The War of 1812

The War of 1812

A Forgotten Conflict

Bicentennial Edition

DONALD R. HICKEY

University of Illinois Press

URBANA, CHICAGO, AND SPRINGFIELD

© 2012 by the Board of Trustees

of the University of Illinois

All rights reserved

Manufactured in the United States of America

P 5 4 3 2 1

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Frontispiece: Engraving by Alonzo Chappel depicting

the battle between the Constitution and the Guerrière.

Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The War of 1812 : a forgotten conflict / Donald R. Hickey.—Bicentennial ed.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-252-07837-8 (pbk. : acid-free paper)

1. United States—History—War of 1812. I. Title.

E354.H53       2012

973.5'2—dc23       2011037322

For my late mother and father,

who always encouraged the pursuit of knowledge,

and for my wife, Connie Clark,

who many years ago encouraged me to write this book

Contents

List of Illustrations

Preface to the First Edition

Preface to the Bicentennial Edition

Introduction

1. The Road to War, 1801–1812

2. The Declaration of War

3. The Baltimore Riots

4. The Campaign of 1812

5. Raising Men and Money

6. The Campaign of 1813

7. The Last Embargo

8. The British Counteroffensive

9. The Crisis of 1814

10. The Hartford Convention

11. The Treaty of Ghent

Conclusion

A Note on Sources

Notes

Index

Illustrations

Figures

Embargo

Tenskwatawa (the Prophet)

Tecumseh

Battle of Tippecanoe

Henry Clay

James Madison

James Monroe

Proclamation of war

Alexander Contee Hanson

Henry Lee

John Stricker

John Randolph

George Prevost

Isaac Brock

John Norton

Constitution v. Guerrière

De Witt Clinton

Josiah Quincy

British license

Oliver H. Perry

Battle of the Thames

George Cockburn

Death of James Lawrence

John C. Calhoun

The prison ship Saratoga

Winfield Scott

Battle of Lundy’s Lane

Defense of Fort Erie

Dolley Madison

Francis Scott Key’s “Defence of Ft. M’Henry”

Battle of New Orleans

Attack on General Armstrong

Execution of deserter

Alexander J. Dallas

Remains of White House

Remains of Capitol Building

Octagon House

Timothy Pickering

Harrison Gray Otis

Hartford Convention

John Quincy Adams

Lord Liverpool

Treaty of Ghent

John Naudee

Andrew Jackson

Dartmoor survivors

Peace

Charts

U.S. Trade

U.S. Public Finance

Maps

The War in the North

The War at Sea

The War in the Southwest and on the Gulf Coast

The War on the Atlantic Coast

The War in the Chesapeake

The Voice of America

Hark! the peal for war is rung;

Hark! the song for battle’s sung;

Firm be ev’ry bosom strung,

And ev’ry soldier ready.

On to Quebec’s embattled halls!

Who will pause, when glory calls?

Charge, soldiers, charge, its lofty walls.

And storm its strong artillery.

Firm as our native hills, we’ll stand,

And should the lords of Europe land,

We’ll meet them on the farthest strand,

We’ll conquer or we’ll die!

—A Citizen of Monmouth, NJ (June, 1812)

On the Conflagrations at Washington

A veteran host, by veterans led,

With Ross and Cockburn at their head—

They came—they saw—they burnt—and fled.

They left our congress naked walls—

Farewell to towers and capitols!

To lofty roofs and splendid halls!

To courtly domes and glittering things,

To folly, that too near us clings,

To courtiers who—tis wel—had wings.

Farewell to all but glorious war,

Which yet shall guard Potomac’s shore,

And honor lost, and fame restore.

—Philip Freneau (August, 1814)

Preface to the First Edition

I first became interested in the War of 1812 in the late 1960s as a graduate student at the University of Illinois. Although the literature on the war was extensive, most studies focused on the military and naval history. The only works that explored domestic developments in any detail were those produced by the great nineteenth-century masters: Richard Hildreth, John Bach McMaster, and especially Henry Adams. I was particularly interested in Federalist opposition to the war, a subject that had never been treated in any systematic way. I explored this topic in my dissertation, “The Federalists and the War of 1812,” which was completed in 1972. In the course of my research, I found that I had to study the Republicans and their policies in order to understand what the Federalists were reacting to. As a result, by the time I finished my dissertation, I had learned almost as much about the Republicans as the Federalists.

In the years that followed, I continued to study the war, and I published some of my findings in articles. Other scholars were working on the war, too, but most of the work continued to focus on a narrow range of topics, particularly the military and naval engagements. What we needed, it seemed to me, was a broader treatment of the war—one that dealt with politics, diplomacy, economics, and finance as well as battles and campaigns. We needed a study, in other words, that more fully explored Republican policies and their impact on the nation. Such was the genesis of this book.

It is my hope that this book will serve two ends. As a short, comprehensive study, I hope it will be suitable for students and others interested in a general overview of the war. And as a study that reexamines the sources and contains new material, I hope it will appeal to specialists as well. In short, this work is designed to be both a textbook and a monograph and to appeal to generalists and specialists alike.

In the course of writing this book, I have incurred numerous obligations. Robert McColley (my mentor at the University of Illinois) and Morton Borden (my inspiration at the University of California at Santa Barbara) both urged me to undertake this project and made helpful suggestions along the way. Others who read the manuscript and gave me the benefit of their expertise were Edward Skeen, Clifford Egan, J. C. A. Stagg, James Broussard, and Lowell Blaisdell. I am also indebted to Vance Burke, who shared materials from his extensive personal library, and to the History Department at the University of Connecticut at Storrs, which invited me to take part in a remarkably stimulating seminar in the summer of 1987. I profited greatly from the Classic Texts Seminar, and while living in Storrs I was able to do considerable work on this project.

Wayne State College facilitated my research with three hours of release time from my teaching chores in the spring of 1986 and again in the spring of 1988. The college gave me annual grants to defray some of my research costs, and the Social Science Division provided travel money on two occasions. I am also indebted to the Wayne State Foundation for a Faculty Renewal Grant that facilitated my research in the summer of 1987.

I want to thank the library staff at Wayne State College, particularly Gail Egbers, Jan Brumm, and two generations of interlibrary loan librarians—Mary Jo Gross and Peggy Brown—who proved remarkably adept at locating and borrowing materials for me. For the extensive assistance they afforded me, I owe a special debt to the library staffs at the University of Illinois at Urbana, the University of Colorado at Boulder, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and the University of Nebraska at Lincoln. For supplying me with materials, I am also indebted to the Kansas City Branch of the National Archives, the University of South Carolina Library, the William L. Clements Library at the University of Michigan, and the New York Public Library.

In my travels around the country, I used resources at a number of other libraries and manuscript depositories. I’d like to thank the staffs at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, Texas Tech University, the University of California at San Diego, the University of California at Berkeley, California State University at Fullerton, the University of Arizona, Arizona State University, Harvard University, Yale University, Brown University, the University of Connecticut at Storrs, the University of Virginia, the University of North Carolina, Duke University, the Library of Congress, the Massachusetts Historical Society, the American Antiquarian Society, the Essex Institute, the Connecticut Historical Society, the Maine Historical Society, the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, the Maryland Historical Society, the Chicago Historical Society, and the Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery.

For permission to quote from articles I’ve published, I am indebted to the editors of the Journal of American History, William and Mary Quarterly, Journal of American Studies, New England Quarterly, Military Affairs, Indiana Magazine of History, and Maryland Historian. Finally, I want to thank my wife, Connie Clark, for urging me to write this book and for giving me the freedom to do it.

Preface to the Bicentennial Edition

When I undertook a senior honors thesis in the 1960s on New England’s opposition to the War of 1812, I never imagined that I would make a career out of this conflict. I completed a PhD dissertation on Federalist opposition to the war in 1972 and launched a series of articles in the hope of landing a college or university teaching job in what was a difficult job market. I held a series of temporary positions until 1978, when I landed a permanent post at Wayne State College in Nebraska. Except for a couple of visiting assignments, this has been my home ever since. By the mid-1980s, I had finished the string of articles I wanted to write and, at the suggestion of my wife, undertook this book.

I had no great expectations for the book. I merely hoped that it would sell enough copies to justify a paperback edition, and that the paperback would sell a few more copies before going out of print. Much to my surprise, the book did far better than I had ever imagined. There were book club editions, an audio edition, a paperback edition, and, in time, even a collector’s leather-bound edition. Now, some twenty years later, the paperback is still in print.

What accounts for the book’s longevity? Three things, I think. First, I did not write this book until I had spent close to fifteen years learning my craft. Any book written much earlier, especially when I was fresh out of graduate school, would have been eminently forgettable. Secondly, I wrote for a broad audience. My aim was not to impress my colleagues with my erudition but to reach as many people as possible with my story. Hence, I tried to keep the writing simple and to craft a narrative that anyone could follow. Finally, I did not limit myself to the military history of the war. Rather, I included the domestic and diplomatic history. This gave the book a breadth lacking in most histories of the war, which usually focus on the battles and campaigns.

My book seems to have served the public well over the years, but it is now time for a revised edition. My aim is not simply to capitalize on the bicentennial of the war, although that makes a new edition especially timely. Rather, I wanted to correct the errors, add new material, and reshape some of the existing material. Although this edition is roughly 5 percent longer than the original edition, I have not dropped anything of material importance that appeared in the first edition. Thus, the new edition supersedes the old one.

Although I have made some changes in every chapter, the bulk have come in the three that deal with military history: chapter 4: The Campaign of 1812, chapter 6: The Campaign of 1813, and chapter 8: The British Counteroffensive. These chapters have been rewritten. I also added a fair amount of new material to the Conclusion. Although I have incorporated additional British/Canadian and Indian material, this edition, like the first, focuses mainly on the American side of the story. Readers interested in the other side should consult the works recommended in “A Note on Sources.” I have completely rewritten that note to reflect the flood of material that has appeared since the publication of the first edition of this book. To better guide readers through the new edition, I have inserted subheadings. I have also added two charts and replaced the original illustrations (which were portraits) with new ones that depict a broader range of people and events from the war. The maps were redrawn to reflect the new place-names that appear in this edition.

The University of Illinois Press did a good job producing the first edition of the book, and it has done an equally good job supporting the book over the years. I am indebted to Dick Wentworth, the director of the press in the 1980s, for agreeing to publish a book that was much longer than the one I had promised, and I am equally indebted to the current director, Bill Regier, for agreeing to publish a new edition despite the financial constraints that all publishers face today. I would also like to thank my copyeditors: Cynthia Mitchell, who worked on the first edition, and Kathryn Roberts Morrow, who labored over this one. I am also obligated to Paul Arroyo and Jennifer Reichlin for all their fine work to make the original manuscript accessible with modern word processing software, and to Tad Ringo for help along the way. I owe a special debt to Tracy Ellen Smith for preparing the new maps and to Dan Morrow for creating the charts.

If the first edition of this book was the fruit of twenty years of scholarly labor, this edition is the culmination of another twenty years, and a number of people have helped me along the way. Two Canadians, Donald E. Graves and the late Robert Malcomson, have been generous in answering my questions and sharing their research. I have learned a great deal from them about the military and naval history of the war and the British and Canadian perspective. Two other Canadians, Carl Benn and Faye Kert, have also been generous in sharing their research, particularly on the role of Indians and privateers in the war. For pointing out errors and suggesting improvements when the first edition came out, I am indebted to Lawrence E. Babits, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Blake, Forrest Daniel, Patrick Lipscomb III, Ian Pemberton, Thomas H. Reed, Major Eric Stanhagen, Donald K. Steiner, and Neil York. For helping me prepare the new edition by supplying information, suggesting sources, or aiding in other ways, I am indebted to Douglas M. Arnold, James M. Banner, Jr., Charles Berthold, Scott Butler, Bill Dudley, Paul Gilje, Andrew Lambert, Georg Mauerhoff, Dustin Meeker, Seth Rockman, and Matthew Warshauer. I owe a special debt to the staff at the U.S. Conn Library at Wayne State College, and particularly to Terri Headley, who has been remarkably adept at borrowing materials from other libraries. I also want to thank Jeryl Nelson for helping me figure out the effective interest rates on the U.S. war loans and Edmund Elfers and Lynn Bowder for working their magic on the illustrations so that they were suitable for publication. Finally, I want to thank my wife, Connie D. Clark, for thirty years of unfailing support and excellent advice.

The War of 1812

Introduction

The War of 1812 is probably our most obscure war. Although a great deal has been written about the conflict, the average American is only vaguely aware of why we fought or who the enemy was. Even those who know something about the contest are likely to remember only a few dramatic moments, such as the Battle of New Orleans, the burning of the nation’s capital, or the writing of “The Star-Spangled Banner.”

Why is this war so obscure? One reason is that no great president is associated with the conflict. Although his enemies called it “Mr. Madison’s War,” James Madison hardly measures up to such war leaders as Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, or Franklin Roosevelt. Moreover, the best American generals in this war—Andrew Jackson, Jacob Brown, and Winfield Scott—were unable to turn the tide because each was confined to a secondary theater of operations. No one like George Washington, Ulysses Grant, or Dwight Eisenhower emerged to put his stamp on the war and to carry the nation to victory.

Another reason for the obscurity of this war is that its causes are complex and still subject to debate. Some scholars have argued for the primacy of maritime causes, claiming that the United States went to war to force the British to give up the Orders-in-Council, which restricted American trade with the European Continent, and impressment, which was the Royal Navy’s practice of removing seamen from American merchant vessels. In contemporary parlance, the war was fought for “Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights.” Other writers have emphasized western aims—the desire to conquer Canada to secure additional farm land or to put an end to British influence over Indians in the Old Northwest. Still others have focused on political causes, asserting that the Republicans embraced war as a means of forging party unity, maintaining power, and silencing the Federalists. Yet another group has stressed ideological factors—the desire to uphold the prestige of the republic, preserve national honor, and ensure the continued vitality of republican institutions. The decision for war, in other words, has been attributed to a wide variety of motives.[1]

If the causes of the war are subject to debate, so too are the consequences. The United States has won most of its wars, often emerging with significant concessions from the enemy. But the War of 1812 was different. Far from bringing the enemy to terms, the nation was lucky to escape without making extensive concessions itself. The Treaty of Ghent (which ended the conflict) said nothing about the issues that had caused the war and contained nothing to suggest that America had achieved its war aims. Instead, it merely provided for returning to the status quo ante bellum—the state that had existed before the war.

The prosecution of the war was marred by considerable bungling and mismanagement. This was partly due to the nature of the republic. The nation was too young and immature—and its government too feeble and inexperienced—to prosecute a major war efficiently. Politics also played a part. Federalists vigorously opposed the conflict, and so too did some Republicans. Even those who supported the war feuded among themselves and never displayed the sort of patriotic enthusiasm that has been so evident in other American wars. The advocates of war appeared to support the conflict more with their heads than their hearts, and more with their hearts than their purses. As a result, efforts to raise men and money lagged consistently behind need.

Despite the bungling and halfhearted support that characterized this conflict, the War of 1812 was not without its stirring moments and splendid victories. American success at the Thames in the Northwest, the victories at Chippawa and Fort Erie on the Niagara front, the rousing defense of Baltimore in the Chesapeake, and the crushing defeat of the British at New Orleans—all these showed that with proper leadership and training American fighting men could hold their own against the well-drilled and battle-hardened regulars of Great Britain. Similarly, the naval victories on the northern lakes and the high seas and the success of privateers around the globe demonstrated that, given the right circumstances, the nation’s armed ships matched up well against even the vaunted and seemingly invincible Royal Navy.

The war also produced its share of heroes—people whose reputations were enhanced by military or government service. The war helped catapult four men into the presidency—Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, James Monroe, and William Henry Harrison—and gave a significant boost to the political or military careers of many others, most notably Henry Clay, Jacob Brown, and Winfield Scott. Indeed, for many young men on the make, the war offered an excellent launching pad for a career.

In some ways, the War of 1812 looked more to the past than to the future. As America’s second and last war against Great Britain, it echoed the ideology and issues of the American Revolution. It was the second and last time that America was the underdog in a war and the second and last time that the nation tried to conquer Canada. It was also the last time that Indians played a major role in determining the future of the continent. In this sense, the War of 1812 was the last of the North American colonial wars. The war was unique in generating such vehement political opposition and nearly unique in ending in a stalemate on the battlefield. Although most Americans pretended they had won the war—even calling it a “Second War of Independence”—they could point to few concrete gains to sustain this claim. In fact, none of the maritime issues that had played such a key role in propelling the young republic into war were even mentioned in the peace treaty.

It is this lack of success that may best explain why the war is so little remembered. Americans have characteristically judged their wars on the basis of their success. The best-known wars—the Revolution, the Civil War, and World War II—were all great successes. Although many people remembered the War of 1812 as a success, in a very real sense it was a failure, and perhaps this is why it attracts so little attention today.

The obscurity of this war, however, should not blind us to its significance, for it was an important turning point, a great watershed, in the history of the young republic. It concluded almost a quarter of a century of troubled diplomacy and partisan politics and ushered in the Era of Good Feelings. It marked the end of the Federalist party but the vindication of Federalist policies, many of which were adopted by Republicans during or after the war. The war also broke the power of American Indians and reinforced the powerful undercurrent of anglophobia that had been spawned by the Revolution a generation before. In addition, it promoted national self-confidence and encouraged the heady expansionism that lay at the heart of American foreign policy for the rest of the century. Finally, the war gave the fledgling republic a host of sayings, symbols, and songs that helped Americans define who they were and where the young republic was headed. Although looking to the past, the war was fraught with consequences for the future, and for this reason it is worth studying today.

Special Notes

Troop terminology. There were four classes of American troops in the war: U.S. Regulars (who enlisted in the regular army for one to five years or for the duration of the war), U.S. Volunteers (who enlisted for one year in special units, mainly at the beginning of the war), militia (who were called into service for up to six months), and volunteer militia, also known simply as volunteers (who enlisted for up to a year, typically to take part in a campaign). There were also four classes of British troops: British regulars (who were long-term professional soldiers), fencible troops (who were locally raised soldiers that were trained and treated like regulars but could not serve beyond North America), provincial troops (who were local soldiers that were raised and paid by the provincial governments but were treated in some ways like regulars), and militia (who were generally called into service to help repel an invasion).

Troop figures. Most troop figures in this study have been rounded. The figures given in contemporary documents are often unreliable because record keeping was sloppy and field commanders had an interest in magnifying their victories and minimizing their defeats. Even with the muster rolls and other contemporary records before them, scholars sometimes find it difficult to determine exactly how many troops were engaged in a battle because some units were invariably detached to protect supplies, garrison temporary posts, guard prisoners, or perform other collateral duties. Casualty figures also vary, and those listed as killed or missing in action sometimes turned up after the fog of war had lifted.

Naval armaments. Warships in the Age of Sail were rated to carry a certain number of guns (cannons), but the actual number they carried was up to the captain, and there was a tendency, especially on American ships, to cram as many aboard as possible. For warships as well as for privateers, I have given the number of guns in parenthesis. Thus, the U.S. Frigate Constitution (56 guns) and the American privateer General Armstrong (14 guns). Readers should bear in mind that some of these figures are an educated guess and that the size of the guns carried made a huge difference in any ship’s firepower. Heavy frigates carrying 24-pounder guns had a third more firepower than light frigates carrying 18-pounders. This was a significant difference.

Rate of exchange. Throughout the Age of Jefferson, the U.S. government used an exchange rate of £1 = $4.44. But this figure, known as the nominal par, was only used for certain purposes, such as computing the tariff on goods imported from Great Britain or settling accounts and satisfying claims that were kept in pounds sterling.[2] The actual rate of exchange on the open market varied considerably. The rate averaged $3.62 in 1812; $3.75 in 1813; $4.24 in 1814; and $4.90 in 1815. Whenever I thought it might be useful, I have used these figures to present contemporary costs in both currencies. For the war as a whole, I have averaged the rate for 1812, 1813, and 1814, which works out to £1 = $3.87. For the entire period 1793–1815, the average is £1 = $4.37.[3]

Place names. For the sake of convenience, Canada refers to Great Britain’s North American provinces even though they were not formally joined in a confederation until 1867. The terms United States and America have been used interchangeably, as have Great Britain and Britain, Old Northwest and Northwest, and Old Southwest and Southwest. When U.S. and Canadian spelling of place names differs, I have followed the practice at the location. Thus, the Battle of Chippawa (instead of Chippewa).

Chapter 1

The Road to War, 1801–1812

On March 4, 1801, Thomas Jefferson walked from his boardinghouse in Washington City, as the nation’s capital was then called, to the Capitol building, where he was inaugurated as third president of the United States. The walk was short but symbolic. Jefferson pointedly refused to take a carriage, a vehicle he considered a badge of aristocracy.[1] The nation’s new leaders favored a more democratic style than their Federalist predecessors. They also planned to adopt a new set of policies. It was these policies—initiated by Jefferson and carried on by Madison—that put the United States on a collision course with Great Britain and ultimately led to the War of 1812.

Republicans did not differ with Federalists over the broad objectives of American policy in this era. During the long series of Anglo-French wars that lasted from 1793 to 1815, all Americans agreed that the nation should work to promote prosperity at home while protecting its rights and preserving its neutrality abroad. But what was the best way to achieve these ends? It was this question, more than any other, that divided Americans into two political camps.[2]

Federalist Policy: Preserving Peace, Preparing for War

Federalists believed in the old Roman doctrine, proclaimed and popularized by Washington, that the best way to preserve peace was to be prepared for war.[3] “War is a great calamity,” said Federalist Congressman Benjamin Tallmadge, “and the surest way to avoid it, is to be prepared for it.” “Even in time of profound peace,” echoed the Boston Weekly Messenger, “it has been considered a maxim of wisdom to be prepared for war.”[4] Toward this end, Federalists implemented a broad program of financial and military preparedness in the 1790s. Their aim was not only to deter war but to put the nation in the best possible position to defend itself if hostilities erupted.

The Federalists’ policy of financial preparedness was based on Alexander Hamilton’s program, which was adopted in the early 1790s. This program provided for the federal government to assume responsibility for more than $75 million of indebtedness incurred by the state and Continental governments during the Revolutionary War. It also provided for the imposition of internal and external taxes and the creation of a national bank. Together these measures initiated a financial revolution that restored public credit, created millions of dollars of investment capital, and established a stable and uniform national currency.[5]

To complement their financial policies, the Federalists also expanded the defense establishment.[6] The peacetime army was gradually increased from 840 men in 1789 to 5,400 in 1801. The navy, which had been scrapped after the Revolution, was rebuilt so that by 1801 there were 13 frigates in service and 6 ships-of-the-line under construction. The Federalists also began a modest system of coastal fortifications, devoting $1 million to the construction and repair of forts to protect American cities from assault via the sea.[7]

Jay’s Treaty (1794)

While promoting preparedness at home, the Federalists pursued a pro-British foreign policy abroad. The sheet anchor of this policy was the Jay Treaty, an Anglo-American agreement forged in 1794 that regulated commerce and defined neutral rights in time of war.[8] Although the Republicans were always critical of this treaty—one paper called it the “death-warrant to our neutral rights”—there is no denying that it achieved two important ends.[9] It ensured peace with the one nation whose naval power could menace the United States, and it ushered in an era of Anglo-American accord that allowed American commerce—and hence the American economy—to flourish. American exports, which stood at $33 million in 1794, soared to $94 million in 1801, and the entire nation basked in the resulting prosperity.[10]

The only liability of the Jay Treaty was that it was deeply resented by the French, who regarded it as a betrayal of the alliance that had bound them to the United States since the Revolution. France responded to the treaty by severing diplomatic relations and unleashing her warships and privateers on American commerce. Between 1795 and 1799, the French seized upwards of $20 million in American mercantile property, mainly in the Caribbean.[11] These losses were significant and cast a pall over all trade with the West Indies. “The risque is so great,” said a North Carolina Republican in 1797, “that to send a Vessel to the West Indies . . . seems like giving the property away.”[12]

The Quasi-War with France (1798–1801)

The French depredations led to the Quasi-War, an undeclared naval war that lasted from 1798 to 1801.[13] This contest provided the first real test for the Federalist navy, a test that it passed with flying colors. Cruising mainly in the Caribbean, the navy defeated or destroyed three French warships (while losing only one of its own), captured 82 privateers, and recovered 70 American merchant vessels.[14] No less important was the performance of American merchant vessels, which were authorized to arm for defense. Besides capturing six privateers and recapturing eight prizes, armed merchantmen forced many small French privateers, which invariably were more interested in booty than battle, to shear off rather than risk a fight.[15]

As a result of the successful defense of American commerce, rates for shipping insurance dropped sharply all along the Atlantic coast. Rates which had peaked at 25–30 percent in the spring of 1798 fell to 10 percent by the end of 1799.[16] In the Convention of 1800, which brought this war to an end when it was ratified the following year, the United States waived any claim for compensation for the depredations that had occurred since 1795. In return, France agreed to suspend the treaties that had bound the nations together since the Revolution.[17]

By the end of the Quasi-War, the Federalists had been in power for more than a decade, and their policies had served the nation well. Their program of preparedness was in place, and the nation was at peace with France and on especially good terms with Britain. Best of all, because of the mounting profits from neutral trade, Americans were enjoying an unprecedented level of prosperity.

In spite of the success of their policies, the Federalists suffered from several liabilities that doomed them at the polls. The additional taxes necessitated by the Quasi-War and the attempt to target immigrants and suppress opposition with the alien and sedition laws alienated many voters. In addition, the Federalists’ approach to politics was too elitist for this era of rising democracy, and their foreign policy too pro-British for a people whose revolutionary experience had left them steeped in anglophobia. As a result, the Federalists were defeated in the election of 1800.

When the Republicans took office in 1801, they began to reverse the policies they had inherited. They had no love for the Jay Treaty and no desire to maintain such a cozy relationship with Great Britain—at least not on the terms laid down in that treaty. Moreover, they were committed by their ideology as well as by their campaign promises to reforming public finance and reducing government expenditures. “We shall push you to the uttermost in economising,” Jefferson told a Congressional leader in 1801.[18]

The Republican Ascendancy

Determined to overhaul the nation’s finances, the Republicans took direct aim on Hamilton’s program. They regarded the national debt as a curse—a source of unearned profit for the rich and a heavy burden on current and future taxpayers. Hence, they devoted a large share of the government’s annual income to paying down the debt. They were equally hostile to the internal taxes, which they considered an excessive burden on their constituents, particularly in the West. Hence these duties were swept away in 1802. The Republicans had no love for the national bank either. Most considered it an engine of aristocracy of doubtful legality that was vulnerable to British control (even though foreign stockholders had to be in the country to vote for the bank’s directors). The bank was protected by a twenty-year charter, but this charter was not renewed when it expired in 1811.[19]

The Republicans were also determined to cut defense spending. As a matter of principle, they were opposed to a large defense establishment, believing that it increased the likelihood of war and fostered special interest groups that posed a danger to republican government. They considered a cut in spending essential anyway because the internal taxes had been repealed at a time when large sums were being devoted to debt retirement.[20]

Accordingly, the peacetime army was trimmed from 5,400 to 3,300 men in 1802.[21] Many good officers were lost in the process.[22] Although the authorized level of the army was increased to almost 10,000 men during a war scare in 1808, Republican leaders used the expanded officer corps to reward the party faithful.[23] Winfield Scott, who served with these officers in the War of 1812, claimed that most were “imbeciles and ignoramuses.” Those from Federalist states, he said, were mainly “coarse and ignorant men,” while those from Republican states were “swaggerers, dependants, decayed gentlemen, and others—‘fit for nothing else.’”[24] By 1810 incompetence in the officer corps had so demoralized the army that Republican Nathaniel Macon suggested that it might as well be disbanded. The men hated their officers so much that they could not be counted on to obey them in time of war. “The state of that Army,” concluded Macon, “is enough to make any man who has the smallest love of country wish to get rid of it.”[25]

The Republicans were even more hostile to the navy. “Every nation,” said one Republican, “which has embarked to any extent, in Naval Establishments, has been eventually crushed by them.” “Show me a nation possessed of a large navy,” said another, “and I will show you a nation always at war.”[26] The Republicans never resumed construction on the ships-of-the-line (which had been halted at the end of the Quasi-War), and they took most of the frigates out of service. Six of the frigates were subsequently lost to rot or other causes so that by 1812 only seven survived. The only concession that Republicans made to naval defense was the construction or purchase of six sloops needed for service in the Tripolitan War (1801–1805).[27]

The Republicans did spend money on coastal fortifications—about $2.8 million between 1801 and 1812.[28] This was almost three times what the Federalists had spent in the previous decade, but without a fleet to serve as the nation’s first line of defense, this sum was wholly inadequate. Most of the nation’s great cities remained exposed to attack from the sea.

Militia, Privateers, and Jefferson’s “Mosquito Fleet”

The Republicans were willing to cut the nation’s regular forces because they planned to rely on militia and privateers (sometimes called “the militia of the sea”). These forces were attractive because they were democratic in character and posed no threat to republican institutions. They were also cheap. Militia did not have to be paid until they were called into service, and privateers actually brought in revenue because their prizes were taxed. But most militia were so poorly trained that they could not be relied on in the heat of battle. There were drawbacks to privateers, too. Although capable of wreaking havoc on an enemy’s commerce, they were hardly a match for enemy warships and could offer little protection to the nation’s coast or commerce.[29]

The Republicans favored another instrument of war that was also of doubtful value. These were the gunboats that made up Jefferson’s “mosquito fleet.” Gunboats were small and inexpensive vessels—“oyster boats,” one critic called them—that had proved effective in several wars in the Mediterranean, where they could maneuver in waters too shallow for heavier ships.[30] Though serviceable in calm seas, they were too light to be effective in rough waters. Moreover, most of the gunboats built in the United States drew so much water that they were difficult to maneuver and could not venture into shallow waters. Time would prove that gun for gun the American gunboats were more expensive to build and operate than frigates, and they rotted in a year if left unrepaired. Although 174 of the boats were built at a cost of $1.5 million, by 1809 the administration had lost faith in the program, and most of the vessels were taken out of service.[31]

The Rule of 1756 and Re-Export Trade

The Republican policy of retrenchment was popular with most voters, and initially at least it did little harm. Great Britain and France concluded the Peace of Amiens in late 1801 and remained at peace until 1803. Although most observers recognized that this was little more than a truce, it nonetheless reduced friction between the United States and the Great Powers and thus gave further impetus to the drive to pare defense expenditures.

The Peace of Amiens also eliminated neutral commercial opportunities. American exports plummeted from $94 million in 1801 to $54 million in 1803. When the Anglo-French war resumed, however, exports began to climb again, peaking at $108 million in 1807.[32] Such was Great Britain’s restraint in the face of this growing trade that in 1804 James Monroe, the American minister in London, could report: “The truth is that our commerce never enjoyed in any war, as much freedom, and indeed favor from this govt. as it now does.”[33]

Little more than a year after delivering this judgment, Monroe accused the British of adopting a plan “to subject our commerce at present and hereafter to every restraint in their power.”[34] What had happened in the interval? British officials, jealous of American commercial success and suspecting fraud in the neutral trade, had stepped up enforcement of a British maritime doctrine known as the Rule of 1756.

The Rule of 1756 held that trade closed to a neutral in time of peace could not be opened in time of war. The rule was supposed to prevent American merchants from freighting goods between France and her West Indian colonies when French ships could not get to sea. But American ships circumvented the rule by making a stopover in the United States, thus transforming a direct trade between France and her colonies into a triangular trade. At first tacitly, and then officially in the Polly decision (1800), the British held that this re-export trade did not violate their doctrine. As a result, the United States captured most of the trade between Europe and the Caribbean, and re-exports (which constituted about half of America’s export trade) soared from $2 million in 1792 to $53 million in 1805.[35]

There was a good deal of grumbling in Britain over this mushrooming trade. Having driven France’s merchant fleet from the high seas, the British had no wish to see American ships fill the void and reap the profits. At the very least, they wanted a share of those profits. “The point at issue with the United States on this subject,” British officials privately conceded, “is not a question of great importance, but a mere consideration of how the profit taken from the Enemy is to be divided.”[36] To ensure a share of the trade, the British modified their policy. In the Essex decision (1805), the High Court of Admiralty ruled that landing goods and paying duties in the United States was no longer proof of bona fide importation. Thenceforth, American merchants would have to provide additional, though unspecified, proof that ships stopping over in the United States actually broke their voyages.[37]

Given the Essex decision, the Royal Navy began seizing American ships engaged in the re-export trade, with paralyzing effect. Insurance rates soared, and American merchants faced staggering losses.[38] The total number of vessels seized was probably 300 or 400, although most were later released by the British courts. As Monroe put it, Britain “seeks to tranquilize us by dismissing our vessels in every case that She possibly can.”[39] Moreover, the new Whig ministry that assumed office under Lord Grenville and Charles James Fox in 1806 found the Essex decision an embarrassment and moved to set it aside. By a government decree issued in May 1806 proclaiming a blockade of northern Europe (the “Fox Blockade”), the re-export trade was implicitly restored to its old status.[40]

In 1805, however, American merchants could not know that the British lion’s growl would prove worse than his bite. They only knew that they faced heavy losses if their ships were in fact condemned. Hence in every major seaport they banded together to petition the government for relief.[41] Federal officials were sympathetic to their appeals, and there was a good deal of support for sending a special mission to London to resolve the problem.

Impressment

Other Anglo-American problems also demanded attention. The most important was impressment—the British practice of taking seamen from American ships on the high seas.[42] American trade grew so rapidly in the early national period that there was a shortage of experienced seamen to man the nation’s growing merchant fleet. To overcome this shortage, British tars were recruited into American service. There was no shortage of volunteers because the pay and working conditions on American ships were so much better than on British warships or even British merchant vessels. As a result, probably 30 percent of the 70,000 seamen employed on American ships in the Age of Jefferson were British.[43]

The problem with this labor system was that the Royal Navy was on a war footing and needed all the seamen it could get. Hence press gangs from British warships regularly boarded American merchant vessels to reclaim British subjects. This practice was objectionable because it sometimes left American ships dangerously shorthanded. Even worse, through accident or design American citizens were sometimes caught in the British dragnet. Between 1803 and 1812, some 6,000 suffered this fate.[44] Although the British government was usually willing to release those Americans whose citizenship could be established, the appeals—which were conducted through diplomatic channels—often took years. In the meantime, American citizens were confined to British ships, exposed to the rigors of a harsh discipline and to all the dangers of a war that was not their own.

In the hope of protecting Americans from British press gangs, the United States began issuing certificates of citizenship in 1796. These “protections” (as they were called) were like modern identification cards or passports, but instead of a photograph they contained a description of the individual. Age, height, hair and eye color, and any other distinguishing features were typically included, but often the description was vague. Hence, it was not difficult for a British seaman to acquire papers that roughly matched his appearance. Indeed, many Americans who had no intention of going to sea applied for a certificate to sell to a British sailor. For a dollar, it was said, a British tar could instantly become an American citizen.[45] Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that British officials gave little credence to the documents. “The flagrant and undeniable abuses of the official documents of American Citizenship,” said the Admiralty, “have obliged their Lordships to look at all such documents with the utmost distrust.”[46]

Territorial Waters, Naval Blockades, and Contraband

Although the re-export trade and impressment were the most serious problems that troubled Anglo-American relations in 1805, there were other sources of friction as well.[47] One was the British practice—all too common—of violating American territorial waters. Under international law a nation’s waters extended three miles out to sea because this was the maximum range of shore batteries. Whether through neglect or design, British warships often operated within American waters. The seizure of enemy ships and the impressment of seamen within the three-mile limit was a violation of the young republic’s sovereignty that Americans found particularly objectionable.

The British use of naval blockades was another source of friction. It was the accepted right of a nation at war to blockade an enemy’s ports in order to interrupt his trade. Neutral powers had to be given sufficient notice of a blockade, there had to be a continued naval presence before a blockaded port, and the naval force had to be large enough to threaten any vessel seeking to enter or leave the port. These were rules that the British recognized in principle but did not always follow in practice.

Still another source of trouble centered on the definition of contraband. It was the accepted right of a nation at war to search neutral merchant vessels on the high seas and to confiscate any contraband headed for the enemy. But there was no commonly accepted definition of contraband. The United States favored a narrow definition—restricted to war material—in order to enhance its commercial opportunities. The British, on the other hand, favored a broad definition—which might include food, naval stores, and even money—in order to deprive their enemies of as many vital supplies as possible. The British were usually willing to pay for dubious items seized—in effect preempting instead of confiscating questionable articles—but this did not mollify American merchants, who were after bigger profits on the continent.

Free Ships–Free Goods

The United States and Great Britain also differed over the status of enemy (French) property on neutral vessels. Upholding the Consolato del Mare, a fourteenth-century maritime code, the British argued that such property was subject to seizure. The United States favored the newer Dutch doctrine of free ships–free goods, which held that any property on a neutral vessel (except contraband) was immune to seizure. To the British the key was who owned the property; to Americans it was who owned the ship.

The doctrine of free ships–free goods is sometimes treated as one of the pivotal diplomatic issues of this period, but by 1800 it was of little practical importance. Although Americans had freighted property for France and other European belligerents in the 1790s, by 1800 they had accumulated sufficient capital to purchase any merchandise they wished to transport. “We are no longer mere freighters for foreigners,” said Republican Barnabas Bidwell in 1806, “but have become the carriers of foreign as well as native produce, on our own capital, and for our own account.”[48]

The purchase of foreign property Americanized it and thus protected it from seizure, even under the Consolato del Mare. Hence in practice Americans had few objections to the enforcement of this doctrine. “If any of our ships are found carrying the property of the enemies of Great Britain,” said Republican merchant Samuel Smith in 1806, “let them be punished, we mean not to defend them.”[49] Federalists even argued that the United States profited from the Consolato del Mare. “The boasted principle of free ships, free goods,” Fisher Ames claimed, “would deprive the United States of a great part of the fair profits of their neutrality. Belligerent nations could in that case transact their own affairs, and neutrals would have no gains but freight.”[50]

The Monroe–Pinkney Treaty (1806)

These, then, were the issues that troubled Anglo-American relations in 1805: the re-export trade and impressment most of all, but also contraband, blockades, and violations of American waters. In private talks with President Jefferson and in strongly worded public resolutions, members of Congress urged the administration to send a special mission to Loncon to resolve these differences.[51]

President Jefferson, however, had long since soured on treaties—particularly commercial agreements—believing that mutual interest was the only reliable guarantee for trade. The day was not distant, he said in 1801, when the United States could dictate international law on the high seas. “In the meantime we wish to let every treaty we have drop off without renewal.”[52] Jefferson had little love for the Jay Treaty—“a millstone round our necks,” he once called it—and he refused British overtures to renew its commercial clauses when they expired in 1803.[53] He was willing to sanction a limited treaty covering neutral rights—the re-export trade, impressment, blockades, and the like—but he wanted to leave the negotiations to Monroe and to exclude commercial issues altogether. But such was the pressure from Congress that he felt obliged to appoint a special mission to work out the whole range of differences between the two nations. “I found it necessary,” he later said, “to yield my own opinion to the general sense of the national council.”[54]

To join Monroe in the negotiations, Jefferson chose William Pinkney, a Baltimore lawyer who had penned a particularly able memorial against the Rule of 1756 after the Essex seizures. The instructions the secretary of state drew up to guide the American envoys called for a host of British concessions and were largely an exercise in wishful thinking, but only two items were deemed essential to a settlement: an end to impressment and the restoration of the re-export trade.[55]

The British refused to give up impressment because they saw it as the only way to prevent wholesale desertions from the Royal Navy. But they did offer to observe “the greatest caution” in impressing British seamen and to afford “immediate and prompt redress” to any Americans mistakenly forced into service.[56] Monroe and Pinkney realized that this fell far short of their instructions, but Britain showed such a conciliatory spirit on the other issues that they decided to conclude an agreement anyway. The result was the Monroe–Pinkney Treaty of 1806, which was in many ways more favorable to the United States than the Jay Treaty had been.[57]

By the terms of the new treaty, the British agreed not to interfere with the re-export trade as long as American ships paid a small transit duty on their stopover in the United States—a duty that was actually smaller than they were accustomed to paying.[58] The British also conceded a narrow definition of contraband, promised to give proper notice of blockades, and agreed to refrain from interfering with American trade within five miles of the American coast. In addition, the British promised to reduce the duties paid by American ships in British ports, and to allow American merchants continued access to the British East Indies, although on a more restricted basis than provided for in the Jay Treaty. Best of all, the treaty contained a kind of insurance clause that bound the British to indemnify any merchant whose vessel was detained in violation of the treaty.

To American merchants seeking to make a profit in a war-torn world, the Monroe–Pinkney Treaty offered considerable security. There was security against interference with the East or West Indian trade, against hazy definitions of contraband or unannounced blockades, and against impressment or seizure within five miles of the American coast. The treaty also presaged a favorable revision of duties in British ports and assured compensation in the event of violations. Given the state of war in Europe and the relative strength of Great Britain and the United States, the British concessions were significant.

What did the United States have to give up in order to win these concessions? Little more than a promise of benevolent neutrality. The nation agreed to employ no commercial sanctions against Britain that did not apply to other nations, to give up the doctrine of free ships–free goods, to deny the use of American ports to privateers belonging to Britain’s enemies, and to prohibit Americans from serving in the armed forces of Britain’s enemies. Except for the ban on commercial sanctions, these points were of little consequence. Indeed, most were already embodied in American law or were accepted practice under international law. Thus, the United States conceded very little in this treaty that constituted a new obligation.

As favorable as the Monroe–Pinkney Treaty was, it did contain a kicker. Before signing the agreement, the British insisted on appending a note that dealt with France’s recently issued Berlin Decree, which proclaimed a blockade of the British Isles. This was a “paper” blockade—illegal because France did not have the naval power to enforce it. In their note the British reserved the right to retaliate against France—any provision in the treaty notwithstanding—if the United States acquiesced in the French decree.[59] The British reservation was extraordinary and put a cloud over the whole treaty, but it did not substantially alter America’s diplomatic position. By ratifying the treaty and making some gesture against the Berlin Decree, the United States could still demand that the entire agreement be implemented.

President Jefferson, however, chose not to submit the treaty to the Senate. “To tell you the truth,” he reportedly told a friend, “I do not wish any treaty with Great Britain.”[60] Jefferson considered the British concessions trifling and was unwilling to give up the weapon of commercial sanctions without a British promise to end impressment. In addition, he was convinced that France and Russia would ultimately prevail in the European war and force the British to accept a much broader definition of neutral rights. The points contended for by the United States, he insisted, were matters of right. “They are points which Bonaparte & [Czar] Alexander will concur in settling at the Treaty of peace, & probably in more latitude than Gr. Br. would now yield.”[61] Even if Britain’s enemies failed to win a broad definition of neutral rights, Jefferson was confident that he could achieve his aims by employing economic sanctions.

The rejection of the Monroe–Pinkney Treaty was a great turning point in the Age of Jefferson. Republicans would later claim that their only options in this era were submission, commercial sanctions, or war. But the Monroe–Pinkney Treaty offered another alternative, that of accommodation. By rejecting this treaty, the United States missed an opportunity to reforge the Anglo-American accord of the 1790s and to substitute peace and prosperity for commercial restrictions and war.

The Chesapeake Affair (1807)

After the loss of the Monroe–Pinkney Treaty, Anglo-American relations steadily deteriorated. In the summer of 1807 the Chesapeake affair created a full-blown war scare.[62] The American frigate had a large number of British subjects among its crew. British officials knew that four deserters from the Royal Navy were serving on the vessel but were unable to secure their return through diplomatic channels. Accordingly, Rear Admiral Sir George Berkeley, the commander-in-chief of the British squadron at Halifax, decided to take matters into his own hands by ordering naval commanders assigned to his station to recover the deserters, employing force if necessary.

On June 22, 1807, nine miles off the American coast, H.M. Ship Leopard (52 guns) approached the Chesapeake (40 guns) and demanded that a boarding party be allowed to search for the deserters. When the American commander demurred, the British vessel fired three broadsides into the ship, killing three men and wounding sixteen others (one of whom later died). Unable to get any guns into service to defend itself, the Chesapeake struck its colors. The British removed the four deserters, and the American ship limped back into port.

The Chesapeake affair stirred public outrage throughout the United States. “But one feeling pervades the Nation,” Republican Joseph H. Nicholson said; “all distinctions of Federalism and Democracy are banished.”[63] Jefferson ordered all British warships out of American waters, but instead of fanning the flames, he waited for Britain’s official response.

The British did not normally claim the right to search or impress from neutral warships, which were considered an extension of a nation’s territory. Hence they disavowed the attack and ordered Berkeley’s recall (although he was later given another command). The British also offered to pay reparations and to return three of the men, all of whom were apparently American citizens who had deserted only after being impressed into British service. (The fourth, a British subject, was summarily hanged.) The issue, however, became entangled with others, and a settlement was delayed until 1811. In the meantime, the Chesapeake affair continued to fester, contributing to the rising anti-British feeling in America.

The Orders-in-Council and Continental Decrees

Shortly after the Chesapeake outrage, another problem surfaced that was to bedevil Anglo-American relations even more. This was the Orders-in-Council, a series of executive decrees issued by the British government that restricted neutral trade with the Continent.[64] The British were no strangers to commercial warfare. Often they had used their naval power to destroy an enemy’s shipping or trade, and sometimes their practices skirted the edge of international law. The Fox Blockade, for example, was probably too sweeping to be strictly legal.

It was the French, however, who initiated the commercial warfare of the Napoleonic era. Napoleon’s brilliant military triumph at Austerlitz in late 1805 had made him master of the Continent, but there was no way he could invade Britain because her great naval victory at Trafalgar six weeks earlier had left her undisputed mistress of the seas. Hence, Napoleon resorted to commercial warfare, claiming that this was “the only way to strike a blow at England and force her to peace.”[65] His plan was to destroy Britain’s prosperity by cutting off its trade with Europe. He hoped to accomplish this with a series of decrees that established the Continental System.

The first Continental decree—the Berlin Decree, issued in 1806—proclaimed a blockade of the British Isles, excluded from French-occupied ports all neutral vessels that had touched at a British port, and declared all British-made goods lawful prize even when owned by neutrals. The British retaliated in 1807 with several Orders-in-Council, the most important of which prohibited any trade from which the British were excluded unless the ships headed for those ports stopped in Britain first and paid transit duties. Napoleon replied with the Milan Decree, which proclaimed that any neutral vessel submitting to the British trade regulations or even permitting a British search party to board was subject to seizure. The British issued a new Order-in-Council in 1809 that substituted an extensive blockade for the earlier restrictions.

Great Britain and France both conceded that their commercial decrees violated international law, but each claimed that it was only retaliating for the illegal acts of the other. The French insisted that the Fox Blockade was the opening round in the commercial war, while the British pointed to the Berlin Decree. Both sides also used the war on trade as a pretext for looting neutral commerce. The British seized neutral ships on the high seas, while the French confiscated neutral property near the coast or in continental ports. For both belligerents, greed and mercantilism played as much a role in the commercial war as higher reasons of state.

The British and French decrees appeared to render any trade with the Continent impossible, but appearances were deceptive. With a little bit of luck, enterprising merchants could still make a profit. The British made it clear that they had no intention of ending all trade with Europe. As Spencer Perceval, the British prime minister, put it: “The object of the Orders in Council was not to destroy the trade of the Continent, but to force the Continent to trade with us.”[66] To facilitate this trade, the British in 1807 began issuing thousands of licenses that authorized trade with ports that the Orders-in-Council had targeted. France often winked at this license trade and granted exemptions from the Continental System when it suited her interest.[67]

Moreover, the countervailing decrees never applied to all of Europe. At no time did Napoleon control the entire Continent, and the British applied their restrictions only to ports under enemy control. Thus at one time or another Americans could freely trade with ports in Portugal, Spain, the Baltic, the Ottoman Empire, and the Austrian Empire. The trade at Europe’s periphery was so extensive that John Quincy Adams compared the Continental System to “an attempt to exclude the air from a bottle, by sealing up hermetically the mouth, while there was a great hole in the side.”[68] Beyond this, the British before 1809 allowed the shipment of certain commodities directly from the United States to the Continent, and some American merchants covered trade in other goods by purchasing British licenses, which were openly hawked in British port cities. In addition, American merchants sometimes circumvented the European restrictions by carrying dual papers or by bribing customs officials in French-occupied ports.

In spite of these opportunities, the losses under the British and French regulations were heavy. Between 1807 and 1812 the two belligerents and their allies seized about 900 American ships.[69] Given these losses, it is little wonder that the repeal of the belligerent decrees became the overriding objective of American foreign policy in the years before the War of 1812.

The Restrictive System (1806–1811)

By late 1807 Americans were under heavy pressure from both belligerents. France had begun to enforce the Berlin Decree, and Britain had reaffirmed the right of impressment and announced her intention of issuing the Orders-in-Council. Under these circumstances, Republican leaders decided to retaliate by imposing economic sanctions. The restrictive system, as these measures were called, was a series of trade restrictions adopted between 1806 and 1811 to force the belligerents to show greater respect for American rights.[70]

The restrictive system had its origins in the era of the American Revolution. In the 1760s and 1770s the American colonies had employed non-importation, non-exportation, and non-consumption agreements against the mother country in the hope of forcing her to change her tax and trade policies. Although these measures had had little impact on British colonial policy, men like Jefferson and Madison interpreted history otherwise. Convinced that America’s greatest weapon was her economic power, Republican leaders believed that the United States held the key to the prosperity of Britain and to a lesser extent of France as well. “Our trade,” said the Boston Chronicle in 1805, “is the most powerful weapon we can use in our defence.”[71] All the United States had to do, the Republicans believed, was to turn the economic screws and the European belligerents would be brought to terms, if not to their knees.

The first restriction adopted was the partial non-importation act of 1806.[72] This law prohibited the importation of a select list of British manufactured goods. It did not strike at the heart of Britain’s export trade because it excluded few textiles or metal products. It was more of a threat than anything else, designed to warn the British of what to expect if they did not show greater respect for American rights. To give the British time to make concessions in the Monroe–Pinkney negotiations, the law was repeatedly suspended and did not go into operation until December 1807.

Shortly after this law went into effect, the Republicans adopted an embargo, the most comprehensive and controversial of all the trade restrictions.[73] Essentially a non-exportation law, the embargo prohibited American ships and goods from leaving port. In principle the measure was extraordinarily sweeping, and many regarded the cure as worse than the disease. Republican critic John Randolph, for example, compared the embargo to an attempt “to cure corns by cutting off the toes.”[74]

Federalists made a lot of political capital out of the embargo. In their cartoons, they usually depicted it as a snapping turtle because, like a turtle, the nation was withdrawing into its shell by giving up its trade. The turtle snapped at everyone’s livelihood, in this case a smuggler trying to get his tobacco to a British ship (incorrectly portrayed here as a warship). To illustrate the measure’s coercive nature, the cartoons invariably included the phrase “Ograbme,” which is “embargo” spelled backwards. (Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812)

In practice, however, the law had numerous loopholes, at least at first. Many ships were able to slip out of port before official news of the embargo arrived and once at sea made no effort to return. Merchants could legally dispatch ships to pick up American property abroad, and some 600 vessels sailed on this pretext. Some ships left port illegally, while others—nominally plying the coasting trade—were “blown” off course to a port in the West Indies or Canada. Foreign ships could still bring cargoes to the United States as long as they left in ballast—a rule they sometimes evaded. There was also a good deal of overland trade, especially along Canadian frontier.[75]

To enforce the embargo, Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin told Jefferson that government officials would need “arbitrary powers” that were “equally dangerous & odious.” The president was undeterred. “Congress,” he replied, “must legalise all means which may be necessary to obtain it’s end.”[76] Accordingly, the administration asked for and received increasingly broad powers. The climax was the enforcement act of 1809, which gave customs officials sweeping powers and authorized the use of the army and navy to suppress smuggling.[77]

The enforcement campaign was largely successful, but Republicans and Federalists alike became increasingly disillusioned with the whole policy. Likening the embargo to a turtle because the nation was drawing into itself, Federalists spelled the word backwards to illustrate its effects. “O-grab-me,” they said, and at one time or another the turtle-like embargo snapped at almost everyone’s livelihood.

Economically, the embargo drove the nation into a deep depression, perhaps the worst experienced since the beginning of colonial times. Exports, which had peaked at $108 million in 1807, plummeted (officially at least) to $22 million in 1808.[78] Farmers could not ship their produce to foreign markets, and merchants could not send their ships to sea. For many people, the result was loss and suffering if not bankruptcy and debtors’ prison.[79]

Politically, the embargo rejuvenated the Federalist party, which only a year or two before had seemed headed for extinction. The howls of protest from commercial New England steadily mounted, and there was even talk of nullification and secession. Although the embargo was conceived of as a substitute for foreign war—as a peaceful means of upholding American rights—it threatened to precipitate civil war.

Yet for all this the embargo elicited hardly a peep from Britain or France. According to the American minister in Paris, the coercive effects of the measure were overrated. “Here it is not felt, and in England . . . it is forgotten.”[80] Napoleon used the embargo as a pretext for seizing American vessels, claiming that they must be British ships in disguise.[81] Great Britain was deprived of some of her customary imports, but she found new markets for her exports in South America and welcomed the withdrawal of a commercial rival. A British subject later made fun of the measure: “The late Jeffersonian Embargo was a Rod which produced no other sensation on the rough hide of John Bull, than the pleasurable one which arises from titilation. The poor Animal was delighted, and not suspecting that this philosophical experiment on his Hide was intended to produce pain, he regretted that weariness had ultimately compelled Mr. Jefferson to cease scratching.”[82]

In March 1809—after fifteen months of national suffering—Congress repealed the embargo and non-importation laws and substituted a non-intercourse act.[83] This measure prohibited all trade with Britain and France and their colonies but permitted it with the rest of the world. It imposed both non-importation and non-exportation on the belligerents, but only part of the law could be enforced. Ships and goods from Britain and France could be kept from American ports, but there was no way to prevent American vessels from going where they pleased once they departed from the United States. American merchants often traded with the British in neutral ports or sailed directly to Great Britain, where they were welcomed despite faulty papers. Given the failure of the embargo, which was far more sweeping, few people expected non-intercourse to work. It was designed primarily to save face, to keep up the appearance of commercial warfare while giving up the rigors of the embargo.

