on Panel 12E, Line 47 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

Charles Swope’s name is inscribed on Panel 12E, Line 49 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

Phase II of Operation 13-66 was conducted from Khe Sanh between November 24th and December 24th, 1966. A total of three Delta Recon missions, five Delta Roadrunner missions, and four Ranger operations were conducted. The weather in I Corps remained miserable at best. Frequent heavy rain, low cloud cover, high winds and limited visibility made flying an on and off venture throughout the operation, especially for high speed aircraft used for delivering tactical air strikes. The weather, along with other factors, would prove disastrous for this operation.

The FOB at Khe Sanh reopened on November 24th. Recon Team 1 received their Operation Order (OPORD) on the 25th. All operations were postponed daily until November 29th. On the 29th Teams 1 (Russell “Pete” Bott and Willie Stark) and 10 (Andre St. Laurent and “Brownie” Browne), and Roadrunner Teams 102 and 104 were inserted at last light. Team 10 and the Roadrunners had only received their OPORDERSs that morning, conducted their brief backs that morning and performed an aerial reconnaissance of the AOs that same day. The insertion helicopters took off in the middle of fog patches, rain showers and low ceilings. After the insertions the pilots returned to the FOB and reported that they had encountered even worse weather in the teams’ AOs. They had been forced to fly low and navigate without the use of geographical navigation aids obscured by the clouds and rain. As they reviewed the maps in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) they came to the realization that they may have confused a rain swollen stream for a larger river that they counted on for orientation. If that was the case, they had inserted Team 1 into Laos.[36] Ordinarily the helicopter pilots would have the prerogative to scrap a mission under such adverse conditions. In this case the entire Project was under intense pressure to conduct the operations. Equally unfortunate was the fact that the presence of U.S. troops on the ground in Laos was an extremely sensitive diplomatic issue for the U.S. There were, of course, U.S. troops operating in Laos under sterile conditions, meaning that they wore no identifying clothing, personal items, or equipment. These troops were from one of Project Delta’s sister units operating clandestinely under the auspices of MACV’s Studies and Observation Group (SOG). They, coincidentally, shared a launch site at Khe Sanh. Their air assets were all Vietnamese. Team 1 was instructed to move north and east. On the 30th Team 1 reported hearing voices near their location but continued the mission. A Ranger Company operation was postponed due to bad weather.

On December 1st the Army radio relay team was up early and reported that the entire AO was socked in.[36] Team 1 reported that they had just broken contact with an NVA tracking team of three enemy soldiers and requested immediate extraction. One of the trackers had gotten away. They were informed that extraction was not possible due to inclement weather.[39] LTC Hayes was confronted by Doc Simpson, who told him that it was insane to leave the team in since one of the NVA had escaped and the team had no idea what their location actually was. Hayes, described as an arrogant control freak, called together the recon section and informed them that there would be more teams inserted despite the weather. Joe Alderman, perhaps the finest recon man to ever put boots on the ground, advised the CO that there was no point in putting more teams in because all they could do was run for their lives. No air support could fly and no extractions could be made. LTC Hayes called Joe Alderman a coward. Joe, to his credit, took it calmly and advised the LTC that he had several awards for valor and figured that was statement enough that he wasn’t a coward. Hayes was so infuriated that he selected three or four recon men that he labeled troublemakers and ordered them from the Project. The fact was that these were quality individuals that he couldn’t control. For the next few days Doc Simpson made sure that Joe Alderman had someone with him at all times to prevent him from doing something he might regret.[92],[94],[97] Pete Bott asked when the FAC (LT Flanagan) would be up to give them a fix on their location. Without a known location they could easily be trapped by geographic features such as swollen rivers, cliffs, roads or even enemy base camps. The area they were in was a known regiment sized base area. They would soon find out they were right in the middle of it.

Flanagan waited for the winds to subside to 20 knots on the morning of December 1st and then he proceeded to be briefed by Norm Doney, now the NCO in charge of the recon section, and the project CO, LTC Hayes.

Doney assigned Jay Graves to ride the back seat with FAC and they departed in weather described as “dog shit”.[36] The Bird Dog flew to an area that Flanagan suspected the team to be in and began to stutter the engine to get their attention. He got no response. The good news was that he was over the southeast corner of North Vietnam and the ground was criss-crossed with fresh trails and newly constructed bunkers and fighting positions. The back-seater spotted five NVA walking openly down a trail. Flanagan changed direction and within a few minutes was rewarded with radio contact with the team. The team guided him by sound over their location and LT Flanagan was able to identify their position, relay the grid coordinates to them and warn them of NVA activity all around them. On his way back to the FOB Flanagan contacted flight control for a weather update and was told that the weather would only get worse for the next few days with winds as high as fifty knots. The bad news got worse; no tactical air support assets could take off or land in the current conditions. Team 1 was in deep trouble. They were confirmed to be in Laos in the middle of a regimental base area. They could not expect to be extracted or to get any tactical air support because of the weather.[36] It would get worse.

On the morning of December 2nd Team 1 reported that they had been in contact again and that one American was wounded. They believed that they were surrounded. Six helicopters from the 281st scrambled and headed for the team’s last known position. On board was SGT Irby Dyer III, a Delta medic and veteran of several Ranger operations.

They called the FOB shortly and asked for the FAC to help them find the team. The helicopters were having difficulty navigating in the low overcast. LT Flanagan grabbed his gear and headed for the flight line. He was joined quickly by Tom Tucker, an NCO from Recon. Flanagan tried to dissuade Tucker to no avail. The two climbed into the Bird Dog and took off for the AO. Several minutes later they managed to avoid colliding with two mountains and rendezvoused with the helicopters. Flanagan directed the helicopters to an area away from his flight path to avoid collisions while trying to pinpoint the team. He was able to establish contact with Pete Bott and be guided over his location. He flew very low, at 300 feet, and drew no enemy fire. He asked Bott to throw a smoke grenade to identify his location for the rescue ships. Bott complied and the rescue ship homed in on a small clearing with four bodies lying prone in some elephant grass.

As the rescue ship flared into the clearing the elephant grass was thrown back from dozens of hidden bunker locations and the helicopter came under intense automatic weapons fire. It had been a trap and the team was the bait. As the rescue ship took fire, the gunships attacked the enemy positions with everything they had. In the matter of a few short seconds the rescue ship gained 300 feet of altitude and slowly turned and nosed into the hillside. The helicopter exploded and burned on impact. Their ordnance and fuel expended, the helicopters were forced to leave the scene. LT Flanagan tried desperately to get air support without success. He then decided that any hope the team had lay in his hands. He began an air assault on the gun positions armed only with a few rockets and some smoke grenades. Tommy Tucker fired his CAR-15 and threw hand grenades. They conducted tree top level strafing runs until their ordnance was gone and then circled to try and make radio contact with the air crew or the recon team. They were met with silence. They flew over the team’s last known position and saw that the little clearing was empty. The team had vanished. They returned to Khe Sanh. The wind and rain caused the runway to be slick and the Bird Dog was blown from one side of the runway to the other as it it was forced to abort its first attempt to land. The second attempt was successful.[36]

Andre St. Laurent’s Team 10 was extracted on the 2nd. Project Delta was informed by the 3rd Marine Division that no further rescue attempts would be made without the express permission of their Commanding General. Despite specific instructions to the contrary, LT Flanagan and Captain Al Groth, the newly arrived replacement for Captain Swope, would continue the search for the team for several days. On the 5th they discovered a red signal panel and directed rescue ships to pick up the only two team members ever heard from again. The two LLDB were able to escape when LT Flanagan threw his yellow smoke grenades near the trapped team. The NVA apparently thought an air strike was coming and ducked under cover of their bunkers. The LLDB used the distraction to evade. They tried to get the two Americans to follow but Pete Bott was last seen waving them off as he cradled Willie Stark’s head on his thigh. The LLDB said that Stark was wounded in the chest and leg and couldn’t move. Pete Bott refused to leave him.[36]

What followed was a series of air attacks orchestrated by the two Delta FACs. They spent a lot of time seeking targets of opportunity and exploiting them with tactical air. With the aid of Delta Recon men as back seat observers and spotters, the two FACs did serious damage to enemy assets in the AO. One of their targets was the 75mm recoilless rifle that had killed Captain Swope the month before. Using one FAC as bait to draw the enemy fire, the second FAC identified the gun placement and destroyed it with air attacks.[36],[38] Flanagan would leave the Project after this operation and continue his career. Captain Al Groth, having survived his baptism of fire with Delta, would become a much respected member of this small band of warriors and come to be known as The Great White Hunter.

In the debriefing of the two LLDB from Team 1, it was revealed that one of the team members, as they fled the ambush site, heard an enemy soldier say something to the effect of “here they are, tie his hands, we will take them this way.”[30] Pete Bott and Willie Stark were carried as Missing in Action (MIA) until they were declared dead in 1978. Many people, including Norm Doney, believe that Pete and Willie were captured and may have survived captivity for many years.[30]

A Hatchet Force was sent into the area to recover the bodies of the air crew and SGT Dyer. The Hatchet Force was an immediate reaction force that was a part of the sterile SOG unit. They went in with Vietnamese helicopters. They found the bodies of all five laid out neatly on a trail next to the crash site. The bodies had been booby trapped. The team was able to recover parts of three bodies before having to depart under enemy fire. Air strikes were called in on the area effectively destroying any chance for further recovery of remains. SGT Dyer and one crewman were carried as “Killed Body Not Recovered”.[30]

The name of Russell Bott is inscribed on Panel 13E, Line 3 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

The name of Willie Stark is inscribed on Panel 13E, Line 7 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

The name of Irby Dyer III is inscribed on Panel 13E, Line 4 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

During Operation 13-66 Project Delta identified an area of troop concentration of NVA regulars along the Laotian border where they were amassed for a major offensive. Safe and secure in the politically protected Laotian fringe, they would be free to train and supply for a major attack of their choosing. It would take a year to launch, but the Marine outpost at Khe Sanh would hear from this group again.

CHAPTER XI: 1967; BACK TO THE AN LAO VALLEY

Until early 1967 Project Delta Recon was the province of the experienced Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) of Special Forces. It was an all volunteer organization that had developed its own methods of operation and developed a warrior ethos that fiercely protected its inner workings and represented a tremendous pride in ownership. Many of the officer corps served valiantly and well in Project Delta, primarily as Senior Advisors to the Rangers and as the heads of the organizational “S” shops. Most of the staff officers rotated in and out of the staff positions from field assignments with the Rangers and, less commonly, Recon. Many of the officers served previous tours with Special Forces A-Teams or with conventional units. In late 1966 and early 1967 a group of seven young lieutenants was assigned to Project Delta. The understanding was that someone had decided that each Recon team should be led by an officer. The real reason emerged some time later.[44]

The NCO led Recon teams of Project Delta had provided some very valuable and, in some cases, unbelievable information gathered on forays into areas far removed from conventional operations. The information was unusual to the point of losing its value on upper echelon staff soldiers who lacked the experience and ability to absorb anything out of the ordinary. These young officers were brought in to verify the information reported by the teams. The professional soldiers of Project Delta understood full well the folly of assigning any inexperienced person the responsibility of conducting clandestine missions far from any zone of comfort, regardless of rank or pay grade. They understood that not every man, again regardless of rank or pay grade, possessed the natural innate field sense, leadership abilities or physical abilities to perform the task at hand. The experienced NCOs of the Recon Section set out to prepare the young officers for their new assignment. What followed was a strenuous physical training program, hours of classroom instruction, immediate action drills and a live fire graduation field exercise. Project Delta had established the MACV Recondo School in the last year and was fully prepared to move forward expeditiously. Another factor that was sorely tested was the character of these young officers. LT Jerry Estenson recalls that he was sent to the air field and instructed to perform parachute jumps with the Rangers until all the pre-packed parachutes were used up. He was told that he needed to do this in order to qualify for Vietnamese Jump Wings. He performed no less than a dozen jumps in one day before he was finally told that award of the VN Jump Wings was honorary; no jumps were required. Jerry was one of the young men who was successful at running Recon. A young Captain by the name of Henry “Hugh” Shelton was designated the Platoon Leader of the Recon Platoon. Many years later he would become the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Few of these young officers would run multiple Recon missions before realizing that their particular talents ran more to the conventional infantry type applications of the Rangers, or with administrative duties removed from the field. Not everyone was cut out for Recon.[44] Of these seven officers, three, Lieutenants Carney, Coulter and Estenson, continued to run recon for their short tours with Delta. LT Richardson was wounded by a punji stake and medevaced, LT Ford became a decorated Senior Ranger Advisor, LT Sullivan also moved to the Rangers, LT Hadden served two tours with Delta in Recon, as a Ranger advisor and in the S-2, S-3, and S-5 shops. Captain Shelton also served as the Recon platoon leader, as a Ranger advisor and in the S shops. [93]

Jerry Estenson, a professor in the University of California system, insists that the NCOs of Project Delta provided him with a foundation for his future that has guided him in his successful family and professional life, but also caused him extreme frustration. During his initial training he was assigned to Joe Markham for his primary instruction and mentoring. Joe was, even then, an icon in the small world of Recon. Known for his cool demeanor, flawless planning and relentless pursuit of perfection in the field, Joe “Pea Head” Markham took Jerry under his wing and guided him through preparation for his first mission. The first time in “the hole” Jerry found himself frozen on the insertion LZ for what seemed to him to be minutes. In reality it was only a second or two, but enough to cause him some self doubt. He told Markham about it and Joe just laughed and told him not to worry, it was a normal feeling given the enormity of a first trip into Delta’s work place. Jerry credits Markham with having such a profound effect on him that on each subsequent mission he led as a Team Leader, and continuing to the present day, when confronted with a difficult decision, he asks himself, “What would Joe do?” Jerry found himself emerging from his Project Delta tour with a personal set of values he attributes to Joe Markham, Gary Kerley, Doc Simpson and the other NCOs he served with. They include a proclivity for intense preparation and organization; setting personal performance and ethical standards that far exceed those of most others; and a level of determination to continue the mission at hand. Jerry’s biggest frustration is seeing his peers and his students falling far short of the standards he sets for himself.

On January 9th, 1967 the local CIDG force charged with security around Nha Trang notified Project Delta that one of its company sized patrols had been ambushed and was surrounded in the hills west of the city. He requested assistance in rescuing the beleaguered patrol. LT Col. Hayes, LT Lewis, SFC Adams, and SSG Nichols led a platoon of Rangers on an air assault of an LZ near the CIDG. The Rangers proceeded toward the CIDG Company’s position and were engaged in a fire fight by an enemy unit of unknown strength. The enemy broke contact and the platoon continued and linked up with the CIDG force and recovered their dead and wounded. They began to move towards an LZ and were again engaged by heavy automatic weapons fire. Hayes requested additional Rangers be inserted on the next morning. On January 10th the 1st Ranger Company, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion, led by Major Jones, MSG Gambill, SSG Jantz and SGT Millam landed and headed toward the combined Ranger and CIDG force. They were stopped just short of the rendezvous by LT Col. Hayes who requested that they secure an LZ for extraction. 1st Company proceeded down the mountain and secured an LZ. 2nd Company and the CIDG force, encumbered by the dead and wounded, were forced to find a place to remain overnight because of darkness. They proceeded to the LZ on the 11th and were extracted without further incident. 1st Company under LT Carney, MSG Gambill, SSG Jantz and SGT Buchanon would conduct a search and destroy mission for a VC base camp in the same vicinity on January 20th and 21st. They discovered that the camp had been abandoned recently and destroyed the buildings and bunkers.[45]

Two recon missions were conducted during 1-67. Teams 3 (SFC Roderick, LT Best, SFC Low) and 4 (SFC Tucker, LT Hadden, SSG Stedman) would report finding signs of recent enemy activity but no sightings. Operation 2-67 was an extension of Project Delta’s Operation 1-67 in the area near Nha Trang known as Binh Tan. A total of six recon, three Roadrunner and two Ranger missions were accomplished during this period.[45],[46] The enemy were discovered to be well hidden and entrenched in a series of caves high in the hills west of Nha Trang. The information was passed on to MACV who then assigned a search and destroy mission to the Korean allied forces (ROK). Air attacks had had little effect on the VC positions and MACV was under pressure from Washington to minimize U.S. losses and avoid political repercussions of any kind. The ROK, having no such constraints, assaulted the caves with flame throwers, driving the VC further into the mountain. When they had suppressed the enemy fire they painted large white semi-circles around the cave openings so they could be identified from far away. They then retreated and proceeded to direct artillery fire into the cave openings, effectively dismantling the enemy positions.[30],[44]

Operation 3-67 was planned for an area in northern II Corps to locate several regimental sized VC and NVA forces known to be operating in the area. The Operations Order was given and mobilization began to set up an FOB at Kham Duc. The FOB was set up and visual reconnaissance was performed as the teams readied for insertion. Higher headquarters scrapped the operation on the 18th of February and Project Delta returned to Nha Trang.[47]

Operation 4-67 was conducted in support of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) from LZ Pony in II Corps. Just a year after the disastrous beginning of 1966, Project Delta would return to the An Lao Valley to search for two NVA Divisions and a VC Regiment located in their AO. During this operation fifteen Recon missions, ten Roadrunner missions and seven Ranger operations would take place.

The results of these missions indicated the presence of both NVA and VC in large but static numbers, indicating that many troops were moving into and out of the area. Base camp facilities were found unoccupied but showed signs of frequent use. The most significant sighting was made by the 3rd Platoon, 5th Company, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion that had been inserted on a reconnaissance in force mission. Accompanied by LT Livingston, SFC Walter “Doc” Simpson, and SGT Cole, the platoon observed a total of 123 enemy troops and called in artillery and air strikes against them. They were engaged in a firefight by a small group and again on the LZ while being extracted. Roadrunner Teams 101 and 102 also reported significant enemy sightings. Team 102 sighted 70 enemy troops that were a mix of Vietnamese and Montagnards and led by an NVA officer. Team 101 heard movements along a trail next to which they had settled for the night. These movements were intermittent and each lasted approximately thirty minutes, leading them to believe that a force of 300-500 enemy troops had moved west across the border during the night. Most of the teams observed smaller squad and platoon sized units that appeared to be engaged in rear security operations. They also experienced new tactics developed by the enemy whereby they would attempt to follow and locate the teams and then surround them at night in order to engage them at first light. The enemy seemed to know that the teams were small in number and would seek extraction upon contact.

On March 11th Recon Team 2 made contact with an enemy force of unknown size and requested immediate extraction. SFC Bill Roderick was wounded in the exchange and treated at the FOB. On March 16th Recon Team 9 detained three men, a woman, and two children for questioning and were extracted. On March 21st Team 7 was surrounded and requested immediate extraction. In the ensuing firefight both U.S. advisors were wounded.

Team 2, Doc Simpson and Allen Archer, was inserted at last light on March 21st. Early on the morning of the 22nd, Team 2 was ambushed by 30-40 enemy dressed in black. SFC Allen Archer was killed in the attack. The remaining team members moved rapidly away from the ambush site and called in artillery on the enemy positions. The 5th Ranger Company was quickly mobilized to recover SFC Archer’s body.

Recon Team 5 was extracted on March 23rd due to a punji stake wound sustained by LT Richardson.

Team 8, Jerry Estenson, Jay Graves and SFC Brewer, inserted high above the An Lao and descended toward the valley floor. Their mission plan called for crossing the valley floor and climbing to an LZ on the opposite side after searching for and surveilling high traffic trails. On the 23rd Team 8 halted a short distance above a trail while Jay Graves crept closer to observe. As Graves approached the trail he saw 12 NVA soldiers in battle uniform traveling toward him. He stepped back and crouched in hiding. As he watched the NVA pass he became aware of pain radiating from his leg just above the boot line and saw a Banded Krait chewing on his calf. The Banded Krait has small rows of teeth and administers its venom in the same manner as the North American Coral snake. Graves attempted to trap the snake and capture it but it escaped. He made his way back to the team and pointed out his situation. SFC Brewer applied a restrictive bandage above the bite and Jerry Estenson tried to make contact with the FAC or any air relay without success. At that time recon teams still carried the PRC 64, a heavy radio set capable only of keyed transmissions in Morse Code, as a backup means of communication. Jerry had been a school trained commo man before transferring to demolitions school. He threw the antenna out and began to tap out an SOS along with his distinct call sign. Within ten minutes a FAC was overhead directing a helicopter toward the team for extraction. Estenson then ran out onto a sandbar in the river and signaled their location for extraction. Knowing that the team’s location would be compromised by the medevac of Graves, Estenson called for the entire team to be extracted. The Detachment CO, LTC Hayes, argued that the remainder of the team should continue the mission. Estenson credits Captain Hugh Shelton with the fortitude to buck his superior officer and convince Hayes that the entire team should be extracted. The team was extracted under enemy fire. Graves recalls that the medic aboard the recovery ship held two syringes in his hand and asked, “Where’s the snake?” Graves responded that he couldn’t catch it but was sure it was a Krait. The medic threw down one syringe and proceeded to inject Jay with the second saying, “I hope you’re Goddamn sure it was a Krait.” As with many recon stories, this one didn’t end with the conclusion of the mission. Jay was transported to a field hospital where treatment continued. He was in a tent by himself when he finally fell into a deep sleep. When he awoke there were about thirty troops in the same tent, all with bullet wounds to the back. He learned that they had been sent charging up a hill in response to Delta’s information about enemy locations. As Jay tells it, “Instead of walking mortar fire up the hill to prep it, some ‘Hey Diddle Diddle Up the Fuckin’ Middle’ Second Lieutenant sent the troops straight up. Nobody paid any attention to the part of our reports that said the hills were covered with spider holes.” The enemy waited until the infantrymen were past them then popped from their concealed positions and fired from the rear.

On March 25th Team 4 made contact with an unknown sized enemy force resulting in wounds to LT Richardson and SFC Seal, the two U.S. advisors. The team was extracted under small arms fire. And so it went for the duration of Operation 4-67. The air assets of the 281st AHC performed admirably in support of the operations and performed medevac and rescue missions for the II Corps Mobile Guerrilla Force (Mike Force) operating nearby. The teams ran multiple missions and encountered many small units of enemy. The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) supported the operation with air and artillery assets in a quick and responsive fashion. Throughout the operation the 1st Cavalry moved and expanded Delta’s AO and preempted Delta insertions with their own higher priority missions. This caused concern for direct support of teams on the ground that were separated by much greater distances than usual making continuous radio relay coverage impossible and immediate response times unnecessarily long. The Project returned to Nha Trang on April 5th, 1967.[48]

The name of Allen Archer is inscribed on Panel 17E, Line 16 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

CHAPTER XII: BACK TO THE ASHAU

Back at Nha Trang, morale seemed to be waning towards an all time low. Some new personnel had been assigned to the Project without the usual vetting process in kind of a “warm body” approach to staff the declining numbers. Major Allen called a formation and with all men present he gave them an ultimatum similar to that given by Charlie Beckwith two years earlier: “If you don’t want to be here then get the hell out. Now.” Several of the unwilling soldiers left immediately. Delta’s all volunteer status was once again restored. Project Delta barely had time to regroup and prepare equipment and manpower before an advance team departed Nha Trang on April 10th for Khe Sanh and then on to establish FOB Phu Bai. It was back to the Ashau Valley for Operation Pirous, 5-67. Delta would once again be OPCON to the 3rd Marine Amphibious Force (MAF). The mission was to confirm the presence of two NVA divisions and a VC regiment in and around the Ashau. During Operation Pirous, twenty Recon missions, eighteen Roadrunner missions, and 9 Ranger operations were conducted.

Visual reconnaissance from the air began on April 16th, with the Command and Control element taking ground fire on the first over flight. On April 18th the FAC was on his way to take a recon team leader for an aerial reconnaissance of his AO when he spotted 27 enemy troops and two large trucks moving along a roadway. He called in an air strike as the enemy tried to camouflage the trucks and destroyed them.

Insertions continued to be plagued by poor weather conditions in the AO. The steep slopes required insertions by jumping from higher than normal and by rappelling or rope ladders. Several teams suffered injuries on infiltration and had to be immediately extracted. Other LZs were under enemy surveillance and helicopters drew fire while trying to insert teams. On April 27th Team 9 reported being pursued by a platoon sized force and requested immediate extraction. The first rescue ship managed to lift two LLDB team members out through the thick canopy by electric hoist. The second helicopter attempted to get to the team and was shot down by small arms and automatic weapons. The crew was not injured and managed to recover machine guns and ammo from the downed helicopter and link up with the four remaining team members from Team 9. 5th Company, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion was scrambled at Phu Bai and loaded three Marine CH-46 helicopters. Two of the ships landed and discharged their Rangers, the third crash landed with only a minor injury to one Ranger. The injured Ranger, the air crew and weapons from the downed helicopter were immediately rescued by another CH-46. The Rangers linked with the team and called in tactical air strikes. Once enemy fire was suppressed five additional CH-46s arrived from the Marines and extracted the remaining air crew, Rangers, and Team 9.[49]

Aircraft troubles were far from over. On May 10th the radio relay aircraft that supported the elements in the field crashed on takeoff from the FOB. The DeHaviland U1A Otter spent all day, every day, in a large and high orbit around the Project’s AO to receive and relay any radio messages from the teams on the ground. The Ashau is so steep that regular communication accomplished via line-of-sight could not be accomplished. The crew usually included a recon man to handle emergency communications with the teams. The Otter would land on the dirt air strip adjacent to the FOB and remain overnight after each days’ flights. The FOB and airstrip had two rolls of concertina wire spread around them as part of the FOB security. At some point, the two rows of wire were supplemented with a third row, placed on top of the other two. The pilot, accustomed to the two rows of wire, did not have enough altitude on takeoff and snagged the planes rear single wheel in the wire. Everyone on board was injured in the crash. SFC Larry Bartlett, the recon NCO onboard, suffered severe back injuries and was medevaced.[49]

On May 14th the insertion helicopter for Team 1 was hit by small arms and automatic weapons fire and crashed on the LZ. A recovery ship immediately flew in and retrieved the air crew and part of the team. A second rescue ship was shot down on the LZ attempting to pick up the remainder of the team. The air crew linked with the team and the Team Leader called in gunships, Spooky, and two F4 jets, all coordinated by the Delta FAC. They provided illumination and suppressive fire until the team and crew could be extracted well after dark. The two downed aircraft and equipment left behind during the extraction were destroyed by tactical air strikes the next morning. An interesting side note to this rescue operation is carried in the After Action Report. The note states that although night extractions were now deemed to be feasible they should not be considered as a matter of routine. The one significant useful piece of information gleaned from this exercise was that parachute flares provided enough illumination so that a signal mirror could be used to locate ground elements. [49]

On May 21st Roadrunner Team 107 requested an immediate extraction due to illness of a team member. On the first extraction attempt the helicopter received small arms fire wounding the pilot in the head and the Delta recovery NCO in the arm. The ship pulled off and directed the team to higher ground. The second attempt resulted in a gunship from the 281st being shot down by small arms fire. The helicopter crashed and rolled down into a small ravine and exploded in flames. Shortly after the crash a red signal panel was seen close to the wreckage. A Marine CH-46 responded to the crash but could not land near the area. They were successful in locating one crew member and rescued him. The Roadrunner team was located and extracted by a CH-3 Jolly Green Giant. More ships from the 281st arrived on station and detected two Americans on the ground. The rescue ship attempted to rescue them and came under heavy ground fire, killing one door gunner. It was decided to insert the 1st Ranger Company at first light to attempt a rescue. On May 22nd the 1st Ranger Company inserted under heavy ground fire. One Marine CH-46 was hit by ground fire and crashed on the LZ. The FAC sighted two of the three missing crew members on the ground and directed the Rangers toward them. The Rangers found one of the missing crewmen who had become separated from the pilot. The Rangers decided to remain in the area overnight after they evacuated the recovered crewman. The C&C aircraft reported seeing another signal panel from the air. On the 23rd the Rangers established radio contact with the missing pilot and linked up with him. During the extraction of the Rangers and the recovered pilot, three Rangers were killed; two Rangers and one interpreter were wounded. The missing copilot was never found despite continuous searches.[49]

During an aerial reconnaissance on May 27th, gunships from the 281st AHC intercepted a radio message from an Army FAC in an O1E Bird Dog saying that he had been hit and was going down in the Ashau. The gunships immediately rallied to his location and escorted him all the way back to Phu Bai.[49]

On June 4th LT Col. Baites, USMC Squadron 235, crashed his F8 aircraft in Delta’s AO. Hearing his radio transmission, two pilots from the 281st AHC sped to his location and rescued him within minutes of the crash.[49]

The teams were in constant contact throughout the entire operation. Injuries were frequent and required team extractions and personnel replacements, dangerous practices. On May 19th Team 9 jumped from a helicopter while inserting into high elephant grass. SSG Maurice Brakeman was impaled through the rectum on a punji stake placed on the LZ. The team was extracted and Brakeman was medevaced. He survived the ordeal and returned to Project Delta in 1970.

An indicator of the high activity in this area were the more than 1000 sorties flown by tactical air support aircraft on over 500 air strikes called in support of Delta’s operations. One of Project Delta’s missions was to identify targets and coordinate the air attacks from on the ground. Many of the air strikes were called in support of teams in contact during their missions and at the time of extraction. On June 15th, 1967 Project Delta headed back to

Nha Trang.[49]

CHAPTER XIII: LTC BRUISER ALLEN; BREAK CONTACT, CONTINUE MISSION

The fifth named campaign of the Vietnam War was “Counteroffensive, Phase III”, 1 June 1967-29 January 1968. The conflict in South Vietnam remains basically unchanged. As Operation JUNCTION CITY ended, elements of the U.S. 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the forces of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam swung back toward Saigon to conduct another clearing operation, MANHATTAN. This took peace in the Long Nguyen base area just north of the previously cleared “Iron Triangle.”

South Vietnamese Armed Forces became more active and capable under U.S. advisors. During the year the Vietnamese Special Forces assumed responsibility for several Special Forces camps and for the CIDG companies manning them. In each case all of the U.S. advisors withdrew, leaving the Vietnamese in full command.

With an increased delegation of responsibility to them, the South Vietnamese conducted major operations during 1967, and, in spite of VC attempts to avoid battle, achieved a number of contacts.

Despite the success of U.S. and South Vietnamese Army operations, there were indications in the fall of 1967 of another enemy build-up, particularly in areas close to Laos and Cambodia. In late October, the VC struck again at the Special Forces Camp at Loc Ninh. Fortunately Vietnamese reinforcements saved the camp. At the same time, approximately 12,000 VC troops converged on a Special Forces camp at Dak To. This camp was located in northern Kontum Province, where the borders of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam meet. In response to this potential threat, the U.S. and South Vietnam committed a total of sixteen battalions to the region to counter a disturbing enemy resurgence at Kontum and Loc Ninh[65]

Operation 6-67 was named Shakedown and was a continuation of Operation 1-67 to locate and destroy elements of NVA and VC units operating west of Nha Trang. The enemy units had sustained extensive losses at the hands of the Koreans earlier in the year and had dispersed. Recent information indicated that they were regrouping and attempting to regain battle strength while continuing to acquire provisions and conduct interdiction missions along roadways and travel routes. Teams 4 (SFC Bartlett, SSG Monroe, SGT Betterton) and 1 (SFC Stanfield, SFC Singh) conducted reconnaissance missions from July 6th through July 8th. Neither team detected any activity although both teams found their extraction LZs to be cultivated in corn. Team 3 crash landed on their LZ on July 7th with no injuries to the crew or the team. They were immediately extracted and the Nung Platoon (SFC Findley, SSG Rittenhouse, SP4 Meder) was alerted to secure the downed helicopter. The Nungs were inserted later on the 7th and established a perimeter around the aircraft. During a routine security patrol outside the perimeter the Nungs discovered a cache of corn, rice and manioc and destroyed it. They rigged explosive charges to the aircraft just prior to extraction on July 8th. The aircraft was destroyed a few minutes after the Nungs were extracted.[50] The Nung Platoon was previously a non-operational element of Project Delta assigned camp security duties. Prior to Operation Shakedown the Nungs were readied for field duty as immediate reaction forces and as reconnaissance in force units. During the time frame of this operation, Major Charles “Bruiser” Allen assumed command of Project Delta. He would be the longest serving Commanding Officer of the unit.

Just days after the conclusion of Operation Shakedown, Project Delta received an order to set up an FOB in I Corps at An Hoa to support the III MAF again. The enemy had established two known base camps in the mountains east of Delta’s assigned AO and was known to resupply the bases with personnel and equipment from Laos through the many east-west valleys including those from the terminating end of the Ashau. Delta’s mission was to identify any other base areas, and to identify which routes were being used and by which units. It was suspected that a number of way stations and rest areas were established in Delta’s AO and were being guarded by small local NVA and VC forces. These forces were apparently instructed not to fire upon aircraft so as not to give away their location. Delta was to find any way stations and destroy them with the use of tactical air.[51]

During Operation Samurai ten Recon missions and three Roadrunner missions were accomplished. Two Nung Platoon missions were launched as reconnaissance in force missions. The Rangers were tasked with ten operations: one battalion mission, four company missions and five platoon missions. The FOB at An Hoa was established as operational on July 17th, 1967. It was apparent from the beginning that the AO was saturated with small units used as trail watchers, way station guards, crop tenders, LZ guards and guides for larger units passing through. These small groups effectively sabotaged, watched and defended many LZs throughout the AO. Many insertions were thwarted by small arms fire on the LZs and others were compromised by strategically placed stakes and traps. Numerous contacts and firefights occurred during Operation Samurai. Most were with small units of three to six enemy. In the areas adjacent to known enemy infiltration routes along the terminus of the Ashau Valley, contacts with larger platoon and company sized units occurred. Invariably these contacts were immediately preceded by contacts with a smaller security force.[51]

Major Allen, a Korean War veteran, brought a leadership style to Project Delta that was both challenging and endearing to his men. Affectionately known as “Bruiser” he was a former football player and sported a perpetual chipped-tooth grin. He expected maximum professional effort from his troops and returned the effort with a fierce loyalty and determination to get the troops out of harm’s way at the right time. Bruiser was an independent commander and had his own ideas about how to efficiently run a clandestine reconnaissance unit. He had an immediate impact on Project Delta when he laid out the operations for Samurai. He delegated more reconnaissance in force missions to the Rangers and Nungs then had been previously done. He still retained the Rangers as the primary reaction force for Recon teams in trouble but began transitioning those responsibilities to the Nung Platoon as they demonstrated their abilities as the Project’s only mercenary force. He began Operation Samurai by inserting Recon Teams, Roadrunner Teams, Nung Recon Forces and Ranger Recon Platoons.

On July 23rd Ranger Platoon 23 made contact with a platoon sized force and suffered three killed and five wounded. They called for gunship support from the 281st AHC and enemy fire was effectively suppressed. Ten enemy were killed by air support. The platoon was reinforced by the remainder of the 3rd Company when casualties were evacuated. The reinforced platoon was given a search and destroy mission. They continued the mission through July 27th, when they made contact again.[51]

While the Ranger Platoon was engaged, the Nung Recon Force found itself surrounded while observing a village and called in an air strike. They successfully destroyed 16 structures and observed two secondary explosions. Enemy casualties were unknown and the force was extracted without injury.[51]

On August 2nd Recon Team 8 was inserted. The senior advisor, SFC Joe Singh, took SP4 Kurt Samide into the hole for his first recon mission. On August 3rd the team reported they had been in contact with an unknown sized enemy force in the early morning darkness, and the team had been split. Upon discovering that the team was split, the senior U.S. advisor, Joe Singh, returned to the scene of the enemy contact and found an M-16 with blood along the receiver and magazine. There was no sign of the separated team members. The Command and Control (C&C) helicopter, with Major Allen aboard, departed for the Team 8 AO and spotted two elements of the split team. Low on fuel, the C&C ship returned to the FOB and refueled. They returned to the last known location of the team and located the senior U.S. advisor and two LLDB and extracted them. A short time later the other two LLDB were extracted by hoist some distance away. SP4 Kurt Samide, the second U.S. advisor, was listed as Missing in Action (MIA). 2nd Company, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion was inserted to search for Samide and clear the area.[51] At the same time, Roadrunner Team 101 was engaged by a superior enemy force and expended all of their ammunition in the ensuing firefight. The team became split during the encounter and began evading the enemy. Extraction aircraft were not available due to the situation with Team 8 and 2nd Ranger Company. On August 4th a search was conducted for the Roadrunners. All aircraft received heavy ground fire from virtually all of the search area.

Three members of Team 101 were extracted under heavy fire. The rescue ships returned to base to refuel and then resumed the search. They soon found a fourth team member and extracted him under heavy fire. The Roadrunner team had initiated a firefight with a small group of NVA and been taken under fire by an estimated two companies of NVA. They expended all their ammunition and dropped their weapons and rucksacks as they fled.[51]

2nd Ranger Company had established a base perimeter and sent smaller patrols to search for Kurt Samide. One of the patrols was mistaken for an enemy force as it returned to the patrol base and was fired upon by their own unit resulting in two Rangers wounded. They were evacuated without incident.

On August 5th, Andy Sheppard, an advisor to the 2nd Ranger Company, found Kurt Samide wounded but conscious. The Rangers had encountered some resistance in their ascent of a ridge and Sheppard’s part of the column was stalled in the bottom of a steep ravine. While observing the area around him he was startled to see the tips of a pair of boots protruding from some dense undergrowth. He and one of the Rangers cautiously approached and pulled back the vegetation and found Kurt Samide barely conscious, very weak, and gravely wounded. He had been struck in the left hand during the initial contact at which time he lost his weapon. In the darkness after the attack he evaded the enemy and ran headlong into a tree and was knocked unconscious. He had lost a lot of blood and moved in and out of consciousness. He settled next to a tree and sat there with a grenade as his only weapon. He pulled the pin and waited for the enemy to find him. He passed out from blood loss and the grenade exploded, taking his right arm off below the elbow. In shock, he followed a stream bed to be near a source of water and continued to try to signal any aircraft flying overhead. Alone and seriously wounded, he decided to stay put until help arrived. Andy Sheppard tied a rope around Samide and assisted him up the hill as four Rangers pulled on the rope from the top.

Medics administered morphine and antibiotics and Samide began to realize that he had been rescued by the Rangers. Joe Singh accompanied the rescue effort and carried Samide to the extraction aircraft on his back. The Recon Section leader, Doc Simpson, was on the rescue ship to take him for medical attention. This was an oft repeated, but seldom recognized, pattern of loyalty and leadership demonstrated by the men of Project Delta. Joe Singh, fresh from a harrowing near-death experience of his own would not take no for an answer when it came time to make every attempt to find a team mate. Recon Section Leaders like Doc Simpson and Norm Doney considered it their sacred duty to take personal responsibility for the welfare of all men in their charge.[60] Kurt Samide eventually spent a year in Walter Reed Army Hospital and learned to live with no right hand and limited use of his left. He was encouraged during his recovery by frequent letters from Delta’s Sergeant Major William Fuller.[51],[54] During all of this activity teams in the field were directed to go to ground. All insertions and extractions were postponed due to the unavailability of aircraft. A lot of people were in very vulnerable positions.

On August 6th Team 12 called for extraction. The recovery ship approached the LZ and was shot down. The crew escaped with only minor injuries as the ship crashed and burned. They successfully linked with Team 12. While the other recovery aircraft returned to FOB for refueling, a Marine CH-53 was dispatched to the scene of the crash and began to recover the crew and team by hoist. The first three men were successfully hoisted into the helicopter but as the second lift of three was hoisted the winch cable contacted a tree and broke. The three air crew members on the lift fell 150 to 200 feet to the ground. The remaining four men on the ground rushed to assist them and reported two crewmen dead and one seriously injured. Another 281st recovery ship flew in and dropped a Delta medic and picked up the four remaining men. The medic discovered that the third man had also died. A recovery crew of eight Delta volunteers was inserted and recovered the bodies of all three crewmen. The recovery ship came under heavy enemy fire while departing the LZ. Tactical air and helicopter gunships suppressed the enemy fire.[51]

4th Ranger Company was inserted on August 9th after a weather delay of 24 hours. On August 11th the Company fired upon six VC in a firefight that lasted about ten minutes. One Ranger was killed in the exchange. The Company took up defensive positions on a hillside with a large bomb crater that served as an LZ as well as a command post near its crest. Herb Siugzda manned the radio inside the bomb crater and called for air support. Fifteen minutes later the 4th Company was attacked from two directions by an estimated reinforced company and another platoon of NVA. Shortly thereafter air support arrived and suppressed enemy fire for a few minutes. During the lull after the air attacks the Rangers counted three more of their own killed and nine wounded.

Fred Walz was with the Rangers in a position down the hill from the bomb crater and went to the aid of a Ranger wounded in the face. After dressing the wound, Walz lifted the soldier and began carrying him up the hill to the crater, leaving his medical kit behind in the process. He met Ed Coffey who was on his way to assist with the wounded and advise Walz that the medevac was on the way in. After this brief exchange Coffey started down the hill and was hit in the face and chest by enemy fire. Walz ran to Coffey and began to carry him up the hill. Struggling under the weight of the injured man he was forced to pause on the steep slope. Siugzda saw the two Americans and thought that Walz was wounded and Coffey was attempting to rescue him. Siugzda ran from the bunker and immediately recognized the situation and began to assist Walz with carrying Coffey to the bunker. Coffey managed a deep gasping breath and quickly wrote a note that said simply, “I cannot breath.” Because the medical kit was some distance away, Siugzda attempted to create an airway for Coffey by performing a tracheotomy with his Kabar knife.