Since the early days of the embargo, the administration had expressed a willingness to give up commercial warfare if either belligerent suspended its restrictions on trade. In April 1809, the British minister in Washington, David M. Erskine, signed a convention providing for the mutual suspension of the British and American restrictions. But the agreement was repudiated in London because Erskine had exceeded his instructions. Hence, non-intercourse was restored against Britain.[84]

In May 1810, Congress repealed the non-intercourse act and substituted a measure known as Macon’s bill #2.[85] This law reopened trade with Britain and France but promised to reimpose non-importation against either belligerent if the other rescinded its restrictions on neutral trade. Seeing an opportunity to hoodwink the United States, Napoleon ordered his foreign minister, the Duc de Cadore, to promise French cooperation. In the so-called Cadore letter, sent to the American government in August 1810, France pledged to suspend the Continental Decrees if the United States “shall cause their rights to be respected by the English,” presumably by reimposing non-importation.[86]

Napoleon had no intention of making good on this promise. Although some American vessels were released for the sake of appearances, the French continued to prey on American shipping, and a new series of French tariffs and export restrictions rendered American trade with the Continent almost impossible. Moreover, in the Trianon Decree (which was issued at the same time as the Cadore letter), the Emperor secretly ordered the condemnation of American ships in French hands that had not even violated his decrees. Clearly, Napoleon’s plan was not to make concessions to the United States, but to give the appearance of doing so in the hope of further embroiling the new nation with Britain.[87]

This plan worked because President Madison chose to accept the Cadore letter at face value. Not only did he hope that Napoleon would live up to his word, but he thought that he could use the French pledge as a lever to force the British to suspend the Orders-in-Council. The British, however, refused to budge, claiming that the French repeal was spurious. Hence Madison issued a proclamation reimposing non-importation against Great Britain and her colonies as of February 1811. The following month Congress passed a bill to give this proclamation the full force of law.[88]

The second non-importation act was the last coercive measure adopted by the United States before the War of 1812. With this measure the nation had come full circle—from non-importation to non-exportation and back to non-importation—as Republican leaders searched in vain for an instrument that would have a decisive impact on the belligerents while doing the least damage to the United States. The second non-importation law was probably the best of these measures, although it turned the normally prosperous Anglo-American trade into a stagnant one-sided exchange and led to the accumulation of American capital in Great Britain.

The Little Belt Affair (1811)

After the adoption of the non-importation law, Anglo-American relations continued to deteriorate. The American minister to Great Britain returned to the United States in early 1811, leaving only a charge d’affaires in his place. The following June the newly appointed British minister, Augustus J. Foster, arrived in Washington with a fresh set of demands. Foster threatened retaliation if non-importation were continued. He also declared that Britain would not lift the Orders-in-Council until France had suspended her decrees for all neutral nations (and not just the United States) and had dropped her tariff and export restrictions as well. In short, the Orders would remain in force until British goods were freely admitted to the Continent.[89]

Two other developments contributed to the deterioration of Anglo-American relations in 1811. The first was the Little Belt incident, a kind of Chesapeake affair in reverse. In the hope of deterring impressments, the Navy Department had ordered the heavy frigate President (54 guns) to cruise off the American coast. On May 16 the President clashed with the much smaller Little Belt (20 guns), killing nine of her crew and wounding twenty-three others. The fight took place at night, and it was never clear who fired first. Most Americans saw the engagement as just retribution for the Chesapeake affair and celebrated accordingly. The British, on the other hand, were convinced that the President was guilty of unprovoked aggression, and some newspapers demanded retaliation.[90] “The blood of our murdered countrymen must be revenged,” declared the London Courier. “The conduct of America leaves us no alternative.”[91] The British government, however, chose not to make an issue of the affair.

The Battle of Tippecanoe (1811)

The other development that contributed to Anglo-American discord in 1811 was the outbreak of an Indian war in the Old Northwest. Since the Jay Treaty, British officials had walked a fine line with their native allies, whom they called “Nitchies” (a corruption of the Ojibway/Chippewa word “Niigii,” which means “friend” or “comrade”).[92] Although seeking to restrain the Indians, the British supplied their needs to retain their loyalty in case of war with the United States. But this subtlety was lost on Americans. Ever since Pontiac’s Rebellion in 1763, the Northwest Territory had periodically erupted in flames, and because the Indians were tied economically and diplomatically to the British, most Americans blamed them for the uprisings. “We have had but one opinion as the cause of the depredations of the Indians,” said Niles’ Register; “they are instigated and supported by the British in Canada.”[93]

The threat of an uprising steadily mounted after 1805, when a Shawnee spiritual leader, Tenskwatawa (better known as the Prophet), launched a religious movement that called for rejecting of the white man’s ways. At the same time, William Henry Harrison, the governor of the Indiana Territory, imposed a series of ever more outrageous land cession treaties on the Indians, culminating in the three treaties of Fort Wayne in 1809.[94] This prompted Tecumseh, who was the Prophet’s brother, to transform the religious movement into a military alliance to resist further land cessions.[95] Besides forging closer bonds with the British, the two Shawnee leaders established a camp at Prophetstown on the Wabash River just below the mouth of the Tippecanoe River in present-day Indiana and from there spread their message of resistance throughout the West. The movement became increasingly militant in tone, and a new round of Indian depredations erupted in 1810.[96]

Responding to the growing depredations, Harrison was determined to crush the Indian conspiracy. “If some decisive measures are not speedily adopted,” he told the secretary of war, “we shall have a general combination of all the tribes against us.”[97] The administration was reluctant to provoke an Indian war but finally succumbed to Harrison’s pleas for troops. By the fall of 1811 Harrison had assembled an army of 1,000 regulars and volunteer militia. His plan was to march to Prophetstown and demand that the Prophet give up those responsible for the recent depredations. (Harrison knew he would not have to face Tecumseh, who was on a recruiting mission in the South.)[98]

Resistance to American expansion in the Old Northwest was spearheaded by two Shawnee brothers, Tenskwatawa, better known as the Prophet (1775–1836), a visionary who built a religious movement to resist assimilation, and Tecumseh (1768?–1813), a commanding leader who transformed his brother’s movement into a military alliance. (Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812)

Harrison’s army reached the vicinity of Prophetstown in early November. In the pre-dawn hours of November 7 some 500 Indians—mostly Kickapoos, Winnebagoes, and Potawatomis—attacked Harrison’s camp. The Indians badly mauled the Americans, who were caught silhouetted against their campfires. But the troops held their positions and eventually turned the tide. Most of the Indians enjoyed good cover, although some appeared in the open because the Prophet had promised them immunity from American muskets. The Indians were finally driven off by a counterattack on their flank, and the next day Harrison burned Prophetstown, along with the Indians’ food supplies.[99]

In the Battle of Tippecanoe, Harrison’s army suffered almost 200 casualties, while Indian losses were probably half that number. Harrison could claim victory, but only because the Indians had been driven from the field and their village and food supplies destroyed. The Prophet suffered some loss of face, but his spell was far from broken.[100] The battle did little to deter the Indian depredations on the frontier, and the whole region remained unsafe. “Most of the Citizens in this Country,” Harrison conceded in 1812, “have abandoned their farms and taken refuge in Such temporary forts as they have been able to construct.”[101]

When Governor William Henry Harrison marched to Prophetstown in late 1811, the result was the Battle of Tippecanoe, a close American victory. This marked the beginning of an Indian war in the Old Northwest that blended into the War of 1812 seven months later. (Print by Kurz & Allison. Library of Congress)

The Indian war drove many natives in the region into the British camp. It also intensified American hatred of Britain. The Indians were armed with British weapons, and this only served to reinforce the notion that the British were behind the depredations. Republican newspapers carried accounts of the conflict under headings that read “ANGLO-SAVAGE WAR” or “Anglo-Indian War.”[102] “The war on the Wabash is purely BRITISH,” concluded the Lexington Reporter, the leading newspaper in the West. “The SCALPING KNIFE and TOMAHAWK of British savages, is now, again devastating our frontiers.”[103]

The Drift toward War (1811–1812)

With Anglo-American discord mounting, a growing number of Republicans began to talk of war.[104] It was an important, even a momentous step, and yet what was the alternative? The restrictive system had failed, and in the eyes of most Republicans, to do nothing at all in the face of British encroachments was unthinkable. For years Republican foreign policy had been predicated on the necessity of upholding American rights, and many now regarded war as the only way of achieving this end. “Negociation & commercial restrictions failed to obtain redress,” William Plumer of New Hampshire later said; “submission or war were the only remaining alternatives.”[105]

War appealed to Republicans because it offered the prospect of winning diplomatic concessions from the British, of forcing them to give up the Orders-in-Council and impressment and perhaps modify other maritime practices as well. War was also seen as a way of resolving the nation’s long-standing Indian problem. Although this problem was not as crucial as the maritime issues, it loomed large in the West. “The blood of our fellow-citizens murdered on the Wabash by British intrigue,” said the Lexington Reporter, “calls aloud for vengeance.”[106] By conquering Canada, or at least administering a sound drubbing to the British there, the Republicans hoped to destroy British influence over American Indians and thus put an end to the nation’s recurring Indian wars. In other words, war offered the prospect of winning American diplomatic aims in the Northwest as well as on the high seas.

Republicans also saw war as a way of vindicating American independence. As heirs of the American Revolution, the Republicans were steeped in anglophobia. Extremely sensitive to British slights—as one would expect from citizens of a new nation—they saw British encroachments as part of a larger plot to keep the United States in a kind of quasi-colonial subjugation. Britain’s aim, said Jonathan Roberts of Pennsylvania, was “to make us subserve her interests as a colonial dependency.” “If we submit,” declared John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, “the independence of this nation is lost.”[107]

War was also seen as a way of shoring up republican institutions. The United States was the only democratic republic in the world, and even though most Americans were confident that they were riding the wave of the future, they were acutely conscious of how fragile republican institutions were. If the administration proved incapable of protecting American rights, the people might turn to some other form of government, and the entire republican experiment might collapse. As the editor of the Washington National Intelligencer put it, “Not only the rights of the nation, but the character of the government are involved in the issue.” “The time is come,” added another Republican, “to humble the overgrown monsters [the British]—and to cause our republic to be respected at home and abroad.”[108]

Besides upholding independence and preserving republican institutions, war offered the prospect of significant political dividends. A successful war would redound to the Republicans’ advantage, while retreat would have just the opposite effect. “The honor of the Nation and that of the party,” said a Philadelphia newspaper editor, “are bound up together and both will be sacrificed if war be not declared.” “If War is not resorted to,” added a Tennessee Congressman, “this nation or rather their representatives will be disgraced.” “The War machine [must be] put into active motion,” said another Republican; “this deed, & this deed alone can save the character of the Democratic party & of the Nation.”[109]

War also offered the best means of unifying the Republican party. For years the administration had been under fire from dissident factions within the party. There was mounting resentment, especially in the North, over the domination of the Virginia dynasty. There was also growing frustration over the British and French depredations and the failure of the restrictive system. Many Republicans were critical of the administration for failing to defend the nation’s rights or to prepare the nation for war. With the election of 1812 looming on the horizon, it was imperative for the administration to silence these dissidents and to consolidate its hold on the party. “Only a change in our foreign relations,” said a Virginia Republican, “would enable Mr. Madison to ride triumphant, put down his opponents in Congress, and silence the growlings of those who ought to possess his entire confidence.”[110]

Besides unifying the Republican party, war offered the prospect of silencing the Federalists. No doubt Republicans found the Federalist claim—which was constantly repeated—that the restrictive system was a futile, double-edged sword all the more galling because it was so near the truth.[111] A state of war, most Republicans assumed, would put an end to this criticism, for everyone—including Federalists—would have to rally to the flag. “A declaration of War,” said William Plumer, “must necessarily produce a great change in public opinion & the State of parties—British partisans must then either close their lips in silence or abscond.” “By war,” Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts told the President, “we should be purified, as by fire.”[112]

Thus by 1812 many Republicans had concluded that there were compelling diplomatic, ideological, and political reasons for going to war against Britain. If all went well, the Republicans could expect to win concessions from the British, vindicate American independence, preserve republican institutions, maintain power, unify their party, and silence the Federalists. With these prospects before them, many Republicans had come to believe that the rewards of war outweighed its risks.

President Madison was by nature a cautious man, but he shared these views. The nation, he believed, was at a crossroads, with the future of the republic at stake. To submit to British practices, he thought, would be to sacrifice “the neutral guaranty of an Independent flag” and to “recolonize our commerce by subjecting it to a foreign authority.”[113] Hence, even though Republican policies had left the nation woefully unprepared to prosecute a major war, the president summoned Congress to an early meeting in November 1811 to consider this very prospect.

Chapter 2

The Declaration of War

The Twelfth Congress—known to history as the War Congress—convened on November 4, 1811. Republicans across the country showed a keen interest in its proceedings. “Never did the American Congress assemble under circumstances of greater interest and responsibility,” said the Boston Chronicle. The deliberations of this body, the Washington National Intelligencer predicted, “will, perhaps, do more to stamp the character of genuine republican governments than has been effected in this respect since the creation of the world.” “The people, the times and the government,” added the Salem Register, “all require DECISION.”[1]

The War Congress Meets

The Republicans had solid majorities in both houses of the new Congress, controlling 75 percent of the seats in the House and 82 percent in the Senate.[2] Yet for years they had been without competent floor leadership and beset by factionalism. “Factions in our own party,” said one Republican, “have hitherto been the bane of the Democratic administration.”[3] The regular Republicans, who customarily followed the administration’s lead, could usually muster a majority, but sometimes they were outmaneuvered by their enemies. Their most implacable foes were the Federalists. Led by Josiah Quincy and James Lloyd of Massachusetts and James A. Bayard of Delaware, the Federalists numbered only 25 percent of the House and 18 percent of the Senate, but they normally voted as a bloc and usually opposed the administration.

The Federalists were sometimes joined by dissident Republicans, such as the Old Republicans, the Clintonians, or the “Invisibles.” The Old Republicans were the conscience of the Republican party. Led by the brilliant but eccentric John Randolph of Roanoke, they were a small group of southern agrarians who favored simple government and believed that the administration had embraced too many Federalist policies.[4] The Clintonians, on the other hand, thought the government ought to adopt more Federalist policies. Led by George and De Witt Clinton of New York, they were northern Republicans—mainly from commercial areas—who opposed economic restrictions and favored greater protection for trade.[5] The “Invisibles” (also known as the Smith faction) were a small band of senators that included Samuel Smith of Maryland, William Branch Giles of Virginia, and Michael Leib of Pennsylvania. They had a reputation for political opportunism, but what actually united them was a common interest in military preparedness and an aversion to Albert Gallatin and his parsimonious Treasury policies.[6] Most of the dissidents also disliked the president. “There is much animosity towards Madison,” said a Pennsylvania congressman, “in the Smiths & Gileses & I might say in the Clintons too.”[7]

The War Congress also contained a new faction, one capable of providing the leadership and firmness that hitherto had been lacking. These were the War Hawks, a group of about a dozen ardent patriots too young to remember the horrors of the last British war and thus willing to run the risks of another to vindicate the nation’s rights.[8] Most of them came from the South or West. The group included Henry Clay and Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky; Felix Grundy of Tennessee; Langdon Cheves, William Lowndes, John C. Calhoun, and David R. Williams of South Carolina; George M. Troup of Georgia; Peter B. Porter of New York; and John A. Harper of New Hampshire.[9] The War Hawks had the respect not only of other Republicans but of the Federalists, too. “Clay, Cheves, Lowndes, and calhoun,” said a Massachusetts Federalist, “are confessedly the best informed & most liberal men of the party.”[10]

Clay was the most able and articulate of the War Hawks. Although not yet 35 and never before a member of the House, he was elected speaker and lost no time in establishing his authority.[11] When Randolph brought his dog into the House, Clay ordered the animal removed—something no previous speaker had dared or cared to do.[12] “The new Speaker is quite popular,” commented a Federalist. “He possesses fine talents and presides with dignity.”[13] Molding the speakership into a position of power, Clay “reduc’d the chaos to order.”[14] By directing debate and interpreting the rules, by packing key committees and acting forcefully behind the scenes, he ensured that the War Hawks dominated the Twelfth Congress and kept the war movement on track.

Preparing for War

The president sent his annual address to Congress on November 5. Although Madison had planned a stronger message, Gallatin—who feared the effects of war—persuaded him to tone down his attack on Britain.[15] The only grievance mentioned in the address was the Orders-in-Council. Accusing England of making “war on our lawful commerce,” the president called for war preparations. In view of Britain’s “hostile inflexibility,” he said, “Congress will feel the duty of putting the United States into an armor and an attitude demanded by the crisis.”[16]

The leading War Hawk in Congress was Henry Clay (1777–1852). Elected speaker of the house in the War Congress, he, more than anyone else, guided the nation into war. Later, he was part of the delegation sent to Europe to forge what proved to be a lasting peace. (Library of Congress)

According to the Philadelphia Aurora, the president’s message was “most happily adapted . . . to redeem the public mind from despondence; and to restore the nation to confidence in itself.” “It has awakened and invigorated the almost desponding spirits of the people,” added the Worcester Aegis.[17] Although the War Hawks had hoped for a more spirited address, they agreed to call it a “war message.”[18] The House referred the bulk of the message to its Foreign Relations Committee, which Clay had packed with War Hawks.[19] Unwilling to recommend preparations without a promise from the president to support war, the committee conferred with Secretary of State James Monroe. William Lowndes reported that Monroe gave “the strongest assurances that the president will cooperate zealously with congress in declaring war if our complaints are not redressed by May next.”[20]

On November 29, Chairman Peter B. Porter read the Foreign Relations Committee’s report. It was a stinging attack on British policies—focusing on the Orders-in-Council but also mentioning impressment—and a ringing plea for action. In the face of British wrongs “so daring in character, and so disgraceful in their execution,” the report called on Congress to summon forth “the patriotism and resources of the country.” Toward this end, the committee recommended six resolutions that called for filling the ranks of the existing army, raising additional regulars and short-term volunteers, authorizing the use of militia, fitting out the navy, and permitting merchant vessels to arm for defense.[21] In his supporting speech, Porter said that the report was to be understood as a forerunner to war and that only those who favored war should vote for the resolutions. “Do not let us raise armies,” he said, “unless we intend to employ them.”[22]

The House approved each resolution by a large margin, the majorities ranging from 75 to 112.[23] The only proposal that generated any opposition, the arming of merchantmen, was attacked as a half-way measure that was premature and also dangerous because it might lead to war with several nations. But even this resolution was approved by a 97–22 margin.[24] “There appears to be a greater degree of unanimity in the national legislature,” said one Federalist, “than I have observed on any important question, since the conclusion of the revolutionary war.”[25]

Appearances were deceptive, however, for different factions in the House supported the resolutions for different reasons. The War Hawks supported them as a prelude to war; commercial Republicans, because they had long advocated stronger defense measures. Some Republicans—the “scarecrow” party—hoped that the mere threat of war would frighten the British into concessions. According to one critic, they believed “that it [would] not be necessary to employ, or even raise the force contemplated.”[26] The Federalists, on the other hand, supported the resolutions to avoid the charge of being under the influence of “British gold” and to uphold their traditional commitment to preparedness. “We hope to avoid being amalgamated with [the] British,” said one Federalist. These are “measures of the old federal school,” added another.[27]

The adoption of the resolutions indicated that a large majority in the House favored war preparations. Members of the Senate were of a like mind, and between December 1811 and April 1812 Congress enacted a war program. The Federalists offered little resistance and even supported some of the bills, but dissidents (particularly in the Senate) stymied the administration on several key proposals.[28] As a result, the war program that emerged was not exactly what the administration had wanted.

Five of the measures were designed to support a land war. The most important provided for completing the existing 10,000-man army (whose ranks were barely half full) by raising the bounty for new recruits from $12 to $31 plus 160 acres of land.[29] The other measures provided for raising 25,000 additional U.S. Regulars and 50,000 one-year U.S. Volunteers, authorized the president to call out 100,000 militia for up to six months’ service, and appropriated $1.9 million for the purchase of arms, munitions, and other military supplies.[30]

The administration disliked the additional army bill because it was too ambitious. Convinced that sufficient regulars could not be recruited in time for a summer campaign, Madison and his advisers planned to rely on short-term volunteers and militia.[31] But Senator Giles preferred regulars, and he persuaded Congress to raise the authorized level of the army to 35,000 men.[32] Even worse, Congress voted to give the states (rather than the national government) authority to appoint the U.S. Volunteer officers. This threatened to decentralize the war effort. It also prompted some congressmen—Federalists and Republicans alike—to insist that the new troops were actually militia who could not legally serve abroad—even in Canada.[33] The administration also failed to secure the authority it sought to arm and classify the militia. Southerners had long favored legislation of this sort because their citizen soldiers were so poorly armed and organized. Northerners, on the other hand, were reasonably satisfied with existing arrangements and hence opposed any innovations.[34] The House defeated one bill to arm and classify the militia and tabled another to arm the militia.[35]

Resistance to Naval Expansion and New Taxes

The measures designed to support a maritime war also ran into trouble. Armed with facts and figures from the Navy Department, Langdon Cheves introduced a bill from the House Naval Committee that called for building ten new frigates. A long-term construction program, Cheves argued, would be relatively inexpensive and would benefit farmers and merchants alike.[36] Cheves was supported by some Republicans as well as by the Federalists. Josiah Quincy delivered a speech on behalf of naval expansion that former Federalist John Adams called “the most important . . . ever . . . uttered” in the House and that even the anti-navy Philadelphia Aurora considered “ingenious.”[37] “If you had a field to defend in Georgia,” Quincy said, “it would be very strange to put up a fence in Massachusetts. And yet, how does this differ from invading Canada, for the purpose of defending our maritime rights?”[38]

Most Republicans, however, were opposed to naval expansion, believing that a fleet was a costly and dangerous expedient that would be overwhelmed by the British navy. “We cannot contend with Great Britain on the ocean,” declared Adam Seybert of Pennsylvania. “Our vessels will only tend to swell the present catalogue of the British navy.”[39] Most Republicans agreed with Seybert, and Cheves’s frigate proposal was voted down by a three-vote margin. James Lloyd offered a similar proposal in the Senate, but it lost by a six-vote margin.[40] The House also rejected proposals to build ships-of-the-line and a naval repair dock.[41] Instead, Congress passed a bill that provided merely for fitting out the existing frigates, purchasing ship timber, and assigning Jefferson’s gunboats to those harbors that were most exposed.[42] A bill to build additional coastal fortifications was approved, too, although only after the Senate had slashed the proposed $1 million appropriation in half.[43]

Even more controversial were the administration’s plans to finance the war. Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin hoped to use tax revenue to pay for the government’s normal operations and loans to defray the cost of the war.[44] The details were presented to Congress in January 1812. Gallatin earlier had estimated that regular expenses for 1812 would be $9.4 million, which could be met from current revenue and a small surplus in the Treasury. To finance war-related expenses, he now recommended a loan of more than $10 million. Moreover, because a disruption in trade was expected to reduce government revenue at a time when interest charges on the national debt were climbing, Gallatin recommended raising the customs duties and reviving the Federalist internal taxes that had been repealed in 1802.[45]

Gallatin’s report was a great shock to most Republicans, few of whom had given any thought to internal taxes. These taxes had contributed to the defeat of the Federalists in 1800, and many Republicans feared that reviving them would undermine their popularity and put a damper on the war spirit. “I cannot think it will necessary at present to resort to direct taxes & stamp acts,” said William Plumer. “This was the very course that proved fatal to John Adams’ administration.”[46]

Fearful of the consequences, House Republicans would not even print the report, and Gallatin was subjected to sharp criticism.[47] One congressman accused him of “treading in the muddy footsteps of his official predecessors” and of trying “to chill the war spirit.” “If reports are true,” said another, the British minister’s carriage “is frequently seen at Gallatin’s house at such hours of the night as honest men are asleep.”[48] A Clintonian paper suggested that Gallatin’s aim was to “‘frighten the war-hawks,’ and blow up the cabinet,” and other papers accused him of treachery or apostasy.[49] Many assured their readers that the war could be won without additional taxes.[50]

As unpalatable as the tax issue was, the War Hawks realized that it could not be sidestepped. Hence, in mid-February Ezekiel Bacon, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, introduced a series of proposals to implement Gallatin’s program. A bill to borrow $11 million stirred little debate and easily passed both houses.[51] The tax resolutions, however, provoked vigorous opposition even though they merely took the sense of the House and specified that no new duties would be imposed until after war had been declared. There was considerable support for postponing the subject altogether, which prompted one Federalist to wonder whether “the war [would] float the taxes, or the taxes sink the war.”[52] In the end the resolutions were approved, which was a triumph for the administration.[53] Members of the House “have got down the dose of taxes,” Madison said. “It is the strongest proof they could give that they do not mean to flinch from the contest to which the mad conduct of G[reat] B[ritain] drives them.”[54]

On paper the Republican war program was impressive. True enough, Congress had refused to endorse either naval expansion or immediate taxation and had failed to arm and classify the militia or give the president authority to appoint the U.S. Volunteer officers. Nevertheless, those measures that were adopted were more far-reaching than any since the Quasi-War. In less than four months, Congress had adopted measures to fill the ranks of the existing army, raise additional U.S. Regulars and Volunteers, call out the militia, purchase ordnance, fit out the navy, build coastal fortifications, and borrow money. Although not exactly what the administration had wanted, the program was nevertheless a giant step in the direction of war.

President James Madison (1751–1836) headed the nation during the War of 1812. He was not a strong leader and was unable to impose his will on either Congress or the country. As the chief architect of the restrictive system, he preferred peaceful methods for upholding the nation’s rights in the war-torn world, but by 1812 he had concluded that more forceful measures were needed. (J. A. Spencer, History of the United States)

The Henry Affair

The War Hawks hoped that their legislative program would promote patriotism and prepare the American people psychologically and militarily for war. President Madison hoped for the same result, and he used the powers of his office to stimulate the war spirit further. On March 9, 1812, as the war program was nearing completion, the president informed Congress that a British plot to incite disunion in New England had been uncovered. The central figure in this plot was a handsome, if simpleminded and pretentious, Irishman by the name of John Henry.[55]

Born in 1777, Henry had immigrated to the United States in 1798. After spending several years in New England, he had moved to Montreal, apparently to pursue the fur-trading business. In 1808 he took a business trip to New England and sent back reports on the state of affairs to British officials in Canada. The following year Sir James Craig, the governor-general of Canada, commissioned Henry to make another trip to New England. War seemed imminent, and Craig wanted more information, particularly on the prospect of exploiting Federalist opposition.

After returning from his second mission, Henry received £200 (about $900) in compensation. Regarding this sum as wholly inadequate, he spent the next two years in England and Canada seeking additional remuneration. He reportedly asked for £32,000 (around $130,000) but would settle for an office yielding £500 (roughly $2,000) a year. Disillusioned with his lack of success, he fell in with a French rogue who styled himself Count Edward de Crillon but who was actually a clever con man named Paul Emile Soubiran. Crillon persuaded Henry to try to sell his correspondence to the United States government. The two adventurers came to America, secured a letter of introduction from Governor Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, and then proceeded to Washington.[56] There they persuaded the administration to buy the documents for $50,000—the entire budget of the secret service fund. The bargain was sealed on February 8, 1812, but the documents were kept under wraps for another month to give Henry time to leave the country.

Convinced that Henry’s papers constituted “formal proof of the Cooperation between the Eastern Junto & the Br[itish] Cabinet,”[57] Madison sent the documents to Congress. In a covering letter, he claimed that they showed that Britain had dispatched a secret agent to New England to promote disaffection and destroy the Union.[58] This was an exaggeration. Although Henry was authorized to put disaffected Federalists in touch with officials in Canada, his primary mission was simply “to obtain the most accurate information of the true state of affairs in that part of the Union.”[59]

The National Intelligencer expressed hope that Henry’s papers would “become a bond of union against a common foe,” but their effect was just the opposite.[60] Initially, Republicans greeted news of the plot with indignation, Federalists with embarrassment and chagrin. According to a Republican observer, when the letters were read in the House, one Federalist “began to kick and squirm,” a second “looked pale—walked the floor in haste,” while “great drops of sweat” ran down the face of a third.[61] But closer examination soon revealed that Henry had implicated no one. He had shown his credentials to no one, and he had put no one in touch with British officials in Canada. According to one Republican, the Federalists at first “seemed astonished, but the next day they came to the house quite in a passion.” After a night’s reflection, they were “as mad as they could be.”[62]

When the House sought to question Henry, Monroe revealed that the Irishman had left the country and had been promised immunity from interrogation anyway.[63] When the Senate asked if any Americans were implicated in Henry’s plot, Monroe conceded that the administration was “not in possession of any names.”[64] Moreover, by tracing the Treasury warrants used to pay Henry, Federalists discovered that the documents had been purchased—rather than freely given, as Henry’s covering letter had implied. This only added to the Federalists’ outrage and to the embarrassment of Republicans.[65]

Federalists considered the whole affair a tawdry political gimmick. A Massachusetts congressman called the publication of the documents “an electioneering trick, calculated for the meridian of Massachusetts.”[66] As if to prove him right, Republican newspapers tried to make political capital out of the affair, and one congressman expressed regret that the documents had not been made public sooner to help Republicans seeking office in New Hampshire.[67]

The Henry affair proved to be a tempest in a teapot. The letters were hardly worth $50,000 and scarcely a cause for war. It was common practice in those days for governments to use amateur spies to secure information from potentially hostile nations. Because of Canada’s weakness vis-à-vis the United States, British officials had employed secret agents on several occasions, and during the war scare that followed the Chesapeake affair in 1807, the United States had returned the favor.[68] The real significance of the Henry affair was not that it demonstrated British perfidy or Federalist disloyalty but that it showed the administration’s determination to whip up support for its war policy. “We have made use of Henry’s documents,” Monroe told the French minister, “as a last means of exciting the nation and Congress.”[69]

The Pre-War Embargo

Just as the dust raised by the Henry affair was settling, Congress took another step toward war by enacting a ninety-day embargo. This measure was adopted at the insistence of the War Hawks, who considered it a forerunner to war. In mid-March Clay had urged the administration to recommend a short-term embargo to be followed by war unless the U.S. Sloop Hornet (20 guns), which was expected from Europe shortly, brought news of British concessions. The administration was unresponsive, but Clay kept up the pressure.[70] Finally, on April 1, the president sent a message to Congress recommending a sixty-day embargo.[71] A bill was rushed through Congress in three days, although the Senate extended the embargo to ninety days.[72] Shortly thereafter, a non-exportation act was adopted as a companion measure.[73] Together these laws prohibited American ships from clearing for foreign ports and barred the export of all goods and specie by land or by sea.

The War Hawks insisted that the embargo was designed to protect American property, that its purpose was to keep ships and cargoes in port pending a declaration of war. “It is to be viewed,” said Clay, “as a direct precursor to war.”[74] But some Republicans supported the embargo as a coercive instrument—as a continuation of the old restrictive system.[75] In addition, some members of the Senate voted to extend the embargo to ninety days because they saw the measure as a negotiating instrument or wished to put off war as long as possible.[76]

The proceedings on the embargo were conducted in secret, but someone (probably John Randolph) leaked word even before the bill was reported from committee. News of the measure soon spread to merchants in Baltimore—perhaps through the agency of Samuel Smith. Calhoun, who thought no one should enjoy an advantage from privileged information, notified Federalist congressmen of the measure, and they sent expresses to northern cities to alert their constituents. Hence, by the time the embargo actually became law, practically everyone in the country already knew about it.[77]

News of the embargo led to a flurry of activity as merchants in virtually every port rushed to get their ships to sea. Freight rates jumped 20 percent, and many vessels were wholly loaded in two days. In Philadelphia shipowners offered seamen $40 a month and in Baltimore as much as $50—which was twice the usual rate. Close to 140 ships cleared from New York City alone, and Boston, reported one merchant, “is all confusion and bustle—& no attention is paid to its being Sunday.”[78] Republicans no less than Federalists took part in the frenzied activity. “In this hurly burley to palsy the arm of the government,” Niles’ Register conceded, “justice compels us to say, that all parties united.”[79]

Mixed War Signals

The rush to get ships to sea made a mockery of the embargo, which was supposed to protect American vessels by keeping them in port. “The great body of the people,” said Niles’ Register, “have acted, as though an adjustment of differences with Great Britain, instead of an appeal to the sword, was at hand.”[80] Insurance rates—a good indication of public expectations—remained low in early 1812, even for ships sailing to Great Britain.[81] “We hear from all quarters,” wrote William Lowndes in late March, “that the people do not expect war.” “Many people, even Republicans,” wrote William Plumer in May, “do not yet believe the govt is in reality preparing for actual war.”[82]

Federalists were particularly skeptical of the war talk. In a highly publicized statement made three years earlier, Josiah Quincy had claimed that the Republican majority “could not be kicked into” war. “No insult, however gross, offered to us by either France or Great Britain,” he said, “could force this majority into the declaration of war.”[83] Nothing in the years that followed had altered Quincy’s opinion. Even after the War Congress had assembled, Quincy claimed that the talk of war was “ludicrous” and that even “the highest toned of the war party” conceded privately that hostilities were unlikely.[84] Most Federalists shared this view. The Republicans, claimed the Boston Gazette, “are playing a hypocritical part.” Their object was “to provoke the Federalists to their accustomed opposition” so that they could retreat to the restrictive system with the plea that the “British” faction opposed stronger measures.[85]

The government was partly responsible for this skepticism. Talk of war in the past had never led to hostilities, and the signals emanating from the administration were still mixed. As late as March 31, Monroe, sounding very much like a proponent of the “scarecrow” strategy, told the House Foreign Relations Committee that the war preparations were designed to “appeal to the feelings of the foreign Govt.”[86] At the time Monroe was writing a series of editorials for the Washington National Intelligencer, but not until April 14 did he call unmistakably for war.[87] Ten days later, Madison told Jefferson that “great differences of opinion” still existed over the timing and the form of hostilities.[88]

Perhaps hoping not to tip its hand, the administration kept the British minister in the dark. When Augustus J. Foster asked if the embargo would be followed by war, Madison demurred, claiming that its purpose was to protect commerce and that “one embargo may be inoculated upon another.”[89] This made the embargo seem like a continuation of the restrictive system. As late as May 10, Foster was so baffled by the signals he was receiving that he wrote to a British consul: “So absolutely are they here without Chart or Compass that I really am at a loss to give you news.”[90]

Republicans in Congress were also sending mixed signals. “The war fever,” reported a House Federalist, “has its hot and cold fits.”[91] It was well known that some Republicans had voted for the embargo as a continuation of the restrictive system, which undermined the War Hawks’ claim that it was a preliminary to war. Moreover, members of both houses showed signs of weariness from the long session and were anxious to return home. “I am so fatigued with the doings and not doings of Congress,” said Nathaniel Macon in March, “that I sincerely wish myself at home and free from all public engagements.”[92]

This sentiment was so prevalent that both houses considered a spring recess even though, as one Republican warned, it would “damp the public Spirit, & paralyze the energies of the nation.”[93] The proposed recess was defeated, but many members went home anyway.[94] “The House of Representatives is now thin,” reported Macon, “and the members are daily leaving the city.” “It is with great difficulty,” added James A. Bayard, that “we can get or preserve a quorum in the Senate.”[95]

A rumor was also circulated by a Baltimore newspaper that a special diplomatic mission would be sent to England to avert war. The report, which was widely credited and was repeated as far away as London, said that Great Britain had offered to resurrect the Monroe–Pinkney Treaty, with certain modifications favorable to the United States, as a basis for preserving peace. With rumors like this afloat, it is hardly surprising that so many people remained skeptical about the likelihood of war.[96]

British Conciliation

Great Britain, like the United States, was also sending mixed signals, but she was heading in the opposite direction. While the United States was moving toward war, the British were hoping through a series of conciliatory gestures to avert hostilities. The first step in this direction was the settlement of the Chesapeake affair in late 1811. After more than four years of sparring, the two powers finally managed to divorce this issue from others and reach a settlement. The British agreed to disavow the attack, pay reparations, and restore the two surviving Americans (the third having died in a Halifax hospital).[97] But this problem had festered for so long that its resolution gave little satisfaction to most Americans. Returning the impressed seamen, said the Baltimore Whig, was “like restoring a hair after fracturing the skull.” It was “only a sop,” added the Lexington Reporter, “to stop the mouth of Congress.”[98]

In the spring of 1812, the British navy began to treat American ships and seamen with new tact. The Admiralty ordered all naval officers to take “especial care” to avoid clashes with the American navy and to exercise “all possible forbearance” toward American citizens.[99] The commanding officers at both Halifax and Bermuda ordered their ships to keep clear of the American coast to avoid incidents.[100] This was particularly significant because Americans found the search and seizure of ships near the coast so infuriating.

In May 1812, on the very eve of war, the British offered to give the United States an equal share of the license trade with the Continent. Inasmuch as Britain had issued an average of 10,000 licenses a year since 1807, this proposal was significant.[101] In effect, the British were offering to suspend the Orders-in-Council in practice if American merchants would conduct their trade with Europe under British licenses. But the administration summarily rejected this proposal, believing that accepting it would be tantamount to surrendering American independence.[102]

The British made their greatest concession in June 1812 just as the United States was declaring war. On June 16—two days before the declaration of war—Lord Castlereagh, the British foreign secretary, announced in Parliament that the Orders-in-Council would be suspended if the United States dropped its ban on British imports. A week later, without waiting for a response from the United States, the British scrapped the whole system of blockades and licenses.[103] Had this decision been made a couple of months earlier, it most likely would have averted war. Madison later indicated that the declaration of war “would have been stayed” if he had known about the repeal of the Orders, and Monroe agreed.[104] But the news of the British action did not reach Washington until August 13, and by then the die was cast.

It was not only slow communication that doomed the British policy of conciliation. At no time did the British announce a new policy toward the United States or even hint that concessions might be made. They themselves were not consciously changing the direction of their policy. They simply offered each concession on an ad hoc basis. As a result, they failed to give adequate publicity to some of their concessions (such as pulling their warships off the coast), and most of the others were made too late to be effective. In short, their policy of conciliation failed because it was not carried out in a timely or thoughtful manner.

American officials were also responsible for the failure of conciliation. The American minister in London had returned home in 1811, leaving only a chargé d’affaires in his place.[105] Thus there was no ranking diplomat who might move freely in British circles, no one to perceive that support for the Orders-in-Council was crumbling. Moreover, Republican leaders were so blinded by their distrust of Great Britain and so burdened by the ideological legacy of the Revolution that they saw significant British concessions as meaningless gestures. The offer to share the license trade, for example, opened the door to a lucrative trade with the Continent, but Republicans saw the proposal as simply a snare designed to recolonize the United States and restore the old navigation system.

The President Recommends War

As much as they distrusted the British, Republican leaders still hoped that the Hornet would bring news of concessions. The long-overdue ship finally reached New York on May 19, 1812. Three days later the dispatches it carried were in the hands of officials in Washington.[106] The news, however, was doubly disappointing. Although unofficial reports suggested a softening of British policy, official statements indicated a stubborn adherence to the Orders-in-Council. The news from France was no better. Reports of continued French depredations had been filtering in for months, and American officials were desperately seeking a definitive statement on the suspension of the Continental Decrees. But no such pronouncement was forthcoming.[107] “The Hornet arrives from france,” a Republican senator confided to his diary, “and brings to me satisfactory proof of the perfidy of that Govt.”[108] For Americans hoping for concessions from at least one of the belligerents, the Hornet’s news was disappointing indeed.

The War Hawks had long since agreed that if the Hornet did not bring news of British concessions, war would be declared.[109] Although the Constitution entrusted the decision to Congress, the War Hawks wanted the president to take the lead. Madison did not disappoint them. On June 1, less than ten days after the Hornet’s dispatches had arrived, he sent a secret message to Congress on the subject of Anglo-American relations.[110]

Madison’s message was a well-organized indictment of Great Britain for acts hostile to the United States. The British were arraigned for impressing American seamen; violating American waters; establishing illegal blockades, particularly “the sweeping system of blockades, under the name of Orders in Council”; employing a secret agent to subvert the Union; and exerting a malicious influence over the Indians in the Old Northwest.[111]

The emphasis in the message was on maritime issues. Fully two-thirds of the indictment was devoted to the Orders-in-Council and other blockades. The issues were not presented in the order of their importance (since the Orders were third), but rather in a rough chronological order that put the most galling grievances first. Hence impressment and the violation of American waters headed the list.

In places Madison’s message echoed the Declaration of Independence, a reflection of the Republican view that a second war of independence was necessary to end Britain’s quasi-colonial practices of regulating American ships and impressing American seamen. Fearing the charge of executive influence, Madison did not recommend a declaration of war, but the thrust of his message was unmistakable. “We behold . . . on the side of Great Britain,” he said, “a state of war against the United States; and on the side of the United States, a state of peace towards Britain.”[112]

Congress Votes for War

Madison’s message was referred to the House Foreign Relations Committee, which issued its report behind closed doors through Acting Chairman Calhoun on June 3. The report, which was mainly the work of Calhoun, was more spirited in tone than Madison’s message, though the content was similar, with the emphasis again on the Orders. “The mad ambition, the lust of power, and commercial avarice of Great Britain,” said the report, “have left to neutral nations an alternative only between the base surrender of their rights, and a manly vindication of them.” The report closed with a plea for “an immediate appeal to arms.”[113]

Shortly after reading this report, Calhoun introduced a war bill that had been drafted by Attorney General William Pinkney.[114] Federalists sought to lift the veil of secrecy so that they could debate the merits of the bill publicly. Although many people suspected that Congress was considering a declaration of war, the Republicans were fearful of debating such an explosive issue openly. Unable to prevail, the Federalists decided to remain silent and to express their views only with their votes. As a result, the Republicans were able to push the bill through the House in only two days—a remarkably short time for so crucial a measure.[115]

In the Senate the bill ran into more trouble.[116] There was considerable support here for limiting the war to the high seas, a sentiment shared by at least some members of the cabinet. On the very day that Madison sent his war message to Congress (a message that in no way precluded limited war), Monroe penned a note to Gallatin indicating his own views. “I am convinced,” he wrote, “that it is very important to attempt, at present, the maritime war only.”[117] Gallatin, who feared the effects of war on the nation’s finances, agreed, and William Lowndes later claimed that other members of the cabinet shared this view, too.[118]

A limited maritime war in the tradition of ’98 appealed to many people because it offered a cheap and direct means of vindicating American rights. The nation would avoid the costs of an extended land war, and the president could end the conflict by executive order without resorting to the sort of time-consuming negotiations that drew out so many wars. The only problem with this strategy was that the British were far more vulnerable in sparsely populated Canada than on the high seas. A maritime war might win some concessions, but it could hardly end in decisive victory.[119]

James Monroe (1758–1831) joined Madison’s cabinet on the eve of war and during the contest helped shape policy as secretary of state and secretary of war. Although he was competent, on occasion his judgment was clouded by his presidential ambitions. (Based on a portrait by Gilbert Stuart. Library of Congress)

Although some Republicans favored maritime war, the Federalists were the most vocal proponents of this strategy. Doubtless recalling the successes of the Quasi-War, the Federalists over the years had repeatedly called for arming American merchantmen.[120] Their aim was not to resist British cruisers (which would have been impractical for lightly armed merchantmen) but to oppose the privateers sent out by France and her allies. Between 1806 and 1810, the leading proponent of this strategy, Samuel W. Dana of Connecticut, introduced resolutions in Congress on four separate occasions to authorize merchantmen to arm for defense. Dana was also the driving force behind a pair of Senate bills (introduced in the spring of 1812) that would accomplish the same end.[121] Most Federalists supported these bills (which passed the Senate but were buried in a House committee) as well as every proposal to expand the navy and to build coastal fortifications. Most agreed with Quincy that the nation had a duty to provide “systematic protection of our maritime rights, by maritime means.”[122]

No doubt some Federalists supported maritime war simply as the lesser of two evils—not desirable in itself but preferable to full-scale war. Yet for most a war restricted to the high seas offered the best means of upholding the nation’s rights, especially if (as was widely assumed) France were included in the reprisals. This would enable Federalist merchants to choose their enemy. Unleashing armed merchantmen against both belligerents, said the Baltimore Federal Republican in a widely reprinted editorial, “meets our peculiar approbation.”[123]

The Senate referred the war bill to a select committee, which reported it with little change on June 8. The following day, however, Republican Andrew Gregg of Pennsylvania moved to send the bill back to committee with instructions to amend it so that it merely authorized warships and privateers to carry out reprisals against Britain. This motion carried by a 17–13 vote. Three days later, however, when the modified bill was reported from committee, the Senate reversed itself. A motion to accept the committee’s changes failed by a tie vote, 16–16, when the president pro tem, John Gaillard of South Carolina, cast his vote against it. The opponents of maritime war prevailed because one Republican (William Branch Giles) changed his vote, while two others who had not voted on Gregg’s motion (Richard Brent of Virginia and Jonathan Robinson of Vermont) now voted to reject the committee’s changes. The tie vote meant that the original bill was restored.[124]

Several additional attempts were made to limit the war to the high seas, but these failed. Amendments to include France in a limited maritime war—a “triangular war”—failed, too.[125] Aside from the drawbacks of fighting two powerful foes at once, such a war would deny American warships and privateers the use of French ports.[126] Although proponents of full-scale war prevailed in the Senate, the outcome was long in doubt. It took the Senate two weeks to complete its deliberations, which prompted one member of the House to exclaim that “the suspense we are in is worse than hell—!!!”[127] Finally, on June 17, the Senate approved the original bill by a 19–13 vote.[128] The following day Madison signed the measure into law. Thus on June 18, 1812, the War of 1812 began.[129]

The vote on the war bill—79–49 in the House and 19–13 in the Senate—was the closest vote on any formal declaration of war in American history.[130] Only 61 percent of the voting members supported the bill. Most representatives and senators from Pennsylvania and the South and West voted for war, while most from the North and East voted against it. But the sectional breakdown was really a reflection of party strength, for the vote on the war bill was essentially a party vote. About 81 percent of the Republicans in both houses of Congress voted for the measure (98–23), while all the Federalists voted against it (39–0).

Republican War Aims

What did the Republicans hope to accomplish with war? Their chief aim was to win concessions from the British on the maritime issues, particularly the Orders-in-Council and impressment. Throughout the winter and spring of 1812, these issues had dominated almost every discussion of American grievances, both in and out of Congress. In the language of the day, war was undertaken primarily to secure “Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights.” The advocates of war also hoped to put an end to British influence over American Indians by conquering Canada or at least breaking the power of the British there. But this objective loomed large only in the West, and even in that region many people gave primacy to the maritime issues because they blamed a slump in commodity prices on the Orders-in-Council.[131]

Republicans also saw the struggle as a second war of independence—a contest that would vindicate American sovereignty and preserve republican institutions by demonstrating to people both at home and abroad that the United States could uphold its rights. In addition, the Republicans saw war as a means of preserving power, unifying their party, and silencing their critics. Political considerations loomed large because (like the Federalists in 1798) the Republicans in 1812 identified the interests of their party with those of the country.

In sum, the Republicans went to war in 1812 to achieve a variety of closely related diplomatic, ideological, and political objectives.[132] The need to take some action was so urgent that Republicans did not wait for their war preparations to mature. This appalled some members of the party, including War Hawk Peter B. Porter, who told the secretary of war in April that it would “be an act of Madness fatal to the administration, to declare war at this time.”[133] Most Republicans, however, were willing to take the risk. In the words of Congressman Robert Wright, they were willing “to get married, & buy the furniture afterwards.”[134]

For some Republicans—members of the “scarecrow” faction—the risks posed by war did not seem great because they expected the British to cave in to American demands. Monroe expressed a common view when he complained that the British had not taken the American threat seriously. “We have been so long dealing in the small way, of embargoes, non-intercourse and non-importation, with menaces of War &c that the British Government has not believed us. Thus the argument of War, with its consequences, has not had its due weight with that Government.” A New Hampshire senator made the same point more emphatically. “I have long since adopted the opinion,” Charles Cutts wrote, “that if Great Britain would be once convinced that war with this country would be inevitable unless she receded from her unjust pretensions all causes of irritation would be be [sic] speedily removed.”[135] Given the speed with which Madison later sent out peace feelers, he too may have expected a bloodless victory.[136] In this respect, the declaration of war was a bluff, designed to shock the British into concessions.

The Debate Over Trade Restrictions

After the decision for war was made, Congress remained in session to deal with related matters. The most pressing problem was the future of the restrictive system. Although economic coercion had often been defended as an alternative to war—as a peaceful means of upholding the nation’s rights—most Republicans were reluctant to give up the system even after war had been declared. The president himself was the chief architect of the restrictive system, and the war in no way dampened his ardor for these measures.[137] Even some of the War Hawks shared his views. Six months into the war, Henry Clay conceded that the nation might be defeated in battle. “But if you cling to the restrictive system,” he said, “it is incessantly working in your favor,” and “if persisted in, the restrictive system, aiding the war, would break down the present [British] Ministry, and lead to a consequent honorable peace.”[138]

Although the ninety-day embargo and non-exportation act were due to expire in July, the non-importation law of 1811 would remain in force unless Congress acted. Ever since the embargo had gone into effect, the Treasury Department had been flooded with requests from merchants seeking permission to send ships abroad to bring their property home. Gallatin asked local customs officials to investigate the legitimacy of these requests, and, if they seemed valid, he granted the necessary permits.[139] But because of a specie shortage in Britain, property could be repatriated from that country only in the form of British-made goods, which would violate the non-importation law. Many people, however, expected Congress to suspend the law, both to enhance the nation’s stock of goods and to secure additional revenue to pay for the war.[140]

The drive to modify the non-importation law had the support of the Federalists and commercial Republicans, but it was the South Carolina War Hawks who spearheaded the drive. John C. Calhoun claimed that the non-importation law would “debilitate the springs of war,” and Langdon Cheves insisted that its suspension would be “a war measure in the strongest sense of the word.”[141] Both to reconcile merchants to the war and to enhance the nation’s war-making capacity, the South Carolina War Hawks sought to repeal the non-importation law in early 1812. Their proposal was defeated, at least partly because some Republicans considered it premature.[142] The day after the declaration of war, Cheves renewed the struggle, introducing a bill to permit the importation of most British goods.[143] Cheves sought to put his bill in the best possible light by portraying it as an anti-tax measure, and he produced a letter from Gallatin showing that several classes of the proposed war taxes—including the hated internal duties—could be dispensed with if non-importation were lifted.[144] The House, however, postponed the measure by a five-vote margin.[145] The following day Republican William M. Richardson of Massachusetts offered a resolution to permit all British imports, but this proposal went down to defeat when Speaker Clay, announcing his “decided opposition to the measure,” refused to break a tie vote.[146] The defeat of these measures showed that the Republican majority was determined to use commercial restrictions as well as armed force to bring the British to terms.

Having settled this matter, Congress turned to a closely related one: the complex and murky issue of trading with the enemy. There were many Americans, merchants and farmers alike, who opposed any legislation that would limit their wartime economic opportunities. Thomas Jefferson, for one, thought that the preservation of agricultural prosperity was vital to the success of the war policy. “To keep open sufficient markets,” he told Madison, “is the very first object towards maintaining the popularity of the war.”[147] Toward this end, Jefferson was willing to sanction a broad range of trade with the enemy under special licenses. Madison, however, took a different view. There was an enormous demand for American grain in Spain because of the presence of British troops there, and Madison had no objection to feeding these soldiers. But he preferred to rely on neutral ships to carry the grain, believing that the use of licenses was “pregnant with abuses of the worst sort.”[148] Madison’s solution would please American farmers but not those merchants who engaged in the carrying trade.

Shortly after the declaration of war, Calhoun, who favored minimal restrictions, introduced a narrow enemy trade bill that merely prohibited the export of war material and provisions to Canada—the only place where British and American armies were likely to meet. As it made its way through Congress, however, the bill was broadened considerably. The final version prohibited not only exports to Canada but also any seaborne trade with the British Empire. Only one concession was made to the anti-restrictionists: the bill did not prohibit the use of British licenses to trade in non-British ports. This assured that the shipment of provisions to the Spanish Peninsula in American bottoms would continue.[149]

The Revenue Shortfall

Another issue that Congress had to deal with before adjourning was that of finance. The $11 million loan authorized in March had brought in only $6.5 million.[150] Hence the administration faced a revenue shortfall. To remedy this, Congress authorized the issue of $5 million in treasury notes. These were one-year notes bearing 5.4 percent. Although not legal tender, the notes (like those of the old national bank) could be used to pay taxes or to buy public lands. They were expected to serve as a kind of paper money that government creditors would accept in lieu of other forms of payment.[151]

Congress also passed a bill raising the customs duties. The taxes on imported goods (which hitherto had averaged about 17 percent) were doubled, a surcharge of 10 percent was imposed on goods imported in foreign bottoms, and the duties on foreign ships (heretofore 50 cents a ton) were quadrupled.[152] The Republicans, however, postponed any action on the internal taxes.[153] “It was admitted by the ruling party, in debate,” said a Virginia Federalist, “that to impose them now, would endanger their success at the next election.”[154]

Federalists raised a howl of protest, claiming that Republican tax policy discriminated against the North, where most of the nation’s imports were consumed. “Is it just and fair,” asked Congressman Harmanus Bleecker of New York, “to abandon the internal taxes and impose so much of the burden of the war upon the people of the Northern and Eastern States, the majority of whom are known to be opposed to it?”[155] In effect, the region that opposed the war was being saddled with taxes to pay for it.

Federalists also argued that Republican financial policies were irresponsible. Raising the specter of runaway inflation, Abijah Bigelow of Massachusetts said: “The public credit must be supported, or you put at hazard the best interests of the country—you hazard, indeed, the very existence of the Government.”[156] Certainly the refusal to adopt a broadly based tax program coupled with the failure of the loan and the issue of treasury notes augured ill for Gallatin’s whole plan of war finance. Indeed, within two years public credit collapsed, and the result was financial chaos.

Final Measures

Congress closed out the session by establishing regulations to govern privateers, appropriating an additional $500,000 for coastal fortifications, and giving the president the authority he had earlier sought to appoint the officers of the U.S. Volunteer corps.[157] Congress finally adjourned on July 6, 1812. “The two Houses,” said the Boston Yankee, “ended their fatiguing and tedious Session of eight months continuance, on Monday Evening.”[158] No doubt most Congressmen were thoroughly exhausted, having adopted 143 laws in a session that was longer than any since the Quasi-War.[159]

The National Intelligencer predicted that historians would rank the Twelfth Congress next to “the immortal Congress” of 1776. “Under the auspices of the one this nation sprung into existence; under those of the other it will have been preserved from disgraceful recolonization.”[160] Although the comparison with ’76 was exaggerated, it illustrated how difficult it was for Republicans to shed the ideological baggage of the Revolution. For most Republicans, the War of 1812 was very much a second war of independence.[161] Whether the United States could actually vindicate its independence against a foe as powerful as Great Britain, however, remained to be seen.

Chapter 3

The Baltimore Riots

According to Samuel G. Goodrich, a Connecticut Federalist who later gained fame writing children’s books, news of the declaration of war hit “like a thunderbolt.”[1] Everywhere people were taken by surprise. Ever since 1805 the nation’s leaders had talked of war, and yet always the result was more commercial restrictions. Many people—Republicans and Federalists alike—assumed that war would again be averted, that some excuse would be found to continue diplomatic negotiations.

Reactions to War

Most Republicans found the news exhilarating. In Washington, an observer reported “felicitations, shaking of hands, and rejoicings as were never exhibited here before.”[2] In Kentucky, there was much cheering, muskets and cannons were fired, and houses were illuminated.[3] In Pennsylvania, “pleasure beam[ed] in the eye of every friend to the government,” and in Baltimore people “heartily greeted” a public reading of the president’s war message.[4] Not all Republicans shared this enthusiasm, but even the pessimists were relieved that at long last a decisive step had been taken. “War is declared,” said Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts; “God be praised, Our country is safe.”[5]

Federalists, by contrast, greeted the news with alarm and foreboding. In New England, bells were rung, shops closed, and flags hung at half-mast.[6] In the middle and southern states, Federalists seemed confused and unsure of what to do. In New York they talked of pursuing a policy of benevolent neutrality, of not obstructing war measures, and in Pennsylvania they considered supporting the war.[7] Many agreed with Felix H. Gilbert of Maryland that even though the declaration of war was an “astounding act of Madness” everyone ought to “rally round the Standard” and contribute to the nation’s success.[8] “Honor, and patriotism, and love of country,” said the Philadelphia Freeman’s Journal, “will now steel every honest heart and nerve every arm, to support our country through her present difficulties.”[9]

This proclamation was issued by the president the day after war was declared. Widely distributed as a handbill and reproduced in newspapers, it helped spread the word that the nation was now at war with Great Britain. (Library of Congress)

Federalists in Congress also talked of supporting the war. On the eve of the final vote, Senator James Lloyd of Massachusetts told Republicans that “whatever may be the issue of your vote, I, for one, will be found in the ranks of my country.”[10] After the decision was made, Lloyd and other Federalists reportedly declared “that as the die is now cast, we must all hands play for our country.”[11] For a brief moment it looked like the opposition would simply melt away. “The opposition to Government,” exulted a Republican paper, “is crumbling to pieces like a ‘rope of sand.’”[12]

Republican celebrations, however, were premature. In New England Federalists were never reconciled to the war policy, and in their speeches, sermons, and newspapers, their criticism was unrestrained. The Massachusetts House called the decision for war an act “of inconceivable folly and desperation” that was “hostile to your interests, menacing to your liberties, and revolting to your feelings.” The Connecticut House said a nation that declared war “without fleets, without armies, with an impoverished treasury, with a frontier by sea and land extending many hundreds of miles, feebly defended . . . hath not ‘first counted the cost.’”[13]

The best way to bring the war to an end, New England Federalists believed, was to oppose it, using every legal means available. The doctrine of non-opposition was considered “heresy” in New England, Harrison Gray Otis of Massachusetts told a friend in South Carolina. The declaration of war was like any other bad law. “It must be obey[e]d but its mischief may be and ought to be freely discuss[e]d and all due means taken to procure its repeal.”[14] New England Federalists attacked not only the war but also those responsible for it. “A president who has made this war, is not qualified to make peace,” said the Massachusetts House. “Organize a peace party throughout your country, and let all party distinctions vanish.”[15]

These words were taken to heart by Federalists elsewhere. Several of the leading newspapers in the middle and southern states—the Baltimore Federal Republican, the Alexandria Gazette, the Philadelphia United States’ Gazette, and the New York Evening Post—already had come out against the war, and they were soon joined by the Charleston Courier.[16] Instead of crumbling, opposition to the war got stronger as the summer progressed. Although there were some exceptions, by the fall of 1812 Federalists in the middle and southern states had joined their friends in New England to present a united front against the war.

Federalists in Congress also closed ranks. Talk of supporting the war evaporated when Federalists in Washington saw what kind of war it was to be. Attempts to limit the war to the high seas and to include France in the hostilities had been defeated; the restrictive system had been retained and even expanded; and a tax program had been adopted that discriminated against the North. Under these circumstances Federalists in Congress lost all heart for supporting the war. Instead, they united against it.

Address of the Federalist Minority

House Federalists aired their views in a widely circulated address published shortly after the declaration of war. “An Address of Members of the House of Representatives . . . on the Subject of War with Great Britain” appeared in pamphlet form in more than twenty editions and was reprinted in virtually every Federalist newspaper. This document became a rallying point for Federalists across the nation. Written by Josiah Quincy, it was signed by all but two of the thirty-six House Federalists. The only exceptions were Robert Le Roy Livingston, who had left Congress before the declaration of war to take a commission in the army, and Daniel Sheffey, a former Republican who still occasionally expressed independent views.[17]

The address opened with an attack on Republican parliamentary tactics: the use of the previous question to cut off debate, the employment of secret sessions to conceal proceedings, and the arbitrary treatment of motions offered by the minority. House Federalists claimed that these practices posed a threat to republican government. “Principles more hostile . . . to . . . Representative liberty,” they said, “cannot easily be conceived.”[18]

Next the address explored the “momentous question of war with Great Britain.” Although conceding that the Orders-in-Council and impressment were legitimate grievances, the Federalists argued that these issues would neither justify nor be remedied by a Canadian war. Echoing a familiar refrain, they asked: “How will war upon the land protect commerce upon the ocean?” A far better course, they said, would be to lift the restrictions on trade and unleash American merchantmen. “It is well known that from the gallantry of our seamen, if merchant vessels were allowed to arm and associate for self defence, they would be able to repel many unlawful aggressions.”[19]

Instead, the nation was “rushing into difficulties, with little calculation about the means, and little concern about the consequences.” To declare war against such a powerful foe with the people divided and the nation unprepared was to invite disaster. “Let us not be deceived,” the address warned. “A war of invasion may invite a retort of invasion.” Moreover, war against Great Britain might throw the nation into the arms of France. “It cannot be concealed, that to engage in the present war against England is to place ourselves on the side of France, and expose us to the vassalage of States serving under the banners of the French Emperor.” War with Britain, the address concluded, was unnecessary and unwise. It was required by neither “any moral duty” nor “any political expediency.”[20]

Republican Pleas for Unity

The Washington National Intelligencer published a reply to the address, but it was so labored and tedious that the editor almost apologized for wasting the space.[21] As far as most Republicans were concerned, the time for debate was over. Republicans had always assumed that war would silence their critics, and since the previous winter they had ominously hinted at what Federalists might expect if they refused to cooperate. Once war is declared, said Felix Grundy in the halls of Congress, the only question would be “are you for your country or against it.” Whenever that decision is made, echoed the Washington National Intelligencer, “he that is not for us must be considered as against us and treated accordingly.”[22] One of the blessings of war, Niles’ Register asserted, is that it would unify the nation and “weed our country of traitors.” “A war will prevent all clamors except from tories,” added a Philadelphia Republican, “and we shall know how to dispose of them.”[23]

After the decision for war was made, Republicans renewed their pleas for unity. “This is no time for debating the propriety of a war,” said the National Intelligencer; “WAR IS DECLARED, and every patriot heart must unite in its support.” “The rightful authority has decreed,” said the Republican-dominated Massachusetts Senate. “Opposition must cease.” The Rubicon has been passed, added the Augusta Chronicle; “he who is not for us is against us.”[24]

Many of these pleas carried an open or implicit threat of violence. “When war is declared,” said the Baltimore American, “there are but two parties, Citizen Soldiers and Enemies—Americans and Tories.” The Wilmington American Watchman warned “tories” to watch their step lest they “light a funeral pile on which they themselves will be consumed.” And John G. Jackson, a former Virginia congressman who was the president’s son-in-law, said: “The war will separate the partisans of England from the honest federalists & Tar & Feathers will cure their penchant for our enemy.”[25]

Shortly before the declaration of war, Robert Wright, a former governor of Maryland and member of the War Congress, had warned that if “the signs of treason and civil war discover themselves in any quarter of the American Empire . . . the evil would soon be radically cured, by hemp [for hanging] and confiscation [of property].”[26] Thomas Jefferson echoed these views in a letter written to Madison shortly after the declaration of war. “The Federalists,” he said, “are poor devils here, not worthy of notice. A barrel of tar to each state South of the Patomac will keep all in order, & that will be freely contributed without troubling government. To the North they will give you more trouble. You may there have to apply the rougher drastics of Govr. Wright, hemp and confiscation.”[27] Perhaps Jefferson was speaking in jest, but other Republicans took the matter more seriously. Most saw war in the same light as the Boston Yankee—as a way to “insure peace at home, if not with the world.”[28]

Baltimore’s Federal Republican

Feeling against those who dared to oppose the war ran especially high in Baltimore. A rough and rowdy boomtown founded in 1729, Baltimore was the youngest of the big cities on the eastern seaboard and the only one that was firmly in the Republican camp. By the end of the eighteenth century, the city had become the entrepôt for the export of wheat and flour produced in the backcountry and had developed close ties with France. A large number of French refugees—mainly from Nova Scotia and Santo Domingo—lived in Baltimore, and the city traded extensively with both France and her West Indian colonies.[29]

By 1812 Baltimore had some 47,000 people—making it the third largest city in the nation—but it was still growing at an explosive pace.[30] A typical boomtown, the city suffered from a shortage of females—only 89 for every 100 males.[31] Although French refugees gave the city a veneer of civilization with their balls, dance halls, and finishing schools, underneath the city was turbulent. The many French, Irish, and Germans in the population hated Great Britain, and so too did most of the native-born Americans. These groups periodically rioted against Federalists or others thought to favor the British cause. Prominent Republicans condoned this violence and sometimes even took part. Samuel Smith, the city’s leading Republican, was implicated in more than one political brawl, and Governor Wright once pardoned several people convicted of tarring and feathering a British shoemaker.[32] Federalists considered Baltimore a dangerous example of democracy—the “head-quarters of mobocracy”—a reputation that persisted well into the nineteenth century.[33]

The principal target of Republican fury in 1812 was the Federal Republican, a spirited Federalist newspaper published by Alexander Contee Hanson and Jacob Wagner. Heir to a distinguished colonial name, Hanson had founded the Federal Republican in 1808 (when he was only twenty-two) and had consolidated it with Wagner’s North American the following year.[34] Together these men built their paper into one of the leading prints in the South. “The Federal party,” said a contemporary, “has long regarded it as a Telegraph to announce the movements of the Cabinet, and as an Oracle to pronounce the Sentiments of the wisest statesmen of the party.”[35] So intense was the paper’s Federalism and so vitriolic its style that local Republicans referred to it as “His majesty’s paper.”[36] “It is the most audacious, shameless, ‘lying Chronicle’ in the U. States,” said the Richmond Enquirer. The “seditious and anti-American” materials that it published, added the Baltimore Whig, “put decency to the blush and civic duty to defiance.”[37]

As early as 1808 Hanson had incurred the wrath of Baltimore Republicans with a trenchant editorial against the embargo. A lieutenant in the militia, he was court-martialed by his Republican superiors, who claimed that the editorial was “mutinous and highly reproachful to the President.”[38] Although Hanson escaped conviction, it was thereafter rumored that a $200 bounty had been offered to anyone who would tar and feather him.[39] Undeterred by such threats, Hanson continued to use his paper to expose Republican folly wherever he found it.

Alexander Contee Hanson (1786–1819) had built the Baltimore Federal Republican into one of the leading Federalist newspapers in the South when a mob tried to silence it in the summer of 1812. Although he continued to publish the paper and later served in Congress, Hanson never recovered from the internal injuries that he sustained at the hands of the mob. (Library of Congress)

As the nation moved closer to war in the spring of 1812, rumors began to circulate that the Federal Republican would suffer violence.[40] While rival papers like the Whig (which was controlled by Samuel Smith) and the Sun published inflammatory articles, the talk in the coffeehouses was “that if war was declared, the paper was so obnoxious that the editors must either alter its tone, or it must be stopped.”[41] Taking note of these threats, the Federal Republican said that Federalists would not be cowed into silence nor frightened into supporting a war that they considered unjust and unwise. Otherwise, “a war would put the constitution and all civil rights to sleep. Those who commenced it, would become dictators and despots, and the people their slaves.”[42]

The First Riot: Mob Rule

On June 20, two days after the declaration of war, the Federal Republican came out squarely against it. Calling the war “unnecessary,” “inexpedient,” and bearing “marks of undisguised foreign influence,” the editors asserted that they would use “every constitutional argument and every legal means” to oppose it. Alluding to the possibility of mob violence, they said they would “hazard every thing most dear” to prevent any attempt to establish “a system of terror and proscription.” If the regular authorities would not protect freedom of the press, the paper concluded, then Federalists would look to themselves.[43]

The paper’s defiant stand did not go unnoticed. Almost as soon as this issue hit the streets, rumors began to circulate that there would be violence. The following day, plans were laid at several beer gardens on Fell’s Point (the rougher section of town) to destroy the newspaper’s office on Gay Street.[44] The next evening, a crowd of several hundred men—mostly Irish, German, and native-born laborers from the Point—gathered at the office. Spurred on by a French apothecary named Philip Lewis, the crowd pulled down the frame building and destroyed the contents inside.[45]

City officials were apprised of the violence but were reluctant to intervene. Federalists asked one constable for help, but he replied that Wagner was “a rascal,” and that the mob “ought to put a rope round his neck, and draw him out of town, then hang him on the first tree they came to.”[46] Other officials, dragged to the scene by angry Federalists, were frightened by the mob. Although appalled by the violence, Mayor Edward Johnson was reluctant to call out the militia. Instead, he wandered through the crowd, timidly addressing one man after another with expressions like: “my dear fellow, you ought not to do so,” or “my dear fellow, you do not know the consequences of what you are doing.”[47]

When the mayor approached Lewis, the apothecary said: “Mr. Johnson, I know you very well, no body wants to hurt you; but the laws of the land must sleep, and the laws of nature and reason must prevail; that house is the Temple of Infamy, it is supported with English gold, and it must and shall come down to the ground!”[48] Having said this, Lewis returned to the business at hand, while the mayor and other officials retired from the scene.[49]

In the weeks that followed, mob violence continued to plague the city. One man was forced to flee town because he had reportedly said: “Damnation to the memory of Washington, and all who espouse his cause”; another, because he had said (whether as wish or prediction is unclear) that “the streets of Quebec would be paved with the bones of those troops who should march from the United States to attack Canada.”[50] An Irishman also had to flee because he had reportedly ridden express for the Federal Republican.[51] Mobs dismantled several ships in the harbor, convinced that they were loaded with provisions for Britain or her allies.[52] The city’s black people came in for a share of the abuse as well. Two houses in the black section of town were pulled down because their owners were thought to be sympathetic to Britain. A black church was also threatened but was saved when a detachment of militia was called out.[53]

Public officials were often present at these scenes but usually showed more interest in appeasing the mob than in dispersing it. On one occasion Mayor Johnson served on a search committee, hoping to save a house from destruction.[54] On another, customs collector James W. McCulloch refused to let a ship clear for Lisbon, declaring that “he would consider himself as accessory to treason” if he let her sail.[55] Except when the church was threatened, city officials refused to call out the militia. They were unwilling to risk their popularity, they were genuinely afraid of the mob, and they considered the militia unreliable anyway.

The Federalists’ Defiant Response

Federalists everywhere were appalled by the violence, fearing that it would spread and deter opposition elsewhere. As Major General Henry “Light-Horse” Harry Lee put it: “Mobs [were] justly styled ‘sores’ political by acrimonious Tom [Jefferson], when his pen was directed by truth, and not by ambition. They must not be allowed to take root in our land, or soon will our tall trees be abrupted from their foundation.”[56] “Unless the people are immediately roused,” warned another Federalist, “all opposition to the ruling policy will be unnerved, and the influence of these satanic outrages in Baltimore, will spread throughout the state.” If the press can be thus silenced, he added, “we are further gone in the road to perdition than I thought possible.”[57]

Hanson fully agreed with these sentiments. “In the course of human events,” he told a friend, “I shall be in Baltimore to assert my rights with effect.”[58] Determined to resurrect his paper, he made arrangements to have it printed in Georgetown and shipped to Baltimore for distribution. Wagner, who had moved to Georgetown to get out of harm’s way, subleased a three-story brick building on Charles Street in Baltimore to Hanson for use as an office. Seeking pledges of support, Hanson toured the Maryland countryside in the company of John Howard Payne, a young actor who later gained fame for composing “Home, Sweet Home.”[59]

On July 25 Hanson and Payne entered Baltimore to take possession of the Charles Street house. In the days that followed scores of Federalists visited Hanson to welcome him back to the city and to encourage him in his campaign against the war. A number of the visitors—mainly young men from the countryside, scions of Maryland’s finer Federalist families—agreed to stay in order to defend the building from possible attack. Henry Lee, who was in the city to discuss the publication of his memoirs, also offered to help. Because of his Revolutionary War experience, he was put in charge of the defensive preparations.[60]

The Second Riot: Mayhem

Around 9:00 in the morning on July 27, the Federal Republican reappeared in the streets of Baltimore. Under a masthead that boldly proclaimed “Baltimore, July 27, 1812—Published at No. 45 So. Charles-Street,” the paper carried a caustic and searching editorial on “Mobocracy.” Denouncing the violence that afflicted the city, the editorial said that the attack on the newspaper had been planned for months. Republican newspapers in the city had repeatedly warned that when war was declared “the office would be demolished and the proprietors thrown into the fangs of a remorseless rabble.” Those who took part in the rioting were merely the “misguided instruments” of more powerful men in Washington: “terrorists upon the floor of Congress,” who denounced opposition to the war, and the editors of the Washington National Intelligencer, who sought to turn a foreign war into a civil contest.

Henry “Light-Horse Harry” Lee (1756–1818) had distinguished himself as a cavalry officer during the American Revolution and was the father of Civil War general Robert E. Lee. In Baltimore to arrange for the publication of his memoirs in July 1812, he organized the defense of the Federal Republican office that was assaulted by a mob. Lee sustained injuries that left him an invalid. (Portrait by William Edward West. Wikimedia Commons)

Who gave “the specific intimation” for the attack, the paper said, was unknown, but the evidence pointed to “the monster in Baltimore [Samuel Smith], whose corruption, profligacy and jacobinical heart, were well suited to place such orders from his superiors, in a train of execution.” City and state officials were culpable, too, because they had done little to suppress the lawlessness. The assault on the Federal Republican was “a daring and desperate attempt to intimidate and overawe the minority” and “to destroy the freedom of speech and of press . . . through a system of French revolutionary terror.” Denouncing the despotism of the mob, the editorial defiantly announced that the paper would continue to be published at Baltimore as well as Georgetown.[61]

Incensed by the newspaper’s reappearance in their city, Republicans resolved to silence it permanently. Early in the evening of July 27, a group of boys gathered at “Fort Hanson” (as the Charles Street house was called) and began stoning the building and taunting the Federalists inside. The boys were soon joined by adults, mainly Irish, German, and native laborers. The mob was enraged by the appearance of a carriage of arms for the defenders, and the assault continued until most of the windows, shutters, and sashes were broken.[62] The occupants warned the mob to disperse, but the reply from the street was: “Fire, fire, you damned tories! Fire! we are not afraid of you.”[63] About 10:00 p.m. the Federalists fired a warning burst into the air. This scattered the mob, but only temporarily, for most of the people returned armed with weapons of their own.[64]

A half block north of the house, a doctor named Thadeus Gale rallied the mob for a fresh assault on the house. “That ball,” he said of the warning burst, “was aimed at me—the Tories ought to be hang’d upon this tree.” Crying “Follow me,” he led the mob back to the house and forced open the front door.[65] As the mob pushed through the doorway, the Federalists inside opened fire, killing Gale and wounding several others. Once again the mob dispersed, but once again it returned, and for the rest of the night it kept the building under siege.[66]

Hoping to save the house from destruction, the son of the widow who owned it went to Brigadier General John Stricker’s home, which was located nearby. When asked for help, the brigadier replied contemptuously: “I am no disperser of mobs.”[67] Later, other Federalists urged Stricker to call out the militia, but he refused to do so without an order signed by city officials.[68] Not until 11:00 p.m., when the mob extended all the way to his house and shots could be heard, did Stricker order Major William Barney to summon his troop of cavalry. Barney managed to round up about thirty men but refused to march to the scene of trouble until 3:00 a.m., when two magistrates who would sign the order were at last found.[69]

At the appearance of Barney’s force, cries rang out “the troop is coming, the troop is coming,” and the mob scattered.[70] But when Barney (who was running for a seat in the House of Delegates) showed more interest in talking than fighting, the people returned. “I come here to keep the peace, and I will keep it,” Barney told them. “I am sent here by superior orders, or I would not be here. You all know, that I am of the same political sentiments with yourselves. I pledge you my word and honor, that I will take every man in that house into custody.”[71] The mob gave Barney three cheers, after which he entered the house to parley with the Federalists. He apologized for speaking harshly of them and promised to do his best to protect them. But to their demands that he disperse the mob he lamely pleaded lack of authority.[72]

About 4:00 a.m., as Barney was mediating between the two groups, a fieldpiece was pulled down a nearby alley and brought to bear on the house. Hovering about the cannon was Thomas Wilson, the editor of the Baltimore Sun, who one witness said “appeared almost deranged.”[73] Declaring that he would not give up the attack on the Federalists “until he had off all their damn’d heads,” Wilson encouraged his compatriots to fire the cannon. “We must have blood for blood,” he cried. “The civil authority shall not protect these tory murderers: We will not be satisfied till we put them to death.”[74] Barney’s resolute intervention, however, prevented the cannon from being fired.

About 6:00 a.m. the crowd swelled to 1,500 or 2,000 as waking people from other parts of the city heard of the disturbance and gathered at the scene. Mayor Johnson, General Stricker, and other officials also arrived. When one of the Federalist defenders asked Stricker where his troops were, the brigadier replied that they were in the street. City officials tried to persuade the Federalists (who numbered about two dozen) to surrender into protective custody, promising to protect their persons and property if they did. Hanson denounced this suggestion, claiming that city officials were duty-bound to disperse the mob and questioning whether they could protect the Federalists anyway.[75] “We should take care what we are about,” he said; “we are negotiating with our enemies, or at all events not with our friends.”[76]

General Lee was inclined to accept the official promises at face value, and most of the other defenders, weary from the long night of fighting and fearing worse if they hesitated, favored capitulation, too. Although Hanson remained skeptical, he had little choice but to go along with the majority. Stricker assembled a hollow square of militia to guard the officials and Federalists as they marched to the county jail a mile away. The mob hurled cobblestones at the formation, hitting one Federalist in the face and almost toppling another, but eventually all the defenders were lodged in the jail.[77]

Assault on the County Jail

Part of the mob lingered in Charles Street and, quickly betraying official promises, sacked or destroyed almost everything in the house. Other people prowled through the jail yard and talked of revenge. Fearing that the jail might be forced, several Federalists tried to make bail for the defendants, but city officials thought they would be safer in custody. The inmates sought permission to arm, but this request was denied. A large body of militia was called out, but only forty or fifty, mostly Federalists, showed up. Some stayed away because Stricker had reportedly ordered the use of blank cartridges, but most simply would not turn out to protect “tories.”[78]

In the early afternoon the Whig appeared with an inflammatory editorial. Calling the Federalists “murderous traitors,” the paper said that the Charles Street garrison should have been leveled and those inside put to death.[79] Mayor Johnson read this “with great anguish and disapprobation” and tried to ensure calm by promising that the Federalists would not be allowed to escape or go free on bail.[80] Many people appeared satisfied with this pledge and headed for home. As the ranks of the crowd thinned, city officials dismissed the militia in the hope of convincing people that the trouble was over.[81]

After dinner, however, the crowd at the jail grew in size and unruliness. As darkness closed in, a laborer named George Wooleslager arrived with thirty or forty toughs from Fell’s Point. Addressing his comrades, Wooleslager exclaimed: “where are those murdering scoundrels who have come . . . and slaughtered our citizens in cold blood! in that gaol my boys; we must have them out; blood cries for blood!” When the mayor tried to calm them, one of the rioters retorted: “you damn’d scoundrel don’t we feed you, and is it not your duty to head and lead us on to take vengeance for the murders committed.”[82]

Pushing Johnson and other officials aside, Wooleslager led the mob in a bid to batter down the jail door, when it was opened from within, apparently by the turnkey. The mob rushed in, dismantled the inner doors, and gained access to the room housing the Federalists. As the mob poured in, the Federalists doused the lights, hoping to escape in the confusion. About half managed to lose themselves in the crowd, but the rest were captured as they were pointed out by a butcher named John Mumma, who could identify them because he had visited the jail earlier in the day.[83]

According to a report later issued by the Federalist Maryland House of Delegates, “a scene of horror and murder ensued, which for its barbarity has no parallel in the history of the American people, and no equal but in the massacres of Paris.”[84] Nine of the Federalists—including Hanson and Lee—were severely beaten and deposited in a heap in front of the jail. Over the next three hours, they were repeatedly beaten. When they showed no signs of life, they were stabbed with penknives and hot candle wax was dropped into their eyes to determine if they were alive.[85] Women who were present reportedly cried out, “Kill the tories,” while children exulted “at the awful scene, clapping their hands and skipping for joy.”[86] One of the victims, Brigadier General James M. Lingan, pleaded for mercy, citing his Revolutionary War record, his advanced age, and the needs of his large family, but his pleas were ignored. Amid cries of “Tory,” he was stabbed in the chest and died several hours later.[87]

When the mob grew weary of torturing the Federalists, one of the rioters proposed a Revolutionary War song, the chorus of which ran:

We’ll feather and tar ev’ry d----d British tory,

And that is the way for American glory.[88]

The rioters next considered what to do with their victims, most of whom no longer showed any signs of life. Some wanted to pitch them into the jail sewer or nearby Jones Falls; others thought they should be tarred and feathered or castrated; still others suggested that their bodies be donated to science. At this point, several Republican doctors intervened and, pleading the needs of science, secured custody over the bodies. The victims were carried back into the jail, where their wounds were dressed.[89] The doctors were assisted by the butcher Mumma, who remarked that the victims “had been beat enough to satisfy the devil.”[90]

Meanwhile, three other Federalists taken from the jail were also beaten. Hanson’s brother-in-law, Daniel Murray, played dead, but a stick was run down his throat to revive him. He later escaped with the help of a rioter who thought “there should be fair play.”[91] Another victim, John Thomson, was a big man whose size invited no such mercy. After being beaten into submission in front of the jail, he was stripped, tarred and feathered, and dumped into a cart. As the cart was pulled through town, he was beaten with clubs and stabbed with old rusty swords. One assailant tried to gouge his eyes, another to break his legs with an iron bar. When Thomson feigned unconsciousness, his coat of feathers was set on fire. There was talk of hanging him, but he was spared when he agreed to give the names of his comrades.[92]

Throughout the night liquor flowed freely, and the mood of the mob was ferocious. One eyewitness said: “All I have ever read of the French [Revolution] does not equal what I saw and heard last night. Such expressions as these were current—‘We’ll root out the damn’d tories.’ ‘We’ll drink their blood.’ ‘We’ll eat their hearts.’”[93] A number of Republican officials, including the mayor and sheriff, tried to stay the fury of the mob, but others refused to help. Congressman Alexander McKim was asked to use his influence, but he declined.[94] Tobias E. Stansbury, a brigadier in the militia and a former speaker of the Maryland House of Delegates, also refused to help, asserting that “he would not protect tories, and that he regretted that the house in Charles-street was not battered to the ground, and the persons in there buried in the ruins.”[95] Stricker shirked his duty, too. At home when he heard the jail had been forced, he retired to his parlor, leaving orders that he was not to be disturbed. When roused from his bed by an angry Federalist, he said that he was tired, that his family needed his protection, and that it was “improbable . . . that any of the prisoners were alive.”[96]

After the violence had subsided, friends and officials helped the victims slip out of town.[97] The toll was heavy: Lingan lay dead and eleven others were injured. Hanson had suffered internal injuries, a broken nose and finger, wounds to his head and hands, and damage to his spinal cord and collarbones. Although he remained politically active, he never recovered from his injuries, and he died in 1819 at the age of thirty-three.[98] Lee never recovered either. He too had suffered extensive internal injuries as well as head and face wounds. Shortly after the riots, a friend described him “as black as a negro, his Head cut to pieces.”[99] Lee’s face remained swollen for months after the riots, and it was said that he was barely recognizable and that even his speech was affected. He later sailed to the West Indies, hoping to recover his health, but remained an invalid until his death in 1818.[100]

Brigadier General John Stricker (1758–1825) was head of the city’s militia during the Baltimore riots of 1812. Although no friend of mob violence, he was reluctant to get involved or to employ militia against his fellow Republicans. Two years later, when the British threatened Baltimore, Stricker distinguished himself in the Battle of North Point. (Portrait by Rembrandt Peale. Wikimedia Commons)

The Third Riot: The Post Office Threatened

Even with his injuries, Hanson managed to publish his newspaper again in early August, and for a third time it caused rioting in Baltimore. The first issue, with its columns draped appropriately in black, was printed in Georgetown on August 3 and shipped to its Baltimore subscribers by mail. When the papers arrived at the post office, a mob gathered and threatened to pull the building down to get at them. The postmaster, Charles Burrall—a Federalist of the old school who wore his hair in a powdered queue—sent an express to Washington asking for federal protection, but his request was denied. Although President Madison conceded that the post office was “under the sanction of the U.S.,” he doubted that “any defensive measures, were within the Executive sphere.”[101] Mayor Johnson tried to persuade Burrall to send the newspapers back to Georgetown, but the postmaster insisted that all subscribers were legally entitled to the newspaper and that the post office must be defended.[102]

The militia was called out, but there was considerable opposition in the ranks to protecting the paper. Johnson tried to convince the troops that they had been summoned to protect the post office rather than the newspaper. When one of the soldiers protested that “our country is at war, and we will shed our blood to put down all opposition to it,” the mayor replied that the Federal Republican should never again be published in Baltimore and that he himself “would draw his sword against its re-establishment.”[103] At this point, some of the troops charged the mob and easily dispersed it. For almost a week thereafter, however, the city was said to be “much disturbed,” and local officials had to place a guard at the post office and proclaim a curfew.[104]

Bitter Aftermath

Although the Baltimore riots were as savage as any that had yet occurred in American history, no one was punished for taking part. A grand jury indicted Lewis, Wilson, Wooleslager, Mumma, and others on various charges, but the state attorney general repeatedly declared that they would never be convicted. In fact, only one man was found guilty, and he escaped with a small fine.[105] A member of the jury later declared “that the affray originated with them tories, and that they all ought to have been killed, and that he would rather starve than find a verdict of guilty against any of the rioters.”[106] Hanson and his associates were also brought to trial, charged with manslaughter in the death of Gale. They retained the state’s top Federalist lawyers—Luther Martin, Robert Goodloe Harper, and Philip Barton Key—and secured a change of venue to Annapolis, a Federalist city. There the jury acquitted them without leaving its box.[107]

The Baltimore riots left a legacy of fear among Federalists in the city—a fear that was fed by continued intolerance. Apparently unrepentant, many Republicans justified the violence or blamed it on the victims. With such a spirit afoot, some Federalists found it prudent to leave town. Those who remained no longer spoke out on the issues.[108] “We were fearful of muttering our sentiments,” said one, “lest we in turn might be attacked.”[109] Most no longer read the Federal Republican because they were afraid to pick it up at the post office, and postmen would not deliver it.[110] Republican violence had effectively silenced Federalism in the city, winning a victory on behalf of national unity for the war effort.

The riots left a bitter legacy in Maryland politics. All across the state the violence was condemned, and a voter backlash gave the Federalists control of the House of Delegates.[111] A House committee investigated the riots and issued a report highly critical of city officials.[112] In a separate report, the committee criticized Tobias Stansbury, who was a member of the House, for uttering “violent and inflammatory expressions, intended and calculated to excite the Mob to break the gaol, and to murder Mr. Hanson and his friends.” Stansbury vehemently denied these charges, claiming that “that puppy Alexander Hanson was at the bottom of the whole proceeding.”[113] One of the victims of the riots moved that Stansbury be committed to jail by warrant of the speaker to be tried as an accessory to murder. Calmer heads prevailed, however, and the House defeated the motion.[114]

The effects of the riots were felt far beyond Maryland. In their town and county meetings and in their newspapers as well, Federalists everywhere denounced the violence, comparing it to the worst excesses of the French Revolution. The Newport Mercury called Baltimore the “Paris of America,” and the Pittsburgh Gazette said that “the cruelty and barbarity” displayed by the mob was “unexampled in the annals of any civilized country, France excepted.”[115] A Boston town meeting expressed fear that the rioting was “a prelude to the dissolution of all free government, and the establishment of a reign of terror.”[116] The Hartford Courant claimed that the violence revealed the true purpose of the war. “We now see, written in bloody characters, by what means disaffection must cease. The war, pretendedly for the freedom of the seas, is valiantly waged against the freedom of the press.”[117]

The Courant exaggerated, but not by much. Republican mobs drove the Savannah American Patriot out of business and assaulted the editor of the Norristown (Pennsylvania) Herald. Federalist editors in other towns in the middle and southern states complained that they were warned to change their tune or risk a similar fate.[118] In a number of states, Republican postmasters held up Federalist newspapers, and in New Jersey, there was violence against Federalists at the polls.[119] In Buffalo, a Federalist hotel was demolished, and in Savannah a ship that had traded with Spanish Florida was burned.[120] An opponent of the war was dragged from his house and beaten in New Hampshire, and in Virginia one Federalist was tarred and feathered because he “had offended the militia,” and another was threatened with the same fate because he “had exerted himself to suppress the mob.”[121]

Republican leaders found this violence embarrassing and accused Federalists of misrepresenting the facts, particularly in connection with the Baltimore riots. Niles’ Register claimed that Federalists had hired people to travel through Maryland to spread “horrible falsehoods,” and Joseph Story insisted that Federalists in New England were circulating “false and exaggerated rumors” to inflame sectional animosity and pave the way for secession.[122] A Republican meeting in Maryland accused Federalists of seeking “to convert the Baltimore atrocities into an electioneering engine,” and a Pennsylvania Republican reported that “ten thousand copies of a narrative of the late disturbances in Baltimore . . . will be distributed thro this State & Jersey.”[123] To counter Federalist propaganda, the Baltimore City Council issued a report on the riots that discreetly avoided using the word mob and exonerated city officials. President Madison welcomed this report, calling it “a seasonable antidote to the misrepresentations” of those who blamed the violence “on the friends of true liberty.”[124]

Republicans also tried to counter the bad publicity by blaming the violence on the Federalists. Those who expressed opinions obnoxious to the people, said the Maryland Republican, “must abide by the consequences.” By arming themselves instead of seeking civil protection, said the New York Columbian, the Federalists in Baltimore were “guilty of a murderous intent, and [of] wilfully exciting the popular vengeance.” “The truth is,” added another Republican, “there would have been no disturbance if those men had not armed themselves, without the least cause.”[125]

Republican newspapers also tried to show that Federalists in New England were equally guilty of violence. Various examples were presented—the roughing up of a Republican congressman in Massachusetts, the destruction of privateers in New Haven and Providence, the closing down of a Massachusetts court, and the mobbing of an army recruiting party in Connecticut.[126] One Republican paper claimed that “more than two thirds of the mobs and riots that have taken place in our country, since the Constitution has been adopted, have proceeded from the federal or tory party,” and another insisted that “in principle” Federalist violence was no different from the Baltimore riots.[127] Although there was some merit in these claims, the Baltimore violence was so vicious and brutal and had such a chilling effect on freedom of speech that it was in a class by itself.

The Price of Suppressing Dissent

The violence in 1812 showed that, like the Federalists in 1798, the Republicans were reluctant to tolerate opposition to their war policy. In 1798 the Federalists had resorted to a sedition law to silence their foes, and some Republicans in 1812 wanted to revive this policy. Judge Joseph Story and Attorney General William Pinkney both urged the adoption of a sedition law, and other Republicans joined in the cry.[128] “Offenders, conspirators, and traitors are enabled to carry on their purposes almost without check,” complained Story. Congress must “give the Judicial Courts of the United States power to punish all crimes and offences against the Government, as at common law.”[129] Madison, however, demurred. Unlike most wartime presidents, he had a healthy respect for the civil rights of his domestic foes. Republican mobs, on the other hand, had their own way of suppressing dissent, and the result was a chilling message for all who opposed the war.[130]

Like the sedition act in 1798, the violence in 1812 boomeranged on the war party. The Washington Benevolent Society of Maryland launched a campaign to drum up subscriptions for the Federal Republican, and Federalists across the country responded. More than 200 subscribers were signed up in Boston, another 70 in Providence, and an additional 42 in Franklin County, Pennsylvania.[131] By December 1812 $2,000 had poured in.[132] Although this did not cover the paper’s losses, which were estimated at $3,000 to $5,000 in the June riot alone, the Federal Republican nonetheless flourished.[133] Thus, instead of silencing the paper, the Baltimore mob made the Federal Republican one of the most widely read newspapers in the country.

Revulsion against the violence also contributed to Federalist election victories in Maryland, New York, and New England.[134] In addition, the violence politicized the war by showing that, for some Republicans at least, the conflict was merely a pretext for suppressing dissent. The effect was to accelerate the movement of Federalists in the middle and southern states back into opposition. By the fall of 1812, Federalists everywhere opposed the war, not simply because they considered it unjust and unwise but also because they saw it as a threat to their basic liberties as well. In short, instead of stifling dissent, Republican violence only added fuel to the growing anti-war fire.

Chapter 4

The Campaign of 1812

On December 16, 1811, after the debate on the war preparations had been under way for more than two weeks, John Randolph raised a specter that was to haunt contemporaries and historians alike. “Agrarian cupidity,” he said, “not maritime right, urges the war. Ever since the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations came into the House, we have heard but one word—like the whip-poor-will, but one eternal monotonous tone—Canada! Canada! Canada!”[1] Randolph exaggerated, since at no time during the debates did territorial expansion overshadow the maritime issues. Even in the West, where expansionist sentiment ran deep, the maritime issues dominated public discussion in the run-up to the war, mainly because westerners blamed the Orders-in-Council for their economic woes.[2] Nevertheless, some historians later seized upon Randolph’s words to prove that this war was undertaken to acquire territory, that the maritime issues were merely a pretext for seizing Canada.[3]

The Lure of Canada

There is no denying that territorial expansionism was a potent force in this era. Republican leaders worked assiduously to pry Louisiana and the Floridas loose from their European overlords, and government and frontiersmen alike pushed Indians off their lands with callous disregard for their rights.[4] Many Americans also coveted Canada, if only to put an end to British influence over American Indians. But the desire to annex Canada did not bring on the war. Rather it was maritime issues—particularly the Orders-in-Council and impressment. “Canada was not the end but the means,” said Henry Clay, “the object of the War being the redress of injuries, and Canada being the instrument by which that redress was to be obtained.”[5]

Most Republicans considered Canada a logical target because of its weakness vis-à-vis the United States. Not counting Indians, about 7.7 million people lived in the United States in 1812, compared to only 500,000 in Canada.[6] The United States also had almost 12,000 regulars in uniform, while the British could muster only 10,000 in Canada, and only 8,000 in the two provinces where the fighting was likely to occur: Upper Canada (modern-day Ontario) and Lower Canada (modern-day Quebec).[7] Additional enlistments, short-term volunteers, and militia drafts were likely to tip the balance still further in America’s favor, especially since Great Britain could ill afford to divert resources from the war in Europe.

John Randolph of Roanoke (1773–1833) was an Old Republican from Virginia who believed in small government. A fierce opponent of the war, he regularly voted with the Federalists. Randolph never matured physically, but his boyish looks belied a sharp tongue. (Portrait by Gilbert Stuart. Library of Congress)

Republicans counted on another advantage, too. In Lower Canada, north of the St. Lawrence River, two-thirds of the inhabitants were of French origin and thus of uncertain loyalty, and many of the rest were recent American immigrants. The loyalty of people in Upper Canada, north of the Great Lakes, was equally problematical because most of the population there was American by birth. Although some were Loyalists who had fled north during or after the Revolution, after 1792 there had been a steady flow of new immigrants from south of the border eager to take advantage of free land and low taxes. By 1812 these immigrants—optimistically called “Late Loyalists”—constituted 60 percent of the population in the province.[8] Loyalists were staunchly committed to British rule and in 1811 had remonstrated against “the sudden and indiscriminate influx of foreigners, sometimes openly, and at other times secretly hostile to the British Government,” but nothing had come of their protest.[9] Despite a request from the administration, the legislature of Upper Canada refused to require men serving in the militia to renounce foreign allegiance.[10] By the time the war began, Major General Isaac Brock, the civilian head and military commander in Upper Canada, claimed that most of the people in his province were “essentially bad.” They were “either indifferent to what is passing, or so completely American as to rejoice in the prospects of a change of Governments.”[11]

Republicans counted on this disaffection to facilitate the conquest of Canada. One reason they had gone to war without adequate preparation was the expectation that American troops would be welcomed in Canada. Governor Daniel D. Tompkins of New York predicted that “one-half of the Militia of [Canada] would join our standard,” and many Republicans shared this view.[12] Jefferson claimed that “the acquisition of Canada this year, as far as the neighborhood of Quebec, will be a mere matter of marching,” and Clay boasted that “the militia of Kentucky are alone competent to place Montreal and Upper Canada at our feet.”[13] Most Republicans, in other words, expected what John Randolph called “a holiday campaign.” With “no expense of blood, or treasure, on our part—Canada is to conquer herself—she is to be subdued by the principles of fraternity.”[14]

Federalists did not dispute that Canada might be conquered, but they vigorously denied that it was a legitimate target. They preferred to settle American differences with Great Britain on the high seas, believing that a war against Canada was unjust. “Canada has issued no Orders in Council,” said Congressman Samuel Taggart of Massachusetts. “She has not impressed our seamen, taken our ships, confiscated our property, nor in any other respect treated us ill. All the crime alleged against Canada or the Canadians, is that, without any act of their own, they are connected with, and under the protection of a nation which has injured us on the ocean.”[15]

Federalists regarded the invasion of Canada as not only unjust but also unwise. Ever since the Louisiana Purchase they had openly opposed expansion, believing that any new territory would only enhance Republican strength and undermine national stability. The acquisition of Canada, declared the Maryland House of Delegates, would be “worse than a doubtful boon.” It would “enfeeble” the United States, said a Massachusetts Federalist, by increasing those “jarring materials” which made up the country. “The strength of the nation,” added a Delaware congressman, is “already too much scattered.”[16]

Annexationist Fever

Federalists assumed that Canada would be annexed because Republicans never made clear what they planned to do with the territory once it was conquered. Since Canada was not an end in itself, presumably it would be held for ransom on the maritime issues, but what if Canada were conquered and the British still balked at concessions? The administration remained silent on this matter, probably to keep its options open. As late as 1814 Federalist Joseph Pearson of North Carolina insisted that Republican leaders had never clarified their position. “Do they mean to plant their standard on the walls of Quebec, apportion out the lands to the conquerors, and sing a requiem to ‘free trade and sailors’ rights’? These questions never have been satisfactorily answered.”[17]

Some Republicans made no secret of their desire to keep Canada, and this sentiment grew as the war progressed. “It appears to be the universal opinion of the Republicans,” said the Boston Chronicle in 1813, “that the Canadas ought in no event to be surrendered. . . . Too much valuable blood has already been shed, and too much treasure expended, to permit us to indulge for a moment the idea of resigning this country.” Any treaty that does not secure Canada, a Georgia senator told the president, “will be very ungraciously received.”[18] Annexationist fever was particularly strong in the West, where toasts were drunk to the acquisition of Canada, and a resolution on the subject was offered in the Kentucky legislature.[19] According to one critic, by 1814 the message from the West “was unequivocal—Canada must not, shall not be given up.”[20]

Long before this, Monroe had conceded privately that public opinion might make it “difficult to relinquish Territory which had been conquered.”[21] In the meantime, the administration had to decide how to govern occupied territory. At the beginning of the war, Congress considered proposals to establish temporary government in Canada and to guarantee the rights of Canadians, but these measures were killed in the Senate.[22] Hence the administration was left to its own devices.

The War Department instructed its commanders in the field to promise Canadians nothing more than protection for their persons, property, and rights.[23] But some officers went further. On the Detroit frontier, Brigadier General William Hull issued a proclamation to Canadians that said: “You will be emancipated from tyranny and oppression, and restored to the dignified station of freemen.”[24] Likewise, on the Niagara frontier, Brigadier General Alexander Smyth announced to his men that “the time is at hand when you will cross the streams of Niagara to conquer . . . a country that is to be one of the United States.”[25] The War Department approved of Hull’s proclamation, and although it reprimanded Smyth, it did so privately.[26] The administration’s failure to repudiate either proclamation made it all the more difficult to reconcile domestic opponents to the war.

The War Department Overwhelmed

The decision for war was a momentous one, and the president was fully aware of this. When the British minister visited Madison the day after the declaration of war, he found other Republicans celebrating, “but the President was white as a sheet and very naturally felt all the responsibility he would incur.”[27] Nevertheless, Madison did his best to encourage his department heads. According to one observer, “He visited in person, a thing never known before, all the offices of the departments of war and the navy, stimulating every thing in a manner worthy of a little commander in chief, with his little round hat and huge cockade!”[28] This may have given heart to Madison’s subordinates, but what the nation really needed was more energy and efficiency, both of which were sorely lacking.

Conditions were particularly bad in the War Department, which was poorly organized and understaffed. According to War Hawk George M. Troup, “In the wretched, deplorably wretched condition of the War Department, it was impossible either to begin the war or to conduct it.” The work load of the department, heavy in time of peace, was staggering in time of war. “No man in the country,” claimed Troup, “is equal to one-half the duties which devolve on the present Secretary.”[29] Although the department had eleven clerks, none had more than a year’s experience.[30] Moreover, when the president asked Congress to authorize two assistant secretaries of war, the Senate balked, apparently because the creation of new supply departments was expected to lighten the work load.[31]

The secretary of war, William Eustis, was a good politician, but he lacked administrative skills and never mastered his duties. Overwhelmed by the task before him, he devoted himself to details and failed to give proper direction to the commanders in the field. He sometimes bypassed the chain of command, corresponding directly with junior officers, and, according to one senator, he spent much of his time “reading advertisements of Petty retailing merchants, to find where he may Purchase 100 shoes, or 200 hats.” “Our Secretary at War,” concluded a Pennsylvania congressman, “is a dead weight in our hands. . . . His unfitness is apparrent to every body but himself.”[32]

Sad State of the Army

Conditions in the army were not much better. The senior officers, headed by two major generals and six brigadiers, inspired little confidence, most owing their appointment to politics. According to Winfield Scott, “the old officers had, very generally, sunk into either sloth, ignorance, or habits of intemperate drinking.”[33] Although there were some promising junior officers, it took time for them to rise to positions of significant authority. The administration had an opportunity to appoint additional officers on the eve of the war, but it was slow to act. “The army appointments,” said one Republican, “cannot be made until names from all the states come in, and there is great tardiness.”[34] According to Scott, the government relied heavily on the recommendations of Republican congressmen, “who unfortunately pressed upon the Executive their own particular friends & dependents, &, in some cases—menials.”[35] As a result, few of the new officers had any experience or knew much about the art of war. “Our Army,” complained Peter B. Porter in 1813, “is full of men, fresh from Lawyer shops & counting rooms, who know little of the physical force of man—of the proper means of sustaining & improving it—or even the mode of its application.”[36]

Most of the enlisted men were inexperienced, and morale in the ranks was low. Infractions of discipline were common, and these multiplied as the army grew. Desertion was common—so common, in fact, that less than four months into the war President Madison felt obliged to issue a proclamation pardoning all deserters who returned to duty within four months.[37] Although Congress outlawed whipping in 1812, army officers had other means of maintaining discipline. Deprivation of pay or spirits, public penance, and paddling as well as other corporal punishments were common. In more serious cases, the offender might be branded on the face, his ears might be cropped, or he might be executed.[38]

Those who enlisted in the army at the beginning of the war had a five-year commitment, though later recruits were given the option of enlisting for the duration of the war.[39] At first the bounty was $31 and 160 acres of land, but because enlistments lagged, Congress gradually increased the incentives to $124 and 320 acres of land.[40] This was a princely sum—probably the highest bounty ever paid by any army in the world. The cash bounty alone was as much as many unskilled laborers earned in a year, and even if the land sold for only $1.00 an acre, the total bounty was more than most people made in two years. This enormous bounty did much to spur enlistments, although the army did not become an effective fighting force until the last year of the war.

Volunteers and Militia

Initially the administration planned to rely on short-term volunteers, but Congress gave the president authority to appoint the officers only after war had been declared.[41] As late as mid-August, the law remained “a dead letter” in Pennsylvania because volunteers continued to offer their services to the state instead of the national government.[42] The incentives offered to U.S. Volunteers were in any case too paltry to be effective. The government paid no bounty but simply allowed men who served at least a month to keep their weapons. Only six regiments were raised during the war, and one army officer claimed that those he inspected were little better than organized bandits who wasted public property, insulted private citizens, and freely engaged in “desertion, robbery, [and] disorderly & Mutinous Conduct.”[43]

Nor could the militia, who were in disarray everywhere except in New England and the West, play the active role that Republican leaders envisioned for them. They were inefficient and unreliable and costly as well. “The expences of the Militia are enormous,” said a Republican general, “& they are of little comparative use, except at the commencement of war, & for special emergencies.—The sooner we can dispense with their services, the better.”[44] In short, after a decade of neglect, the nation’s land forces were not up to the task at hand.

Payment and Supply Problems

The system for paying the troops broke down from the beginning. At the start of the war privates were paid $5 a month, noncommissioned officers $7 to $9, and officers $20 to $200.[45] To stimulate enlistments, Congress in late 1812 raised the pay of privates and noncommissioned officers by $3.[46] At $8 a month, privates still earned less than the $10 to $20 that most unskilled laborers made, but as the bounty increased, army wages soared well above the civilian average.[47]

By law army pay could not be more than two months in arrears “unless the circumstances of the case should render it unavoidable.”[48] But even in the first year of the war, when the government had ample resources, administrative inefficiency and slow communication kept many troops from receiving their pay on time. In October 1812 men who had enlisted five months earlier “absolutely refused to march untill they had recd. their pay,” and other troops also mutinied for want of pay.[49] As the war progressed, the problem of paying the troops became almost unmanageable. By the fall of 1814 army pay was frequently 6 to 12 months in arrears, and in some cases even more.[50]

The system for supplying the troops was also grossly inefficient.[51] To cut expenses, Congress had abolished the quartermaster and commissary departments in 1802.[52] Thereafter the army was supplied by civilian agents who were eager to maximize their profits. According to one officer, many of the agents were “perfectly ignorant of military affairs.”[53] In March 1812, Congress reestablished the quartermaster and commissary departments, but it was months before either department was staffed and working, and the authority granted to each was vague and overlapping.[54] The legislation creating these departments, Madison complained, “was so inadequate, that the War office, otherwise overcharged, was obliged for some time to perform the functions of both.”[55] Even when operational the supply departments were woefully inefficient, and troops in the field frequently had to go for months at a time without shoes, clothing, blankets, or other vital supplies.[56]

The system for feeding the troops—based on private contract—was even worse. Although most government officials recognized that (in the words of John Armstrong) “all military operations . . . must begin with the belly,” this vital service was left in civilian hands in order to save money.[57] It was “madness in the extreme,” said one officer, to rely on such a system in time of war.[58] The daily ration was supposed to consist of 20 ounces of beef or 12 ounces of pork; 18 ounces of bread or flour; 4 ounces of rum, brandy, or whiskey; and small quantities of salt, vinegar, soap, and candles.[59] Contractors and subcontractors, however, were so intent on making a profit that they often delivered bad provisions or chiseled on the quantity. “It would be endless to trace the petty villa[i]nies which contractors are daily tempted to commit,” said Brigadier General Winfield Scott in 1814.[60] Although contractors had to sign a binding agreement and post a bond, they were not subject to military law, and it was almost impossible to bring them to heel. “If a contractor fails to make issues,” said Scott, “he can only be punished by civil actions.”[61] In an emergency, commanding officers could buy provisions, but the cost was likely to be prohibitive, especially in remote areas on the frontier.

Problems with the system of supply were compounded by the strategic demands of the war. Unlike the American Revolution, which was fundamentally a defensive war, the United States had to target Canada in 1812 to force the British to give up their maritime practices. But supplying an army operating in the dense wilderness of the northern frontier was no easy task. The nation had two main supply routes. One ran from New York City up the Hudson River to Albany and from there either due north to the Canadian frontier or west along the Mohawk River and connecting waterways to Oswego on Lake Ontario. The other route ran from Philadelphia over the mountains to Pittsburgh. From there it ran north to Lake Erie, or down the Ohio River to Cincinnati and then north to the forts in the Old Northwest, or further down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers to posts in the Old Southwest (including New Orleans). Since the roads were primitive, waterways offered the best means of transportation, but they could be unusable in winter and treacherous in any season. Although Pittsburgh and Cincinnati could produce some of war material needed in the West, they could not satisfy the voracious appetite of the armies operating there. Nor could these forces live off the land. There simply was not enough food being produced on the frontier to feed the troops on either side.[62]

Complaints over supply multiplied as the war progressed, and many illnesses and deaths were blamed on the system. One officer complained that the want of food and other supplies had “produced dysenteries and other diseases” that filled his hospital. Another said: “We are literally starving on this end of the line for bread.”[63] A doctor at one camp found excrement in the bread, and a food inspector claimed that the flour was so bad that “it would kill the best horse at Sackett’s Harbour.”[64] Doubtless many agreed with Major General Edmund P. Gaines that “the irregularity in the Supply and badness of the rations” had done more to retard American operations than anything else.[65] In fact, one general claimed that contractors knocked more men out of combat than the enemy, and another insisted that the men were so badly provided for that the number killed in battle was “trifling” compared to losses from other causes.[66]

Doctors and Disease

Medical science was so primitive that army doctors were powerless to combat disease. Although some doctors understood the importance of cleanliness, imposing their views on a camp of careless young soldiers was no easy task.[67] Diseases such as dysentery, typhoid fever, pneumonia, malaria, measles, typhus, and even smallpox were common and often fatal.[68] Fevers were particularly dangerous because before the development of aconite (which is derived from the monkshood plant) there was no good way to treat them.