At that point a Marine CH-46 arrived to medevac the wounded. The Rangers quickly loaded nine wounded soldiers and the rear gate of the helicopter closed just as Siugzda and Walz arrived with Coffey. Siugzda quickly ran to the front of the helicopter and requested, in the strongest of terms, that the gate be opened. The helicopter pilot initially declined and said they were drawing too much fire. Siugzda said, “What the fuck do you think we’ve been doing all day?” The pilot relented and lowered the gate. Walz quickly loaded Coffey and was told by the crew that he could not accompany the wounded. After further discussion Walz prevailed and attempted to keep Coffey’s airway open and treat the bullet wounds to his chest. At Phu Bai the doctors at the field hospital declared Master Sergeant Ed Coffey dead.

Meanwhile, Herb Siugzda found himself alone with ten Rangers and no interpreter. He was able to contact Major “Bruiser” Allen in the C&C ship and was told that no air assets were available to assist him. He and his small band continued to pour fire at the enemy and Bruiser came back on line to tell him that he had found an Air Force jet with two 500 pound bombs on board. Herb requested that the first be delivered 50 meters from his position. The pilot refused, saying that 50 meters was much too close. He dropped it 300 meters down the hill from the bomb crater with no resulting lull in the enemy fire. Running low on ammunition and badly outnumbered, Siugzda demanded the second bomb be placed 50 meters from the bunker. The pilot agreed and with hand gestures accompanied by heavily Lithuanian accented pigeon English Siugzda informed his Rangers that the bomb was coming and would be very close. They all hunkered down in the bunker for the blast. As Herb tells it today, “Trust me. I don’t know what is a 500 pound bomb …” Herb recalls that after the blast the area was encompassed in total silence. After hours of constant small arms and machine gun fire there was not even a bird chirping. Bruiser called from the C&C ship and directed Siugzda to assess the battlefield for enemy casualties. Siugzda responded with, “If you want a body count come down here and get it yourself.” Five UH1Ds and two CH-46 helicopters evacuated the rest of 4th Company.[51],[95],[96]

Edward Coffey’s name is inscribed on Panel 24E, Line 99 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

3rd Ranger Company was inserted on August 12th. On August 13th they reported sighting ten enemy soldiers dressed in gray uniforms and called an air strike on their location. On August 15th 3rd Company was ambushed by an unknown sized enemy force. The Company seized the initiative and captured a hill top and was engaged in a sustained contact for several hours. They successfully repelled three enemy attacks and counted twenty NVA killed and captured thirteen. The 2nd and 4th Ranger Companies were inserted as an immediate reaction force. They were accompanied by Major Allen and his counterpart. One Marine CH-46 suffered damage to its rotors and was forced to land on the insertion LZ. The 4th Ranger Company secured the LZ and helicopter while a Marine maintenance crew flew in and repaired the damaged rotor. The repaired Ch-46 evacuated the five wounded Rangers. Major Allen and his counterpart took the thirteen prisoners out by 281st UH1D helicopters. The remainder of the Ranger Battalion was extracted on the 16th.[51]

Operation Samurai was stood down on August 16th, 1967 and Project Delta returned to Nha Trang a day later. Over the next month the Marines exploited target areas identified by Delta during Operation Samurai. Their success led Lieutenant General Cushman, Commander of the III MAF, to request that Project Delta again be assigned to identify other targets of opportunity for them in I Corps, their area of responsibility.

Project Delta mobilized to An Hoa and reestablished their FOB on September 15th, 1967 to execute Operation Samurai II. Old intelligence reports had long indicated the location of major NVA base camps in Laos. In Operation Samurai Project Delta had investigated a specific area for way stations and travel routes as well as enemy units and their locations. In Samurai I Project Delta was tasked with exploring another suspected maze of intersecting travel routes through an area that had received little U.S. attention to date. The routes were suspected to utilize networks of small stream and river beds that were numerous in the area that borders I and II Corps. The existence of several north-south drainages intersected by many smaller east-west drainages offered numerous potential routes for infiltration of men and equipment toward the coastal areas, toward the northern cities, or toward northern II Corps.[55]

Once again the weather would have an effect on operations. Attempts to begin reconnaissance in the western sections of the AO were aborted due to the heavy rains and lingering cloud cover. Major Allen and his staff identified several known and potential areas of enemy concentrations and got approval for B-52 strikes to be available on a standby basis. Delta would conduct twelve Recon missions, ten Roadrunner missions, eight Ranger operations and one Nung platoon operation during Samurai II. Roadrunner Team 102 was inserted on September 20th. They found several huts that showed signs of recent occupation that contained personal effects and cached food. In one group of huts they found 100 hogs running loose. Shortly thereafter they encountered seven VC and opened fire on them, killing one. The dead VC was armed with a Chicom model 53 carbine and had eleven rounds of ammunition. On September 22nd, Roadrunner Team 102 was extracted under enemy fire that resulted in 281st AHC pilot WO Boisseau being wounded in the leg. At the same time, 1st Company, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion came into contact with enemy troops and Recon Team 9 reported being pursued by an estimated 15-25 enemy troops. The Rangers suffered one killed and one wounded. Recon Team 9 called for an immediate air strike and the FAC had support on station in a matter of minutes. In what was to become a Delta mantra, Major Allen instructed the team to “Break contact and continue mission.”[55] The Ranger casualties were extracted on the 23rdand the Ranger Company asked to continue the mission for another day. Recon Team 9 continued their mission into the afternoon of the 23rd and made successive contacts with small groups of enemy who were apparently trying to surround them. After killing several of the enemy soldiers the team found itself confronted by 10-20 enemy at a distance of 50 meters and they requested extraction. They were extracted under heavy small arms fire that was quickly suppressed by the 281st AHC gunships. On September 24th Roadrunner Team 103 reported making contact with an enemy company. In the ensuing firefight twelve enemy were killed and one member of the Roadrunner team became separated from the others. The rescue helicopters immediately scrambled for departure from the FOB and began a search of the area. The separated team member was found and rescued. Shortly thereafter the remainder of the team was picked up. The helicopters took small arms fire from virtually all directions during the extraction effort. The Delta FAC placed air strikes in the area. Roadrunner Team 101 heard voices from three directions almost immediately upon insertion. They evaded their pursuers and over the course of the next few days they found several huts and villages. They situated themselves to observe activities and found themselves listening to nightly gatherings of villagers singing patriotic songs the central theme of which was to protest the “American Imperialist.”[55]

On September 29th Major Allen put into play an operation of his own design. He named it Condor I. Because of the early indications that the AO was saturated with small groups of inhabitants, many of whom were women and children, Major Allen decided to conduct a surprise mission in an area of known habitation and seize all people and equipment and exploit their intelligence value. The attack would consist of two or three platoon sized elements inserted in different locations with missions of seizing the village and blocking escape routes. The 1st Company, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion, led by Major Allen, acted as the main assault force. 2nd Company inserted 1500 meters from 1st Company and acted as a blocking force as they moved to link up with 1st Company. Within twenty minutes of landing, 1st Company came under small arms fire near the LZ. They directed suppressing fire from the 281st gunships and proceeded to their target. They immediately captured seven prisoners and initial interrogation yielded information on the location of several platoon sized enemy positions nearby. Major Allen called air strikes in on those locations and the FAC reported them completely destroyed. They began searching the village and discovered more people hiding in bunkers that were located under each house. 2nd Company completed its sweep into the village and began posting security around the village and assisted 1st Company in the search. 2nd Company had intercepted nine people and detained them. A total of 29 detainees and 11 VC suspects were captured and transported to III MAF Interrogation Center for processing.[55]

Condor I was so successful that Major Allen decided to attempt Condor II in and around the abandoned Special Forces camp at A Ro. No signs of recent occupation were found. In mid-October the Nung Platoon conducted a reconnaissance in force mission and encountered an estimated enemy platoon at very close quarters. Unable to move, the Nung’s U.S. advisor called in helicopter gunships for close support and drove off the enemy, leaving one Nung wounded.[55]

As it turned out, the information gained from the many detainees served to augment and verify the information gathered by Project Delta’s ground elements. Throughout the entire AO there was evidence of an organized VC infrastructure. There was little doubt that the VC had complete control of the area and its inhabitants. There was no evidence that the VC had resorted to terrorist tactics to gain the support of the people but information from the detainees indicated that the VC were lenient on the local populace in times of poor crops and reduced taxes from each village. All of the detainees were women and children or men over age thirty five. They readily admitted that most young men had joined the VC and that platoon sized units existed back in the hills. Soon after Project Delta began operations and directed air attacks on river and trail traffic, the local populace and VC resorted to night time operations. Small groups would venture into villages after dark for food and to visit families. Platoon sized groups would make their way to villages and conduct meetings that often included songs and instructions to villagers. The villagers were instructed to shoot at any aircraft they saw and build bomb shelters under their houses. This accounted for the persistant single shot small arms fire encountered throughout Samurai II. A total of eight contacts with squad or smaller sized enemy units occurred during the operation. Most likely these small groups were employed as trail watchers or to transport supplies. Only four contacts with platoon or company sized units occurred; three by Roadrunner teams and one by the Rangers. As suspected, there was a major infiltration route system that crossed this AO. Some trail areas were observed to have been cut two meters wide and up to four meters high through the jungle. No signs of vehicular traffic were seen. All indications were that this trail system was not a primary system but one that could be easily utilized to centralize the enemy assets scattered through the AO and mobilize them into either I Corps or II Corps.[55]

During the Samurai Operations Project Delta established a Civilian Action (CA) program and charged Captain Biff Hadden with implementing it. During the operations from late 1967 into 1968, Captain Hadden visited several hamlets and villages located near the FOB and AO. Accompanied by Project Delta medics, LLDB counter parts and MACV representatives, the CA team distributed medical and hygiene supplies, treated injured and sick villagers, taught classes on basic health and hygiene, and held special events for the area children. The program was well received and well attended.[55]

Project Delta remained in An Hoa for the period October 18th through October 31st, 1967, to conduct Operation Samurai III, an extension of Samurai II. Earlier intelligence gained during Operation Samurai in August indicated the presence of the NVA 368B Rocket Regiment, responsible for several attacks on the city of Da Nang. A prisoner taken during the initial operation admitted to being a part of the forward unit for the 368B responsible for staging firing positions and selecting targets. He reported that there was a base area located in the Happy Valley that the 368B operated from. Project Delta’s mission was to locate the base area and any other smaller support units in Happy Valley and destroy them with ground assaults or air strikes. To assist in the offensive, the 6th Company of the Mobile Guerrilla Force, A-503 (Mike Force) was attached to Delta. The Mike Force consisted of six U.S. advisors and a company of CIDG Montagnard troops. In the previous several operations the Areas of Operation assigned to Project Delta had encompassed an average of 1500 square kilometers. Samurai III’s AO was a mere 550 square kilometers, allowing much more intensely saturated mission coverage. It allowed for faster response times for teams in trouble and for near continuous radio relay coverage. During Operation Samurai III nine Recon missions, seven Roadrunner missions, four Ranger operations, one Nung operation, and one operation utilizing the Mike Force Company were conducted. These twenty three operations were conducted in a short two week span. Numerous contacts were made with small enemy units of one to ten individuals. These small units were characteristic of the small units encountered during Samurai and Samurai II and probably were deployed as trail watchers, rear security for larger forces, and as local guerrillas awaiting orders to consolidate and mobilize.[56]

Recon Team 12 was inserted on October 19th and began hearing sounds of human activity almost immediately. They heard people filling water containers from a stream near their overnight location and heard hammering noises the next morning. Later on the 20th the team heard voices coming from the same area that they had heard the hammering noises. Team 12 called for gunship support from the 281st AHC and directed fire on the area. The gunships reported good coverage on target and the team was reinforced with a Ranger Platoon reaction force to perform a damage assessment. The reinforced team continued to patrol and contacted two more small groups of enemy and engaged them in a firefight.

During this same time Roadrunner Teams 106 and 107 were inserted together and stayed together for a short time before splitting up on their separate missions. Both teams encountered small groups of enemy soldiers and were tracked by platoon sized forces using flashlights at night. The teams called in air strikes and continued their missions until the 22nd, when both teams were extracted under heavy small arms fire.[56]

The mission assigned to Recon Team 2 was typical of the missions run during Samurai III. Team 2 was inserted on October 20th and began to see signs of enemy presence almost immediately. They found a series of foxholes along a well used trail and discovered bamboo slat fencing running parallel to the trail. The next day the team found another fence that surrounded an area with fire rings and signs of recent occupation. Soon after they watched as ten VC followed them. They attempted to ambush their pursuers but lost them instead. After spending the night listening for their pursuers the team made contact with six VC on the 22nd, killing one and wounding four. In the now familiar direction from the C&C chopper, they were instructed to “Break contact and continue mission.” Ten minutes later the team made contact with more VC. The enemy broke contact and fled into the jungle. Later on the afternoon of the 22nd, the team heard troop movement very close to their position and called in an air strike. During a lull in the air attack the team heard the sound of a whistling object that landed 30 meters from their position. Two minutes later they heard an explosion and surmised that an enemy mortar round had been launched at them and was a dud with a delayed explosion. The enemy fled the area during the air strike. On October 23rd Team 2 made contact with another small group of three VC and fired on them. They called for an extraction and placed fire from the 281st AHC gunships on the enemy. As they approached the extraction helicopter a lone VC dressed in a khaki shirt and loincloth attempted to fire upon them on the LZ. The team fired on him, killing him.[56]

The payoff mission for Samurai III began with the routine insertion of Team 7 (SFC Edgar Morales, SFC Cahall, SGT Jim Holland) at last light on October 20th, 1967. On the 21st the team began searching the area and came across a well used trail. Team 7 decided to observe the trail for activity. While watching the trail they heard chopping noises from an area about 300 meters in the direction the trail followed. They decided to get to higher ground and observe the area from which the noise emanated. They discovered a second trail leading to the same general area as the first trail and came upon a log fence that extended as far as they could see into the jungle. Deciding that there might be a significant installation within the fence, the team established surveillance. In a very short time they observed three small groups of soldiers dressed in khakis and carrying semi-automatic weapons leave the fenced area. They called for air strikes which were delivered two hours later. Soon after the air strikes the team heard signal shots fired some distance away. The team continued their reconnaissance and found the junction of two more well-used trails. They set up observation of the trails and saw 15 NVA carrying bags of supplies and wearing khakis and black pajamas. Late in the day the team decided to set up for a prisoner snatch on the trail but saw no more activity. They moved away from the trail and set up their night position. They observed enemy soldiers searching for them with flashlights in three directions from their position and heard others moving under cover of darkness within ten meters of their position all through the night. Early on the morning of the 22nd the team made immediate contact with one enemy soldier and began to evade toward an extraction LZ. Team 7 called for gunship support to be placed on their overnight position and in areas where they had heard enemy activity through the night. They were extracted under heavy fire at 0915 on the 22nd.[56],[57]

Upon returning to the FOB, Team 7 gave a detailed mission report at the debriefing. Major Allen decided to seize the advantage and place an immediate reaction force on the suspected base installation discovered by Team 7. Less than four hours after completing their reconnaissance mission, Team 7 volunteered to go back in and guide a platoon of the CIDG Mike Force Company to the base camp. SFC Morales, SFC Cahall, and SGT Holland from Team 7 accompanied SFC Macintosh, SSG Sanders and 47 of their Montagnard strikers into the area. They quickly closed on the fenced area and entered it. They immediately found a large 100 x100 meter cultivated field with crops in it. Adjacent to the field were huts that had been destroyed by the earlier air attack. They continued on and soon came across two farmers tending another large cultivated area. The farmers fled in different directions. The Mike Force rear element surprised two enemy soldiers who were following them and opened fire on them. They wore khaki uniforms and fled. The platoon set up a night ambush and spent the night without further activity.

They continued their movement on the morning of the 23rd and happened on to an enemy position and took heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from two directions. Pinned down and unable to move the platoon consolidated their position and returned fire. During the engagement the enemy exercised excellent fire discipline, firing only as targets presented themselves. They shouted insults and waved their hats attempting to have the Mike Force give away their positions. During the fire fight the platoon noticed several bed rolls within a few meters of their position, indicating that they had surprised an enemy patrol in their night position. After a two hour fire fight the platoon asked for and received air support and successfully recovered the enemy bedrolls. As they began to assault the enemy positions after the air strikes the platoon was met with a heavy barrage of gunfire and hand grenades. Three Montagnards were wounded in the action and the platoon called the FOB for the remainder of the Mike Force Company to reinforce them. The enemy yelling and taunting continued.[56]

SSG Andy Sheppard and SGT Fred Walz from Project Delta and SFC Bruno, SSG Coy, 98 Montagnards and one interpreter from the Mike Force were inserted to support Team 7 and the CIDG platoon. Soon after insertion the company linked with the platoon and the wounded were evacuated. An assault was conducted on the enemy positions and was stalled by heavy automatic weapons fire. The force decided to call for air strikes the morning of the 24th. No air strikes were delivered due to heavy ground fog and the company assaulted the enemy positions without their benefit. The enemy had abandoned the positions during the night. After conducting a thorough search of the area, Team 7 and the Mike Force Company followed a blood trail that led to a hasty gravesite. The graves were dug up exposing two soldiers dressed in green uniforms, each wearing two pairs of pants. They had been killed by shrapnel, presumed to be from the previous day’s air strike. The force continued to follow a well worn path with blood trails and discovered a series of huts in a relatively small area which contained freshly laundered clothing, including one shirt that was still wet. Every 50 meters or so another cluster of buildings was found, each in an excellent state of repair, constructed of logs and earth and well camouflaged from aerial view. Underground bunkers with earthen covers of five feet were discovered that were strategically placed to defend the entire ridge from all directions. Beneath the houses the force discovered bunkers designed to withstand heavy bombardment. In these bunkers a total of thirty rucksacks containing the personal gear and documents of soldiers were discovered. A plotting board of the type used to plan and execute artillery, mortar, and rocket attacks was discovered, as was a remote electric firing device for multiple weapons. The area was well kept, clean, and bore all the earmarks of a well disciplined military unit. Documents and uniform insignia collected from the facility indicated that the headquarters of the 368B had been found. One document captured had mission instructions for the unit for an operation to be conducted beginning October 20th, the same time frame during which the base camp was discovered. The Mobile Strike Force Company and Team 7 were extracted without incident.[56]

After Team 7’s mission, a platoon of Nungs accompanied by SGM William Fuller was assigned a reconnaissance in force mission in the eastern section of the AO. On October 25th at 0500 the Nung force spotted a large circle of cooking fires several hundred meters to their east, out of Project Delta’s AO. They called for coordination of an air strike on that location and observed as it took place. The Nungs and their U.S. advisors estimated that the encampment could easily be a battalion sized force, probably elements of the NVA unit (368B) that had recently vacated the base area exploited the day before. During the air strike the Nung force heard 12.7 mm anti aircraft machine gun fire directed at the aircraft. This was the only large caliber fire detected during Samurai III.[56]

In his AAR for this operation Major Allen offered a critique of the performance of the Mobile Strike Force Company. He noted that in addition to being better equipped, the Mike Force soldiers were better motivated and more effective due to their command structure. The Ranger Companies were advised by their U.S. advisors whereas the Mike Force Company was commanded by the assigned Americans. When compared to the Ranger Companies of the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion, Allen offered that the Mike Force Company, although larger than the Ranger Company, was capable of mobilizing much faster. He suggested to 5th Special Group Headquarters that two Mike Force Companies augment the Project Delta forces on future operations.[56]

Despite the success of U.S. and South Vietnamese Army operations, there were indications in the fall of 1967 of another enemy build-up, particularly in areas close to Laos and Cambodia. In late October, the VC struck again at the Special Forces Camp at Loc Ninh. Fortunately, Vietnamese reinforcements saved the camp. At the same time, approximately 12,000 VC troops converged on a Special Forces camp at Dak To. This camp was located in northern Kontum Province, where the borders of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam meet. In response to this potential threat, the U.S. and South Vietnam committed a total of sixteen battalions to the region to counter a disturbing enemy resurgence at Kontum and Loc Ninh. The ensuing battle of Dak To in November, 1967, sent the enemy scurrying back toward the border.[59] Immediately after this battle, aerial photography identified several base areas and fortified positions. Other intelligence gathered during the Dak To battle revealed that the NVA 1st Division and its subordinate 66th, 22nd and 34th NVA Regiments were located just west of Dak To. Also present in the area was the 174th NVA Regiment which made continuing sporadic contact with conventional infantry patrols in the area. It was suspected that the 174th was acting as a blocking force for the elements of the 1st NVA Division during its retreat. It was unknown whether the 1st NVA Division would continue straight west into Cambodia, turn north into Laos, or turn south towards their original base area. To the south, threatening Pleiku, was the 95th NVA Regiment, which could turn north and act as a screening force for the 1st Division if they turned south. Project Delta was assigned the task of performing reconnaissance of the two major north-south infiltration routes that the 1st Division might use if they were indeed headed back to their original base. One of these routes was located on each of the eastern and western edges of Delta’s newly assigned AO. Recent reports and aerial photography indicated that the western route, which closely followed the Cambodian border, had been reinforced with timbers in places, and effectively resembled corduroy road.[58]

Project Delta received the Operations Order for Operation Sultan, 9-67, on November 27th, 1967 and mobilized to the FOB at Kontum on November 28th. An isolation and launch site was established at the nearby Special Forces camp at Polei Kleng. Fourteen Recon missions, seventeen Roadrunner missions and five Ranger operations were conducted between November 30th and December 24th, 1967. The Recon and Roadrunner teams inserted early in Operation Sultan reported finding numerous trails criss-crossing the AO, some of which were wide and hard packed showing signs of recent use. While attempting to follow one such trail Roadrunner Team 103 heard many voices speaking in a Montagnard dialect and called an airstrike on their location with unknown results. Nearby, Team 103 found a battalion sized bivouac area that showed signs of use within the previous three days. The area was laid out in an orderly fashion with fresh foxholes and fortified automatic weapons positions. Team 103 also found an area that had several huts in it that had trees growing through the floors and showed no signs of recent use. 2nd Company, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion was inserted to further explore the findings. The Rangers discovered more bunkers and a company sized base area that had not been recently used. Soon after, the Rangers encountered 20 Montagnards and opened fire on them, wounding several. While in pursuit of the wounded, 2nd Company discovered a steep ravine with a narrow five foot wide bottom. Off the bottom of the ravine were eleven openings into the hillside that led to large caverns capable of accommodating 10 to 15 persons each. Soon after finding the caverns the Rangers made successive contacts with small enemy units dressed in khaki uniforms and carrying automatic weapons. The density of the jungle prevented the Rangers from inflicting casualties. Further exploration yielded discovery of another platoon sized rest area and two bridges constructed on rock foundations across small creeks. Leading to the bridges were trails deeply cut with wheel marks 2 inches wide and 18 inches apart. Roadrunner Team 104 explored their AO and discovered a regimental sized rest area that had seen use within the previous month. While examining the area they encountered two unarmed khaki clad NVA soldiers. The Roadrun-ners evaded the soldiers without firing and the NVA fled. The Roadrunners continued their mission until dark.

Late in the evening they heard a company sized force searching for them. They spoke in a northern Vietnamese dialect. The Roadrunners remained hidden until the NVA continued searching away from them. The team was extracted the following day and was debriefed at FOB Kontum.

The following morning, December 11th, 1967, 3rd Ranger Company, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion (LT Ford, LT Wentz, SFC Sites, SSG Siugzda, SGT Cole, WO Turner) were inserted to exploit the findings of Roadrunner Team 104. They patrolled the area throughout the 11th and on the 12th set up a patrol base. They discovered several heavily used trails and consolidated the Company. 3rd Company moved until they found an old bivouac area previously occupied by a U.S. unit or a CIDG unit long ago. On the 13th the Company again moved some distance and set up another patrol base. This time the patrol returned and reported sighting livestock and other signs of a nearby village. The Company again consolidated and continued to march. They crossed a trail that showed signs of frequent and recent use and followed it until they observed two NVA digging foxholes. The enemy fled as the Rangers approached and the Rangers discovered several foxholes and heard voices from their right flank, the direction in which the two NVA had fled.

The Rangers said that the voices were saying “Assault, assault!”[58] The Company set up hasty fire positions and fired in the direction of the voices. They immediately came under heavy automatic weapons fire from their original direction of travel and, changing direction, they assaulted 35 meters and were stopped by enemy fire. During a lull in the firing the Rangers assaulted another 50 meters and were again stopped. They could hear the enemy yelling and whistling and assaulted for a third time but were only able to move another 35 meters before being stopped. A fourth assault was attempted but thwarted after only 20 meters. The Company again consolidated and returned to the area where the first two NVA were encountered. They called for a medevac for one Ranger killed and one wounded. After the medevac departed 3rd Company again attempted to assault and was engaged in a short firefight during which SSG Herb Siugzda was wounded in the chest. Siugzda stayed with the Company and continued the assault.

The enemy withdrew and the Rangers set up a perimeter for the night. Early on the morning of the 14th a reinforced company of NVA began probing the Ranger perimeter and launched an all out attack at daylight. The attack came from all directions. The U.S. advisor called for airstrikes and gunship support. The enemy launched 82 mm mortar rounds, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), automatic weapon fire and hand grenades into the perimeter. During this barrage the 3rd Company commander, Cpt. Nguyen Nghi, was killed and LT Wentz was wounded by shrapnel from grenades. The Company was running low on ammunition and supplies and called for them as well as reinforcements. The supply helicopter flew in and dropped the ammunition outside the perimeter and was shot down 2000 meters from the Company’s position. All of the crewmen were immediately rescued.

2nd Company, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion (LT Livingston, LT Ellis, SSG Hill, SGT Walz) was inserted 700 meters from 3rd Company and moved to reinforce them. Within a few meters of the LZ 2nd Company found numerous blood trails and bloody rags scattered throughout the area. They continued another 500 meters toward the 3rd Company position and found a company sized base area that had been evacuated minutes before their arrival. They found thirty fortified positions, a hundred rucksacks, numerous small arms and mortar rounds, explosives and many documents. They came under fire while searching the camp and engaged the enemy sporadically for an hour. Enemy fire was received from several directions resulting in three Rangers wounded.

2nd Company again attempted to link with 3rd Company which was located 100 meters away. They again came under fire and were engaged in a fire fight for another hour until the enemy broke contact and fled. They linked up with 3rd Company at 1600 hours. At 1630 hours medical evacuation of the three Rangers killed, thirty four wounded, and two U.S. advisors wounded was accomplished. Earlier in the day, 1st Company, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion (MSG Kreilick, SSG Monroe, SSG Rittenhouse, SGT Gardiner) was inserted. They made their way toward 3rd Company’s position and linked with 2nd and 3rd Companies at 1730 hours. They encountered three NVA on the way to the rendezvous. The battalion secured for the night and headed for an LZ on the morning of the 15th. During the short move to the LZ the Rangers discovered several more enemy killed the previous day. After preparing the LZ the first group of Rangers boarded the flight of three helicopters for extraction without incident.

The second flight drew heavy enemy fire and one helicopter was forced down 1000 meters from the extraction point. More Rangers boarded the other two helicopters and departed. The remaining elements of the 1st and 2nd Companies swept the area toward the crash site and immediately found themselves in the middle of a second company sized base area fortified in a similar fashion to the first. They destroyed six 300 pound bags of rice and continued to the crash site. The downed UH1D was extracted. The four injured crewman had been rescued at the time of the crash. The 91st headed home.[58]

Recon and Roadrunner teams made numerous contacts with the enemy during Operation Sultan. With the exception of the protracted battle fought by the Rangers the encounters were with smaller units. These smaller units seemed to have the duties of trail watching, LZ security, tracking recon teams and rear security for the units passing through. The unusual thing noted in all cases was that these were NVA regulars and not the local VC forces that were expected.

Recon Team 9 was inserted on December 21st. On the 22nd they heard many voices through the thick undergrowth but could not distinguish what was being said. They moved to a well used trail and observed that recent trail maintenance had occurred by cutting back bamboo growth. They set up for the night nearby. On the 23rd they heard sounds of wood cutting and many voices 75 meters from their location. As they moved closer they heard voices transmitted over a radio as well as voices now only 25 meters away. Team 9 called first for 281st AHC gunships to bring rocket, machine gun and 40 mm grenade fire on the enemy location. While this attack was underway the team called for tactical air support and directed an air strike on the enemy. After the airstrike the team could still hear voices and heard one enemy say he had been wounded in the leg. Team 9 then crept away to another of the many trails in the area, this one under new construction with tools lying beside it. The trail had been cut into the side of the hill and had bamboo drainage pipes set at the inner edges. Bamboo had been placed perpendicular to the trail to direct drainage down the hillside. While observing this new trail the team saw eight enemy dressed in khaki uniforms appear on a hidden trail 10 meters downhill from their position. Immediately after they passed, another NVA appeared from around the hill at a distance of 10 feet from the team and was killed by the U.S. senior advisor. The team evaded on the new trail in order to depart the area, and was pursued by a squad of NVA. As they ran up the trail, the U.S. assistant advisor took two NVA under fire, killing them. The team realized they were being pursued by a growing number of enemy converging on their trail from several directions. The assistant U.S. advisor threw a white phosphorous grenade and the team escaped unharmed.[58]

The intelligence garnered from Operation Sultan indicated that the enemy was present in all areas of the AO. Documents captured contained both personal and military correspondence. Elements of the 32nd NVA Regiment were indeed present in the AO. The number of letter box numbers and unit designations found in personal correspondence indicated that elements of the 66th NVA Regiment had been transferred to the 32nd NVA Regiment to replace the over 1600 men lost in the Battle of Dak To. The absence of agricultural activities throughout the AO and the presence of numerous high speed travel routes indicated that the replenished 32nd NVA Regiment had relocated from the Plei Trap Valley westward to stage for their next offensive from Cambodia.[58]

On New Year’s Day, 1968, an Operations Order was issued for Operation Sultan II. The FOB was established at the Special Forces Camp at New Plei Djereng. The operation was a continuation of Operation Sultan to identify the suspected enemy buildup in the Central Highlands. Very little record exists of missions run from the FOB at Plei Djerang. The following is a recollection of Gary Nichols, who served in Project Delta from 1966 to 1970.

“In January 1968, Project Delta was working the tri-border area out of Plei Djereng. A couple recon teams were already on the ground and Doc Simpson and I were scheduled to infiltrate that night. Everything had gone well on our recon flight. We managed to select the primary, secondary and alternate landing zones. All three were on the western side of our AO, close to the Cambodian border and close together. We had already discussed the possibility of a ladder extraction if there were any problems. The team was ready and just before last light we took off for our primary LZ. On final approach, flying tree top level, the pilot pulled up right on the LZ and just before the skid touched ground, muzzle flashes and NVA started coming from the wood lines (thank God none of us jumped out). As we hastily departed, door gunners returned fire and we could hear the clunk of bullets striking the chopper body. When we landed at the FOB and inspected the chopper for damage it was discovered that one of the incoming rounds had almost cut through the rear rotary blade cable. Fortunate for us it didn’t let go until we got home. Needless to say I don’t think there was a happy face amongst us when we were told that a decision to infiltrate the same area, different LZ was on for the next night.

“The following night we departed as scheduled and everything was going fine, until the chopper was hovering over the LZ. The point man jumped (requiring the five of us to follow) and while the chopper was leaving we heard shots, people yelling and dogs barking. We took off like a bat out of hell for cover and it was only a miracle that we ran to a place in the tree line where there were no enemy. Throwing caution to the wind we ran as fast as we could, through brush and trees hoping all the noise they were making would cover up all the noise we were making.

“We followed a small brook for a while and spread our special recipe seasoning (garlic, onion, salt and pepper) in strategic places behind us as we traveled (didn’t last long). That night, all night, we heard people with dogs looking for us. We determined the dogs were not trained trackers or they would have found us by now, unfortunately even mutts get lucky sometimes. With first light came overcast skies (which stayed with us for the entire time out) and the sounds of people and dogs moving above and below us. This continued for three days, keeping us in check. We were under a triple canopy and the closest place we could be extracted was back from whence we came, so we moved straight up the mountain stopping at the military crest. On the second day we were out of water (it was hot, humid, and the continuous trek up the mountain took most of our water, the rest went to make our small bag (one days ration, the size of your fist) of dehydrated rice with dried minnows soluble (disgusting mixture, filled you up, no one wanted seconds). As we quietly laid in wait for the NVA to leave we had nothing to do but look and listen. One of the VNSF must have brought an extra canteen of water, which he so diligently sipped one capful at a time day and night. He finally ran out of water on the third day, just prior to his scheduled demise by the rest of the team. After three days without water, it became the only thought occupying our minds. We couldn’t sleep, couldn’t eat, our tongues were swollen, it was hard to talk and difficult to breathe.

“The Sounds of dogs and people searching had ceased. Where they went was a mystery and at that point we didn’t care. The decision to split the team by sending two people for water wasn’t easy. We knew we couldn’t remain in the present location and because of the weather, terrain and condition of the team (weak from hunger, thirst, no water) it would be suicide if we moved as a team and got caught in the open. Although the two going for water wouldn’t have a radio, they would be traveling light and could possibly out run anyone who may detect them. So with these assumptions one VNSF and I emptied our rucksacks, took all the canteens and went in search of water (I left the radio with Doc). Off we went moving along the military crest until we came to a small crevice leading down the side of the mountain, although dry it held promise that past rain fall had followed its path down the mountain, so down the mountain we went. The grade was steep and movement was slow and hazardous. We came to an area where the trees were sparse with a single canopy and stopped there to take a short break. Through the trees and vegetation we could see the valley floor and spotted two men with rifles, off in the distance moving away from us. We watched and after a few minutes continued down the mountain another 100 meters. That’s when we came upon the mud hole of our dreams, no more then a small indentation in the run off; it was enough to have collected water at some time in the past and now became our salvation. From this point on I have lapses in my memory. I remember the VN and me digging in mud and sucking water. I think the two of us forgot where we were and instead focused on drinking as much water as we could. After filling the canteens we started back up the mountain, back tracking the crevice. That night was a feast to remember, finally water to wet our parched throats and to mix up our rice and minnow gourmet meal (we hadn’t eaten in days). The next day everyone felt better, still weak but with renewed hope we started down to the valley floor. The weather was still overcast, but we could hear FAC flying. We quickly set up to make radio contact and get a fix on our location so we could request extraction.

“Unfortunately we were in the low ground under a thick canopy and the sky was overcast. Doc was communicating with FAC and I was attempting to get FACs attention with my flare gun. After numerous tries, unable to get through the canopy I got out the strobe light, this seemed futile under this canopy and didn’t do any good either. Doc told me to try the strobe light in conjunction with the survival mirror, the rest is history. FAC directed us to a LZ, and we were extracted without incident.”[106]

With indications that a major offensive was brewing, Project Delta closed the FOB at Plei Djerang and headed for Nha Trang.

CHAPTER XIV: 1968, TET

The sixth named campaign of the Vietnam War was “Tet Counteroffensive”, 30 January 1968-1 April 1968. On 29 January 1968 the Allies began the Tet-Lunar New Year expecting the usual 36-hour peaceful holiday truce. Because of the threat of a large-scale attack and communist buildup around Khe Sanh, the cease fire order was issued in all areas over which the Allies were responsible with the exception of I Corps, south of the Demilitarized Zone.

Determined enemy assaults began in the northern and Central provinces before daylight on 30 January and in Saigon and the Mekong Delta regions that night. Some 84,000 VC and North Vietnamese attacked or fired upon 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 64 of 242 district capitals and 50 hamlets. In addition, the enemy raided a number of military installations including almost every airfield. The actual fighting lasted three days; however Saigon and Hue were under more intense and sustained attack.

The attack in Saigon began with a sapper assault against the U.S. Embassy. Other assaults were directed against the Presidential Palace, the compound of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and nearby Ton San Nhut air base.

At Hue, eight enemy battalions infiltrated the city and fought the three U.S. Marine Corps, three U.S. Army and eleven South Vietnamese battalions defending it. The fight to expel the enemy lasted a month. American and South Vietnamese units lost over 500 killed, while VC and North Vietnamese battle deaths may have been somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000.

Heavy fighting also occurred in two remote regions: around the Special Forces camp at Dak To in the central highlands and around the U.S. Marines Corps base at Khe Sanh. In both areas, the allies defeated attempts to dislodge them. Finally, with the arrival of more U.S. Army troops under the new XXIV Corps headquarters to reinforce the marines in the northern province, Khe Sanh was abandoned.

Tet proved a major military defeat for the communists. It had failed to spawn either an uprising or appreciable support among the South Vietnamese. On the other hand, the U.S. public became discouraged and support for the war was seriously eroded. U.S. strength in South Vietnam totaled more than 500,000 by early 1968. In addition, there were 61,000 other allied troops and 600,000 South Vietnamese.

The Tet Offensive also dealt a visibly severe setback to the pacification program, as a result of the intense fighting needed to root out VC elements that clung to fortified positions inside the towns. For example, in the densely populated delta there had been approximately 14,000 refugees in January; after Tet some 170,000 were homeless. The requirement to assist these persons seriously inhibited national recovery efforts.[65]

On January 30th, 1968 the Communists launched their TET general offensive across South Vietnam. Caught celebrating the lunar New Year, the Saigon government was initially ill prepared to counter the VC/NVA attacks. When the Tet Offensive began, Project Delta was in Nha Trang. When Nha Trang was hit on the first day, the LLDB Headquarters was protected by the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion, recently returned from Plei Djerang. At only 60 percent strength the Airborne Rangers turned in an excellent performance, pushing the major Communist elements out of Nha Trang in less than a day. The battle, however, cost the life of the battalion commander and wounded the four company commanders.[68]

Project Delta was dispatched to the beleaguered I Corps area for Operation Samurai IV (2-68) from March 4th to April 4th, 1968. The NVA forces had successfully utilized Highway 547 in western Thua Thien Province as a major infiltration route to Hue from Laos. Hue became the scene of a long and vicious battle depicted in several Hollywood features. Much of the true story of the Battle of Hue is not widely known in the United States. For a Vietnamese perspective of the events of early 1968 see Appendix IV.

Major Allen briefed the Deputy Commander, MACV, General Creighton Abrams and his staff on the concepts to be employed during Samurai IV. The operation would be punctuated with frequent enemy contacts and sightings and would again demonstrate the skill and ingenuity of this small legion of professionals. Once again a Company of the Mobile Strike Force A-503 (Mike Force) would accompany Delta as an exploitation and reaction force.[69]

On March 5th, 1968, Recon Team 2 (SSG Edward Cook, SSG Jimmy Cooley, SP5 Albert Merriman) infiltrated their assigned AO with the mission of observing activity along Highway 547 and Highway 547A west of Hue and east of the Ashau Valley. The team moved several hundred meters to a hidden point overlooking an area where the highway crossed the Rao Nai and looped sharply to the east toward Hue. Just a few hundred meters to the north the Rao Nho intersected the Rao Nai from the west. Highway 547A followed the Rao Nho valley. No sooner had the team established its Remain Over Night (RON) position than they heard a single vehicle from the direction of Highway 547 to the east. The team also heard five single rifle shots from the same location.

The next morning the team moved north and west toward Highway 547A and received instructions to halt and hide for the remainder of the day. This type of instruction was not unusual when other Project Delta elements were being infiltrated or extracted or otherwise required the air assets of the Project. The team stayed in that position overnight and during the hours of darkness heard 14 trucks moving west to east along the highway at twenty minute intervals. The trucks sounded like ¾ ton or 2 ½ ton trucks. The team remained in the same position all of that day and through the following night. During this time they heard numerous small arms fire in single shots and groups of up to six shots that seemed like signal shots. The team was again instructed to remain in the same position overnight.

At 0450 hours on the morning of the 9th the team heard more trucks moving west to east on highway 547A. At 0730 hours Team 2 was given the go ahead to continue the mission. All during the day the team heard voices from the general direction of the highway and managed to avoid contact until late afternoon when they came across two NVA soldiers at a distance of 5 meters and took them under fire, killing one and wounding the other. Team 2 withdrew to a good hiding place and listened as signal shots were fired from the direction of the enemy contact. Near dusk the team heard five trucks moving from east to west along the highway.

At 0445 hours on the 10th the team heard three more trucks traveling west to east. As daylight approached the team prepared to move back toward the highway. They came across a small stream and decided to explore further. Within several meters they discovered eight huts that showed signs of use within the previous 24 hours. They found bloody bandages, khaki uniforms and several documents. Team 2 moved to their RON and between 1830 hours and 0200 hours on the 11th they heard 14 trucks moving west to east on Highway 547A. The team moved closer to the road and by late afternoon was hidden within a few meters of it.

They continued to hear sporadic small arms fire and an occasional explosion, some within 150 meters of their position. They soon discerned that some of the small arms fire coincided with the movement of vehicles on the road, indicating a pattern of signals. On March 11th Team 2 again heard three trucks heading west to east accompanied by small arms signals along the route. This time they were able to identify trucks traveling in the opposite direction some 45 minutes later as the same trucks by their distinctive engine sounds. On the morning of the 12th Team 2 heard a heavy machine gun being fired from the direction of the explosions they had heard earlier. The team was extracted without incident.[69]

While Team 2 was gathering information in the Rao Nho Valley the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion was alerted to respond to a FAC sighting of a convoy of six enemy trucks and 200 enemy troops along Highway 547 in the Rao Nai Valley to their east. FAC had directed an air strike on the convoy and destroyed several trucks and an unknown number of enemy soldiers. The 1st and 5th Companies were inserted together along Highway 547 while 3rd Company was inserted 3 kilometers to the southwest along the highway to act as a blocking force and trap any enemy attempting to flee that way.[69] The 91st was inserted without incident and began moving to a better location along the road. Senior Ranger Advisor LT Tom Humphus recalls that, in spite of the noise involved in the insertion of two companies at his location, there was no response or indication of awareness from the enemy. The two companies took positions on opposite sides of the road in a rough “L” shaped ambush and set up to wait for the enemy. Humphus and his second in command, WO Cedric “Shorty” Turner, assigned from the Australian SAS, took position with the LLDB Company Commander behind a banyan tree. SSG Phil Salzwedel, the U.S. enlisted advisor, and SGT Little J. Jackson, the Delta medic, were located to their right in a shallow depression.