Most doctors were still committed to the “heroic” practice of medicine—which meant that they bled and blistered their patients and subjected them to assorted emetics, cathartics, and diuretics designed to purge the body of disease.[69] Doctors also dispensed a large number of drugs, few of which worked. Although opium helped ease pain and intestinal distress, and cinchona (Jesuits’ bark) was effective against malaria, most of the drugs were worthless or even toxic. The most common was mercury—the “Samson of the Materia Medica”—which was usually dispensed in the form of calomel (mercury chloride). It had no therapeutic value, and it was frequently injurious and occasionally fatal. Those who survived a disease usually did so in spite of their treatment rather than because of it.[70]

Weapons of War

The United States had better luck with its ordnance. The nation already had well-established arsenals at Springfield, Massachusetts, and Harpers Ferry, Virginia, and additional facilities were built during the war at Rome and West Troy in New York and at Pittsburgh in western Pennsylvania. Hence the government was able to manufacture and repair small arms, produce ammunition, and test powder and ammunition.[71] The army also procured large guns and small arms from private sources, such as Eli Whitney’s firm in Connecticut. Although Whitney and others had embraced the concept of interchangeable parts, the only weapons made to this standard that were available during the war were pistols.[72] In contrast to the American Revolution, there was no shortage of powder during the War of 1812. More than 200 powder mills were scattered around the country, although the government purchased most of its powder from several large firms, such as Dupont & Company in Delaware.[73]

At the beginning of the war, Congress created a department to supervise and test artillery for the army.[74] Headed by Colonel Decius Wadsworth, this department functioned reasonably well. The main problem that Wadsworth had to contend with was the huge variety in the nation’s inventory of artillery and ammunition. The ordnance might be of American, British, French, or Spanish origin and was manufactured to many different specifications. Wadsworth labored mightily to bring order out of the chaos, but most of his reforms had to wait until after the war.

The field guns that the army relied on were mainly long guns, ranging from 3- to 12-pounders. These guns could fire round or solid shot (an iron ball); grapeshot (a cloth sack of balls that were usually the size of modern golf balls); and case shot or canister (a tin can filled with musket balls or other small projectiles). Sometimes round shot was heated into hot shot in the hope of causing a fire. Grapeshot and canister had a limited range and were best used against massed troops; long guns had much greater range and were most effective against fortified positions. For even greater range, howitzers or mortars (both of which fired at a pronounced angle) were employed. These weapons fired explosive shells, then called “bombs” (hollowed-out iron balls filled with powder and fitted with a fuse that was lit before firing). In addition, howitzers could fire round shot and canister.[75]

The vast majority of American troops were infantry and thus were armed with muskets. Although there were still many British and French muskets in the American inventory, most soldiers were issued the domestically manufactured Springfield Model 1795. This was a .69-caliber muzzle-loaded smooth-bore that fired a soft lead ball weighing about an ounce. It was accurate only to 100 yards (although it could be lethal at much greater distances), and it misfired about 20 percent of the time, mainly because the flint wore down. Many Americans, particularly in the West, loaded their muskets with “buck and ball”—that is, with two or three large buckshot as well as the standard ball. Some westerners left the ball out altogether and loaded their muskets with 12 to 15 buckshot. The use of any buckshot increased the shooter’s chance of hitting a target but reduced the lethality of the projectiles. British soldiers considered buckshot little more than an annoyance, but it could cause serious facial wounds or deadly infections.[76]

Some American troops carried rifles during the war. These weapons had a grooved barrel that fired a smaller ball than the musket but had greater range. Although some soldiers were equipped with the Harper’s Ferry Model 1803, which fired a .54-caliber ball, most carried the privately made Pennsylvania rifle (later known as the Kentucky rifle), which had a longer barrel and typically fired a .40- to .50-caliber ball. The Pennsylvania rifle was accurate to 200 yards or more, but because of the grooves in its barrel, it fouled easily. Most rifles also worked best with a finer grade of powder that was not always available.[77]

The U.S. Navy relied mainly on artillery for its firepower. Warships carried long guns, ranging from 9- to 42-pounders, as well as howitzers and occasionally mortars. Warships also carried carronades, which were small short-range guns that fired round shot weighing up to 68 pounds. The bigger carronades were known as “smashers” because the large, slow-moving projectiles they fired could blow much larger holes in a warship’s hull and bulwarks than the faster-moving small round shot fired by long guns. Naval guns also fired grape shop and canister as well as some special kinds of ammunition—star shot, chain shot, and bar shot—designed to render an enemy ship immobile by bringing down its masts or destroying its spars and rigging.[78]

The rapid expansion of the military services during the war inevitably produced some shortages. Every service had to scramble to find enough men to fill new units or keep old ones up to strength. In addition, some riflemen had to carry muskets because of a shortage of rifles; there were not enough big guns to equip the new artillery units or to outfit the new warships; and some regulars were clothed in gray uniforms because of a shortage of blue cloth.[79] But overall, the nation was much better able to supply its military needs during the War of 1812 than during the American Revolution.

Defense of Canada

Republicans greatly underestimated the many logistical, military, and administrative problems they faced in conquering Canada. They also underrated the enemy. British war policy in 1812 was shaped mainly by three men: Lord Liverpool, the prime minister; Lord Castlereagh, the foreign secretary; and the Duke of Wellington, who headed the British army in the Spanish Peninsula but provided civilian leaders in London with counsel on a broad range of topics. Also influential in shaping policy was Lord Bathurst, secretary of state for war and the colonies; and Lord Melville, the first lord of the Admiralty. But since all eyes in Great Britain were on Europe, the defense of Canada was left largely to local officials.

The man in charge in 1812 was forty-five-year-old Sir George Prevost (commonly pronounced Pray-vo), who served as governor-general of Canada. An experienced soldier and administrator, Prevost took office in 1811. Although he did a good job of conciliating the French population that his predecessor had alienated, he did so at the expense of support from his British followers. In developing a plan for the defense of Canada, Prevost focused on Quebec, known as “the Gibraltar of America.” “I have considered the preservation of Quebec,” he wrote to Lord Liverpool on the eve of war, “as the first object, and to which all others must be subordinate.”[80]

Although Prevost had only 8,000 regulars in Upper and Lower Canada and another 2,000 in the Maritime provinces, his subordinate officers were good and most of his men were combat tested. He also could count on the assistance of formidable native allies. In the Old Northwest the Shawnee leaders Tecumseh and the Prophet headed a large band of militants drawn from a number of tribes. Further east John Norton, the mixed-blood Mohawk leader known as “the Snipe,” led a small band of the Grand River Iroquois in battle, mainly on the Niagara frontier. The Indians were excellent scouts and skirmishers, and such was their known ferocity that their very presence could tip the balance in any battle.[81]

Because Canada was so sparsely populated and undeveloped, the British had to ship men and material for its defense from the mother country or from other provinces in the Empire. The supply lines were long and, at least in North America, vulnerable. It was almost 3,000 miles from London, England, to the Gulf of St. Lawrence and another 1,200 miles to Fort Amherstburg on the Detroit River. The British did a pretty good job of keeping their forces supplied but only because they could buy food from American sources.

Sir George Prevost (1767–1816) was the civilian and military head of Canada during the War of 1812. Although he did a superb job of marshalling his limited resources to safeguard Canada during the first two years of the conflict, his enemies used his retreat from Plattsburgh in 1814 to secure his recall to Great Britain. Prevost demanded a court martial to clear his name, but he died before the court convened. (Portrait by S. W. Reynolds. William Wood, Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812)

American Strategy: A Three-Pronged Attack

Canada in this era was often compared to a tree. The taproots were the sea lanes that stretched across the Atlantic; the trunk was the St. Lawrence, dominated by Quebec and Montreal; and the outlying settlements on the Great Lakes formed the branches. Because the surrounding wilderness was so dense, most of western Canada could best be supplied by utilizing the St. Lawrence-Lake Ontario-Lake Erie route. There was an alternative route from York that followed the Holland River and Lake Simcoe into Lake Huron, but this required more overland travel.[82]

The United States lacked the naval power to blockade the Gulf of St. Lawrence and thus sever the roots of the Canadian tree, and striking at the branches in the West was unlikely to produce any meaningful British concessions. The best way to strike at Canada was by targeting the St. Lawrence. “It has always been my opinion,” said Commodore Isaac Chauncey, “that among the best means to conquer the Canadas was . . . by taking and maintaining a Position on the St. Lawrence—this would be killing the tree by ‘girdling’—the branches deprived of their ordinary Supplies from the root, die of necessity.”[83]

The War in the North

There was little enthusiasm for an immediate attack on Quebec. It was heavily fortified, and the Royal Navy could provide close-in support for upwards of six months a year. In addition, it lay north of Federalist New England, which was unlikely to provide the necessary men and material to make the campaign a success. This left Montreal. Madison conceded the importance of this city, but concentrating on Montreal would not allow the administration to take advantage of the war enthusiasm in the West or to protect that region from Indian depredations. Hence, the president adopted a plan developed by Major General Henry Dearborn that called for a three-pronged attack on Montreal and British positions on the Niagara and Detroit frontiers. Montreal was still supposed to be the main target, but because of mismanagement at every level, the other operations assumed greater importance.[84]

Campaign in the West

To manage the campaign in the West, the administration chose William Hull, the fifty-nine-year-old governor of Michigan Territory who had a record of distinguished service during the Revolutionary War. Hull initially sought a military appointment, although later he claimed that he accepted command of the western army only “with great reluctance.”[85] Age had taken a heavy toll on him, and a stroke and other health problems had further eroded his strength. Behind his back, Hull’s men called him “the Old Lady.” The administration was aware of Hull’s liabilities, but the only other suitable candidate, Colonel Jacob Kingsbury, was too ill for the job.[86]

In the late spring of 1812, Hull assembled in Ohio an army of regulars and militia, some of whom wore signs on their caps that read “CONQUER OR DIE.”[87] Hull’s marching orders, issued before the declaration of war, called for him to proceed to Fort Detroit, located on the river of that name that linked the northern lakes to Lake Erie. Although Hull had earlier insisted that naval control of Lake Erie was vital to the success of the campaign, he now believed that the presence of a large American army at Detroit might force the British to evacuate the entire region.[88]

To facilitate communication, Hull began the laborious task of carving a road through the Black Swamp that would link Urbana, Ohio, to Detroit. Arriving at the Maumee River (then known as the Miami of the Lake) at the end of June, he hired the schooner Cuyahoga to take his baggage, papers, and supplies to Detroit. Although Hull did not yet know of the declaration of war, the British learned of it in time to seize the ship as it passed by Fort Amherstburg. This enabled them to learn about Hull’s plans as well as the size and condition of his army. “Till I received these letters,” said Major General Isaac Brock, “I had no idea General Hull was advancing with so large a force.”[89]

Hull reached Detroit on July 5 without further incident with an army of about 2,000 men. A week later he crossed the Detroit River into British territory with the intention of attacking Fort Amherstburg to the south. Some 200 Ohio militiamen refused to accompany him, claiming that they could not serve beyond American territory. Hull also had to stop to build carriages for his cannons. But otherwise his prospects looked bright. His army was still larger than the force defending the British fort, and a proclamation he issued to the inhabitants induced many Canadian militia to go home or to defect to the United States. According to Brock, Hull’s invasion “was productive of very unfavorable sensations among a large portion of the population.”[90]

Hull’s prospects, however, soon dimmed. The American commander became increasingly worried about his supply lines to Ohio, which were threatened by the British and their Indian allies. Although a detachment of 200 militia had left Ohio loaded with supplies for Hull, the men stopped at the Raisin River, some thirty-five miles south of Detroit, to await reinforcements from Hull’s camp. Hull dispatched 150 men under Major Thomas Van Horne to meet these troops, but the detachment was attacked at Brownstown by a band of Indians led by Tecumseh and returned to Detroit. Hull next sent a force of 600 men under the command of Lieutenant Colonel James Miller to break through to Ohio. After being briefly pinned down by a small group of British and Indians at Maguaga, this force also retreated to Detroit.[91]

The Fall of Mackinac and Surrender of Detroit

Hull received further bad news at the end of July. The tiny American outpost on the island of Mackinac between Lake Huron and Lake Michigan had surrendered to a large enemy force.[92] Hull was convinced that this “opened the Northern hive of Indians, and they were swarming down in every direction.”[93] Accordingly, he decided to withdraw across the river to Detroit, giving up his plan to attack Fort Amherstburg. “This fatal and unaccountable step,” said one of his officers, “dispirited the troops” and “left to the tender mercy of the enemy the miserable Canadians, who had joined us.”[94] Hull suggested that it might be prudent to retreat all the way to Ohio, but his militia officers told him the entire army would melt away if he did.[95]

By this time Hull’s men were openly questioning his leadership. “He is a coward,” said one, “and will not risque his person.”[96] The militia officers were so alarmed that they considered removing Hull from command, but they gave up the plan when Colonel Miller, the ranking regular army officer, refused to be a party to the mutiny and take command.[97] Hull made one last effort to break through to Ohio by dispatching 400 picked men under the command of colonels Lewis Cass and Duncan McArthur. This force advanced further than the others but was unable to find the Ohio encampment. By this time Hull’s position had become so desperate that he sent an urgent message recalling the troops. But the men had lost all confidence in their general and elected to remain in the wilderness.[98]

Meanwhile, the British had made good use of the reprieve that Hull had given them. General Brock had recently arrived with reinforcements, bringing British strength (counting regulars, militia, and Indians) to about 2,000.[99] This was considerably larger than the army that Hull now had at Detroit. Moreover, the contents of a mail bag captured from Van Horne’s force informed Brock of the condition of the American army. “I got possession of the letters my antagonist addressed to the secretary of war,” said Brock, “and also of the sentiments which hundreds of his army uttered to their friends. Confidence in the general was gone, and evident despondency prevailed throughout.”[100]

Major General Isaac Brock (1769–1812) was a gifted military leader who knew how to inspire his men, cultivate Indian allies, and make good use of intelligence to wage psychological warfare. He achieved public acclaim in Canada and Great Britain for his victory at Detroit in August 1812, but less than two months later he was dead on the battlefield of Queenston Heights. Today he is celebrated as a Canadian national hero. (Library and Archives of Canada)

Crossing the river, Brock brought his cannons to bear on Fort Detroit and mounted a siege. In demanding the surrender of the fort, Brock played on Hull’s fear of the Indians. “It is far from my inclination to join in a war of extermination,” he said, “but you must be aware, that the numerous body of Indians who have attached themselves to my troops, will be beyond controul the moment the contest commences.”[101] With many civilians in the fort (including members of his own family), Hull was terrified at the prospect of an Indian massacre. “My God!” he exclaimed to a subordinate. “What shall I do with these women and children.”[102]

Facing a siege and the possibility of a massacre, Hull became increasingly despondent. He started keeping to himself, and when he did speak to others his voice often faltered. He took to stuffing huge quids of chewing tobacco into his mouth, apparently oblivious of the spittle that was running down his face and soiling his beard and clothes. He also began crouching in the fort, evidently spooked by incoming artillery shells.[103] Finally, on August 16, 1812, he dispatched a white flag to the British to ask for terms. Shortly thereafter, he surrendered the fort as well as his entire army, including the detachment in the wilderness. “Not an officer was consulted,” said Captain Robert Lucas. “Even the women was indignant at the Shameful degradation of the Americ[an] character.”[104]

When Hull later returned to the United States on parole, he was court-martialed. Initially he told the British that lack of powder had forced him to surrender, but Brock’s men found huge quantities of munitions in the fort, including more than 5,000 pounds of powder.[105] Later—and with more justice—Hull accused Dearborn of failing to make an adequate demonstration further East, which allowed the British to concentrate their forces in the West.[106] Unimpressed by this logic, the court—which was headed by Dearborn—convicted Hull of cowardice and neglect of duty. The court sentenced Hull to death but recommended mercy because of his “revolutionary services, and his advanced age.” The president approved this verdict and remitted the punishment.[107] Hull and his heirs spent the next thirty-five years trying to vindicate his actions.[108]

Fort Dearborn Massacre

Several days before surrendering, Hull had ordered the evacuation of Fort Dearborn in Chicago on the grounds that the fall of Mackinac had rendered its defense untenable. The fort was held by about sixty-five regulars and militia under the command of Captain Nathan Heald. Some two dozen civilians were also present. The fort was well stocked, the nearby Potawatomi Indians were known to be unfriendly, and almost everyone was opposed to evacuation. Nevertheless, Heald was determined to obey his orders. To pacify the Indians, Heald promised to give them the public property in his possession, but he withheld the arms and liquor, which infuriated them. The Americans marched out of the fort on August 15, and shortly thereafter some 500 Indians, mainly Potawatomis under the leadership of Blackbird, attacked, killing most of the whites after surrender terms had been arranged. Captain William Wells met with an especially grisly fate. A “white Indian” who had been captured as a boy and raised by the Miamis, Wells had returned to Kentucky society as an adult and worked as an interpreter and Indian agent. The Indians beheaded him, carved out his heart, and ate it raw.[109]

The fall of Mackinac, Detroit, and Chicago exposed the entire Northwest to enemy attack. The effect of these losses, said the Pittsburgh Mercury, was to lay open “to the ravages of the merciless foe the whole extent of our western frontier.”[110] The one bright spot in the campaign was that three posts—Fort Wayne and Fort Harrison (in Indiana Territory) and Fort Madison (in present-day Iowa)—held out against Indian attacks in September. Captain Zachary Taylor, who later became president, offered a particularly spirited defense of Fort Harrison.[111] Otherwise, people in the West had little to cheer about. Thrown into a panic by the prospect of Indian depredations, westerners bombarded the federal government with pleas for protection.[112]

Harrison Takes Command

Government officials were anxious to meet these demands and to reestablish American control over the Northwest. According to Eustis, the president was determined “to regain the ground that has been lost by the Surrender of Detroit & the army under General Hull, and to prosecute with increased Vigor the important objects of the Campaign.”[113] The administration wanted to assign the western command to Brigadier General James Winchester, a regular army officer of modest talents, rather than to the local favorite, William Henry Harrison, the governor of Indiana Territory and the hero of Tippecanoe. But Kentucky leaders took matters into their own hands by making Harrison a major general in the militia (even though he was not a citizen of the state) and giving him command of the local troops. Congressman Richard M. Johnson and other westerners pressured the administration until Harrison was put in charge of the whole theater of operations.[114]

Harrison spent the fall of 1812 building a huge army that soaked up federal money and supplies at an alarming rate. The War Department ordered one contractor to supply one million additional rations to the army, and the price of provisions throughout the West soared.[115] Rumor had it that Harrison’s agents paid $50 to $60 a barrel for flour—a charge vigorously denied by the administration paper in Washington.[116] Nevertheless, Harrison conceded that “the Expenses of this Army will greatly exceed the calculations of the Government.”[117] Although the administration was alarmed by the mounting costs, the spending worked like a tonic on the western economy and helped keep the war popular despite the military setbacks.

Harrison’s intention was to sweep hostile Indians from the region and then retake Detroit, but the onset of winter forced him to postpone any major campaign.[118] He did, however, send out raiding parties to destroy Indian villages and provisions, and these expeditions were largely successful. Of special note was a campaign against the Miamis in Indiana Territory. Harrison’s troops defeated the Miamis in the Battle of the Mississinewa River in mid-December and burned their villages. Harrsion’s campaign against the Indians made the whole region safer but far from secure.[119]

The Battle of Frenchtown and River Raisin Massacre

Before ordering his troops into winter quarters, Harrison dispatched a force under Brigadier General Winchester to the rapids of the Maumee River. Following his own counsel, Winchester decided to send a large detachment to the Raisin River in order to protect American settlers at Frenchtown (now Monroe, Michigan). The American force, about 700 strong, drove off a small British force on January 18, and Winchester soon arrived with more troops, bringing his strength to around 1,000 men. On January 22, Colonel Henry Procter arrived from Fort Amherstburg with 1,200 soldiers and Indians and counterattacked. Winchester’s men were badly placed, and after considerable carnage, he was captured and persuaded to surrender his army. Some 900 Americans were killed, missing, or captured in the Battle of Frenchtown, while the British and their Indian allies lost around 200.

Fearing that Harrison was near with a large army, Procter hastened to Fort Amherstburg with most of his prisoners, leaving the wounded behind. The next day Indians, many of whom were probably drunk, killed at least thirty of the prisoners. “The savages were suffered to commit every depredation upon our wounded,” reported a group of American officers; “many were tomahawked, and many were burned alive in the houses.”[120] This massacre was not soon forgotten, and “Remember the Raisin” became a rallying cry throughout the Northwest.[121]

After a season of campaigning, the nation had little show for the blood and treasure expended in the West. Sizeable armies had been lost at Detroit and Frenchtown, and the British and their Indian allies were in the ascendant throughout the region.

Campaign on the Niagara

The campaign in the East did not go much better. The War Department let Governor Daniel D. Tompkins of New York select a local man to direct operations on the Niagara front. Tompkins chose Major General Stephen Van Rensselaer, a forty-seven-year-old rich and powerful Federalist known as “the last of the patroons.” Van Rensselaer was a militia officer with little military experience and relied for expert advice on his kinsman and aide, Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer, who had taken part in the Indian wars of the 1790s and for many years had served as adjutant general of New York. The elder Van Rensselaer shared his command in western New York with a regular army officer, Brigadier General Alexander Smyth. A political appointee who had received his commission when the army was expanded in 1808, Smyth had published a pamphlet on field maneuvers but was without practical experience. Vain and pompous, he was unwilling to place himself (and his 1,600 regulars) under Van Rensselaer’s command despite explicit orders from the War Department to do so.[122]

By October 1812, 6,400 American troops faced perhaps 2,300 British and Indians across the Niagara River. General Van Rensselaer’s plan was to seize Queenston Heights on the British side, while Smyth attacked Fort George six miles to the north. But Smyth, reluctant to take orders from a militia officer, remained aloof and uncooperative. Even without Smyth’s troops, Van Rensselaer still had a decided advantage over the British, and such was his fear of public criticism if he remained inactive that he decided to attack Queenston anyway.[123]

The Battle of Queenston Heights

Van Rensselaer planned to send troops across the river on October 11, but this scheme had to be abandoned when a boat carrying most of the oars disappeared. Two days later, another attempt was made. Despite a strong current, an advance guard of some 300 men—mostly regulars—managed to get across the river. The commanding officer, Solomon Van Rensselaer, was wounded several times in the assault, and his men found themselves pinned down at the river by British troops occupying the heights nearby. Captain John E. Wool took charge of the American force and, learning of an unguarded fisherman’s path that led to the heights, marched his men to the top. There the Americans drove off a British force and took command of the heights. Major General Brock, who had returned from the West to take charge of the British defenses, was killed in a futile bid to retake the heights, and soon there were about 600 Americans in place, now under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Winfield Scott.[124]

At this point Stephen Van Rensselaer ordered the militia on the American side to cross over to reinforce Scott. But the militia, most of whom were “violent democrats” from New York, were disheartened by the Indian war whoops they heard from the British side and the sight of the dead and wounded who were ferried back to the United States.[125] Following the example of their Ohio counterparts in the West, they refused to leave American territory. “To my utter astonishment,” Van Rensselaer reported, “I found that at the very moment when compleate victory was in our hands, the Ardor of the unengaged Troops had entirely subsided. . . . I rode in all directions.—urged men by every Consideration to pass over, but in vain.”[126]

Without reinforcements, Scott’s troops were lost. At first pinned down by a band of Grand River Iroquois led by the Mohawk leader John Norton, they soon faced a large British force led by Major General Roger Sheaffe. Although Sheaffe botched the deployment of his troops, his noncommissioned officers got the men straightened out, and they overwhelmed the Americans. Some Americans were driven from the heights, and the rest, Scott included, surrendered. In all, around 250 Americans were killed or wounded and 925 (which included some of the wounded) were captured. The British lost 125 killed, wounded, or captured, and their Indian allies five killed and an unknown number (including Norton) wounded.[127] Local Republicans—never reconciled to General Van Rensselaer’s command—blamed him for the defeat, claiming that he had secretly given the British advance warning of the attack.[128]

After this disaster, Van Rensselaer, who had shown little talent for managing a campaign, asked to be relieved of his duties, and the War Department, unaware of Smyth’s shortcomings, gave him the command. Smyth planned to attack Fort Erie at the south end of the Niagara River, but “Van Bladder” or “Alexander the Great” (as his men called him) wasted his time composing bombastic proclamations that even the British found laughable.[129] Sounding more like a postman than a soldier, he told his troops: “Neither rain, snow or frost will prevent the embarkation.”[130] Although a preliminary assault in late November destroyed the enemy’s outlying positions at Fort Erie, the primary attack was given up when Smyth’s officers voted it down, partly because most of the Pennsylvania militia refused to cross the border.[131]

Major John Norton (1770–1830?), a Scottish-Cherokee mixed-blood who served as a Mohawk leader during the War of 1812, played a central role in keeping the Grand River Iroquois loyal to Great Britain. He also fought in almost every major engagement on the Niagara frontier. (Portrait by Mary Ann Knight. Library and Archives of Canada)

The abandonment of the attack on Fort Erie brought the fighting on the Niagara front to an end. The only thing gained was the death of Brock, a military genius whose loss the Quebec Gazette called “a public calamity.”[132] As for Smyth, he was bitterly assailed by the New York militia, some of whom even took potshots at him. One soldier called him “a traitor, a tory and a d-----d coward,” and Peter B. Porter used similar language, which led to a bloodless duel.[133] Shortly thereafter Smyth left for Virginia, and without the courtesy of an investigation, he was dropped from the rolls of the army in a reorganization mandated by Congress.[134]

Campaign in the East

The third and most important thrust in the campaign was supposed to be against Montreal. To head this operation, the administration selected sixty-one-year-old Major General Henry Dearborn, a Revolutionary War veteran who had been Jefferson’s secretary of war. Dearborn—known to his troops as “Granny”—had grown fat with prosperity and was no better suited for his command than Hull, Van Rensselaer, or Smyth.[135] He was supposed to coordinate his attack with the one on the Niagara front in order to take the pressure off Hull in the West. But enlistments were slow, and most of the available troops had been sent to other fronts. Hence, he remained in New England to recruit men and prepare coastal defenses, which enabled Brock to concentrate his forces in the West and thus bring about Hull’s defeat.[136]

Such was Dearborn’s dilatoriness, and such was the administration’s need for a victory, that the War Department finally ordered him to proceed with the attack on Montreal. “Go to Albany or the Lake [Champlain]!” Eustis told him. “The troops shall come to you as fast as the season will admit, and the blow must be struck. Congress must not meet without a victory to announce to them.”[137] Dearborn had no taste for a field command, and to conduct operations he planned to rely on Brigadier General Joseph Bloomfield (a political appointee who was the governor of New Jersey). But when Bloomfield became ill, Dearborn had to take charge.

It was not until November that Dearborn’s army, 3,500 regulars and 2,500 militia, marched from Plattsburgh to the Canadian frontier. Colonel Zebulon Pike secured permission to lead a detachment of 500 men into Canada to search for a band of Indians thought to be nearby, but, unable to find them, he decided to attack a British blockhouse on the Lacolle River. The skirmish that followed on November 20, known as the first Battle of Lacolle Mill, was inconclusive, and in the confusion and darkness the Americans fired on each other. By the time Pike had returned to camp, Dearborn realized that most of his militia, standing on their supposed right to serve only in American territory, would not cross the border. With this Dearborn decided to call off the campaign and march back to Plattsburgh.[138] A contemporary later described his failure as a “miscarriage, without even [the] heroism of disaster.”[139]

“Uncle Sam” Makes an Appearance

There was another development in this theater in 1812 that went unnoticed at the time but loomed large for the future. That was the first appearance of the phrase “Uncle Sam.” In late December, the Bennington (Vermont) News-Letter carried a letter from a Federalist who had been drafted into militia duty. “Now, Mr. Editor,” the conscripted citizen soldier asked, “pray if you can inform me, what single solitary good thing will, or can ac[c]rue to (Uncle Sam) the U.S. for all the expence, marching and countermarching, pain, sickness, death &c. among us?”[140] This was the first known reference to “Uncle Sam.”

The following spring a broadside celebrating American victories was published in eastern New York that included doggerel with two more allusions to “Uncle Sam.” The first appeared in a couplet under a picture of Napoleon: “If uncle Sam needs, I’d be glad to assist him,/For it makes my heart bleed we live at such a distance.” The second, which was under a picture of Commodore John Rodgers, predicted that John Bull and his Indian allies would suffer the same fate as Major General John Burgoyne in 1777: “He builds on the Indians that now with him join’d,/But if Uncle Sam lives, they will all be Burgoyn’d.”[141]

Thereafter references to “Uncle Sam” proliferated, first in New York and New England, and then elsewhere in the country. The early references usually carried a negative connotation, and often referred to the U.S. Army rather than the government. Indeed, by 1814 the British sometimes referred to American soldiers as “Uncle Sams.”[142]

Conventional wisdom holds that this nickname originated with an army contractor named Sam Wilson who lived in Troy, New York. Wilson employed people (including some relatives) who called him “Uncle Sam,” and somehow this name got transferred to the U.S. government. Although the evidence for this connection is far from conclusive, there is no denying that the war launched what would one day be a powerful symbol for the nation and its government.[143]

The Failure of American Arms

Uncle Sam had little to cheer about on the northern frontier in 1812 because the invasion of Canada had failed on all three fronts. The “blustering, bullying, mountain laboring campaign,” said a Federalist newspaper in Vermont, had produced nothing but “an unbroken series of disaster, defeat, disgrace, and ruin and death.”[144] Armies had surrendered at Detroit, Frenchtown, and Queenston; much of the Northwest had been overrun by Indians; and no headway had been made against British positions on the St. Lawrence. “The series of misfortunes,” said Albert Gallatin, “exceeds all anticipations made even by those who had least confidence in our inexperienced officers and undisciplined men.”[145]

The principal reason for America’s failure was poor leadership. The administration’s strategy pushed the focus of American operations too far west, the War Department failed to give proper direction to commanders in the field, and most of the army’s senior officers were incompetent. Some of the junior officers, like Winfield Scott, Zachary Taylor, John Wool, and Zebulon Pike, had shown promise; and the rank and file had proven adequate, although most were still raw recruits without battlefield experience. As for the militia, they were a major disappointment. When forced to take the offensive, more often than not they had proven undisciplined, unreliable, and unwilling to leave the country. “Volunteer militia,” the Washington National Intelligencer conceded, “are not precisely the species of force on which to rely for carrying on war, however competent they may be to repel invasion.”[146] The entire campaign showed how difficult it was to build an army overnight. “The degraded state in which the military institutions have been retained,” concluded the Philadelphia Aurora, “comes now upon us with a dismal sentence of retribution.”[147]

The Rival Navies

The war at sea went much better for the United States in 1812, although not because of superior leadership in the cabinet. The secretary of the navy was Paul Hamilton, a South Carolina rice planter with little knowledge of naval affairs. Hamilton was an alcoholic who was sometimes drunk by noon, and Nathaniel Macon thought that he was “about as fit for his place, as the Indian prophet would be for Emperor of Europe.”[148] Hamilton’s one claim to his office was that he was an advocate of preparedness, though parsimonious Treasury policies and congressional opposition doomed his schemes to expand the navy.[149]

A decade of Republican hostility had taken a heavy toll on the navy, but seventeen ships still survived in 1812. Seven were frigates. The Constitution, President, and United States were rated at 44 guns; the Constellation, Chesapeake, and Congress at 36 guns; and the Essex at 32 guns. Another frigate, the Adams, was being cut down to a 28-gun corvette and would later go to sea as a sloop-of-war. There were also nine smaller vessels rated at 10 to 20 guns. Most of the ships carried more guns than they were rated for, and most also carried extra crewmen.[150]

The frigates were the heart of the navy. Inspired by Philadelphia shipwright Joshua Humphreys, the three heavy frigates—or “44s” as they were called—were bigger and sturdier than other frigates. They carried heavier guns (24-pounders rather than 18-pounders) and their thick hulls were better able to withstand enemy broadsides. In fact, they were “superfrigates,” capable of outfighting and outsailing other ships in their class and of outrunning anything larger.[151]

The nation also had the advantage of a rich maritime tradition. Officers and men alike were excellent seamen and skilled marksmen with naval guns and small arms. Most of the officers had seen action in the Quasi-War (1798–1801) or in the War with Tripoli (1801–1805). Many of the men had fought in those wars, too, or had served on British warships. The morale of the service was high, and the men were trained to perfect their skills. In addition, the navy did not face the same logistical problems as the army. The fleet was small, and once supplied a ship could remain at sea for months.[152]

In spite of its high morale, the navy had trouble keeping its ships fully manned. The army siphoned off potential recruits (even some with extensive naval experience) because of the large bounties it offered. The competition from privateers was even greater. Privateering was an attractive alternative to naval service: the tour of duty was shorter (usually a two- or three-month cruise instead of a year), the prospect of an armed engagement was less, and the chances of large profits greater.[153]

It was particularly difficult for the navy to find men to serve in the gunboat flotillas attached to the major ports or in the squadrons on the northern lakes. Flotilla duty was dull and lake service rigorous, and neither offered much prospect of prize money. Although men could be transferred from the navy’s oceangoing vessels to the lakes or flotillas, this encouraged desertion and discouraged reenlistments.[154]

The War at Sea

The usual term of service for navy personnel was a year, and normally there was no bounty.[155] The pay ranged from $6 a month for boys and landsmen to $20 for sailmakers. Ordinary seamen earned $10, able-bodied seamen $12, and gunners $18.[156] Most could earn more on a merchantman and a lot more on a lucky privateer. To compete, the navy began offering incentives on some stations as early as 1812, a practice that became almost universal by the end of the war. By then new recruits could expect to receive a bounty (ranging from $10 to $30), three months’ advance pay, and a 25 percent boost in pay. The navy demanded a two-year commitment in exchange for these incentives but sometimes had to settle for a year or even six months. Even so, the incentives went a long way toward securing the men that were needed.[157]

Even with a full complement of men, the tiny American fleet hardly seemed a match for the Mistress of the Seas. For more than a century Great Britain had ruled the waves, and on paper her naval superiority was overwhelming. She had over 500 ships in service, including 115 ships-of-the-line and 126 frigates. Yet her fleet was scattered all over the world in 1812, engaged in patrol, convoy, and blockade duty. Indeed, at the beginning of the war she had only one small ship-of-the-line, five frigates, and nineteen smaller vessels on the Halifax station. Although additional ships were assigned to the Newfoundland and West Indian stations, they were charged with protecting the North Atlantic fisheries and Britain’s huge Caribbean trade and thus were not available for service on the American coast.[158]

The Royal Navy faced other problems. Its manpower needs had soared from 45,000 in 1793 to 145,000 in 1812, which meant that most of its ships were chronically undermanned. A lack of skilled workers and materials at the navy yards in the New World meant that ships in need of a major overhaul had to be sent home. In addition, after Trafalgar, the Admiralty prohibited live-fire training to save on gun powder, and this undermined the readiness of the gun crews.[159]

The British were reluctant to divert any warships from the European theater because Napoleon was rebuilding his fleet in the Mediterranean. In addition, they hoped that the repeal of the Orders-in-Council would put an end to the American war. Even when it became evident that the war was likely to continue, they feared that closing the sea lanes would deprive their troops in Spain and their colonists in the West Indies and Canada of much-needed provisions. Consequently, they retained only a modest naval presence in American waters until 1813.[160]

U.S. Naval Strategy

American officials recognized that the nation’s fleet might be useful but could not agree on how to deploy it. James Monroe wanted to keep the ships in port, while Albert Gallatin thought they should cruise in American waters to protect returning merchantmen, whose value he estimated at $4 million to $6 million in the first month of the war. Two captains in the service, Stephen Decatur and William Bainbridge, wanted to send the ships abroad to cruise separately, while a third, John Rodgers, thought they should operate in squadrons.[161]

The administration adopted a plan based on Gallatin’s and Rodgers’s recommendations. The ships were divided into two squadrons (later increased to three) and ordered “to afford to our returning commerce, all possible protection.”[162] But this order arrived after Rodgers, who was in charge of one of the squadrons, had set sail in search of a rich British convoy en route from Jamaica to England.[163] Although he never caught up with the convoy, his cruise nonetheless had a dramatic effect on British naval strategy. Rodgers’s squadron chanced upon the British frigate Belvidera (42 guns), and in the ensuing chase Rodger’s flagship, the President (54 guns), exchanged fire with the British ship. Both sides suffered some casualties, one of whom was Rodgers, who sustained a broken leg when one of the President’s guns burst. The Belvidera made its escape, taking word to Halifax that the war had begun and that an American squadron was off the U.S. coast.

Vice Admiral Herbert Sawyer, commander of the Halifax station, wanted to post a British cruiser in front of each American port to intercept returning merchantmen. But when he learned that Rodgers was at sea with a large squadron, he gave up this plan, fearing that his vessels might be picked off one at a time. More by accident than design, the tiny U.S. navy had come up with a strategy that prevented the British from blockading the American coast. Instead, Sawyer kept his ships together and spent most of his time searching for Rodgers’s squadron. As a result, he was able to make only one sweep through American waters, and his catch was poor. “We have been so completely occupied looking for Commodore Rodgers’s squadron,” a British officer complained, “that we have taken very few prizes.”[164]

Because the British did not patrol American waters, most American merchant vessels were able to reach home safely. “Nearly as great a proportion of homeward bound merchantmen have escaped capture,” Governor Tompkins reported, “as has been customary during the last three or four years of peace.”[165] The windfall for the United States was considerable. The flood of goods replenished the nation’s stockpiles and buoyed the customs revenue. In addition, returning seaman helped fill out the crews of American warships and privateers that were fitting out for sea.[166]

The Constitution Shines

Some American warships cruised separately in 1812, and their record of accomplishments was impressive. Captain Isaac Hull, the nephew of the disgraced army general, commanded the U.S. Frigate Constitution (55 guns), the nation’s best frigate. After putting to sea, Hull ran into the Halifax squadron—consisting of a ship-of-the-line and four frigates—which gave chase. Normally, Hull could have outdistanced his pursuers, but he lost his wind. To keep the British at bay, he mounted guns on his stern and undertook several laborious maneuvers to propel his ship. First he used his small boats to tow the ship; then (after discovering that he was in shallow water) he used his boats to drop his kedge anchor ahead, his men then pulling the Constitution forward (a maneuver known as “kedging”). Later, when a slight breeze picked up, Hull ordered his men to water down the sails to better hold the wind. The chase continued for fifty-seven hours, the British keeping pace by matching Hull’s maneuvers. The Constitution finally slipped away, eventually putting in at Boston.[167] The escape was the talk of the nation, and even the British conceded that it was “elegant.”[168]

Without waiting for new orders, Hull took on supplies and set sail again.[169] On August 19, about 750 miles east of Boston, the Constitution, still carrying 55 guns, encountered H.M. Ship Guerrière (49 guns), a ship commanded by Captain James R. Dacres (pronounced Da-kers) and described by the British Naval Chronicle as “one of our stoutest frigates.”[170] After considerable maneuvering, Hull’s ship delivered a powerful and destructive raking fire. An American on board the British ship said the Constitution’s double-shotted first fire (700 pounds of metal delivered at close range) sounded like “a tremendous explosion” and forced the Guerrière to “reel, and tremble as though she had received the shock of an earthquake.”[171]

Although the Guerrière returned the fire, her masts were soon destroyed, her hull damaged, and much of her crew knocked out of action. This left Dacres with no choice but to surrender. “She was left without a Spar Standing,” the American captain reported, “and the Hull cut to pieces, in such a manner as to make it difficult to keep her above water.” Unable to salvage the British ship, Hull removed her crew and ordered her set on fire and sent to the bottom.[172]

In the first major engagement of the war at sea, the U.S. Frigate Constitution defeated the light British frigate Guerrière. British round shot bounced off the thick hull of the American ship, thus earning her the nickname “Ironsides.” The victory of the Constitution gave a huge boost to American morale, which had plummeted after the defeats on the Canadian frontier. (Engraving by Alonzo Chappel. Library of Congress)

During the battle, a seaman on the Constitution saw a shot bounce off the ship and exclaimed: “Huzza, her sides are made of iron.” Thereafter, the Constitution was affectionately known as “Ironsides” and then “Old Ironsides.”[173] The American victory was particularly gratifying because the British ship (which had “Guerrière” painted on her mainsail and “Not the Little Belt!” on her foresail) had been one of the most obnoxious British vessels operating along the coast before the war.[174] The American victory ended the talk of keeping the fleet in port, and other naval victories soon followed.

On December 29, off the coast of Brazil, the Constitution, now carrying 54 guns and commanded by Bainbridge, met H.M. Ship Java (49 guns), a frigate under the command of Captain Henry Lambert. Both captains demonstrated excellent seamanship, but once again superior American firepower and marksmanship carried the day. American gunners destroyed most of the rigging of the Java and killed or wounded a large portion of the British crew. “The Enemy was completely dismasted,” Bainbridge reported, “not having a Spar of any kind standing.”[175] Unable to move, the Java surrendered. After removing the crew and passengers (which included Lieutenant General Thomas Hislop, the governor of India), Bainbridge sent the British ship to the bottom.[176]

Other Naval Engagements

On October 15, the U.S. Frigate United States, carrying 56 guns and commanded by Decatur, was cruising 600 miles west of the Canaries when it encountered a British frigate, H.M. Ship Macedonian (49 guns), Captain John S. Carden commanding. Although the United States was known as “the Wagon” because it was such a poor sailer, Decatur nonetheless outmaneuvered his foe, keeping his distance to take advantage of his powerful long-range guns and his crew’s marksmanship. In the ensuing battle, the United States got off seventy broadsides, the Macedonian only thirty. A sailor on the British ship described the damage done by the American guns: “Grapeshot and canister were pouring through our portholes like leaden hail; the large shot came against the ship’s side, shaking her to the very keel, and passing through her timbers and scattering terrific splinters, which did more appalling work than the shot itself.”[177]

By the time the Macedonian was able to close, she had lost most of her spars and rigging and a third of her crew, forcing Carden to strike his colors. When Decatur boarded the vessel, he found “fragments of the dead scattered in every direction, the decks slippery with blood, [and] one continuous agonizing yell of the unhappy wounded.”[178] A prize crew sailed the Macedonian into Newport Harbor, the only time a British frigate has ever been brought into an American port as a prize of war. Based on the erroneous notion that the American ship had defeated a British ship of equal size, the government gave the officers and crew of the United States $200,000 in prize money, the largest award made for the capture of a single ship during the war. The Macedonian remained on the rolls of the American navy for many years thereafter.[179]

Several smaller American ships also distinguished themselves. On October 18, 1812, 500 miles off the Virginia coast, the American sloop Wasp (18 guns) defeated the British sloop Frolic (22 guns) by firing into the hull of the British ship and killing or wounding almost 80 percent of her crew. Another sloop, the Hornet (20 guns), defeated the British sloop Peacock (20 guns) in February 1813 off the coast of British Guiana. The small American frigate Essex (which was overloaded with 46 guns) defeated the British brig Alert (18 guns?) and also captured a troop transport carrying 160 soldiers from Barbados to Canada. Although the British captured three American warships—the Wasp, Nautilus (14 guns) and Vixen (14 guns)—the balance was clearly in America’s favor.[180] In all, the U.S. Navy had defeated or captured three British frigates, two sloops, a brig, and a transport, while losing only three vessels of its own. American success was due not only to the superior size and firepower of the heavy frigates but also to the skillful seamanship and gunnery displayed on all the ships.

Privateering

The American navy captured fifty merchantmen, but the real damage to British commerce in 1812 was done by what one Republican called “our cheapest & best Navy”—American privateers.[181] Congress laid down the rules for privateering a week after the declaration of war, and several days later the administration began issuing commissions.[182] The first privateers were small pilot boats armed with one large center-pivot gun, called a “Long Tom,” and carrying fifty or sixty men armed with assorted small arms: muskets, sabers, boarding pikes, and the like. According to one privateer captain, this “was quite enough to capture almost any British merchantman, at this stage of the war.”[183]

Cruising mainly off the coast of Canada and in the West Indies, American privateers took 450 prizes in the first six months of the war.[184] “Our Privateers,” said a Richmond merchant, “bring in Prizes to almost every Port & many of these, of great value.”[185] The most successful cruises were made by large, heavily armed and well-manned ships that scoured the Atlantic. The Yankee (15 guns), sailing out of Bristol, Rhode Island, took eight British vessels valued at $300,000, and the Rossie (15 guns), commanded by Joshua Barney of Baltimore, captured 18 vessels worth close to $1.5 million.[186]

A Halifax paper reported in July 1812 that American privateers were “swarming round our coast and in the Bay of Fundy” and that it was “very imprudent for any vessel to sail from this port unless under convoy.” Several months later another report from Halifax claimed that “American privateers annoy this place to a degree astonishingly injurious; scarcely a day passes but crews are coming in that have had their vessels taken and sunk.”[187] Similar reports came from the West Indies. A letter from Martinique said that American privateers “have destroyed a great number of our coasting vessels”; another from Guadeloupe claimed that “American privateers are swarming” and that “the navy force upon the station is not sufficient for the protection of the islands.” According to a third report, the British naval commander in the Leeward Islands was “mortified at the depredations of the American privateers, it not being in his power to prevent them.”[188] “By every account received from the West Indies,” the Times concluded, “the American privateers are still enabled to range unmolested.”[189]

Although British warships in the New World captured more than 150 privateers in the first eight months of the war, the western Atlantic had nonetheless become dangerous for any British merchantman sailing without an escort.[190] Sir John Borlase Warren, who assumed command of the Halifax station in the summer of 1812, conceded “the impossibility of our trade navigating these seas unless a very extensive squadron is employed to scour the vicinity.”[191] Armed American vessels threatened British commerce in other seas, too. “Jonathan’s privateers,” complained a correspondent to the Naval Chronicle, “have roved with impunity and success to all corners of the earth.”[192]

British privateers could respond in kind, but they were slow to act, and their window of opportunity was much smaller. Any prizes taken before London officials authorized reprisals on October 13 technically belonged to the Crown, and by then most American merchant vessels had withdrawn from the sea. Some British privateers were already at sea when war was declared, and they took some prizes. Another six privateers were commissioned in Canada before the end of the year, and they took 24 prizes, mainly by cruising in nearby American waters. The Liverpool Packet (5 guns) was authorized to take French prizes when the War of 1812 began but in August started targeting American ships even though the British government had not yet authorized reprisals. As a result, she had to fight for some of her prizes twice, first at sea and then in the British courts.[193] Although British and Canadian privateers took a toll on American shipping and gave a boost to the economy of the Maritime provinces, American privateers took a much bigger bite out of British commerce.

Impact of the Victories at Sea

The war at sea gave a tremendous boost to American morale, a boost that was sorely needed because the nation was reeling from the disasters on the Canadian frontier. “Our brilliant naval victories,” said an army officer, “serve, in some measure, to wipe out the disgrace brought upon the Nation by the conduct of our generals.” “But for the gallantry of our noble Tar’s,” said another American, “we should be covered with shame and disgrace.”[194] There was also considerable pride in humbling the Mistress of the Seas on her own element. “British arms cannot withstand American upon the sea,” exulted a Republican congressman. “The bully has been disgraced by an infant.”[195]

The British, on the other hand, were stunned by their losses. In more than 200 naval engagements with France and her allies over a twenty-year period they had lost only five battles.[196] Some British subjects, like the editor of the Times, acknowledged the merits of American ships and seamen, but most shared the view of the London Evening Star, which described the American navy as “a few fir-built frigates, manned by a handful of bastards and outlaws.”[197] Given this contempt, the American victories went down hard. “It is a cruel mortification,” said a cabinet official, “to be beat by these second-hand Englishmen upon our own element.”[198]

Learned essays appeared in the Naval Chronicle analyzing the reasons for American success, and the Times wondered “whether the Americans are possessed of any secret in the management of their guns, in the fabrication of their powder, or in the size and construction of their shot.”[199] Most British subjects concluded that the Royal Navy had been victimized by Yankee trickery—that the “superfrigates” were really ships-of-the-line in disguise.[200] But this overstated the power of the American ships, which fit the accepted definition of a frigate: a square-rigged warship “mounting [its] principal ordnance on a single covered gundeck.”[201] It also implied that British naval personnel were easily duped and could not tell the difference between a battleship and a cruiser.

Some British commentators claimed that American warships won because they had picked crews or relied heavily on British tars, but these claims were also untrue.[202] The U.S. Navy had to compete with privateers and the army for men and could not count on British seamen to fill out crews. Although there once were many British tars in the U.S. Navy, that number had declined after the Chesapeake affair, when Navy Department ordered American commanders to recruit only U.S. citizens. Most British subjects who were in the U.S. Navy when the war began asked for shore duty or left the service altogether rather than fight against their country and risk being captured and hanged for desertion or treason. It is thus unlikely that British tars constituted a significant portion of the crew on any U.S. warship in the summer of 1812.[203]

The losses to the American navy and privateers exposed the British government to growing criticism. Although normally a supporter of the government, the Times attacked the ministry’s passive war policy. In October 1812 the paper accused the government of adopting “so drivelling a line of conduct, as to think of waging a war of conciliation and forbearance.” “The paramount duty . . . of British Ministers,” the paper declared, “is to render the English arms as formidable in the new world as they have become in the old.” Two months later, the Times renewed the attack. “Political cowardice alone,” the paper claimed, “prevented Ministers . . . from having a plan matured and ready, for falling upon the sea-coasts of America, blocking up her ports, hindering her privateers from sailing, and capturing or destroying every frigate she might dare to send to sea.” The British government, the Times concluded, had brought out “the impatient ‘dogs of war’ muzzled and clogged.”[204]

This kind of criticism mounted with each defeat. “We have suffered ourselves to be beaten in detail,” said the Times, “by a Power that we should not have allowed to send a vessel to sea.”[205] “We are satisfied,” added the London Chronicle, “that every individual in the country must feel humiliated at this succession of disasters, which thus mock and render nugatory our boasted naval superiority.”[206] A writer in the Naval Chronicle suggested that the best way to retrieve the situation was to maintain a large enough force in American waters to show “that the frontier of England is the high-water mark on every shore: that the British seas are wherever a 32-pounder can be floated.”[207]

British officials took this criticism to heart. Besides dispatching additional ships to the New World, they launched a crash program to build heavy frigates.[208] A dozen were constructed during the war, but most were so badly designed and built of such poor materials that they were no match for the American 44s.[209] In addition, the Admiralty secretly ordered British frigates not “to engage, single handed, the larger Class of American Ships; which though they may be called Frigates . . . [resemble] Line of Battle Ships.”[210] The government also ordered all merchantmen in the Atlantic to sail in convoy.[211] These orders were undoubtedly wise, but in truth the British had nothing to be ashamed of because in every naval engagement the stronger ship had prevailed.

Outcome of the Campaign

The outcome of the campaign of 1812 was a surprise to people in both countries. The conquest of Canada, which was supposed to be a “mere matter of marching,” had eluded the United States, while the war at sea, in which the British were supposed to have a decisive advantage, had gone surprisingly well for the young republic. The campaign, the Naval Chronicle concluded, “has been marked by events on land and at sea . . . diametrically opposite to the public expectation.”[212] Both sides had been unprepared for the war, which had worked to Britain’s advantage in Canada but to America’s on the high seas.

Time, however, was on Great Britain’s side. In June 1812 Napoleon had taken the largest army ever assembled, some 600,000 men, into Russia. By the fall of 1812 stout resistance and a lack of supplies had forced him to retreat. The retreat soon turned into a rout, and by the end of the year the Grand Army had melted away. In December Niles’ Register claimed that “all Europe, the British islands excepted, . . . now are, or soon will be, at the feet of Bonaparte,” but the news pouring in from the Continent suggested just the opposite.[213] If Napoleon were in fact defeated, Great Britain would be able to concentrate all of her military and naval might against the United States, and there would be little chance for the young republic to take Canada or to win any maritime concessions.

Chapter 5

Raising Men and Money

The Campaign of 1812 was both disappointing and embarrassing to Republicans. The string of defeats on the Canadian frontier had dashed all hopes for a quick and an easy victory and had exposed the administration to criticism. The war had never lost its political character, and Republican leaders had hoped that triumphs on the battlefield would disarm their critics and enhance their chances at the polls. “A little success,” said one Republican, “would silence many who are clamerous.” “If our government does not look sharp,” said another, “the Federalists will come in again.”[1] But except for the naval victories, there was little to cheer about, and the result was growing disillusionment with the management of the war. “Our aff[a] irs,” Senator Thomas Worthington of Ohio scrawled in his diary on December 1, “is [in] a misreable way[,] defeated and disgraced[,] the revenue extravagantly expended[,] the war not man[a]ged at all.”[2]

Election of 1812: The Candidates

Although voters usually rally around a wartime president, Madison fared worse in 1812 than he had in 1808.[3] A split in the Republican party and charges of mismanagement very nearly cost him his office. In addition, the Federalists made significant gains in the congressional and state elections. Although the Republicans retained control over the national government and a majority of the state governments, the election results showed that many questioned not only the administration’s handling of the war but the wisdom of the war itself.

The presidential campaign opened in February 1812 when Republicans in the Virginia legislature nominated electors committed to Madison.[4] In the ensuing months Republican caucuses in seven other states followed suit.[5] The regular Republicans in Congress added their endorsement in May 1812. At a widely publicized meeting (which most people considered the official Republican caucus), eighty-three members of Congress promised to support Madison for the presidency and seventy-one-year-old John Langdon of New Hampshire for the vice presidency. (Langdon declined because of age, which necessitated substituting Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts.) Nine other members of Congress later added their endorsements, so Madison ended up with the avowed support of about two-thirds of the Republican membership. Most Republican congressmen from New York and other northern states, however, withheld their support because they preferred a northern candidate.[6]

Shortly after the Washington caucus, Republicans in the New York state legislature met to nominate their own candidate. The favorite was De Witt Clinton, the mayor of New York City. Known as the “Magnus Apollo,” Clinton was a handsome, popular, and talented statesman from a family long active in politics. Although some New Yorkers were fearful of splitting the party, Clinton won the legislature’s endorsement when congressmen returning from Washington brought stories of growing disillusionment with Madison and letters from Postmaster General Gideon Granger urging support for a northern candidate.[7]

Clinton’s friends put his case before the people in an address published in the summer of 1812. The address attacked the congressional nominating system and the Virginia Dynasty and charged the administration with mismanaging the war. Virginia’s domination of the presidency, the address said, had given rise to charges of “Virginia influence,” pitting the agricultural states against the commercial ones. To put an end to this divisiveness, the address recommended Clinton as a man who would provide “vigor in war, and a determined character in the relations of peace.”[8]

De Witt Clinton (1769–1828) was a gifted New York leader who challenged President Madison and the Virginia Dynasty in the election of 1812. Although Clinton appealed to Republicans who had grown weary of Virginia rule and to Federalists who opposed the war, he was narrowly defeated. After the war he became the driving force behind the development of the Erie Canal. (Library of Congress)

The Federalist Dilemma

Clinton’s nomination posed a dilemma for Federalists. Should they maintain their purity by supporting a Federal candidate—a course sure to lead to defeat—or should they vote for Clinton, a man long associated with the Republican party but considered friendly to commerce and anxious for peace? In New York and Virginia, the prevailing sentiment was for a Federal candidate, the favorites being Rufus King, John Marshall, and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney.[9] Elsewhere there was considerable support for Clinton because, as one Federalist put it, he “wd. engage, if chosen President, to make immediate Peace with England.”[10] The sentiment for Clinton was particularly strong among Federalists in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. In midsummer a Philadelphia committee of correspondence sent out a circular recommending Clinton because of “his residence and attachments, his asserted freedom from foreign influence, his avowed hostility to the anti-commercial system, . . . combined with the positive declarations which have been made that he is desirous of the restoration of peace.”[11]

To fix their election strategy, Federalists held a convention in New York City in September 1812. Seventy delegates from eleven states attended, though most were from New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.[12] Rufus King spearheaded the opposition to Clinton, believing that he was nothing more than the “Leader of a Faction.” King thought “it was of less importance that the Federalists should acquire a temporary ascendency by the aid of a portion of the Repubs. than that their reputation and integrity shd. be preserved unblemished.”[13] Many of the delegates disagreed, not because they had any great confidence in Clinton but because they saw him as the lesser of two evils. As Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts put it, “I am far enough from desiring Clinton for President . . . but I would vote for any man in preference to Madison.”[14]

Harrison Gray Otis delivered an impassioned appeal on behalf of Clinton. According to one observer, “Mr. Otis arose, apparently much embarrassed, holding his hat in his hand, and seeming as if he were almost sorry he had arisen. Soon he warmed with his subject, his hat fell from his hand, and he poured forth a strain of eloquence that chained all present to their seats.”[15] Otis’s appeal carried the day, but the convention stopped short of formally endorsing Clinton, fearing that this would undermine his Republican support. Instead, the delegates simply urged Federalists to support presidential electors “most likely by their votes to effect a change in the present course of measures.”[16] The convention made no provision for the vice presidency, but Jared Ingersoll became the accepted candidate when he was nominated by Federalists in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.[17]

A Spirited Campaign

None of the candidates openly campaigned for office, but the followers of each were busy, particularly in the middle states. “Never did I witness a more spirited preparation for an election,” said a New Yorker.[18] The war was the principal issue in the campaign. Madison’s supporters insisted that the contest was necessary to vindicate the nation’s rights and to uphold its independence. “It is a war of right against lawless aggression,” said a South Carolina campaign document, “of Justice against perfidy and violence.”[19] Republicans also argued that the president could not be blamed for setbacks in the field, that it was unfair “to impute to Mr. Madison the failure of every military expedition, or the defection of every military chief.”[20] In response to this, the Clintonians accused Madison’s followers of embracing “the British maxim—the king can do no wrong,” and of applying it “to the President in its full force.”[21]

The Clintonians sought to win northern support by portraying their candidate as a bold and energetic leader who was friendly to commerce and the navy and in no way tied to France. In pro-war states, Clinton’s followers emphasized that he would shorten the war by prosecuting it more vigorously, while in anti-war states he was portrayed as a man who would achieve this end by negotiating with the British. Friends of the administration were quick to exploit this inconsistency. “In the west,” said one critic, “Mr. Clinton is recommended as a friend of war . . . in the East he is presented as a friend of peace.”[22] A character in a contemporary play echoed this sentiment: “He cannot have war and peace at the same time.”[23]

The Clintonians claimed that there had been a breakdown in presidential leadership, a charge that some of Madison’s followers privately conceded. According to a New Hampshire War Hawk, “many of the friends of the Administration believe, that the Executive are not disposed to prosecute the war with vigor, provided they can find any hole through which they can creep out, and avoid the contest.”[24] Even in Madison’s home state a “horrible spirit of disaffection or distrust” was said to be afoot. “All the misfortunes of our arms,” reported a Virginia Republican, “are here Publicly ascribed to the mismanagement of the Genl Government.”[25] Many people wondered whether “Little Jemmy” (who was only 5 feet 4 inches tall) was big enough for the job. “Mr. Madison is wholly unfit for the storms of War,” Henry Clay confided to a friend. “Nature has cast him in too benevolent a mould.”[26]

The Republicans sought to counter charges of Madison’s weakness by attacking Clinton’s character. One called him “the modern Cromwell,” a second described him as a “sprig of upstart nobility,” while a third compared him to “Judas Iscariot.”[27] The Republicans also tried to discredit Clinton by focusing on his alliance with the Federalists. According to a Philadelphia campaign document, this alliance was “unanswerable evidence, that Mr. Clinton has sacrificed his democratic principles on the altar of his ambition.” “Courting the interest and votes of the Essex Junto,” said another Republican, “ought forever [to] damn him with Democrats.”[28]

The means of selecting presidential electors varied from state to state. Half of the states chose their electors by popular vote, while the rest left the decision to the legislature. Before 1848 each state followed its own timetable, and the results drifted in over a two-month period in the fall of 1812. The outcome was by no means certain. According to congressman Samuel Latham Mitchill, November was “a dark and dismal month” in the White House because news of election defeats coupled with military reverses rolled in “Day after day, like the tidings of Job’s disasters.”[29]

Federalists Gain Ground

The voting followed the same sectional pattern as the vote on the declaration of war. Clinton fared best in the North, Madison in the South and West. The outcome hinged on the results in New York and Pennsylvania, the two populous middle Atlantic states. Clinton needed both to win. He had no trouble in New York, winning all of that state’s twenty-nine electoral votes, mainly because of shrewd maneuvering in the legislature by twenty-nine-year-old Martin Van Buren, who henceforth would be known as the “Little Magician.”[30] Madison, however, prevailed in Pennsylvania, winning all twenty-five electoral votes and proving again that this state was the “Keystone in the Democratic Arch.”[31] The election was “pretty close work,” conceded Richard Rush, “and Pennsylvania, as usual, carries the union on her back.”[32] Madison was aided in no small degree by Pennsylvania’s booming prosperity, which was based on military spending and a still robust overseas trade. “Never did the abundant harvests of Pennsylvania find a quicker or a better market,” crowed a Republican campaign document.[33] In all, Madison won 128 electoral votes to Clinton’s 89. (By contrast, Madison had defeated Charles Cotesworth Pinckney in 1808 by a margin of 122 to 47.)[34]

The Republicans also lost ground in the congressional elections. The proportion of seats they held fell from 75 to 63 percent in the House and from 83 to 78 percent in the Senate. Their losses were particularly heavy in New York, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire.[35] The Republicans lost control of several states, too. In 1811 they had won every state except Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Delaware. In 1812 they lost these states as well as Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Maryland. They also lost their majority in the New York assembly and suffered small or moderate losses in almost every other state east of the Appalachian Mountains.[36] Although the Republicans remained in charge of the nation’s destinies, their popularity appeared to be waning. The Federalists, on the other hand, had every reason to be pleased. By capitalizing on the mismanagement and unpopularity of the war and by exploiting the gruesome violence at Baltimore, they had achieved their most impressive electoral gains since the 1790s.

Cabinet Changes

With the elections safely behind them, Republican leaders urged President Madison to strengthen his cabinet. Secretary of War William Eustis and Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton had long been under fire, and by the end of the year this criticism threatened to engulf the president. “Our executive officers are most incompetent men,” said John C. Calhoun. “We are literally boren down under the effects of errors and mismanagement.” “The clamor against the gentlemen who are at the head of the War and Navy Departments,” said another congressman, “is loud & very general.” If these men are not removed, added a Georgia senator, the president “must be content, with defeat, and disgrace in all his efforts, during the war.”[37] Although Madison was reluctant to act, he finally accepted the resignations of both men in December.[38]

To replace Hamilton, Madison chose William Jones, a Philadelphia merchant and former congressman who had fought at Trenton and Princeton and served on a privateer during the Revolution.[39] Although later discredited for mismanaging the national bank, Jones had considerable ability. With some justice, Madison later claimed that he was “the fittest minister who had ever been charged with the Navy Department.”[40] Far more knowledgeable about naval affairs than his predecessor, he was a good administrator who brought energy and efficiency to the department and won the admiration of his contemporaries. “I know of Some,” said Nathaniel Macon in 1814, “who once thought little of his talents, [but] now consider him, the most useful member of the administration.”[41]

It was much harder to find a new secretary of war because this office was such an administrative nightmare. “With all its horrors & perils,” said Gallatin, the office “frightens those who know best its difficulties.” Finding a candidate who is “qualified, popular, and willing to accept is extremely difficult.”[42] Secretary of State James Monroe agreed to serve temporarily but refused to take the office permanently because he was hoping for a command in the field. Senator William H. Crawford and General Henry Dearborn also declined.[43]

The president finally settled on John Armstrong of New York.[44] Although knowledgeable about military affairs and a good judge of talent, Armstrong was abrasive and indolent and a known enemy of the Virginia Dynasty. In 1783 he had written the notorious Newburgh Letters inciting the Continental Army to mutiny, and many people considered this “an indelible stain” upon his character.[45] He also had a reputation for intrigue, a reputation that was largely justified.[46] Given his liabilities, his confirmation in the Senate was doubtful. “Armstrong will rub hard, if he gets through at all,” said one Republican.[47] Although the Senate finally approved him, the vote was 18–15, with both Virginia senators abstaining.[48]

The new appointments improved the efficiency of the administration but not without a price. Armstrong lived up to his reputation for intrigue and alienated his colleagues. Monroe saw him as a rival for the presidency and was constantly at odds with him. Monroe finally told Madison that if Armstrong were not removed he would “ruin not you and the admn. only, but the whole republican party and cause.”[49] Gallatin also despised him. Armstrong sided with Gallatin’s enemies (particularly in Pennsylvania) and distributed patronage accordingly. The crowning insult came when he awarded an army staff position to William Duane, the editor of the virulently anti-Gallatin Philadelphia Aurora. “The appointment of Duane,” lamented Gallatin, “has appeared to me so gross an outrage on decency and self respect . . . that I felt no wish to remain associated with an administration which would employ such a miscreant.”[50] By the summer of 1813, William Jones had lost confidence in Armstrong, too. “Many begin to believe,” he said, “that the ‘Old Soldier’ [Armstrong’s nom de plume] is not a legitimate son of Mars.”[51]

The War Congress Meets Again

On November 2, 1812, about a month before the election results were in and the cabinet shuffling had begun, the Twelfth Congress met for its second and last session. This was the same Congress that had declared war four and a half months earlier. Since House officers are chosen for the life of a Congress, Henry Clay resumed his place as speaker. Once again he filled the key committees with supporters of the war.[52] Although a Federalist congressman thought that the advocates of war had “greatly cooled in their zeal,” this was not evident in the proceedings.[53]

On November 4 President Madison sent his annual message to Congress.[54] He opened on a positive note, reminding Americans of their health and prosperity. “It is my first duty,” he said, “to invite your attention to the providential favors which our country has experienced.” Madison was not exaggerating, for the nation was enjoying a wartime boom fueled by huge government expenditures and a mushrooming trade that included large exports of grain to the Spanish Peninsula and large imports of manufactured goods from the British Empire.[55]

The president mentioned the defeats on the northern frontier and the victories at sea. He also contrasted British and American Indian policies. “Whilst the benevolent policy of the United States invariably recommended peace and promoted civilization among that wretched portion of the human race . . . the enemy has not scrupled to call to his aid their ruthless ferocity.” In order to prosecute the war more efficiently, Madison recommended measures to improve the army, upgrade the militia, expand the navy, and restrict trade with the enemy. “The situation of our country,” he concluded, “is not without its difficulties. . . . The spirit and strength of the nation are nevertheless equal to the support of all its rights, and to carry it through all its trials.”[56]

Republicans in Congress were receptive to the president’s recommendations, but before they could act, a full-scale debate erupted on the merits of the war. House Federalists had remained silent during the proceedings on the war bill the previous June, refusing to debate the issue in secret session. Now, as one Republican put it, they “embraced [the] opportunity to deliver themselves of their war speeches with which they were pregnant last session.”[57] The Republicans responded with lengthy speeches of their own, and for two weeks the debate raged, pushing other business aside. The exchanges focused on the wisdom of the war and the justice of invading Canada and were so long-winded and repetitious that even John Randolph, who was no fan of brevity, conceded that the debate had become “unnecessarily protracted.”[58]

The most provocative speech was delivered by Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts. Taking a swipe at Jefferson, Madison, and Swiss-born Albert Gallatin, Quincy said that for twelve years the nation’s affairs had been mismanaged by “two Virginians and a foreigner.” The war policy, he claimed, was designed to further the Virginia Dynasty by insuring that James II (Monroe) succeeded James I (Madison). Those New England Republicans who aided the administration were characterized as “toads, or reptiles, which spread their slime in the drawing room”—language so coarse that Quincy deleted this passage before publishing his speech.[59]

Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts (1772–1864) was an outspoken opponent of Republican policies and defender of New England’s interests. In this cartoon, he is lampooned as a secessionist who hoped to become King Josiah the First of New England and Nova Scotia. (Watercolor etching by William Charles. Library of Congress)

Republicans hotly denied Quincy’s accusations and, according to one War Hawk, “paid him in his own coin, and with use.”[60] Not all the speeches were recorded because most were extemporaneous, and a stenographer was not always present to take them down. Stevenson Archer’s speech, which was recorded, was probably typical. The Maryland Republican accused Quincy of “secretly advocating, and insidiously endeavoring to effect, a disunion of the States.” Archer also articulated a view that most Republicans shared, namely, that Federalists could best work for peace by supporting the war. It is the duty of every good citizen, he said, “to aid in the prosecution of the present war, in order that a speedy and honorable peace might be be [sic] obtained.”[61]

Congress Adopts an Impressment Bill

Both sides talked at length about impressment because, with the Orders-in-Council repealed, this was the only major issue that separated the two nations. “There is but one point of difference,” said a Connecticut Federalist. “But that is a point which we well know, or ought to know, that [Great Britain] will not yield until reduced to the last extremity.”[62] Republican leaders recognized the importance of impressment, and the administration had already offered to bar all British tars from American ships if Great Britain would give up the practice.[63] Although Britain had rejected this proposal, the administration was anxious to publicize it in order to shore up its position at home and abroad. As one Republican put it, we must “define the grounds of contest . . . that we may stand justified in our own eyes, and in the eyes of the world.”[64]

Accordingly, Gallatin drew up a bill that embodied the administration’s views. As finally enacted into law, the foreign seaman bill barred from American ships the seamen of any nation that excluded American tars from its ships. The bill also required foreigners seeking American citizenship to reside continuously in the United States for five years. This was designed to force those interested in citizenship to give up seafaring because the British claimed the right to impress anyone born in the British Isles, even those who had become naturalized foreign citizens.[65]

The “Impressment Bill” (as contemporaries called it) was attacked by both sides in Congress.[66] Some Republicans thought it was humiliating to give legislative sanction to an offer already rejected by the British. John Clopton of Virginia argued that the bill would “greatly lower the dignity of this nation” and would probably be treated by the British with “scorn and contumely.” Joseph Desha thought the measure was tantamount to “begging for peace” and that Americans would be humbling themselves “at the footstool of British corruption.”[67] Federalists also distrusted the bill, believing that its main purpose was to undermine opposition to the war. According to Charles Goldsborough of Maryland, the proposal was “a sort of political adventurer, sent out to catch what it may; peace, if it may so happen; if not, what is perhaps more desired—popularity to the war and its authors.”[68] Despite these misgivings, a bipartisan coalition pushed the bill through Congress, and Madison signed it into law.[69]

Raising Troops and Reforming the Army

Congress devoted much of its time in this session to debating the larger issues of the war. As valuable as this was for bringing the issues into focus, it did little to strengthen American arms in the field, and this, most Republicans agreed, was essential. “We ought not to calculate on peace,” said David R. Williams; “it has become more than ever necessary to prove that we will not only declare war, but can prosecute it with energy and courageous enterprise.” “The next campaign,” echoed George M. Troup, “must be opened with vigor, and prosecuted to success.”[70]

The main problem the nation faced was raising troops. Recruitment lagged behind need for a variety of reasons. Army pay was low and army life hard, and Republicans no less than Federalists were reluctant to enlist. “Money usually can command men,” said one Federalist, “but it will take millions to make soldiers of the happy people of this country—nothing short of a little fortune will induce our Farmers or their sons to enter on a life which they cordially despise: that of a common soldier.”[71]

The administration made a number of proposals for upgrading the army, and most of these were enacted into law.[72] The most important provided for raising an additional 22,000 regulars for one year of service, thus increasing the authorized level of the army to 57,000 men. This bill offered short-term recruits a bounty of $16 and was designed to replace the volunteer act of 1812, which had failed because it offered no bounty at all. Proponents of the new bill argued that the short enlistment period would attract recruits, while opponents claimed that the term was too short to allow for sufficient training. The bill probably would have been defeated had not Federalists chosen this occasion to deliver most of their speeches against the war.[73] This transformed the vote on the troop bill into a vote of confidence on the war. According to William Lowndes, “there were not half a dozen men who approved [the bill]. . . . The vote was by many considered a vote of approbation to the war.”[74]

Congress also tried to spur enlistments by raising army pay. Privates earned only $5 a month, which was less than half what most unskilled laborers made.[75] To lessen the gap, Congress boosted army pay to $8. This also had the effect of increasing the bounty for long-term recruits, which was set at $16 plus three months’ pay and 160 acres of land. Under the revised pay schedule, new recruits would receive a cash bounty of $40 instead of $31. On top of this, Congress ordered the army to give all long-term recruits three months’ advance pay, which would put an additional $24 into their pockets. Congress also increased the number of officers in each regiment (so that more could concentrate on recruiting) and authorized long-term recruits to sign up for the duration of the war instead of the usual five years.[76]

Congress also prohibited the arrest of any soldier for debt.[77] Although Federalists claimed that this measure was unconstitutional, Ezekiel Bacon of Massachusetts argued that it was necessary to prevent fraud. Some soldiers, he said, created fictitious debts, were arrested, and then released when a friend or relative promised to serve as their bail. These soldiers could not be reclaimed by the army because the courts considered a man the property of his bail until the suit was settled—which could take years.[78]

The practice that Bacon complained of continued even after Congress had legislated against it. In Massachusetts, Judge Joseph Story complained that “the service has suffered exceedingly from fraudulent arrests,” and there was nothing he could do about it. “The Courts of the United States are expressly prohibited from issuing a writ of habeas corpus, except in certain specified cases, and this is not within the exception.”[79] An army officer reported that soldiers continued to be arrested for debt in Connecticut, too. “No regard is paid, here,” he said, “to the laws or authority of the United States.”[80]

Congress added several measures to improve the efficiency of the army. The number of staff officers was increased, and some of these were assigned to armies in the field. In addition, to keep better track of supplies, Congress created a superintendent general of military stores and ordered all supply officers to make quarterly reports.[81] Finally, the secretary of war was ordered to draw up a new code of regulations defining the respective duties of the different departments in the army. Armstrong responded to this charge with unaccustomed alacrity. The result was “Rules and Regulations of the Army of the United States,” published on May 1, 1813. This manual was so well conceived and so clearly drawn that it governed army organization and procedure for years to come.[82]

Although the administration got most of the army legislation it wanted, Congress denied two requests. The War Department sought authority to enlist minors eighteen years or older without the consent of parent, master, or guardian, but Federalists denounced the proposal, claiming that it would violate parental right and contract law and undermine the apprentice system.[83] If the war were as popular as Republicans claimed, said Laban Wheaton of Massachusetts, it would not be necessary “to call to their aid . . . boys without discretion.”[84] The Senate was sympathetic to these arguments and killed the proposal.[85] The administration also lobbied for a bill to arm and classify the militia—a measure long advocated by southerners. In the past, schemes of this sort had been defeated by a bipartisan coalition of northerners in the House. This time the House approved the plan, but it died in the Senate.[86]

Naval Expansion and Privateering

Congress also endorsed naval expansion. “Our brilliant naval victories,” said an army officer, “have contributed to place that description of force in a proper point of View.”[87] In the flush of excitement generated by the American victories, even President Madison had come out for naval expansion.[88] The remaining opposition in Congress was deflated by two grand naval balls, one of which was held on board the U.S. Frigate Constellation and attended by the president and his cabinet.[89] Congress subsequently authorized the construction of four ships-of-the-line (rated at 74 guns), six heavy frigates (rated at 44 guns), six sloops, and an unspecified number of vessels for service on the northern lakes.[90] This legislation—a fundamental reversal in Republican policy—committed the nation to a large-scale, long-term construction program.

As usual, Federalists were virtually unanimous in support of naval expansion. In fact, so enthusiastic were they that James Milnor of Pennsylvania suggested that Congress authorize a special naval loan so that opponents of the war could contribute to maritime defense. Republicans, however, voted down this proposal, claiming that the war must be prosecuted as a whole.[91] The various interests in the country, said Langdon Cheves, “should be all freighted in the same bark . . . and they should all float or go down together.”[92]

Besides endorsing naval expansion, Congress sought to foster privateering. Merchants from New York and Baltimore had appealed to the government to reduce the duties on prize goods, which (counting all the fees) usually amounted to 30 or 40 percent of their value.[93] Gallatin was opposed to any reduction, claiming that it would cost the government money without stimulating privateering.[94] Congress accepted Gallatin’s logic and sought instead to promote privateering by expediting the sale of prize goods and limiting some of the fees. A pension fund was also established for privateersmen wounded in action. Moreover, to promote the destruction of armed enemy ships by any means—privateers, submarines, mines, or the like—Congress authorized the payment of a bounty equal to half the value of each vessel destroyed.[95]

The Debate over British Imports

Republicans were able to forge a consensus on army and navy legislation, but tax and trade issues continued to divide them. The most pressing trade problem concerned the flood of imports that had arrived illegally from the British Empire after the declaration of war. This problem grew out of the repeal of the Orders-in-Council in June 1812. To American merchants in England, the British action appeared to pave the way for the restoration of normal trade relations because the administration had earlier promised to lift non-importation if the Orders were rescinded. Seeking guidance, a group of merchants had approached Jonathan Russell, the American chargé d’affaires in London. Russell, who was himself a merchant, “thought it his duty to countenance the idea that shipments made after the revocation of the orders, would be admitted into the United States.”[96]

Accordingly, those merchants who already held British-made goods began to ship them to America, while those who held other forms of capital began to convert their funds into goods. When news of the declaration of war reached England at the end of July, the merchants again asked for Russell’s advice, and again he advised them to send their property home.[97] The British government, hoping the repeal of the Orders would put an end to the war, allowed these shipments under special license.[98] American merchants in Britain’s colonies responded to the news of war by shipping their property home, too.[99]

All of these shipments were made in violation of the non-importation law, and thus every ship and cargo was subject to seizure. As word of the shipments spread, merchants in some American ports began to fit out privateers in the hope of reaping an easy harvest.[100] The government, however, ordered American warships and privateers not to interfere with the shipments.[101] Instead, the merchandise was seized by customs officials when it arrived in port. By the end of the year, the government had impounded merchandise whose prime value was $18 million but whose actual value in the American market was close to $30 million.[102]

The administration sought to keep the goods under government seal, but federal judges working closely with sympathetic customs officials in Baltimore, New York, and New England released some of the merchandise on bond. Gallatin was dismayed by this but decided that (in fairness to merchants elsewhere) the rest of the goods should be released as well. As a result, the government was left holding $18 million in penal bonds.[103]

Normally, the administration might have prosecuted for the full value of the bonds, but under the circumstances the merchants seemed entitled to more sympathetic treatment. After considering various alternatives, the administration decided to cancel half the value of the bonds and to prosecute for the balance. The secretary of the treasury had authority to pursue this course under a 1797 law, but because of the scope of the problem, the administration decided to seek congressional approval first.[104]

The merchants, however, launched a massive campaign to persuade Congress to cancel the penalties altogether. Claiming that their profits had been modest—only 5 or 10 percent above normal—the merchants argued that they could not afford to pay even half the value of the bonds.[105] Many congressmen, Federalists and Republicans alike, were sympathetic to their pleas. There was considerable sentiment among commercial Republicans for appeasing the merchants in the hope of winning their support for the war. As William M. Richardson of Massachusetts put it: “The merchants are a powerful class of the community, and ought at this crisis to be conciliated.”[106] There was also much resistance to bilking the merchants to finance the war. Privately, William Branch Giles called Gallatin’s plan a “miserable impracticable attempt to plunder merchants,” and Langdon Cheves said that he “would rather see the objects of the war fail . . . than see the long arm of the Treasury indirectly thrust into the pocket of the citizen through the medium of a penal law.”[107]

Most Republicans, however, were skeptical of the merchants’ claims. Rumors circulated of enormous profits, and some people thought the merchants could afford to pay the bonds and still make a profit. “In many cases,” Jonathan Roberts of Pennsylvania claimed, “the profits were immense, three hundred per cent advance, from the hungry demand of an exhausted Market.”[108] To most Republicans, the merchants’ bonds offered an irresistible alternative to internal taxes. Richard M. Johnson best summarized this view: “I am unwilling to fix upon [the American people] internal taxation until it become[s] indispensable, nor to permit [the merchants] to monopolize advantages without an equivalent.”[109] After much soul-searching, Congress finally sided with the merchants, though the decision in the House was close. The result was the passage of a trio of bills that remitted all fines and forfeitures on the goods in question.[110]

The Restrictive System Challenged

The defeat of Gallatin’s plan for dealing with the illegal imports deprived the government of $9 million in revenue and brought the whole non-importation system into question. There were some Republicans—including Gallatin himself—who wanted to modify the system in order to raise revenue. Accordingly, Cheves reintroduced his bill from the last session to permit the importation of most British goods. To make the bill more palatable to restrictionists, Cheves included provisions that prohibited judges from releasing impounded goods on bond and provided for closer inspection of ships importing certain products traditionally purchased from Britain’s colonies.[111]

Cheves pleaded for the passage of this bill, claiming that the disadvantages of non-importation far outweighed the advantages. “It puts out one eye of your enemy,” he said, “but it puts out both your own. It exhausts the purse, it exhausts the spirit, and paralyzes the sword of the nation.”[112] Most Republicans, however, were as yet unwilling to give up on economic coercion. Many agreed with a memorial from Baltimore that non-importation was “amongst the most effectual means, which can be used to procure for our Country the blessings of a speedy and honorable peace.”[113] Although Federalists did not accept this logic, they too opposed Cheves’s bill because they saw it merely as a device “to put further off the dooms-day of direct taxation.”[114] Federalists joined with Republican restrictionists to strike out the heart of the bill. Although the House passed the remnant, it died in the Senate. Thus, the non-importation system remained intact.[115]

Republicans were divided over controlling not only imports but also exports. The enemy trade act adopted shortly after the declaration of war should have prevented most trade with the enemy, but American citizens continued to supply British subjects in Canada and the West Indies, British fleets in American waters, and British armies in the Spanish Peninsula. Most of this trade was conducted under British licenses, some 500 of which were issued by British military and civilian authorities in the first two and a half months of the war. Known as “Sidmouths” or “Prince Regents” (after the authority that issued them), these licenses were usually valid for three to six months. They were extremely valuable, not only for protecting the overseas trade but also as a cover for the coasting trade. The licenses were frequently counterfeited and were openly hawked in American cities, sometimes commanding as much as $5,000.[116]

The British government was particularly anxious to facilitate trade to the Spanish Peninsula because British armies there were dependent on American provisions. The export of American flour to this region had mushroomed from 105,000 barrels in 1809 to 939,000 barrels in 1812.[117] Since this trade was vital to American agriculture, the government was careful not to obstruct it. The enemy trade act did not prohibit the use of British licenses to trade with non-British ports, and the attorney general’s office and the Treasury Department both ruled that American trade with British-occupied Spain and Portugal did not violate the law.[118]

President Madison was never very fond of the license trade, but he tolerated it until early 1813, when he learned of a British order directing officials in the West Indies to favor Federalist New England with the licenses.[119] Incensed by this policy, Madison sent a special message to Congress accusing the British of adopting “a system equally distinguished by the deformity of its features, and the depravity of its Character.” The British policy, the president said, was an “insulting attempt on the virtue, the honor, the patriotism, and the fidelity of our brethren of the Eastern States.” To spare New England from temptation, Madison asked Congress to outlaw the use of all foreign licenses. He also asked for a ban on all exports in foreign bottoms because he was convinced that most neutral vessels were British ships in disguise.[120]

Both presidential recommendations ran into stiff opposition in the Senate. A bill to prohibit the use of foreign licenses passed the House but was postponed indefinitely by the Senate.[121] The opposition to non-exportation was even greater. Cheves called non-exportation “a system of self-torture” that would throw the nation “upon the rack of excruciating torment.”[122] The House had already rejected two proposals to restrict exports when the president made his recommendation.[123] Although a bill was duly introduced to restrict the export of provisions in foreign bottoms, the prohibition was to remain in effect for only four months. Federalists succeeded in making the bill less palatable—and also more fair—by broadening the prohibition to include all exports. The House passed the bill in this form, but the Senate killed it just as it had killed the ban on foreign licenses.[124]

Public Finance

Congress thwarted the administration not only on trade measures but on tax policy as well. Even though the $11 million loan of 1812 had never been filled, Gallatin was able to balance his books at the end of the year by borrowing short-term money and taking advantage of the $5 million tax windfall generated by the British imports.[125] Balancing the budget in 1813, however, was likely to be more difficult. In January Gallatin estimated that expenses for the coming year would be $36 million but that revenue would be only $17 million. This would necessitate raising $19 million with loans and treasury notes, a sum that Gallatin considered prohibitive.[126] “I think a loan to that amount to be altogether unattainable,” he told the president.[127] Hence the imposition of new taxes was more essential than ever.

Republicans had no objection to authorizing a $16 million loan and $5 million in treasury notes, but they were still reluctant to move on the tax issue.[128] A proposal to triple the foreign tonnage duties—from $2 to $6 a ton—failed because it was attached to the bill suspending non-importation.[129] The House refused even to consider internal taxes until mid-February, three and a half months into the session. By then most Republicans professed to believe that it was too late to take any action and that the tax windfall from the British imports rendered immediate action unnecessary anyway.[130] Even a proposal to hold a special session in May to deal with the tax issue was initially defeated and was salvaged only by intense lobbying outside of Congress.[131] Thus when the Twelfth Congress adjourned on March 3, 1813, the imposition of internal taxes still lay in the future. The failure to provide “a system of finance . . . adapted to a state of war,” admonished a Republican paper, was “wholly inexcusable.”[132]

Several days after the adjournment of Congress, the Russian minister in Washington transmitted a formal proposal from his government to mediate an end to the war.[133] The president accepted this proposal, which necessitated another cabinet change because Gallatin, who had grown weary of Armstrong’s intrigues and the burdens of the Treasury Department, asked to be appointed to the peace commission. Madison complied with Gallatin’s wishes, but rather than permanently lose such a valued member of his official family, he retained Gallatin as nominal head of the Treasury Department, assigning his duties temporarily to Secretary of the Navy William Jones. This arrangement caused the president considerable embarrassment in the Senate, and Gallatin never in fact rejoined the cabinet.[134]

The New Congress Meets

The Thirteenth Congress met for its special session on May 24, 1813. Most congressmen were unaccustomed to Washington’s hot and sticky summers, and there were some complaints. In June Federalist John Lovett of New York claimed that it was “hotter, in this house, than purgatory.” The following month, after meeting in open session for five hours, Lovett reported that “the doors were closed and we were boiled and roasted three hours longer; almost to suffocation.”[135] Lovett also complained that it was difficult to sleep because of “the yells and popping [shooting] of our undisciplined Patrols.”[136] Doubtless these distractions contributed to the unruliness of the session.

Henry Clay was again elected speaker, and again he packed the key committees with strong war men.[137] But the Republican party was in a weaker position than it had been in the last Congress. As a result of the elections of 1812, the Federalists had increased their strength in both houses. “We have . . . a majority of decided friends of the Administration,” said one Republican, “but the opposition have gained considerably in talents.”[138] With the Republican majority reduced, this Congress threatened to be more factious than the Twelfth Congress had been.

Nor was the president able to provide effective leadership. At the beginning of the session, a Republican reported that Madison was in “good health & spirits & temper.”[139] Yet three weeks later the president was struck down by a “bilious fever”—an intestinal ailment, perhaps dysentery—which kept him bedridden for five weeks and carried him to the doors of death.[140] “His complaint,” said a Republican congressman, “justly excites apprehensions as to the issue.”[141] With the president ill and the cabinet divided, it was difficult for the administration to give direction to Congress. “The influence of the president is much less than I supposed,” conceded a first-term Federalist senator. “There seems to be little plan or concert in the management of public affairs.” “Party sperit,” added John C. Calhoun, “is more violent than I ever knew.”[142]

Madison’s Appointments Rejected

President Madison sent his opening address to Congress on May 25. He expressed hope for the Russian mediation proposal, mentioned military and naval developments, and again blasted the British for employing Indian auxiliaries. He also urged Congress to put the nation on a sound financial footing. “This can be best done,” he said, “by a well digested system of internal revenue.”[143]

Before Congress could tackle the tax issue, it became embroiled with the president over two of his diplomatic appointments. Shortly after the session began, Madison nominated Jonathan Russell, former chargé d’affaires in Paris and London, to serve as United States minister to Sweden. Some senators suspected Russell of mismanaging his earlier diplomatic assignments, and many questioned whether a full-fledged minister was needed in Sweden. When the president refused to confer with a Senate committee to discuss the matter, the Senate rejected the appointment by a vote of 22–14.[144] Russell’s rejection, said a Federalist, “is considered here, as being the most important point which has been carried against the administration for ten years.”[145]

Shortly thereafter, the president received another jolt when he asked the Senate to confirm John Quincy Adams, James A. Bayard, and Albert Gallatin for the Russian peace commission. Many senators resented the president’s precipitous decision to dispatch the envoys to Russia without waiting for Senate confirmation. Many also doubted whether the secretary of the navy could handle his own duties as well as those of the Treasury Department.[146] Although Adams and Bayard were confirmed by large majorities, there was considerable opposition to Gallatin.[147]

Gallatin had long feuded with Republican dissidents in the Senate, and resentment against him had been mounting ever since he had urged internal taxation on the eve of war. His enemies now claimed that “The Rat—in the Treasury” (as the Philadelphia Aurora called him) was deserting the ship of state at a critical time.[148] “It is freely imputed to him,” said a Republican senator, “that he fled to avoid the Odium of the System of taxation . . . which he himself asserted necessary.”[149] Gallatin’s enemies hoped to take advantage of this resentment to force him from the cabinet. “The scuffle,” said one observer, “is to get Gallatin out of the treasury.”[150]

The Senate adopted a resolution declaring that the powers of the secretary of the treasury and those of a diplomatic envoy “are so incompatible, that they ought not to be . . . united, in the same person.”[151] When the president refused to budge, the Senate rejected Gallatin’s appointment by a vote of 18 to 17.[152] Gallatin had been a presidential confidant and cabinet minister for more than twelve years, and according to one Federalist, his defeat (coming on the heels of Russell’s defeat) was “the rudest shock the president has ever experienced. It was wholly unexpected.”[153]

The St. Cloud Decree Challenged

It was not only the Senate that feuded with the president. There was trouble in the House, too. On June 10, Daniel Webster, a first-term Federalist congressman who was at the beginning of a long and distinguished career, introduced a series of resolutions to secure information on the repeal of the Continental Decrees.[154] At issue was the authenticity of the St. Cloud Decree, a mysterious French document dated April 28, 1811, that purportedly repealed the Continental Decrees. The document was not made public until 1812, and everyone knew that it had been backdated by French officials to make it look like the Continental Decrees had been repealed the year before. Federalists were particularly incensed by France’s deception, believing that this kind of trickery had led to the War of 1812. “I declare confidently and boldly,” said Congressman Harmanus Bleecker, “that Napoleon has inveigled us into the war. . . . But for his arts, intrigues, and duplicity, the United States would not now [be] at war with Great Britain.”[155] Webster’s resolutions were designed to force the administration to acknowledge French perfidy and to bring into question the repeal of the French decrees and by implication the war itself.

The resolutions posed a dilemma for Republicans. Adopting them would force the administration to address an issue that it preferred to ignore, while rejecting them might raise charges of a cover-up. Felix Grundy tried to turn the debate against the Federalists by characterizing their opposition to the war as “moral” treason.[156] Although Federalists hotly denied this charge, it dogged them for the rest of the war.[157] Ultimately all the resolutions were approved by large majorities.[158] This forced the administration to admit that it knew nothing of the St. Cloud Decree until it was made public in 1812. Monroe tried to put the best face on matters by delivering a long report justifying the war, but the damage had been done.[159]

New Taxes Adopted

The House and Senate debates over policies and appointments pushed financial matters into the background, but only temporarily. By early March the government was so destitute of funds that Gallatin told the president: “We have hardly money enough to last till the end of the month.”[160] Shortly thereafter, the $16 million loan had been opened for subscriptions. Initially there was little response, but the Russian mediation proposal raised hopes for peace, and the entire loan was subsequently filled. Three wealthy merchants—David Parish, Stephen Girard, and John Jacob Astor—took two-thirds of the sum offered, though the Treasury had to accept a 12 percent discount, which meant that it received only $88 in cash for every $100 in bonds.[161] Since the loan was 6 percent for thirteen years, this worked out to an effective interest rate of just under 7.5 percent.

The discount on the loan emphasized the need for more tax money, but Congress still seemed reluctant to act. Although most Republicans conceded the need for additional revenue, no one in Congress wanted to take the lead. “The authors of the war,” said a Virginia Federalist, “approach the subject with fear & trembling.” “Even the most supple courtiers and minions of power,” declared another observer, “fear the loss of their Seats.”[162] All were anxious to spare their constituents from as much of the burden as possible, and this threatened the entire program. As John W. Eppes of Virginia put it, “every one is for taxing every body, except himself and his Constituents.”[163] Federalists were particularly skeptical of Republican resolve. The internal taxes had been repeatedly postponed, and most Federalists expected them to be put off again.[164]

Much to the surprise of their enemies, the Republicans closed ranks and enacted virtually the entire tax program. The new duties were designed to yield $5.5 million.[165] They included a direct tax on land, a duty on imported salt, and excise taxes on stills, retailers, auction sales, sugar, carriages, and bank notes and other negotiable paper. All the taxes were to go into effect on the last day of 1813 or the first day of 1814, which showed that Republicans were still determined to put off “the dooms-day” of internal taxation as long as possible. The direct tax was levied for a year only, but the other duties were to remain in effect until a year after the end of the war.[166]

The most important of the new levies was the direct tax, designed to yield $3 million. Federalists had imposed a $2 million direct tax in 1798 during the Quasi-War, but the method of assessment was so complicated and collection was so difficult that as late as 1812 close to $100,000 was still uncollected, mainly in the South.[167] Republicans hoped to avoid this problem by giving discounts of 10 or 15 percent to any state willing to pay its quota directly into the federal Treasury.[168] Seven states took advantage of this provision, but the rest declined because they would have to raise their own taxes.[169] Federalist states had an additional reason for refusing to assume the direct tax. According to the Rhode Island Assembly, paying the tax “would release the General Government from the odium of collecting a tax which their own mad policy has brought upon the country.”[170]

Congressional action on tax legislation came none too soon, for the administration came back to Congress in mid-July with a request to borrow an additional $7.5 million. According to the acting secretary of the treasury, William Jones, this money was needed to cover an unanticipated deficit and to defray costs in early 1814 before a loan for that year could be filled.[171] Congress passed the necessary legislation, and the loan was filled at a discount of 11.75 percent, which was slightly less than the discount on the previous loan.[172] No doubt this was a reflection of the continued optimism generated by the Russian peace initiative as well as the progress Congress had made on tax legislation.

More Trade Restrictions and a Boost to Privateering

Even though the administration finally got the tax program it wanted, it still had trouble with Congress over trade restrictions. The only restriction adopted in this session was a ban on the use of British licenses. Although the previous Congress had balked at such a ban, the courts had come to the administration’s aid. At the end of 1812 the U.S. Frigate Chesapeake had seized the Julia, an American ship trading with Lisbon under a British license, and the courts had upheld the seizure. Basing his decision on the common law, Judge Joseph Story ruled that using a British license to supply British armies (even through a neutral port) constituted illegal intercourse with the enemy.[173] Congress sustained this decision in the summer of 1813 by adopting legislation that outlawed the use of all enemy licenses. Thenceforth, American ships carrying British licenses would be treated like enemy vessels.[174]

The administration was pleased with the court decision and the license law, but these measures did not halt the flow of provisions to British men-of-war in American waters. Coasting vessels continued to ply this trade, and so too did neutral vessels, many of which were actually British ships in disguise. Madison was incensed by this trade. He also resented a British decision to blockade the middle and southern states while leaving New England’s ports open. Determined to put an end to the flow of goods to the enemy and to the “insidious discrimination between different ports of the United States,” the president sent a confidential message to Congress on July 20 recommending an embargo on all exports.[175]

Officials throughout the British Empire issued licenses to permit trade that was otherwise prohibited by the Navigation Acts or other Parliamentary acts or Royal decrees. This license, issued by the lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia, authorized a Halifax merchant to import food from the United States in 1813. (Record Group 8, Halifax Prize Cases, Library and Archives of Canada)

The president’s proposal was treated roughly in both houses. The House referred the message to its foreign relations committee, which recommended against an embargo. The House overrode this recommendation and passed the necessary legislation, but it was defeated in the Senate.[176] Madison was dismayed by the Senate’s action, claiming that an embargo would have “driven the enemy out of Canada, expelled him from our waters, and forced him to retire from Spain and Portugal.”[177] Nor was the president pleased when the House rejected proposals to expand the scope of the enemy trade act and prohibit the export of provisions and naval stores in foreign bottoms.[178] Neither chamber, it seemed, was enthusiastic about restricting trade with the enemy.

Blocked in Congress, the administration fell back on its executive powers. On July 29, the day after the embargo was defeated, the secretary of the navy issued a general order to all naval commanders, directing them to seize any vessel, whatever its flag, that was headed toward enemy ships in American waters or enemy stations in American territory. A week later, the War Department issued a similar directive to the nation’s army officers.[179]

Before adjourning, Congress sought to give another boost to privateering. In a letter to a House committee, William Jones took issue with Gallatin’s argument (voiced during the previous session) against reducing the duties on prize goods. Jones claimed that excessive duties had sharply curtailed privateering and that the revenue from prize goods was now “very inconsiderable.”[180] Jones recommended a reduction in the duties, and Congress responded by approving a 33 percent decrease.[181] The purpose of this measure, said Federalist John Lovett, was “to bore a hole through the Non importation Law, large enough to throw a little money . . . in the hands of the Admin.”[182] Congress also sought to encourage privateers to hold on to their prisoners of war (instead of releasing them at sea or in a neutral port) by offering a bounty of $25 for each prisoner brought to the United States. The balance of prisoners held by the two warring nations was running against the United States, and the government was anxious to redress the balance.[183]

Congress Adjourns

Congress adjourned on August 2, 1813, thus bringing to a close a difficult nine months for the president. At the beginning of this period, Madison was nearly defeated in a close election, and at the end he suffered through a lengthy illness that almost took his life. In between, he had to contend with a recalcitrant Congress that blocked two of his appointments, questioned his position on the repeal of the French decrees, rejected his proposals for trade restrictions, militia reform, and the enlistment of minors, and dangerously delayed the adoption of new taxes.

The Senate was particularly obstreperous. The “Invisibles,” led by William Branch Giles, Samuel Smith, and Michael Leib, had frequently sided with the Federalists, not because they opposed the war but because they opposed the administration and its management of the war. “[I] never saw or heard of so much personal rancor and private intrigue,” said Republican Alexander Dallas, who was visiting from Philadelphia. “The malcontent junto, of self-called Republicans, was worse” than the Federalists.[184] Nor were the malcontents amenable to criticism. When the semi-official National Intelligencer suggested that opposition to Gallatin’s diplomatic appointment was based on jealousy of “his virtues and transcendent talents,” dissident senators responded angrily, calling the paper’s British-born editor “a d—d little mischief making ‘English-man.’”[185]

By the end of the session the Senate had become so unmanageable that the vice president, Elbridge Gerry, refused to follow custom and vacate his seat as presiding officer. This prevented the election of a president pro tem and thus ensured that if death took both the ailing Madison and the elderly Gerry (who was sixty-nine), the presidency would pass on to the reliable speaker of the house, Henry Clay, instead of to Giles or to one of the other “malcontents” in the Senate.[186]

Yet Congress did not entirely repudiate presidential leadership or ignore its responsibilities for prosecuting the war. A good deal of much-needed war legislation was adopted in these two sessions. The army was expanded and the general staff and supply system improved. The pay of the troops was increased and so too was the enlistment bounty. In addition, the navy was expanded, privateering encouraged, new loans and taxes authorized, and a ban on the use of British licenses adopted. But time was running out on the United States, and whether this legislation would translate into battlefield victories was by no means certain.

Chapter 6

The Campaign of 1813

When the spring thaw opened the campaigning season in 1813, the United States was in a stronger position than it had been in 1812. The addition of John Armstrong and William Jones to the cabinet had improved the leadership in Washington, and there were better commanders in the field as well. Although no competent officers had been found to take charge of the Niagara and St. Lawrence fronts, William Henry Harrison had succeeded William Hull in the Northwest, and Andrew Jackson was emerging as a leader in the Southwest. Moreover, Armstrong was promoting talented young officers to positions of authority. Thus men like Winfield Scott and Zebulon Pike were able to play a larger role in 1813 than they had in 1812.[1]

The troops in the field were also better. Although enlistments still lagged behind need, the combination of higher bounties and better pay attracted large numbers to the service. By the spring of 1813, there were about 30,000 men in uniform. This was more than twice as many as when the war began, and 50 percent more than the 20,000 regulars and quasi-regulars that the British could muster in Canada.[2] Although most of the American troops were still inexperienced, the campaign of 1812 had turned some into seasoned veterans. In addition, the staff and supply legislation passed the previous winter, coupled with Armstrong’s new code of regulations, promised to make army operations more efficient. To ensure tighter control, Armstrong also had divided the nation into nine districts, putting a regular officer in charge of each sector with orders to report directly to the War Department.[3]

In spite of these reforms, the road to victory was beset with obstacles. The campaign of 1812 had demonstrated that conquering Canada was no easy task and that the British would not simply cave in to American demands. Under these circumstances, the nation had little choice but to prepare for a vigorous campaign in the hope of bringing the British to terms. “I have no belief in an honorable peace,” said one Republican, “’till We give them a drubbing on Land.”[4] Speed was important because the tide in Europe was running in Britain’s favor. If the United States were to prevail in the New World before Britain was freed from her commitments in the Old, the nation had to act quickly and decisively.

American Strategy: Winning Control of the Lakes

American strategy in 1813 once again focused on targets in Upper Canada. Quebec was ignored because it was so heavily fortified, and even Montreal was considered too well defended to be a primary target. Armstrong had trouble setting priorities, but his broader plan called for regaining control of the Old Northwest, driving the British from the Niagara peninsula, and destroying Britain’s two naval bases on Lake Ontario (Kingston and York). Success against these targets was expected to pave the way for operations against Montreal and other British strongholds further east while at the same time producing a favorable effect on the spring elections in New York.[5]

The key to the campaign was control of the Great Lakes—particularly Ontario and Erie. Because of the dense wilderness and lack of good roads, the lakes offered the only efficient means of moving men and material on the northern frontier. Whoever controlled the lakes controlled the border. Command of Lake Ontario was particularly important because it was close to the centers of power and population in the East and served as a vital link between the St. Lawrence River and British outposts in the West.

At the beginning of the war, the British held undisputed sway over both lakes. On Lake Ontario they had five vessels that mounted 8 to 22 guns, while the United States had only the Oneida (16 guns). On Lake Erie, the British had another four ships mounting 3 to 18 guns, while the United States had only the Adams (14 guns), an army supply vessel that fell into British hands with Hull’s surrender.[6] Control of Lake Erie had played a central role in British success in 1812. While Hull struggled to supply his army by using undeveloped and exposed roads, Brock was able to use the lake. The disruption of American supply routes contributed to Hull’s decision to surrender Detroit, while British control of Lake Erie enabled Brock to capture Detroit while still maintaining a presence on the Niagara frontier.

American officials were aware of the importance of controlling the lakes but had hoped that a few well-aimed strokes would destroy British power in Canada and render the whole question academic. It was only after Hull’s defeat that the administration resolved to secure command of the lakes. “Without the ascendency over those waters,” Madison said, “we can never have it over the savages, nor be able to secure such posts as Mackinaw.” “The success of the ensuing Campaign,” added the secretary of the navy, “will depend absolutely upon our superiority on all the Lakes—& every effort, & resource, must be directed to that object.”[7]

Accordingly, in September 1812, the administration ordered Captain Isaac Chauncey, a forty-year-old veteran naval officer, “to assume command of the naval force on lakes Erie and Ontario, and to use every exertion to obtain control of them this fall.”[8] The nation already had a naval base at Sackets Harbor, New York, on Lake Ontario, and Chauncey dispatched Lieutenant Jesse Elliott to develop a shipyard at Black Rock (near Buffalo) for Lake Erie. At the same time the Navy Department sent Sailing Master Daniel Dobbins to develop a second yard for Lake Erie at Presque Isle, Pennsylvania. Dobbins was soon joined by master shipbuilder Noah Brown. By purchasing merchant vessels and converting them into small warships, and by launching an energetic program to build larger ones, American officials hoped to wrest control of the both lakes from the British.[9]

British officials fully appreciated the significance of the American challenge. “The enemy,” reported Brock, “is making every exertion to gain a naval Superiority on both Lakes which if they accomplish I do not see how we can retain the Country.”[10] The British were determined to match America’s building program, but this was no easy task. Unlike the United States, which had relatively short and secure supply lines to both lakes, the British had to ship men and material across the Atlantic and then over a Canadian water route that was both long and exposed. Moreover, for the first nine months of the war, British vessels on the lakes were under the direction of the Provincial Marine, an army transport service. The men who ran this service were old and ill-equipped for energetic action. Not until March 1813 did London officials put Sir James Yeo (pronounced Yo), a Royal Navy captain, in charge, and not until 1814 did the Royal Navy assume responsibility for the ships. In spite of these liabilities, the British were able to maintain parity on Lake Ontario. On Lake Erie, however, they lacked the manpower and resources to compete effectively. As a result, they lost control of this lake, although this did not occur until the late summer of 1813.[11]

The Campaign Opens in the West

When the campaigning season opened in the spring of 1813, the British were still dominant in the Old Northwest, and officials in Washington were not eager to challenge them until the United States had won control of Lake Erie. With the Treasury nearly empty, Gallatin recommended “reducing the Western expenditure to what is necessary for defensive operations, relying exclusively on the possession of the Lakes for any thing of an offensive nature.”[12] Armstrong, who was himself an advocate of economy, agreed. He had no confidence in Harrison and preferred to concentrate American resources further east anyway. Hence he restricted Harrison’s authority to call out the militia, draw supplies, and engage in offensive operations.[13]

Harrison was unhappy with these restrictions but understood the need to bide his time until he could take the offensive. Already he had ordered the construction of a major post at the Maumee Rapids in Ohio that would serve as both a supply depot and staging area for his operations. Named in honor of Return J. Meigs, the governor of Ohio, the fort was built under the supervision of two of the first West Point graduates, captains Eleazer Wood and Charles Gratiot. Fort Meigs was exceptionally strong. Ringed by picket logs and reinforced by mounds of dirt, it was protected by blockhouses and batteries that commanded all approaches and later included interior earthworks, known as traverses, that afforded additional protection.[14]

The Siege of Fort Meigs

Britain’s Indian allies were eager to invade American territory, and Brigadier General Henry Procter realized that he had to act before the American military position in Ohio became too strong. Departing from Fort Amherstburg with 1,000 regulars and militia in late April, Procter sailed to the mouth of the Maumee River, where he met 1,200 Indians headed by Tecumseh. Their target was Fort Meigs, which was defended by 1,100 men under Harrison. Procter hoped to bring the defenders to their knees by using his artillery and mounting a siege. The artillery bombardment began on May 1, but most of the round shot fell harmlessly on the interior earthworks. “The Enemy,” Procter reported, “had during our Approach so completely entrenched, and covered himself as to render unavailing every Effort of our Artillery.”[15]

On May 5 a 1,200-man relief force of militia under the command of Brigadier General Green Clay arrived from Kentucky and attacked the British positions on the west bank of the Maumee while Harrison’s men launched a sortie from the fort against the British on east bank. In this engagement, known as the Battle of Fort Meigs, Clay’s Kentuckians were initially successful, overrunning several British batteries. But ignoring orders to head for the fort, the militia launched a disorganized pursuit of the retreating enemy and ran into the jaws of a powerful Anglo-Indian counterattack. Almost half of the Kentuckians were killed, wounded, or captured. Harrison complained that the “excessive ardour” shown by the militia was “scarcely less fatal than cowardice.”[16] Later that day the Indians, ignoring pleas from their British allies, started killing their prisoners. Some forty Americans were killed before the British Indian agent, Matthew Elliott, and Tecumseh arrived on the scene and ended the carnage.