Shortly before dark the left flank of the 5th Company signaled that they saw enemy movement on the road. A squad of NVA walked down the road unaware of the Ranger presence. All but one were walking at sling arms. One carried his weapon casually at his side. When someone opened fire the squad was a little left of center, between both legs of the ambush, meaning that any fire directed by either Company would intersect the other Company’s position. Three of the NVA were killed immediately. As the one NVA fell, he managed to fire a burst of random shots as he died that struck SGT Jackson in the chest and SSG Salzwedel in the arm.

The remaining NVA took cover in the ditch below 5th Company’s position, thus positioning themselves in the only area protected from direct fire by either Company. As the NVA randomly fired in both directions the Rangers proceeded to return fire, effectively firing on each other. LT Humphus called for support from the 281st AHC who laid down 40 mm cannon fire and succeeded in silencing the enemy fire. After tending to the minor wounds incurred by the two Companies firing toward each other, Humphus repeatedly tried to get a medevac in for SGT Jackson but was told to wait for first light.

The Rangers remained on high alert, knowing full well that the noise of the helicopter cannon fire had surely alerted the NVA. Again, no enemy response was forthcoming. About two hours after dark LT Humphus and WO Turner observed someone light a cigarette on the edge of the road, a serious breach of security protocol. Turner identified the smoker as LT Lam, the Executive Officer of 5th Company. Suddenly an individual clad in black pajamas appeared, walking up the road toward Lam. LT Lam calmly asked who he was and the man responded by shining a flashlight on his own face, giving his name and asking who Lam was. LT Lam calmly said, “I am Lieutenant Lam, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion,” and shot the man in the head with his .45. Lam had not removed the cigarette from his mouth during the whole encounter and continued to smoke it until it was gone.

Again the U.S. advisors feared they had been compromised and again nothing happened until first light. As dawn broke the Rangers heard the sound of a single truck coming from the west. It would travel for a distance, stop and blow the horn, and then continue coming down the road. It passed through the ambush position to a small stream that had a submerged bridge constructed as a crossing and then turned around and headed back to the west. The truck was apparently an advance element checking the road and signaling at intervals to let the convoy know the path was clear. Shortly after the truck passed, Shorty Turner informed Humphus that SGT Little J. Jackson had died of his wounds.

Very shortly thereafter the sound of heavy trucks coming from the west was heard. The ambush was to be initiated by firing a Light Anti-tank Weapon (LAW) at the lead vehicle once the convoy was in the kill zone. The Ranger in 1st Company aimed the missile at the lead truck and it misfired. Seizing the initiative, another Ranger Private jumped up and fired his M-79 grenade launcher into the truck’s windshield, effectively stopping it and initiating the ambush. The FAC had been on standby with air assets and directed an air strike against the stalled convoy resulting the destruction of five trucks destroyed, four trucks damaged and a number of enemy killed.[69],[62]

The name of Little J. Jackson is inscribed on Panel 43E, Line 45 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

On March 6th Recon Team 1 was inserted south of Highway 547 and east of the site of the Ranger actions. Like Team 2, Team 1 was ordered to find a hiding place until the Ranger action was concluded. As the team resumed movement toward the highway they encountered a lone NVA soldier who fled after being fired upon. The team continued their mission and discovered 14 fresh graves very close to the road. The decision was made to insert the Nung BDA Platoon (SSG Mike Stanfield, SSG Jay Graves, SGT Roland Meder) to exploit any targets around the grave sites. The Nungs were inserted on March 10th and began to search the area. They soon discovered a bamboo structure with a sleeping platform and cooking utensils. The area had been used within the last 24 hours. On the 11th the Nungs found an aid station with many bloody bandages, empty boxes of morphine syrettes, expended medicine containers, human hair and forceps. They encountered three NVA soldiers who fled to the rear when fired upon. The Nung BDA Platoon spent two nights without movement due to heavy rainfall. On the 13th they linked with Recon Team 1 and went to the site of the freshly dug graves. They traveled along Highway 547 and placed demolition charges on the road to create a crater 5-7 meters deep. At the grave site the Nungs dug up 14 graves. Each grave had a head marker identifying the interred soldier as a corporal killed on March 5th. Each body was wrapped in a plastic sheet. Documents found on the bodies indicated that the NVA had recently made the journey from North Vietnam through Laos and into South Vietnam, some within the previous week. Their unit designations did not appear on any known order of battle listing and it was assumed that these were replacement troops. The sophistication of the medical equipment found at the aid station was such that it appeared to be a large medical facility usually located in what the enemy would consider a secure area.[69]

Recon Team 7 (SSG Sam Zumbrun, SFC Bill Bruno, SFC Rick Conaway) was inserted into their AO on March 13th. During insertion the helicopters received intense heavy machine gun fire. The aircraft laid down a smoke screen to shield the insertion but Team 7 came under fire in the LZ resulting in slight wounds to Zumbrun and Bruno. The team evaded the enemy and continued their mission. Late in the day, Team 7 watched a platoon of fifty NVA advance toward them on line. Thinking that they were well hidden, Team 7 remained in the brush until the enemy opened fire on them. They returned fire in an intense fire fight that lasted three minutes.

Zumbrun and Conaway were both wounded, Zumbrun for the second time that day. As the team executed their immediate action and evaded the enemy Zumbrun noticed that one LLDB was missing. The team was forced to leave much of its gear behind as it fled under continuous enemy fire. They successfully evaded the enemy and found a suitable LZ. The first recovery ship dropped ladders and Bruno and two LLDB quickly climbed as the ship drew heavy fire and departed the LZ. One LLDB was shot as he entered the helicopter; the other was shot off the ladder some 50 meters from the LZ. The second ship came in and was forced from the LZ by heavy enemy fire. The third helicopter arrived at the LZ and dropped McGuire rigs only to take several automatic weapon hits and be forced to land a short distance away.

The remaining team members, Zumbrun and Conaway, both wounded, attempted to find the LLDB team member who had fallen from the ladder. They were pursued immediately by well disciplined NVA who moved rapidly through the undergrowth without speaking or shooting to give away their positions. The team moved in ever expanding figure eights all night and finally broke contact in the early morning hours of March 14th. Amazingly, these two men, both wounded, continued to gather intelligence until midday when a recovery ship dropped a hoist to extract them. When the hoist was 30 feet above the ground the helicopter took heavy ground fire causing Zumbrun to fall to the ground and injure his back. To their credit, the 281st rescue ship stayed over Zumbrun until they could lower the hoist and lift him to safety.[69]

The small stream named Khe A To flows west down a steep valley and then crosses an open plain before approaching Highway 547 and turning abruptly north. Recon Team 10 was assigned the area near the point where the stream emerges from the steep valley and enters the flatland. Team 10 was inserted at last light on March 17th and hastened to their RON position. They heard movement on two sides of them intermittently all night long. During the hours of darkness they also heard the sounds of heavy trucks or bulldozers from the general area of Highway 547 to their west. On the 19th the team made contact with two NVA with unknown results. They continued the mission and found a well used trail that followed a ravine north of the Khe A To. They heard sounds of several people and some small arms fire and decided to attempt a prisoner snatch.

As they began to set up, three NVA approached on the trail and the team was forced to open fire and move away from the area. They evaded up the ridge to the northeast and set up observation on an intersecting trail near the top of the ridge. They soon observed many groups of three to fifteen men carrying 5 inch diameter tubes slung across their shoulders. The men would reappear from the opposite direction without the tubes. They would then reappear with more canisters and the sequence was repeated several times over the course of the hour that the team watched them. Team 10 made its way slowly around the area and heard the sounds of many men coughing and talking along a stream bed near the trail they had been watching. On March 21st the team moved quietly toward an extraction LZ and engaged three enemy in a firefight before being extracted.[69]

On March 29th a combined force consisting of the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion, Nung BDA Platoon and Recon Team 3 prepared for insertion near the site of the Ranger ambush on Highway 547 in which several trucks were destroyed and SGT Little Jackson was killed. It seemed that more information about the vehicles was desired and could be obtained from the vehicle identification plates attached to each chassis. Team 3 was to accompany the larger force and choose a time and place to slip unnoticed into the hills for a stay behind recon mission. Three school qualified demolitions men, Jay Graves, Gary Stedman and John Link accompanied the combined force prepared to set explosive charges and render the trucks totally unsalvageable. The size of the force required the use of both the 281st AHC helicopters and CH-46 Helicopters from the Marines. As the force began infiltration mid-morning on the 29th the first lift came under intense automatic weapons fire but managed to unload the lead elements. The second lift also came under fire and one UH-1H and one CH-46 were forced down on the LZ. The downed helicopters and the Delta forces on the ground began receiving small arms and rocket fire on the LZ. 281st gunships suppressed enemy fire long enough for the third lift to approach. A Marine CH-46 attempted to land and received heavy machine gun fire during which SSG Phil Salzwedel was wounded in the elbow, MSG Jim Kreilick had his fingers shot off and three LLDB Rangers were wounded. The helicopter aborted the insertion and departed the area with the senior advisor to 5th Company, LT Tom Humphus, still on board.

While the third lift was regrouping at Hue/Phu Bai the Rangers on the LZ continued to receive rocket fire and continued to call air strikes against the enemy positions. SGT Jim Holland, a Recon NCO, had accompanied the Rangers on this mission and found himself as the senior advisor to 5th Company after Salzwedel was wounded and Humphus had not been able to exit the aircraft. He immediately positioned the Company and directed fire while also directing the helicopters into the LZ. The third insertion lift returned and received the wounded as the last elements of the 91st departed. During the third lift two UH-1H and One CH-46 were shot down. A second CH-46 went down some distance from the LZ. One pilot was killed and two wounded; the crews were pinned down under heavy enemy grazing fire on the LZ. Dangerously low on ammunition, the force called for immediate resupply from the FOB. SP4 Russ Cooper, an S-4 clerk, immediately took charge and loaded 281st slicks with cases of ammunition and grenades. The 281st slicks began arriving at the LZ with crates of ammunition stacked in the door for resupplying the ground force. Gunships lay down suppressing fire as the pilots flew in, Russ Cooper kicked out the ammo, and the dead and wounded were loaded.

SFC George Ku ran for cover and was blasted off his feet by a mortar round landing to his rear. One of the American advisors rushed to his aid and began carrying him to a resupply helicopter. He was wounded just as he placed Ku on the bird and was pushed into the helicopter by Humphus, who had dragged his wounded interpreter to the helicopter. Humphus returned to his bomb crater and began to look for 5th Company when he was struck in the chest by a single small arms round. The bullet entered his left chest and followed the pectoral muscle before exiting under his arm.

The Nung platoon provided cover for SSG Jay Graves, SFC Robert Thompson and SGT Roland Meder as they attempted to retrieve the dead and wounded air crews from the downed helicopters. Graves recovered the body of a dead Marine door gunner and grabbed an ammo can to help with the shortage situation. When he had reached cover he opened the can only to find an assortment of screw drivers and pliers. Thompson, an S-2 clerk along to take photographs of the trucks, was shot twice in the chest and moved to a crater to wait for medical attention. A few minutes later SP5 Albert Merriman and SP4 John Link rushed the LZ to rescue a wounded Marine crewman. Merriman was wounded in the legs but Link managed to assist the Marine to safety. He then returned to assist Merriman and managed to remove him to safety but was wounded in the process. Meder and Gary Stedman rushed to Link’s aid and moved him to a covered position. Captain Jim Morris, a Special Forces Public Information Officer along for the ride, was wounded in the arm while providing cover fire as Link was recovered. John Link died from his wounds.

Major Ken Naumann, the Ranger Battalion Senior Advisor, continued to call in air strikes around the LZ against positions that continued to fire rockets and mortars into the perimeter. Early in the morning of the 30th enemy squads probed the perimeter with machine guns, mortars and rockets. The Rangers returned fire and the enemy broke contact. The Rangers captured one enemy soldier and killed several others. During the course of the battle, thirteen helicopters were shot down and several crewmen and pilots were rescued by the Rangers. An extraction LZ was selected several hundred meters from the insertion LZ- turned- battlefield.

The Rangers utilized tactical air strikes to cover their withdrawal to the LZ and to clear the LZ for extraction. The force carried their dead and wounded with them. Two Marine pilots, both officers, were directed to carry the body of their dead door gunner. When they got within a hundred meters of the LZ they saw the rescue helicopters approaching and dropped the body of the gunner and ran for the LZ. The Delta advisors were shocked that any U.S. military man would behave in such a cowardly fashion and after gently carrying the dead gunner to the aircraft they chastised the officers in no uncertain terms.[62],[69],[70],[97]

The name of John Link is inscribed on Panel 47E, Line 13 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

During Operation Samurai IV, over thirty contacts were made with the enemy. Two U.S. Special Forces advisors were killed and thirteen wounded. The 91st Ranger Battalion lost eleven killed and 59 wounded. The operation ultimately showed that VC military and political organizations had been all but eliminated in the tactical area of operations by the Tet counter offensive. They had been supplanted by NVA regular troops who had established a regimental base in the Highway 547/547A area. Weapons and ammunition captured indicated that heavy caliber weapons were being emplaced and used against aircraft. Large amounts of 23 mm ammunition indicated that the NVA planned to use even heavier weapons than the heavy machine guns used against aircraft during Samurai IV. The patterns of truck operations also indicated that a base area probably existed close to the junction of the Rao Nhi and Rao Nho river junctions. This was further supported by the number of secondary explosions occurring during air strikes on the area.[69]

“Counteroffensive, Phase IV”, 2 Apri1 1968-30 June 1968. During this period friendly forces conducted a number of battalion-size attritional operations against the enemy.

Operation PEGASUS-Lam Son 207 relieved the Khe Sanh Combat Base on 5 April and thereby opened Route 9 for the first time since August 1967. This operation not only severely restricted the North Vietnamese Army’s use of western Quang Tri Province but also inflicted casualties on the remnants of two North Vietnamese divisions withdrawing from the area. This success was followed by a singular allied spoiling operation in the A Shau Valley, Operation DELAWARE-Lam Son. These two operations prevented the enemy from further attacking I Corps Tactical Zone population centers and forced him to shift his pressure to the III Corps Tactical Zone.

During the period 5-12 May 1968 the Viet Cong launched an offensive with Saigon as the primary objective. Friendly forces defended the city with great determination. Consequently Saigon was never in danger of being overrun. Small Viet Cong units that did manage to get into the outskirts were fragmented and driven out with great loss of enemy life. By the end of June 1968 friendly forces had decisively blunted the enemy’s attacks, inflicted very heavy casualties, and hindered his ability to attack urban areas throughout the Republic of Vietnam. The enemy was forced to withdraw to his sanctuaries.

The strength of the U.S. Army in Vietnam reached a peak of nearly 360,000 men during this period.[65]

Operation Samurai V was an extension of Samurai IV. The AO was expanded to include what came to be known as The Yellow Brick Road, a newly constructed and well maintained infiltration route from Laos that intersected another well documented part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail known as Wire Road Alpha. During Samurai V eighteen Recon missions, fourteen Roadrunner missions, two Ranger operations, two Nung BDA missions, and one Mike Force operation were launched. Five rescue missions were also run to find missing members of a gunship crew and a Roadrunner team. During the stand down period between Samurai IV and V the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion was designated the 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion and its authorized strength was increased to six Companies.

Operation Samurai V was run from April 19th through May 20th, 1968. During this time Project Delta was able to establish that it was unlikely that any significant enemy base was yet established in the area. NVA/VC were widely spread throughout the area and had freedom of movement. Most were engaged in establishing food sources and constructing and maintaining antiaircraft positions, bunkers and travel routes. Many of the teams encountered small groups of NVA and engaged in firefights.

The most significant intelligence items were garnered from prisoners taken by Team 4 and Team 10. Another prisoner was captured by Team 5 but died on the way to the LZ. The prisoners were recent arrivals from North Vietnam and were attached to support and transportation units. The operation was plagued by continuous rain and poor weather, resulting in many delays and postponements. A force of an estimated 30 NVA pursued Team 1 for two days before the 81st Rangers were inserted as a reaction force and engaged them. The enemy broke contact amid air strikes and a counter attack by the Rangers.[71]

Project Delta returned to Nha Trang to regroup and recover from the effects of two long and arduous operations in I Corps. The Project was immediately tasked with performing reconnaissance in the areas to the west of Nha Trang as part of the post Tet security plan. Four teams were inserted for a very short two day period and succeeded only in being fired upon by friendly troops in an adjoining area. The operation, called Shakedown IV, was quickly recognized as an effort in futility and lack of coordination and shut down. In June the newly designated 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion prepared for urban operations in Saigon after a second surge of Communist attacks pushed government forces out of the capital’s northern suburbs.

The Airborne Rangers were shuttled into Saigon and began advancing toward VC held sectors around the Duc Tin Military School. Without the Rangers as an immediate reaction force the Recon section was out of business. Several Recon men joined the Rangers in Saigon, among them SFC Paul “Mickey” Spillane. MSG Virgil Murphy, SFC Moe Elmore, SFC Billy Bean, SSG Dave Ryder, SGT John Burdish, SGT Erickson, and several others were already there. SSG Dennis McVey joined the Rangers for his first operation with Project Delta as a medic. McVey recalls, “While in the Saigon area the rangers and DELTA advisors patrolled what was known as the “rocket belt”, that area outside of the city and the airport where 122 mm rockets were or had been firing from. We would be deployed out to an area and patrol looking for bunkers, trenches, caches, or enemy contact. After an area was swept we would go back to a base area in the city, refit, and then deploy to another area. We also did one riverine operation with the US Navy brown water swift boats. We would also use loaches (LOH Light Observation Helicopters) to draw fire and then the cobras would pounce and the rangers would follow up with a sweep of the area.”[66]

SFC Tom Schultz recalls that the Rangers suffered casualties, but this under strength and combat weary Battalion of Airborne Rangers routed a VC Regiment and literally wiped them off the enemy’s Order of Battle.[63] So feared was the reputation of these Rangers that hundreds of enemy sought out any other allied unit in order to surrender by the hundreds.[66],[63]

The pace of the operation was furious. As soon as one sweep was completed, another would begin. Nights were spent either on night patrol or in positions close enough to the rocket belt where enemy rockets were launched so that an immediate reaction could be mounted. On July 26, 1968, The Rangers were settling in for a watchful night when a single small arms shot rang out. SFC Paul D. “ Mickey” Spillane lay dead with a single gunshot wound to the head.[61],[62],[63],[64],[66]

A medevac helicopter would not respond to the Rangers because Spillane was dead and not wounded. The Project Delta advisors, already in despair over his loss, were even more incensed that they couldn’t get his body taken care of in the timely fashion due a fallen warrior. The following morning the U.S. advisors carried Mickey’s body toward a road and watched as a helicopter landed. A LT in starched and pressed jungle fatigues and spit shined jungle boots walked over to tell them that they could not take the body and then left. The men then carried Mickey’s body out to a highway where they flagged down a truck and took his body to the 3rd Field Hospital in Saigon.[61].[62],[63],[66]

The Americans were quartered in an empty warehouse on the MACV compound and the 81st rangers were quartered around a loose perimeter. The U.S. advisors were permitted to use the MACV officer’s club annex for food, drink and to relax between operations, as there were no other facilities available. The advisors were able to shower and clean up then go to the officers’ club for a sandwich and beer. While there, SSG Dave Ryder and SSG Dennis McVey saw the LT that had landed in the helicopter earlier that day come into the club and go to the bar. They walked up to the bar and flanked him, Ryder on his left, McVey on his right, and said hello. The LT answered, and they asked if he was the guy that they saw that morning. He answered in the affirmative and apologized that they could not help them, but they had to get the movies and mail to MACV Headquarters first. Ryder and McVey then urinated in his jungle fatigue shirt side pockets while he stood dumbfounded. They walked away and the LT stood there for a few seconds, then walked out of the club without saying a word. Project Delta advisors were informed that they were no longer welcome in the club. Their collective response was that they were OK with that as they were particular about who they drank with.[66]

The name of Paul D. Spillane is inscribed on Panel 50W, Line 99 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

During the Saigon operation the Rangers discovered a VC/NVA bunker complex and found a dozen US 7.62 mm M60 ammo cans in one bunker. When they pulled them out and opened them, they found them full of brand new 500 piaster notes with the Bank of Cholon wrappers still on them. This immediately got the attention of the ARVN Rangers, especially the officers. They had a hurried conference and got on the radio and in no time a helicopter showed up with an ARVN Brigadier General. The money cans were loaded and never seen by U.S. advisors again.[61],[66]

After finishing the rocket belt operation, the 81st Rangers and the Delta advisors were moved to the Tay Ninh area. They spent a few days at the B-32 team site for briefings, rest and refit. SSG McVey had an opportunity to visit the 45th Surgical Hospital in Tay Ninh, make some contacts and get some needed medical supplies. The Rangers then moved to the Trang Sup A camp, A – 301, which was located on hwy 781 northwest of Tay Ninh, and near Nui Ba Den. Trang Sup was a Mobile Strike Force training and operations camp. Delta and the Rangers got briefed on a new mission and departed for Nui Ba Den or “Black Virgin Mountain” or the “Black Widows Mountain” depending on which legend one preferred.[66]

The mission was to patrol the area around the mountain, secure the mountain and gather intelligence. Part of the unit went in by helicopter on top of the mountain then patrolled down. Part of the unit went in by truck to the base of the mountain on the west side by the Cambodian Border to act as a blocking force for the troops coming down the mountain. Nui Ba Den is a 3,000 foot tall mountain that is basically a pile of huge granite boulders with slopes of 45–50 degrees and steeper and is filled with tunnels and caverns. It sits on a large flat plain and has a vista of 30 or more miles in any direction from the top. It is also covered in trees and brush making it very difficult to move around the terrain. The mountain is located about 18 miles east of the Cambodian border in what was called the “Parrots Beak” and/or “the Iron Triangle” in III Corps, War Zone C.

The Rangers were successful in finding enemy locations, made some contacts and captured some arms and equipment. One of the items captured was a wooden case filled with NVA stick grenades which was brought back to the Trang Sup Camp at the end of the operation. SSG McVey thought it would be good to have some unarmed grenades to use for trading material to “get stuff” for the project from the Air Force or other organizations. He started to disassemble and remove the TNT and cap from the grenades when the A – 301 Team Sergeant told him to “get the hell out of his building to do that.” McVey went out and sat on top of the perimeter defense wall to spend the afternoon disarming the case of grenades, luckily with no mishaps. The disarmed grenades were used to trade for supply items not normally available to Delta through military supply channels.[66]

CHAPTER XV: TET COUNTEROFFENSIVE

“Counteroffensive, Phase V”, 1 July 1968 - 1 November 1968. During this period a country-wide effort was begun to restore government control of territory lost to the enemy since the Tet offensive. The enemy attempted another such offensive on 17-18 August but his efforts were comparatively feeble and were quickly overwhelmed by Allied forces.

In the fall of 1968 the South Vietnamese government, with major U.S. support, launched an accelerated pacification campaign. All friendly forces were coordinated and brought to bear on the enemy in every tactical area of operation. In these intensified operations, friendly units first secured a target area, then Vietnamese government units, regional forces/popular forces, police and civil authorities screened the inhabitants, seeking members of the Viet Cong infrastructure. This technique was so successful against the political apparatus that it became the basis for subsequent friendly operations. Government influence expanded into areas of the countryside previously dominated by the Viet Cong to such an extent that two years later at least some measure of government control was evident in all but a few remote regions.[65]

Operation Alamo (5-68) was conducted from August 30th through September 30th, 1968. Project Delta was OPCON first to III Corps and then to the 5th ARVN Infantry Division. The mission was to conduct reconnaissance and interdiction missions along the Cambodian border west of Saigon in the Parrot’s Beak. The 281st AHC was authorized to operate in I Corps and II Corps tactical zones and was thus prevented from supporting Delta in III IV Corps. The 195th AHC provided minimal support and the Project found itself reliant upon back channel arrangements with the 1st U.S. Infantry Division. A total of thirteen Recon missions, fourteen Roadrunner missions, two Nung BDA operations and four Ranger operations were conducted.[73]

The FOB was established at the end of a dirt runway adjacent to an old French rubber plantation at Quan Loi. The weather was again a factor as the frequent rains turned the red clay into slippery mud and caused air activities to be delayed on occasion. The mission began on a productive note as Roadrunner Team 101 was the first to be inserted on August 30th and was extracted on September 1st with two prisoners. Recon Team 1 was inserted on September 1st and was extracted on September 3rd with a prisoner. The remaining teams in the field were extracted after making contact with enemy troops and being compromised. Recon Team 3 found a large fortified area that had been recently occupied. The Nung platoon was inserted and linked with Team 3 to exploit the area. The base area was found to be 15,000 square meters in size and held 30 houses, each capable of providing quarters for 25 to 30 men.[73]

On September 6th, 5th Company, 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion was inserted along with the prisoner captured by Team 1. On the 7th the Company’s rear element was fired upon by three NVA. The 1st Platoon returned fire, killing two. As the prisoner led them toward an enemy hospital, the Rangers were again fired upon by four VC as they negotiated an old mine field. The hospital was abandoned and run down. It was located underground, but was not concealed, although it could not be detected from the air.[73]

On September 12th Team 7 reported watching several VC around a cluster of buildings that contained many 82mm mortar rounds and tubes, 122mm rockets and a quantity of AK 47 rifles. The team soon found itself surrounded and remained hidden as they called for a reaction force. The Nung platoon was inserted on the 12th and linked with Team 7. The Delta combined force secured the area and was soon in contact with an estimated 30 VC. They called for more reinforcements and the 1st Company, 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion was inserted on the 13th. The Rangers came under heavy fire on the insertion LZ. After the fire was suppressed by gunships the Rangers linked with Team 7 and the Nungs. On the 14th the Delta force was attacked from the front and rear resulting in five Rangers wounded and one killed. Later that afternoon the 3rd and 5th Companies were inserted to reinforce the ground forces. The Rangers loaded the captured ordnance aboard CH- 47 helicopters over the next two days. The captured ordnance included RPG-7 rockets (51 cases, 306 rounds, B-40 Rockets (406 cases, 2,436 rounds), anti-tank grenades (28 cases, 336 each), 60 mm Mortar rounds (94 cases, 1,128 rounds), 82 mm Mortar rounds (143 cases, 573 rounds), ChiCom TNT (61 cases, 4,575 blocks), AK-47 ammunition (399 cases, 574,500 rounds). A number of mortar tubes and AK rifles were also captured. Contact with the enemy continued sporadically throughout the removal operation.[73]

SSG Dennis McVey recalled that the enemy ordnance was removed to the FOB and stacked in a secure area. After about twenty CH-47 loads were brought out, someone realized that the stockpiled munitions would make a very nice target for the enemy. A direct hit would be devastating to the FOB. It was decided to remove the munitions from the FOB by truck and destroy the quantities at the capture site rather than remove any more.[66]

McVey also recounts one of the many serious situations that were made humorous after the fact. “While at Quan Loi I went out with the rangers to do an area recon and SFC Billy V. Bean was one of the ranger advisors. We got into contact and I got behind a huge tree for cover, but Billy Bean ran into me and knocked me out from behind the tree and into the dirt. He hit me so hard that it knocked the breath out of me and before I caught my breath and got up it was all over. Billy thought it was funny. I did not. We found an old abandoned and derelict French truck and some caches with ammunition and old bolt action French rifles obviously from the Viet Minh- French era. What was interesting was the woven split bamboo trails and roads constructed in the jungle to make travel easier. The trees were tied together at the top to form a roof like structure to obscure view from overhead; some of the trail/roads were 8’ – 10’ wide.”[66]

On September 24th Recon Team 9 and Roadrunner Team 102 each captured a prisoner and were extracted. On September 26th Recon Team 1 reported being in contact with the enemy and requested extraction. They reported three enemy killed and U.S. senior advisor Lawrence “Tiny” Young received a gunshot wound to the forehead above the right eye. Tiny shrugged it off and continued to run missions.[73]

The Project Delta Commander, Major Robert May, wrote a scathing after action report to this operation. High on his list of unsatisfactory efforts was the commitment of a minimum number of aircraft to the Project that caused the number of teams in the field to be reduced. The reconnaissance mission of the Project came to an abrupt halt when all aircraft were committed to support the removal of munitions from the large weapons cache discovered in the area. May further expressed dissatisfaction with the air relay aircraft and crew assigned from the Vietnamese Air Force. They averaged less than eight hours a day on station, thus depriving the teams on the ground of reliable radio communication.

He was very critical of the small size of the assigned AO and the way the ARVN Commander decided to divide it into two sections in order to support his own ground operation. May opined that the small area deprived Delta of most of its options to keep the operation clandestine and the arbitrary division of the AO enabled the enemy to shift his operations to the area that Delta was denied. May revealed that an Operations Order for Operation Alamo was requested but was never issued and in fact never existed. MACV had issued a letter assuring May that requisite support would be available but never followed up with any assignments. Delta had to rely on its back channel communication to request support from the 1st U.S. Infantry Division, a unit that performed well.

In his report, May saved the best for last. He presented detailed documentation of the Project’s effort to establish reliable communication with III Corps and with 5th Special Forces Group. After much discussion and disappointing response from III Corps, a call sign and frequency was finally established with the 5th ARVN Division Signal Center. Another day passed before a compatible key code was produced for encoding Delta’s messages. Delta attempted to pass a high priority message and could not break through the chatter on the communications network; long agonizing personal chatter punctuated by an occasional low priority message. Totally enraged, May collected a series of high priority messages and compared their time of transmittal to their time of receipt at 5th Special Forces Group Headquarters and documented the average transpired time as 23 hours and 25 minutes. Project Delta closed the FOB and headed home.[73]

Operation Alamo identified two major enemy units, the 368th Local Forces Battalion and the 168th Local Forces Battalion, and their subordinate elements through interrogation of prisoners and captured documents. Because of a large number of base sites, hospitals, large food caches, and ammunition caches found in the area, it was felt that the general area of the Song Be River South from Cambodia to E-W Highway 13 was a possible new enemy base area. In addition, four major infiltration routes were confirmed. A large number of high speed trails with bamboo matting were also found.[40]

Operation Warbonnet (6-68) began on October 13th with the installation of a Mission Support Site (MSS) at Da Nang and preliminary movement of equipment from Quan Loi to An Hoa. The FOB did not become operational until October 30th. Between October 30th and November 14th nine Recon missions and six Roadrunner missions were conducted. The missions were frequently postponed and delayed due to heavy rain and ground fog in the AO. During this short operation, contact with enemy forces ranging in size from one individual to a platoon, were frequent and caused teams to be extracted after compromise.

It was determined that enemy political and military organizations existed in all parts of the AO. There was evidence that the area was heavily used by both VC and NVA troops. Units identified in the AO included the C27 production unit normally responsible for growing food, providing shelter and guiding infiltrators through the area. Due to the large number of enemy troop sightings, enemy contacts, secondary explosions and agent reports it was determined that the area was used primarily as a headquarters area for training, regrouping, food cache, hospital area and quartermaster depot. The village of My Hiep was determined to be occupied and engaged in agricultural production. Project Delta identified two major infiltration routes within the AO; Highway 14 and the Song Cai River. The enemy demonstrated an ability to maintain simple communications while tracking and pursuing Delta teams by firing groups of single shots and beating sticks together.[74]

Medic Dennis McVey recalls that the FOB was set up at an old unfinished factory site and coal mine next to the 3rd Marine Division Base Camp in I Corps. “It was very wet and muddy. The Marine LRRP teams had suffered heavy losses due to their tactics, but were unwilling to take advice from Delta or adopt some of Delta’s methods. The Marines used the same insertion and extraction LZs repeatedly. They would insert teams by Sea Knight Helicopters with the team hanging from ropes or ladders, so they were exposed to weather which put them in a tired and weakened condition before ever getting on the ground. They could also be seen by everyone in the AO and the enemy knew exactly how many were being inserted. I remember that we traded quart bottles of Ten High Whisky with Marines for their M-79’s as theirs were the ones with the wooden stocks instead of the newer plastic stocks. Delta would cut the barrels down and cut the stocks into pistol grips to create an M-79 pistol that was easier to carry than a full sized M-79. Delta could not cut down the plastic stocks as they were hollow. We also traded some whisky for a Marine motorized mule and hid it in a conex box by standing it on end and taking it back to Nha Trang. I also remember that the Marines had no sandbagged tents, just fighting bunkers. That left them unprotected during mortar/rocket attacks. There were several 122 mm rockets fired into the Marine base while we were there but only one rocket hit in our area. It was a memorable event as it was aimed at the Marine base but fell short and landed in our FOB. The thing that made it memorable was the guy (not a Delta member) that was sitting on a pile of coal with no shirt on when the rocket hit the coal pile. He instantly turned black, peppered with bits of coal and coal dust; no serious injuries but his whole chest, arm, neck and face were tattooed with coal.”[66]

In another scathing after action report Major May pulled no punches in criticizing the fact that a FAC aircraft assigned to support Warbonnet was sidelined for maintenance for five of the fifteen days of the operation. This not only compromised the safety of the teams on the ground, it deprived the Project of its important photographic intelligence gathering ability. Just as Delta began closing on FOB An Hoa, orders were received from 5th Special Forces Group Headquarters that Project Delta would return to III Corps and continue to operate from Quan Loi. As a result the aircraft scheduled to lift the Rangers from Nha Trang to An Hoa were cancelled, leaving the FOB without proper security for nearly a week. The operation was declared a go at An Hoa and the move to the new FOB continued. After Warbonnet had been in progress for a week, another message came ordering Delta back to III Corps. Delta cancelled all insertions and began preparations to be operational in III Corps within a week. Within a few days Major May was instructed to continue the mission at An Hoa until November 15th. An obviously frustrated May finished his AAR with the following, “When newly assigned officers are placed in high staff positions which could influence the deployment of Project Delta it is recommended they receive a complete briefing on Project Delta. This should be considered a part of the in-country briefing and should be given by Project

Delta.”[74]

As a direct result of Major May’s two blistering After Action Reports Lieutenant Colonel Caridakis, Assistant Chief of Staff, MACV J-3, forwarded the following MACV Directive for the Chief of Staff’s approval. Note that the entire directive is not classified but that (C) denotes paragraphs that are specifically classified and (U) denotes specific paragraphs that are not classified.

MACJ3-033 Employment of PROJECT DELTA (U)

Chief of Staff ACofS, J3

LTC Caridakis/tnb

1. (U) PURPOSE. To forward a proposed MACV Directive, PROJECT DELTA, to Chief of Staff for approval

2. (C) DISCUSSION.

a. At Tab B is a letter from CO, 5th SFG requesting that a MACV Directive be published regarding the employment of PROJECT DELTA (Detachment B-52, 5th SFGA.

b. The proposed directive enclosed with the letter has been reviewed. J-3 concurred in except for para 3 a, b, c, (green flag), and the excessive details contained in para 5, Support Requirements (Red flag).

c. Subparagraphs 3 a, b, and c pertain to requests for PROJECT DELTA forces and the transfer of OPCON of Vietnamese elements to US Field Force Commanders/Senior Advisor. These paragraphs have been rewritten under COMMAND and CONTROL paragraph and delineate the request procedures for US Field Force Commanders/Senior Advisors to obtain PROJECT DELTA assignment and tasks the Field Force Commanders/Senior Advisors with the responsibility of coordinating with the Vietnamese Corps Commander for transfer of OPCON of Vietnamese elements. In addition, when transfer of OPCON of Vietnamese elements is not feasible, the US Field Force Commanders/Senior Advisor will be responsible for providing necessary support to PROJECT DELTA forces.

d. CO, 5th SFGA concurs with the above changes. (Ref telecon with MAJ McCullough, Ass’t S-3, 13 Nov 68).

e. At Tab A is proposed directive.

3. (U) RECOMMENDATION: That the proposed directive at Tab A be approved and published.

ELIAS C. TOWNSEND

Major General, USA

Assistant Chief of Staff, J3

2 Incl

asHEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANT COMMAND, VIETNAM

APO San Francisco 96222

DIRECTIVE NUMBER : PROJECT DELTA

1. (U) PURPOSE: To provide guidance for employment of PROJECT DELTA.

2. (C) GENERAL: PROJECT DELTA is a joint US Special Forces and Vietnamese Special Forces special operations detachment with the primary mission of long range covert reconnaissance surveillance. The detachment has the capabilities to:

a. Gather intelligence for tactical or strategic exploitation.

b. Plan airstrikes, and conduct bomb damage assessment.

c. Interdict routes of infiltration and lines of communication.

d. Conduct limited search and clear operations.

e. Conduct special purpose raids:

(1) Hunter-killer missions

(2) POW recovery

(3) Downed air crew or body recovery missions

(4) Wire tap operations

(5) Prisoner acquisitions

f. Conduct harassing, cover and/or deception operations.

g. Conduct photo reconnaissance operations and furnish completed photo intelligence reports.

h. Conduct airborne personnel detector missions.

i. Combat test new equipment.

j. Conduct classified missions.

3. (C) EMPLOYMENT.

a. Assets

(1) 81st Ranger Battalion (Airborne), three (3) companies as reaction elements.

(2) Elements of 281st Assault helicopter Company, when operating in I or II CTZ.

(3) Tactical Air Control Party (TACP).

(4) CIDG Roadrunner Platoon (12 teams).

(5) CIDG bomb damage assessment platoon.

(6) USASF - VNSF reconnaissance platoon (16 teams).

b. Operations. PROJECT DELTA is normally utilized in an area of 1200 - 1500 square kilometers where there is a definite intelligence void. The area of operations (AO) and Forward Operating Base (FOB) are assigned exclusively to CO PROJECT DELTA. Requested boundary penetrations of the AO by other units or supporting arms are coordinated with CO PROJECT DELTA. During the operation, the AO is saturated with roadrunner teams and helicopter inserted reconnaissance teams, with the reaction elements held for insertion in one lift for the exploitation of developed contacts or the relief of embattled teams.

c. Logistics: PROJECT DELTA requires the following logistical considerations:

(1) Class II through V supplies including III-A and V-A.

(2) Aviation.

(a) C-130 aircraft for movement to and from FOB. For planning purposes 20-25 aircraft required.

(b) Radio relay aircraft.

(c) Aircraft for TACP, normally two required.

(1) Designate the AO, adjacent unit responsibilities and location of FOB.

(2) Effect liaison with CO, 5th SFG and initiate planning with CO, PROJECT DELTA. Assume operational control of PROJECT DELTA upon movement into FOB.

(3) Provide additional reaction forces as required.

(4) Provide additional helicopter gunships or helilift support as required.

(5) Establish secure voice communications between FOB and OPCON headquarters.

(6) Designate priority on tactical air and arclight missions.

(7) Insure the availability of the required combat and logistic support for PROJECT DELTA forces.

5. (U) REPORTS. Upon completion of a PROJECT DELTA mission, Commanding Officer, PROJECT DELTA will submit after action report to this headquarters via the OPCON headquarters and the US Field Force Commander or Senior Advisor.

Enclosure 1 - Chain of Command

Enclosure 2 - Capabilities of Project Delta

Enclosure 3 - Operational Organization

Enclosure 4 - Project DELTA Reaction Force- 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion

Enclosure 5 - CIDG Bomb Damage Assessment Plan

Enclosure 6 - Reconnaissance Team

ECT DELTA. Enclosure 7 - Road Runners

(3) Coordinate tactical airlift of all PROJECT DELTA elements to and from the FOB.

c. OPCON headquarters:

By the end of 1968 the winds of change were blowing in Washington, D.C. The uncertainty that prevailed on Capitol Hill began to affect conventional unit commanders in Vietnam. Project Delta would enter its final year and a half with a long and hard earned identity and would face much adversity through the indecisiveness and uncertainty of U.S. commanders on whom Delta depended for action.

CHAPTER XVI: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

“Counteroffensive, Phase VI”, 2 November 1968 - 22 February 1969. In November 1968 the South Vietnam government with American support began a concentrated effort to expand security in the countryside. This project was known as the “Accelerated Pacification Campaign.”

This period covers the election of President Richard M. Nixon and a change of policy brought about by his administration after January 1969 when he announced a coming end to US combat in Southeast Asia and a simultaneous strengthening of South Vietnam’s ability to defend itself. Formal truce negotiations began in Paris on January 25, 1969. The period can be characterized as marking time in preparation for an about face. Forty-seven ground combat operations were recorded during this period, the following being the most important:

(1). Operation NAPOLEON in the Dong Ha area initiated previously (1967) by Marine units, terminated on 9 December 1968.

(2). Operation WHEELER WALLOWA by 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division and 196th Infantry Brigade (Light) in north-central Quan Tin Province. This ended on 11 November.

(3). Operation MACARTHUR initiated by 4th U.S. Infantry Division in II Corps tactical zone terminated on 31 January 1969.

(4). Operation COCHISE GREEN conducted by the 173d Airborne Brigade in Binh Dinh Province.

(5). Operation TOAN THANG II consisted of ground operations throughout III CTZ. This was a multi-division operation involving allied forces.

(6). Operation SEA LORDS was a coast and riverine operation. On 6 December Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT was started to disrupt enemy infiltration of materials from the “Parrot’s Beak” area of Cambodia. Air operations continued to be important with over 60,000 sorties flown”.[65]

Project Delta returned to III Corps for a two month operation running from November 16th, 1968 through January 16th, 1969. Operation Ares (7-68) was accomplished from an FOB located outside of the provincial capital city of Dong Xoai, which sat on a major five-highway cross roads, and was a logging area. The area was hilly with many lakes and streams. The FOB was set up across a 16 foot wide asphalt highway that had been widened and extended for about three thousand feet to form a runway. There was an SF A camp in the area that had been overrun earlier in a major battle for the area in 1965 (10 June 1965–20 June 1965) in which 2LT Charles Q. Williams, 5th SFG was awarded the Medal of Honor and the first SEABEE to receive the Medal of Honor was part of the battle.[66]

During Operation Ares thirty four Recon missions, twenty nine Roadrunner missions, eighteen Ranger operations, and five Nung Platoon operations were conducted. These missions included reconnaissance/surveillance, search and clear and rescue/recovery missions. During the operations, 66 enemy sightings and 41 enemy contacts occurred. Many Recon and Roadrunner teams were forced from their operating areas because of enemy pursuit, contact, or compromise. On December 5th Recon Team 12 ambushed seven NVA and managed to kill six and take one prisoner. On December 8th Recon Team 1 engaged an unknown sized enemy force and evaded with a prisoner. The prisoner died at the extraction LZ. One LLDB team member was separated from the team at the time of contact. The Nung Platoon was inserted on Team 1’s extraction LZ and began to search for the missing team member. The Nungs came under attack by an enemy company and called for air support. During the attack two Nungs were wounded. The Nungs continued their mission and located the body of the missing team member who had died of wounds sustained in the initial contact. On December 11th the 2nd Company, 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion came under attack by an enemy force. During the exchange of fire U.S. advisor SFC Tom Schultz and ROK advisor LT Wu were wounded.[75]

During Operation Ares, an unoccupied Battalion base area was discovered and ultimately destroyed. Numerous documents were captured that identified the unit as the VC 81st Rear Service Group. Documents captured through other enemy contacts identified the presence of the 70th Rear Service Group, its subordinate warehouse group H.10, and its subordinate Transportation unit V.532. The transportation routes between the two Rear Service Groups was patrolled and guarded by reconnaissance platoons of the 70th Rear Service group. The presence of these two units, the large number of troop sightings, the number of enemy contacts, the number of abandoned base camps and hospitals, and the discovery of a large number of bicycles indicated that the area was being used as a headquarters complex for convalescence, training, resupply, and food and weapons cache. Project Delta identified three major infiltration routes and numerous smaller high speed trails heavily used by foot, motorcycle and bicycle traffic. Many trails were covered with bamboo fronds to minimize noise and to hide the trails from the air.[75]

The following are excerpts taken directly from the After Action Report for Operation Ares. Although they don’t give a blow by blow of the entire missions they do serve to demonstrate the level of detail observed by the Recon teams even under enemy fire.

“Recon Team 10 (08 - 10 Jan 69). 090910H, vic coord YT276805, team heard 3-4 SA shots fired approx 1000 m SE of their position. (Item 148, Enemy Activity Overlay).

(2) 091100H, vic coord YT274796, team observed an enemy base camp consisting of 10

covered foxholes, 3 cook fire sites, 2 cooking pots, and 1 empty AK ammo case. Area showed no sign of recent use.

(3) 091500H, vic coord YT277797, team observed a 4 m wide, E/W trail consisting of

bamboo matting. Trail showed signs of heavy use by motorcycles, bicycles and foot traffic.

(4) 100900H, vic coord YT275795, team observed 6 VC moving E on a trail. Enemy point man was dressed in civilian khaki pants, black shirt, sandals, and wore a green triangle-shaped cloth tied around his head. He also wore a U.S. pistol belt with canteen on his right hip, a poncho and AK ammo vest. Remaining five enemy wore black PJ and mixed khaki pants/black shirts. The 1st and 2nd enemy were armed with ChiCom assault rifles. The remaining four enemy were armed with SKS weapons. Team initiated contact and enemy returned fire with numerous SA rds and fled. The following were captured: 1 AK-47 (SN 12047683), 1 AK ammo vest, 134 rds 7.62mm ammo (ChiCom and Russian origin), 3 brassieres, 7 panties, 1 U.S. pistol belt, 1 hammock, 6 BA 30 (make “Calor”), 1 ChiCom flashlight, 1 cooking pot, 7 bars of baby soap, 7 bars regular soap, 1 kerosene lamp, 1 can of milk, 1 bed sheet, 7towels (one U.S. green), 1 pair black socks (US type), 1 kilo rice, 1 slip (female undergarment), 5 black trousers (female), 5 black shirts (female), 1 black shirt (male), 1 shirt (khaki), 1 pair khaki trousers, 4 AK magazines, 1 oil can. 00920H, same coord, team observed 2 enemy KIA as a res of gunships, and USASF adv, in recovery ship, observed 1 enemy WIA (possibly KIA) approx 50 m W of vic coord YT275795. Enemy body was clothed with black PJ uniform. Helicopter received SA fire during extraction.”[75]

“Rcn Team 12 (10 - 12 Jan 69). (1) 101945H, vic coord YT297747, team heard 1 SA shot fired approx 400 to 500 m SE of their position. On 102045H, same coord, team heard 1 SA shot fired approx 400 to 500 m SE of their position. On 102245H, same coord, team heard 1 SA shot fired approx 400-500 m SE of their position. (Item 157, Enemy Activity Overlay).

(2) 110915H, vic coord YT296746, team observed a NW/SE trail approx 1/2 m wide that showed sign of heavy use.

(3) 111530H, vic coord YT295740, team observed 12-15 enemy moving SW on the trail. Enemy were wearing mixed black, gray and tan uniforms, and green fatigue hats. They were armed with AK assault rifles. Enemy appeared to be unobservant, talked loudly, and wore their weapons at sling arms and on their shoulders. On 111615H, same coord, team observed 2 enemy moving SW on the trail. One wore a black shirt and brown trousers, and the other wore a brown uniform. Both wore green hats and were armed with AK assault rifles. On 120825H, same coord, team observed 9 enemy moving NE on trail. They were wearing brown uniforms and green hats, and had packs and were armed with AK assault rifles. On 120835H, same coord, team observed 1 enemy moving NE on the trail. Enemy wore black uniform and green hat and was armed with an AK assault rifle. He was carrying a civilian radio and played it loudly. On 120840H, same coord, team observed 2 enemy moving NE on trail. They had packs and were armed with AK assault rifles. Enemy got near team’s position, and turned around moving SW back down the trail. On 121010H, same coord, team observed 4 enemy moving NE on trail. they were armed with 3 AK assault rifles and 1 BAR. They were very observant; however, completely disregarded the LZ being blasted by an air strike. On 121015H, same coord, team observed 12 enemy moving SW on the trail. They were wearing brown uniform and green hats. Their packs were full of unk contents, and they were armed with AK assault rifles. On 121125H, same coord, team observed 5 enemy moving SW on the trail. They were brown unif, web gear, and appeared to be very observant. The first enemy wore a green hat and was armed with an AK assault rifle. the 2nd enemy wore a U.S. steel helmet and was armed with a BAR. The third enemy wore a green hat with a U.S. steel helmet hooked to his web gear and had his left shirt sleeve rolled to the elbow. The 4th enemy wore a green hat and was armed with an AK assault rifle. The 5th enemy wore a green hat and was armed with an AK assault rifle. On 121515H, same coord, team observed 1 enemy moving SW on the trail wearing black shirt and gray trousers and sandals. He was armed with an AK assault rifle. At approx 4-5 m range, team fired and enemy was KIA. On 112045H, same coord, team heard 1 SA shot fired approx 500 m SW of their location. On 112100H, same coord, team heard 6 SA/AW rds fired approx 500 m SW of their location. On 112200H, same coord, team heard voices and unk number of people moving NW of their position on trail. On120830H, same coord, team heard 1 SA shot fired approx 500 m SW of their position. On 120950H, same coord, Team heard 1 SA shot fired approx 1000 m NE of their location.[75]

“121345H, vic coord YT118543, Team 3 discovered a bicycle repair shop. It contained 3 used bicycles, 6 new bicycle tires, spare parts for bicycles and trucks. Area showed signs of having been used for vehicle repair. There was an old destroyed bunker at this loc, and also a 1 m wide, well used trench running SE/NW. Team observed 12 steel rods, 12 feet long, 1/2 inch thick (2 separate piles). 121415H, same loc, team heard chopping of wood approx 200 m N of their location. Team destroyed the bicycles, bicycle tires, and most of the equipment.”[75]

Medic SSG Dennis McVey recalls several incidents from his time at Dong Xoai.

“One morning during resupply, a CH 47 was on the ground with its turbines running and sitting next to the runway when a C -130 landed. The C -130’s right wing hit the rotor blades and about three feet of the wing was torn off. Unbelievably, the CH – 47 was able to fly out for repairs and no one on either aircraft or on the ground was injured. The C -130 taxied to the end of the runway, pulled off the edge and shut down. As it was going down the runway it spilled fuel all along the edge of the runway and the FOB, but luckily none of it caught fire. The flight crew was flown out as they did not want to stay out in the boonies with us. The next day a repair crew flew in and began working on the wing. They cleaned up the jagged edges, sealed the fuel tank and lines in the right wing and then fabricated a shortened wing tip on the plane. They would come in early in the morning and leave in the evening. They worked quickly and got the job done in three days. A crew came in and flew the C 130 out. During the time the plane was on the ground the Delta folks thought it would be mortared and destroyed before they could get it out but that did not happen. The night after the day it was flown out, the FOB got mortared with lots of rounds falling where the plane had been. I can only assume that it took that long to get a plan in action and get the mortars in place. It says a lot about the VC’s ability to react in that it took that long, and even though the plane was gone they still executed the attack.”[66]

“After we had been set up at the FOB for a week or so, an artillery unit moved in at the end of the runway and set up to support us. They hired locals to fill and stack sandbags for their firing positions and bunkers and let the locals, especially the kids, wander around their area freely. The kids sold cold drinks and fruit and of course scoped everything. We warned them about security but they ignored us and during a mid-operation stand down they got probed and lost a couple of people. I stayed behind at the FOB during the short stand down and we got probed twice and mortared once, not much, just harassment. However we did take one casualty, a 2LT who was a liaison from the Division we were working for. He had a Thompson and thought he was John Wayne. During the probe, he jumped out of his hole and was running parallel to the wire firing his Thompson into the jungle like an idiot. A mortar round came in and he received one shrapnel wound to the abdomen. He was in a panic, and as we had no way to know if there was any internal damage we medevaced him out. Bill Pomeroy also received a shrapnel wound to the head manning his defensive position.”[66]

“While at Dong Xoai the recon guys found a trail system near the border with bamboo trails and overhead concealment. They also found a big cache of bicycles which were brought out by CH -47 sling load, about 60–80 were brought in. I remember that none of them were equipped with brakes and had the handle bars extended on the left side with a large stick to help steer while carrying a load. The medics kept one and took it back to Nha Trang to ride around the Delta compound, but Crash Whalen made us get rid of it after a few spills because we could only stop it by dragging our feet.”[66]

D.J. Taylor recalls a particularly memorable post mission debriefing from one of the larger than life characters that populated Project Delta: “As with most men with the nick-name ‘Tiny,’ Laurence ‘Tiny’ Young was a large, powerful man, but with an even larger heart and limitless compassion for others. It was always entertaining just to be around Tiny, as there was never a dull moment. If something wasn’t happening, he’d make something happen.

“However, with Tiny, there was a time and place for everything. When it was time to have fun, Tiny would lead the pack, but when it came time to work, he was, in my opinion, one of the best Recon Team Leaders we had in the Recon Section during my two year tour with Project Delta.

“I don’t think Tiny was afraid of anything. He especially wasn’t afraid of trying new reconnaissance techniques as soon as they were suggested, so we Recon Team Leaders were always anxious to learn how these techniques had worked in actual application and would debrief Tiny as soon as he returned from a recon mission. Learning how, and if, these new and innovative techniques actually worked was extremely crucial to our survival, so we Recon Team Leaders hung on every word Tiny said in our impromptu debriefings.

“For some reason, I remember one of Tiny’s post-mission debriefings in minute detail and here it is: I hope you all learn something from it. I know I did.

“It was in December 1968 during the Dong Xoai deployment. Tiny had taken a recon team into an AO near the Song Be River, and on the morning of the third day the FOB received a call from Tiny for an emergency extraction. Tiny reported that his LLDB counterpart had been badly wounded, was unconscious, and needed med-evac along with an emergency extraction for his recon team.

“We, in the Recon Section, anxiously awaited Tiny’s return so we could pick his brain for his lessons learned during his latest recon mission. As soon as the S-2 completed their formal debriefing of his team, several of us approached Tiny with questions about what had happened as he departed the TOC, but, for the first time since I knew him, he didn’t want to talk about it and evaded our questions.

“Of course, Tiny’s evasiveness peaked my curiosity and I planned to use my favorite elicitation technique (Budweiser) on him that evening in the Beer Tent. I was right; it was a four Budweiser secret, and at Budweiser number five the story unfolded.

“I hope you can remember how animated Tiny could get at the five Bud-weiser level, so picture him again seated at a table in the Beer Tent with a beer can in his hand, waving both hands and relating this story:

‘Our infiltration LZ was a small clearing in the jungle near the Song Be, and we got in by ladder at last light without a problem. For the next two days, we patrolled our AO and found nothing but God damned leeches. There were so many leeches in that AO that no self respecting VC would have anything to do with such a place, so we moved away from the river toward higher and dryer ground to escape the leeches.’

“Tiny was into his sixth beer by now and really getting into it, as he continued. ‘At last light of the second day, I found an RON position on the top of a steep hill that was some distance from the river, dry, and therefore leech-free. It was a perfect RON position but for one thing; a troop of rock apes had also claimed it for an RON position. But, what the heck? Those apes would stay in the trees, I’d stay on the ground, and I wasn’t going to be run out of such a fine RON as that one was by a bunch of apes, so we settled in for a peaceful night’s sleep.’

“Well, it was sometime around midnight, and I was sound asleep when something woke me up. What awoke me was a tugging on my rifle. My rifle was dummy-corded to me by team SOP, and my rifle was at the end of the dummy-cord. I reached out to grab my rifle, but all I grabbed was a handful of hairy animal; it was one of the rock apes that had come down out of the trees to try and take my rifle. As soon as I grabbed him, it let go of my rifle and fled back into the trees, but I expected it, or one of the other apes, to return, so I got ready for it, and I didn’t have long to wait.’

‘A couple of minutes later, I felt a tugging on my shirt-sleeve and I gave that rock ape my best rifle butt-stroke to the head. That ended our problems with the rock-apes, and we heard nothing more from them for the rest of the night.’

“Tiny was silent for a moment, finished off his sixth Budweiser, and I thought for a second that the impromptu debriefing had ended, but then he continued. ‘The next morning, I did a first light head-count and discovered that my LLDB counterpart was missing. His rucksack was there, but he and his rifle were missing. For a moment I thought he’d pulled a dumb-assed stunt like going to shit and not telling anyone, so we waited a few minutes for him to return before we commenced to search for him.’

‘We found my LLDB counterpart lying unconscious at the bottom of the hill. I knew then it hadn’t been a rock ape tugging on my sleeve the night before; it had been my LLDB counterpart trying to awake me to tell me he’d heard something. Jeeze! I hope he’s going to be OK.’

“I never heard anything about the LLDB’s recovery, but I too hope he was all right after receiving what had to be the mother of all rifle-butt strokes to the head.

“And, as for lessons learned from Tiny’s patrol, there was one that stuck with me for the rest of my life and kept me from making several serious mistakes in the years to come. That bit of hard-won knowledge that Tiny managed to pass to us in the Beer Tent that night was this: No matter what the circumstances, you should never, ever, ever, ever go to bed with a rock ape.”[80]

Ted Aslund and Bob Fegan were inserted on a recon mission at Dong Xoai and found themselves in the middle of a large enemy force with nowhere to go. They called for gunship support and an extraction. The 281st Wolfpack arrived on the scene and began to lay down a field of fire. From the air they could see the enemy locations and knew that the team was about to be over-run. They advised the team to put themselves in a box and began to make strafing runs that laid continuous fire about three feet over the teams’ heads. Aslund and Fegan kept their cool until the gunships directed them through an area cleared by their fire to an LZ. Upon returning to the FOB they were humbled to see that every single recon man had arrived at the air strip and loaded their gear and weapons on helicopters to effect a rescue in the event the 281st had failed. This was just one example of the many times the same scenario was repeated throughout the life of Delta. The loyalty and dedication these men had towards each other was absolute.[101]

On an excursion into a village, Ted Aslund encountered a group of Montagnards with a spider monkey they were planning to eat. Ted asked if he could buy the monkey and was surprised when the Yards generously gave him to him. Ted named the monkey Oscar and took him back to the FOB. It didn’t take long to learn that not only was Oscar intelligent, he was also meaner than a snake. He ran off more than a few laundry girls by repeatedly jumping on them and pulling their hair and he was not the least bit reluctant to bite anyone he deemed an outsider. Still, he got along fine with just about everybody in the recon section.

The recon men decided that if Oscar was to be a member of the team he should at least be airborne. They set about to “qualify” him for his jump wings by designing a parachute for him and tossing him from a helicopter. Oscar completed several jumps and except for some undisciplined releases of fecal matter, a weakness common in the species, he seemed to like it. As a sign of complete acceptance Oscar was allowed his own bar tab at the Delta Hilton when the troops were on stand down. Oscar would spend every evening in the company of his recon buddies drinking Salty Dogs until he could no longer navigate and then Ted would see that he retired to Ted’s room in the barracks for a good night’s rest.

Oscar contracted pneumonia and grew quite ill. The recon men took him to the hospital in Cam Ranh Bay and sought treatment for him. The nursing staff was immediately taken with Oscar and adopted him as their special project. Within a few days the nurses called Delta and demanded that the men come and get their fucking monkey. He had recovered fully and was terrorizing everyone in the hospital and veterinary lab. He had learned how to unlock the K-9 cages and delighted in releasing the guard and tracking dogs at all hours. He also figured out the most sterile places to relieve himself. Ted and others picked him up and Oscar quickly fell back into his old routine at “home.”

Each room in the barracks had a ceiling fan. Partly out of curiosity and partly to amuse himself, Ted put Oscar on a fan blade and turned the fan on. Oscar seemed to enjoy the ride thoroughly but did manage to indiscriminately evacuate his bowels and coat the walls of Ted’s room. Early in 1969 it appeared that Delta was in for a long deployment and SGM Crash Whalen ordered the monkey gone. Ted took Oscar over to the Air Force compound and tried to sell him to some young fellows there. He struck a deal and traded Oscar for three poncho liners and $10. Two days later the Airmen showed up at Delta’s gate and demanded that they get their barter back and wanted to leave the monkey. Ted instructed the Nung gate guards not to let them in. The Airmen walked along the road outside the Delta compound and tossed Oscar, wrapped in another poncho liner, over the fence. Within the next day or so Nha Trang came under rocket attack in the middle of the night. As everyone rushed to man the perimeter a very excited Oscar jumped on Crash Whalen’s back, wrapped his arms around his head and defecated down his shirt collar. After the alert was lifted, Oscar left with one of the indigenous workers.[101]

Dennis McVey recalls the following incident from Operation ARES at Dong Xoai: “I had to take a sick Delta member into the Third Field Hospital in Saigon. I took the 281st admin run that was going to Tan So Nhut and got the patient to the hospital. He was not sick enough for a MEDEVAC but too sick to keep at the FOB. The Recon SGM asked me to pick up some beer as the beer supply was running low, and gave me money from the beer fund to purchase some beer and sodas. I bought a pallet of beer, a half pallet of soda and paid the bill. The guy from the PX asked if I wanted some free beer and of course I said yes. He showed me some pallets of beer, some off the wall brand (Blatz something) that nobody wanted and that had been sitting around for so long that the cans were rusting and leaking, but I agreed to take some. The PX guy said to take all you want so we loaded another pallet of “free” beer on the 2 ½ ton and set off to the airfield. Well, my eyes were bigger than the cargo area of a Huey and it did not appear that two and a half pallets of drinks would fit. However the makers of Huey’s had underestimated the initiative of thirsty Delta members and the 281st aircrew. We painstakingly stacked beer and soda, with the good stuff in the middle of course, so that the “free” beer cases were hanging over the edge on the chopper by ¾ of their length. By carefully stacking we were able to weigh them down with cases stacked on cases until we got everything wedged in. I had to squeeze in with a gunner on the ride back but what the hell, we had a whole pallet of “free” beer on board. I felt good as I had made a good deal for DELTA and the guys would have plenty of beer. Well, we were a little heavy and the beer hanging over the side made the Huey a little less aerodynamic but it was flying and we were on our way home. About halfway back and flying over heavy jungle, we hit a downdraft and the chopper made a huge lurch and began shedding cases of beer like a dog shaking water off itself. I sat stunned as I watched my “good deal for free beer” cascade toward the earth. There was silence for a moment then we all burst out laughing and talking about Charlie looking up and saying “those crazy Americans are bombing us with beer”. I can only hope that the beer was so bad that it made them sick if they got any. We got back to the FOB with all of the good beer and soda and a small amount of the “free” beer which turned out to be flat as it had sat in the sun too long. I believe we finally traded what was left of the bad ‘free’ beer for some C- rations with the artillery unit that set up next to us for a short time at the end of the runway so things turned out all right in the end.”

CHAPTER XVII: ASHAU; AGAIN

“Tet 69/Counteroffensive”, 23 February 1969 - 8 June 1969. From Tet 1969 through the month of June, the enemy again tried to sustain an offensive. His inability to do so can be largely attributed to aggressive allied ground operations. Between 23 February and 8 June 1969, a total of 70 significant named ground operations were terminated resulting in heavy enemy loss of life and materiel.

The main operations concluded during this period were:

(1). The 3d Marine Division’s Operation KENTUCKY aimed at preventing enemy infiltration through the Demilitarized Zone in central Quang Tri Province. Throughout the early part of January 1969, Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces continued to avoid major contacts with Free World Forces. Their continual movement to avoid friendly forces or to search for food and supplies contributed to a decrease in the enemy-initiated ground attacks and attacks-by-fire in Quang Tri Province.

(2). Operation NEVADA EAGlE, initiated on 17 May 1968 in Thua Thien Province, continued in 1969 as the U.S. 101st Airborne Division continued to defeat enemy personnel, and capture rice caches, material, and installations within its large area of operations, where it undertook offensive sweeps along Route 547 and around Song Bo.

(3). Two battalions of the 4th Marine Regiment were engaged in Operation SCOTLAND II. Initiated on 15 April 1968, this multi-battalion search and clear operation was centered in and around Khe Sanh.

(4). The IV Corps Tactical Zone Dry Weather Campaign began on 1 December 1968 in support of the overall mission to prevent Viet Cong units from interfering with pacification efforts. This operation, “Speedy Express,” interdicted lines of enemy communication and denied him the use of base areas. In 1969 the 1st Brigade, 9th U.S. Infantry Division continued the operation in Dinh Tuong Province, using its highly successful night ambush tactics while the 2d Brigade continued its mission with the Mobile Riverine Force. Although engagements in Operation SPEEDY EXPRESS were typically small, the 9th Infantry Division fought several sizeable engagements with impressive results.

On 23 February U.S. Navy units and installations at Da Nang, Tan An, Ben Luc, Go Dan Ha, and Tra Cu came under numerous and widespread attacks associated with a new enemy offensive, but since many units in these areas were poised to meet these attacks they caused only minimal damage. April saw the heaviest cumulative enemy activity in the barrier interdiction campaign to date.[65]

During February and March, 1969, Project Delta remained in its base headquarters at Nha Trang for a much needed rest and refit. Extensive training was conducted and new members were introduced to their teams and Delta’s methods of operation. The Project remained on alert in the event of another Tet offensive and was prepared to mobilize wherever they were needed. That someplace turned out to be the Ashau Valley and its surrounding area. From March 29th through April 25th, 1969, Project Delta was OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division from an FOB at Phu Bai. Operation Cass Park (1-69) was launched to locate NVA/VC troop concentrations in preparation for large clearing operations to be conducted by the 101st. The Ashau Valley belonged to the enemy. It provided areas where the enemy could be hidden from the air and relatively safe from air attack, plentiful water and food sources, terrain that prevented any covert operations by large forces to be launched, a well developed network of high speed trails that were not observable from the air, and imposing natural terrain barriers that prevented ease of mobility except down ridge lines and along valley floors. Landing Zones (LZs) were few and located on steep hillsides, necessitating the use of ladders or ropes for many infiltrations. The Ashau was a known major infiltration route for NVA soldiers coming from the north through Laos and was guarded vigorously from U.S. and South Vietnamese penetration.

The NVA had long since developed its tactics and training for anti-reconnaissance forces. Because of the importance of the Ashau and A Vuong valley areas to their forces as access and egress routes the NVA had established a battalion as an anti reconnaissance force. Trained in specific tactics, the battalion was subordinate to the E-220 Transportation Regiment and employed its extensive knowledge of the trail system and lookout points to quickly observe and pinpoint team insertions. The battalion had also developed a complex system of hard wired field phones between base areas and a simpler system of communication by small arms shots, shouting, and whistling between smaller mobile units. During Operation Cass Park Project Delta launched ten Recon missions, six Roadrunner missions, four Ranger operations and four Nung BDA operations. Every single operation was compromised and teams were engaged by the enemy within 12 hours of infiltration. In the case of Recon and Roadrunner teams, the enemy watched as the teams were inserted and then quickly signaled for small squad sized units to converge on the teams and attempt to surround them. They would continue to signal as they converged and try to kill or capture the teams. That failing, the NVA would track the team to its extraction LZ and attempt to shoot down the rescue aircraft. The larger units put on the ground met with different tactics. The NVA avoided traditional infantry combat and elected to harass the Rangers and Nungs with sniper fire and small hit and run attacks. Many of the Project’s teams reported being tracked by dogs during the day and at night.[82]

Operation Cass Park began on an ominous note. The first team to be inserted was Roadrunner Team 101. One team member fell from the ladder on insertion, breaking his arm. He was extracted and the team continued the mission. Team 101 made its last radio contact on April 4th and was not seen or heard from for the duration of Cass Park. Recon Team 1 was inserted on April 2nd and found themselves in the middle of a battalion bivouac area on the 3rd. They called for gunships and tactical air support and managed to be extracted without casualties. Recon Team 4 was inserted on April 7th and was immediately pursued by NVA. They engaged five NVA on the 8th, killing one, and were pursued by an estimated company. They requested air strikes and reinforcements. The 2nd Company, 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion was inserted to link with Team 4.[76],[78],[80],[81],[82]

At the same time on the 8th, Recon Team 2, Mike Sillings, Ted Aslund and J.D. Benoit, reported being pursued by an unknown sized enemy force using a very skilled and persistent tracker. The team moved quickly and stealthily, maneuvering so as to observe their back trail and cover it as best they could. Around 1400 the team sought some deep cover in thick brush to observe their back trail. They hid themselves and stayed alert. They soon heard the sounds of the tracker moving towards them. The tracker reached his hands in to part the undergrowth and Ted Aslund remembers saying to Mike Sillings, “Get ready to rock n’ roll.” The team opened fire, killing the tracker, and began to run for their lives. Almost immediately they heard the sounds of dogs on their trail. For the next two hours they tried to outrun the dogs to no avail. They ambushed the dogs, who had outdistanced the tracking team, and took advantage of the lull to find a good place to spend the night. The team gathered its wits and reviewed their options.

In the pre-mission briefing, Doc Simpson had pointed out all the directions the team was not to run in because of known enemy concentrations. Left with essentially a single compass azimuth to follow, the team prepared to move at first light. As soon as the sun rose the team found itself severely limited by heavy fog and listened nervously to the sounds of yet another dog on their trail. The team found themselves running deeper and deeper into enemy territory and unable to make radio contact. They finally were able to raise the FAC and were told that extraction was not possible due to the heavy weather and fog.

The team found itself being pressured and pushed at every turn. They came upon a camp that had women in it cooking and doing laundry. They came upon many bunkers and heavily traveled trails. They eventually bedded down in an empty bunker for the afternoon and at dusk they walked through the camp and out the other side. On the third day Team 2 found itself on a steep hillside above a stream. Across the stream was a large open meadow with what appeared to be stumps scattered across it. The team tied themselves to trees with their A7A belt straps so as not to tumble down the 70 degree slope in the night. In the very early morning hours, J.D. Benoit spotted a small luminous light moving up the hill towards them. He alerted the team and they collectively decided that it must be the dial of a wrist watch. The NVA soldier stood and attempted to bring his weapon up. Before he could, Benoit killed him with a burst from his CAR 15. As the team loosed themselves to run, the “tree stumps” in the field stood and came on line to assault the hill. The team heard a tank approach the far end of the field and as it turned to face them, it shone a spot light on their hillside. The team quickly shot out the light and came under a barrage of fire. They crested the hill and found themselves in a large cultivated field with machine gun positions set up in the trees around it.

The teams ran for their lives and at daylight were able to raise an Air Force jet on the Air Force emergency frequency. Soon they had a FAC overhead directing them to an LZ. Another FAC joined the first and both FACs fired their white phosphorus marking rounds at the enemy to slow them down. Ahead of them, one of the 281st ships was shot down and the extraction was delayed by the rescue efforts for the air crew. As the team emerged onto the LZ, they saw that it was another vegetable garden with machine gun positions on either side of it. Aslund recalls seeing the large caliber guns firing their tracer rounds from the canopy and being silenced by the Wolfpack guns. Aslund made a lunge for the helicopter and slipped on the skid, sliding backwards. The strong hands of Ted Perkins, the recon man riding recovery that day, grabbed Aslund’s web gear and pulled him into the chopper. Perkins said, “This is no Goddamn place to play around.” Aslund doesn’t recall that he was playing around at all.

The team landed at the air strip in Phu Bai and was told to stand by to be transported to Nha Trang for debriefing at headquarters, an unusual procedure. Instead, a Major showed up in a jeep and transported them to 101st Airborne HQ where they gave the team debriefing to the Commanding General. At the conclusion of the debriefing the General commented that he didn’t believe a word of what they reported. Mike Sillings calmly looked the General in the eye and said, “Take your rusty ass out there see what you can find.” The General replied that he would do just that.[101] One month later, almost to the day, the 101st Airborne began what it characterized as a “reconnaissance in force” of Hill 937 in the Ashau Valley. The engagement would become known as the battle of Hamburger Hill. Forty six Americans would lose their lives and some four hundred more would be wounded. It would mark a significant turning point in the way the remainder of the Vietnam conflict would be conducted.[59]

Roadrunner Team 103 made contact and became split. Recon Team 3 reported being in the middle of many NVA and sent continuous reports of enemy sightings. On April 9th a 281st gunship was shot down with serious injury to its four crew members. They were rescued and medevaced. Recon Teams 2 and 3 were extracted after firefights that left several enemy dead. All but one member of Roadrunner Team 103 was recovered and Roadrunner Team 104 was extracted. The pace was frenzied. It would only get worse.[76], [78], [80], [81], [82]

On April 9th and 10th the Nung BDA Platoon and 3rd Ranger Company were inserted with the primary mission of finding the missing Roadrunner Team 101 and the missing member of Roadrunner Team 103. Both units would be plagued by NVA sniper and hit and run tactics. The Rangers suffered one killed and several wounded. Neither the Rangers nor the Nungs found any sign of the missing Roadrunners.[82]

Recon Team 7, Terry Bryan, David Barta and Tom Long, was inserted on April 15th. On the morning of April 16th Team 7 reported being in heavy contact and requested gunships, air strikes and immediate extraction. SGT Ted Aslund was the belly man for the extraction. When the helicopter arrived on the LZ Aslund could see the bodies of two team members lying still in the grass. Dave Barta was laying down constant fire in all directions to cover recovery efforts. Aslund recalls that Barta was involved in “one hell of a fire fight” and holding off the enemy force almost single handedly. Aslund says that the rescue ship never would have made it down without Barta’s heroic efforts.

Terry Bryan had lost two fingers and was also wounded in the arm and leg. Aslund dragged the wounded Bryan, a wounded LLDB and the other two uninjured LLDB into the helicopter. Aslund fought Terry Bryan, who insisted on recovering Tom Long. Aslund could see Long’s body from the helicopter and noted no movement. The helicopter was under intense enemy fire and had been hit multiple times. The helicopter struggled to take off. Knowing that the helicopter could handle no more weight in its damaged condition, and knowing that any attempt to recover the two dead would result in more injuries, Aslund made the decision to leave Long’s body and save the rest of the team. SSG Thomas K. Long and one LLDB, were reported missing.

The 1st Ranger Company had been immediately launched to search for the missing team members. The lead helicopter crashed while attempting to insert the Rangers a couple of kilometers from the battle scene, killing the pilot and injuring the crew and one Ranger. Aslund’s crippled helicopter managed to land within the newly inserted Rangers’ positions and requisition another helicopter to transport the wounded to Phu Bai.[101],[82] On April 19th the 1st Ranger Company found the body of SSG Thomas K. Long.[82]

While this recovery operation was being launched, Recon Team 9 was inserted and came into contact with a larger NVA force. They called for air strikes and managed to evade the enemy and were extracted by McGuire rig hours later when aircraft were freed up.

Recon Team 8, Ted Perkins and Fred Foster, also made contact with the enemy and was extracted about the same time as Team 9. In a situation no recon man liked to find himself in, Ted Perkins had an overwhelming need to void his bowels. In spite of efforts to evacuate bowels before missions and the use of “no shit” pills, bad water and indigenous rations could frequently cause the drizzles. As Perkins squatted to accomplish the task at hand, three NVA soldiers walked briskly up a trail toward his position and opened fire. Perkins was struck in the buttocks but managed to return fire. He returned the few meters to his team carrying three AK 47s and called for extraction. He had been compromised, in a compromising position.[101]

On April 17th, Recon Team 6’s third day in the hole, the team reported they were in heavy contact and requested immediate assistance. After a last frantic radio communication there was no further contact with the team. With two Ranger Companies and the Nung BDA platoon engaged in ground searches for missing team members elsewhere, immediate search efforts were limited to air searches conducted at low treetop level until April 19th when 2nd Ranger Company and the BDA platoon were inserted along with several Recon men to search for the missing team.[82] Among the search team were recon men Ted Aslund and Mike Sillings. The Rangers would conduct a search lasting days and punctuated by frequent enemy sightings and contacts. They quickly found an area that showed signs of a recent battle. Trampled grass, expended 5.56 mm casings and blood were found.

The Rangers followed a trail near the battle site and encountered two enemy wearing tiger fatigues and carrying M-16s. Both were killed in the ensuing fire fight, effectively ending any further intelligence value they might have had. Their uniforms and weapons would cause members of Project Delta to speculate on the fate of the team for many years to come.[101]

Project Delta’s Commanding Officer, LTC Alan Park, to this day recalls the event with great emotion and feels as if he lost his own family that day.[81] The Rangers continued their hunt for the team for several days and found an NVA hospital complex. They were instructed to leave it alone and were extracted the next day.[101] The team, like Roadrunner Team 101, was never found. SSG Charles Newton, SGT Charles Prevedel and SP4 Douglas Dahill were listed as Missing in Action.[82] At the Special Operations Association Reunion (SOAR) held in Las Vegas in September of 2008, a representative of the Joint Personnel and Accountability Command (JPAC) announced that the remains of all three missing members of Team 6 had been recovered from near the battle site, identified and repatriated.

While searching for Long’s body the Rangers discovered a cache of rocket and mortar rounds. Project Delta U.S. losses for Operation Cass Park were one killed, five wounded and three missing in action. Losses inflicted on the enemy were much greater. One of the telling statistics of the operation was that thirty medevac missions were flown as opposed to twenty four total ground missions.[82]

The name of Thomas K. Long is inscribed on Panel 27W, Line 96 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

The name of Douglas Dahill is inscribed on Panel 27W, Line 99 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

The name of Charles Newton is inscribed on Panel 27W, Line 102 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

The name of Charles Prevedel is inscribed on Panel 27W, Line 103 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

The following is an account of the Phu Bai operation from the memory of Delta Medic SSG Dennis McVey. “My worst day in Vietnam was in April, 1969 when I had to go identify SSG Thomas K. Long’s (KIA 4/16/69) body after having been in the jungle for several days. His body was recovered by the Delta Rangers and was at the Battalion Aid Station at Phu Bai Airfield in a body bag. I identified Thomas from his equipment and mission documents. It was evident that he had not been touched or searched by anyone while he lay in the jungle. He had been hit by small arms fire several times and probably died immediately.”[66]

“Just prior to that, on April 17, 1969 the air-powered Deuce and a half horns blew (Refers to the air horns on an Army 2 1/2 Ton truck) and as I was up for recovery we went out to try and pick up RT6 with Charles Newton, Charles Prevedel, and Douglas Dahill, and three indigenous personnel. When we got into the AO and started circling we received heavy ground fire from a 12.7 machine gun and had to move off while the gunships worked the area; they also drew fire but suppressed the fire or destroyed the gun. When we moved back in to try again there was no radio contact and no visual sighting. However I did see enemy movement on the ground and actually fired on them with my CAR 15 as we were that low looking for signs of the team. We got weathered out and the BDA platoon and other teams went in the next day but they were never found. To this day I still hate the sound of deuce and a half air horns as they always meant someone was in trouble or that we were being hit with a probe or mortar/rocket rounds.”[66]

While flying recovery on another mission in the Ashau, Dennis McVey remembers problems of a different sort. “I was flying recovery to pull Al Drapeau and his team out as they were in contact and moving to an extraction LZ. They could not get to a sit down LZ so I had to bring them out on ladders, while we were hovering and just as I dropped the ladders, the crew chief said the pilot wants you. I looked around and the pilot pointed to the cockpit dash where the twenty minute red fuel warning light had come on. Not an ideal situation! However the 281st was not going to leave our guys on the run in contact with out trying to get them. We got the team into the chopper and the pilot took off like hell towards the airfield at Phu Bai. I warned Al and the team to be ready for an unprepared landing. We were in sight of the airfield when the fuel lines started to collapse from the pumps sucking dry tanks; it’s a horrible sounding high pitched screaming noise. The noise stopped and the turbine died just as we crossed the end of the runway but the pilot managed to sit it down without major incident except for springing the skids a little. That same day we picked up a team on McGuire rigs and the chopper was so low on fuel that we set them down on a sand bar in the middle of a river and a chase chopper picked them up. The red light came on for the second time that day, but we were closer to the airfield and landed normally.”[66]

“After losing several people at Phu Bai, the Project went into stand down and regrouping. Several of us stayed at the FOB during the stand down and a company from the Mike Force provided security. The FOB was about 5 clicks down the road from Camp Eagle and the 101st Division, the unit we were working for. The FOB was on a hill overlooking a small valley that the 101st, CCN FOB, and the Phu Bai Airfield were using as a dump. Periodically, the 101st would send some guys out with a 5,000 gal fuel truck with various contaminated fuels and lay out a hose and flush the fuel into the dump then burn everything in order to try and keep the Vietnamese scroungers out of the dump. One day the 101st guy’s forgot to roll up the hose prior to lighting off the dump and they burned up the truck and almost themselves, it was great entertainment for the stay behind party. We also worried about all of the scroungers being around the area for security reasons due to the decreased number of people at the FOB. To try and solve the problem SSG Jay Graves Delta Recon, SSG Walt Hetzler Mike Force, and myself SSG McVey decided to chase them away using persistent CS Powder. Jay was wearing shorts and a tee shirt and I was just wearing shorts, Walt was in Jungle fatigues. We grabbed a 5 gal container of persistent CS powder and with Graves driving, Hetzler in the back seat and me in the front passenger seat we took off across the helo pad/runway and circled the scroungers while I poured out the CS powder. What a disaster, we did not even think about what happens in a moving vehicle that is stirring up dust and creating wind. The CS Powder hit the ground, got stirred up by the jeep and all came right back into the jeep and onto us. Our eyes were watering from the powder and our noses were running like a water hose, and our skin was burning like crazy. Only one or two of the scroungers were affected and the rest laughed and started throwing rocks at us. Graves beat a hasty retreat in the jeep and that was the last time we bothered the scroungers.”[66]

“Summer-Fall 1969”, 9 June 1969-31 October 1969. During the summer and fall of 1969, conduct of operations was increasingly turned over to Vietnamese, US troops withdrew in greater numbers amid reaffirmations of support for the Republic of South Vietnam government. President Nixon announced the reduction of the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam which would be demonstrated initially by the withdrawal of 25,000 troops by 31 August 1969.