By this time, most of the Indians, perceiving that the siege was a failure, started drifting off with whatever plunder they could find. At the same time, the Canadian militia, eager to get home to plant their crops, were leaving the British camp in droves. With his force melting away, Procter lifted the siege on May 9 and returned to Canada. The United States had suffered 320 killed and wounded and 550 captured. British losses (excluding Indians) were only about 100. Still, the British had been unable to capture the fort, largely because it was so well built.[17]

Assault on Fort Stephenson

In late July Procter invaded Ohio again, this time with 500 troops plus a large body of Indians. Following a plan developed by Tecumseh, the British hoped to lure the defenders out of Fort Meigs by staging a sham battle nearby. But Brigadier General Green Clay, who was now in command of the fort, knew that no other Americans were anywhere near and refused the bait. Urged by Tecumseh to find an alternative target, Procter marched to Fort Stephenson on the Sandusky River (in present-day Fremont, Ohio). This small post was defended by 160 men under twenty-one-year-old Major George Croghan (pronounced Crawn), the nephew of George Rogers Clark (of Lewis and Clark fame). Convinced that the fort was indefensible, Harrison ordered Croghan to abandon it. But Croghan demurred. “We have determined to maintain this place,” he wrote Harrison, “and by heavens we can.”[18] In the face of such determination, Harrison relented.

Procter attacked Fort Stephenson on August 1. Although Indians accompanied the British, they had no taste for storming a fortified position, and the British had to act alone. When the British reached a ditch at the edge of the fort, they were cut down by small arms fire and grapeshot from a concealed 6-pounder cannon known as “Good Bess.” Calling this “the severest Fire I ever saw,” Procter gave up the attack and ordered his troops back to Canada. He blamed the defeat on the Indians, who had clamored for action and then disappeared when the fighting began. “A more than adequate Sacrifice having been made to Indian Opinion,” he said, “I drew off the brave Assailants.” The British had lost about one hundred men in the assault, while Croghan had sustained only eight casualties.[19]

Capture of the Detroit and Caledonia

Procter’s assault on Fort Stevenson was the last British operation in Ohio, for the balance of power on Lake Erie was beginning to shift against them. While fitting out schooners at Black Rock the previous fall, Lieutenant Jesse Elliott had learned of the arrival of two British vessels at Fort Erie to the south. These were the Detroit (6 guns) and the Caledonia (3 guns). Elliott decided to try to take the ships by surprise. “A strong inducement,” he wrote, was “that with these two Vessels added to those which I have purchaced and am fitting out I should be able to meet the remainder of the Brittish force on the upper Lakes.”[20]

In the early morning hours of October 9, 1812, Elliott set sail upriver with his two schooners and a mixed force of one hundred seamen, regulars, and militia. Taking the British by surprise, the Americans made off with the ships. The Caledonia was navigated safely to the American shore, but the Detroit was carried off by the river current and ran aground. She was pounded by fire from both shores and finally burned by the Americans.[21] The loss of these vessels and the supplies they carried—the hold of the Detroit was loaded with ordnance captured at Detroit—was a serious blow to the British. “This event is particularly unfortunate,” said Brock, “and may reduce us to incalculable distress.”[22]

By the end of 1812 Chauncey was searching for a more seasoned officer to assume command of Lake Erie when he learned that Master Commandant Oliver H. Perry, a twenty-seven-year-old officer who was in charge of the gunboats at Newport, was eager to escape from flotilla service. “You are the very person,” said Chauncey, “that I want for a particular service, in which you may gain reputation for Yourself and honour for your country.”[23] Thenceforth, Chauncey devoted himself exclusively to Lake Ontario, giving Perry a free hand on Lake Erie.[24]

The Struggle for Control of Lake Erie

When Perry arrived at the Niagara front in the spring of 1813, he found four converted merchantmen and the Caledonia at Black Rock and two brigs and two gunboats under construction 100 miles away at Presque Isle. Although plagued by recurring bouts of “bilious fever”—probably dysentery—Perry worked at a frantic pace to prepare his squadron for action. His first task was to move the vessels at Black Rock to Presque Isle. Moving these ships upriver into Lake Erie against a steady wind was exceedingly difficult and was accomplished only with the assistance of 200 soldiers supplied by Major General Dearborn and only after the British had evacuated Fort Erie at the end of May. Getting the ships to Presque Isle posed additional dangers because the British squadron on Lake Erie was cruising nearby, but Perry’s luck held, and a fog covered his movements. Even after all the ships were at Presque Isle, Perry needed to get them ready for service, and once they were ready, the brigs had to be stripped of their guns and lifted by floats over a sand bar to reach deep water. This was accomplished in early August when the British squadron had withdrawn, probably to resupply.[25]

Perry faced another problem: finding men to fill out his crews.[26] At one point he became so exasperated with this task that he asked to be transferred, even offering to return to his old station at Newport, but the secretary of navy refused his request.[27] Perry blamed his manpower problems on Chauncey, claiming that the senior officer had kept the best sailors and sent only “a Motley set, blacks, Soldiers and boys.”[28] Major General William Henry Harrison was more cooperative, furnishing Perry with 100 of his best Kentucky sharpshooters and all the seamen he could find in his army.[29] With this ragtag crew, Perry took command of the Lawrence (20 guns) and assigned the Niagara (20 guns) to Lieutenant Elliott. The squadron of nine vessels then set sail for Put-in-Bay, located in the Bass Islands at the western end of the lake. This afforded a good vantage point for watching the British squadron, now anchored near Fort Amherstburg, and for disrupting the British supply line on the lake to Detroit.[30]

The commander of the British squadron was Captain Robert H. Barclay, an experienced naval officer who had been with Lord Nelson at Trafalgar and had lost an arm in the service (which prompted Indians to call him “our father with one arm”).[31] Barclay’s squadron of six ships was inferior to Perry’s force, especially at close range. The weight of his broadside was just over half of Perry’s, 494 to 912 pounds.[32] Like Perry, Barclay faced a manpower shortage that could be remedied only by using soldiers. He was also short of naval guns and had to use guns taken from Fort Amherstburg to equip his best ship, the Detroit. Because of a shortage of slow match, these guns could be fired only by shooting a pistol over the touch hole.[33]

Barclay also had to contend with a food shortage because British officials at Fort Amherstburg had to feed some 14,000 Indians.[34] “The quantity of Beef, and flour consumed here is tremenduous,” Barclay complained; “there are such hordes of Indians with their Wives, and children.” By early September Barclay reported that “so perfectly destitute of Provisions was the Post, that there was not a days flour in Store, and the Crews of the Squadron under my Command were on Half Allowance of many things.” Desperately short of provisions and goaded on by the army, Barclay decided “to risk everything” to open his lines of communication.[35] Accordingly, he sailed forth to meet Perry’s squadron.

The Battle of Lake Erie

On September 10, 1813, the opposing squadrons came within sight of each other. Following common practice, Perry had spread sand on his decks to prevent his men from slipping on the water that would be splashed up or the blood that would be spilled. He flew a battle flag emblazoned with the words “DON’T GIVE UP THE SHIP.”[36] At first the British had the weather gauge (the wind at their backs), which meant that they could choose the distance for the engagement. But once again Perry’s luck held, and the wind shifted to give him the weather gauge. Barclay claimed this was “a prodigious advantage,” although given the disparity in their firepower, it is unlikely that Barclay could have prevailed even if he had retained the wind at his back.[37]

The British opened at long range, which was their best strategy, but Perry soon closed to take full advantage of his firepower. “I made sail,” he said, “and directed the other vessels to follow, for the purpose of closing with the enemy.”[38] Elliott, however, held the Niagara back, preferring for reasons that have never been satisfactorily explained to rely on his long guns. This meant that Perry fought the British ships at close range with only minimal assistance from his sister ship.

The Lawrence repeatedly traded broadsides with the two largest British ships, the Detroit (19 guns), which was Barclay’s flagship, and the Queen Charlotte (17 guns). Perry’s smaller vessels also pounded the big British ships. After two hours, all three of the big ships were badly damaged, and the casualties on both sides were staggering. Perry’s crew had suffered more than 80 percent casualties, forcing the commander to call up surgeon’s assistants and the wounded from below to man his guns. Although his ship had become a floating hulk, Perry refused to surrender. Instead, he hauled down his battle flag, hopped into a small boat manned by four unwounded sailors, and headed for the Niagara, miraculously escaping injury from the rain of fire around him.

Many nineteenth-century prints show Master Commandant Oliver H. Perry in a boat shifting his command to the U.S. Brig Niagara, but this unusual engraving takes a wider view, showing the British flagship Detroit on the left, the abandoned U.S. Brig Lawrence in the center, and the Niagara on the right. But there should be only four seamen in Perry’s boat, and the American officer was undoubtedly sitting rather than standing. (R. M. Devens, American Progress: or the Great Events of the Greatest Century)

Taking command of the Niagara, Perry ran up his battle flag and sailed back into the heart of the British squadron. As he approached, the two main British ships tried to wind around to bring fresh batteries to bear, but in the process the Queen Charlotte rammed the Detroit, and thereafter neither ship could move. The Niagara, aided by two of Perry’s schooners, fired broadside after broadside into the two immobile British ships. Three hours into the battle, the larger British ships had been destroyed, and the first and second in command on all six British vessels had been killed or wounded. Barclay himself had to be carried below. His good arm was now mangled, and he had sustained a deep thigh wound as well as several lesser wounds. Four of the British ships struck their colors. Two others tried to escape but were run down and forced to surrender. When the victors boarded the Detroit, they found a pet bear lapping up blood on the deck and two Indians (who were supposed to be musketeers in the tops) hiding in the hold. The Americans had suffered 125 killed and wounded, the British 135.[39]

Perry’s victory on Lake Erie was a tribute to his courage and coolness under fire and to the effective use of his superior firepower. On the back of an old letter he wrote a brief note to Harrison that added more luster to his name: “We have met the enemy and they are ours: Two Ships, two Brigs[,] one Schooner & one Sloop.”[40] Perry’s triumph was celebrated all over the nation. “Every demonstration of joy and admiration,” reported the secretary of the navy, “was exhibited as far and as fast as the roar of cannon and splendour of illumination could travel.”[41]

To show its appreciation, Congress voted Perry and his men $260,000 in prize money and three months’ pay. (The largest share of prize money—$12,750—actually went to Chauncey, who was nominally in command of the forces on both lakes. Perry got $12,140, Elliott $7,140, and the other officers and men sums ranging from $215 to $2,295.)[42] The British Naval Chronicle called Perry’s victory “a miscarriage, of minor importance,” but British officials knew better.[43] The battle was the most important fought on the Great Lakes during the war. It changed the balance of power in the West and enabled the United States to recover all that it had lost in 1812.

Harrison Invades Canada

With the defeat of Barclay’s squadron and the British supply situation at Detroit becoming ever more desperate, Procter decided to withdraw along the Thames River to Burlington Heights (now Hamilton). “The Loss of the Fleet is a most calamitous Circumstance,” he wrote. “I do not see the least Chance of occupying to advantage my present extensive Position.”[44] The Indians bitterly opposed this abandonment of their lands. Tecumseh upbraided Procter, comparing him to “a fat animal, that carries its tail upon its back, but when affrighted . . . drops it between his legs and runs off.”[45] But the only concession that he could win from the British general was a promise to make a stand somewhere on the Thames.

While Perry repaired his squadron so that it could be used to transport men and supplies, Harrison raised additional troops. Already he had persuaded Governor Isaac Shelby of Kentucky to take the field in person. Known as “Old King’s Mountain” because of a battle he had fought in during the Revolutionary War, the sixty-three-year-old Shelby delivered a stirring plea urging Kentuckians to turn out for service. “I will lead you to the field of battle,” the governor’s widely circulated handbill proclaimed, “and share with you the dangers and honors of the campaign.”[46] More than 3,000 Kentuckians—many of whom were “but lads and quite careless”—responded to the call.[47] This raised Harrison’s total strength to about 5,500 men. Although a large number of Ohioans responded to a similar call from their governor, these men had to be turned away—much to their chagrin—because of a lack of supplies to sustain them.[48]

Harrison’s army rendezvoused on the Detroit River in late September 1813. Most of the Kentucky troops had brought their horses, which were left in a large corral constructed for that purpose. Only 1,200 volunteers under the command of Colonel Richard M. Johnson (who was still a member of Congress) were permitted to take their mounts into battle. The Americans occupied Detroit and Fort Amherstburg, which the British had abandoned in their flight to the interior. Although 150 Pennsylvania militia refused to cross the border, the Kentucky militia had no such qualms. Thus most of Harrison’s army crossed into Canada, and the pursuit of Procter began in earnest.

Harrison did not expect to catch up with the British army, but Procter moved at a leisurely pace and failed to destroy all the bridges behind him so that his straggling Indian allies could follow. The Americans soon came across baggage and supplies discarded by the British. They also captured, on the Thames, two gunboats carrying Procter’s spare ammunition. With the Americans closing in, Procter decided to make a stand near Moraviantown, about fifty miles east of Detroit. Procter’s force consisted of 800 regulars (although only about 600 were fit for service) and perhaps 500 Indians. The British were arrayed in open order in two thin lines extending from the river to a large swamp, while the Indians, headed by Tecumseh, took positions in the underbrush near the swamp on the British right flank.

The Battle of the Thames and Death of Tecumseh

Harrison approached the enemy on October 5 with 3,000 men, including Johnson’s regiment. Finding the British lines thin, Johnson asked for permission to make a frontal assault with his mounted troops. Although a cavalry charge like this was unusual, Harrison acceded to the request. “The American backwoodsmen ride better in the woods than any other people,” he said. “I was persuaded too that the enemy would be quite unprepared for the shock and that they could not resist it.”[49]

Shouting “Remember the Raisin!”—the rallying cry commemorating the massacre after the American defeat at Frenchtown—the mounted men galloped toward the enemy. The right wing, led by Richard M. Johnson’s brother James, burst through the British lines and then dismounted and caught the British in a crossfire, forcing them to surrender, although Procter managed to escape to the east with around 200 men. “It is really a novel thing,” said an American officer, “that raw militia stuck upon horses, with muskets in their hands instead of sabres, should be able to pierce British lines with such complete effect.”[50]

Richard M. Johnson led the left wing of the attack against the Indians. Johnson had volunteered to be part of the advance, known as “the forlorn hope” because the chances of surviving were considered slim. Johnson received several disabling wounds but managed to kill an Indian—thought to be Tecumseh—who tried to finish him off. (This feat helped catapult Johnson into the vice presidency in 1836.) The Indians continued their resistance for a while longer, but when word spread that Tecumseh had been killed, the natives disappeared into the wilderness. The Americans returned to the battlefield the next day, and after several British officers confirmed that one of the swollen corpses was Tecumseh, they took his clothing, hair, and even patches of his skin for souvenirs. “I [helped] kill Tecumseh and [helped] skin him,” a veteran of the campaign recalled a half century later, “and brot Two pieces of his yellow hide home with me to my Mother & Sweet Harts.”[51]

The Battle of the Thames (known as the Battle of Moraviantown in Canada) was a great victory for the United States. Although the casualties on both sides were light, close to 600 British soldiers were captured. The Americans also captured a large quantity of war material, including a cannon that had been taken at Saratoga in 1777 and then lost by Hull in 1812. Procter had mismanaged the retreat and thus sacrificed his army. Although he tried to blame the disaster on his subordinates, a military court convicted him of misconduct and sentenced him to be reprimanded publicly and suspended from duty for six months. The Prince Regent rescinded the suspension, but the reprimand stood, and Procter was never again given a command.[52]

This highly romanticized print, which was produced during Andrew Jackson’s presidency in the 1830s, shows the climax of the Battle of the Thames on the British right flank, when Richard M. Johnson killed Tecumseh. (Lithograph by John Dorival. Library of Congress)

Harrison and Perry worked up a plan to retake Mackinac, but bad weather forced them to abandon the scheme.[53] Preserving this post helped the British retain the allegiance of some of their Indian allies, but the Battle of the Thames had nonetheless done profound damage to their cause. British power and influence in the Old Northwest was undermined, and Tecumseh’s Indian confederacy was shattered beyond repair. Many Indians abandoned the British, and in July 22, 1814, Harrison joined with Lewis Cass in signing a treaty with several bands of the Northwestern tribes—the Miamis, Potawatomis, Kickapoos, and Ottawas—that bound them to wage war against Britain.[54] By this time Harrison had resigned his army commission in disgust over Armstrong’s open enmity, claiming that “the most malicious insinuations had been made against me at Washington.”[55]

The Contest for Lake Ontario

There was little action on Lake Ontario in the early months of the war, but by the end of 1812 the United States had enough ships to challenge the British for control. Thereafter, the balance of power tipped back and forth between the two nations depending on the progress of their building programs and the deployment of their ships. Both squadron commanders—Chauncey and Yeo—were cautious men, reluctant to risk an engagement without naval superiority. Hence even though there was some skirmishing, the results were inconclusive.[56]

The closest that the opposing squadrons came to a decisive engagement occurred on September 28, 1813, about 12 miles south of York. News had just reached both commanders of Perry’s victory on Lake Erie, and this was a rare occasion when the two were willing to risk a major engagement at the same time. In the ensuing clash, fire from Chauncey’s flagship, the General Pike (28 guns), destroyed the mizzen topmast and main topmast of Yeo’s flagship, H.M. Ship Wolfe (21 guns), leaving the British ship crippled. With this, Yeo’s squadron fled west toward Burlington Heights fifteen miles away with Chauncey in hot pursuit. For ninety minutes the two squadrons raced across the lake, driven by gale force winds, and occasionally exchanging fire. As Yeo neared a bar in Burlington Bay, Chauncey, fearing that the fierce winds might drive his ships ashore or expose him to land-based artillery fire, gave up his pursuit, thus ending what is commonly called the “Burlington Races.”[57]

The most significant loss on Lake Ontario in 1813 was caused not by a battle but by Mother Nature. The United States had a pair of converted merchantmen on the lake, the Hamilton (9 guns) and the Scourge (10 guns). Both were top heavy because of the naval guns they carried. According to Ned Myers, one of the Scourge’s crewmen, his ship was “unfit for her duty,” and it was often said that “she would prove our coffin.”[58] For many of Myers’s shipmates, this proved to be correct, for both vessels sank after capsizing in a storm in the early morning hours of August 8. All but sixteen of the one hundred men aboard perished. Although he could not swim, Myers was one of the lucky survivors. (These vessels have since been found—perfectly preserved in 300 feet of water—near Hamilton, Ontario.)[59]

The Battle of York

Although Chauncey and Yeo engaged in no decisive naval action on Lake Ontario, each made a determined bid to destroy the other’s naval base. American strategy called for attacking the primary British base at Kingston first, but Dearborn and Chauncey, looking for an easier target, substituted York (present-day Toronto). A small community of about 700 people near the western end of Lake Ontario, York was the capital of Upper Canada and home to a small navy yard. Dearborn and Chauncey were convinced that the destruction of the British ships at York would give the United States command of Lake Ontario and thus greatly facilitate American operations elsewhere in the region.[60]

On April 25, 1813, Chauncey sailed from Sackets Harbor with 1,800 soldiers and 800 seamen and marines. Two days later the American force reached York, which was defended by around 1,000 British troops under the command of Major General Sir Roger Sheaffe and 50–100 Indians. Although Major General Henry Dearborn had overall command of the American land forces, characteristically he remained safely on Chauncey’s flagship during the ensuing engagement. Using army bateaux and ships’ boats, the Americans landed west of York. With Brigadier General Zebulon Pike in command of the landing force, Major John Forsyth’s riflemen spearheaded the attack. Aided by Chauncey’s supporting fire, the invaders drove off the Indians who contested the landing and then forced the British to retreat east to Kingston. The road to York was now open.[61]

The British suffered 200 killed and wounded and 275 captured in the Battle of “Little York.” The Americans sustained 310 casualties, mostly from the explosion of the garrison’s magazine, which Sheaffe had ordered detonated during his retreat.[62] “The explosion was tremendous,” said an American who witnessed it. “The column was raked from front to rear.”[63] The blast, which rattled windows at Fort Niagara more than thirty miles away, caused so many injuries that army doctors waded “in blood, cutting off arms, legs & trepanning [boring holes in] heads.” One of the surgeons claimed that he “cut & slashed for 48 hours, without food or sleep.”[64] Among the casualties was General Pike. “A large Stone,” said a fellow officer, “Struck him in the forehead and Stamped him for the Grave.”[65]

American soldiers, already angry over the explosion, which they blamed on the British, found what they thought was a scalp hanging in one of the government buildings in York and used this as an excuse to loot the town. They were joined by locals whom they had freed from jail or who had come in from the countryside. “Every house they found deserted was completely sacked,” said a resident.[66] The Americans carried off enemy provisions and military stores. They also destroyed a printing press (which prevented the provincial government from publishing its laws); took a government mace (which was returned in 1934); and carried off books from the subscription library (most of which were returned by an embarrassed Chauncey after the war). The government buildings in York were also put to the torch. Dearborn, who was now ashore, was slow to end the lawlessness because he was convinced that the navy yard and ship had been put to the torch after city officials had begun negotiations for surrender. He restored order only after local clergyman John Strachan (who later became the first Anglican bishop of Toronto) confronted him and shamed him into action.[67]

The Americans suffered additional losses when their ships, crowded with men, could not leave York for a week because of bad weather.[68] Despite the heavy toll, the capture of York was an important victory. The United States seized one British vessel (although it proved unseaworthy), and the British destroyed another as well as a large quantity of naval stores. This helped the United States maintain parity on Lake Ontario and may have hampered British operations on Lake Erie. “The ordnance, ammunition and other stores for the service on Lake Erie,” claimed Governor George Prevost, “were either destroyed or fell into the enemy’s hands when York was taken.”[69]

York remained so vulnerable that in July 1813 Chauncey attacked again. A small detachment of soldiers and sailors landed unopposed on July 31. The Americans again carried off military and naval stores and burned the public buildings. They also destroyed a lumberyard and several boats. In their search for public property, they were assisted by disaffected British subjects. “The Number of Enemies & Spies,” complained a local merchant, “are beyond all conception.”[70] The Americans also seized British soldiers who were confined in the jail or hospital, carrying off those who were fit and paroling those who were not.[71]

The Battle of Sackets Harbor

The British returned the favor in May 1813 by attacking the American naval base at Sackets Harbor. At dawn on May 29 Commodore Yeo’s squadron landed 900 troops and 37 Indians. Although Sir George Prevost was aboard Yeo’s flagship, the landing force was under the command of Colonel Edward Baynes. The American base was defended by 1,450 men under the direction of Brigadier General Jacob Brown of the New York militia. The Americans made good use of the cover afforded by their defensive works and the surrounding forest. The British received fire from the Albany Volunteers on Horse Island and the militia on the shore but soon drove them off. U.S. Regulars under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Electus Backus held fast, pouring on a steady stream of fire. The British also took heavy fire from a huge 32-pounder in Fort Tompkins and from other American guns. “I do not exaggerate,” said one British soldier, “when I tell you that shot, both grape and musket, flew like hail.”[72] The invaders got some supporting fire from two British gunboats, but contrary winds prevented Yeo from bringing the guns from his larger ships into action.

Convinced that the battle was lost, an American midshipman ordered the navy yard and a ship on the stocks burned. Although a hastily organized fire brigade doused the flames, General Brown was furious, calling this “as infamous a transaction as ever occurred among military men.”[73] The smoke from the fire convinced the British that they had achieved their mission of destroying the naval yard, and this, coupled with the stout resistance they continued to face, induced Baynes (with Prevost’s approval) to call off the attack. In the Battle of Sackets Harbor, the British suffered 260 killed, wounded, and missing, while American casualties were 155 with another 140 captured on the lake while en route to Sackets Harbor. Backus died of wounds sustained in the battle, while Brown was rewarded with a commission as a brigadier general in the regular army.[74]

Capture of Fort George

The campaign along the Niagara front in 1813 had a promising start, but in the end reverses and mismanagement cost the United States all that it had gained. The principal target of American troops here was Fort George, located on the Canadian side where the Niagara River empties into Lake Ontario. The British fort was garrisoned by 1,000 regulars under the command of Brigadier General John Vincent. Vincent also had 350 militia and 50 Indians available for service. There were an additional 750 British troops stationed at other posts along the Niagara frontier, and several hundred militia from the surrounding area might be called upon as well.[75]

In May 1813 the United States assembled a force of 4,000 troops across from Fort George. For two days the fort was bombarded by batteries from the American side of the river. On May 27 Chauncey laid down an artillery barrage from the lake to cover a landing of American troops west of the fort. The landing—a joint operation directed by Winfield Scott and Oliver Perry—put American troops in a position to attack the fort from the rear. The British came out to meet the invaders but were outgunned and outnumbered. Forced to give ground, they abandoned the fort and fled south. Scott pursued the British but was ordered to return to Fort George by Major General Morgan Lewis, who was temporarily in command. The British lost 350 killed, wounded, and captured in the Battle of Fort George compared to American losses of only 140.[76]

Since the loss of this fort exposed British positions all along the Niagara frontier, Vincent ordered the evacuation of the other British positions—at Chippawa, Queenston, and Fort Erie—each of which was subsequently occupied by American troops. Although the United States now controlled the entire frontier, the failure to follow up on the initial victory proved costly, for Vincent was able to regroup his forces—about 1,600 men—at Burlington Heights at the western end of Lake Ontario.

The Battles of Stoney Creek and Beaver Dams

In early June Dearborn ordered two brigades—about 2,500 men—to challenge the British at Burlington Heights. These troops were led by two political generals, William Winder and John Chandler, neither of whom had much military experience. Chandler, the senior of the two brigadiers, assumed command. After skirmishing with the British, most of the Americans made camp at Stoney Creek, seven miles from the British camp. The site chosen was excellent, but Chandler’s troops were spread out too much to effectively support one another.[77]

In the predawn hours of June 5 a British force of 750 men under the command of Lieutenant Colonel John Harvey silently approached the American camp. Having learned the countersign, perhaps from a paroled prisoner, the British captured or bayoneted the American sentries and then launched their attack. The surprise was complete. According to one British soldier, “The [British] men set up a tremendous shout, which continued along the whole line and was the cause of throwing the enemy into the greatest disorder and Confusion imaginable.”[78] The Americans almost prevailed by the sheer force of their numbers, but when the British overran their artillery batteries, the Americans were forced to retreat. In the confusion both Winder and Chandler blundered into British units and were captured. Although the United States suffered fewer losses—about 170 men compared to 215 for the British—the Americans had decamped in such haste that they had left their dead and equipment on the field.[79]

The retreat from Stoney Creek, coupled with the appearance of Yeo’s squadron, rendered American positions on Canadian soil less secure, and Major General Dearborn ordered all the garrisons on the Canadian side of the river consolidated at Fort George. This, however, only increased the partisan warfare on the front. One of the leading partisans was Cyrenius Chapin, a Federalist doctor living in Buffalo who secured a major’s commission and organized a unit of mounted volunteers. Chapin’s men conducted looting raids across the river that bore little resemblance to any form of recognized warfare, and the unit was soon known as “Dr. Chapin and the Forty Thieves.” To protect against such raids and to harass any Americans who ventured from Fort George, the British established outposts near the American stronghold.[80]

In late June Major Chapin persuaded American officials at Fort George to attack a British outpost sixteen miles away that was garrisoned by fifty men under Lieutenant James FitzGibbon. The force chosen for the mission, about 600 strong, was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Charles Boerstler and included Chapin and thirty-eight of his men. FitzGibbon learned of the impending attack from a Canadian woman, Laura Secord, who walked twenty miles through rough and unfamiliar territory at night to deliver the warning, and from Indians, who were monitoring the movements of the American force. On June 24 at Beaver Dams, a large body of Indians led by Captain Dominique Ducharme of the Indian Department ambushed Boerstler’s force. The Americans fought well but were running low on ammunition when FitzGibbon arrived with his men. Running a good bluff, FitzGibbon exaggerated the size of his force and raised the specter of an Indian massacre. In response, Boerstler surrendered.[81]

FitzGibbon gave the Indians full credit for the victory at Beaver Dams. “They beat the American detachment into a state of terror,” he said, “and the only share I claim is taking advantage of a favorable moment to offer them protection from the tomahawk and scalping knife.”[82] But FitzGibbon got most of the credit. As Mohawk leader John Norton shrewdly put it, “The Cognawauga Indians fought the battle. The Mohawks or 6 Nations got the plunder, and Fitzgibbon got the Credit.”[83] Although Chapin and some of his men were captured, they managed to seize control of the boats that were taking them to York and returned safely to Fort George, where they were treated like heroes.[84] Even so, Boerstler’s defeat went down hard in Washington. Republican congressmen were so furious that they forced the administration to remove Dearborn from command. “The news of Boe[r]stler’s capture threw us into an indignation,” said Charles J. Ingersoll. “We have deposed Gen. Dearborn, who is to be removed to Albany, where he may eat sturgeon and recruit.”[85]

The Siege of Fort George and Burning of Newark

The British and their Indian allies now established a loose siege of Fort George. They also brought the war home to Americans all along the Niagara frontier. On July 5 a small party of Canadian militia crossed the river, attacked a blockhouse called Fort Schlosser, and made off with the supplies there. A week later another British force burned the military post at Black Rock and carried off additional supplies. These raids were designed to force the American troops to evacuate Fort George or to overextend themselves.[86]

Fort George, which was now under the direction of Brigadier General George McClure of the New York militia, had become increasingly vulnerable. Most of the regulars had been transferred east, leaving only 250 men to defend the entire frontier. In addition, lack of pay had turned McClure’s best militia into “a disaffected and ungovernable multitude” and made it impossible to recruit additional volunteer militia.[87] Everyone knew that the pay was in arrears and that (despite the onset of winter) the only housing available was tents. Few citizen soldiers were willing to serve in Canada anyway. On December 10, 1813, McClure ordered Fort George abandoned. He was supposed to burn the fort but botched the job and instead burned the nearby village of Newark to deny British troops shelter there. The inhabitants were given only a few hours notice in winter weather to vacate their homes.[88] “Every building in Newark is reduced to ashes,” McClure reported; “the Enemy is much exasperated and will make a descent on this frontier if possible.”[89]

The British Capture Fort Niagara

McClure’s prediction proved correct. Lieutenant General Sir Gordon Drummond, who had assumed command of the British forces in this theater of operations, was furious over the callous treatment of Newark’s civilians and authorized retaliation. On December 19 a British force of 550 men under Colonel John Murray surprised the American sentries at Fort Niagara (across the river from Fort George), extracted the password, and then charged into the fort. The American commander, Captain Nathan Leonard, was reportedly drunk at his home three miles away, and those in the fort had taken no precautions. “Our men,” said General McClure, “were nearly all asleep in their tents, the Enemy rushed in and commenced a most horrid slaughter.”[90]

The British inflicted 80 casualties (mostly by bayonet) and took 350 prisoners, while suffering fewer than a dozen casualties themselves. Leonard was captured the next day when he returned to the fort. The British also acquired a huge quantity of war material. According to Governor Daniel D. Tompkins of New York, “The quantity of cannon, muskets, shot, shells, powder, fixed ammunition, clothing & other supplies in Fort Niagara was immense. The acquisition of them will be of the greatest importance to the British, & an irreparable loss to us.”[91] The British retained control of Fort Niagara—an important beachhead on American territory—until the end of the war.

Lewiston and Buffalo Burned

As soon as Fort Niagara was secure, a British force under Major General Phineas Riall (pronounced “Rile”) crossed into American territory and destroyed Lewiston as well as several smaller towns nearby.[92] The Indians who accompanied Riall got drunk and left a ghastly scene at Lewiston. According to an American who later visited the town: “The sight we here witnessed was shocking beyond description. Our neighbors were seen lying dead in the fields and roads, some horribly cut and mangled with tomahawks, others eaten by the hogs.”[93]

American officials tried to rally the militia to end these depredations but without much success. Most of the men in the region had already stood several drafts and were unwilling to serve again. According to McClure, even those who responded to the call were more interested “in taking care of their families and property by carrying them into the interior, than helping us to fight.”[94] Few were willing to serve under McClure anyway. He was blamed for the recent reverses and was so universally detested that he had to withdraw from the front. “The gross insults which I have received from many at Buffalo,” he said, “will apologise for my absence.”[95]

Anticipating that Buffalo and Black Rock would be targeted next, Major General Amos Hall, who succeeded McClure in command, was able to assemble 2,000 men (mostly militia). Riall landed near Black Rock with about 1,400 regulars and Indians on December 30. The militia units sent to investigate were routed, and eventually Hall’s main force had to give way, too. The American units that offered the stoutest resistance were a group of defectors, known as Canadian Volunteers, and a small band of men under Cyrenius Chapin (who now had a brevet commission as a lieutenant colonel). The Canadian Volunteers escaped capture (and thus execution for treason), but Chapin was taken prisoner and sent under heavy guard to Quebec. Later that day the British looted and burned both Black Rock and Buffalo.[96] Lewis Cass, who saw Buffalo a week later, called it “a scene of distress and destruction such as I have never before witnessed.”[97] Thus by the end of the year, the Niagara Valley was in flames, and the American position along the entire front had collapsed. “The whole frontier from Lake Ontario to Lake Erie,” lamented Governor Tompkins, “is depopulated & the buildings & Improvements, with a few exceptions, destroyed.”[98]

Sir George Prevost was eager to put an end to the depredations, and in a proclamation offered to give up this kind of predatory warfare if the Americans followed suit.[99] American officials were receptive to this overture. They disavowed the destruction of Newark and did not retaliate for the burning of the settlements on the American side of the river.[100] But in the field, American commanders followed their own counsels and often took the advice of the renegade Canadian Volunteers, who used the war to settle old scores. Hence, the Niagara frontier continued to be subjected to depredations that ultimately contributed to the British decision to burn Washington.

The Campaign against Montreal

The Niagara frontier was exposed in the second half of 1813 because most of the regulars stationed there had been shipped east for service on the St. Lawrence front. Although a major offensive in this theater was not part of the administration’s original planning, from the beginning Armstrong had waffled on the objectives of the campaign. Although he remained committed to attacking Kingston, he asked the cabinet in July to approve Montreal as an alternative. Then in October, after the British had reinforced Kingston, he ordered his generals to target Montreal. By this time, however, it was so late in the season that the chances of success were remote.[101]

It was not only the War Department’s indecision that doomed the campaign against Montreal. The United States had suffered a major setback on Lake Champlain as well. This lake, which lies between New York and Vermont, empties into the Richelieu River, which in turn flows into the St. Lawrence River between Montreal and Quebec. Together these waterways form a natural invasion route that could be used to ferry troops and supplies in either direction. Whoever controlled these waters—particularly Lake Champlain—controlled the region.

The United States held the balance of power on Lake Champlain until mid-1813, when Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough, who was in charge of the American squadron, ordered Lieutenant Sidney Smith to patrol the northern reaches of the lake with the Eagle and Growler, each of which mounted 11 guns. On June 3 the overeager Smith sailed into the shallow waters of Isle-aux-Noix, a small, fortified British island at the northern end of the lake. When Smith tried to withdraw, he found that his ships could not maneuver because the water was too shallow. The British mounted an artillery attack from the shore, and after a three-and-a-half hour engagement both ships were disabled and forced to surrender.[102] The acquisition of these vessels, which were renamed Chub and Finch, gave the British naval superiority on Lake Champlain and deprived the United States of an important supply route. “The loss of our command of Lake Champlain at so critical a moment,” said Madison, “is deeply to be regretted.”[103]

If the lateness of the season and the loss of Lake Champlain undermined the chances for a successful campaign, so too did poor leadership in the field. The man in charge was Major General James Wilkinson, a longtime Spanish spy with an appetite for booty and intrigue. Winfield Scott (who was once suspended from the army for publicly maligning Wilkinson) considered him an “unprincipled imbecile,” and John Randolph claimed that the general was the only man he knew “who was from the bark to the very core a villain.”[104]

Wilkinson had long commanded troops in the Southwest, but his despotism in New Orleans during the Burr Conspiracy in 1806 and his known ties to Spanish officials had thoroughly alienated local Republicans. Moreover, he had so mismanaged his command in 1809 that he had lost nearly half his army—over 1,000 men—to disease and desertion. By 1813 it was said that some Louisiana militia “positively refused to serve under General Wilkinson” and that the state’s two senators would go into opposition unless he were removed from command.[105]

To quell this incipient rebellion, the administration ordered Wilkinson to the Canadian frontier. Wilkinson was promoted to major general but was expected to serve under Dearborn. When the debacle on the Niagara frontier forced Dearborn’s removal, Wilkinson became the ranking officer. After a leisurely trip north, Wilkinson established himself at Sackets Harbor and assumed command over the whole eastern theater of operations. But Major General Wade Hampton, a haughty South Carolinian who headed a large force at Plattsburgh, considered his superior so despicable that he refused to take orders from him. Armstrong tried to appease Hampton, first by assuring him that his orders would come from Washington and then by visiting the field in person to facilitate coordination, but his efforts were in vain.[106]

The plan of operations called for Wilkinson to lead one army from Sackets Harbor down the St. Lawrence River and approach Montreal from the west, while Hampton approached from the south with a second army from Plattsburgh. The campaign did not get under way until October, and neither commanding officer showed much confidence in the plan. Moreover, when Armstrong left the front in early November, any prospect of cooperation between the two generals vanished.[107]

The Battle of Châteauguay

On September 19, Hampton moved his army, about 6,000 strong, by boat from Plattsburgh to the head of Lake Champlain. From there Hampton marched into Canada. Although his militia (about a quarter of his force) refused to cross the border, he had little trouble fighting his way into Odelltown. Here he faced the prospect of more British resistance and a lack of water because the local wells had dried up. Hence, he veered west toward the Châteauguay River, where he made camp at Four Corners, New York, and awaited further orders.[108] Although he had a sizeable force at his disposal, his regulars were mostly new recruits and his officers untested. “The perfect rawness of the troops,” he complained, “has been a source of much solicitude to the best informed among us.”[109]

In mid-October, after receiving orders from Armstrong to target Montreal, Hampton marched his army, about 3,800 men, north along the Châteauguay River, fighting rain and bad roads along the way. Fallen trees and bridges destroyed by the enemy added to Hampton’s woes. But eventually he found himself face to face with the enemy, about 1,800 troops, mostly French Canadian fencible units and militia plus 150 Indians, all under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles de Salaberry, an experienced combat veteran. De Salaberry had prepared strong defensive works (including abatis) to repel the invasion.

Hampton sent Colonel Robert Purdy and 2,300 men across the river to try to get beyond de Salaberry, recross the river, and thus threaten him from the rear. At the same time, Brigadier General George Izard led an advance up the west bank. The result was the Battle of Châteauguay, fought on October 26. Neither wing of Hampton’s attack had much success. On the east bank, Purdy was hampered by ignorant guides and was harassed by Indians and militia. Some of his junior officers deserted and hid in the underbrush by the river. Purdy made it no further north than a point just across the river from de Salaberry’s army, and once he got this far he sustained fire from enemy units on the west bank.

On the west side of the Châteauguay, Izard was reinforced but could not break through de Salaberry’s works. By 3:00 p.m. Hampton had concluded that the attack was a failure and ordered a withdrawal. Casualties on both sides were light, about fifty for the United States and half that number for the British.[110] Hampton had lost heart even before the battle had begun when he saw an order from Armstrong for the construction of winter quarters on the border. This convinced him that the administration had no real interest in pressing the invasion. “This paper sank my hopes,” he said, “and raised serious doubts of receiving that efficatious support which had been anticipated.”[111]

The Battle of Crysler’s Farm

Wilkinson proved no more eager to carry out his part of the operation. He wanted the administration to order the attack (so that he could avoid blame if it failed), and he suggested that “in case of Misfortune[,] having no retreat, the army must surrender at discretion.”[112] Afflicted with dysentery, Wilkinson took massive quantities of laudanum, a compound of opium and alcohol used to treat intestinal disorders. This rendered him unfit for command. Wilkinson conceded that the laudanum gave him “a giddy head,” and according to one officer, during the ensuing campaign “the general became very merry, and sung and repeated stories.”[113]

Wilkinson moved his army, about 7,300 strong, from Sackets Harbor to Grenadier Island in a flotilla of boats in mid-October, but high winds and rough seas damaged his boats and destroyed many of his supplies and munitions. Repairs and resupply delayed his descent into the St. Lawrence until early November.[114] Moving by water and land, Wilkinson’s army reached Long Sault (now called the International Rapids) on November 10. Brigadier General Jacob Brown, who had helped clear the way, was now dispatched ahead to drive the enemy from the north shore. With assistance from Colonel Winfield Scott, Brown drove British militia from Hoople’s (or Uphold’s) Creek and then occupied Cornwall.[115]

Wilkinson’s advance down the river was followed by a mixed British force of 1,200 regulars, fencibles, and Mohawks under the command of thirty-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Joseph W. Morrison, a respected officer but without combat experience. Morrison’s men left their boats and established a good defensive position at Crysler’s Farm on the north shore. Too ill to conduct operations himself, Wilkinson sent forty-eight-year-old Brigadier General John P. Boyd and 3,000 men to dislodge the British. Boyd had an impressive service record, having fought as a mercenary in India and taken part in the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811, although he had never quite mastered his trade.

On November 11, Boyd launched an attack against Morrison’s force, but he failed to provide adequate guidance to his men, and he sent them into battle piecemeal and without enough ammunition. The British defeated the Americans in detail and then drove them from the field. In the Battle of Crysler’s Farm, about 400 Americans were killed, wounded, or missing, while the British losses were half this number. Among the American casualties was a respected officer, Leonard Covington, who had just turned forty-five and been promoted to brigadier general.[116]

Aftermath of Wilkinson’s Failure

By the time of this defeat, Wilkinson realized that Hampton had returned to Plattsburgh and had no intention of joining forces with him. Using this as an excuse to call off the campaign, he ordered his army into winter quarters at French Mills (now Fort Covington), New York. Here his troops suffered from the severe winter weather. “You can almost gather the Atmosphere in by handfulls as you do Water,” said one officer. “Several Sentinels, have frozen to death on post and Many are badly frostbitten.”[117] The men also suffered from bad provisions and a scarcity of hospital stores and other supplies. “Even the sick had no covering except tents,” reported an army doctor. “Under these circumstances sickness and mortality were very great.”[118] Most of the officers, Wilkinson included, had fled to safer quarters, and conditions at French Mills improved only after General Brown took charge and competent medical personnel arrived.[119]

It was difficult to put a good face on the campaign against Montreal in 1813. This double-barreled attack was the largest military operation of the war on either side, and yet it had ended in disgrace with both armies losing to much smaller forces without ever getting within sight of Montreal. Since the British had taken the American campaign seriously enough to garrison Montreal with some 6,000 men, it is unlikely that any assault would have succeeded anyway.[120]

Wilkinson roused himself for one more foray into enemy territory in March 1814. Leading some 4,000 men into Lower Canada, he aimed to menace Montreal and thus force the British to transfer troops from Upper Canada to protect the city.[121] On March 30 he found himself at Lacolle Mill, which had been the site of an inconclusive battle during Major General Dearborn’s stillborn campaign in 1812. The mill was a stone fortification protected by thick walls and now garrisoned by 180 men. Wilkinson laboriously brought up three small fieldpieces to assault the mill, but his artillery made little impression on the stone walls. The British were subsequently reinforced and then retired to a blockhouse on the north side of Lacolle River. Since the British had several armed vessels on the river, Wilkinson gave up the attack and retreated to the United States. In the Second Battle of Lacolle Mill, the British lost about 60 men, the Americans more than 150. Wilkinson later claimed that his ill-conceived invasion had had a tonic effect on his army. Shortly thereafter, he was removed from command, thus bringing to an end his long and checkered career as a U.S. army officer.[122]

The Creek War in the Southwest

There was also fighting on the southern frontier in 1813, although here the enemy was a militant band of Creeks. The British had talked about cultivating and supplying southern Indians as early as 1812 to force the United States to divert resources from the Canadian frontier. But by the time they acted in 1814, it was too late. The Creeks had been defeated, and those who had survived either had come to terms with the United States or taken refuge in Spanish Florida.[123]

The Creeks occupied much of present-day Alabama and Georgia and were loosely allied with neighboring tribes in a large confederation. Benjamin Hawkins, who had been the Indian agent to the tribe since 1796, had long urged the Creeks to adopt white ways to survive the decline in game. Many Creeks, particularly the mixed-bloods, were receptive. Although still primarily hunters, Creeks practiced agriculture, raised livestock, and owned slaves. They also had an effective form of tribal government, accepted private property, valued the written word and education, and were open to new gender roles. In short, they embraced many values and conventions that in 1812 would have defined them as civilized.[124]

Niles’ Register claimed that the United States had treated the Creeks “with the utmost gentleness and generosity” and that the Indians had “no possible cause of complaint.”[125] But some Creeks, like the Indians in the Northwest, had long been nursing grievances. Known as “Red Sticks” because they carried red war clubs, these Creeks were eager to resist further encroachments on their lands and the destruction of their traditional way of life. Tecumseh had visited the Creeks in 1811, hoping to persuade them to return to their traditional ways and to join his crusade against the white man. “Let the white race perish!” he told the Creeks. “Burn their dwellings—destroy their stock—slay their wives and children, that the very breed may perish.”[126] Although the older chiefs withstood Tecumseh’s entreaties, the Red Sticks were more receptive. They were further emboldened by promises of aid from Spanish officials in Florida and by Anglo-Indian victories in the Old Northwest.[127]

The War in the Southwest and on the Gulf Coast

With visions of rolling back white settlements, Red Sticks began raiding the frontier. In May 1812, one band of Red Sticks murdered several white people living on the Duck River south of Nashville. In February 1813 another band that had visited Tecumseh and taken part in the Battle of Frenchtown killed settlers in Kentucky on their way home. These depredations led to demands for retaliation. To keep peace with the whites, the old Creek chiefs ordered the guilty Indians hunted down and killed. This precipitated a civil war in the tribe, and the old chiefs soon found that they had to flee to the American Indian agent for protection. With the Red Sticks in the ascendant and threatening to destroy those who opposed them, most Creek towns pledged their support, and Indian raids in the Southwest increased.[128]

In July 1813, a group of Red Sticks, who had sacked several Mississippi settlements, visited Pensacola to trade for European goods and to pick up powder and lead promised by Spanish officials. On July 27, as some of these Indians were returning with their pack train, they were attacked 80 miles north of Pensacola by 180 Mississippi militia and volunteers. In the three-hour desultory Battle of Burnt Corn, casualties on both sides were light, seventeen for the Americans and perhaps eight for the Indians. Although the Americans escaped with most of the pack train, the ease with which they were ultimately driven from the field by a much smaller force only emboldened the Indians. This was the opening battle in the Creek War. It transformed what had been a civil war in the Creek confederation into a larger war with the United States.[129]

Fort Mims Massacre

The Creeks retaliated on August 30 by attacking Fort Mims, a stockade 40 miles north of Mobile. The fort was occupied by 300 people, including 120 militia under the command of Major Daniel Beasley, a regular army officer. Beasley took his duties lightly and did not adequately prepare the fort for defense. Ignoring a warning from slaves who had spotted Indians earlier in the day, the Americans were caught by surprise and overrun when blown sand made it impossible to close the fort’s gate. The Indian assailants, led by William Weatherford, a Scottish-Cherokee leader also known as Red Eagle, paid dearly, losing at least 100 killed and many more wounded. But they killed close to 300 of the defenders, including many women and children. Weatherford tried to halt the slaughter but without success. “My warriors were like famished wolves,” he said, “and the first taste of blood made their appetites insatiable.”[130] The only survivors were a few whites who escaped into the woods and some black slaves who were carried off by the victorious Indians.[131]

Early reports exaggerated the number of people killed at Fort Mims and “spread consternation through the Territory.”[132] “Our settlement is overrun,” reported one westerner, “and our country, I fear, is on the eve of being depopulated.”[133] The Fort Mims massacre stirred up people in the Southwest, much as the River Raisin massacre had galvanized people in the Northwest. There were widespread calls to punish, if not destroy, the Indians, and throughout the region militia were called up and volunteers recruited for guard duty and punitive expeditions.

American Retaliation

People in Georgia and the Mississippi Territory were quick to answer the call. Captain Sam Dale, known as “Big Sam” to the Indians, had been wounded at Burnt Corn but had recovered enough to resume operations in the Mississippi Territory. Determined to drive the small Indian war parties from the frontier, he led forty men up the Alabama River, reaching what is today Monroe County, Alabama. On November 12, in a legendary skirmish known as the Canoe Fight, Dale boarded a large Indian dugout and in hand-to-hand combat killed several Indians. Dale’s prowess gave people in the territory both a victory to celebrate and a hero to honor.[134]

Later that month, Brigadier General John Floyd targeted Autosee, a large Creek village in Georgia that was inhabited by around about 1,000 warriors. With 1,000 Georgia troops and 300–400 friendly Creeks led by William McIntosh, Floyd attacked Autosee on November 29. Using field artillery and a bayonet charge, Floyd’s men scattered the Indians and then burned Autosee and the neighboring village of Tallassee. The following month Brigadier General Ferdinand L. Claiborne targeted Econochaca, also known as the Holy Ground, located on the Alabama River in the Mississippi Territory. With a mixed force of 1,000 regulars, militia, volunteers, and friendly Indians, Claiborne on December 23 attacked. After some hard fighting, the Indians fled into the wilderness. William Weatherford was the last to leave, and he escaped only by riding his horse off a bluff into the river 20 feet below. In January 1814, Floyd again marched into Creek country, this time with 1,200 Georgia troops, some cavalry, and about 400 friendly Creeks. On January 27, this force was attacked at Calabee Creek. The fighting was fierce, but a combination of artillery and rifle fire followed by a bayonet charge drove the Indians off. In the Battle of Calabee Creek, Floyd’s men sustained around 170 casualties. The Red Sticks suffered 40 dead and an unknown number wounded.[135]

“Old Hickory” Takes Command

Although the operations launched from Georgia and the Mississippi Territory took a heavy toll on the Creeks, the results were inconclusive. The campaign from Tennessee, by contrast, was more sustained and thus more decisive. Although the heart of the Creek country was least accessible from this state, by the fall of 1813 some 2,500 militia and volunteers had assembled to undertake a punitive expedition. The troops included young Sam Houston and Davy Crockett, who reportedly kept “the camp alive with his quaint conceits and marvelous narratives.”[136] Andrew Jackson, a major general in the Tennessee militia, assumed command of the troops even though he was still recovering from bullet wounds suffered in a brawl with the Benton brothers, Jesse and Thomas Hart. A tough Indian fighter who was already known as “Old Hickory,” Jackson planned to wipe out the Red Sticks and then seize Spanish Florida. “The blood of our women & children,” he told his troops, “shall not call for vengeance in vain.”[137]

Marching rapidly south, Jackson built Fort Strother on the Coosa River to serve as a forward base. On November 3, his most able lieutenant, Brigadier General John Coffee, led 900 Tennessee militia and volunteers and some Cherokees and friendly Creeks against the Red Stick village of Tallushatchee. Using tactics pioneered by Hannibal 2,000 years before, Coffee formed his men into a semicircle around the village, induced the Indians to attack, and then closed the loop. Coffee sustained fewer than 50 casualties in the Battle of Tallushatchee, while the Indians suffered at least 200 killed and 84 women and children captured.[138] “The enemy fought with savage fury,” reported Coffee, “and met death with all its horrors, without shrinking or complaining: not one asked to be spared, but fought as long as they could stand or sit.”[139]

Several days later Jackson learned that 1,100 Red Sticks were besieging a town of friendly Creeks at Talladega. Jackson marched 2,000 men to the town and on November 9 used the same tactics as Coffee to envelop the Red Sticks. The Indians suffered huge casualties, leaving 300 dead on the field, before finding a weak spot in Jackson’s line and effecting their escape. Jackson’s own losses in the Battle of Talladega were about 100.[140]

Jackson’s Supply and Discipline Problems

At this point, Jackson had to suspend operations and return to Fort Strother because his provisions were low. Like so many field commanders in this war, Jackson had to contend with recurring supply problems. “The difficulties and delays of The Campaign,” he said, “are to be ascribed, primarily, to The negligence of The Contractors.”[141] In addition, many of his troops, whose terms of service had expired, wanted to go home. On several occasions Jackson had to threaten volunteers with militia or militia with volunteers in order to keep his army intact. Twice he leveled his own gun against men threatening to leave. As if this were not enough, the governor of Tennessee was beginning to lose heart, and Jackson had to buttress his resolve. It was only by sheer force of will that Old Hickory kept his army together and the campaign alive.[142]

Ultimately, Jackson had to permit most of his troops to go home. But by early 1814 reinforcements had arrived, raising his strength to 1,000 men. Resuming the offensive, Jackson marched into the very heart of Creek country, where he fought two engagements: one at Emuckfau on January 22 and the other at Enotachopco Creek two days later. The fighting in both battles was intense, but each time the outcome was inconclusive. Jackson sustained about 100 casualties, while the Indians probably suffered twice this number. By now the Red Sticks, who had learned something of their foe, called Jackson “Sharp Knife” or “Pointed Arrow.”[143]

After returning again to Fort Strother, Jackson stockpiled supplies and waited for fresh troops. Tales of his campaign stimulated recruiting in Tennessee, and by February 1814 his army was 4,000 strong. Among the new arrivals were 600 regulars. Jackson hoped that these troops would give “Strength to my arm & quell mutiny,” but he continued to have trouble with the militia.[144] When one young soldier, John Woods, refused to obey orders, Jackson ordered him court-martialed. The defendant was convicted and shot—the first execution of a citizen soldier since the Revolution. “An army cannot exist where order & Subordination are wholly disregarded,” Jackson said in defense of his actions.[145] The sanguinary lesson was not lost on his men. According to Jackson’s aide, “a strict obedience afterwards characterized the army.”[146] In this campaign, as in others, Jackson got the most out of his men because they feared him more than they feared the enemy.

The Battle of Horseshoe Bend

Jackson learned from friendly Indians that about 1,000 hostile Creeks had established themselves on a peninsula called Horseshoe Bend on the Tallapoosa River. The Indians had fortified the land approach and placed their canoes on the river in case they had to flee. Jackson marched to the scene with about 3,000 men (including a sizeable number of friendly Creeks and Cherokees) and laid plans for an attack. The battle began on March 27, 1814, when friendly Indians swam the river and made off with the Creek canoes. After fruitlessly pounding the enemy breastworks with his two small fieldpieces, Jackson launched a frontal assault. Among the first over the breastworks was Sam Houston, who was wounded in the leg. (“The Raven” was wounded twice more in the battle but survived to become the first president of the independent Republic of Texas.) As Jackson’s men were storming the Red Stick works from the front, his Indian allies used the Creek canoes to cross the river and mount an attack from the rear.