American troop strength had peaked at 543,400 in April 1969 but dropped to 505,500 by mid October. More scattered than before, enemy attacks were concentrated on South Vietnamese positions. U.S. combat deaths were down in the early fall as American units switched to small unit actions. The trend was not constant, however, because U.S. troops deaths which had fallen well below l00 a week in the fall, rose above 100 later in the year.[65]

Operation Cass Park II began a week later on May 2nd, 1969 and ran through July 5th. Project Delta was OPCON to the Americal Division and set up its FOB adjacent to the 5th Marines at An Hoa. Project Delta fielded a total of thirty three Recon and Roadrunner missions during Cass Park II. A total of eleven enemy contacts occurred in which four U.S. advisors were wounded. The contacts were made with small units ranging from individuals to an estimated company. Weather deteriorated as the operation progressed, signaling the onset of the wet season monsoons. Cloud cover became a problem for air support. In spite of the relatively low number of enemy contacts there were numerous sightings of enemy and many reports of pursuit by enemy forces that seemed unwilling to close with the teams. Cass Park II revealed that NVA/VC used the AO frequently as a travel route and a cache area for weapons and food. Units identified as working in the area were the 231st Transportation Battalion, the 233rd Transportation Battalion and the 4th Transportation Battalion. Several infiltration routes from Laos and dispersal routes within South Vietnam were identified. It was evident that the enemy had been moving through the area unmolested for a long period of time. A lack of security noted by several teams, and the unwillingness of the enemy to engage the teams may have been a reflection on their lack of counter reconnaissance training. Even when contact was initiated with the enemy they were reluctant to pursue. The enemy was dressed in a variety of uniforms and mixed uniforms of black, green and khaki. Weapons were uniformly AK 47s and SKSs. One Roadrunner team observed a Soviet manufactured 37 mm anti aircraft gun being pulled by two cows and accompanied by four armed NVA escorts. Recon Team 1A was inserted on June 17th. Their mission was typical of most of the missions run during Cass Park II from the standpoint of visual observations. Every once in a while a mission comes along that yields a surprise or two. This is the actual intelligence report issued after Team 1A’s debriefing and is included in the After Action Report for Cass Park II.[83]

“Recon Team 1A (17 - 19 Jun 69).

(1) 17130H vic coord ZC088001 team heard A/C throughout the night either A C-119 or C-47, stopped at 0500 hours, no incident throughout the night. (Team heard spooky 13 over station friendly aircraft.)

(2) 180620H vic coord ZC086002 E/NE of location team heard rooster crow approx 800 meters.

(3) 180630H, same location team heard tin rattling similar to eating utensils approx 800 meters from their location.

(4) 180645H, vic coord ZC086002, team heard single shot approx 1000 meters NE directions. Same time heard approx 2 enemy NW direction approx 200 meters.

(5) 180655H vic coord ZC086002 team heard 1 or 2 men walking SE at approx 50 meters.

(6) 180655H team moved NE for approx 200 meters. At 0910H team observed 1 man wearing VN straw hat, khaki shirt moving SW to NE on trail approx 1 m wide, hard packed but lightly used. Team thinks this indiv heard team. Indiv moved to edge of bushes and then moved NE. (Item 77, Enemy Activity Overlay).

(7) 180930H, vic coord ZC086005 team heard 1 S/A shot in direction of LZ and heard voices NE approx 200 meters. Team continued NE approx 50 meters and observed trail watchers hut with a 2 man foxhole freshly dug next to the hut. (Item 78, Enemy Activity Overlay).

(8) 181055H, vic coord ZC085002, team came upon trail, 2 meters wide, hard packed, burned on the sides and fairly new, excellent condition. Trail runs SE to SW has overhead canopy. Could not be seen from the air. Dirt from trail was packed on each side. This trail is very clean and it is a high speed trail. Team then moved approx 25 m off the trail to observe. Team stayed in this location.

(9) 181100H, vic coord ZC085002 team observed 2 VC walking NE direction [Illegible] were wearing khakis and armed with AK-47’s. Enemy were talking loudly no apparent concern for their security.

(10) 181115H, vic coord ZC085002 team observed 2 VC riding bicycles SW on trail. Enemy were wearing khakis and armed with AK-47’s. Enemy were riding as if they were going to work without a care in the world, talking loudly.

(11) 181100H, vic coord ZC085002 team heard what is believed to be a 3 wheel scooter moving from SE to NW and back from NW to SE. This continued until 1700 hours.

(12) 18130H, vic coord ZC085002, team observed enemy moving for the next 2 ½ hours in groups of 2 - 3 and 5, and 1 group of 10 at 3 to 5 minute intervals. A total of approx 60 VC. Enemy was traveling SW with approx 40 to 45 bicycles and the rest were walking, again talking loudly. Most of enemy was wearing khakis, some without shirts, some with white shirts, some with VN straw hats. All enemy had weapons AK-47’s and SKS’s, they were not equipped with packs or web gear. Approx 1300 hours, Team observed 2 VC pulling a 2 wheel cart. Contents of cart unknown. Metal rattles could be heard. At 1330 hours a group bunched up at trail junction, then a group of 7 VC moved south on trail. Trail approx 1 m wide, hard packed and lightly used. Team believes the 7 VC went to the hut.

(13) 181130H, vic coord ZC085002, team heard 1 S/A shot from SE approx 800 meters.

(14) 181430H, vic coord ZC085002, team observed groups of 2, 3 and 5 moving NE. Team believes this was a change of work shifts. These groups are dressed, same as others mentioned before. Walking and riding bicycles as the group observed before. This continued for 30 minutes.

(15) 181500H, vic coord ZC085002 team observed 1 VC on bicycle on trail moving W and stopped at trail junction. This VC fired 1 shot (sounded like an elephant gun) in the air. The 7 VC that broke off the trail previously came back up the trail to the junction to meet this 1 VC. For approx 1 minute these 7 VC talked to this person and all 8 VC moved SW on the trail.

(16) 181515H, vic coord ZC085002, team observed a group of 12 VC moving NE, all were walking and dressed the same as enemy mentioned above. All had weapons but no packs nor web gear. Approx in the center of this group team observed a Caucasian female. The Caucasian female was dressed in white shirt, dark pants, with her shirt tucked in her pants. She was without head gear. Her clothes were clean and neat. Hair was strawberry blonde, roughly shoulder length. Smooth light skin. Weight approx 140 to 145 lbs, height approx 5’ 6”, large bust, female was not carrying anything. She was not under duress. She seemed well fed and in good health.

(17) 181535H, vic coord ZC085002, team observed 3 groups each of 2, [Illegible] dressed in khaki pants and white shirts carrying large bundles [Illegible] what looked like white sheets. Enemy was walking SW to NE. Scarves were wrapped around their heads. They had no weapons. Other groups besides these groups were still moving NE until 1630 hours. At 1600 hours, a cart pulled by 2 VC moved NE with same type rattle as before. Team believes this was a chow cart.

(18) 190545H, vic coord ZC085002, team heard rooster from SE approx 700 m. Another rooster W approx 22 m and another E/SE approx 700 meters. At this time, 1 enemy moved SW on a bicycle with flashlight, too dark to see what type dress or equipment. Approx same time 1 VC was heard moving S walking.

(19) 190650H, vic coord ZC085002, team observed 2 enemy dressed in green uniforms, armed with AK-47’s, web gear and packs moving SW to NE. From this time on no traffic was observed or heard until contact approx 1600 hours when Team heard fire fight and air strike supporting 1st Ranger Company. Team saw 1 VC running S to N. (Item 79, Enemy Activity Overlay).

(20) 190650H, vic coord ZC085002, team heard 2 shots E/SE of their location approx 1000 meters. (21) 191710H, vic coord ZC085002, Team linked up with 1st Ranger Company, 81st Airborne Ranger Bn (ARVN).

It was widely speculated back in the Recon area that these two team members might have a future guessing women’s weights at the County Fair back home.

Operation Trojan Horse (3-69) was conducted from an FOB located outside Special Forces CIDG Camp Mai Loc, A-101. This was the third A Camp designated A-101, the first two being Khe Sanh and Lang Vei, neither of which survived. It was affectionately called the “gateway to the north” as it was the northernmost outpost in Vietnam and sat very near both the DMZ and the Laotian border. Project Delta was OPCON to the U.S. 3rd Marine Division. Operation Trojan Horse ran from August 4th through August 29th and after a brief stand down resumed from September 8th through October 1st, 1969. The advance party responsible for constructing the FOB found themselves in the middle of a battlefield with many unexploded pieces of ordnance. Several Rangers broke for a meal and as they sat down one Ranger detonated an old French rifle grenade, blasting the group with shrapnel. One heavy piece of metal cleaved the skull of one Ranger in the forehead and between the eyes, SSG Dennis McVey did his best to stabilize the men and they were all still alive when they were medevaced. An Ordnance Explosives Detail was requested from the 3rd Marine Division and they came and disabled all ordnance discovered to date. Everybody tiptoed around the FOB for quite a while.

During the two month operation Project Delta committed nineteen Recon teams, seventeen Roadrunner teams, six Ranger Companies, and four Nung BDA platoons on operations. Throughout the Vietnam conflict the northern provinces of I Corps remained a hotly contested piece of real estate. In spite of heavy casualties inflicted on them during Tet of 1968, the NVA maintained enough control in the remote border areas to comfortably stage troops and supplies for future actions. President Johnson had ordered a cessation of bombing on October 31st, 1968. Except for an air campaign in Cambodia, the cessation provided an opportunity for the North Vietnamese, who were tottering on the brink of defeat in 1968, to renew their infiltration via the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Project Delta’s AO for Trojan Horse encompassed the Khe Sanh Plain and areas including the northwest borders of South Vietnam, Laos and the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The 47 missions run during the two months of Operation Trojan Horse revealed that the NVA and what remained of the local VC units were present throughout the AO. Project Delta identified no less than eight NVA Regiments and Battalions operating in the area. The NVA had altered their methods of operation significantly so that they engaged in transporting supplies, building base camps and maintaining equipment at night. During the day they maintained security and rested out of sight of aircraft. Interrogation of prisoners taken during Trojan Horse revealed that the majority of the fighting men from these NVA units were located in Laos and in the DMZ where they were engaged in training and refit.[84]

On August 17th Recon Team 3 discovered a large ammunition cache that included many rocket and mortar rounds. The 2nd Company, 81st Airborne Rangers was inserted to secure the cache and exploit the find. On September 13th Recon Team 10 was compromised by twenty five NVA soldiers closing in on its position. That evening Recon Team 6A (Burhl Cunningham, Roy Sprouse) reported counting over 100 trucks due east of their position. The team continued to see trucks through the night, into the next day and all through the following night. They called and adjusted artillery, Spooky gunship and air strikes. They asked for a Marine reaction force. Again the

Marines denied the request.[80],[84]

Many years later several interesting facts emerged that may have affected the 3rd Marine Division’s view of Project Delta’s intelligence gathering. Shortly after Delta’s reconnaissance efforts in the Ashau Valley in April, 1969, the 101st Airborne Division launched its attack on Hamburger Hill. Forty six U.S. soldiers would die taking the hill which was immediately abandoned by U.S. forces. The NVA quietly retook the hill unopposed. There was a great public outcry when the pictures of all forty six dead were shown in Life Magazine along with some two hundred killed in the third week of June. Washington ordered General Creighton Abrams to avoid any more such encounters. Coincidental to this, the 3rd Marine Division Commander knew that his Division would be one of the first to leave Vietnam. The Division departed in November, 1969. Unbeknown to many, this would signal the end of large unit search and destroy operations in South Vietnam. Small unit engagements would be the rule for the remainder of the war. The only large unit search and destroy operations would be conducted in Laos and Cambodia.[59]

As Trojan Horse wound down two significant incidents occurred. An armored vehicle with a turret mounted cannon was assigned as part of the perimeter security for Project Delta at Mai Loc. On September 19th the FOB was attacked by a small ground unit and received small arms and mortar rounds. The young soldier assigned with the armored vehicle ran from his tent and was killed by a mortar round exploded near his feet. Two U.S. and three VN Delta men were wounded. On September 27th SFC D.J. Taylor took several newly arrived Recon men on a shakedown mission near the FOB. They surprised a group of VC with arms pilfered from the A Camp. They were engaged in a firefight and SGT Tom Crosby, on his first mission, was critically wounded in the neck and chest. He was saved by the quick actions of SSG Dennis McVey who grasped Crosby’s severed carotid artery and kept him from bleeding to death on the medevac ride to Quang Tri. Dennis’ account follows.

“Delta moved into an FOB across a dirt road/air strip from the Mai Loc Special Forces Camp West of Quang Tri in Quang Tri Province in I Corps, on the road that ran to the Khe Sahn area and to Laos, highway 9. We had the support of an artillery unit with an attached track mounted duster (twin 40 mm guns) and crew. They were set up on the perimeter facing the mountains of Laos and would fire harassment and interdiction (H&I) at night. It was quite a sight to watch the stream of tracers’ shells going out and hitting the mountains. The FOB got mortared a few times and during one of the attacks the SSG in charge of the duster ran out of their tent rather than crawling and was riddled by shrapnel and KIA. The old Khe Sahn base was abandoned but the air strip was still usable and Delta used it to land and pick up our guys that had to be brought out on McGuire rigs. This was the operation when SGT Thomas J. Crosby was hit in the right carotid artery and chest outside of the FOB at Mai Loc. We got him in a chopper to take him to the hospital in Quang Tri and both he and I were covered in his blood. I had his carotid artery pinched off with my left hand and could not let go, I was trying to bandage his chest wound but could not with only one free hand. I tried to get the door gunners to help but they just sat and stared. The co-pilot was turned in his seat staring at Tom and me with his eyes bugged out. Tom stopped breathing and I had to give him mouth to nose as his jaw muscles had clamped down due to the wound and I could not open it one handed. Mouth to nose worked and Tom lived. I did not see him again until May of 2007 when he and his wife came to Washington to visit. It was great to see him after 38 years and to see how well he had recovered, and how his life had turned out. He recovered, went to college, met his wife and they both became school teachers and both were adamant in their support for our country, military and veterans, and taught that belief to their students. I had not had a chance to get to know Tom in the Project as he was only with us for 26 days (09/01/1969–09/27/1969) before being wounded and evacuated.”[66]

One of the big problems at FOB Mai Loc was finding good water. The nearest water hole was a river that ran near the tiny hamlet of Mai Loc. The river had a tendency to run cloudy especially during this time of year when the monsoons approached. The condition of the water was not improved by the many villagers who bathed and washed their clothes in it or by the livestock that used it to water and get cool.

Many of the Project Delta men contracted dysentery and dealt constantly with diarrhea, parasites and dehydration. Dennis McVey contracted both bacillary and amoebic dysentery and was medevaced to the USS Repose off the coast. He spent a week there and then was sent back to the FOB and placed on light duty. Viet Nam was an object lesson in inconsistency, and Mai Loc was no exception. It was a rainy muddy place with typical red clay soil and the FOB was a mess. Delta had obtained the use of a dump truck, so Dennis spent a week hauling gravel from the SEABEE quarry near Quang Tri. He made two trips a day and spread the gravel around the FOB to fight the mud. It was an easy way to recover and still do something useful. He would eat breakfast and then start to Quang Tri on his first trip of the day. He traveled alone and carried his CAR 15 as his only armament. On the way in each morning, he would pass the Marines sweeping for mines on the road. Dennis would honk the horn and wave as he passed. The Marines would usually have some kind of contact during the patrol but Dennis never saw anybody or anything. He saw and heard helicopters flying back and forth as they using the road as a guide. He would load up with gravel and head back to the FOB, sometimes passing the Marines again as they patrolled the road. He would unload the gravel, eat lunch, then go back for his second load and return. As Dennis looks back on it 40 years later, he is amazed that there was no contact or incident; maybe the NVA/VC appreciated Delta preparing the road and FOB area for their eventual use when they came across the border and took over the South in 1975.[66]

Dennis McVey recounts an experience he had while accompanying the Rangers on Operation Trojan Horse. “The 2nd CO., 81st Ranger BN was deployed into the AO to check out some trails and bunker areas and I went out with them. We were walking along a ridgeline on a heavily used trail that was about six feet wide when the Ranger point man ran into some NVA on the trail and he was hit by an AK round in the right hip. The company went into a defensive position on the ridge and the enemy was down a very steep slope. We were in a strong position on top of the ridge with large trees on either side of the trail and on the slopes to provide cover, but we were vulnerable from either end of our position if the NVA had been strong enough to get up on the ridge and flank us. I set up in the middle of the trail and started treating the wounded ranger, he was in great pain but his wound was not life threatening so I did not give him any morphine as he was still able to walk and we had no idea what was going to happen and did not want to be burdened by having to carry him. He was not happy about not getting morphine but had guts and stayed alert and bore the pain. The NVA were shooting at us with small arms, and RPD light machine gun and numerous RPG’s, however, due to the steepness of the slopes they were firing over our heads while we were able to fire down the slope into their position and to throw grenades down slope. The bad part was the RPG’s as they were hitting the trees and tree limbs and exploding which created secondary projectiles. While I was treating the wounded Ranger, an RPG hit the tree we were under and a piece of wood the size of one of those big grammar school pencils hit me in the back of the neck and was sticking out about 4 or 5 inches. Fortunately it was in the neck muscle and did not hit anything vital or really bleed that much, it hurt like hell though, especially when I had SSG John G. (“Johnny G”) Santora pull it out. John was killed many years later as a MSG in a helicopter crash in Central America, he was a great guy with a great sense of humor, and tried to convince me to put in for a purple heart but I refused. How bad would that look, a medic submitting his own Purple Heart request? The ranger advisor called in some air support and they suppressed the enemy fire and we were able to get a medevac in for the wounded ranger. As we loaded him on the slick I did give him some morphine for his pain. The air support broke the contact and we moved out further along the ridgeline trail until we moved into an RON site. While in the RON site I was sitting on a log on the perimeter smoking a cigarette and enjoying the beauty of the scene of the jungle across a large open space. I happened to see someone else about a hundred meters away across the clearing also smoking a cigarette and apparently doing what I was doing so I waved and he waved back. Suddenly I realized that we had no one in that area and I jumped into a hole and told the ranger advisor what I had seen but nothing happened and it was an uneventful night and we were extracted with no more contact.”[66]

Project Delta stood down for twelve days at the conclusion of Trojan Horse and left the FOB in place because the Project would return and continue with Operation Trojan Horse II. The following is a personal account of what it was like to stay behind and guard the FOB rather than return to Nha Trang and engage in the antics of relaxation.

Some operations lasted longer than a few weeks or a month. Such was the series of operations run out of the FOB at Mai Loc from August to November, 1969. The FOB was set up a half mile or so from the front gate of A-101 at Mai Loc. The A camp had been plagued with a steady stream of thefts, deceptions and attacks from local insurgents. It wasn’t long before rockets, small arms, and mortars were directed at the Delta FOB, the helicopter pads, and at any aircraft attempting to take off or land from the small air strip. When some new volunteers arrived in September, they were taken on a local mission to prepare for the ‘real thing.’ Led by D.J. Taylor, the group encountered a group of local bad guys engaged in hiding arms pilfered from the A Detachment. An engagement followed in which one of the new guys, Tom Crosby, was shot in the neck. He was saved by the brilliant actions of medic Dennis McVey, who managed to stop the bleeding from a severed artery. All this to say that it never got really quiet at Mai Loc.

In the Fall of the year, the weather became such that aircraft couldn’t support the Project’s mission. Low cloud cover, steady rain, and wind all added up to reasons for Delta to stand down for a couple of weeks in Nha Trang. It also gave the CO time to straighten out the credibility problem that seemed to persist with the conventional units we were OPCON to. They didn’t want to believe or react to the real time information that the teams provided. The FOB could not be left unguarded or unattended, so four young Recon guys volunteered to stay behind and keep an eye on things. A company of the Project’s Ranger Battalion also stayed near the compound to provide security. The four volunteers included SSG Jim Thornton, SGT Chester Howard, SGT Bob ‘Archie” Inscore, and, SGT Steve Carpenter. The compound consisted of a few tents that housed the Recon, Staff, and Commo personnel, a briefing tent, and the TOC tent. The compound perimeter consisted of multiple coils of concertina wire, some noisemakers and a few claymores. A mortar pit was located close to the Recon tent area, as were several metal Conex boxes used to store rations and equipment. The routine on stay behind was pretty simple: somebody manned the TOC at all times, a few random inspections were done every day and night, and the rest of the time was spent drinking beer, staying dry and playing cards. The excitement of the day was lifting the cargo pallets in each tent to determine how many venomous snakes had sought refuge from the wet weather. One evening, as Jim Thornton manned the TOC, Chester, Archie, and I were roused by the sound of small arms fire and radio traffic from the Ranger company requesting fire support. As the qualified mortar man, I grabbed my weapon and web gear and ran to the mortar pit and began to unwrap the 81 mm mortar and position it for use. Chester clambered to the top of a conex container and began to relay fire requests to me from the radio. The call for fire put Chester on a straight line between the mortar pit and the NW perimeter, which was being attacked. He called out a range; I positioned the tube, charged the round and called ‘fire in the hole!’ Although on a straight line path toward Chester, the mortar round travels in a high arcing trajectory enroute to its target and would pass well overhead. Several revolutions out of the tube, the round loses the locking pin on the detonator and arms itself. The first round, a white phosphorous illumination round, exited the tube with a ‘bloop’ and traveled the twenty feet to Chester’s conex in very slow motion. Chester turned toward the pit as the round launched and watched it come slowly toward him like a slow pitch softball, and hit the side of the conex box just inches below his feet. His eyes grew to the size of dinner plates and he stammered his way through some kind of exclamatory expression replete with four letter expletives. I began to laugh at the surreal image of Chester dancing and swearing in the strobe like flashes atop the conex box. I charged another round and sent it his way, with the same result. By this time the person on the other end was calling for High Explosive rounds, so I complied. This time I changed the charge and the round hit the conex two inches higher and closer to Chester. By this time, I could hear Archie laughing, and I was becoming hysterical with laughter. I quickly grabbed a pry bar and opened a different box of rounds, took the charges from that box, and started again. This time almost everything went where it was supposed to go. After another fifteen minutes of illumination and HE fired on the perimeter, the fight was over. A total of eleven rounds lay at the base of the conex container, the product of charges rendered useless by the humidity. By this time Archie and I were laughing so hard we were rolling in the mud and Chester joined in.

Early the next morning, we gathered at the pit to assess our next move. We cautiously transported the enabled but unexploded rounds to the bottom of the deep gully that ran just North of the recon tents and stacked them neatly. I placed five pounds of C-4 under them with a thirty minute delayed fuse and retreated to the recon area to wait it out. The four of us each cracked a beer and sat on a cot, wondering aloud how big a bang it would make. When it finally went off, we were apparently not the only ones impressed with the magnitude of the bang and the ensuing cloud. Within minutes, a jet from Quang Tri was flying over at low altitude asking if we thought we’d been nuked. Thornton replied in his slow, laconic style, “Nope. Just a couple of kids havin’ fun.”

“Winter-Spring 1970”, 1 November 1969-30 April 1970. An increase in enemy-initiated attacks, at the highest level since 4-5 September signaled the start of the first phase of the Communist winter campaign. This was highlighted by intensified harassment incidents, and attacks throughout the Republic of Vietnam. In November-December these were heaviest in Corps Tactical Zones III and IV (around Saigon), primarily directed against Vietnamese military installations in order to disrupt the pacification program. The most significant enemy activity occurred in November with heavy attacks upon Bu Prang and Duc Lap in CTZ II (Central Vietnam).

By February 1970 the focus of enemy activity began to shift to CTZ I and II. Attacks increased steadily, reaching a peak in April 1970. Hostile forces staged their heaviest attacks in the Central Highlands near Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps at Dak Seang, Dak Pek, and Ben Het in I CTZ. The enemy also conducted numerous attacks by fire and several sapper attacks against U.S. fire support bases. This high level of enemy activity began in I CTZ in April and continued through May.

During the period 1 November 1969 through 30 April 1970 U.S. and allied forces concentrated on aggressive operations to find and destroy enemy main and local forces, the penetration of base camps and installations and the seizure of enemy supplies and materiel. These operations sought to deny the enemy the initiative and to inflict heavy losses in men and materiel. Further progress was made in Vietnamization through improving the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. As a result of these advances three brigades of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division and several major U.S.M.C. units were withdrawn from Vietnam during this period.

The enemy made several efforts to take the offensive at Dak Seang, which was attacked on 1 April 1970 and remained under siege throughout the month, and at Quang Duc in the Bu Prang-Duc Lap area which ended on 28 December. Only Vietnamese forces were engaged in both of these operations, the Quang Duc campaign involving some 12,000 ARVN troops. South Vietnamese forces again took the offensive on 14 April in a bold 3-day operation in the Angel’s Wing area along the Cambodian border. The Vietnamese Army completed this mission in an aggressive professional manner without U.S. support, further evidence of their growing proficiency.[65]

Project Delta returned to Mai Loc on October 13th and conducted Operation Trojan Horse II through November 9th, 1969, this time OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division. Project Delta launched 9 Recon, 9 Roadrunner, 3 Ranger and 1 BDA operations. The weather conditions that had limited operations during Operation Trojan Horse continued to worsen throughout Trojan Horse II. The 101st divided an already small AO into four smaller reconnaissance zones. Their plan was for Delta to move through the zones one at a time, releasing the zones back to the 101st after completion of the missions. The problems associated with this too conventional method were that limiting the reconnaissance zones allowed the enemy to pattern the missions and either prepare for attacking the teams or to focus their activities outside the reconnaissance zone resulting in a loss of the element of surprise. It also put all of Delta’s assets at risk because they became channeled and easily patterned. Operation Trojan Horse II began with over flight of all areas on Airborne Personnel Detection (APD) or Sniffer missions where the areas were searched with infrared heat detectors. All areas were characterized as having moderate to high concentrations of enemy.[85]

One of the new methods of operation that Delta was introduced to by the 101st Airborne Division was the use of Pink Teams. A Pink Team consisted of the small two man OH-6 helicopter, often called a LOACH, and three Cobra gunships. The Pink Team’s OH-6 would fly at treetop level drawing enemy fire and searching for likely targets and the team’s three Cobras would hang above and behind the OH-6 at a thousand feet or so. When the observer on the OH-6 identified a target, he would drop a smoke grenade to mark the target, and the three Cobras, armed with 7.62MM mini-guns and 2.75 inch rockets, would dive and fire on the marked target. Close coordination was maintained between Project Delta and this Pink Team to ensure they knew where the Project had deployed ground operations and the Pink Team would stay out of those areas. Project Delta’s Area of Operation was large enough that it was thought to be unlikely the Pink Team would interfere with ground operations. Project Delta’s Reconnaissance Section developed a close relationship with this Pink Team when it was realized that a real close up look at Recon Areas of Operation (AO) could be had while flying in the observer seat of the OH-6. Recon team leaders (RTLs) flew several missions with the Pink Teams at Mai Loc. The assigned OH-6 observer didn’t mind at all letting someone else go out and get shot at in his place, and it provided a close up look at recon AOs.

As observers, RTLs flew in the left seat (copilot’s seat) of the OH-6 with a red smoke grenade in their left hand and the pin pulled. When a target was identified, the grenade was tossed out and the pilot broke off at a right angle. As soon as the Cobras saw the smoke, they dove and fired their mini-guns and rockets at the smoke. The 2.75-inch Flechette rockets the Cobras fired were especially deadly. Each rocket was packed with over 2,000 tiny steel darts that rained down after the warhead exploded over the target area. When fired on troops in the open, one Flechette rocket could reliably kill or wound everything within an area the size of a football field, and each Cobra could carry up to eighteen of these Flechette rockets in its two rocket pods. Cobra rocket pods were usually loaded with a mixture of Flechette (Nails), High Explosive (HE), and White Phosphorous (WP). The Pink Team could handle any target they happened upon, from troops in the open or troops in a tree line, to troops in bunkers or troops in vehicles.[102]

A total of twenty-two reconnaissance and surveillance operations were conducted in the area of operation (AO). These, combined with local security operations, training operations, and continuous aerial surveillance (i.e., SLAR, RED HAZE, APD, URS Reports and Aerial Photograph) established the following intelligence conclusions.

Elements of the 7th Front were operating within Project Delta’s AO. The 7th Front was concentrating maximum effort in a food collection program and construction of food storage areas; taxation of the local populace was included in this program. Captured enemy documents reflected a noticeable amount of rice and other food products that were being collected by elements of the 7th Front. For the month of September 1969, cadre from the 7th Front organized with local civilian economic groups, collected the following amounts of rice from areas as indicated: 31,317 kilos Lowlands, 3,768 kilos Ba Lang, 11,872 kilos Western Area. Previous information showed that a food shortage had existed throughout this area since the beginning of 1969. Captured enemy documents from elements of the 7th Front Headquarters make reference to a regulation that specifies rice allowances were discontinued for sick or wounded personnel due to the fact that rice was reserved for fighting personnel only. Very strict regulations controlling food and money were enforced to include personnel whom may be visiting or passing through. A warning from the 7th Front Headquarters had been published and passed down to squad size elements stating that violators of this regulation would be dealt with in a serious manner. A careful plan was formulated pertaining to the logistical activities of the 7th Front. This plan included contingency plans of pre-selected transportation routes which would be used in the event primary routes were blocked by US/Allied interdicting fires. The enemy was active in transporting weapons, ammunition, and other supplies from storage areas believed to be located along the Laos border on the Western boundary of the AO. The majority of supplies were being transported by porters, but the enemy possessed the capability of resupplying and/or reinforcing troops by motorized means for approximately one third of the total distance. The distances involved were from main storage facilities located along the Laos/SVN Border to preplanned storage areas, located within the Rear Services Area of the 7th Front located within Project Delta’s area of operation. When transporting equipment, the unit involved was formed in a long column, well dispersed with security squads to the front and rear of the column. The security elements were prepared to fight if necessary to accomplish the mission. Enemy units were hesitant in initiating contact with U.S./Allied Forces. The time involved from start to completion was a 3-6 day journey by foot. Other capabilities noted among the enemy forces within the area of operations gave insight to his communications capabilities and his awareness of allied communications procedures. During insertion and extraction of recon teams, 108 minutes of jamming was noted on both UHF and VHF bands. By his jamming techniques, the enemy showed his interest in interception and interdiction of allied communications. It was assumed that the enemy had linguists and other personnel trained for this mission. In regards to the degree of sophistication of his communication equipment, it was determined that enemy equipment spanned the entire spectrum ranging from crude homemade devices to the most modern Russian and Chinese Communist products. The enemy was known to cannibalize commercial products and convert them into reliable and effective equipment.[85]

Elements of the 7th Front appeared to be the units committed for the initiation of the Winter/Spring Offensive. Indications were that the primary targets would be within the cities, villages, and hamlets in Quang Tri Province and US/Allied Base Areas throughout I Corps. Various sources indicated that the 5th NVA Regt, subordinate to Tri Thien Hue Military Region (TTHMR), were located in the mountainous region east of the AO. Their exact location, strength, and mission were unknown. The 6th NVA Regiment, subordinate to the TTHMR, showed signs of increased activity near the southwestern border of the AO. They were believed to be assisting elements of the 7th Front by securing routes of transportation from the Laotian Border north through the central portion of the AO along the Da Krong River and into the mountainous areas, known to be the AO of the Rear Service Group of the 7th Front. It was reported that the 803rd NVA Regt was located in Laos to the northwest of the AO, near the Laos/SVN Border. Strength, mission and further plans were unknown. The 803rd Regt is subordinate to TTHMR. It was assumed that these units could be part of a major plan to reinforce elements of the 7th Front. Captured enemy documents listed the total strength of the 7th Front to be 1,789 personnel. Three (3) units, K.8, K.14 and K.34 that were subordinate to the 7th Front, were listed as being up to only 60% fighting strength. Problems existent among enemy units were critical food shortages, and under strength fighting elements. Captured documents listed personnel percentages that were plagued with malaria to be in the range of 1/3 of total troop strength. All indications were that the enemy was concentrating maximum effort in support of a plan to launch a winter/spring offensive campaign against U.S. and Allied Forces to include base areas, cities, villages, and hamlets throughout I Corps.[85]

During Operation Trojan Horse II, contacts with the enemy were sporadic and short lived as the enemy avoided prolonged combat. Enemy sightings were frequent and air strikes were utilized to destroy base areas and fortifications. The deteriorating weather was the biggest enemy of the operation and at least one team was inserted only to be told to go to ground because there was no way to attempt an extraction with the heavy rain and low cloud cover. Communications relay aircraft were grounded much of the time, severely limiting the ability of teams on the ground to maintain contact with the FOB. After several consecutive days of “no fly weather” Operation Trojan Horse II was terminated on November 9th, 1969 and Project Delta was moved by convoy to Quang Tri and an airlift back to Nha Trang.[85]

The following description of what the Recon men termed a “dry hole”, meaning one without significant enemy contact, took place during Operation Trojan Horse II. Not all missions that were run in the Project were successful or even eventful, as far as affecting the status quo. Virtually all missions provided good experience, lessons learned, and some measure of excitement.

In October of 1969, I was assigned as the second man on a team led by Ralph Hill. Ralph was a career soldier with lots of experience. His mission, in part, was to get me ready to take over a team of my own. We received an OP Order that called for a mission to locate a suspected battalion sized headquarters located just inside the border from Laos near the DMZ. After conducting the initial mission brief, Ralph tasked me with the aerial recon of the AO and the duty of selecting a primary LZ, as well as planned routes of travel, alternate LZs, rally points and E&E routes. I met with an Army FAC named Captain Jones and climbed into the back seat of the Bird Dog, my only instructions being that if I had to puke, I was to do it in my helmet. I was later told that Jones was an ex-SF guy and his biggest joy in life was causing young NCOs to vomit in his plane.

About 20 minutes into our flight, we received an emergency call from a team on the ground requesting air support. They were in contact and in dire straits. As we diverted the short distance to the team’s location, Captain Jones called for fast movers. The team was easy to locate on a mountainside by the dust and smoke rising through the canopy. The team marked its location and directed FAC to the enemy locations. Captain Jones banked the little plane sharply, instructed me to hang on, and shoved the throttles forward as he dived toward the mountainside. No more than a few hundred feet from the ground, he toggled a switch and fired 40 mm rockets from under each wing. The plane seemed to stop suddenly in mid flight and drop toward the ground. It recovered quickly and cleared the trees as it circled for another pass. I noticed, for the first time, a circle with a cross in it grease penciled on the windshield. I realized that this was his gun sight. About then a flight of jets arrived on station and I watched as Captain Jones expertly directed their attacks and marked their targets with more diving assaults of his own. The team managed to break contact and radioed an OK. We then continued toward the AO.

The AO, as expected, was a heavily canopied piece of ground that ran mostly vertical. The ridge tops were steep and jagged and there were few breaks in the canopy. Near the top of one ridge there was a long narrow opening that ran down one side for about a hundred meters, too obvious and too convenient for an LZ. On the opposite side, very near the border, was a small opening two thirds of the way down the mountain that was too steep to land a chopper, but large enough to effect a ladder infil. The FAC and I agreed that we were looking at our best bet. We headed back toward the FOB, monitoring ground traffic as we went. As we passed over the FOB, Captain Jones asked if I was ready to go down. I responded that I was and he proceeded to perform a loop that ended in a nose dive toward the runway below. As we spiraled toward the ground I was aware that the engine noise had stopped and that Jones was talking in a normal voice as though nothing was happening. At some point, which I still believe to be about 10 meters above the ground, he engaged the engine and brought the plane back to its horizontal flying attitude. I squeezed my testicles out of my boots and back into place as he came around for a landing. As we rolled to a stop, I grabbed my gear, jumped from the plane and placed my vomit-free helmet on the seat. Captain Jones, a look of grave disappointment on his face, wished me well.

Opinions vary on the wisdom of last light versus first light insertions. Suffice it to say we decided on a last light insertion primarily because of the location of the LZ down low on the west side of the mountain. The setting sun should give us a slight advantage from being pinpointed immediately, at least from higher ground. We geared up, ran our drills, did our final mission brief and headed for the choppers. It was a long run, about 45 minutes to the LZ and we arrived at just the perfect time. As the decoys peeled off we dove and made a beeline for our spot. The ladders were extended and we began to exit the aircraft. With me dangling on one side and the point man on the other, the aircraft took ground fire from the LZ and pulled off. I climbed back into the chopper and hurried to the other door to pull the VN point man back up. We aborted and headed back to the FOB. Infils and exfils tend to be the times of greatest vulnerability and being ‘shot off’ an LZ leaves a team pretty unsettled. Back at the FOB we discussed our plan and decided to approach the secondary LZ at first light. Nobody liked the idea, since we had already rejected it as our primary, but they sure wanted us in there. The bright side was that we’d be nearer the top of the hill, and have a little less climbing to do.

Ralph and I met with the team and we decided to go a little heavier on ordnance. We boarded the choppers an hour before daylight, after being seen off by the rest of the recon section. These mission send-offs had become a quiet ritual within the recon section. They were somber and serious affairs that lacked the bravado and humor that characterized most of our existence. I always felt that they revealed the true depth of the feelings we held for each other and exhibited the level of serious professionalism that distinguished this group from any other.

The team was silent as we each rehearsed our insertion plans in our heads. Light was barely peeking over the horizon when the decoy ships headed to their locations and our ship tree topped it to our LZ. In a matter of seconds, the chopper settled just above the ground, we exited the aircraft, and then it was gone. There is a unique silence that greets a team on an LZ as the thump-thump of the choppers recedes into the distance. We paused briefly at the edge of the LZ to look and listen. There was a movement across the clearing at about 50 meters that was so swift that it caught my eye, but left no visual impression. There was no reception of gunfire. Ralph checked in on the radio and heard that the decoy ship that approached our aborted LZ had received very heavy ground fire. Apparently we were expected. I told Ralph about the movement across the LZ and we moved quickly to skirt the opening and investigate. We found an observation ground blind that looked recently occupied. It appeared that an LZ watcher was on the way to warn others of our presence. Ralph passed the information on through the FAC and we were off on the run. Many typical recon missions were compromised in some manner; either by enemy contact, enemy observation, or some other means of detection. A team’s presence, once detected, never went unchallenged. The intensity of the challenge depended on the enemy’s capabilities, level of concern, and mission. Our teams had no way of gauging the bad guys’ response.

Expecting the worst, our team covered ground quickly and quietly into some of the steepest terrain in that part of the country. By performing evasive maneuvers, checking and covering our back trail, and diving into deep and dark undergrowth, we were able to establish ourselves in a good overnight position. After a full day of uphill and downhill climbing under the weight of our packs and web gear, all the while at a heightened level of vigilance, we were sweat soaked and exhausted. We were also relieved that there was no indication that our location was known. The team took turns eating and prepared for the night. Night time temperatures might drop 40-50 degrees below daytime temperatures. While still in the balmy range, it became very chilly to a sweat soaked and immobile guy. Even a dry jungle sweater did little to bring comfort. The night, spent straddling a tree trunk to prevent sliding down the mountain, was long, uncomfortable, and sleepless. Fortunately, it was also uneventful.

At first light we prepared to tackle the mission anew. We began the slow process of moving through the undergrowth with stealth and purpose, in search of clues to the whereabouts of the enemy. Near midday we approached a break in the slope of a steep hill as it flattened slightly toward the crest. Cautiously we peeked over the break. It was still over 100 meters to the crest of the ridge, and the vegetation, at first glance, seemed a continuation of what we had been fighting for a day and a half. As we slowly rose to continue, tunnel-like openings through the undergrowth subtly became apparent. We retreated a few steps below the break and regrouped. Ralph cautiously crept to the break and slowly glassed the area with his binoculars. Silently he motioned us back down the hill.

Once we’d established a little distance, Ralph said that he had seen several defensive positions through the expertly cleared fire lanes, but spotted no troops. We decided to take a break and try to circle the positions and establish the extent of whatever it was we had found. We began to traverse the hill before attempting to reach the top. As we completed our traverse and neared the hilltop, I heard a foot slip on the steep hillside accompanied by an audible pop. Ralph was on one knee with his other leg extended straight downhill. He grimaced in pain and his face was drained of all color. Ralph’s leg was out of line at the knee and rapidly swelling. The team quickly found a less steep spot and formed a defensive perimeter. Ralph’s leg continued to swell and turn a nasty shade of blue. He could not place weight on it or walk. We were nowhere near an LZ and our radio reception was limited because of the terrain. Our only good fortune was that we had not spotted any enemy since leaving the LZ the day before.

FAC was due overhead anytime for our noon sitrep. We prepared the coded message for delivery and waited. FAC, as usual, was right on time. The message delivered, FAC advised what we already knew; there was no decent LZ anywhere close to us. There were a couple of spots where FAC could see the ground through the canopy at the very top of the narrow ridge directly above us and he further advised that we were to find a hiding place and sit tight until further notice. There was a problem elsewhere and no aircraft were available to extract us. We took quick stock of our situation and decided we were as well off where we were as anywhere we could get to with Ralph’s leg. We settled in for our wait.

A couple of hours later we heard the drone of the FAC and listened as he said that they would try for a first light extraction the next morning. About an hour before dark, we heard the unmistakable sound of movement through the foliage. It came toward us quickly, and with a purpose, from the direction of the suspected enemy defensive position. We shared a determined exchange of acknowledgement and quietly stacked magazines in front of us in preparation for a fight. The movement continued to become louder and came directly for us. As our adrenaline pumped we gripped our weapons and watched as nine apes suddenly appeared overhead. They saw us at about the same time we saw them and formed a circle around us. As they peered down at us, we avoided eye contact but were able to get a good look at them. They appeared to be about five feet tall, if they stood up, and had butts that were like red patent leather, that they seemed to enjoy digging and scratching. After perhaps three minutes of mutual admiration, the apes turned uphill and resumed their treetop journey. We had no sooner breathed a collective sigh of relief when the retreat was punctuated by a gunshot no more than 100 meters above us on the hill. We heard the apes shriek and take off and heard a definite thud as one of them hit the ground. We may have been lonely, but we weren’t alone.