The Battle of Horseshoe Bend quickly turned into a slaughter. Most of the hostile Creeks preferred death to surrender, and those who tried to escape were shot down. Even Jackson admitted that the “carnage was dreadfull.”[147] Close to 800 hostile Indians perished, while Jackson’s own force sustained only 200 casualties.[148] “The fiends of the Tallapoosa,” Jackson triumphantly intoned, “will no longer murder our Women and Children, or disturb the quiet of our borders.”[149]

William Weatherford, who had taken part in the Fort Mims massacre and emerged as a conspicuous Red Stick leader, later marched into Jackson’s camp to surrender. “My people are no more!!” he reportedly said. “Their bones are bleaching on the plains of Tallushatches, Talladega, and Emuckfau.”[150] Impressed by his bravery, Jackson spared Weatherford, who took a message of peace to other Red Sticks still in the region. Weatherford lived out his days as an affluent and respected Alabama planter, but the other Creeks did not fare so well. “They . . . [have] forfeighted all right to the Territory we have conquered,” Jackson wrote.[151]

Even though many of the Creeks had sided with the United States, on August 9, 1814, Jackson forced all the tribal leaders—friend and foe alike—to sign the Treaty of Fort Jackson, which stripped the Indians of some 36,000 square miles of land—over half of their territory. Such a massive land grab pleased Jackson’s western supporters but left official Washington aghast, and the Senate did not approve the treaty until after news of Jackson’s victory at New Orleans had arrived six months later.[152]

Jackson’s victories in the Southwest, coupled with those of Perry and Harrison in the Northwest, greatly increased American security on the western frontier. The only problem with these victories was that they had occurred in regions too remote to affect the outcome of the war with Great Britain. On the more important fronts—along the Niagara and St. Lawrence rivers—the United States had made no headway in its efforts to dislodge the British. After two years of campaigning, Canada remained in British hands, and victory for the United States seemed as remote as ever.

The War at Sea

If the war on land went better for the United States in 1813, the war at sea went worse. This was to be expected because the ocean was Britain’s element. The British had been slow to exploit their naval superiority in the first six months of the war, which had led to considerable domestic criticism.[153] In response, the government in early 1813 increased its naval force in American waters to ten ships-of-the-line, thirty-eight frigates, and fifty-two smaller vessels. In the months that followed, the buildup continued so that total British naval strength in the Western Hemisphere rose by more than 50 percent, from 83 vessels in June 1812 to 129 vessels in July 1813.[154]

The government also lectured Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, who was put in charge of all British naval forces in the North Atlantic and Caribbean, on what was expected of him in the ensuing campaign. “It is of the highest importance to the character and interests of the country,” wrote the Admiralty, “that the naval force of the enemy should be quickly and completely disposed of.” Warren was “to bring the naval war to a termination, either by the capture of the American national vessels, or by strictly blockading them in their own waters.”[155]

The British Blockade the Atlantic Coast

Warren had already established a blockade from Charleston, South Carolina, to Spanish Florida in the fall of 1812.[156] With his enlarged fleet, he extended this blockade in early 1813 to the Chesapeake and Delaware bays and then to other ports and harbors in the middle and southern states. Thus by November 1813, the entire coast south of New England was under blockade. Warren exempted New England, both to reward her for opposing the war and to keep up the flow of provisions to Canada and the British West Indies. (By this time, British troops in the Spanish Peninsula no longer needed American grain.)[157]

The War on the Atlantic Coast

The War in the Chesapeake

The British blockade had a crushing effect on American foreign trade. “Commerce is becoming very slack,” reported a resident of Baltimore in the spring of 1813; “no arrivals from abroad, & nothing going to sea but sharp [that is, fast] vessels.”[158] By the end of the year, the sea lanes had become so dangerous that merchants wishing to insure oceangoing voyages had to shell out 50 percent of the value of the ship and cargo.[159]

With British warships hovering nearby, the coasting trade had become perilous, too, forcing American merchants to resort to overland transportation. But there were few good roads, and even the best broke down under heavy use and the ongoing assault of the elements. “The roads [in Virginia] . . . are worse than usual,” Nathaniel Macon reported in March 1813; “it takes 38 hours to travel from Fredericksburg to Alexandria the distance 50 miles.” “The road is literally cut hub deep,” wrote a New Jersey traveler in May; “wagons innumerable [are] passing and repassing from Trenton to New York with goods.”[160]

The stoppage of trade created gluts and shortages everywhere. Sugar that sold for $9 a hundredweight in August 1813 in New Orleans commanded $21.50 in New York and $26.50 in Baltimore. Rice selling for $3 a hundredweight in Charleston or Savannah brought $9 in New York and $12 in Philadelphia. Flour, which was $4.50 a barrel in Richmond, fetched $8.50 in New York and almost $12 in Boston.[161] With New York contractors bidding up the price of flour to feed U.S. troops operating to the north, one traveler reported seeing 2,000 barrels en route to the city. “Every hut, blacksmith’s shop, house, shed and hovel is filled with flour,” he said; “10, 20, 60, 100 Barrels in a place, and piled on the sides of the road, and many loads thrown down in the mire.”[162]

Because the blockade curtailed imports from abroad, a panic set in at the end of 1813 that drove up prices. “A rage for speculation,” reported a Philadelphia merchant, “has seized our traders.”[163] Coffee, tea, sugar, salt, cotton, molasses, and spices suddenly doubled, tripled, or even quadrupled in price. The “mania for commercial speculations and monopolies,” said the New York Columbian, is “extensive and increasing.”[164] One Republican paper called the speculation “criminal,” and another urged people to boycott overpriced goods.[165] The press insisted that there were ample stocks of most commodities on hand, but not until early 1814, after the arrival of a truce ship raised hopes of peace, did the bubble burst and prices tumble.[166]

The U.S. government felt the impact of the blockade because the Treasury was so dependent on taxes on foreign trade. Although the customs duties were doubled at the beginning of the war, government income, which stood at $14 million in 1811, declined to $10 million in 1812 and rose only back to $14 million in 1813. With the cost of the war driving up government expenditures, from $8 million in 1811 to $20 million in 1812 and $32 million in 1813, the administration had to rely ever more on public loans.[167] Albert Gallatin did not anticipate how much the British blockade would undermine his balance sheet and disrupt his plan for financing the war.

British Raids in the Chesapeake

The British used their naval power not only to put economic and financial pressure on the United States but also to bring the war home to the American people, especially in the Chesapeake Bay. Warren, who had no stomach for raiding and plundering, assigned the command in these waters to Rear Admiral Sir George Cockburn (pronounced Co-burn). Cockburn was a bold and able officer in the prime of a long and distinguished naval career.[168] Guided through the countryside by runaway slaves, he devoted the spring of 1813 to plundering the Chesapeake. His immediate aim was to destroy American warships, burn government supplies, and ruin the coastal trade. His larger purpose was to show Americans the perils of making war on the Mistress of the Seas.[169]

Rear Admiral Sir George Cockburn (1772–1853) perfected the fine art of amphibious warfare in the Chesapeake in 1813–14 and was largely responsible for the decision to attack the nation’s capital. Although he followed the laws of war as he understood them, he was long remembered as “the despoiler of the Chesapeake.” (Portrait by W. Greatbatch. Library and Archives of Canada)

In late April Cockburn sailed into the Upper Chesapeake, attacked and burned Frenchtown, Maryland, and destroyed the ships that were docked there. Several days later he marched to Principio, where a cannon foundry and forty-five cannons were destroyed. In early May Cockburn’s forces swept aside the local militia and looted and burned three other towns in Maryland: Havre de Grace, Georgetown, and Fredericktown. At Havre de Grace the militia fled after one of the defenders was killed by a Congreve rocket. To drive home the purpose of the campaign, a British naval officer told people in Havre de Grace: “you shall now feel the effects of war.”[170] The only time that the British were rebuffed was at Fort Defiance, which spared the town of Elkton. Otherwise, they moved freely on American soil for two weeks without meeting effective resistance.[171] This caused considerable consternation. “On my way from Philadelphia to Washington,” recalled a Republican congressman, “I found the whole country excited by these depredations. Cockburn’s name was on every tongue, with various particulars of his incredibly coarse and blackguard misconduct.”[172]

In mid-June Warren returned to the Chesapeake with reinforcements, determined to attack Norfolk, Virginia, a regional commercial center that harbored the frigate Constellation. Brigadier General Robert B. Taylor of the Virginia militia, who was in charge of the local defenses, prepared for the attack by assembling 750 men and fortifying Craney Island, which commanded the approaches to Norfolk. A flotilla of gunboats under the command of Captain John Cassin protected the channel behind the island. Some 2,400 men took part in the assault. Part of the force, led by Colonel Thomas Sidney Beckwith, who had earned a reputation fighting for Wellington in the Peninsular War, landed on the mainland west of the island, while the rest approached in barges commanded by Captain Samuel J. Pechell of the Royal Navy. Both assault forces sustained heavy artillery fire and were stalled by natural obstacles. Beckwith’s land force could not ford the deep water that separated the island from mainland, and Pechell’s barges ran aground in mud when they were still far from the shore. The entire British force had no choice but to retreat. In the Battle of Craney Island, the British sustained about eighty killed, wounded, or missing, while the Americans had no losses at all.[173]

The British next attacked Hampton, Virginia, with a force of 2,000 men. The 450 militia commanded by Major Stapleton Crutchfield who were charged with defending the town offered surprisingly stout resistance before being overwhelmed and forced to retreat. Once the fighting ended, the civilian population was subjected to all kinds of abuse. According to Lieutenant Colonel Charles Napier, a young British officer who later gained fame in India, “every horror was committed with impunity, rape, murder, pillage: and not a man was punished!”[174] The guilty were French deserters and prisoners-of-war who had enlisted in two independent companies of foreigners. Unruly in the best of circumstances, these troops became thoroughly unmanageable when they realized that their French officers were stealing their pay. The British sent the two companies to Halifax, where they continued to terrorize civilians. “The Inhabitants of Halifax are in the greatest alarm about these fellows,” said a British official.[175] The trouble ended only when the offending units were shipped to Europe and disbanded.[176]

The British occupied Kent Island in early August and renewed their raids on the Eastern Shore. Colonel Beckwith led a joint operation against Queenstown on August 13. Although local militiamen were overwhelmed, they inflicted a number of casualties before retreating. Moreover, because the British could not tell where the enemy fire was coming from, they panicked and fired in all directions, producing some casualties from friendly fire. The British also targeted St. Michaels, first on August 10 and then again on August 26, but unaccountably withdrew without destroying the town’s shipyard. A story surfaced in the late nineteenth century that residents induced the British to overshoot the mark with their artillery in the first attack by hanging lanterns in trees and two-story houses, but there is no contemporary evidence to support this tale.[177]

The British depredations caused a great deal of bitterness in the Chesapeake. Niles’ Register attacked Warren and dubbed his troops “water-Winnebagoes”—an allusion to the most militant Indians in the Old Northwest. Cockburn drew even greater fire. “The wantonness of his barbarities,” said Niles, “have gibbetted him on infamy.”[178] Some Americans, however, benefited from the British presence. When they met with no resistance, the British usually paid for the provisions they needed. Those willing to do business with the invaders—and there were many—profited handsomely. In addition, a growing number of runaway slaves found sanctuary with the British and were given a choice of either enlisting in the service or settling in the West Indies.[179] This was a matter of grave concern to southerners, who, fearing a slave rebellion, stepped up their militia patrols. “All accounts agree,” a northern congressman reported, “that [the British] are recruiting rapidly from the Plantations; . . . there begins to be loud howling on this subject.”[180]

Naval Engagements

There were fewer naval engagements in 1813 than in 1812 because most American warships were bottled up in port. Even those that managed to escape often returned empty-handed because British warships now sailed in squadrons and British merchantmen in convoys. The Navy Department ordered American warships to cruise separately and to avoid battle except under the most favorable circumstances. Their mission was “to destroy the commerce of the enemy, from the cape of good Hope [off the tip of South Africa], to cape clear [off the Irish coast].”[181] There were only four naval duels on the high seas in this campaign, and three of these ended in defeat for the United States.

In May 1813 thirty-one-year-old James Lawrence, who had earlier commanded the U.S.Sloop Hornet (20 guns) in its victory over the British sloop Peacock (20 guns), was given command of the Chesapeake (50 guns) when the captain assigned to this vessel asked to be relieved because an old war wound had flared up.[182] The Chesapeake was fitted out in Boston. Although there was some grumbling among Chesapeake’s crew over prize money, Lawrence’s biggest problem was an inexperienced set of officers and the lack of an opportunity to train with his crew. The Chesapeake badly needed a shakedown cruise, but in his eagerness to do battle, Lawrence ignored this.[183]

Hovering off the coast of Boston were two British frigates, the Shannon (52 guns), commanded by thirty-five-year-old Captain Philip Broke (pronounced Brook), and the Tenedos (47 guns?). Broke was a superb officer who had been cruising in the Shannon since 1806. Using his own money, he outfitted his ship with special aiming devices, and, unlike other British naval commanders after Trafalgar, he drilled his crew incessantly in gunnery using live ammunition. According to a British officer who was assigned to the American station, “The Shannon’s men were better trained, and understood gunnery better, than any men I ever saw.”[184] As the Chesapeake was preparing to sail, Broke sent the Tenedos away and dispatched a challenge to Lawrence for a meeting “Ship to Ship, to try the fortunes of our respective Flags.”[185] Lawrence sailed before this challenge arrived, but he needed no invitation.

On June 1 the Chesapeake emerged from port flying a banner that read “Free Trade and Sailors Rights.” Lawrence made for the Shannon, but for reasons that are unclear, he passed up a chance to cut across the British ship’s stern and rake her. Instead, the two ships lined up parallel to each other and exchanged broadsides at close range. Very quickly superior gunnery carried the day for the Shannon, taking a terrific toll on the American officers, men, and ship. The Chesapeake lost control, was subjected to a murderous raking fire, and then boarded. Lawrence was wounded but repeatedly urged his men to fight on, uttering “Don’t give up the ship” and similar expressions. His men, however, suffered heavy casualties and had no choice but to surrender. Lawrence’s wounds were mortal, but he lingered on for three days after the battle and thus knew the fate of his ship. The British took control of the Chesapeake and sailed her into Halifax as a prize of war. The vessel was later taken to England, broken up, and her timbers used in the construction of a flour mill.[186]

The Shannon’s victory, which was accomplished in only fifteen minutes, provided a great boost to British morale. It was the first defeat of an American frigate in the war and ended a long string of American naval victories. The British people were ecstatic. “Captain Broke and his crew,” said the London Morning Chronicle, “have vindicated the character of the British Navy.”[187] The Naval Chronicle called the British triumph “the most brilliant act of heroism ever performed,” and the news was greeted in Parliament with the “loudest and most cordial acclamations from every part of the House.”[188] Broke never fully recovered from a head wound received in the battle, but he was made a baronet, given the key to London, and showered with gifts from an appreciative nation.[189]

Captain James Lawrence (1781–1813) of the U.S. Frigate Chesapeake was mortally wounded when his ship was defeated by the British frigate Shannon. In this idealized picture, Lawrence looks to heaven as his men carry him away from the battle. (J. A. Spencer, History of the United States)

Lawrence, on the other hand, was given a hero’s funeral in New York City that was reportedly attended by 50,000 people.[190] He was honored in a poem by Philip Freneau and eulogized in newspapers across the nation.[191] “The brave, the noble Lawrence is no more,” said the Maryland Republican. “He who added the last brilliant trophy to our triumphal diadem [with his victory over the Peacock], the bed of glory has received.”[192] Acting on orders from the secretary of the navy, Perry paid tribute to Lawrence by naming his flagship on Lake Erie after him. He also flew a banner emblazoned with Lawrence’s words—“Don’t give up the ship.”[193] After Perry’s celebrated victory on the lake, this slogan became the motto of the young navy and replaced “free trade and sailors’ rights” as the rallying cry of the war.

The Cruise of the Essex

The United States frigate Essex (46 guns), Captain David Porter commanding, had better luck although ultimately she too was captured. Porter was never happy with the Essex, calling her “the worst frigate in the service.”[194] She was a poor sailer, and Porter made her worse by overloading her with guns. Nevertheless, he made the most of his cruise in the ship. Rounding the Horn in late 1812, the Essex became the first American warship to sail in the Pacific. For over a year Porter cruised in those waters, destroying British whale ships, taking prizes, and living off the enemy. “The valuable whale Fishery there is entirely destroyed,” he reported, “and the actual injury we have done [to the British] may be estimated at two and a half millions of dollars.”[195] Porter greatly overestimated the value of the British losses, but there is no denying that he did enough damage to get the attention of the Admiralty.[196]

In late 1813 the British dispatched a squadron of three ships under the command of Captain James Hillyar to track down the Essex and destroy her. Two of the British ships, the Phoebe (46 or 53 guns) and the Cherub (26 guns), caught up with the Essex at Valparaiso, Chile. Porter could have destroyed the Phoebe when she docked next to the Essex in port, but preferring to respect Chile’s territorial waters, he sought to persuade Hillyar to fight a duel at sea. Even though the crew of the Essex goaded the British with insulting songs, Hillyar refused the challenge. Instead, the two British ships cruised beyond the harbor, waiting for an opportunity to act in concert against the American vessel.[197]

On March 28, 1814, Porter made a run for the sea, but a sudden squall destroyed his topmast, forcing him to seek sanctuary in a small bay. Although the Essex was in Chilean waters, the Phoebe closed to take advantage of the American ship’s distress, and the Cherub soon followed. After a hard-fought contest, the Essex was forced to strike her colors. Porter bitterly assailed the British officers, not only for refusing a duel but also for attacking the Essex while she was in a crippled state in neutral waters. He also accused the British of continuing their fire after the Essex had struck her colors. The British denied any wrongdoing and accused Porter of conniving in the escape of his crew after surrendering. On both sides, the fog of war rather than bad faith probably accounts for the charges.[198]

Two smaller American warships also fought duels with the British. On August 14, 1813, H.M. Sloop Pelican (21 guns) defeated the U.S. Brig Argus (20 guns) off the coast of Ireland. After this loss, the Navy Department urged its smaller cruisers to stick to commerce raiding. On September 5, another American brig, the Enterprise (16 guns), fought the British sloop Boxer (14 guns) off the coast of Maine. The two vessels exchanged broadsides for over an hour before the British ship struck its colors. Both ship commanders were killed in the engagement.[199]

Privateering: Success Beyond the Blockade

With most of the American fleet bottled up in port or simply overmatched by the British, privateers had to shoulder a heavier burden, though the pickings were slimmer than they had been in 1812. It was difficult to find prizes on the open seas because most British merchantmen now traveled in convoy. The captain of one privateer reported “vexing the whole Atlantic” without sighting a single enemy vessel.[200] To find prizes, privateers had to cruise in the British West Indies or near the British Isles because in these waters merchant ships traveled without an escort.

The most spectacular cruise was made by the True-Blooded Yankee (16 guns), a small vessel fitted out by an American citizen in Paris. On a thirty-seven-day cruise in waters around the British Isles, this ship took twenty-seven prizes, occupied an Irish island for six days, and burned seven vessels in a Scottish harbor.[201] “She out-sailed everything,” marveled a British naval officer; “not one of our cruisers could touch her.”[202] The Scourge (15 guns) and Rattlesnake (16 guns) found equally good hunting in the North Sea. Between them they took twenty-three prizes, which were sent into Norwegian ports for condemnation. The Scourge made another successful cruise and then took additional prizes on her way home.[203] Still another privateer, the Decatur (7 guns), captured the H.M. Sloop Dominica (16 guns) by boarding in one the bloodiest engagements of the war.[204] Other privateers also enjoyed successful cruises in 1813, and this species of warfare continued to bedevil the British, especially in their own waters.

End of the Campaign

The outcome of the campaign should have occasioned no surprise: the American victories on land and the British victories at sea accorded with the general strengths of the two nations. Although Americans could be justly proud of their triumphs, final victory continued to elude them, and now, more than ever, time was running against them. In October 1813 Great Britain’s allies had defeated Napoleon in the decisive Battle of Leipzig. Coupled with the British triumphs in Spain, this foreshadowed Napoleon’s downfall. With these victories behind them, the British began diverting men and material to the New World, and this changed the whole complexion of the American war. Having failed to conquer Canada in 1812 or 1813, the United States would not get another chance. When the campaign of 1814 opened, the British were on the offensive.

Chapter 7

The Last Embargo

By the time the Thirteenth Congress convened for its second session on December 6, 1813, there was a note of apprehension in the air. Despite the victories in the Northwest and Southwest, the news from the other fronts was uniformly bad. Canada was still in British hands, the British fleet was in American waters, and British troops moved freely about the Chesapeake. The tide of war appeared to be turning against the United States. “The result of the last campaign,” lamented a Republican, has “disappointed the expectations of every one.” “In spite of some gleams of success,” added a Federalist, “We are further off our object than at first.”[1]

Fortunately, the president had fully recovered from his summer illness and was again able to steer the ship of state. “The little president is back, and as game as ever,” said one of his supporters.[2] In his opening address to Congress, Madison announced that the British had rejected the Russian mediation offer. Putting the best face on events, he enumerated American victories and insisted that “the progress of the campaign has been filled with incidents highly honorable to the American arms.” He also pointed out that “the privations and sacrifices” necessitated by the war were offset by “improvements and advantages of which the contest itself is the source.” Among these were the development of manufacturing and a permanent increase in the defense establishment. In short, “the war, with its vicissitudes, is illustrating the capacity and the destiny of the United States to be a great, a flourishing, and a powerful nation.”[3]

Britain’s Peace Initiative

Madison’s optimism was strained though not entirely unwarranted, for on December 30 a truce ship arrived with the first good news from Great Britain since the repeal of the Orders-in-Council. Although the British had rejected the Russian mediation proposal, they offered to open direct negotiations with the United States. The president accepted this offer and nominated John Quincy Adams, James A. Bayard, Henry Clay, and Jonathan Russell to serve on the peace commission. When Madison later learned that Albert Gallatin was still in Europe, his name was added to the list, too.[4]

There was some opposition in Federalist circles to Clay, who was considered too strong a War Hawk, and to Russell, who was variously described as “a bankrupt merchant” and “a time-serving wretch.”[5] Nevertheless, it was a strong commission, and the Senate confirmed each nomination by a large majority. Since the negotiations were expected to take place in Sweden, the Senate also approved Russell’s nomination as United States minister to that country. This was an important victory for the administration because the Senate had rejected this nomination by a large majority the previous summer.[6]

Personnel Changes

The appointment of the peace commissioners necessitated other changes in the government. With Clay’s departure, the House had to pick a new speaker. Friends of the administration backed Felix Grundy, while opponents supported Langdon Cheves. Both were War Hawks, but Cheves was a known enemy of the restrictive system, and he won, 94–59. The voting was secret, but Cheves apparently garnered the support of the Federalists and dissident Republicans as well as some of the regular Republicans.[7]

Since all now conceded that Gallatin had forfeited his position in the cabinet, members of the Senate urged the president to fill this vacancy, too.[8] Secretary of the Navy William Jones, who was overseeing the Treasury Department, was anxious to be relieved of the extra duties anyway. “I am as perfect a galley slave as ever laboured at the oar,” he told a friend; “the duties of both [offices] have become intolerable.”[9] Unable to persuade more capable men to take the post, Madison offered it to Senator George W. Campbell of Tennessee.[10] Although Campbell was an able politician, he lacked the necessary skills for so demanding a job. Jonathan Roberts claimed that he “wanted promptness of action, & more knowledge of finance,” and William Jones concluded that he was “entirely out of place in the Treasury.”[11] The appointment had the added effect of depriving the administration of an important ally in Congress. “He will be much missed in the Senate,” said Nathaniel Macon. “I am at a loss to guess, who now will be the defender of the administration in the Senate.”[12]

Madison also had to appoint a new attorney general. The attorney general was not a full-time executive officer but simply the government’s legal counsel. He was not expected to live in Washington nor to give up his private legal practice. In early 1813, however, the House passed a bill requiring the attorney general to reside in Washington. Although the bill ultimately died in the Senate, by this time incumbent William Pinkney, who had a lucrative legal practice in Baltimore, had resigned.[13] This was a significant loss to the administration: Pinkney was an accomplished statesman who was considered by many to be “the first Lawyer in the Nation.”[14] As his replacement, Madison chose Richard Rush of Philadelphia. Rush was a brilliant young attorney and a rising star in the party, but he lacked Pinkney’s stature and experience.[15]

The president also replaced his postmaster general. Although this was not a cabinet-level position, the postmaster general had enormous patronage—over 3,000 postmasterships—and none of his appointments required Senate or even presidential approval. The man who had held this job since 1801 was Gideon Granger, a Connecticut Republican who in recent years had quietly doled out patronage to opponents of the administration. Since postal officials often read the mail that passed through their hands, these appointments caused regular Republicans considerable dismay.[16] Granger also had supported Clinton for the presidency and was considered by many to be an opponent of the war. Indeed, one War Hawk described him as “a violent peacable man, and a strong anti-Madisonian.”[17]

When the postmastership in Philadelphia fell vacant in early 1814, regular Republicans in the state urged the appointment of Richard Bache.[18] The president himself urged Bache’s candidacy, but Granger chose Michael Leib, an anti-administration senator.[19] This elicited a vigorous protest from Pennsylvania. Harrisburg merchants complained that with Leib as postmaster they could not safely transmit money to Philadelphia, and a Republican editor insisted that even the governor was reluctant to use the mails.[20] Madison finally dismissed Granger and appointed Governor Return J. Meigs of Ohio in his stead, although not before Republicans in Congress had initiated a full-scale investigation into postal matters.[21] “The fall of G------r,” said a New York senator, “will deprive the faction hostile to the Administration of their most efficient man, who has for seven years past been engaged in thwarting the measures taken by the Government.”[22]

The War Debate Renewed

Madison made few recommendations to Congress in his opening address, preferring to rely on special messages or informal conferences to make his wishes known. Once again, however, congressional action on war legislation was delayed by Federalist opposition. “There is every appearance,” said Jonathan Roberts, “that the minority will Contest every inch of ground—I look for one of the most procrastinated & angry debates . . . that has ever occurr[e]d in Congress.”[23] Federalists renewed their attack on the Canadian strategy and denounced Republican demands that they support the war without questioning its justice or necessity. “It savors too much of the old tory doctrine of passive obedience and non-resistance,” said one Federalist. “It is repugnant to the genius of our free institutions.”[24]

House Federalists made two proposals to restrict the war to defensive operations. Daniel Sheffey of Virginia offered an amendment to an army bill that would limit the service of the troops “to the defence of the territories and frontiers of the United States,” and William Gaston of North Carolina submitted a resolution proclaiming that, “pending the negotiation with Great Britain, it is inexpedient to prosecute military operations against the Canadas for invasion or conquest.”[25] Republicans were exasperated by these proposals. Thomas B. Robertson of Louisiana expressed “astonishment and indignation” at Sheffey’s amendment, claiming that he had never heard of “a proposition more fraught with mischief, more parricidal in its nature.”[26] House Republicans closed ranks to vote down both proposals by large majorities.[27]

The Republicans tried to counter Federalist arguments by demonstrating that the war was defensive in character. John C. Calhoun argued that “a war is offensive or defensive, not by the mode of carrying it on, which is an immaterial circumstance, but by the motive and cause which led to it.”[28] But Federalist Zebulon R. Shipherd of New York replied that if this were true then every war was defensive: “When a nation declares war it always complains that it has been injured; and, if the gentleman is correct, all wars are defensive.”[29]

Republicans also tried to blame the war on the Federalists, arguing that opposition to the government had encouraged the British to persist in their policies. “If that American feeling had prevailed everywhere which ought to animate the bosoms of every man,” said James Fisk of Vermont, “we should never have had occasion to go to war.” Fisk claimed that Federalist opposition was linked to British gold. “If you could open the secret archives of the enemy,” he said, “you would find that money has a little influence somewhere.”[30] Felix Grundy also joined in the attack, renewing a charge that he had made in the previous session: “I then said, and I now repeat, that those who systematically oppose the filling of the loans, and the enlistment of soldiers, are, in my opinion, guilty of moral treason.”[31]

John C. Calhoun (1782–1850), a South Carolina War Hawk, was a strong nationalist in this phase of his career. An enemy of the restrictive system, he worked during the war to jettison those restrictions that remained on the books. After the war, he had a brilliant career as secretary of war before embracing states’ rights and becoming the South’s leading defender of slavery. (Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812)

The debate dragged on for weeks and even spilled over to routine appropriations bills, which was almost unheard of.[32] “This is the [most] talking legislature, that I have Seen,” said veteran Congressman Nathaniel Macon. “Both Houses,” added the Washington National Intelligencer, “are engaged in an unlimited, and, it would almost appear, interminable Debate on the State of the Union.”[33] The speeches were so long-winded and repetitive that attendance in the House dropped off sharply. “We have . . . some very moving Speeches,” said Macon wryly, “so much so that more than half the chairs are vacant and some times the stenographers are absent.”[34] For those who remained the experience was tedious and frustrating. Twice John C. Calhoun almost engaged in duels with Federalists, and in general Republicans were less tolerant of Federalist opposition than they had been in the past.[35]

More War Measures

Raising troops was still a top priority with Republicans. Although the increase in pay and bounty the year before had attracted many new recruits, by the end of 1813 enlistments had slowed considerably. “It Seems to be general opinion,” said Macon, “that the recruiting of men by enlistment is every where nearly at an end.”[36] Worse still, many of those who had enlisted for five years in 1808–1809 or for a year in 1812–1813 would soon be discharged. If Congress did not act, there was a real danger that the army would simply melt away.

The secretary of war, John Armstrong, who had lingered in New York at the end of the last campaign, aired his views in an anonymous article published in the Albany Argus. Convinced that voluntary enlistments would never produce the necessary troops, Armstrong called for drafting 55,000 militia into the regular army. To command these troops, he recommended the appointment of a lieutenant general of “deep and comprehensive views”—no doubt thinking of himself.[37]

Congress had little faith in Armstrong and no interest in his conscription plans.[38] Instead, congressional Republicans sought to bolster enlistments by raising the bounty again. Hitherto new recruits had received $40 in cash, a $24 advance in pay, and 160 acres of land. Thenceforth they would receive $124 in cash and 160 acres in land. To stimulate enlistments still further, Congress offered an $8 premium to anyone who secured a recruit.[39] Federalists protested that amateur recruiting agents would overrun the country, but Robert Wright replied that the government needed some means to offset the “treasonable sentiments” of those who discouraged enlistments. “When every effort was used by the minority to defeat the recruiting service,” he said, “there ought to be a counter projet on the part of Government.”[40]

Congress also authorized the president to reenlist the army’s short-term men for longer periods and to raise additional riflemen. This legislation, coupled with a reorganization in the artillery and cavalry corps, raised the authorized level of the army to 62,500.[41] In accordance with a recommendation from the administration, Congress also adopted a law to secure the obedience of recalcitrant militia. The new law gave military courts broad authority to try delinquent militia in absentia and to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses.[42]

Robert Wright wanted to give military courts authority to try civilian spies as well. He argued that it was impossible to secure a conviction for treason in civilian courts because the constitutional requirements were so strict.[43] Federalist Richard Stockton of New Jersey called Wright’s proposal “monstrous,” claiming that it would “subvert every principle of civil liberty.”[44] Most Republicans evidently agreed. Although Wright’s resolution was adopted, no bill on the subject was ever reported.[45]

Congress also passed a pair of laws to bolster American operations at sea. One measure appropriated $500,000 for the construction of a floating battery, which was actually a steam-powered frigate designed by Robert Fulton.[46] Federalists objected to so large an expenditure for an experimental project, but Republicans countered that the expense was justified because of the danger posed by British warships in American waters.[47]

Congress also quadrupled the $25 bounty that was paid for prisoners of war brought in by privateers.[48] Federalists considered the additional premium excessive, but once again Republicans argued that circumstances justified the expense.[49] The British had accumulated 2,000 more prisoners than the United States, and, according to an American official, they had “discontinued the system of releases on account.”[50] The object of the bill, said Congressman Alexander McKim, “was to get as many prisoners of war as we could, to balance accounts with the enemy, and enable us to redeem our fellow-citizens from captivity.”[51]

Financing the War

Congress had to make further provision not only for fighting the war but also for financing it. In January 1814, before surrendering the Treasury Department to Campbell, William Jones presented his budget for the coming year. He estimated that the government’s income would be only $16 million while its expenses would be $45.4 million. This meant that $29.4 million would have to be raised by loans and treasury notes. Since the cost of servicing the national debt was growing faster than tax revenue, the government was actually using money from new loans to pay the interest on old ones. This violated Gallatin’s original plan of war finance, and hence Jones recommended a new round of taxes.[52]

Having adopted a comprehensive system of internal duties only a few months earlier, congressional Republicans were in no mood for additional taxes. Instead, they authorized a $25 million loan and the issue of $10 million in treasury notes.[53] Federalists attacked these measures as unsound. Alexander Contee Hanson, who was still suffering from injuries sustained in the Baltimore riots but was now a member of Congress, called the Republican system of war finance “deceptive and disingenuous.” To float new loans to pay the interest on old ones, he said, was “to adopt a most desperate system of fiscal gambling.”[54]

Calhoun responded that the government had no choice but to borrow the money it needed. If the money were withheld, he said, “it must communicate a fatal shock to public credit.” The result, said the National Intelligencer, would be “the bankruptcy of the Treasury; confusion and anarchy at home; and . . . an ignominious submission to whatever terms the arrogance of the enemy might dictate!”[55]

A National Bank Debated

Although irked by Federalist opposition, most Republicans recognized that the government’s financial position was precarious. To shore up this position, many Republicans favored a national bank. Pro-bank Republicans had been unable to save the first national bank when its charter had expired in 1811 even though they had the unanimous support of the Federalists.[56] But now, as a measure of war finance, a national bank had greater appeal. In December 1813 a group of businessmen in New York City urged Congress to establish a bank. “Among the most obvious and important advantages which the Government would acquire,” they said, “would be the means of borrowing . . . money for the public service.”[57]

The House Ways and Means Committee agreed. On February 19, 1814, John W. Taylor of New York reported a bill from committee for creating a national bank in Washington, D.C. The bank would have no branches and thus would not compete with or exert any influence over state banks. The bill set the bank’s capital stock at $30 million and required the bank to lend the government $6 million to buy bank stock plus an additional $15 million to finance the war. The whole scheme was little more than an attempt to float paper money in the guise of bank notes. Many Republicans doubted the wisdom of the plan. Some preferred to rely on treasury notes, while others insisted that additional revenue was unnecessary. The proposal was finally killed by a rash of armistice rumors that swept through the country in April.[58]

On the Brink of Bankruptcy

The fears voiced for the nation’s financial health were nonetheless well founded. Although some Federalists had quietly subscribed to the war loans in 1812 and 1813, most Federalist bankers, who controlled the bulk of the nation’s liquid capital, had remained aloof.[59] The British offer to open peace talks, however, had generated considerable optimism in 1814, and some bankers wanted to take part in the new loan, especially since it was likely to be offered on favorable terms.[60]

Federalist bankers from Boston and Philadelphia met in April to work out a common policy. They agreed to subscribe to the loan but only if the administration dropped its demand for an end to impressment. When the administration refused to budge, the bankers withheld their support.[61] Some New England Federalists did not approve of subscribing to the loan under any circumstances. “As to Federalists who loan their money,” said Timothy Pickering, “I know not any punishment they do not deserve.”[62]

Although representatives of the government ran newspaper ads in Boston offering to keep the names of subscribers secret, the loan of 1814 failed.[63] When the Treasury put up $10 million in May, it received subscriptions for $9.8 million, but the principal subscriber was Jacob Barker of New York, who took $5 million. Federalists scoffed at Barker’s ability to raise so much capital, and even Republicans were skeptical.[64] Eventually he defaulted on $1.5 million of his contract. Since other subscribers defaulted on $400,000, the government realized only $7.9 million from the loan. Moreover, it had to accept $88 in cash for every $100 in bonds issued and guarantee to increase the discount if future subscribers received a better deal.[65]

Two months later, the administration put up another $6 million of the loan, but subscribers would take only $2.9 million even at $80 a share, which was a 20 percent discount. Since the loan was offered at 6 percent for thirteen years, this means the effective rate was just over 8.6 percent. The administration had to accept this offer out of sheer necessity, but because of defaults, the total amount realized was only $2.5 million. Moreover, the Treasury had to issue additional bonds to the subscribers of the May loan so that they would receive the same discount. In all, the government issued $4 million in bonds to raise $2.5 million in cash.[66] All of this suggested that public credit was sinking and that the government teetered on the brink of bankruptcy.

Trade with the Enemy

With the nation’s military prospects dimming and public credit in decline, the administration looked for other ways to pressure the enemy. The president had lost none of his faith in commercial sanctions, and this was the only major weapon still left in the nation’s arsenal. Madison was also determined to stamp out trade with the enemy, which flourished all along the common border in the north and on the maritime frontier in the east and south, “We have been feeding and supplying the enemy,” complained a Republican newspaper, “both on our coast and in Canada, ever since the war began.”[67]

Most of this traffic was carried on with Canada. Extensive trade along the Canadian-American border was well established before 1812 despite the non-importation law, and the war did little to halt it.[68] Indeed, one of the reasons the British left New England unblockaded was to facilitate this trade. At the beginning of the war, British officials in Canada explicitly authorized the export of all goods to the United States (war material and specie excepted) and ordered British subjects in the Maritime provinces not to molest the goods or vessels of American citizens “so long as they shall abstain, on their parts, from any Acts of Hostility.”[69] Americans living near the frontier were happy to accept this modus vivendi. Anxious to acquire British textiles, plaster of paris, pottery, salt, and sugar products, they freely offered provisions and naval stores in return.[70]

Much of the trade with Canada was carried on by sea, and as long as it was conducted in neutral vessels, it did not violate American law. Neutral ships ferried particularly large quantities of American food from Massachusetts (which then included Maine) to the Maritime provinces. “Since I have been here (about 15 days),” wrote an American from Halifax in late 1812, “upwards of 20,000 barrels of flour have been brought in by vessels under Swedish and Spanish colors—most of the shipments are from Boston.”[71]

The bulk of the seaborne trade, however, was conducted in American vessels—a clear violation of the enemy trade act. Coasting vessels, which did not have to enter or clear from a customshouse, traded directly with Nova Scotia and New Brunswick or rendezvoused with neutral vessels at sea. Islands were often used as “drops” for the exchange of goods, and collusive captures were common.[72] In one notorious case, the tiny privateer Washington “captured” two heavily laden ships from Halifax worth more than $100,000. Although customs officials seized the prizes, the Supreme Court later restored them to their captors. Justice William Johnson conceded “that the voyage of these vessels was loaded with infamy,” but “the evidence is not sufficient to fasten on the captors a participation in the fraud.”[73]

American merchants commonly ransomed captured vessels for 5 or 10 percent of their value. “A brisk business is now carrying on all along our coast,” said the Boston Centinel in 1813, “between the British cruizers and our coasting vessels, in ready money.”[74] Although this practice was sanctioned by the American government, it was sometimes a cover for illegal trade. Moreover, British merchants who wished to ship their merchandise directly to the United States could usually secure neutral papers from obliging Swedish officials at St. Barthelemy in the Caribbean. Although the United States denounced this practice, the Swedish government was slow to curtail it.[75] In the meantime, some customs officials hired experts to distinguish between British and non-British goods. In practice, however, it was almost impossible to determine the source of any product unless those perpetrating the fraud slipped up. In one case, customs officials in Boston confiscated a $130,000 shipment because thread pulled out of the woolens had left a visible impression of the word London.[76]

There was also a great deal of overland trade between Canada and the United States. Merchants in the interior often used inland waterways, such as Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River, or Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River. Some merchants outfitted privateers on these waters and made dummy captures of goods purchased by their agents in Montreal. Others informed on themselves (which entitled them to a third of the proceeds) and then used various legal maneuvers to secure additional relief.[77]

Nor was the illicit trade confined to the northern frontier. Amelia Island, a Spanish possession at the mouth of St. Marys River in Florida, was the principal outlet for southern produce and the main source of British goods for people living in the South. Shortly before the war, Gallatin received reports “that British goods to an immense amount have been imported into Amelia Island, with the view of smuggling the same into the United States.”[78] There were also reports of illegal slave imports from the Spanish island.[79]

Lake Barataria, with its ready access to the sea, was the funnel through which illegal goods flowed into Louisiana. The Baratarian pirates had established a settlement on Grand Terre Island in Barataria Bay in southern Louisiana. Although technically privateersmen sailing under commissions issued by France or Cartagena (a city state in present-day Colombia), the pirates preyed indiscriminately on commerce in the Gulf of Mexico and smuggled their booty into New Orleans.[80] “Our whole coast Westwardly of the Balize,” reported a naval officer in 1812, “is at this moment, infested with pirates and smugglers.”[81]

Most merchants in New Orleans had no qualms about buying smuggled goods because the profits were so high. “Smuggling is carried on to a great degree,” reported an observer; “fortunes have been made in a few Months.”[82] The smugglers operated openly, and according to one official, they “even dared to rescue property which had been Seized by the Officers of the Customs.”[83] In one case, a customs official was killed and two others were wounded in an armed clash with smugglers.[84]

The collector at New Orleans repeatedly asked for military assistance, but Brigadier General James Wilkinson (who may have profited from the trade) was unwilling to cooperate.[85] Nor could the navy help. “The force heretofore under my command,” said the ranking officer on the station, “had been rendered by decay, altogether inadequate to the protection of the coast, and the support of the revenue laws, even in a time of peace.”[86] The administration promised assistance but insisted that the real problem was local complicity. “I will not dissemble,” William Jones told the New Orleans collector in 1813, “that whilst the inhabitants of Louisiana continue to countenance this illegal commerce and the Courts of justice forbear to enforce the laws against the offenders, little or no benefit can be expected to result from the best concerted measures.”[87]

Growing Enforcement Problems

The experience of customs agents in New Orleans typified that of most border officials during the war. Even before the war, collectors on the northern frontier had complained of the difficulty of enforcing the non-importation law. “Large combinations,” wrote the Sackets Harbor collector in early 1812, “appear to be forming to render the Non-importation law, unpopular and intimidate those who will assist in inforcing the law. The public houses in this quarter are kept by violent partisans in their interest. Every friend to the law is misused at them; by a gang of villains kept for that purpose.”[88] The wartime expansion of the restrictive system did not make enforcement any easier. After Vermont repealed a law against trading with Canada, the customs collector there claimed that illegal trade was conducted “in a public and open manner.”[89]

Widespread complicity rendered government officials helpless. Before meeting his death in the Battle of York, Colonel Zebulon M. Pike sought to prosecute smugglers near Plattsburgh, but no court would take cognizance because even the judges had a hand in the trade.[90] In Eastport, Maine, a volunteer army officer reported that some 200 merchants were engaged in trade with the enemy and that eighty-six British subjects were present to facilitate the trade. When the officer tried to suppress the traffic, he was threatened with tar and feathers and eventually jailed for fictitious debts.[91] Other army officers later assigned to the station profited from his example by looking the other way. According to an anonymous correspondent of the War Department, they showed a “blind indifference and almost total disregard . . . to the prosecution of an illicit trade.”[92] Government officials were also stymied in Provincetown, Massachusetts, on the tip of Cape Cod. Local merchants, said a customs official, were so deeply involved in illegal trade that “his Inspecters dare not now attempt to search Stores or Houses there, for smuggled Goods, as the mass of the population are interested in their concealment, and so far from giving assistance, threaten such opposition as renders the attempt . . . futile.”[93]

Nor were government officials able to keep provisions from British fleets in American waters. “The fact is notorious,” declared the Lexington Reporter, “that the very squadrons of the enemy now annoying our coast . . . derive their supplies from the very country which is the theatre of their atrocities.”[94] Although royal officials sometimes threatened coastal towns with destruction if their needs were not met, the use of force was rarely necessary. Admiralty procurers paid for provisions in cash, and there was no shortage of volunteers to supply their needs. Chesapeake Bay, Long Island Sound, and Vineyard Sound teemed with tiny coasters ferrying supplies to the British ships stationed there. Some sixty vessels were reportedly engaged in this traffic in Long Island Sound alone.[95] Although most trade with the Royal Navy was clandestine, the harbor at Provincetown, Massachusetts, was openly used by British warships seeking provisions or refuge from winter storms. According to one report, small coasters and fishing vessels regularly carried “Fresh Beef, vegitables, and in fact all Kind of supplies” to these ships.[96]

The trade with the enemy knew no political or social barriers. Although Republicans blamed the traffic on Federalists, members of both parties were implicated. Republican John Jacob Astor used various ruses to import furs from Canada, and while cruising in the Rossie Joshua Barney stopped a ship owned by Maine Republican William King that was carrying a fraudulent manifest and British goods.[97] Barney let the ship go, fearing that “such a seizure at this time would be made a handle by the enemies of the administration.”[98] Another Republican, Jacob Gibson of Maryland, was described as a “flaming democrat and war-man,” but because of his friendship with Royal Navy officials, he was allowed to export produce to the mainland from his island in the Chesapeake.[99] Local Republicans freely admitted that if Gibson had been a Federalist “he would have been tarred and feathered and his house pulled down.”[100]

New Trade Restrictions

Such was the extent of this illegal trade and such was the administration’s faith in economic coercion that Madison decided in late 1813 to seek a broad range of new restrictions. The government hoped not only to stamp out trade with the enemy but also to increase the economic pressure on Britain. In a confidential message sent to Congress on December 9, the president said: “To shorten, as much as possible, the duration of the war, it is indispensable that the enemy should feel all the pressure that can be given to it.” Toward this end, the president recommended four new restrictions: (1) an embargo prohibiting all American ships and goods from leaving port; (2) a complete ban on the importation of certain commodities customarily produced in the British Empire, such as woolen and cotton goods and rum; (3) a ban against foreign ships trading in American ports unless the master, supercargo, and at least three-quarters of the crew were citizens or subjects of the flag flown by the ship; and (4) a ban on ransoming ships. Together these measures were designed to halt the flow of supplies to British armies in Canada and Europe and British ships in American waters, tighten the non-importation system, prevent the British from fraudulently using neutral flags, and put an end to the use of ransoming as a cover for illegal trade.[101]

Congress had rejected the president’s recommendation for an embargo the previous summer but was more compliant this time. The Senate, which had killed so many other restrictive proposals, was now willing to follow the administration’s lead, in part because of the exigencies of war. In addition, public pressure had been exerted on three senators who had opposed the embargo in the previous session. “Messrs Giles, and Stone and Anderson,” said the National Intelligencer, “have thought better of their votes, and will now yield their suffrages in favor of the measure.”[102]

Federalists fought a spirited but futile rearguard action against the embargo, offering a host of amendments to ameliorate its impact and outlining its likely effects on commerce, agriculture, and government revenue.[103] Zebulon Shipherd called the measure “an engine of tyranny, an engine of oppression,” and the Maryland House of Delegates later compared it to one of the Coercive Acts adopted by Britain in 1774. “The bitter tribulation of the Boston port bill,” said the delegates, “is again to be realized on an infinitely more extended scale.”[104]

The Republicans met these attacks with a stony silence. “The duty of the friends to the embargo,” said the National Intelligencer, “was to act, not to speak.”[105] Thus only eight days after submitting his request to Congress, Madison signed the embargo into law.[106] One of the reasons that Congress acted so quickly was that news of the measure had leaked to the press. According to one Federalist, congressional action on the proposal was “the subject of newspaper paragraphs” and was “as well known in the principal cities of the Union as in this Hall.”[107]

Modeled after the enforcement act of 1809, the embargo of 1813 was more sweeping than any previous restriction. All ships were embargoed in port and the export of all goods and produce prohibited. The coasting trade was outlawed except in bays, rivers, sounds, and lakes, and fishing vessels could venture to sea only after posting heavy bonds. Government officials were given broad powers to enforce the law, and the penalties for violation were heavy.[108]

The embargo proved too sweeping even for its supporters. A week after the measure became law, Treasury Secretary Jones sent a circular to all customs officials interpreting a section of the law that appeared to sanction seizures on the vaguest of suspicions. Jones instructed collectors to impound goods only if circumstances clearly indicated that a violation was intended.[109] Congress also had to pass legislation to ameliorate the harshest effects of the measure. Nantucket, an island thirty miles off the coast of Massachusetts, was given special permission to import food and fuel, and coasting vessels trapped away from home were allowed to return.[110]

The embargo could not halt all trade, but according to the customs collector at Boston, the only loophole was a clause that allowed privateers to sail. After leaving port, these vessels sometimes discharged their crews and sold their provisions abroad.[111] Federalist fishermen in Boston complained that their Republican counterparts in Marblehead were permitted to go to sea while they were not, but in general the measure was fairly enforced.[112] The main problem, as Federalists pointed out, was that it further undermined American prosperity and cut into government revenue. It punished the entire nation, said one Federalist, “because of a few sinners.”[113]

Repeal of the Restrictive System

Even though the president finally got the embargo he wanted, Congress was unresponsive to his request for other restrictions. Most Republicans were reluctant to go as far as the president, even in time of war. Moreover, the same truce ship that brought news of Britain’s peace initiative at the end of December also brought reports of Napoleon’s defeat at Leipzig. This battle shattered the Continental System and opened all of northern Europe to British trade.[114] As a result, the restrictive system as a coercive instrument lost much of its effectiveness. Although bills were introduced to tighten the non-importation system and outlaw the ransoming of ships, these proposals failed to become law.[115]

Besides killing the prospects for additional restrictions, the news from Europe also led to a clamor for the repeal of the embargo and non-importation law. Federalists made several attempts to repeal these laws, and Republicans, looking for ways to generate badly needed revenue, lent a sympathetic ear.[116] Even Robert Wright, a pro-embargo Republican, wondered if it might not be wise to sheathe “the two-edged sword, the embargo . . . during the [peace] negotiation.”[117] Madison himself eventually came around to this view, and on March 31, 1814—less than four months after recommending the new restrictions—he asked Congress to repeal both the embargo and non-importation act. Goods that were owned by the enemy, he said, should still be barred from the United States. The export of specie should also be banned to prevent an unfavorable balance of trade from draining the nation’s banks.[118]

Madison’s change of heart stunned nearly everyone. “The shock produced by this political earthquake,” said a Republican newspaper, “is tremendous.”[119] The president’s about-face was greeted with “utter astonishment” in Washington and caused a particular sensation among the most devoted restrictionists, some of whom were said to be “pretty warm . . . and a little violent.”[120] According to one observer, there was “much pouting and no small degree of execration . . . among [the president’s] zealous supporters, some of whom, I am told, will oppose the Bill with bitterness in the House, as they certainly do out of it.”[121] Most Republicans, however, were willing to follow the president’s lead. “In the present state of Europe,” said Niles’ Register, “it is pretty generally agreed that the embargo ought to be raised.”[122] With victory at hand, longtime opponents of the restrictive system found it difficult to contain their joy. “I have not for a long time seen the feds look in as so good humor,” commented Nathaniel Macon; “they have all a smile on their countenance.”[123]

A bill repealing the embargo and non-importation law passed both houses by large majorities.[124] In fact, the mood of Congress had swung so much against restrictions that another bill to outlaw the export of specie failed to win a majority in either house.[125] John C. Calhoun doubted whether even “the most strenuous efforts of our customhouse officers” could halt the export of specie, and a Federalist said “you might as rationally . . . prevent the ebb and flow of the tide.”[126] With the repeal of the embargo and non-importation act and the defeat of the ban on specie exports, Americans were now barred only from trading directly with the enemy, importing enemy-owned goods, or using enemy licenses.

Enemy Aliens

Schemes to raise men and money and restrict trade with the enemy consumed much of the administration’s time during the war, but other war-related issues demanded attention, too. Among these was the regulation of enemy aliens.[127] More than 10,000 British subjects lived in the United States during the war, mainly in New York and Pennsylvania.[128] Most were permanent residents who for one reason or another had never taken out citizenship papers. Although few posed any real threat, all were enemy aliens, and the government had to devise regulations to ensure that they provided no aid or information to the British.

The basic legislation governing American policy was the alien enemies act of 1798, which was still in force in 1812. This law gave the government broad powers over enemy aliens but also decreed that they be accorded a “reasonable time” to depart from the United States with their property.[129] Shortly after the declaration of war, Congress fixed the grace period at six months.[130] At the same time, the State Department ordered all enemy aliens who remained in the country to register with United States marshals.[131]

Initially, government officials treated British subjects with indulgence, stretching the letter of the law to avoid hardship. The State Department freely granted passports for the removal of property long after the grace period had expired, and many aliens—known and trusted in their communities—did not bother to register.[132] Although the government in early 1813 ordered enemy aliens to move to a place (chosen by the local marshal) that was at least forty miles from the tidewater, all except merchants could secure permission from the marshal to remain, and even merchants could seek an exemption from the State Department.[133] Such were the indulgences granted by the government that in May 1813 Monroe told a British official that enemy aliens enjoyed “almost equal rights with American Citizens.”[134]

By this time, however, the administration had already begun to adopt tougher policies. In February 1813 the government prohibited enemy aliens from traveling without a passport secured from a marshal or customs collector.[135] The following July, in response to British depredations in the Chesapeake, the State Department stopped granting passports for the removal of British property. “The conduct of Great Britain,” Monroe said, “has not been such as to authorise a relaxation of the rules.”[136] Then in November, John Mason, who had been put in charge of enemy aliens (as well as British prisoners of war) adopted tougher rules to prevent British subjects who had moved to the interior from visiting the enemy. “The lenity shown Enemy Aliens,” he complained, “has been frequently abused.” To avoid future abuses, Mason ordered all British subjects living beyond the tidewater to sign “a parole of honor” not to travel more than five miles from their assigned place or to correspond with the enemy.[137] This completed the government’s code of regulations, which even with the recent additions remained comparatively lenient.