As darkness fell, we prepared for another long vigilant night. Ralph, in obvious pain, sweated profusely. There was little we could do for him. I used Ralph’s code book and handset and reported our situation to FAC as he put us to bed for the night. Sometime during the night I watched several lights move along the top of the ridge above us. They moved toward the positions we had spotted earlier. They showed no signs of looking for us. As morning approached, Ralph and I discussed a plan for getting out of Dodge. We’d only get a brief shot at it, given our lack of mobility. We inched our way to the top of the hill where I had seen the lights the night before. With a little luck we would be close to one of the spots the FAC had said he could see ground. The ridgetop came to a sharp point and fell steeply off the other side. A well-used foot path was worn along its crest. A quick glance revealed two things: First, we were in luck that some down trees left a very small opening in the canopy through which McGuire rigs might be dropped. Second, the trail in front of us was alive with leeches poking their heads out of the leaves and rotating them like tiny radar in search of their next meal. Something warm blooded had passed recently. The leeches receded into the leaves.

FAC arrived just after first light and said the ships were on their way. Suspecting we had people in both directions along the ridge top, I instructed FAC to hold the ships until the last possible moment for extraction. We didn’t have much room to maneuver and I needed to expand the LZ just a little bit to ensure that the choppers could get low enough. I rigged a claymore to the tree I needed to remove and posted half the team to watch in each direction. I instructed FAC that the claymore detonation and the falling tree would mark our location and that he should run the gunships up and down the ridge as the first ship came in. It went like clockwork. The tree fell, the first ship flared in, the belly man dropped the rigs and half the team left. I looked around, expecting to have the VN team leader and the point man with me and was surprised to see Ralph still there. You can debate the wisdom of that move til the cows come home and it won’t change a thing. The second ship moved in as the gunships identified enemy troops heading our way. The chopper began taking fire from a distance before the rigs were thrown out to us. I had donned Ralph’s pack to have access to the radio and had attached my pack to his via a carabiner. Normally, time permitting; a pack would be attached to the sling seat of the McGuire rig before settling into it for the ride. Unfortunately, time didn’t permit. I helped Ralph into his seat, made sure the VN team leader was aboard and struggled into my seat, still wearing both packs, as the chopper pulled pitch to escape the ground fire. I glanced up to insert my left wrist into the safety strap (thank you Norm Doney) and saw my rope tighten against the half loop it had fallen in around a big tree. The first thing that hit the tree was my head. I awoke at around two thousand feet suspended from a 120 foot rope behind and beneath a helicopter pushing about 80 knots. I was hanging backwards, nearly upside down by my ankles and my left wrist through the wrist loop. I still had both packs attached to my back. Although my left arm was numb, I could tell that the shoulder, elbow and wrist were stretched out of joint. I grabbed the handset, pressed the transmit button and screamed, “I don’t know if you can hear me or not, but PUT THIS MOTHERFUCKER DOWN!” The belly man’s head popped out of the chopper and quickly back in again. Against all common sense and good training, the pilot set the ship down next to a river. The belly man and a door gunner rushed to help Ralph and me into the chopper. I’m convinced that my arm would have been literally torn off in a pretty short time.

Back at the FOB, we were greeted by the usual cold beer and handshakes. The medics attended to Ralph and gave me a quick inspection. The feeling returned to my arm after a few hours and by the next day I had most of the motion back, which was good because Doc assigned me to help train the pilots and new guys on proper McGuire rig use. He made the assignment with a twinkle in his eye and a shit eatin’ grin on his face. I learned at the debrief that we had taken a lot of ground fire as we were dragged through the trees. It appeared that we may have found the base camp we were looking for, but it was not fully occupied at the time of our visit. Later that night, in typical Recon fashion, we sat around the tents and I was gently tutored on all the things that were right and wrong about our little walk in the woods. Even the old timers paid close attention to these sessions. In this business, if you stop learning, you’re probably dead.

Project Delta was called upon to verify intelligence, or the absence of it, in II Corps along the border areas. As the South Vietnamese forces prepared for another winter campaign and possible Tet offensive in early 1970 they wanted to determine if the NVA were preparing another operation aimed at splitting the country in half as they had attempted to do in the previous two years. Reconnaissance and surveillance missions accomplished by conventional units in the central highlands had indicated no significant enemy activity in recent months. Project Delta committed nineteen reconnaissance and reconnaissance in force teams during Operation Yellow Ribbon (5-69) conducted between December 11th and December 29th, 1969. Reconnaissance and surveillance operations were concentrated in the northern half of the AO to ensure adequate coverage of at least that portion due to the shortness of the entire operation. These reconnaissance and surveillance missions, combined with continuous aerial surveillance (i.e., SLAR, RED HAZE, APD, Starlight, and Aerial Photography) of the entire AO established that no major enemy units were identified or contacted in the AO. Contacts and sightings by Delta elements were limited to platoon size enemy units by RR Team 111 on December 15th, by Recon Team 6 on December 16th and by RR Team 106 on December 29th. Enemy units were comprised of Montagnards armed with rifles, with some Vietnamese, possibly cadre, attached. A fourth major incident occurred on December 19th when Delta helicopters received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. The only indication of NVA presence occurred on December 22nd when Recon Team 9 had to be extracted under fire after having been pursued by an unknown number of enemy. The counter-reconnaissance tactics employed by the enemy in this case were similar to those used by NVA units against Delta reconnaissance teams during previous operations. Enemy presence in this portion of the AO was likely because friendly agents placed the 40B NVA Artillery Regiment a short distance to the west inside Base Area 609.

The suspected location of a 500-600 man Montagnard VC training center was checked twice; once by Recon Team 6 during the period December 14 through 16 resulting in a contact with a Montagnard VC Platoon, and a second time by the 2nd Company, 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion during the period December 20 through 23 which resulted in negative contact or sighting. The only indication of enemy presence was a well used north south trail 1 meter wide.

No major infiltration routes traversing the northern half of the AO in any direction were found. Delta Recon and Roadrunner Teams were placed astride suspected infiltration routes throughout the northern half of the AO. This effort resulted in finding some foot trails, none of which showed indications of heavy use by the enemy. In addition, continuous aerial surveillance by Delta air elements on a 24-hour basis, using starlight scopes during the hours of darkness, failed to find infiltration routes in the area. Some cultivated areas, small foot trails, and sightings indicated that small family groups of Montagnards lived throughout the AO. Former villages and hamlets shown on maps either no longer exist on the ground or had not been inhabited for a long period of time. Montagnard groups were most probably hiding in small valleys and draws close to their fields. Montagnards living in the AO were believed to be members of the Jarai tribe.

APD (Sniffer) missions flown repeatedly by Delta assets, especially in the southern half of the AO, resulted in some heavy MODE 1 (People) and

MODE 2 (Smoke) readings in valley areas. Each of these target areas was taken under fire by escorting gunships with unknown results. Only two incidents of enemy ground fire directed against Delta air assets were recorded. One occurred on December 19th when Delta helicopters received a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire while making a low pass to check a smoke sighting. No damage to friendly aircraft resulted and suppressive fire by gunships silenced enemy ground fire. The second incident occurred on December 22nd during the extraction of Recon Team 9 when helicopters received small arms fire without sustaining damages.

It was concluded that no major NVA or VC units were located in the northern half of the AO, with the exception of possible NVA units located in the extreme northern portion of the AO. Small Montagnard VC units armed with rifles and possibly some automatic weapons were scattered throughout the northern half of the AO.[86]

Project Delta spent the Christmas Holiday at the FOB in Kontum. The highlight of the day was the football game between the Delta men and the 281st AHC. The football game was conducted with rolls of concertina wire serving as goal lines on either end of the field. Delta let the 281st score at will. The game was dubbed The Toilet Bowl.

CHAPTER XVII: 1970, LAST HURRAH

1970 began on a freakish and ominous note. SFC Richard V. Williams had recently joined Project Delta and was looking forward to his first operation. On the morning of January 26 he drove one of the jeeps obtained for the Project on the raised road at the end of the runway in Nha Trang. As he passed the end of the runway an Air Vietnam C 54 aircraft attempted to land with flames coming from its engines and the passenger compartment. The aircraft overshot the runway and bounced through the fence and over the road, catching SFC Williams and the jeep in a tangle of burning fence and airplane wreckage. The aircraft burst into flame and came to rest on the CIDG village school across the road from the runway. SFC Williams died from his injuries as did everyone aboard the aircraft and many school children.

The name of Richard V. Williams is inscribed on Panel 14W, Line 70 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

Operation Sabre and Spurs was conducted between February 11 and March 11, 1970. Project Delta was OPCON to Company A, 5th Special Forces Group at Bien Hoa. The FOB was set up outside the A Camp at Polei Klang. Delta Forces were to locate, surveil and interdict the Jolley Road; and to locate and eliminate elements of the 81st, 84th, and 86th Rear Service Units. The Delta AO was separated into 29 lateral reconnaissance zones. Each zone was 3 kilometers wide and varied in length from 17 to 47 kilometers.

Recon teams (each having six men - two U.S. advisors and four VNSF) were inserted on zone reconnaissance missions on the east west axis and reverse. Roadrunner teams (each having five CIDG personnel dressed in NVA uniforms) were given route reconnaissance missions on north south trails and along the banks of the Dong Ngai River. BDA platoons (each having three U.S. advisors and 24 CIDG Nungs) were given point reconnaissance and raid missions at random locations throughout the AO. This was intended to confuse the enemy on the scheme of Delta intelligence collection and also served as a rapid check on current intelligence.

Ranger companies were used to conduct area reconnaissance missions derived from information furnished by the BDA platoons and other sources. Delta artillery (175mm guns) provided interdiction, blocking, and preparatory fires. Delta aviation provided 24 hour surveillance using aerial observers during daylight hours and starlight scopes at night. Delta forces conducted 63 ground operations: 20 were by Delta Recon teams, 16 were by Delta Roadrunner teams, 20 were by the BDA Platoons and 7 were by the Delta Ranger Battalion. Delta forces discovered that the Jolley Road was a network of intersecting north south and east west trails varying in width from one to three meters. This network was interdicted by ambush, patrols, airstrikes, and artillery fire. Delta forces located elements of the 81st, 84th, and 86th Rear Service Units. Most of these elements fled before Delta forces could initiate contact. Delta did destroy administrative and logistical areas that were abandoned by fleeing enemy. Delta forces destroyed 157 huts, 195 bunkers, 15 sampans, 8 foot bridges, one bulldozer, and captured 46 bicycles, seven weapons, and numerous documents. MSG Orville G. Robinette prepared and published 57 area studies covering the assigned AO. Each study concentrated on a 36 square kilometers area and indicated the following: the combat index point, trails, landing zones, possible fire support bases, sites of enemy activity, and terrain analysis. As a result of this operation, Delta members wrote the following studies:

No. 1 DELTA Patrolling Techniques SSG Joe E. Alderman

No. 2 DELTA Artillery (175mm guns) Tactics SFC David A. Norville

No. 3 DELTA Combat Indexing SFC Alton E. Monroe

No. 4 DELTA Raid and Ambush Methods SFC Donald J. Taylor

These and many others were collected over time and first typed and distributed to the men of Project Delta by Joe Alderman in 1970. Norm Doney and Joe collaborated on assembling the “Tips of the Trade” original document both during their times together at Project Delta and during their other assignments in the Vietnam Special Operations theater. Norm posted smaller easily digested versions for the men of Recon Company, CCC, while he was 1st Sergeant there in 1970. There is no doubt that many of these tidbits of wisdom were derived from many great recon men over a long period of time. Each and every morsel is a lesson learned from a real experience, either with a happy ending or a tragic one. I’m sure that most came to light over a cold beer after a hot mission. No matter the source, the “Tips of the Trade” has morphed into a collection that serves the Special Operations soldiers of today. A version of “Tips of the Trade” is included as Appendix V.

No contacts with major enemy units occurred in the AO. Most contacts and sightings involved enemy rear service elements of squad and platoon size and were concentrated in the northern portion of the AO, along the DONG NGAI RIVER through the center of the AO, and in scattered areas in the southeastern and southwestern portions of AO HORSE. The most significant contact took place on March 4th near the southeastern edge of AO HORSE when the 2nd Ranger Company was attacked by an estimated force of 30 NVA using AK-47, SKS, and B-40 rockets supported by machine guns. The enemy unit was forced to break off the attack and withdraw under fire by Delta ground and air elements. Documents captured during contacts and in enemy way stations and bases indicated that elements of the 81st, 84th, and 86th Rear Service Groups were operating the AO and engaged in the production of food, maintenance of trails, transportation of material, and in the maintenance of local security. Documents also indicated that enemy forces in the area were suffering from an extreme shortage of food and a very high sickness rate. Reconnaissance and surveillance along the Jolley Road complex showed the trail activity was light and involved foot traffic only. No indications of vehicular traffic were found, except a wounded POW stated that on 8 March 70 eight enemy, including 5 nurses, had moved north along a trail using Honda motorcycles. In addition, a large number of bicycles were found in several way stations along the Jolley Road complex.[87]

Operation Sabre and Spurs proved to be an experiment of sorts in what one Commander’s idea of Vietnamization should be. Although reconnaissance had always been the core business of Project Delta, Sabre and Spurs introduced a new mode of operation where the Nung Platoons were used heavily to conduct raids and other offensive operations. The number of BDA platoon missions equaled the number of Recon missions for the first time. Because these missions put Delta on the offensive, the BDA Platoons were augmented with many Recon men and others. One such mission occurred on the last day of Operation Sabre and Spurs and sent Delta back to Nha Trang in a subdued state. On March 10th the First BDA Platoon was inserted at1235 hours into their second AO of the day. The platoon commenced movement and found two storage huts which it destroyed. The platoon moved north along a trail and was ambushed at1255 hours by an unknown size enemy force. The platoon called for gunship support and forced the enemy to withdraw to the north. During the initial contact three U.S. and 1 Nung CIDG were WIA. One of the U.S. and the CIDG wounded were moved to an LZ and medevaced. The remainder of the platoon returned to reestablish contact with the enemy and direct air strikes against enemy positions. The wounded American who was medevaced, SP4 Stephen Spiers, died of his wounds. He was the medic for the operation.

The name of Stephen Spiers is inscribed on Panel 13W, Line 9 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

Operation Cavalry Glory (2-70) was a continuation of Operation Sabre and Spurs. The AO was changed to include the area bordering II Corps and III Corps. Operation Cavalry Glory ran from March 22nd through April 21st, 1970. Project Delta was to start reconnaissance and surveillance on March 22nd in the assigned area of operations to locate, trace, and interdict trail networks; to locate caches and base areas of the 84th Rear Area Service Group and other enemy units operating in the area; and to locate and engage enemy elements within unit capability. The Delta AO was separated into six reconnaissance sectors initially, and later five additional sectors were added. Each zone varied in size and shape depending primarily upon terrain. Project Delta conducted 59 ground operations: 16 were by Recon teams, 13 were by Delta Roadrunner teams, 25 were by BDA and Ranger Platoons and 5 were by the Delta Ranger Companies. Delta artillery (175mm and 155mm guns) provided interdiction, blocking and preparatory fires. Delta aviation provided 24 hour surveillance employing aerial observers during daylight hours and starlight scopes at night. Project Delta concluded that the majority of enemy traffic was concentrated in the eastern portion of the AO, primarily oriented northwest southeast along the II and III CTZ boundary. These well maintained trails were effectively interdicted by Delta resources. Project Delta located the 84th Rear Service Group and subordinate elements, to include the K76E Hospital unit security elements. Most of these elements fled after initial contact, however their logistical and administrative areas were destroyed. No contacts with major enemy units occurred in the AO. Most contacts and sightings involved enemy rear service elements of squad and platoon size and were concentrated in the northeastern and southeastern portion of the AO, east of the DONG NGAI RIVER and along the boundary between II CTZ and III CTZ. Contacts and sightings west of the Dong Ngai were minor in nature, with one exception. This engagement involved security elements of the K76E Hospital unit. Documents captured during contacts and in enemy way stations and bases identified the 84th Rear Service Group and subordinate elements and indicated that these units were operating in the area east of the Dong Ngai on both sides of the II CTZ and III CTZ boundary. They were conducting rear service activities such as procurement and issuance of food and transportation of supplies. Documents also indicate that the 84th RSG had been specifically tasked to support the 33rd NVA Regiment and was experiencing severe food shortages and supply problems because of allied operations.[88]

Operation Delta Dagger (3-70) was conducted from May 15th through June 9th, 1970. In the six months since Project Delta left Mai Loc in November, 1969, CIDG Camp A-101 had been attacked by sappers in an early morning raid and suffered destruction of most of the camp structures. The FOB was set up outside the Special Forces CIDG Camp A-101. Project Delta was again OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division. During Operation Delta Dagger Project Delta conducted 35 ground operations: 13 by Recon teams, 9 by Delta Roadrunners, 11 by BDA or Ranger Platoons and 2 were company sized operations by the 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion. No contacts with major enemy units occurred in the AO. Most contacts and sightings involved enemy elements ranging from squad to company size units and occurred along Route 616. The area where Route 616 crosses the Xe-Pone river was identified as a way station/supply transfer point with truck park protected by at least a company size force. Anti aircraft fire encountered in this area was intense and included 12.7mm fire. The ford across the river was considered impassable, however new road construction work had been observed on both sides of the ford during the first week of the operation. A total of 5 enemy trucks and large amounts of supplies (possibly ammunition) were destroyed in this area by Delta air assets. A combat assault by a friendly exploitation force after intensive and accurate air strikes on 28 May 70 had to be aborted due to a heavy volume of enemy ground fire originating from trench lines and bunkers extensive enough to accommodate a Battalion size force. In addition, one large and well used east west trail was observed connecting this area with the “Laotian Salient”.[89]

On May 21st, 1970, Al Drapeau, a long time Delta recon man, was flying along with a Pink Team from the 2/17th Cavalry. Drapeau was flying in the copilot’s seat as the observer over his prospective AO in the tri-border area of Laos, South Vietnam and North Vietnam (DMZ). The OH-6 helicopters flew low and fast and were accustomed to drawing automatic weapons and small arms fire from enemy troops that they surprised with their sudden appearance. It was unusual for aircraft to be targeted by anything larger than a 12.7 mm machine gun (similar to the U.S. .50 caliber machine gun) over South Vietnam. Aircraft that flew bombing missions over North Vietnam, however, were often fired upon by a vicious anti aircraft weapon known as the “Golden Hose.” It was the ZSU-23-4, a track mounted, four barreled, fully automatic, 23 mm anti aircraft weapon that fired yellow tracers loaded at intervals with regular ammunition. The high cyclic rate of the weapon resulted in what seemed to be a stream of yellow water from a hose. Somehow the Pink Team made a navigation error and headed across the DMZ into North Vietnam. As soon as anti aircraft firing filled the sky they realized their mistake and made a hasty retreat back to the south. Somewhere just inside the DMZ the “Golden Hose” caught up with them, hitting the helicopter several times, wounding the plot in the leg and wounding Al with several fragments of shrapnel. Drapeau attempted to gain control of the helicopter but the helicopter was traveling near maximum speed of 150 knots and crashed. The bubble shape of the cockpit allowed the helicopter to roll several times and it came to rest on Al’s side of the bird. Al quickly released his seat harness and pulled the wounded pilot from the wreckage. He dragged the pilot away from the LOACH and set up a hasty perimeter. The gunships called for help and a crew quickly arrived and extracted the men to safety. Al later sat calmly in the medical tent and drank a beer as Ed Foshee removed the fragments from his body and sewed his wounds.[100],[98]

Route 616 crossed a major ridge line via a narrow and winding pass. The road through the pass showed that the enemy had spent considerable time and effort to build and maintain it. Initially, ground and aerial reconnaissance showed continuous efforts by the enemy to keep the road passable for truck traffic despite repeated air strikes. Since May 24th however, truck traffic through the pass had ceased and no signs of road repair were observed until June 7th when Delta FAC reported sighting one bulldozer and signs of road repair work. On the same day, the road was cut again by airstrikes. Reconnaissance and surveillance throughout the AO showed only minor signs of trail activity in all areas other than along Route 616. Traffic along Route 616 initially appeared to be heavy. During the last two weeks of the operation however, indications of truck traffic along Route 616 decreased sharply and traffic may have ceased completely. The BDA Platoon reported on June 6th that Route 616 showed no sign of truck traffic since the last heavy rain (approximately 2 weeks previously). Ground fire directed against friendly aircraft was initially heavy and included 12.7 mm anti aircraft fire.

Most ground fire incidents occurred in the vicinity of main enemy concentrations along Route 616. During the last 2 weeks of the operation however, ground fire incidents decreased sharply and involved isolated incidents of small arms fire only. The sharp decrease of road activity and enemy ground fire experienced during the second half of the operation was most likely the result of constant airstrikes on key targets and action taken by Delta assets resulting in the known destruction of 10 enemy trucks, 2 bulldozers and large quantities of supplies along

Route 616.[89]

During Operation Delta Dagger the 220th Catkillers provided the FACs. Based in Phu Bai with the 320th Reconnaissance Airplane Company, it wasn’t their first experience with Project Delta. In 1968 and 1969 the 220th had assigned Jack Bentley and John Hillman to support operations in I Corps. WO1 Joe “Nokey” Klutts was assigned for Delta Dagger and after flying for the first few weeks he was told to fly to Phu Bai and pick up a relief pilot. The relief pilot was a long time personal friend of Klutts and a classmate from flight school named Larrie Landersheim. Klutts rose before daylight on May 23rd, 1970 and flew to Phu Bai to pick up Landersheim. He remembers waking Larrie about 0630 and Landersheim’s first question was “Do I have to fly today?” Joe replied that he didn’t at which time Larrie reached into his cooler, withdrew a cold beer and drank it down. After a quick shower the two loaded into the O1E and flew to Mai Loc. Nokey had a mission scheduled that day and left Larrie at the TOC for his orientation. Nokey flew his mission and remembers hearing someone broadcast a “Mayday” message on the radio. He quickly determined that Project Delta’s Command and Control helicopter had been shot down and he hurried the short distance to the crash site. Klutts recalls that the helicopter appeared to have crashed skids down and was on its side, in flames. Another FAC on the scene reported that there were no survivors. Klutts headed back to the FOB and was met by Roy Sprouse who said, “Goddamn! You’re supposed to be dead!” He had gotten the report that the Catkiller FAC was on the C&C ship and had perished along with Project Delta’s Commanding Officer, Major Shane Soldato and the entire crew. Klutts immediately realized that his friend Larrie Landersheim was lost.[100],[89]

Major Shane Soldato was only with Project Delta for a short time. He is remembered fondly as a soldier’s soldier and a good leader. His first priority was always his men.

The name of Shane Soldato is inscribed on Panel 10W, Line 88 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

The name of Larrie Landersheim is inscribed on Panel 10W, Line 86 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial

On June 4th, 1970 the 3rd Company, 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion was inserted to assess the damage from a B 52 strike. SFC Arno Voigt was the senior Ranger advisor. A Pink Team flying a mission with its regular crewman, not a Delta recon man, as an observer, strayed into the AO. They crested a hill at a high rate of speed and mistook the Rangers for enemy troops. They fired on 3rd Company killing SFC Arno Voigt, 2 Rangers and wounding 20 others. Arno Voigt was the last man killed in action while serving with Project Delta.

The name of Arno Voigt is inscribed on Panel 9W, Line 13 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

Operation Delta Dagger was the last Reconnaissance operation of Project Delta. Included here is a recollection of DJ Taylor about his last mission which, as it turns out, was the last recon mission to inflict damage on the enemy.

“In April 1970, Project Delta broke camp in Bunard, returned to Nha Trang for a brief stand-down, and then in May, the Project deployed to Quang Tri Province to set up an FOB outside the Special Forces Camp at Mai Loc and conduct Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols along the Laotian Border from the DMZ south to the Khe Sanh area.

“Mai Loc was the northernmost Special Forces Camp in the Republic of Vietnam and was the proverbial ‘stone’s throw’ from North Vietnam. This had been the second time Project Delta had worked out of an FOB at Mai Loc, and we knew on arrival our recon missions were not going to be easy ones. There were just too many enemy units in the area for a recon team to expect to infiltrate undetected and remain undetected throughout a five-day recon patrol. Anytime a recon team went into the Khe Sanh/Lang Vei area, the team knew it was probably going to come out by emergency extraction after a fierce firefight with the enemy.

“Soon after we arrived, my recon team received a mission briefing and was assigned a recon AO that with one look at the map promised to be one of the toughest recon missions I had run to date. My Recon AO lay right on the Laotian Border due south of the abandoned Special Forces Camp at Lang Vei, southwest of the abandoned Special Forces Camp/Marine Base at Khe Sanh, and just south of where Route 616 crossed the border from Laos into South Vietnam. Route 616 was a road that connected with the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and was used by the NVA to funnel troops and equipment into Quang Tri Province. This had been a well-traveled road, and Project Delta recon teams had reported truck traffic running up and down 616 on numerous occasions. We were going into a recon AO inside a “fishhook” formed by a turn in the Xe’ Pon River where the river delineated the Laotian Border, and the sheer rock Coroc cliffs rose up over 1,000 feet on the Laotian side of the river.

“Just by looking at my recon AO on the map, I could see trouble written all over it. We were briefed that intelligence reports indicated this area held numerous small base camps and supply storage areas where supplies were off-loaded from trucks crossing over from Laos and the Ho Chi Minh Trail using Route 616. Our EEI was to determine whether there were storage facilities (caches) in our recon AO, and if so, what type equipment or munitions were kept there? I knew right off this was going to be one very bad recon AO; it just couldn’t be any other way.

“After the mission brief, I flew out with the FAC in an O-2 Skymaster to select my infiltration and exfiltration LZs and saw right away that this AO was just as bad as the map indicated. My AO was inside a turn in the river, with Laos on three of its four sides, and I could see from the numerous bomb craters throughout my AO that it had been heavily and recently bombed. In the center of my AO was a shallow valley with a small river running down its center that drained into the Xe’ Pon River right at the base of the Coroc Cliffs. I picked an Infiltration LZ in what appeared to be a large bomb crater made by three closely spaced 500-pound bombs and an exfiltration LZ near the Laotian Border directly under those Laotian cliffs. My infiltration LZ was well within the South Vietnam side of the border and my route of march would take us right up to the river and the Laotian Border to exfiltrate. I could tell from the air that wherever we moved in our AO, we would be under the watchful presence of those solid rock Coroc cliffs towering 1,000 feet above us.

“The FAC VR (Visual Reconnaissance) confirmed it for me; this was going to be one tough recon mission. There was just too much enemy activity in the area for it to be otherwise. As this was an extremely hot area and I expected to be in contact as soon as we left our infiltration LZ, I requested a first light insertion and it was approved. My assistant team leader was still SSG William R. (Grit) Pomeroy Jr., and he and I spent the next day running the team through IA (immediate action) drills and practicing movement SOPs (Standing Operating Procedures). Then we test fired our weapons, packed up, briefed back, and the next morning we flew out for a first light insertion.

“Our insertion helicopter had no problem settling in for a low hover in our three-bomb crater LZ, and we jumped out at about six feet above ground, ran into the wood line and assembled. To my surprise, we found a waist high bamboo fence inside the wood line, and I then realized my infiltration LZ was really a VC/NVA vegetable garden the U.S. Air Force had completely destroyed with three each 500 pound bombs.

“As soon as we crossed the fence and moved fifty meters into the jungle, we found ourselves entering an abandoned NVA company sized base camp. The camp consisted of about ten above ground, thatched roof, log constructed huts that could house about ten men each. Underground bunkers had been dug alongside each building, but they had not been dug with the defense of the base camp in mind; the bunkers were only intended to provide overhead cover for the men who lived there. Having no defensive positions, this base camp wasn’t arranged like the base camps I had seen constructed by VC/NVA combat units, and I assumed it had been built to house laborers. A 500-pound bomb crater was in one corner of the base camp and had destroyed one of the huts, but other than that the base camp was undamaged. By the degree of weather related rot, mold, and the amount of underbrush grown up in the camp since the last time it had been cut, I estimated the camp had been abandoned for over six months, or about the time the 500 pound bomb had hit the camp. It was currently toward the end of I Corps’ Monsoon Season, and the camp appeared to have had no occupants during the entire rainy season.

“There was a hard packed trail leaving the camp in a direction that would take it out of our AO and in the direction of Route 616 and another hard-packed trail leaving the camp toward the southwest. Both of these trails had had no traffic on them in quite some time, foliage had begun to grow across them and should have been cut back long ago. By the old cut-marks on the trails, I could tell the trails had not been maintained in well over six months.

“ We paralleled the old, unused trail and followed it north until it departed our AO and found nothing, so we turned around, returned to the base camp, and then paralleled the old trail to the southwest. As I considered all trails to be danger areas, I was extremely uncomfortable paralleling enemy high-speed trails, even old ones that hadn’t been used in six months or more, but it had begun to look more and more as if we had just been dealt a dry hole.

“As we followed the old trail to the southwest, we came upon trails breaking off to the right and to the left leading to cache’ areas where the enemy had built 10’X 20’ foot log platforms about 3’ off the ground to store equipment on top of and keep it off the ground. We found about twenty of these cache sites and they were all empty. It took us most of the first day to recon this cache site, and by the end of the day we were fairly sure “there were no VC/ NVA in that part of our AO, so the next morning we turned and started moving southwest in the direction of the Laotian Border and our extraction LZ.

“On our second day in our recon AO, we entered into a tropical rainforest covering the hills forming the northern side of the valley that ran through the center of our AO, and I intended to follow these hills until they ended at the Xe’ Pon River and the Laotian Border. After leaving the NVA cache site and entering into the rainforest, we saw no further sign of enemy activity. By the end of our second day, the four Vietnamese Army Special Forces (Luc Luong Dac Biet (LLDB) on my team were convinced we had been blessed with a dry hole and they went into full dry hole mode. Once LLDB became convinced they were in a dry hole, they became infected with what we called “the dry hole syndrome,” and once infected they couldn’t have been more relaxed and carefree if they had suddenly found themselves on a beach in Miami.

“By the middle of the third day, we were over half way to our extraction LZ, the LLDB were having a good old time, laughing, joking, and smoking cigarettes. I tried to get them to straighten up and act right, follow our SOPs and get serious about what we were doing, but they weren’t having any of it. My LLDB counterpart would come back at me with, ‘Cam cau chi, Chung Si. Cam cau VC.’ (No sweat Sergeant, No Viet Cong.) I almost expected them to, at any time, sling arms, hold hands and start singing and skipping through the forest in carefree abandon.

“By that time, I had been working with LLDB for several years and had come to understand they had a much different outlook on life than did most Americans. The Vietnamese equated caution with fear, and, to them, there was nothing wrong with showing caution/fear when it was necessary, but to show caution/fear when it was unnecessary was to be downright sissy.

“After an American had observed LLDB in several tight situations, he would begin to understand that Vietnamese would put off getting concerned about the enemy until the very last possible minute or the last possible second in some cases. Then there were some LLDB who thought it was unmanly to even show any concern at all for the possibility of imminent contact with the enemy and believed this showed the world how brave they were. This ability to turn caution off and relax in the middle of a combat operation was probably a good thing if you were going to partake in a war that spanned many years as it had for the LLDB, but their timing had to be perfect or they would occasionally find themselves in very serious trouble.

“When an LLDB got serious and showed agitation and concern about the enemy situation, you better pay attention and get prepared for the coming disaster, because it was frequently too late to do anything about what was going to happen. And if your LLDB counterpart ever turned to you with abject terror in his eyes and said, ‘Beaucoup VC,’ you always knew he wasn’t kidding, because there was one thing LLDB would never joke about and that was the VC.

“There was a distinct cultural and psychological difference between how the LLDB and most U.S. Army Special Forces viewed the war. Most Americans would only spend one year in the war and would remain keyed up and on edge from the time they arrived until they departed. The American would leave country after one year with his nerves frazzled and would be a likely candidate for future PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder), but the LLDB were in the war for the duration and PTSD was not part of their culture. There were no touchy-feely “psychiatrists at their equivalent of the Veterans Administration, and there were no words for PTSD in the Vietnamese language.

“I tried to remind myself these LLDB had been fighting the communists much longer than I had, they would be fighting communists long after I was ordered out of the country, and they needed to take their moments of rest and relaxation wherever and whenever they could find them, but I knew they had to be wrong about this AO being a dry hole. One look up at those Coroc cliffs would remind me it was just not possible to find a dry hole anywhere around there. The enemy had to be there, but where were they? That night the LLDB were laughing, joking, smoking cigarettes and grab-assing in the RON (remain overnight position), I still couldn’t get them to behave, and I just hoped they were right about this being a dry hole.

“The morning of the fourth day we awoke to a peaceful morning in a peaceful forest, and we continued our pleasant stroll toward our exfiltration LZ, but the Coroc cliffs seemed to be looking down on us and laughing at our brazen foolishness. Later that morning, we came up to a stream flowing across our route of march that we had to cross. The stream had a steep bank on our side that dropped off about six feet down into the crystal clear running water below, was about twenty feet across and less than knee deep at its deepest. The opposite stream bank was a fern filled gentle slope that slowly rose up until it met thick vegetation about fifteen feet from the water’s edge. The stream flowed through triple canopy jungle, the sun never penetrated to the streambed, and we found ourselves peering down into the gloom below.

“Streams were considered danger areas, and we had a well-choreographed and rehearsed SOP routine we used when crossing all danger areas. Danger areas were all roads, heavily used trails, clearings, and streams, or any place where contact with the enemy was likely and contained good fields of fire and observation the enemy could use against us. The primary purpose of our danger area SOPs was to move the team through the danger area as quickly and as securely as possible. We had used our SOP for stream crossings a thousand times before and could run it in our sleep if we had to.

“We halted and went into a hasty defensive perimeter while we observed the stream for enemy activity. After I had observed across, up, and down the stream long enough to be fairly certain it was free of enemy activity, I sent the point man across. The point man slid down the bank into the water, rapidly crossed the stream, and as soon as he reached the wood line fifteen feet from the water’s edge on the opposite side of the stream, he dropped down and took up a security position straight ahead at twelve o’clock. As soon as the point man had dropped into position, without any prompting my LLDB counterpart slid down the bank, rapidly crossed the stream and dropped down into the ferns between the water’s edge and the wood line to take up a security position facing nine o’clock and downstream. I was glad to see the LLDB had not become so deep into the dry hole syndrome that they would goof off in a danger area, as I slid down the bank, rapidly crossed the stream, and dropped into my security position facing three o’clock and up stream. Then nothing further happened.

“As soon as I had dropped into my position, Grit was to slide down the bank, rapidly cross the stream and take up a position providing security immediately behind me and facing five o’clock. Right behind Grit would come the assistant tail gunner who would take up a position to Grit’s right and provide security at seven o’clock. The tail gunner was to cross the stream, not stop but continue straight through the formation, take over as point man and continue forward. The assistant tail gunner would rise up from his seven o’clock position and follow the tail “gunner, now to become the assistant point man. I would rise from my three o’clock position and follow behind the new assistant point man with Grit rising and following right behind me. My LLDB counterpart and the previous point man would rise and follow behind Grit until we had moved a safe distance from the danger area then we would halt and reform in our regular movement order. Our danger area SOP was intended to move us through the danger area as quickly and securely as possible, and the stream crossing shouldn’t have taken us much more than sixty seconds. But Grit had not followed immediately behind me, and I lay there wondering why.

“Out of my right side peripheral vision, I could see the opposite bank where I expected to see Grit slide down into the stream, then move across the stream and drop down behind me. But after lying there for several minutes there was no movement on the opposite bank, and I was becoming angrier and angrier the longer I lay there. What were they doing over there, taking a chow break or a nap? How could they have become so lax in their dry hole syndrome they would goof off in a danger area? But what had really irritated me was I thought Grit was now goofing off along with the LLDB.

“To make matters worse, I was lying on top of a mound of wet ground about three feet above the stream on my right, and on my left was a small three feet deep gully holding about six inches of stagnant water in its bottom, and the entire area was infested with land leeches. Land leeches didn’t live in the water, they lived on the damp ground near water, and like all leeches they lived on blood they sucked from passing animals. Land leeches were about the same size, color, shape and consistency of night crawlers or earthworms, and they moved like an inchworm moved by humping their backs straight up then pushing their heads forward. Land leeches sensed their prey by seismic vibrations in the soil that telegraphed the presence of their next meal. I could see several leeches inching their way toward me from the front, had to assume there were more approaching from my rear and both sides to say nothing of the ones I had dropped down on top of. If Grit and the two LLDB on the opposite bank had followed the SOP instead of whatever they were doing, I would have only lain there for ten or fifteen seconds before I was up and moving again and the leeches wouldn’t have been a problem. But as it was, I’d soon be covered from head to toe by those leeches, and it was only because Grit and those two LLDB on the opposite bank had decided to take a chow break, a nap, or whatever the hell they were doing instead of following the SOP. And I asked myself again, ‘Where in the hell was Grit?’

“Land leeches couldn’t penetrate your clothing to get to you; they had to crawl through your boot blouse, your fly, your beltline, your shirtfront, or your collar to get to your bare skin. Before we infiltrated, we would always apply a heavy application of leech repellant to those areas of our uniform where leeches could penetrate, but it would wash off after several days in the rain, and it had rained on us every day so far. After a land leech gained access to your bare skin, they would apply a strong natural analgesic to deaden the pain, and then they would shove their heads deep into you and gorge themselves on your blood. A land leech the diameter of matchstick when it crawled onto you would quickly grow to the thickness of your thumb. The slightest pressure on one of the little gluttons would cause them to explode leaving a large splotch of blood on your uniform as if you had been shot, but that would kill the leech and that, in its self, was a problem. When a leech got on you, and fed, you had to make it pull its head out before you killed it or its head would remain forever inside you. To this day, you can tell who was a Project Delta recon man, and who wasn’t, by the number of still visible leech cysts around his belt line. A spot of insect repellant or a lit cigarette would usually cause a leech to pull its head out and un-attach its self from you, and I asked myself again, ‘Where in the hell was Grit?’

“I could now feel leeches crawling down my collar, but my SOP didn’t permit picking land leeches while inside a danger area, so I just lay there. Water leeches weren’t that bad. You only got them on you when you were in the water, and when you got out of the water you picked them off and you were done with it, but a damned land leech would follow you home and crawl in bed with you. Given a choice, a recon team would never RON in a wet area infested with land leeches, but sometimes we had no choice in the matter and would have to spend the night picking leeches off one another.

“Finally, there was movement on the opposite stream bank. In my peripheral vision and through the thin screening of ferns, I saw Grit slide down the opposite bank, slowly walk to the middle of the stream about ten feet from me, stop, take out his canteen, bend over and start to fill it. That in its self pissed me off, but when the two LLDB slid down the bank together, walked over to Grit, stopped and also began to fill their canteens in the middle of the stream it was more than I could stand, and I intended to chew their asses right there in the middle of the stream.

“I raised up on my forearms, turned my head so I could clearly see them and said in a rather loud voice, ‘Hey!’ and that was as far as I got with their ass chewing. I was looking into the startled faces of three NVA soldiers as they dropped their canteens and went for the AK-47s slung around their necks. A very hasty ‘fight or flight’ decision had to be made and I selected flight, as there was no way I could have swung my CAR-15 through 45 degrees of ferns and engage them before they raised their AK-47s up to engage me. I might have beaten one of the three, but one out of three just wasn’t good enough at that range, so I rolled over and fell into the gully on my left as the top of the mound I had been lying on exploded from the impact of a hail of bullets that flung mud, dirt, and debris all over me. I brought my CAR-15 up to engage them when they came over the mound, but they never did. Bullets continued to strike the top of the mound and beyond, and two grenades went off in the stream. Then there was the usual silence that came after a firefight when the only sound to be heard was the crying and moaning of the dying and the wounded.

“The crying and the moaning was coming from the stream, so I raised my head above the mound and saw the three NVA now lying in the middle of the stream either dead or dying. I saw my LLDB counterpart jump up, run to where the point man was lying and they both disappeared into the wood line. I joined them, and we took up a position where we could observe the opposite bank. We knew the three NVA now dead in the stream had come from the opposite bank, but we didn’t know if there were any more NVA over there or not. We didn’t know if the three NVA had been alone or if they had been the point element of a larger unit. We didn’t know if Grit and the two LLDB were still over there and alive or if they had been overrun by the NVA. We had no communications with them and had no way of knowing their status, so we just lay there and waited for what would happen next.

“If there had been an engagement on the other side and our three team members had prevailed, they would soon be crossing the stream, but if the NVA had been successful, the NVA would soon be sliding down that bank. If it were our team members who came off of the bank, we would be there to cover them, but if it were the enemy, we would be there to kill them. After a few minutes, we saw movement on the opposite bank, and much to our relief our tail gunner slid down, crossed the stream and joined us, followed by Grit and then the assistant tail gunner. I moved the team away from the stream and to a hilltop that could be easily defended, and we then attempted to sort out what had just happened.

“Grit told me that when I had slid down the stream bank and started to cross the stream, he had heard the three NVA coming up behind them. He said the three NVA had halted in the tall grass just a few feet to his right, and they had observed the opposite side for several minutes before, one at a time, sliding down the bank into the stream. The NVA were in his direct line of fire with where he knew I was lying in the ferns, and he couldn’t shoot them without fear of hitting me. But as soon as they began to fire on me, it no longer mattered that I happened to be in his line of fire, so he emptied a twenty round magazine into their backs…and into where I had been. While Grit was reloading, the two LLDB with him had thrown two M-26 fragmentation grenades into the stream for good measure. Although one of the NVA groaned for a few minutes, all three had been killed almost instantly.

“As in all contacts with the enemy, there had been valuable lessons to learn, or to relearn, from this engagement. First of the lessons to be relearned, of course, was that a recon team’s SOPs must be followed at all times while in the hole even if it happened to be a dry hole. If the LLDB had been religiously following our SOPs all along, I would never have mistaken the enemy for my team members when the enemy made an unexpected appearance. Danger flags should have immediately popped up in my mind when I saw men come off the opposite bank and they were not following my team’s SOP for a stream crossing.

“But, to me, the most disturbing thing that had just happened was that I had, for a moment, doubted Grit’s competence and dependability, and he had never before given me reason to doubt him. Grit was a solid, dependable, and highly competent recon man, and I had been extremely fortunate to have him on my recon team, but I had just doubted him and it had almost cost me my life. The moment Grit had failed to follow our SOP, I should have known something had gone bad wrong, and the only thing it could have been was that the enemy had somehow entered into the equation. I could write it off as a temporary lapse in judgment brought on by the leeches I had been lying in, or I could admit to myself it was a serious character defect I really needed to work on.

“There had also been another way of looking at it. If I had immediately recognized those three NVA crossing the stream, I would have had no choice but to shoot them before they reached the other side and saw me. Just as I had been in Grit’s line of fire, so was he in mine. Grit, in his position on top of the stream bank, only had a thin screen of grass for cover, and if I had fired most of a twenty-round magazine, point blank, into those three NVA, I would have probably hit Grit several times. If that had happened, Grit would have probably been killed, and I would have had to live the rest of my life with the knowledge I had killed my partner.

“Still yet, there is another explanation for the outcome of this brief engagement if I tell you SSG William R. (Grit) Pomeroy, Jr. was, and still is, a deeply religious man and a devout Christian. At the end of his tour in Vietnam, Grit left the Army, attended Divinity School, received a Degree in Theology, and returned to the U.S. Army as a Protestant Chaplain. Grit served as a Chaplain with Special Forces units and ministered to countless Special Forces soldiers during their time of spiritual need for the next thirty years. Lieutenant Colonel William R. Pomeroy, Jr. retired from the Army a few years ago at his last assignment as the 20th Special Forces Group Chaplain. To me, there is little doubt but that God made one of His infrequent appearances in that streambed that day to save one of His favorite servants and just happened to inadvertently save my life in the time of it.

“My team was back together again, no one had been even slightly wounded, and I was glad to see the LLDB were back to following our SOPs. Whether those three NVA had only been three unlucky hunters, or whether they had been three very amateur trackers would forever remain unknown. Whoever they were, one must pity them for how they departed this world. A filthy, bearded, wild-eyed, leech covered apparition had risen up from the ferns at their feet, shouted at them, scared them out of their wits, then disappeared as suddenly as it had appeared, and then they were shot dead from behind. None of us knew exactly what had just happened, but at least everyone now knew this wasn’t a dry hole. I looked up at the Coroc cliffs towering over us and could almost hear them say, ‘I told you so.’

“I had already radioed the FAC and reported my recon team had become separated because of enemy contact during a stream crossing, and the FOB had launched a recovery operation that was inbound at the time. I had no way of knowing how many NVA were now in the area, but I did know we had been detected by the enemy, and our location in the AO had been compromised, so I called the FAC, reported my recon team had linked up and asked him to relay my request to the FOB for an emergency extraction. We moved to a small clearing on the top of a hill, and a short time later we were extracted by ladder.

“On the flight back to the Mai Loc FOB, the recovery NCO told me word had just been received that Project Delta was closing down and all personnel would soon return to Nha Trang for reassignment. As it turned out, this would be my last recon patrol with Project Delta, and it had almost been nothing more than a dry hole to remember. But as it was, this patrol had made the last contact with the enemy any Project Delta recon team would make, the last enemy soldiers killed during the war by Project Delta had just been killed on this patrol by the future Chaplain of the 20th Special Forces Group (Airborne), and as such, it had been a most appropriate way to end my tour of duty with Project Delta.”[103]

Operation Delta Dagger II was the final operation of Project Delta’s history. The original operation called for continuing OPCON to the 101st Airborne to identify enemy troop concentrations, travel routes and base areas. The operation ran from June 24 through noon on June 30, 1970. On Thursday, June 25 the 2nd Platoon, 4th Ranger Company was inserted for a one day mission. While preparing an extraction LZ a Vietnamese Ranger detonated an undetermined type mine killing two Rangers and wounding three. The BDA Platoon conducted a one day mission on Friday, June 26 without incident. The 1st Platoon, 5th Company, 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion conducted the last operation in Project Delta’s history. It was a one day operation and terminated upon completion of the mission.[90]

REFERENCES AND SOURCES

1. Beckwith, Charlie A., and Knox, Donald, Delta Force, The Army’s Elite Counterterrorist Unit, Avon Books 2000 mass media paperback, New York, original published 1983

2. Florio, William SSG E-6, Recommendation for Award of Silver Star to SSG J.J. Malia, Nha Trang, Vietnam, 9 March, 1965

3. United States, Directorate for Armed Forces Information and Education,, The Evidence at Vung Ro Bay, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965

4. Conboy, Ken and Morrison, James, Operation Leaping Lena, Project Delta Disaster, Vietnam Magazine, Volume 3, Issue 30, 10/1/2000

5. Richardson, William, Personal Interview, Fayetteville, NC, 25 March, 2009

6. Payne, Paul, Personal Interview, Fayetteville, NC, 25 March, 2009

7. Boulas, Leonard, Personal Interview, Albuquerque, NM, 3 March, 2009

8. Author Unknown, Sherman Steve, Project Delta CD, After Action Report (Leaping Lena). Radix Press, Houston, TX, 1999

9. Author Unknown, Sherman Steve, Project Delta CD, After Action Report Operation 12-64, Radix Press, Houston, TX, 1999

10. Author Unknown, Sherman Steve, Project Delta CD, After Action Report Operation 01-65, Radix Press, Houston, TX, 1999 Strange,

11. Arthur A, Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 9-65, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 31 March, 1965

12. Strange, Arthur A, Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 10-65, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 10 April 1965

13. Thompson, Charles H. Jr., Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 11-65, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, Undated

14. Strange, Arthur A, Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 13-65, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 27 July 1965

15. Strange, Arthur A, Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 14-65, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 28 July 1965

16. Strange, Arthur A, Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 15-65, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 30 July 1965

17. Beckwith, Charlie A, Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 16-65, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 20 August, 1965

18. Beckwith, Charlie A, Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 19-65, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 10 November, 1965

19. Beckwith, Charlie A, Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 19A-65, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 15 November, 1965

20. Beckwith, Charlie A, Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 20-65, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 12 November, 1965

21. Beckwith, Charlie A, Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 22-65, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 13 December, 1965

22. Beckwith, Charlie A, Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 23-65, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 23 December, 1965

23. Beckwith, Charlie A, Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 24-65, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 24 December, 1965

24. Beckwith, Charlie A, Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 1-66, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 25 January, 1966

25. Warren, John S., LT Col., U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 2-66, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, February, 1966

26. Warren, John S., LT Col., U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 3-66, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 25 March, 1966

27. Warren, John S., LT Col., U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 4-66, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 29 March, 1966

28. Warren, John S., LT Col., U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 5-66, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 1 May, 1966

29. Warren, John S., LT Col., U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 6-66, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 12 May, 1966

30. Doney, Norman, Personal Interview, Warrenton, OR, 3 February, 2009

31. Warren, John S., LT Col., U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 7-66, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 18 June, 1966

32. Warren, John S., LT Col., U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 8-66, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 2 July, 1966

33. Luttrell, Robert F., Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 9-66, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 29 July, 1966

34. Luttrell, Robert F., Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 10-66, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 13 September, 1966

35. Norman, William C., LT Col., U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 11-66, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 10 September, 1966

36. Flanagan, John F., Vietnam Above The Treetops, A Forward Air Controller Reports, New York, Praeger Press, 1992

37. Norman, William C., LT Col., U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 12-66, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 8 October, 1966

38. Hayes, John G., LT Col., U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 13-66 Phase I, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 19 November, 1966

39. Hayes, John G., LT Col., U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 13-66 Phase II, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 27 December, 1966

40. Aiken, George F., Major, U.S. Army, Unit History SOA (B-52), Nha Trang, Vietnam, 18 July 1970

41. Edens, Ken, Personal Interview, Albuquerque, NM, 3 March, 2009

42. Jarrett, James, Personal Interview, Albquerque, NM, 4 March, 2009

43. Monroe, Alton, Personal Interview, Albuquerque, NM, 4 March, 2009

44. Hadden, Mayo T. III, Personal Interview, Fort Benning, GA, 10 March, 2009

45. Hayes, John G., LT Col., U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 1-67, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 3 February, 1967

46. Hayes, John G., LT Col., U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 2-67, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 2 March, 1967

47. Hayes, John G., LT Col., U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 3-67, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 2 March, 1967

48. Asente, James, Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 4-67, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 6 April, 1967

49. Asente, James, Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 5-67 Operation Pirous, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 16 June, 1967

50. Asente, James, Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 6-67 Operation Shakedown, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 8 July, 1967

51. Allen, Charles A., Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 7-67 Operation Samurai, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 20 August, 1967

52. Adler, Hermann, Personal Interview, Fayetteville, NC, 27 March, 2009

53. Fuller, William, Personal Interview, Fayetteville, NC, 27 March, 2009

54. Samide, Kurt N., Telephone Interview, 26 June, 2009

55. Allen, Charles A., Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 8-67 Operation Samurai II, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 3 November, 1967

56. Allen, Charles A., Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 8A-67 Operation Samurai III, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 5 November, 1967

57. Holland, James, Personal Interview, Fayetteville, NC, 25 March 2009

58. Jones, Willis D., Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 9-67 Operation SuLTan, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 29 December, 1967

59. The History Place, Vietnam War 1945-1975, www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/vietnam

60. Sheppard, Andrew, Telephone Interview, 1 July, 2009

61. Elmore, Darrel, Personal Interview, Albuquerque, NM, 4 March, 2009

62. Humphus, Thomas, Personal Interview, Fort Benning, GA, 10 March, 2009

63. Schultz, Thomas, Personal Interview, Tampa Bay, FL, 12 March, 2009

64. Young, John, Personal Interview, Tampa Bay, FL, 12 March. 2009

65. The Patriot Files, Named Campaigns of the Vietnam War, www.patriotfiles.com

66. McVey, Dennis, Personal Interview, Rainier, WA, 4 February, 2009

67. Jones, Willis D., Major, U.S. Army, OPORD 1-68 (SULTAN II), Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 1 January 1968

68. Comboy, Kenneth J. and Andrade, Dale, Spies and Commandos, How America Lost the Secret War in North Vietnam, Modern War Studies, date and publisher unknown

69. Allen, Charles A., Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 2-68 Operation Samurai IV, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 7 April, 1968

70. Morris, Jim, Death Dealing Project Delta, Parts 1, 2, and 3, Soldier of Fortune Magazine, July, August and September, 1981

71. Allen, Charles A., Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 3-68 Operation Samurai V, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, May, 1968

72. May, Robert, Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 4-68 Operation Shakedown IV, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 29 June, 1968

73. May, Robert, Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 5-68 Operation Alamo, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, Undated

74. May, Robert, Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 6-68 Operation Warbonnet, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, Undated

75. May, Robert, Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 7-68 Operation Ares, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, Undated

76. Pomeroy, William, Personal Interview, Helena, AL, 8 March, 2009

77. Mozian, Steve, Personal Interview, Helena, AL, 8 March, 2009

78. Hicks, Arvill, Personal Interview, Fayetteville, NC, 24 March, 2009

79. Schwarchber, Al, Personal Interview, Fayetteville, NC, 26 March, 2009

80. Taylor, Donald J., Personal Interview, Fayetteville, NC, 26 March, 2009

81. Park, Alan, Personal Interview, Tacoma, WA, 4 February, 2009

82. Park, Alan, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 1-69 Operation Cass Park, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, Undated

83. Aiken, George F., Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 2-69 Operation Cass Park II, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 25 July, 1969

84. Aiken, George F., Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 3-69 Operation Trojan Horse, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, Undated

85. Moore, Robert J., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 4-69 Operation Trojan Horse II, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, Undated

86. Moore, Robert J., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 5-69 Operation Yellow Ribbon, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 5 January, 1970

87. Moore, Robert J., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 1-70 Operation Sabre and Spurs, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 12 March, 1970

88. Moore, Robert J., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 2-70 Operation Cavalry Glory, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 22 April, 1970

89. Aiken, George F., Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 3-70 Operation Delta Dagger, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 9 June, 1970

90. Aiken, George F., Major, U.S. Army, After Action Report to OPORD 4-70 Operation Delta Dagger II, Declassified per Executive Order 12356, 6/24/1996, 7 July, 1970

91. Taylor, Donald J., The McGuire Rig, Project Delta Website www.project-delta.net

92. Carpenter, Harold T., Personal Interview, Las Vegas, NV, 22 and 23 September, 2009

93. Estonson, Jerry, Personal Interview, Las Vegas, NV, 24 September, 2009

94. St. Laurent, Andre, Personal Interview, Las Vegas, NV, 22 September, 2009

95. Walz, Fred, Personal Interview, Las Vegas, NV, 22 September, 2009

96. Siugzda, Herb, Personal Interview, Las Vegas, NV, 22 September, 2009

97. Graves, James J., Personal Interview, Las Vegas, NV, 22 and 24 September, 2009

98. Howard, Chester, Personal Interview, Las Vegas, NV, 24 September, 2008

99. Montez, Al, Personal Interview, Las Vegas, NV, 24 September, 2009

100. Klutts, Joe, Personal Interview, Las Vegas, NV, 23 September, 2009

101. Aslund, Ted, Personal Interview, Las Vegas, NV, 24 September, 2009

102. Taylor, Donald J., Friendly Fire, Project Delta Website, www.projectdelta.net

103. Taylor, Donald J., A Pleasant Stroll in the Jungle, Project Delta website, www.projectdelta.net

104. Hanson, Marshal, Capt. U.S.N.R (Ret.) and Beaton, Scott, Vietnam War: Facts vs Fiction, 2007, unpublished

105. Burkett, B.G. and Whitney, Glenna, Stolen Valor, Verity Press, Inc., Dallas, TX, 1998

106. Nichols, Gary G., The Simple Things In Life, Project Delta Website, www.projectdelta.net

A very special thanks to Steve Sherman to whom I credit the collection of After Action Reports on his CD, “Project Delta”, published under his RADIX Press label. This and other historical data are available from his website www.greenberet.net.

Cover photo courtesy James Jarrett

APPENDIX I

UNIT CITATIONS

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON, DC, 16 JULY 1969

GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 45

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION (ARMY) -Amendment - Section IV

4. Award of Presidential Unit Citation (Army) by The President of the United States of America to the following units of the Armed Forces of the United States is confirmed in accordance with paragraph 194, AR 672-5-1. The text of the citation, signed by President Richard Nixon on 13 June 1969, reads as follows:

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, I have today awarded:

THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION (ARMY) FOR EXTRAORDINARY HEROISMTO THE 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) 1ST SPECIAL FORCES, UNITED STATES ARMY AND ITS ASSIGNED AND ATTACHED UNITS:

The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces and its assigned and attached units distinguished themselves by extraordinary heroism in combat operations in wide areas of the Republic of Vietnam from 1 November 1966 through 31 January 1968. During this period, members of the 5th Special Forces Group constantly displayed endurance and exceptional heroism while carrying the fight to the enemy. Operating from remote isolated areas pre-dominantly controlled by the enemy, and deploying normally in 12-man teams, United States Army Special Forces detachments so successfully trained, organized and led their indigenous paramilitary troops that large areas of the Re-public of Vietnam were returned to government control. As a direct result, valuable intelligence information was collected and the enemy suffered over 8,000 killed and 2,000 captured during this period. The conspicuous gallantry and extraordinary heroism displayed by the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces and its assigned and attached units are in keeping with the finest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit on the personnel of the units and the Armed Forces of the United States of America, (This award supersedes the award of the Meritorious Unit Commendation awarded for meritorious achievement during the period 1 November 1966 to 31 January 1968, as announced in General Orders Number 3427, Headquarters United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375, dated 17 July 1968, and confirmed in DAGO No. 48, dated 13 September 1968.)

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON, DC, 27 JANUARY, 1969

GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 5

VALOROUS UNIT AWARD

By direction of the Secretary of the Army, under the provisions 202.1, AR 672-5-1, the Valorous Unit Award is awarded the following-named unit of the United States Army and its attached United States Air Force and Army of the Republic of Vietnam units for extraordinary heroism while engaged in military operations during the period indicated:

The citation reads as follows: DETACHMENT B-52 (PROJECT DELTA), 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES and its assigned and attached units:

Delta Tactical Air Control Party, 21st Tactical Air Support Squadron Delta Training Command

1st Company, 91st Army of the Republic of Vietnam Ranger Battalion

(Airborne)

2d Company, 91st Army of the Republic of Vietnam Ranger Battalion

(Airborne)

5th Company, 91st Army of the Republic of Vietnam Ranger Battalion

(Airborne)

DETACHMENT B-52 (PROJECT DELTA), 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES and its assigned and attached units distinguished themselves by extraordinary heroism while engaged in military operations during the period 4 March to 4 April 1968 in the Hue/ Phu Bai area of the Republic of Vietnam. When intelligence sources indicated a massive enemy buildup in the I Corps Tactical Zone, the Deputy Commander, United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam, tasked the unit with the hazardous mission of infiltrating the region, locating the suspected enemy supply route and interdicting the vital lines of communication. Exhibiting the characteristic professionalism that has enabled DETACHMENT B-52 (PROJECT DELTA), 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) 1ST SPECIAL FORCES to become the foremost reconnaissance unit in the theater, the Delta staff developed an extremely complex and highly effective plan of operations. The existence of the new major supply route was quickly confirmed and the members of the unit immediately undertook extensive inter diction activities. Expert utilization of tactical air support by the ground elements continuously dealt demoralizing blows to the numerically superior enemy forces. The relentless determination and exemplary perseverance of the members of this proud unit were key factors in averting a second major offensive against the Hue/Phu Bai area. The men of DETACHMENT B-52 (PROJECT DELTA), 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES displayed extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty which are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect distinct credit upon themselves and the Armed Forces of the United States.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON, DC, 13 NOVEMBER 1969

GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 70

AWARD OF THE MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMENDATION

1. By direction of the Secretary of the Army, under the provisions of paragraph 203, AR 672-5-1, the Meritorious Unit Commendation is awarded to the following units of the United States Army for exceptionally meritorious achievement in performance of outstanding service during the periods indicated.

2. THE 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES, it’s assigned and attached units.

The citation reads as follows:

The 5th SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES, it’s assigned and attached units, distinguished themselves in support of military operations in the Republic of Vietnam during the period 31 January 1968 to 31 December 1968. These officers and men of the group demonstrated the highest standards of professional soldiering in the outstanding performance of myriad complex task throughout the entire theater. Engaged in numerous strategic combat operations, they successfully trained and led Vietnamese Special Forces and Civilian Irregular Defense Group personnel in the accumulation of vital information concerning enemy activity, the denial of large geographical areas and infiltration routes to hostile forces and the destruction of enemy havens and bunker complexes. By maintaining a sophisticated intelligence network, organizing “Go Teams” and utilizing Hoi Chanhs and refugees, the men of the 5th SPECIAL FORCES GROUP provided valuable intelligence information to Allied forces and Army of the Republic of Vietnam units. Through their personal involvement with numerous Civic Action projects and their fine coordination of psychological operations with many foreign and domestic agencies, the local populace gained confidence in their government to provide them with services and aid in time of need. With unrelenting perseverance and singular initiative, they significantly advanced the free world struggle against Communist aggression in the Republic of Vietnam. The remarkable proficiency and devotion to duty displayed by the members of the 5th SPECIAL FORCES GROUP are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect distinct credit upon them and the Armed Forces of the USA.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY WASHINGTON, DC

The Secretary of the Navy takes great pleasure in commending SPECIAL PROJECT DELTA Detachment B52 for services set forth In the following CITATION:

For exceptionally meritorious service in action against enemy Viet Cong And North Vietnamese forces during the conduct of long-range reconnaissance Missions in the I Corps Tactical Zone, Republic of Vietnam, from 17 April to 17 June 1967 and from 15 July to 16 August 1967. PROJECT DELTA, attached to The III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE, was assigned the task of locating and interdicting an enemy route of infiltration by which the enemy was moving large Quantities of men and munitions through the remote western regions of the I CORP Zone. Operating in an enemy controlled, extremely rugged jungle area, encompassing A total of 7000 square miles, PROJECT DELTA utilized highly skilled, combined United States and Republic of Vietnam Special Forces Teams, together with assault Helicopters and tactical air support, to effectively penetrate the objective area. The Small Delta reconnaissance teams outmaneuvered the enemy’s aggressive counter-Reconnaissance operation and located and recorded major enemy trail systems, food and supply caches, and base areas. Acting on this information, Delta’s Tactical Air Control Party planned and controlled devastating air strikes against these lucrative Targets with significant results. In addition, PROJECT DELTA conducted reconnaissance in force operations, resulting in 57 confirmed enemy killed, 13 enemy Personnel captured, and large quantities of food and munitions destroyed. The Aggressiveness, skillful planning, and heroic conduct displayed by the officers and Men of PROJECT DELTA were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.

All personnel attached to and serving with PROJECT DELTA during the period Designated above, or any part thereof, are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION RIBBON.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON, DC, 8 APRIL 1969

GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 21

AWARD OF THE VIETNAMESE CROSS OF GALLANTRY WITH PALM

First Award

6. The Cross of Gallantry with Palm has been awarded by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam for outstanding service during the period 15 May, 1964 to 16 August, 1968, to DETACHMENT B-52 (PROJECT DELTA), 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES

The Citation reads as follows:

The brave soldiers of this unit successfully accomplished their mission despite many dangers. During the four years since the establishment of Project Delta, the advice and support given to the Vietnamese Special Forces Training Center in combat operations throughout the four Corps Tactical Zones of Vietnam has been outstanding. These highly trained personnel contributed immeasurably to stemming Communist aggression through cooperation with the Vietnamese Special Forces in 36 combat operations, utilizing reconnaissance, infiltration, and raiding techniques, to destroy known Viet Cong secret bases. In addition to successfully advising the Vietnamese Special Forces, Detachment B-52 has participated in several victorious operations with other Republic of Vietnam, and Allied Forces at Vung Ro, Duc Co, and Plei Me, resulting in 958 enemy killed in action, 94 captured, and the seizure of 28 crew served, and 89 individual weapons, plus a large quantity of equipment, and important documents. Numerous important enemy installations were destroyed by tactical air support directed by elements of Detachment B-52. The above results show the determination of these soldiers to fight the Communist in the Republic of Vietnam, and are in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Armed Forces.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON, DC, 25 SEPTEMBER 1969

GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 59

AWARD OF THE VIETNAMESE CROSS OF GALLANTRY WITH PALM

Second Award

III. 3. The Cross of Gallantry with Palm has been awarded by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam for outstanding service during the period 1 October 1964 to 17 May 1969 to: The 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) and it’s assigned and attached units.

The Citation reads as follows:

The 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) was activated in Vietnam on 1 October 1964, with the mission of providing direct logistical and operational support to Vietnamese Special Forces and to conduct the mission of unconventional warfare. Particularly, the emphasis was placed on the Civilian Irregular Defense Group. Since this activation, the personnel of the 5th Special Forces Group have performed as advisors in coordinating the deployment of Vietnamese Special Forces in A, B, and C Detachments throughout the four Corps Tactical Zones. Over 60 Vietnamese Special Forces Camps, located along the Vietnamese and Laotian borders, have been established with the mission of interdicting the infiltration of North Vietnamese Army Troops in territory of the Republic of Vietnam. Additionally, MOBILE STRIKE FORCES, and PROJECT DELTA have been deployed for parallel operation with the Vietnamese Special Forces. United States Army Special Forces Advisors were constantly present, fought side by side with their counterparts, Vietnamese Special Forces personnel, and greatly contributed to their glorious achievements. The Headquarters, 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, located in Nha Trang, has enthusiastically advised the Vietnamese Special Forces High Command, and at the same time, directly handled the Logistics Support Program, and Plan of Operation at all locations containing United States Army Special Forces Personnel. Numerous combat deeds have been achieved by Vietnamese Special Forces through offensive operations, which engaged Communist Troops. These were the result of the direct participation of 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP Personnel. The devotion to duty and high morale of officer and men of the 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP in the accomplishment of their mission has effectively contributed to the fight for freedom in Vietnam.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON, DC, 14 OCTOBER 1971

GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 48

AWARD OF THE CIVIL ACTION HONOR MEDAL FIRST CLASS

IV. 2. The Civil Action Honor Medal, First Class has been awarded by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam for outstanding service during the period January 1968 through 24 September 1970 to the 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 1ST SPECIAL FORCES and its assigned units.

The Citation reads as follows:

The 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP has distinguished itself as an outstanding, Combat-Experienced unit, which always displays an enthusiastic spirit of service. Since January 1968, the 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, in addition to its combat operations against the Communist forces has collaborated closely with the Vietnamese Special Forces in its effort to implement civil affairs projects. These countless projects encompassed economic, educational, social and public welfare and transportation; assistance to refugees; and construction of churches, markets, medical facilities, schools, bridges and roads. With the achievement of these splendid results, the 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP has contributed significantly to the pacification and rural development program of the Vietnamese Government and at the same time has strengthened the existing bond of friendship between the Vietnamese and American people.

APPENDIX II

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR

After Action Report

AC

Aviation Company

AHC

Assault Helicopter Company

ALC

Air Lift Company

ALO

Air Liaison Organization

AO

Area of Operations

AP

Associated Press

APD

Airborne Personnel Detector

ARVN

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)

AW

Automatic Weapons

BDA

Bomb Damage Assessment

C&C

Command and Control

CCC

Command and Control Central

CCN

Command and Control North

CCS

Command and Control South

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

CIDG

Civilian Irregular Defense Group

CO

Commanding Officer

Co

Company

COL

Colonel

CPL

Corporal

DMZ

Demilitarized Zone

FAC

Forward Air Controller

FFV

Field Force Vietnam

FOB

Forward Operational Base

H&I

Harassment and Interdiction

HE

High Explosive

HQ

Headquarters

ICC

International Control Commission (commissioned by the Geneva Conference of 1954 to police the cease fire between North and South Vietnam

KIA

Killed in Action

LLDB

Luc Luong Dac Biet (Vietnamese Special Forces)

LRRP

Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol

LSM

Landing Ship Medium

LT

Lieutenant

LTC

Lieutenant Colonel

LZ

Landing Zone

MACV

Military Assistance Command Vietnam

MAF

Marine Amphibious Force

MAJ

Major

MG

Machine Gun mm millimeter

MSG

Master Sergeant

MSS

Mission Support Site

NCO

Non Commissioned Officer

NCOIC

Non Commissioned Officer In Charge

NVA

Army of North Vietnam

OPCON

Operational Contingent

OPLAN

Operations Plan

PC

Patrol Craft

PCE

Patrol Craft Escort

PCS

Permanent Change of Station

PLT

Platoon

POW

Prisoner of War

PTSD

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder

RON

Remain Over Night

RPG

Rocket Propelled Grenade

SF

Special Forces

SFC

Sergeant First Class

SFGA

Special Forces Group (Airborne)

SGT

Sergeant

SLAR

Side Looking Airborne Radar

SOG

Studies and Observations Group

SP4

Specialist Fourth Class

SP5

Specialist Fifth Class

SSG

Staff Sergeant

TAOR

Tactical Area of Responsibility

TASS

Tactical Air Support Squadron

TDY

Temporary Duty

TOC

Tactical Operations Center

U.S.N.R

United States Navy (Retired)

USARV

United States Army Vietnam

USASF

United States Army Special Forces (also USSF)

USASOC

United States Army Special Operations Command

USMC

United States Marine Corps

VC

Viet Cong

VNAF

Vietnamese Air Force

WO

Warrant Officer

WP

White Phosphorous, Willy Peter

APPENDIX III

“Debriefing of Ranger Operation Conducted by 1st, 3rd & 5th Companies, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion, (29-30 Sep 66)

1. Company and US Advisors:

1st Company (-) (VN 73), SFC Winder, SSG Jantz; 3rd Company (VN 84), CPT Moore, SGT Nichols, CPL Benjamin, SP4 Dyer; 5th Company (VN 91), LT Hamilton, LT Deaton, SFC Sommerhof

2. Mission: To conduct search and destroy operations vicinity XT012753.

3. Summary of Operations. The 3d Company infiltrated the AO on 290900 Sept at XT012732. From the infiltration LZ, the unit marched on an azimuth of 350 degrees to XT 012753 and halted for one hour; the patrol turned on an azimuth of 130 degrees for three hundred meters. At this location, the two lead platoons were taken under fire by a VC force of unknown size. After a brief firefight, the 3rd company assaulted the VC position, causing the VC to withdraw.

The 3rd Company began a search of the immediate are as soon as the VC withdrew. The point of contact was on the southern edge of a large VC complex of bamboo structures. After a forty five minute search of the area, the company had observed 16-20 structures, including a large kitchen, a bicycle repair shop, two ammunition caches and approximately 12-15 shelters, assumed to be a barracks. (Numerous interviews revealed that many other structures were observed in the complex; but were not searched by the ground party). The kitchen was furnished with large earthenware crocks which contained pickled fish, and cooking pans, approximately four to five feet in diameter containing cooked rice; numerous other cooking utensils were also observed. The shelters did not have bunks; they consisted of thatched roofs and sides, but had no flooring. Each shelter had an outside entrance to an underground shelter. There was a bicycle repair shop which contained hand tools, such as hammers, wrenches, screwdrivers etc., and some shovels. There were two ammunition bunkers; the bunkers looked like craters, approximately eight feet in diameter and each had thatched overhead cover and no sides. The contents of the bunkers included small arms ammunition, small arms repair parts, Bangalore torpedoes, C-4, anti-tank mines, 25 containers of documents, a canister of opium and a duplication machine. (Make or origin of manufacture was not determined on any of the above items.) Another cache revealed large quantities of medical supplies, including vitamins (liquid) and penicillin. (Origin of medical supplies is unknown.) VN Rangers reported that they observed several typewriters and sewing machines (Singer type), in the complex. In the complex, a SCR 1694 radio (French make) was destroyed by the Rangers. The 3d Company departed the VC complex on an azimuth of 130 degrees for approximately one hundred and fifty meters to XT011751 and was attacked by a force of VC at three points. The VC force was estimated at two companies. The VC laid down a heavy volume of fire. AW and SA. The US advisors could not identify the MG fire. The 3d Company maintained contact with the VC element for approximately ninety minutes overall. During this period of time, a total of nine airstrikes were called on the VC position. Results of this contact were 3 VC KIA; friendly casualties were one US WIA, Benjamin, fragments in the left forearm and twelve VN WIA. The 3d Company called for reinforcements at 291605 hours.

The 5th Company was infiltrated on an LZ at XT007752; one Ranger was KIA by friendly fire during infiltration. The 5th Company was giving an azimuth of 90 degrees and four hundred meters by the FAC to effect linkup with the 3d Company. The 5th Company moved for three hundred meters to actually linkup with the 3d Company. Enroute to linkup the US advisors with 5th Company stated that they crossed several trails that were well used, and saw a complex of bamboo structures at XT010754. In this vicinity, a VC KIA was observed and a Mosin-Nagant 7.62 Carbine was captured. One contact was made with 3d Company, one platoon from the 5th Company moved forward to cover the withdrawal of the 3d Company towards the LZ at XT006753. The remainder of 5th Company secured the LZ for evacuation of the 3d Company wounded and for the infiltration of 1st company (-) at 291845 hours. The Battalion (-) then formed a perimeter of defense on the eastern edge of the LZ for the remainder of the night. Airstrikes were directed on possible reinforcement routes throughout the night. A flareship and a C-47 (PUFF) provided air cover for the night.) Except for sporadic sniper fire, the night was uneventful and no further contact was made with the VC. All three companies were extracted out of the AO by 300855 September. There were many well used trails throughout the AO, many which appeared to lead into and out of the VC complex and could facilitate small vehicles and oxcarts. No booby traps or punji stakes were observed. There were no open bunkers, foxholes or trenches in the AO. There were apparent OP’s or LP’s in the AO. There were no signs of cultivated areas within the AO; one well was reported to be located in the vicinity of the kitchen in the VC complex. The VC uniforms varied; mixed green and black, green and khaki and full green uniforms were observed. VC weapons which were identified, included the French MAS 36, AK-47 assault rifle, K-50 Chicom SMG, SKS 7.62 Russian carbine, K-66 SMG and the Russian Chicom model 1944 Mossin-Nagant Carbine, 7.62 caliber. Captured material included (1) K-50 SMG, (1) K-66 SMG, (1) Mauser rifle (1) Rifle make unknown, (1) sewing machine (Singer), (2) pair binoculars, Make unknown, (2) Pocket compasses, (2) overlays of the IA Drang battle that took place with the 1st US Cavalry Division Nov 1965. Several dozen documents and personal items.

The estimated body count (60) enemy KIA is by US Advisors and VN Rangers.

4. Terrain Analysis. Movement within the AO was relatively easy. Secondary growth consist of scrubwood trees, vines, elephant grass and broadleaf evergreen. There was double and triple jungle canopy which afforded complete concealment from the air. The soil consisted primarily of sand, mixed with a small amount of clay. No running streams were observed throughout the AO.”[37]

During this operation Corporal Benjamin sustained shrapnel wounds but was treated in the field and continued the mission.

Another Ranger operation was conducted on October 2nd and 3rd 1966 to explore a previously identified regimental headquarters that had been bombed by B-52s a month earlier in September. The 1st and 5th Companies, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion and the 9th CIDG Company from Camp Trai Bi were inserted on the 2nd. The following is the debriefing report from the Operation 12-66 After Action Report.[37]

Debriefing Report Ranger Operation conducted by 1st and 5th Companies, 91st Airborne

Ranger Bn, and the 9th CIDG Company (SF Camp Trai Bi) 02-03 Oct 1966.

1. Company and US Advisors:

1st Co. (VN 93): LT Hamilton, SFC Winder, SP4 Dyer; 5th Co. (VN 91):LT Deaton, SFC Sommerhof, SSG Jantz; 9th CIDG Co.:SFC Pickleson, SP4 Taylor

2. Mission:To conduct search and destroy operations of known VC Regimental complex, vicinity XT050665.

3. The 1st, 5th and 9th companies were infiltrated on an LZ at XT053660 on 020745, 0755, and 0805, respectively. All three companies moved from the LZ in a column formation heading generally northeast through the AO. 5th company made contact with three VC. Fire was exchanged and the VC fled as the 5th company deployed on line. The US advisors called for an airstrike north of the company. Rockets were fired on the VC and two were probably KIA because of the large amounts of blood seen after the strike; the VC were not recovered. Two of the VC were armed with bolt action rifles and the third had an AW. Minutes after the strike, 9th company saw six VC moving west from the northwest corner of the LZ. Fire was exchanged and one VC was WIA. All three companies continued moving northwest through the AO. 1st company located a cache at XT056664; two huts and two hundred kilos of rice were destroyed by fire. One M-14 mine (US) was located near the cache. 5th company located a cache at XT058667; two huts and two hundred kilos of rice were destroyed by fire. All companies changed direction and headed for coordinates XT053678, to the northwest. 1st company saw a newly constructed tin hut in the vicinity of XT053678 and destroyed it with a shape charge. Near the tin hut, there was an ambush position on an east west trail; there were punji traps on both sides of the trail and AW positions covering the trail and the obstacles. All three companies moved to XT053681 and established a perimeter of defense for the night, ambush positions and patrols provided security for the main force. A newly dug ambush position was discovered on the west bank of the river at XT054682. Patrols dispatched north and south on the west side of the river reported that the VC had built ambush positions at virtually all possible fording sites between XT053 and XT054683. At 021945 one VC with an AW walked west on a trail at XT053683. The VC was fired upon but escaped apparently uninjured. With that exception, no contact was made after the companies had stopped for the night. At 030700 all companies formed with platoons on line and conducted a thorough search and sweep operation back through the AO, heading generally southwest. All three companies entered a VC regimental complex for a thorough search. During the search, one VN Ranger was KIA by a sniper, the sniper was fired upon and believed to have been wounded, but escaped. The KIA was extracted from an LZ at XT046664 at 031330. In the VC complex, two wells were destroyed by shape charges; two large kitchens and twenty barracks were burned. (The size of the kitchens and barracks were comparable to the size of a GP medium tent). Two thousand kilos of rice were burned and five hundred pounds of squash were, if you will, squashed. US C rations were seen in small quantities. Several of the structures had been partially damaged (B-52 strikes in early September) but were being repaired, and many new huts were being built in the vicinity of the B-52 strike zones. Three rope ladders, each one hundred to one hundred and fifty feet long, were hung from trees used as OP’s. The ladders were destroyed. The entire complex was constructed within a continuous rectangular shaped communication trench. Underground tunnels led from this trench to underground shelters, on the inside of the perimeter (see sketch). Several huts and entrenchments were observed around the complex, outside of the perimeter, probably positioned for watching trails. All three companies moved from the VC complex to the original LZ at XT052660 and were helilifted back to the base camp without incident. The last lift was extracted at 031525 hours. The VC which were seen in the complex wore mixed black and civilian attire; this may have been a labor party sent to restore the complex. US advisors stated that the B-52 strikes had hit the center of this complex and damaged or destroyed thirty percent of the structures within it.

4. Except for the debris which was strewn about by the B-52 strikes, movement was relatively easy in the AO. The jungle canopy averaged sixty feet in height from the ground, undergrowth consists primarily of broadleaf evergreen and scrub trees. Trees averaged sixty to one hundred and twenty five feet in height and six inches to eighteen inches in diameter. There were many streams in the AO, but none within the VC complex.”[37]

APPENDIX IV: THE BATTLE OF HUE, 1968, FROM A VIETNAMESE PERSPECTIVE

The Following document was produced by the South Vietnamese government after the 1968 Tet Offensive to document the real hatred and savagery demonstrated by the North Vietnamese and the local VC forces in their attack on the imperial city of Hue. It is included here as a reminder to all the readers who were not there that the Vietnam conflict was a nasty affair that took place for a reason. In spite of the brutality and atrocities wreaked upon them by the Communists, the people of Hue emerged with hope and resolve for a future free of oppression. This document was provided by Dennis McVey.

APPENDIX V: TIPS OF THE TRADE

This document courtesy of Dennis McVey.

Special Forces Combat Recon Manual

Republic of Vietnam

POI 7658, Patrolling FTX

Prepared by Project Delta (B-52, 5th SFG)

HQ. NhaTrang

1. Attached are “Reconnaissance Tips of the Trade” prepared by Detachment B-52. Commanders of all units are encouraged to disseminate, widely, the information contained therein. The information presented in the attached “Recon Tips” is very appropriate for use in unit and individual training of US and indigenous personnel. Such information can be of significant value to units engaged in conventional patrolling as well as special reconnaissance units.

2. Detachment B-52, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn), 1st Special Forces assembled the original document. Assistance was provided by personnel of B-52, MACV Recondo School and 5th SFGA Combat Orientation Course School, who contributed from their knowledge and experience. Special credit is given to MSG Norman A. Doney, 1 SG, CCC Recon Company for his assistance.

3. This document has been reviewed and annotated by Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn), 1st Special Forces. For easy use and reference the document has been organized into annexes.

General Tips of the Trade

1. While on a mission, minimize fatigue because the tired become careless.

2. If you show confidence, your team will have confidence.

3. If the team leader loses his temper it will affect his judgment. Keep cool and think ahead, always keeping an alternate plan in mind. Don’t be afraid to take advice from your team member.

4. Team work, the key to success, only comes through constant practice and training. Realism must be injected into all phases of training such as zeroing of weapons at targets in the jungle, use of live training aids for POW snatch or ambush practice, etc.

5. Teams that have a good physical training program have fewer health problems.

6. Make sure. that personnel take salt tablets as a preventative measure rather than waiting until collapse is imminent. One tablet in a canteen of water is a good way to take salt, especially on very hot and humid days. Only when plenty of water is available!!!

7. If your mission calls for emplacing a mine in a road, ensure that an extra fuse is taken along, in case one is lost.

8. All personnel should wear loose fitting and untailored clothing on field operations. Tight fitting clothing often tears or rips, allowing easy access to exposed parts of the body for mosquitoes and leeches.

9. Each team leader should have a pre-mission and post-mission checklist to ensure that nothing is left behind.

10. Use tact when reprimanding your personnel, especially indigenous team members. If possible, take the man aside to criticize him. This enables him to reason positively to the criticism, since he will not feel ridiculed and lose self confidence.

11. Do not hang clothing or bandanas on green bamboo if you plan on wearing it afterwards. The fuzz on the bamboo is just like itching powder.

12. Conduct English classes for your indigenous personnel, especially interpreters. Conduct classes for your U.S. Personnel on your indigenous team member’s dialect.

13. Pre-set frequencies on the PRC-25 so that a quick turn of the dials will put you on the desired frequency. This is especially helpful at night when you want to avoid a light.

14. Carry CS powder in plastic insect repellent or lube oil bottles. It is difficult to put CS powder in them but it is definitely worth the effort. Sprinkle CS powder in and on empty “C” ration cans and food containers. This will prevent animals from digging them up once you have buried them.

M-16/CAR-15 Tips

1. Tape the muzzle of your weapon to keep out water and dirt. Leave lower portion of slits open for ventilation.

2. Use one magazine full of tracer during infiltration and exfiltration. If taken under fire during infiltration or exfiltration the tracers can be used to identify enemy positions to friendly air assets.

3. The last three rounds in each magazine should be tracer. This reminds the firer that he needs a loaded magazine.

4. Replace the cartridge in the chamber of your weapon each morning “quietly”. Condensation may cause a malfunction.

5. Always carry a small vial/tube of lubricating oil for your weapon.

6. Oil the selector switch on your weapon daily and work the switch back and forth, especially during rainy season. This will prevent the common occurrence of a stuck switch.

7. Always carry your weapon with the selector switch on “safe”.

8. To improve noise discipline, tape all sling swivels or remove them from weapons.

9. During extraction do not fire weapons from helicopters after leaving the LZ because a gunship may be passing under you without your knowledge.

10. Do not retrieve your first expended magazine during contact, because it will consume valuable time.

11. Check all magazines before going on an operation, to ensure they are clean and properly loaded.

12. Never assume that your weapon is clean enough on an operation. CLEAN YOUR WEAPON DAILY.

13. Place magazines upside down with bullets pointed away from your body in the ammo pouches. This will keep dirt and water out of them and if rounds go off due to enemy fire, you won’t be injured by your own ammo.

Load Bearing Equipment Tips

1. Be sure that all snaps and buckles are taped. Do not use paper tape.

2. Place triangular bandages or individual dressings (in original containers) in the ammo pouches. This makes it easier to remove magazines, and increases the first-aid capability of your unit.

3. Cut the front corners of ammo pouches 1/2”-3/4” to make it easier to remove magazines during the rainy season. Also, have 2 magazines with pull tabs in each pouch. If they are available, use canteen covers to carry magazines rather than ammo pouches. They hold more magazines, are easier to open, and you won’t need so many pouches hanging from your web gear.

4. Tie a string or lanyard between M-79 and web belt so you won’t lose it when firing the M-16.

5. Keep your UPC-10 secured to your harness during use. If lost with the beeper on, it will negate all other signals on that frequency until the battery runs down.

6. Always carry some type of knife on patrol.

7. Snap links should be secured around the shoulder harness, NOT on the cloth loops.

8. For survival, each individual should carry, in a first aid pouch on the harness, one tube of bouillon cubes, one tube of salt tablets, and one bottle of purification tablets. One bouillon tube in one canteen of water, when dissolved will give energy for one or two days.

9. All team members should carry a mixture of fragmentation, CS and WP grenades on their belts for the following reasons:

a. Fragmentation grenades are good for inflicting casualties,

b. CS grenades are ideal for stopping or slowing down enemy troops pursuing your team. In addition they will stop dogs from pursuing you in wet weather when CS powder will dis sipate due to wetness.

c. WP grenades have a great psychological effect against enemy troops and can be used for the same purpose as CS Grenades. The use of CS and WP at the same time will more than double their effectiveness.

10. Smoke grenades should be carried in or on the pack and not on the web gear or harness. You don’t fight with smoke grenades and if you need one, 99 times out of 100, you will have time to get it from your pack.

11. Fold paper tape through the rings of grenades and tape the ring to the body of the grenade. The paper tape will tear for fast use, where plastic or cloth tape will not. Also it keeps the ring open for your finger, stops noise and prevent snagging.

12. Camouflage grenades, using black or OD spray paint.

13. Do not bend the pins on the grenades flat. That makes the rings too hard to pull when needed.

14. Make continuous daily checks on all grenades, when on patrol, to ensure that the primer is not coming unscrewed.

15. Each team should carry one thermite grenade for destruction of equipment, either friendly or enemy.

16. Do not carry grenades on the upper portion of your harness because the enemy will shoot at them, trying to inflict several casualties with one shot.

17. Sew a long slim pocket on the side of your rucksack to accommodate the long antenna.

18. Ensure that the snap link on your rucksack is snapped through the loop in the upper portion of your rucksacks carrying straps so that you won’t lose it during extraction if you have to snap it on a ladder or McGuire Rig.

19. Insect repellent leaks and spills easily, therefore, isolate it from your other equipment in the rucksack. Also squeeze air from repellent container and screw on cap firmly.

20. An indigenous poncho and/or a ground sheet along with a jungle sweater and a rain jacket are sufficient for sleeping.

21. A claymore bag, sewn onto the top flap of the rucksack is extremely useful to carry binoculars, extra handsets, camera or URC-10, prepared rations, or any other special equipment. This gives easy access to those items while on patrol or when you have to ditch the rucksack.

22. Tie smoke grenades on rucksack between pockets.

23. Always use the water from canteens in or on your rucksack before using water in the canteens on your belt. This will ensure a supply of water should you lose your rucksack.

24. Test straps on the rucksack before packing for each patrol. Always carry some parachute cord to repair straps on patrol.

25. Use waterproof bag in rucksack to protect equipment while on patrol. This is extremely important during the rainy season.

Recon Patrol Tips

1. When making VRs always mark every LZ within your AO and near it, on your map. Plan the route of march so that you will always know how far and on what azimuth the nearest LZ is located.

2. Don’t cut off too much of the map showing your recon zone (RZ). Always designate at least 5-10 kilometers surrounding your RZ as running room.

3. Base the number of canteens per map upon the weather and availability of water in the AO. Select water points when planning your route of march.

4. Check all team members’ pockets prior to departing home base for passes, ID cards, lighters with insignias, rings with insignias, etc. Personnel should only carry dog tags while on patrol.

5. If the team uses a grenadier armed with rifle grenades, have him place a crimped cartridge as the first round in each magazine carried. After firing the grenade, he can use the rifle normally. When the magazine is empty and a new one inserted the grenadier can then quickly fire another grenade.

6. Always carry maps and notebooks in waterproof containers.

7. Use a pencil to make notes during an operation. Ink smears when it becomes wet, whereas lead does not.

8. Inspect each team member’s uniform and equipment, especially radios and strobe lights, prior to departure on a mission.

9. If you use the Hanson Rig, adjust your harness and webbing before leaving on patrol.

10. During the rainy season take extra cough medicine with codeine on patrol.

11. The location and proper use of morphine should be known by all team members.

12. All survival equipment should be tied or secured to the uniform or harness to prevent loss if pockets become torn, etc.

13. Each US or key team member should carry maps, notebooks, and SOI in the same pocket of each uniform, for hasty removal by other team members if one becomes a casualty.

14. Take paper matches to the field in waterproof container. Do not take cigarette lighters as they make too much noise when opening and closing.

15. Tie panel and mirror to pocket flap to prevent losing.

16. Always carry rifle cleaning equipment on operation, i.e., brush, oil and at least one cleaning rod.

17. Each team should have designated primary and alternate rally points at all times. The team leader is responsible for ensuring that each team member knows the azimuth and approximate distance to each rally point/LZ.

18. Never take pictures of team members while on patrol. If the enemy captures the camera, they will have gained invaluable intelligence.

19. At least two pen lights should be taken by each team.

20. While on patrol, move 20 minutes and halt and listen for 10 minutes. Listen half the amount of time you move. Move and halt at irregular intervals.

21. Stay alert at all times. You are never 100% safe until you are back home.

22. Never break limbs or branches on trees, bushes, or palms, or you will leave a very clear trail for the enemy to follow.

23. Put insect/leech repellent around tops of boots, on pants fly, belt, and cuffs to stop leeches and insects.

24. Do most of your moving during the morning hours to conserve water. Never be afraid to move at night, especially if you think your RON has been discovered.

25. Continually check your point man to ensure that he is on the correct azimuth. Do not run a compass course on patrol, change direction regularly.

26. If followed by trackers, change direction of movement often and attempt to evade or ambush your trackers, they make good PWs.

27. Do not ask for a “fix” from FAC unless absolutely necessary. This will aid in the prevention of compromise.

28. Force yourself to cough whenever a high performance aircraft passes over. It will clear your throat, ease tension, and cannot be heard. If you must cough, cough in your hat or neckerchief to smother the noise.

29. Never take your web gear off, day or night. In an area where it is necessary to put the jungle sweater on at night, no more than two patrol members at a time should do so. Take the sweaters off the next morning to prevent cold and overheating.

30. If you change socks, especially in the rainy season, try to wait until RON and have no more than two patrol members change socks at one time. Never take off both boots at the same time.

31. When a team member starts to come down with immersion foot, stop in a secure position, remove the injured person’s boot, dry off his feet, put foot powder on his feet and place a ground sheet or poncho over his feet so that they can dry out. Continued walking will make matters worse, ensuring that the man will become a casualty, thereby halting the further progress of the team.

32. Desenex or Vaseline rubbed on the feet during the rainy season or in wet weather will aid in the prevention of immersion foot. It will also help avoid chapping if put on the hands.

33. Gloves will protect hands from thorns and aid in holding a weapon when it heats up from firing.

34. Place a plastic cover on your PRC-25 to keep it dry in the rainy season.

35. When using a wire tap device, never place the batteries in the set until needed. If the batteries are carried in the device they will lose power even though the switches are in the off position.

36. If batteries go dead or weak do not throw them away while on patrol. Small batteries can be recharged by placing them in arm pits or between the legs of the body. A larger battery can gain added life by sleeping with the battery next to the body. Additional life can also be gained by placing batteries in the sun.

37. If possible, carry on extra hand set for the PRC-25 and ensure that it is wrapped in a waterproof container.

38. Always carry a spare PRC-25 battery, but do not remove the spare from its plastic container prior to use or it may lose power.

39. Do not send “same” or “no change” when reporting team location. Always send your coordinates. Keep radio traffic at a minimum.

40. Avoid over confidence, it leads to carelessness. Just because you have seen no sign of the enemy for 3 or 4 days does not mean that he isn’t there or hasn’t seen you.

41. A large percentage of patrols have been compromised due to poor noise discipline.

42. Correct all team and/or individual errors as they occur or happen.

43. All personnel should camouflage faces and backs of hands in the morning, at noon and at RON or ambush positions.

44. Never cook or build heating fires on patrol. No more than two persons should eat chow at any one time. The rest of the team should be on security.

45. When team stops, always check out 40-60 meters from the perimeter.

46. All team members should take notes while on an operation and compare them nightly. Each man should keep a list of tips and lessons learned and add to them after each operation.

47. Each man on a team must continually observe the man in front of him and the man behind him, in addition to watching for other team members’ arm and hand signals.

48. A recon team should never place more than one mine, AP, or AT, in one small section of a road or trail at a time. If more than one is set out the team is just resupplying the enemy, because when a mine goes off, a search will be made of the immediate area for others and they will surely be found.

49. During the dry season, do not urinate on rocks or leaves, but rather in a hole or small crevice. The wet spot may be seen, and the odor will carry further.

50. When carrying the M-79 on patrol, use a retainer band around the stock to hold the safety on safe while moving.

51. When crossing streams, observe first for activity, then send a point man across to check the area. Then cross the rest of the patrol, with each taking water as he crosses. If in a danger area, have all personnel cross prior to getting water. Treat all trails (old and new), streams, and open areas as danger areas.

52. Carry one extra pair of socks, plus foot powder, on patrol, especially during the rainy season. In addition, each team member should carry a large sized pair of socks to place over his boots when walking or crossing a trail or stream.

53. During rest halts don’t take your pack off or leave your weapon alone. During long breaks, such as for noon chow, don’t take your pack off until your perimeter has been checked for at least 40 to 60 meters out for 360 degrees. During breaks throw nothing on the ground. Either put trash in your pocket or spray it with CS powder and bury it.

54. In most areas, the enemy will send patrols along roads and major trails between the hours of 0700-1000 and from 1500-1900. Since most of the enemy’s vehicular movement is at night, a team that has a road watch mission should stay no less than 200 meters from the road during the day and move up to the road just prior to last light. When the enemy makes a security sweep along a road, usually twice a week, he normally does not check further than 200 meters to each flank.

55. If you hear people speaking, move close enough to hear what they are saying. The reason is obvious. The VN team leader should make notes.

56. While on patrol, don’t take the obvious course of action and don’t set a pattern in your activities, such as, always turning to the left when “button hooking to ambush your own back trail.

57. A dead enemy’s shirt and contents in pockets, plus pack, if he has one, are normally more valuable than his weapon.

Forward Air Controller (FAC) Tips

1. The FAC is second in importance to your weapon while on combat operation. Learn all you can about FAC procedures. Proper use of FAC support could mean the difference between whether or not you return from a patrol.

2. When making a FAC VR take a map that covers the AO from the FOB to your RZ.

3. Never fly directly over your RZ (down the middle). Fly along the side of your RZ so you can observe as much as possible in your RZ.

4. Whenever you hear an aircraft, ensure that your radio is turned on; they may be trying to contact you.

5. The FAC is severely limited in bad weather and the rainy season, plan for this.

6. The average time for reaction to an immediate request is 15-45 minutes.

7. The tactical aircraft may have mixed ordinance or, if it’s a diverted aircraft, the ordinance someone else has requested for a pre-planned target.

8. If a patrol, not in contact with the enemy, requests an air strike against a specific target, request appropriate ordinance to destroy the target.

9. Don’t use the PRC-25 as a homing station for the FAC because VC have homing equipment for FM radios. Instead, use the radio to direct FAC to your position.

10. The FAC must know your position on the ground before he will clear any strike craft on your target.

11. The Mirror is the way of best signaling the FAC to mark your position. If the sun is not out, use the clock system with your panels.

12. If the sun is obscured by clouds you can still signal an aircraft by placing your strobe light against your signal mirror. The pilot can more readily see the flashes from the strobe light as they are reflected from the mirror.

13. Do not cut your signal panel if it will make it difficult to see from the air.

14. When using the transponder or beacon never point the antenna at the aircraft. The antenna should be parallel to the aircraft.

15. Use smoke, flares, pen guns, and tracers as a last resort for marking your position.

16. Pilots should identify the color of smoke used by teams on the ground after it has been thrown. The team does not identify the color to the pilots. Violet and red smoke are the best colors to use.

17. If contact is made with enemy and you are in a dense jungle, use WP grenades to mark your location for the FAC. Normally the regular red and violet smoke grenades are not sufficient.

18. There are several methods of marking your location at night. You can use a flashlight, strobe light, flares or WP grenades.

1. The flashlight should be placed inside of a M-79 barrel and aimed directly at the aircraft. This shields the light from observation by the enemy.

2. Tape or paint the sides of the strobe light to make it more directional and to reduce illumination from the sides.

3. Notify the aircraft before firing a pen flare since a flare resemble a tracer. Never fire them directly at the aircraft.

19. When directing a FAC to your position or target area use the clock system. NOTE: The nose of the aircraft is the twelve o’clock position.

20. Don’t use AZ readings to direct aircraft until the FAC has your position located. Once located use AZ reading in degrees to your target and distance in meters.

21. Always give the FAC a complete description of your target and target area.

22. Make adjustments for the FAC after each round and after each aircraft makes a pass.

23. Give the track that you request, always try to put strike across your front. Do not call air in with its strike track coming directly across your position, from the front or rear. NOTE: A strike that is a fraction too soon or late could land in your position. IT HAS HAPPENED BEFORE.

24. A combat sky-spot can be used as an immediate or pre-planned strike. You must give him an eight digit coordinate and a track for the aircraft. NOTE: If possible, have the FAC determine the patrol’s location before the sky spot makes a strike.

25. Whenever possible, try to give a BDA (bomb damage assessment) to the FAC.

26. A FAC can be used effectively to direct a team in contact to LZ’s. A FAC can also provide an airstrike to prep an exfill LZ for a team before it reaches the LZ. This is a good technique to employ in dangerous areas.

27. A FAC can be used to break off contact while a patrol is waiting for strike craft. A low pass or a pass firing a marking round may make the enemy think they are being attacked, thus causing them to withdraw.

28. When directing Shadow over your target do not let him fly directly over the targets.

29. Ask Shadow to drop a flare and direct him to the target from that flare. Make adjustments from his tracer impact area to insure that you get full target coverage.

Remain Over Night Tips

1. Practice proper RON procedures when your team is training, even if you are on rifle range. Take advantage of all training opportunities. Many training areas are not in what we would call “safe zones”.

2. Select a tentative site for RON, from your map, at least two hours in advance.

3. Deviate from your route of march often. Never move in a straight line.

4. After passing a suitable RON site “fish hook” and move into your selected position so that you can observe your own trail.

5. When in position, personnel should keep their equipment on and remain alert until the perimeter has been checked for 360 degrees at a distance of no less than 40 to 60 meters.

6. Packs should not be taken off until it is dark.

7. Before dark each team member should memorize the azimuth and distance to the trees and bushes around his RON.

8. When deploying the team for RON, place the point man in a position opposite the most likely avenue of approach to lead the team out in case of emergency.

9. If a team is within range of friendly artillery, and has preplanned concentrations, azimuths should be taken (OT line) to the concentrations, noting distances, prior to night fall. Nearby large trees or propositioned stakes will aid as hasty reference points for calling in artillery at night.

10. If it is necessary to send in nightly “SITREP”, do not send the message from your RON position. Send your present location but add that you will RON 100 meters east or 200 meters north, etc. This will confuse the enemy as to your exact location in the event he has monitored your transmission with DF equipment. Use your SOI.

11. Keep transmissions to a minimum. It is better to send the location of your RON position the next morning, after you have moved out. The enemy may monitor your traffic but he will not know in what direction you plan to move.

12. Do not send radio transmissions from your RON site unless they are necessary. Be prepared to move if you do send radio transmissions.

13. Prior to dark, the team leader should tell each man the primary and alternate rally points.

14. One half of the team should have their compasses set on the primary rally point and the other half on the alternate. If the enemy comes from the direction of the primary rally point, the man with the azimuth of the alternate rally point set on his compass can lead the team out.

15. A buddy system should be established in case casualties are taken at night. Each man will take care of another man and his equipment if one is wounded, injured, or killed.

16. The pack or rucksack can be used as a pillow, however, ensure that the carrying straps are in the “up” position for easy insertion of the arms in case of rapid withdrawal.

17. It is permissible to unhook the web gear or harness but it should not be taken completely off, at night or at any time during the entire stay in the field.

18. If a person coughs or talks in his sleep, make him sleep with a gag in his mouth.

19. US team members should not “bunch up” or sleep next to each other. One grenade or automatic burst from a weapon could get them all. Each team member should be able to touch each other without moving from their position.

20. Check your RON position to find a break in the canopy for using the strobe light to direct “Shadow” at night.

21. Know what your next day’s plans are to be before settling down for the night.

22. When placing claymores around your RON they should be placed one at a time by two men, one man emplacing the mine while the other stands guard. Never emplace claymores in a position that prevents you from having visual contact with it.

23. Claymores should be emplaced so that the blast parallels the team, ensuring that the firing wire does not lead straight back to the team position from the mine. If the claymore is turned around by the enemy they will not point at the team.

24. Determine, in advance, who will fire each claymore and who will give the command or signal.

25. In most instances it is better not to put out claymores around RON positions but rather to rely on the use of CS grenades for the following reasons:

1. When claymores have been put out, and the enemy is discovered to be moving in on the team, the team will have a tendency to stay in place too long, waiting for the enemy to get within the killing zone.

2. If the team discovers the enemy moving in on them, the enemy will normally be “on line”, not knowing the exact position of the team. If no claymores are out, predesignated team members throw CS grenades in the direction of the enemy force. After the gas begins to disperse the team can withdraw. When the enemy is hit with the CS he will normally panic. If he has gas masks with him, and puts them on, he can no longer see clearly. If he does not have them he will run away and may even fire his weapon indiscriminately, causing overall confusion and panic. In either case, the team has a good chance to escape, unharmed and unseen.

3. If a claymore is triggered, a grenade thrown, or a rifle fired, the enemy may flank the team and box it in.

26. All team members should be awake, alert, and ready to move, prior to the first light.

27. Another check of the perimeter, for 360 degrees, at a distance of at least 40 to 60 meters, should be made prior to moving out or prior to retrieving claymores.

28. A thorough check should be made of the RON site to ensure that nothing is left behind and that the entire site is sterile.

29. The team leader must make sure that each man takes his daily dap-sone malaria tablet.

30. Never eat chow or smoke cigarettes in your RON position. The odor of the food or tobacco gives your position away.

31. Be alert when leaving your RON. If you have been seen, you will probably be attacked or ambushed within 300 meters.

32. Team leaders should check themselves to ensure they are not forming the common habit of constantly turning to the left, or right, when fish hooking.

33. Habits are easily formed, as mentioned previously around certain times of the day. For example, some always move into an RON site at 1830 hours or into a noon break position at exactly 100 hours each day. If the enemy has been observing you, he will take note of this and will plan an ambush for you.

Breaking Out of Encirclement Tips

1. General: Too many times Recon Teams which have not planned for or practiced methods to “break out” from the encirclement have been encircled by the enemy. The following methods and suggestions have worked for others in the past and it is hoped that this will be of assistance to you in the future if you find yourself and your team in such a situation.

a. Team encircled, the sooner you attempt to break out the better chance you will have to do so effectively and with the least amount of casualties. The longer you wait the stronger the enemy becomes.

2. Preparations for breaking out of encirclement: Plans must be made prior to the break out attempt to take care of the following:

a. Rucksacks and equipment left behind must be destroyed by someone.

b. Dead must be left behind. Someone must remove any classi fied documents such as SOIs, notebooks, maps, etc.

c. One or two persons, depending upon the size of the team must have the mission, during the break out assault, of rear security. This will include assisting any personnel who may be wounded before or during the attempt. Additionally they should recover documents from personnel killed during the break out movement. No attempt should be mode to try to take KlAs with the team.

d. Keep in mind that the successful completion of your mission depends on getting the information back to headquarters. All personnel must be reminded of the important information the team has observed.

3. Formation to use: The most effective method a small element can use (5 to 12 man teams) is to form into a pyramid configuration, with the base of the pyramid leading. The following actions should take place:

a. The teams forms into position.

b. CS rounds from M-79s and/or CS grenades are fired or thrown to the flanks.

c. WP grenades are thrown to the rear.

d. A claymore mine and/or grenades are fired or thrown in the direction the team will move.

e. Immediately after the claymore and/or grenades go off to the front, the team moves out.

f. The first element of line will fire on full automatic. The others hold fire.

g. When the first elements’ magazines are empty, the second element moves through them and continues the fire.

h. When the second element has emptied their magazines the first element will have reloaded and will pass through them, taking up the assault but will only fire on semi-automatic.

i. Once the team starts to move it must move rapidly, but not run, and never stop until completely out of the encirclement.

4. Supporting fires: Artillery, helicopter gunships and TAG Air, if available, should be used to assist your break out attempt. These are discussed below:

a. Supporting artillery fire, within range, can be effectively employed to pave your way out of an encirclement or near encirclement. When foul or inclement weather prevents your use of helicopter or TAC air for support, you must use artillery if available. Artillery support, when available, should also be requested at the first sign of trouble for many times it can be firing in your direction before air support can arrive on station to assist you. It is a common practice, as you learned in basic training, that when you are subjected to incoming mortar or artillery fire, you move out of the area as quickly as possible. Enemy forces follow this same doctrine. When you desire to break out, with the aid of artillery, first have the fires placed completely around your position, and then having selected your desired heading, “walk” the artillery in front of you. This will effectively lead you out of the danger area and you may even pick up a shell shocked or wounded PW on your way out.

b. Helicopter gunships can assist you with almost continuous close in fire support, firing directly in front and to the rear during your break out attempt. The effect this fire will have is dependent upon the density of the vegetation, location of your team, and whether or not your supporting aircraft crews can see you or your signals. You may have to direct their fire by adjusting from the strike of the rounds and rockets.

c. Tactical airstrikes can assist you in your attempt to break out of an encirclement. To do this, call for bombs in the direction you desire to move. Since the enemy will get as close to the team as possible to avoid airstrikes, it is preferred to call in the bombs first and then have the TAC Air fire his machine guns and 20mm in front of you as you move out. They can place machine gun fire much closer to you than bombs.

PW Snatch Tips

1. General: Once your recon team has been selected for a PW snatch mission and given a recon zone the following actions should be taken in addition to those normally taken for a recon mission.

a. Study the map to find a possible location to conduct your PW snatch within your RZ.

b. Conduct a visual reconnaissance to familiarize yourself with the terrain, select LZ’s, E&E routes, reference points, record any new trails in RZ and pick tentative PW snatch positions.

c. Finalize plans for primary and alternate LZ’s and routes of march to and from PW snatch location you selected while on VR. If you have any photos or have taken some during your VR, study them carefully.

d. Assign duties for each patrol member and draw equipment needed both for training and for actual preparation.

e. AWPRT-r and AMPRR-9 or HT1 radios should be taken for “in-position” transmission and signaling.

f. Flight time to and from the target area considering the time recovery aircraft will have “on target” should be remembered by the team leader when he selects the number of personnel and helicopters it will take for insertion and extraction. Plan the altitude of the insertion and extraction LZ’s with the load carrying capacity of the aircraft in mind.

2. Training: Practice rehearsals and put as much realism into your training as possible. If you are going to handcuff, gag and blindfold your prisoner then do it during your training. If you plan to carry your prisoner, don’t carry him just 20 or 30 meters as is commonly done but as far as your proposed extraction LZ.

a. Designate men to accomplish the following missions:

1. Handcuff, blindfold, search and gag prisoner.

2. Treat and bandage prisoner’s wounds.

3. Carry or assist him.

4. Carry his equipment and weapon.

5. Cover the tell tale signs at the ambush site.

6. Take care of friendly WIA’s or MIA’s to include their weapon and equipment.

7. Take point, rear security and who will be alternates in each class.

8. Make security check of extraction LZ.

9. Stand guard over prisoner at LZ.

10. U.S advisor to get on board exfill aircraft first.

11. Lift prisoner into aircraft.

12. Secure prisoner to floor of aircraft.

13. Ride out with prisoner.

14. Bring out prisoner’s equipment.

b. Other actions that need to be practiced, explained and rehearsed are:

1. Action taken by each team member if discovered in snatch position.

2. Movement into position.

3. Signals to be used.

4. Concealment of personnel and equipment.

5. Employment of claymores.

6. Action to be taken if the team’s preparations are not completed in time.

7. Action to be taken if inclement weather moves in preventing any possible extraction attempt.

3. Considerations for selecting the location of the PW SNATCH SITE. Generally speaking there are three different locations, a road, a trail and a village (or living complex). The advantages and disadvantages are as follows:

a. Location on a Road:

1. Advantages:

a. Vehicles and/or troops will pass by thus ensuring a possible target.

b. A lone messenger on foot or riding a bicycle is very possible.

c. Personnel moving on a road are not, normally, very familiar with the surrounding terrain or area. hampering their pursuit of the team in case of compromise.

d. Sites can normally be found which offer long stretches of clear visibility.

2. Disadvantages:

a. Large formations of troops use roads and normally sweep possible ambush sites with security elements.

b. Rapid reinforcement is easily effected.

c. Security elements normally check roads for mines and ambushes each morning and evening.

d. Stationary security elements are normally positioned every two to five kilometers along all roads.

e. Troops and convoys traveling on roads are constantly on the alert for possible ambushes and carry heavy caliber weapons to break them up if they occur.

b. Location on a Trail:

1. Advantages:

a. Not so apt to encounter large numbers of enemy troops.

b. Advantageous snatch sites are more easily located which will permit good concealment, good vision, hamper the effectiveness of enemy counter fire, and still be close enough to the trail to perform the mission in the least time possible.

c. Enemy personnel are not normally as cautious or alert to possible ambushes when moving down a trail.

d. The ambushing element can more readily and easily cover up signs that anything happened.

e. Rapid and effective enemy pursuit is not as likely as on a road.

2. Disadvantages:

a. More likely to encounter personnel who are familiar with the local area.

b. Dogs, women and children are more likely to be encountered.

c. Pre-planned sites/locations for PW snatches are more difficult to locate.

d. The enemy can jump off a trail and disappear easily.

e. Normally you are right on a trail before being aware of it’s presence which could allow for discovery of the team by passing enemy personnel.

c. Never attempt a PW snatch from a village or complex unless you have extraction aircraft available which guarantee immediate extraction. The reasons for this are many. First, the individual will soon be missed; second, village dogs will more likely give away your presence; third, if discovered, pursuit will be immediate and the locals know the surrounding terrain much better than you to include any nearby LZ’s; fourth, most villages of any importance will have security elements surrounding them and they will normally have established preventative measures to preclude such a snatch.

d. Other considerations:

1. Have at least two extraction LZ’s and two rally points selected and ensure that each man knows the azimuth and approximate distance to each before moving into position.

2. Select a good ambush site. Do not place an ambush at the spot where you first come up to a road or trail. This can only get you into trouble.

3. Always search at least 200 meters along a road or trail and on each flank of your ambush site. Look for major road or trail crossings, bunkers, complexes, outposts, and any other signs of the enemy which might prevent the successful execution of your mission.

4. Upon final selection of the actual snatch site, the team leader should trace a diagram, in the dirt, of the site and point out each team member’s position, pertinent terrain features, and ask for questions.

5. Prior to moving into the snatch position, be sure your RTO has notified your base station of your intentions.

6. Cache your rucksacks prior to moving into the ambush positions. Be sure that the carrying straps are in the “up” position for faster and easier recovery.

7. Double check all weapons and essential equipment prior to moving into your final position.

8. Try to attempt your PW capture within the first three to four days. The team members will still be in good physical condition, their morale and spirits will be up, thus giving you a much better chance for success.

4. Types of PW ambushes: Normally, there are four planned and two unplanned PW ambusher. Normally on a PW snatch mission the team leader will select one of the planned types after considering the variables of his own personnel and equipment, knowledge of the enemy, weather and terrain. The team will practice this type of ambush prior to departing on the mission. In addition they should rehearse their actions for the two types of unplanned PW ambushes. The planned and unplanned types are as follows:

a. Gas (Planned): The advantages and disadvantages of using CS Powder or gas are as follows:

1. Advantages:

a. Quickly incapacitates the individual, preventing him from using his weapon accurately.

b. Will prevent the use of dogs being used in the pursuit of the friendly element.

c. Enemy personnel will have to put on masks to enter the area, which will hamper their vision and therefore their effectiveness.

2. Disadvantages:

a. The team cannot hide the fact that they were there and that an incident took place.

b. The CS powder will cling to the PW’s and friendly clothing which may affect the efficiency of the extraction helicopter’s crew members if they do not have masks.

c. Team members cannot see clearly because of the necessity to wear masks.

d. The prospective PW will probably panic when exposed to the gas causing him to run and have to be chased down.

e. CS powder is normally dispersed by using explosives which will alert any nearby enemy elements of the team’s presence and location.

3. Other: When your team is set up for a gas ambush have all personnel place their gas masks on top of their heads. It will only take a couple of seconds to pull the masks over their faces just prior to initiating the ambush.

b. Claymore and Explosives (Planned): This is set up with C4 explosive placed between claymores. Personnel in the zone of the C4 will be stunned and/or incapacitated while the claymores will kill and wound the personnel in their zone.

1. Advantages:

a. As normally set up, with C4 spaced between the claymores, the explosion will incapacitate an individual but not kill him.

b. The team can hit a large element.

c. Will ensure that the enemy is stopped.

d. Will thoroughly disorganize and confuse the element hit, preventing them from reacting effectively.

2. Disadvantages.

a. The noise of the explosive going off will alert enemy forces of the team’s presence and location.

b. C4 takes a long time to emplace properly.

c. The disturbed soil and vegetation will mark the team’s location. This will aid the enemy in his attempts to pick up the team’s departure tail.

d. The additional weight of the demolitions may hamper swift movement.

e. The resulting smoke, rising above the trees and vegetation, could result in enemy mortar fire on the site, if any are located in the general area.

c. Silent Weapon (Planned): Use of a silenced or muffled rifle or pistol.

1. Advantages:

a. The noise from the weapon being discharged is minimal.

b. A well executed and placed round will stop an enemy and prevent his returning fire or using his weapon. Care should be taken to hit the intended PW’s right arm or shoulder. This should prevent him from returning fire, but will enable him to walk.

2. Disadvantages:

a. A wounded PW may die of shock or loss of blood before proper treatment can be given.

b. A wounded PW will have to be assisted and possibly carried, thus slowing down the team during it’s withdrawal from the site.

c. Care must be taken not to leave a blood trail.

d. A silenced weapon is not normally as reliable as an unsilenced one and in the case of a silenced pistol it would necessitate carrying another weapon, both of which must be available, within easy reach when springing the ambush.

d. No Fire/Silent Capture (Planned):

1. Advantages:

a. There is little noise to give the team’s presence or location away.

b. A live and healthy PW is the best kind.

2. Disadvantages: There are no significant disadvantages to a no fire/silent capture.

e. Chance Contacts (Unplanned): Both the friendly and enemy elements may see each other at the same time.

1. A team must always be prepared to take a PW during a chance contact, especially with a small enemy element.

2. If contact is made with a small local or regional force element, they will normally break and run. This is because they seldom carry more than three magazines each for an AK-47. Those who carry the SKS rifle/carbine may have extra rounds in one pouch, making it difficult to reload and of negligible influence upon the outcome of a firefight.

3. The team, after firing the initial rounds, should deploy into a defensive posture and look for enemy wounded. If one is located, don’t move directly up to him. You may be fired upon or set a grenade thrown at you, forcing you to kill him in self defense. Instead, throw a CS grenade at him. After a few moments in the CS most of the will to resist should be out of his mind and you will have a PW.

4. If there are between two to five enemy, attempt to deploy around them asking them to surrender. If, after a few minutes, you have not received desired results, it is better to break contact and move away before reinforcements arrive, remembering that you are in the enemy’s territory.

f. Hasty ambush (Unplanned): Where the friendly elements may observe the enemy before being seen and take up a hasty position to capture them.

1. There can be no set or prescribed way to set up for a hasty ambush. Each team leader should establish his own SOP.

2. A hasty ambush can result in a capture of a PW only if it is practiced and rehearsed to perfection.

5. Ambush positions and Executing the Ambush:

a. Positioning of Personnel: No attempt will be made here to tell you exactly how to emplace your personnel into ambush positions. Whether you have five or twelve team members it is possible to succeed if you have the desire and training. By constant practice and training, using live ammo and training aids, you will come up with the best disposition for your personnel to suit you, your plans, and your team. One of the best references you will have is your own and the teams experiences. Ask other team leaders of their attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, solicit their advice. The final decision is yours. A good point to remember, when selecting personnel for key positions, is that an indigenous team member firing his weapon normally keeps his finger depressed on the trigger until all the rounds are expended.

b. If you have an 8 to 12 man team give strong consideration to placing three men on each flank for security and early warning. They will psychologically feel more secure and will normally retain their position if one is wounded, thus better ensuring the successful accomplishment of the mission.

c. During a PW snatch, place the M-79 on the flank of the ambush.

d. Claymore should be set on each flank of a PW snatch if possible.

e. Be patient and wait for the right moment and opportunity when one or two individuals come along the road or trail. Without patience your mission will most likely fail.

f. Once you have committed yourself and sprung the ambush, you must be aggressive. By that I mean that you must immediately react. If you have wounded or otherwise halted your prospective PW, you must immediately move to physically secure him. Do not give him a chance to think or react. If you do not do this he will more than likely run or attempt to fire his weapon, forcing you to kill him.

g. If an attempted PW snatch fails, in that the individual dies, his body should be completely stripped and his belongings taken back to the S2. The body should then be taken a great distance away and hidden, if at all possible. When the individual turns up missing, the enemy may assume that he has been captured and has talked. This will necessitate the enemy changing his plans and moving his headquarters; when he could have been doing something else.

Movement Technique Tips

1. Movement Technique: There are five basic techniques of movement that can be employed by small recon teams to avoid being detected or encircled by enemy forces. Each of these are explained and discussed below:

2. The Box Technique: This is a simple and effective method to use and takes very little practice to employ. From a given point the team moves out on a set azimuth for a specific set number of meters or paces, for example let’s say 35 meters. The team then makes a 90 degree turn and moves 75 meters, then another 90 degree turns for 30 meters, another 90 degrees turn for 30 meters, another for 30 meters. You will have formed a “box”. At this point you can do any one of several things. You can wait in ambush for your trackers, or pursuers, walk backwards across your old trail, if the vegetation and soil is such that it is impossible to hide your tracks, or continue on. When you move out, after having formed your first “box”, move for another 50 to 75 meters and form another box. By forming these boxes, it will enable you to ambush your pursuers and will definitely confuse any trackers as to your direction of movement. It will also discourage the enemy if you occasionally booby-trap your back trail. You can maintain a general heading that you desire to go without the enemy force becoming aware of it until you are out of the danger area or until he loses you completely. A word of caution though, and that is not to continually make your boxes the same size or to continually turn to the right or left. Never set a definite pattern of movement. The Figure Eight Technique: The figure eight method is very similar to the box technique in that you are doing basically the same thing except here you will be making circles instead of squares. Angle Technique: Another effective method to use in evasion and takes very little practice to employ. The patrol will change the direction of movement from the present patrol route of march in a series of angle movements. For example the team will make on angle move to change direction such as 30 degrees, 45 degrees, 70 degrees for a hundred or so meters, and then do it again to confuse the enemy. Step Technique: The simple method of changing the route of march in 90 degree turns for a distance of a hundred or so meters.

3. Skip Method: An effective method that requires practice to employ. The patrol will stop in place and on command will move left or right of present route. Each member will move as carefully as possible not to make a trail or leave tell tale signs to the flank for a distance of 20-30 meters and then resume the patrol’s former route of march. The team leader should send the point man ahead to make a false trail for 30 to 50 meters before using the skip method. This method takes practice and team members have to be careful not to leave signs as they move. Additional Information:

a. Never set a pattern if one technique does not work, change to another.

b. In both the box and figure eight techniques the size of the squares or circles will depend on the terrain and vegetation. The box technique is extremely effective at night. Both methods can be used to find a hole or weak point in the enemies encircling perimeter from which to break out. Both techniques have been used successfully in the past by recon teams. One survivor, of an ambushed recon team, succeeded for three days, in ambushing and killing six enemy pursuers by employing the figure eight method before being spotted and recovered by searching aircraft.

c. During the dry season CS powder spread over your back trail is extremely helpful in stopping dogs.

d. During the rainy season CS powder is almost useless or very ineffective against dogs. It is much more effective to drop a CS grenade during wet weather since it will hang low to the ground and remain effective against enemy personnel, especially those that do not have or carry protective masks.

e. In closing I might remind you that your tactics and techniques are only as good or effective as you make them. This can only be done through constant practice, training and rehearsals.

Infiltration/Exfiltration Tips

1. When loading the aircraft for infiltration, insure the team is seated so that they can exit the proper door.

2. Lead the team in reverse team order with the tail gunner being the first one in the aircraft.

3. The senior advisor position inside the aircraft is between the pilot and co-pilot’s seats. The remainder of the team sits against the firewall of the A/C.

4. Sudden shifts of weight in flight will cause temporary loss of aircraft control.

5. The team leader and pilot will determine direction of approach to the infill LZ for loading of team.

6. The team leader will follow the flight with his map from their FOB to his infill LZ.

7. Team members will unload one at a time to enable the pilot to stabilize his A/C.

8. On a ladder LZ the team leader ensures the ladder is down. Note: If A/C is more than 6-8 foot off ground use ladder to avoid injury to team members.

9. If the point man exits the A/C under fire, the entire team will exit the A/C.

10. If the A/C is shot down the team leader is in command on the ground. He will do the following:

a. Account for his team and A/C crew.

b. Secure an area 40-50 meters in front of the A/C.

c. Care for the wounded/dead.

d. With the pilot return to the A/C to ensure the radios are zeroed of frequency, gas is off, destroy the battery, remove maps, SOI, notebooks of the pilots, and M60s and ammo.

e. Call for pick up A/C.

f. Evac A/C crew and wounded/dead on first recovery A/C.

g. Rest of his team on the last recovery A/C.

11. Inform your personnel in what order they will be extracted prior to the arrival of the extraction A/C. The LZ should be secured prior to the arrival of the A/C.

12. Team leader should give pilot a track to fly, and describe his LZ.

13. Team members should approach the exfill A/C from the front. Note; Doing this the door gunner can support the team easier.

14. Team could use both doors if exfill LZ is a sit-down but should notify pilot first.

15. The team leader is the last to enter aircraft and will give the pilot an UP.

16. In selection of LZs avoid likely LZs or large LZ.

Table of Contents

Title Page

Copyright Page

About the Book

Chapter I: Origin of a Mission

Chapter II: The Situation

Chapter III: Leaping Lena

Chapter IV: Revitalization; Continue the Mission

Chapter V: Vung Ro Bay; Changing the Tides of War

Chapter VI: 1965; Ramping Up

Chapter VII: 1966; Counter Offensive

Chapter VIII: Regroup and Recovery

Chapter IX: Counterinsurgency

Chapter X: 1966; Disaster at Khe Sanh

Chapter XI: 1967; Back to the An Lao Valley

Chapter XII: Back to the Ashau

Chapter XIII: Major Bruiser Allen, Break Contact, Continue Mission

Chapter XIV: 1968; Tet

Chapter XV: Tet Counteroffensive

Chapter XVI: The Beginning of the End

Chapter XVII: The Ashau, Again

Chapter XVIII: The Last Hurrah

Appendix I: Unit Citations

Appendix II: Acronyms and Abbreviations

Appendix III: Debriefing, Ranger Operations 1966

Appendix IV: Battle of Hue

Appendix V: Tips of the Trade