Prisoners of War

The administration also had to establish rules to regulate the treatment of prisoners of war, and this proved more vexing.[138] Although there was no international agreement on the subject, warfare in this era was carefully limited and highly professional, and each nation professed to favor humane treatment. The precedents, however, were vague, and prisoners on both sides complained of crowded, cold, and dirty housing, foul rations, and physical abuse.[139]

Since officers were considered gentlemen, they received special treatment. Most were given the freedom of a town or larger area, and some were sent home on an extended parole if they pledged to refrain from fighting until officially exchanged. Militia were often sent home, too, because they were considered part-time soldiers. Enlisted men, on the other hand, were confined until they were actually exchanged. The United States favored the use of state penitentiaries located near (but not too near) the northern frontier, particularly in Massachusetts and Kentucky. Great Britain, on the other hand, utilized a host of prison ships and several jails, the most important of which were on Melville Island in Halifax and at Dartmoor in England.[140]

In theory men taken at sea were treated like those captured on land, but in practice the British handled them differently. Some 2,200 Americans who were in the Royal Navy when war broke out refused to fight against their country. They were confined as prisoners of war but were not deemed eligible for release or exchange until their citizenship was proven. Once their citizenship was established, those who had been impressed into British service were released, while those who had volunteered (or had been impressed and then accepted the royal bounty) were exchanged. Because communication was slow and documentation that satisfied the British was hard to find, most of these men languished in prison for the duration of the war.[141] The United States, by contrast, discharged all British seamen who claimed to be deserters from the Royal Navy.[142] Much to the dismay of the Navy Department, however, Captain David Porter allowed his men to tar and feather a British subject who was discharged from his ship at the beginning of the war.[143]

The British housed American captives in prisons at Halifax and Dartmoor as well as in old hulks that had been converted into prison ships. The prisons were usually dark and dank, but the prison ships were worse, providing an especially fertile breeding ground for disease. The prison ship Saratoga, which was anchored at Dartmouth, was the home of eighty Americans in 1814. (United States Military Magazine, May, 1841)

In order to discourage privateering, the British refused to parole or exchange anyone from a privateer that mounted fewer than 14 guns. In addition, royal officials held some mariners trapped in the British Isles in 1812 as prisoners of war and sought to make prison life hard on all maritime prisoners in the hope of inducing them to enlist in the Royal Navy. Great Britain also insisted that British prisoners who were put on a neutral vessel at sea or dropped at a neutral port by American privateers were not on parole. These men, the British claimed, had been released outright and were not subject to exchange. The British objective was to force American privateers to keep their prisoners until they returned to the United States, an inconvenience that was likely to interfere with normal cruising.[144]

To regularize the treatment and exchange of prisoners, the two warring nations negotiated a series of conventions. The first was signed in Halifax on November 28, 1812.[145] American officials were unhappy with this agreement and refused to ratify it. Hence a new one was signed on May 12, 1813. The second convention bound both nations to treat prisoners “with humanity, conformable to the usage and practice of the most civilized nations during war.” It prohibited corporal punishment, fixed the daily ration, defined the terms of parole, authorized the use of cartel ships for exchanges, and set the places where exchanged prisoners were to be delivered. The convention also established the rates of exchange. (A rear admiral or major general was worth thirty privates; a petty officer or noncommissioned officer was worth two).[146]

This agreement was never ratified by Great Britain. Besides mandating a more varied and generous ration than British officials favored, the convention provided for paroling maritime prisoners at sea. Nevertheless officials of both countries in the New World generally adhered to the terms of the agreement. Only in 1814, after learning that American prisoners in Halifax, Jamaica, and Barbados had been put on a smaller ration, did American officials reduce the ration of British prisoners in the United States.[147]

Both sides adopted liberal parole policies in 1812, but this changed when a bitter controversy erupted over the treatment of prisoners of doubtful nationality.[148] As a result of the Battle of Queenston Heights, the British had captured a large number of American soldiers, including twenty-three—mostly Irishmen—who had been born in the British Isles. Although some of these men were naturalized American citizens and others had lived in the United States for many years, royal officials considered them all British subjects. The twenty-three were therefore clamped into irons and shipped to England to be tried for treason. The men reportedly offered to atone for their “treason” by taking up arms against the United States, but this did not appease British officials.[149]

Winfield Scott, who was himself captured at Queenston Heights, protested British actions but to no avail. When Scott was later paroled, he went to Washington to inform American officials of the problem.[150] The president secured authority from Congress to retaliate and then ordered twenty-three British soldiers put in close confinement as hostages for the safety of the Americans.[151] Sir George Prevost, governor-general of Canada, responded by confining forty-six American officers and noncommissioned officers and threatened to put two Americans to death for every British soldier executed. Prevost also threatened “to prosecute the war with unmitigated severity” if any of the British prisoners were harmed.[152] American officials responded by confining British officers in American hands, which prompted the British to confine the remaining American officers they held. Thus by early 1814, all the officers held by either side in the New World were in close confinement with the threat of retaliatory execution hanging over their heads.[153]

For Winfield Scott (1786–1866), the War of 1812 was a launching pad for a military career that spanned nearly half a century. Scott did a superb job training his men for the campaign on the Niagara front in 1814, and he developed a reputation for being a fearless, even reckless, battlefield commander. Scott achieved greater fame in the Mexican War and closed out his career advising President Abraham Lincoln in the Civil War. This daguerreotype from later in his career celebrates his participation in the Battle of Lundy’s Lane, which was sometimes called the Battle of Niagara. (Robert Tomes, Battles of America by Land and Sea)

British officials were livid over the threat of American retaliation, and most English newspapers followed their lead. “If Mr. Madison dare to retaliate by taking away the life of one English prisoner,” warned the London Courier, “America puts herself out of the protection of the law of nations, and must be treated as an outlaw. An army and navy acting against her will then be absolved from all obligation to respect the usages and laws of war.” The confinement of the British officers, added the Times, was “a wanton and barbarous act of cruelty.” Any violence against them would “justify severe retaliation.”[154]

Some Federalists agreed with the British. The Maryland House of Delegates protested against the “system of sanguinary retaliation” which jeopardized American prisoners to protect “British traitors.” Gouverneur Morris went further. “If the horrible project of murdering our prisoners because the enemy executes her traitorous subjects in our service be carried into effect,” he said, “we shall soon be divested of everything which can check the savage temper of barbarous nations.”[155]

In Worcester, Massachusetts, Federalists complained that British officers were confined under intolerable conditions in the local jail. “We have never witnessed a more powerful excitement of the tender sympathies of the friends of peace,” commented a Republican paper, “than by the cruel duress imposed upon these ‘unfortunate captives’!”[156] When the sheriff failed to search visitors to the jail, someone (presumably a Federalist) gave a pistol to the incarcerated officers, and nine of them escaped. Five were recaptured, but the others made their way to Canada. The state of Massachusetts subsequently prohibited the use of its jails for this purpose.[157]

The question of retaliation raised the whole issue of allegiance, much as the subject of impressment did. Langdon Cheves took a broad view of the matter and probably spoke for most Americans. “The right of retaliation,” he said, “does not depend on questions of allegiance, naturalization, or expatriation, but on the laws and usages of civilized war.” These laws “concede to belligerent sovereigns the right of protecting by retaliation, if necessary, not only their naturalized subjects, but all those who fight under their banners.”[158]

Ultimately, good sense prevailed on both sides, and none of the prisoners were harmed. The United States authorized Brigadier General William Winder, who was captured by the British at Stoney Creek and later paroled, to negotiate an exchange of all confined prisoners. But Winder, who was sympathetic to the British position and eager to escape close confinement, signed an agreement on April 15, 1814, that excluded the original twenty-three sent to England and the first round of hostages held by each side. Although American officials refused to ratify the agreement, the British had already released their hostages.[159] Later, American officials learned that the original twenty-three prisoners were being treated no differently from other American prisoners in Great Britain. Hence on July 16, 1814, they signed a new convention that confirmed the terms of the April agreement and provided for the exchange of all remaining hostages. The original twenty-three remained in British hands until after the war, when all but two (who had died of natural causes) were returned to the United States.[160]

There were other incidents like this one. On numerous occasions the British learned that men captured in battle or taken from American warships or privateers had been born in the British Isles. Royal officials often threatened to try these men for treason, but in each case the prospect of American retaliation forced them to relent. Thus no one fighting on America’s side during the war was actually prosecuted by the enemy for treason.[161]

The Administration’s Record

All in all, President Madison had reason to be satisfied with his accomplishments in the winter of 1813–14. Besides facing down the British on the prisoner of war issue, the administration got most of what it wanted from Congress. By the time it adjourned on April 18—almost four and a half months after convening—Congress had Increased the army enlistment bounty, provided for the extension of short-term enlistments, strengthened the hand of military courts to discipline militia, appropriated money for a steam frigate, raised the bounty for prisoners of war, and authorized a new loan and a new issue of treasury notes. Moreover, in sharp contrast to the previous session, the Senate had confirmed all of the president’s appointments, and the House had been far less indulgent of Federalist opposition. On several occasions House Republicans had responded to Federalist arguments with silence or had used the previous question to cut off debate.[162] All of this suggested that the Republicans were at last closing ranks.

The administration failed to get its way on only three issues. Most of the president’s requests for additional trade restrictions were ignored. So too was a recommendation that French warships and privateers be explicitly authorized to use American ports.[163] The president hoped to ensure continued access to French ports for American privateers, but Congressional Republicans (fearing the cry of French influence) buried this proposal in committee.[164] The president also asked Congress to retain the double duties on imports beyond the end of the war in order to protect American manufactures.[165] No action was taken on this proposal because neither Republicans nor Federalists were ready for such overt protectionism. Even Daniel Webster, the great champion of protection in later years, declared that he was in no hurry “to see Sheffields and Birminghams in America.”[166]

These setbacks for the administration were minor. Far more ominous were the growing difficulties that the government faced in prosecuting the war. Public credit was declining, trade with the enemy continued, and the tide of the conflict appeared to be turning against the nation. Moreover, developments in Europe had stripped the nation of its last great weapon. Commercial sanctions had been at the heart of Republican foreign policy ever since 1806, but the collapse of French power on the Continent had rendered them useless. When the embargo was repealed, Daniel Webster had expressed hope that “the immense losses and sufferings which the people of the United States have endured, uselessly endured, under the operations of the restrictive system, will insure a long abhorrence of its memory.”[167] Webster got his wish. The embargo of 1813 was the nation’s last great trade restriction. Never again would the United States cut off all its trade to achieve a foreign policy objective.

Chapter 8

The British Counteroffensive

By the time the campaign of 1814 opened, the initiative in the war had shifted to the British. The Battle of Leipzig the previous October had forced Napoleon to retreat to France with the Allies in pursuit. At the same time, a British army under the Duke of Wellington had shattered French power in Spain and invaded France from the south. On March 31, 1814, the Allies entered Paris—the only time that Russian troops have ever occupied the French capital. On April 11 Napoleon abdicated unconditionally and shortly thereafter was exiled to the Mediterranean island of Elba. For the first time in more than a decade, Europe was at peace.[1]

Federalists celebrated the defeat of the Antichrist, and some Republicans joined them.[2] “I rejoice with you,” Jefferson told a friend, “in the downfall of Bonaparte. This scourge of the world has occasioned the deaths of at least ten millions of human beings.”[3] Federalists assumed that Napoleon’s defeat would pave the way for peace with England, but Republicans were skeptical.[4] The United States was now alone in the field against Great Britain, and most Republicans expected the British to be vindictive. “We should have to fight hereafter,” said Joseph H. Nicholson, “not for ‘free Trade and sailors rights,’ not for the Conquest of the Canadas, but for our national Existence.”[5] As the character of the war changed, so too did the nation’s motto. “Don’t give up the soil” replaced “Don’t give up the ship.”[6]

The Rival Armies

Ever since Leipzig, the British had been cautiously detaching veterans from Europe for service in America. After Napoleon’s exile, the trickle of troops to the New World turned into a torrent. By September 1814 some 13,000 veterans had reached Canada, bringing British troop strength there to 30,000. Additional men continued to arrive, so that by the end of the year there were close to 52,000 British troops in the American theater.[7] With the balance of power shifting in their favor, many British subjects wanted to punish the United States. “I have it much at heart,” declared Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, who had succeeded Sir John Borlase Warren as the naval commander on the Atlantic station, “to give [the Americans] a complete drubbing before Peace is made.” “Chastise the savages,” said the Times, “for such they are, in a much truer sense, than the followers of Tecumseh or the Prophet.”[8]

Fortunately for the United States, the American army was steadily improving with experience. Two years of campaigning had weeded out many incompetent officers, and Secretary of War John Armstrong, who was a fair judge of talent, continued to advance capable young men. “It was under the auspices of his administration,” a sympathetic Congressman later said, “that Wilkinson, Hampton, Lewis, and Boyd had to make room for Brown, Scott, Gaines, Ripley, and Macomb.”[9] Moreover, despite the large number of discharges in the winter of 1813–1814, the enhanced bounty attracted a host of new recruits and induced many veterans to reenlist.[10] As a result, by the spring of 1814, there were about 40,000 men in uniform—a third more than the year before. Enlistments continued to mount in the remaining months of the war, so that by early 1815 the army’s strength was close to 45,000.[11]

British and American Strategy

Because British officials still focused on European affairs, they did not develop a coherent plan for the American war in 1814 but instead developed their strategy piecemeal over time. They planned to reestablish their position in the West with a winter campaign against Detroit, but to supply their advancing army they needed frozen roads and rivers. Unseasonably warm weather in January forced them to cancel this campaign. This spared British settlements on the east bank of the Detroit River from the torch because the local American commander had ordered them burned if a British force threatened.[12] British plans further east called for extending their naval blockade to New England, using their naval power against targets on the Atlantic coast, and occupying territory in New York and Maine and on the Gulf Coast. The coastal campaigns were supposed to draw American troops from Canada (although they never did), and the occupation of territory was designed to improve Canadian security and enhance Britain’s bargaining power in the peace negotiations.[13]

The United States was forced on the defensive in 1814, but it remained strong where the British were weak. American command of Lake Erie, coupled with shorter and more secure supply lines, meant that Americans could remain aggressive in the West. They hoped to consolidate their power there by building new posts and retaking Mackinac. They also hoped to drive the British from the Niagara frontier. If these operations were successful, then British strongholds further east, most notably Kingston and Montreal, might be targeted.[14]

The Contest in the West Continues

The American campaign in the West went awry from the beginning. In May the governor of the Missouri Territory, William Clark (the famous explorer), drove a small Anglo-Indian force out of Prairie du Chien, which was strategically located near the confluence of the Wisconsin and Mississippi rivers. Clark built Fort Shelby there to serve as an American outpost and then returned to St. Louis. On July 17 a large Anglo-Indian force under Major William McKay arrived from Mackinac and attacked Fort Shelby. After two days of desultory fighting, McKay threatened to use hot shot against the post, and the outnumbered defenders surrendered. Prairie du Chien remained in British hands for the rest of the war.[15]

Americans were no more successful at Mackinac. To retake this post, the army and navy prepared for a joint operation in the summer of 1814. Captain Arthur Sinclair, who had succeeded Perry on Lake Erie, ferried 700 regulars and volunteer militia under Lieutenant Colonel George Croghan (the hero of Fort Stephenson) into Lake Huron. The squadron’s progress was slow because the ships had to be unloaded to get across the flats of Lake St. Clair, but once the armada got into Lake Huron, it picked up speed. Sailing north, the American force burned an abandoned British post on St. Joseph Island and confiscated or destroyed British property at Sault Ste. Marie. Sinclair reached Mackinac in late July.[16]

According to Sinclair, Mackinac was “a perfect Gibraltar, being high inaccessible Rock on every side except the West.”[17] Unable to elevate his naval guns enough to hit the British fortifications, Sinclair landed Croghan’s men on the western end of the island near a forest. But Lieutenant Colonel Robert McDouall, who was in charge of the defense of Mackinac, was waiting in the forest with some 450 regulars, militia, and Indians. In the ensuing battle on August 4, the Americans could not break through the British lines. Croghan, who never had much faith in the operation, became disillusioned when he lost several key officers and called off the attack. In the Battle of Mackinac Island, he lost about seventy-five men, the British and their Indian allies around a dozen.[18]

The British on Lake Huron

Sinclair next set sail for the Nottawasaga River on Georgian Bay in search of H.M. Schooner Nancy (3 guns), a converted merchantman that one contemporary described as “a beautiful and swift sailing vessel.”[19] This was the only British warship on the lake. Nancy’s commander, twenty-three-year-old Lieutenant Miller Worsley, sailed up the river (which ran parallel to the lakeshore) in the hope of evading detection, but on August 14 Sinclair’s men spotted the British ship from the lake and opened fire. The bombardment destroyed the Nancy and a nearby British blockhouse, although Worsley escaped into the wilderness with his walking wounded. Sinclair next sailed back to Lake Erie, leaving two schooners, the Tigress (1 gun) and the Scorpion (2 guns) to maintain American control of Lake Huron.[20]

Worsley, however, refused give up. Returning to the Nottawasaga River, he led his men in two bateaux and a canoe on harrowing trip of 380 miles across open water to Fort Mackinac. There he hatched a plan to capture the American schooners by surprise. With additional men supplied by McDouall, Worsley led four bateaux to the Tigress, and in the dark of night on September 3 fought his way onto the American vessel and seized control. Still flying American colors, the Tigress made contact with the Scorpion three days later, and Worlsey captured that vessel as well. In seventy-two hours, Worsley had given the British control of Lake Huron, which enabled them to resupply Fort Mackinac, provide food and trade goods to their Indian allies, and protect British fur traders. With their supply lines to Mackinac re-established, the British and their Indian allies had a secure base from which to launch raids into American territory.[21]

American Raids into Upper Canada

After the American victory in the Battle of the Thames in 1813, the British maintained no military presence in Western District and only a small one in the London District. This meant that the western part of Upper Canada was vulnerable to attack and had to rely heavily on militia for protection. In February 1814 Captain Andrew H. Holmes led a force of 180 regulars and militia from Detroit into the London District to target the small British outposts at Port Talbot and Delaware. When Holmes reached a forest known as Longwoods, he learned that a British force was marching to meet him, and he established a strong position on a hill on the west side of a steep ravine. On March 4 the British force, about 200 strong under the command of Captain Alexander Stewart, attacked, but the American position was so strong that the British got mauled, suffering almost seventy casualties compared to fewer than ten for the Americans. The Battle of Longwoods was a clear American victory that further eroded Britain’s position in the district.[22]

Making good use of Lake Erie as well as overland routes, American raiding parties repeatedly targeted the exposed districts. Some of the raiding parties were guided by renegade Canadians who belonged to the unit of Canadian Volunteers that had been organized by Joseph Willcocks after the fall of Fort George in 1813. On two occasions in 1814 Americans raided Port Talbot on the north shore of Lake Erie, and on a third Indians allied to the United States raided the village. Oxford was also raided several times.[23]

Dover or Dover Mills (now Port Dover) was the target of a larger raid in the spring of 1814. On May 14 Captain Sinclair ferried Colonel John B. Campbell and 700 troops to Dover. The following day Campbell marched into the village. Relying on information supplied by Canadian Volunteer Andrew Westbrook, Campbell claimed that Dover was inhabited by “revolutionary tories and halfpay officers,” some of whom had taken part in the burning of Buffalo the previous winter. Hence he ordered the town and nearby settlements put to the torch.[24] “A scene of destruction and plunder now ensued,” reported a Pennsylvania soldier, “which beggars all description. In a short time the houses, mills, and barns were all consumed.”[25] British officials were livid, and the mild reprimand that Campbell received from a court of inquiry did little to mollify them. Later that year they used Campbell’s lawlessness as a justification for plundering the Chesapeake.[26]

In the fall of 1814, the United States launched an extended raid from Detroit that reached 180 miles into Upper Canada. Brigadier General Duncan McArthur assembled an army of 720 mounted men that consisted mainly of volunteer militia from Ohio and Kentucky but also included fifty U.S. Rangers and seventy Indians. McArthur put the word out that he planned to attack Potawatomi Indians, but his real target was the economic resources of Upper Canada. Departing from Detroit on October 22, McArthur’s men moved quickly through the Thames River Valley, reaching Brant’s Ford on the Grand River on November 5. McArthur then turned south, defeated 400 militia on November 6 in a minor engagement known as the Battle of Malcolm’s Mills (near present-day Oakland), and returned home, reaching Detroit on November 17.

During the campaign McArthur’s men lived off the land and burned and plundered as they went. They took special aim at the many mills that were full of grain from the recent harvest. Although the mills were private property, they were legitimate military targets because they supplied the British army with food. The widespread plunder, however, was not justified by any military logic. McArthur blamed the excesses on his Indian allies, “whose customs in war impel them to plunder after victory.”[27] Since there was already a shortage of food in Upper Canada, the raid worked a hardship on soldiers and civilians alike. Governor George Prevost was livid over the destruction of so much private property and ordered Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond to seek out mills in American territory for retaliation, but the war ended before this order could be carried out.[28]

The Niagara Campaign Resumes

The heaviest fighting on the northern frontier took place further east, along the Niagara River. To prepare for this campaign, Brigadier General Winfield Scott drilled his brigade seven hours a day for ten weeks in early 1814 at his camp near Buffalo. Even the hard-nosed Scott was impressed with the results. “I have a handsome little army,” he said. “The men are healthy, sober, cheerful and docile.”[29] By the early summer the American army had swelled considerably with the arrival of additional regulars under Jacob Brown (who was now a major general and the senior officer on the front), New York and Pennsylvania militia under Brigadier General Peter B. Porter (who had been a War Hawk in the Twelfth Congress), fifty Canadian Volunteers under Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Willcocks, and some 500 Iroquois led by the aging Seneca chief Red Jacket. In all, Brown’s army consisted of 5,500 men.

On July 3 Brown led his army across the Niagara and besieged Fort Erie, which was defended by 140 men under Major Thomas Buck, who offered only token resistance before surrendering.[30] After taking control of the British post, Brown dispatched Scott with his brigade and several other units north along the river road and followed with his main force shortly thereafter. Preparing to meet them was Major General Phineas Riall, who had 4,000 men at his disposal. Riall’s force consisted of regulars, fencibles, and some 500–600 Indians. Most of the Indians were refugees from the West, but there was also a band of Grand River Iroquois headed by Mohawk leader John Norton.

To slow down the American advance, Riall dispatched a small force under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Pearson, who tore up the bridges and skirmished with the advancing army. On the night of July 4 the Americans made camp south of Street’s Creek (now Ussher’s Creek), while the British bedded down not far away just north of the Chippawa River. The next day there was more skirmishing, and that afternoon Brown sent Porter and a party of militia and Iroquois to clear British and Indian skirmishers from a nearby forest on the west. Although Porter’s men accomplished their mission, when they emerged from the woods at the Chippawa River, they ran into the right flank Riall’s army, which had just crossed the river. Overwhelmed, the militia and Iroquois fled back to the American camp.[31]

The Battle of Chippawa

Realizing that a major British force was headed his way, Brown ordered Scott to attack. The engagement that followed pitted some 2,000 Americans and Indians against an Anglo-Indian force of about equal strength. While an American artillery battery under Captain Nathan Towson pounded the British, Scott coolly maneuvered his men under heavy enemy artillery fire to take up a position along a farm lane. Scott’s men were outfitted in gray uniforms because of a shortage of blue cloth. Riall, who thought the uniforms signified militia, was stunned by the discipline he saw. “Why, these are regulars!” he reportedly exclaimed, thus contributing to an American legend.[32] The British advanced within musket range of Scott’s force, but Scott’s long hours of training again paid off, and the Redcoats got the worse of several volleys. When the British right sagged in the face of an American advance, Riall withdrew across the Chippawa and then took refuge in Fort George.

In the Battle of Chippawa, the Americans lost 325 killed, wounded, and missing, the British about 500. The engagement was an important benchmark for the U.S. Army because it marked the first time that an American force had defeated a British force of equal strength on an open battlefield. It also demonstrated the benefits of Scott’s rigorous training methods.[33] Scott later claimed that the cadets at West Point adopted gray uniforms to honor his brigade, but the cadets already wore gray because blue cloth was unavailable. Only later did the U.S. Military Academy embrace the notion that the color honored the American army for its performance on the Niagara in 1814.[34]

Brown next moved his army across the Chippawa River. He hoped that Chauncey would bring heavy guns and additional troops from Sackets Harbor and that the two commanders could undertake joint operations against the British.[35] But Chauncey was ill and, as usual, slow to commit his squadron to action. In addition, he resented Brown’s intimation that the navy was the army’s transport service. “The Secretary of the Navy,” he archly told Brown, “has honoured us with a higher destiny—we are intended to seek and to fight the enemys fleet—This is the great purpose of the Government in creating this Fleet and I shall not be diverted in my efforts to effectuate it, by any sinister attempt to render us either subordinate to or an appendage of the army.”[36]

Even without naval support, Brown was determined to engage the enemy, although he could not lure the British out of Fort George. In the meantime, petty warfare erupted in the region, which both sides found exasperating. On July 12, Brigadier General John Swift of the New York militia was mortally wounded by a British picket who the Americans thought had surrendered. A week later Lieutenant Colonel Isaac Stone marched a party of New York militia into the village of St. Davids. Egged on by Canadian Volunteers, Stone burned the village to the ground. Brown was furious and sent Stone home, but the damage had been done, and the British had further justification for their depredations in the Chesapeake.

The Battle of Lundy’s Lane

In late July Lieutenant General Drummond arrived at Fort George with British reinforcements. Determined to engage Brown’s army, he dispatched 1,600 men to take up a position on a hill at Lundy’s Lane. Brown responded by ordering Scott to attack. In the evening of July 25 the ever-aggressive Scott attacked the larger British force with about 1,200 men. Both sides were reinforced until about 3,000 men on each side were engaged, and both commanding generals were now present to direct operations. The confused and bloody battle raged into the night, drowning out the roar of nearby Niagara Falls.

Scott’s brigade was shredded by British artillery fire from the south slope of Lundy’s Lane before his men could get within musket range. To silence the British guns, Major General Brown asked Lieutenant Colonel James Miller to storm the British batteries. “I’ll try, Sir!” was Miller’s laconic reply.[37] Miller led his regiment to the British batteries and delivered a volley of musket fire at close range before overrunning the British guns with a bayonet charge. British veterans from the Napoleonic Wars claimed they had never seen such a determined charge. “The Americans charged to the very muzzles of our cannon,” said one observer, “and actually bayonetted the artillerymen who were at their guns.”[38] The British repeatedly counterattacked but could not retake the guns.

This dramatic illustration, which is often labeled “Miller at Chippawa,” actually depicts Colonel James Miller’s storming of British batteries at Lundy’s Lane. Although Miller was not on horseback and there was probably no one there dressed in buckskins, the picture captures the drama of the hand-to-hand combat that characterized this phase of the battle. (Robert Tomes, Battles of America by Land and Sea)

Hoping to break the main American line, Drummond three times ordered his men to attack but without success. By this time Scott had reorganized his brigade but took more casualties from friendly and enemy fire when he marched his men across the battle front. The battle finally ended when Brown ordered a withdrawal. By this time both sides had suffered so many casualties and were so exhausted that neither could mount another attack.

Colonel Miller called the six-hour Battle of Lundy’s Lane “one of the most desperately fought actions ever experienced in America,” which was no exaggeration.[39] This was the bloodiest battle of the war. Brown and Scott were wounded, the latter so seriously that he was knocked out of the war. Both of Britain’s senior officers, Riall and Drummond, were also wounded, and Riall was captured by an American detachment on the British flank. In all, the United States suffered 860 killed, wounded, or missing. Total British losses were about 880. The Americans suffered about twice as many deaths because British artillery fire was so deadly before darkness set in. Even though the United States had withdrawn from the field and failed to carry off the British guns, the Battle of Lundy’s Lane was a draw.[40]

The Battle of Fort Erie

After Lundy’s Lane, the Americans—now about 2,200 strong—withdrew to Fort Erie. The fort had been gradually strengthened, and now under the direction of two West Point engineers, William McRee and Eleazar Wood, it was further strengthened and greatly enlarged with earthworks to the south to accommodate all the American troops. On August 4 Brigadier General Edmund P. Gaines arrived to take command. Having learned from deserters that the British planned an assault, Gaines made sure his men were ready, and his vigilance paid off.[41]

Before assaulting the fort, Drummond first tried to deprive it of supplies. On August 3 he dispatched 600 men under the command of Lieutenant Colonel John Tucker across the Niagara River to destroy the supply depots at Buffalo and Black Rock. At Conjocta Creek, however, the British were ambushed by some 300 American riflemen under the command of Major Lodowick Morgan. Morgan had destroyed the bridge across the river, and the destructive fire of his riflemen prevented the British from fording. Complaining that his men “displayed an unpardonable degree of unsteadiness,” Tucker gave up the attack and returned to Canada.[42] The casualties on both sides in the Battle of Conjocta Creek were light, thirty-five for the British and ten for the Americans.[43]

Another operation launched by Drummond nine days later was more successful. On August 12 Captain Alexander Dobbs of the Royal Navy brought six small boats overland, slipped them into the Niagara River, and surprised two American schooners anchored off Fort Erie. As a result of this operation, the British captured the Somers (2 guns) and the Ohio (1 gun). The loss of these vessels made it more difficult for the United States to protect its supply lines and deprived Fort Erie of artillery support from the river.[44]

The following day the British began to pound Fort Erie with artillery fire. This was a prelude to a risky night attack that Drummond planned for the early morning hours of August 15. [45] A demonstration by Indians on the west side of the fort was supposed to draw attention while the fort was assaulted by 2,300 British troops from the north and south. But the native demonstration never materialized, and the Americans in the fort were ready for the attack. At 2:30 a.m. in a heavy rainstorm Lieutenant Colonel Victor Fischer moved against the southern end of the fort with 1,300 men. Fischer’s men were ordered to remove their flints in order to achieve surprise, but this made it difficult for them to respond when they reached the fort and were fired on. To compound their problems the British discovered that their ladders were too short to scale the fort’s breastworks. Intense small arms and artillery fire soon drove Fischer’s men off.

At the north end of the fort, the British launched a double-barreled assault at 3:00 a.m. Colonel Hercules Scott led 650 men, while Lieutenant Colonel William Drummond (General Drummond’s nephew) led another 300. Both commanding officers were killed, but the British penetrated a bastion, where they engaged in fierce hand-to-hand combat with the defenders for at least a half hour. Gaines and other Americans heard the British officers cry out to “give the Damned Yankee rascals no quarter.”[46] With the outcome still in doubt, a powder magazine accidentally exploded, blowing up virtually the entire British assault force and ending the battle. “The Explosion,” reported Gaines, “was tremendous—it was decisive.”[47] The British suffered 360 killed or wounded and almost 540 captured or missing. “Our loss has been very severe,” said Lieutenant General Drummond, “and I am sorry to add that almost all those returned ‘missing’ may be considered as wounded or killed by the explosion, and left in the hands of the enemy.”[48] Total American losses were only about eighty-five. As the lopsided casualty figures suggest, the Battle of Fort Erie was a clear American victory.[49]

In the month that followed, the opposing armies exchanged artillery fire and skirmished around the fort. In one skirmish, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Willcocks, the commander of the Canadian Volunteers, was killed, and in one of the British artillery barrages Gaines was seriously wounded. This forced Major General Brown to resume command even though he had not yet recovered from his Lundy’s Lane wounds. When the British began mounting an artillery battery less than 500 yards from the fort, Brown’s officers recommended that the post be abandoned. But the arrival of Brigadier General Peter Porter with 2,000 volunteer militia buoyed Brown’s spirits, and the “Fighting Quaker” determined to try to knock out the British batteries before ordering an evacuation. Brown’s plan was “to storm the batteries, destroy the cannon and roughly handle the brigade upon duty, before those in reserve could be brought into action.”[50]

This illustration of the defense of Fort Erie during the British night attack on August 15, 1814, was created in 1840 by one of the American participants. Lieutenant E. C. Watmough placed himself in the center of the picture between his fellow officer, Lieutenant Patrick McDonough, and one of the British commanders, Lieutenant Colonel William Drummond, who was killed in the assault. (United States Military Magazine, March, 1841)

Two assault forces were formed. One consisted of 1,200 men, mainly New York militia, under Porter; the other consisted of 800 regulars under Lieutenant Colonel James Miller. In a driving rainstorm in the middle of the night on September 17, the American troops surprised the British and after severe fighting overran two of their batteries and spiked the guns before heavy resistance forced them to retire. The engagement was costly to both sides, the Americans suffering 510 killed, wounded, and missing, the British 720.[51] An American officer later described this sortie as “the most Splendid achievement” of the campaign.[52] Major General Brown was particularly happy with the courage and discipline shown by the militia, who so often in the past had been a disappointment. “The Militia of New York,” he said, “have redeemed their character. They behaved gallantly.”[53]

Even before the sortie from Fort Erie had been launched, Drummond had decided to give up his siege and withdraw to the north side of the Chippawa River. His men were running low on food and ammunition, and there were not enough tents to go around. The endless rains that pelted the Niagara that summer left everyone wet, and Drummond feared that this would increase the danger of disease.[54]

The Battle of Cook’s Mills

In early October Major General George Izard arrived at Fort Erie with a large force of regulars from Plattsburgh. Izard had little combat experience but had seniority over Brown and thus assumed command of their combined force, more than 6,000 men. Izard marched his army north on the river road, rebuilding the bridges as he went until he reached the Chippawa River. Drummond was greatly outnumbered but had established his army in a strong position on the north bank of the river. Izard was unwilling to storm Drummond’s position and could not persuade the British to come out and fight a set-piece battle.[55]

Learning of a stockpile of grain at Cook’s Mills on Lyon’s Creek about twelve miles west of Drummond’s position, Izard ordered Brigadier General Daniel Bissell to take 900 men and seize or destroy the grain. To meet this challenge, Drummond dispatched 750 men under Colonel Christopher Myers. On October 19 the opposing forces clashed. Although Myers used a 6-pounder and Congreve rockets to good effect, Bissell launched a frontal attack and a flanking movement that drove the British from the field. He then destroyed the grain. In the Battle of Cook’s Mills (also known as the Battle of Lyon’s Creek), the Americans sustained about seventy-five casualties, the British thirty-five.[56]

The Battle of Cook’s Mills was the last in this series of bloody but indecisive engagements on the Niagara front in 1814. Because Fort Erie was difficult to supply, the Americans blew it up on November 5 and returned to New York.[57] The battles of Chippawa and Lundy’s Lane and the two engagements at Fort Erie contributed to the nation’s military tradition by demonstrating that American troops could hold their own against British regulars in close combat. But Brown’s invasion had nonetheless been blunted, and despite the carnage little of strategic importance had been accomplished. The British retained possession of the Niagara peninsula, and with the American army now in winter quarters, the front was quiet for the rest of the war.

The Contest for Lake Ontario

The British could do no better than hold their own on the Niagara front, but further east, closer to their supply lines, they could be more aggressive. In March 1813 London officials had put Commodore Yeo, a career naval officer, in charge of all British warships on the lakes, but the establishment had remained part of the army. This changed in May 1814 when the British transferred the entire establishment to the Admiralty and upgraded Yeo’s status from Senior Officer on the Lakes to Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty’s Ships and Vessels on the Lakes. This put the full resources of the Royal Navy behind the British presence on the lakes, although it also reduced Yeo’s willingness to cooperate with Governor Prevost.[58]

On Lake Ontario, Yeo and Chauncey remained cautious in 1814, unwilling to engage in combat without clear superiority. Instead, each hoped to achieve control by putting ever-larger ships into service. At the beginning of the campaign, Yeo launched the Prince Regent (58 guns) and the Princess Charlotte (40 guns). Chauncey countered with the Superior (58 guns) and the Mohawk (42 guns). Later in the year, the British launched the St. Lawrence (104 guns) and began construction on two additional ships-of-the-line, the Canada and the Wolfe. The United States countered by laying down two battleships of its own, the New Orleans and Chippewa, each of which was capable of mounting over 100 guns.

Because these shallow-draft ships were designed for service on the lake, they lacked the strength and stability of their oceangoing counterparts. In potential firepower, however, they were unsurpassed. The St. Lawrence, which carried a large number of powerful carronades, had more firepower than any other ship in the Royal Navy. Its broadside was 36 percent larger than the Victory, Lord Nelson’s flagship at Trafalgar (even though it, too, mounted 104 guns). Although the St. Lawrence was put into service in October, the war ended before the other four battleships were completed. Had the conflict lasted another year, five of the most powerful warships in the world would have been concentrated within thirty-five miles of one another at Kingston and Sackets Harbor on an inland lake with no access to the sea.[59]

Assault on Oswego

In the spring of 1814 Commodore Yeo took advantage of temporary superiority on the lake to mount an attack against Oswego, an important way station in the supply line from New York City to Sackets Harbor. Oswego was protected by a decaying fortification named Fort Ontario, which was stocked with a few decrepit guns. In early May Yeo ferried some 900 men under Lieutenant General Drummond to the American fort, which was defended by 300 regulars, mostly artillerymen, and 200 militia, all under Lieutenant Colonel George E. Mitchell. In their first attack on May 5, the British, led by Lieutenant Colonel Victor Fischer, were repulsed by artillery fire because contrary winds prevented Yeo from offering supporting fire. The following day, the British landing force got the naval support it needed and drove the Americans from the beach and then stormed the fort. The British suffered ninety casualties, the Americans half this number, although an additional twenty-five Americans were taken prisoner. The British destroyed the post and withdrew with whatever provisions and war material they could find. Fortunately for the United States, they missed a large cache of naval guns and rope intended for Sackets Harbor that had been stashed twelve miles above the fort at Oswego Falls (present-day Fulton, New York).[60]

The Battle of Sandy Creek

Another engagement ensued when a flotilla of boats under Master Commandant Melancthon Woolsey tried to ferry the naval guns and rope from Oswego to Sackets Harbor. With a powerful British squadron nearby, Woolsey began his voyage on the night of May 29, hugging the shoreline and taking refuge the next day in Sandy Creek about twenty miles from Sackets Harbor. To protect Woolsey’s valuable cargo, 130 riflemen under Major Daniel Appling served as an escort. Once in Sandy Creek, they were joined by 300 men (who brought along artillery) from Sackets Harbor and 120 Oneida Indians.

Captain Stephen Popham, who was on detached duty from the main British squadron, discovered Woolsey’s presence. Convinced that the American flotilla was undefended, Popham led a flotilla of gunboats carrying 200 British soldiers, seamen, and marines into the creek to mount an attack. Although the Oneida Indians fled, Popham’s force was cut to shreds by the American artillery and riflemen. More than seventy British soldiers were killed or wounded before the rest surrendered. The American force sustained only two casualties. Deprived of these gunboats, Yeo called off a Congreve rocket attack that had been planned for Sackets Harbor.[61]

With the British squadron nearby, Woolsey could not hazard moving his precious cargo back into the lake, so most of the guns and rope were transported to Sackets Harbor overland. But there was one cable intended for the Superior that was so large that it would not fit into any wagon. It was 300 feet long, seven inches in diameter, and weighed a staggering 9,600 pounds. After some delay, Colonel Allen Clarke’s regiment of New York militiamen offered to carry the hope on their shoulders. Part of the rope was loaded into a wagon, while the rest was carried by the men, perhaps 100 in all. The men marched for a mile at a time and then rested. Many padded their shoulders with straw to cut down on the chafing. Although some men dropped out along the way, others appeared to take their places. Thirty hours after departing from Sandy Creek, the militia arrived at Sackets Harbor with the cable. As a reward, the men were given a barrel of whiskey and a bonus of $2 a day.[62]

Invasion of New York

The British mounted their most significant campaign on the northern frontier in 1814 against northern New York. Officials in London supplied Sir George Prevost with additional troops, including several of Wellington’s generals from the Spanish Peninsula, and ordered him to take the offensive. “If you shall allow the present campaign to close without having undertaken offensive measures,” said a dispatch, “you will very seriously disappoint the expectations of the Prince Regent and the country.”[63] The only caveat that the government gave Prevost was to make sure that he was not cut off the way that Major General John Burgoyne was in 1777, when he was forced to surrender his entire army at Saratoga. In response to this mandate, Prevost devised a plan to march down the western side of Lake Champlain, destroy the American position at Plattsburgh, and occupy a significant portion of northern New York.[64]

Having amassed an army of 10,000 men at Montreal, Prevost crossed into the United States on August 31. To minimize opposition, he issued a proclamation promising to treat civilians kindly and urging them to sell supplies to the British army.[65] Secretary of War Armstrong, who did not expect the British to mount a major attack in this region, had ordered 4,000 troops under Major General George Izard to depart from Plattsburgh for Sackets Harbor and then the Niagara frontier.[66] This left the burden of defense on Brigadier General Alexander Macomb, who had only 3,400 troops at his disposal, many of whom were new recruits. Although some members of his staff urged Macomb to retreat, he refused. “The eyes of America are on us,” he said. “Fortune always favors the brave.”[67]

Macomb sent skirmishing parties—consisting mainly of militia—to slow the British march, but these troops were brushed aside. “So undaunted . . . was the Enemy,” Macomb reported, “that he never deployed in his whole march always pressing on in Column.”[68] The British also had to move trees felled by Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Appling’s riflemen. Prevost arrived on the north shore of the Saranac River on September 6 with about 8,000 men. For the next five days he skirmished with American troops and marked time, waiting for the British squadron on Lake Champlain to engage the American squadron. Macomb used the time to shore up his defenses and summon additional militia from New York and Vermont.[69]

The Battle of Lake Champlain

The British had won control of Lake Champlain the previous summer when they captured the Eagle and Growler, but both nations had been building ships, and the two squadrons were now about evenly matched.[70] The British squadron, commanded by thirty-six-year-old Captain George Downie, consisted of the Confiance (39 guns), Linnet (16 guns), Chub (11 guns), Finch (11 guns), and twelve gunboats mounting a total of 17 guns. The Confiance was the largest ship on the lake—superior to anything the United States had—but she was not quite ready for action. In fact, the last carpenters did not leave the ship until just before the naval battle began. Opposing the British was thirty-year-old Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough, whose squadron consisted of the Saratoga (26 guns), Eagle (20 guns), Ticonderoga (17 guns), Preble (7 guns), and ten gunboats carrying a total of 16 guns. Although the British held advantage in long guns, the United States had the edge in the more powerful short-range carronades.[71]

Macdonough anchored his squadron in Plattsburgh Bay to await Downie’s attack. He positioned his ships far enough from the shore to ensure that he was out of range of land-based artillery in case the British overran Macomb’s position. Macdonough also set the kedge anchors of his two largest ships so that he could rotate these vessels if he needed to bring fresh batteries to bear on the enemy. This, as it turned out, gave him a decisive advantage in the battle that ensued. The winds also favored Macdonough because the British could not easily stand off and use their long guns to good effect. Instead, they would have to close, where Macdonough’s carronades were likely to be more effective.

At 8:00 a.m. on September 11, Downie rounded Cumberland Head and made for Macdonough’s squadron. The British ships took heavy fire from Macdonough’s long guns as they approached, but Downie brought his ships around in good order. Once in position the Confiance delivered a withering broadside to the Saratoga, killing or wounding 40 of her crew. The men on the American ship were momentarily stunned and disheartened, but a rooster, whose coop had been smashed, flew into the ship’s shrouds and crowed loudly. The Americans took heart from this omen, let out a cheer, and resumed the battle.[72]

Early in the contest each side lost a ship. The Chub drifted out of control toward the shore, where she surrendered to American troops. The Preble was also disabled and drifted away from the battle. Most of the fighting was done by the two flagships, which pounded one another relentlessly with devastating broadsides. Both commanding officers were hit during the battle. Downie was killed fifteen minutes into the battle when struck by a gun carriage knocked loose from its moorings. His watch was flattened by the blow, marking the exact time of his death. Macdonough was twice knocked down by flying debris, in one case by the head of a decapitated midshipman.[73]

Enemy fire eventually silenced all of the guns on one side of the Saratoga. At this point, Macdonough performed the masterstroke that turned the tide in the battle, winding his flagship around so that he could bring fresh guns to bear on the British ships. Lieutenant James Robertson, who had taken command of the Confiance after Downie’s death, tried to bring his flagship around by employing the same maneuver, but without advance preparation his lines became fouled and his ship immobilized. The Saratoga relentlessly pounded the British ship with broadside after broadside. The fire was so intense that a British marine who had been at Trafalgar claimed that “that was a mere flea-bite in comparison with this.”[74] Two and a half hours into the fight, the Confiance had 105 shot-holes in her hull, and her crew refused to continue the fight. According to Robertson, “the Ship’s Company declared they would stand no longer to their Quarters, nor could the Officers with their utmost exertions rally them.”[75]

Robertson had little choice but to surrender his flagship. The Linnet followed suit. The Finch, which had lost control and run aground off Crab Island, also surrendered. Only the gunboats, which had fled during the heat of battle, escaped. In the Battle of Lake Champlain, Americans suffered 110 casualties, the British 170. Echoing Perry after his great victory on Lake Erie, Macdonough sent a message to the secretary of the navy that read: “The Almighty has been pleased to Grant us a Signal Victory on Lake Champlain in the Capture of one Frigate, one Brig and two sloops of war of the enemy.”[76]

The Battle of Plattsburgh

Meanwhile, the Battle of Plattsburgh had begun on land. The morning of the naval battle Provost had dispatched 4,000 troops under Major General Frederick Robinson west to find a ford across the river and threaten Macomb from the rear. Robinson’s men lost valuable time searching for the ford but eventually found it, crossed the river, and scattered the 400 militia that contested their passage. According to Robinson, his men “dashed down a very steep and high bank, and forded the river like so many foxhounds, driving the Doddles in all directions.”[77] But by the time these troops were in a position to attack Macomb from the rear, it was too late. The battle on the lake was over, and Prevost, fearing that the American squadron would menace his supply lines and that militia pouring in would cut off his retreat, ordered his entire army to withdraw to Canada. Furious with the order, General Robinson claimed that the withdrawal was conducted “in the most precipitate and disgraceful manner.”[78] The retreat was so unexpected that the British were eight miles away before Macomb realized that they were gone. The British sustained about 160 casualties in the Battle of Plattsburgh, the United States about 100. The British lost an additional 240 men to desertion during the withdrawal. They also abandoned significant quantities of war material.[79]

The retreat of such a large force after so little fighting created consternation in both Canada and Great Britain. Prevost had alienated many of Wellington’s officers with a strict dress code, and the retreat served only to increase the antagonism.[80] According to one observer, “The recent disgraceful business of Plattsburg has so completely irritated the feelings of the whole army, that it is in a state almost amounting to mutiny.” Joining in the criticism were civilians who had never approved of Prevost’s friendly policy toward the French inhabitants of Lower Canada and Yeo and other naval officers who blamed Downie’s defeat on pressure from the army to fight before the squadron was ready. “All ranks of people,” concluded a British newspaper, “were clamorous against Sir George Prevost.”[81] Ultimately Prevost was recalled to England to answer for his failure. He demanded a court martial but died before he could present his case. As a result, instead of being celebrated as the savior of Canada, he is remembered for his failures in the field.

Macdonough, on the other hand, was showered with praise and rewards. He received a gold medal from Congress, 1,000 acres of land in Cayuga County from New York, and 100 acres on Cumberland Head from Vermont. He was also given valuable keepsakes by other cities and states.[82] “In one month,” he said, “from a poor lieutenant I became a rich man.”[83]

The battles on Lake Champlain and at Plattsburgh closed out the fighting on the northern frontier in 1814. In spite of growing British strength in Canada, the fighting here continued to be indecisive. Although Great Britain controlled Prairie du Chien, Mackinac Island, and Fort Niagara and the United States controlled both banks of the Detroit River, neither side could claim any significant conquests, and command of the lakes was divided. Thus, after three years of fighting, the war on the Canadian-American frontier was a stalemate.

The British Blockade Extended

The British enjoyed more success on the Atlantic coast because here they could make full use of their sea power. The most effective use was still their blockade. The Royal Navy had blockaded the middle and southern states in 1812–1813, and in April 1814 that blockade was extended to New England. The British decided to close New England’s ports to put an end to neutral trade and to prevent warships there from getting to sea.[84] President Madison responded by publicly denouncing the entire blockade as illegal. Even the Royal Navy, he said, did not have enough ships to enforce a blockade extending all the way from Maine to Georgia. The administration hoped that European neutrals eager to trade with the United States would oppose the blockade, but this was unlikely in any circumstances and out of the question once Napoleon had been defeated.[85]

U.S. Trade, 1790–1815. This chart shows progressively steeper declines in American trade, first during the Peace of Amiens (1801–1803), then during the embargo (1807–1809), and finally during the War of 1812 (1812–1815).

The extension of the British blockade further curtailed American trade and reduced government revenue. American exports, which had reached $61 million in 1811, steadily plunged to less than $7 million in 1814. There was a similar decline in imports, from $53 million in 1811 to $13 million in 1814. Even though the customs duties had been doubled at the beginning of the war, revenue from this source fell from $13 million in 1811 to $6 million in 1814, and revenue from all sources declined from $14 million to $11 million.[86] The decline in revenue was particularly alarming because the cost of the war was soaring.

The economic bottlenecks that had appeared in 1813 worsened in 1814, and the gluts and shortages in every market increased. Merchants and fishermen could not send their ships to sea, and farmers could not ship their produce to market. The shipping industry was particularly hard hit. The tonnage of American ships engaged in foreign trade dropped from 948,000 in 1811 to 60,000 in 1814.[87] Although some of these losses were offset by new economic activities—such as privateering and manufacturing—the overall effect of the war on the American economy was decidedly negative.[88]

British Raids on New England

Great Britain’s naval presence was felt in other ways. The number of predatory raids increased in 1814, particularly along the lengthy and exposed New England coast, which heretofore had been untouched. “The eastern coast of the United States is much vexed by the enemy,” reported Niles’ Register in July.[89] Although the larger cities enjoyed a measure of protection from coastal fortifications, the smaller ones were more vulnerable. The British, said Niles, “seem determined to enter the little out ports and villages, and burn every thing that floats.”[90]

In one such raid, a flotilla of British boats rowed six miles up the Connecticut River and attacked Pettipaug (now Essex), Connecticut. After driving away the militia, the British destroyed twenty-seven vessels valued at $140,000.[91] Another British naval force threatened Stonington, Connecticut. Although the British did not attempt a landing, artillery fire from their ships destroyed a number of buildings in the town.[92]

The Royal Navy also cut off the nation’s coastal islands. Nantucket was dependent on food imported from the mainland. By August 1814 the threat of starvation had become so acute that even though Republicans controlled the island they had to proclaim its neutrality. In exchange for surrendering its public stores, supplying British warships, and discontinuing the payment of federal taxes, Nantucket won the right to import provisions and fuel from the mainland and to fish in nearby waters. As a bonus, Vice Admiral Cochrane worked for the release all Nantucketeers who were being held as prisoners of war.[93]

Other exposed towns also came to terms with the British. On Cape Cod many communities paid tribute to avoid bombardment and plundering.[94] On Block Island (which was part of Rhode Island) people were “in the daily habit of carrying intelligence and succour to the enemy’s squadron,” which prompted American officials to cut off all trade with the island.[95] British officers were shocked by the eagerness with which Americans pursued their own interests at the expense of the nation’s. “Self, the great ruling principle,” said one, “[is] more powerful with Yankees than any people I ever saw.”[96]

The Occupation of Maine

The British did not limit their operations on the New England coast to petty raids and plundering. They also launched a major amphibious campaign against Maine. British officials coveted northern Maine because it jutted into Canada, blocking the development of a direct overland route between Halifax and Quebec. The Canadian-American boundary here was in dispute because of an ambiguity in the Treaty of Paris in 1783. By occupying part of Maine the British hoped to rectify the border in their favor.

The first step the British took was to seize Moose Island in Passamaquoddy Bay, which was claimed by both nations but occupied by the United States. On July 11 Captain Thomas Hardy transported 1,000 men under Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Pilkington from Halifax to Eastport, which was located on Moose Island. Eastport was protected by Fort Sullivan, which was garrisoned by eighty-five men under the command of Major Perley Putnam. Putnam surrendered without offering any resistance. Since the island was considered British, the inhabitants were required to take an oath of allegiance or leave. About two-thirds of the residents took the oath.[97]

The British next targeted a much broader stretch of the coast of Maine. To oversee this operation, London officials tapped Sir John Sherbrooke, who held the title of lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia but was actually the province’s chief executive officer. Sherbrooke was ordered to occupy “that part of the District of Maine which at present intercepts the communication between Halifax and Quebec.”[98]

In accordance with this mandate, Rear Admiral Edward Griffith ferried 2,500 men under Sherbrooke to Castine on Penobscot Bay on September 1. Castine was protected by a small redoubt manned by forty soldiers commanded by Lieutenant Andrew Lewis. Facing an overwhelming force, Lewis fired several rounds of artillery and then blew up his redoubt and fled. The British next sailed up the Penobscot River, meeting only token resistance along the way. Captain Charles Morris had earlier sailed the U.S. Sloop Adams (28 guns) up the Penobscot to refit at Hampden after an Atlantic cruise. In response to the British threat, Morris developed an effective plan of defense, but it depended on the local militia. When the British approached, the militia gave way, leaving Morris with little choice but to burn his ship and flee with his crew to Portland. The British occupied the river up to Bangor, where they seized or destroyed a number of merchant vessels. Later they occupied the port town of Machias. This gave them effective control over 100 miles of the Maine coast.[99]

The British seized all public property in eastern Maine and some private maritime property as well. The inhabitants were given a choice of taking an oath to keep the peace or leaving the area. They were also urged to take an oath of allegiance to the British Crown. Those who took this oath were accorded the commercial privileges of British subjects, which meant they could trade freely with Canada and other British provinces. Castine became a British port of entry and a resort town for British military officers on leave. Most of the inhabitants welcomed the region’s new status because it meant increased trade with New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.[100] “It is scarcely possible to conceive the joy of the inhabitants,” said a Massachusetts newspaper. “At the striking of the flag, some huzza’d, and others, men of influence, observed, ‘now we shall get rid of the tax gathers,’ ‘now the damned democrats will get it.’”[101]

American officials halted all mail service to the occupied territory and hatched a scheme for reconquest. The plan called for sending an army of regulars and militia overland to make an assault on Castine from the rear. The War Department asked Governor Caleb Strong of Massachusetts to call up the necessary militia and to provide part of the funding, but the state’s resources were stretched so thin that Strong demurred. In addition, his advisers told him, probably correctly, that it would be almost impossible to succeed without “a naval force that shall command the Bay of Penobscot.”[102] The administration finally shelved the plan when it was leaked to the press. Hence eastern Maine (like Prairie du Chien, Mackinac Island, and Fort Niagara) remained in British hands until the war was over.[103]

British Raids in the Chesapeake

Far more demoralizing to Americans than British operations in New England was their invasion of the Chesapeake. In 1814 London officials ordered Major General Robert Ross “to effect a diversion on the coasts of the United States of America in favor of the army employed in the defence of Upper and Lower Canada.” At the same time, Prevost, who was angry over the burning of Dover and other depredations in Upper Canada, asked Vice Admiral Alexander Cochrane to “assist in inflicting that measure of retaliation which shall deter the enemy from a repetition of similar outrages.”[104] The British had successfully targeted the Chesapeake in 1813, and both Ross and Cochrane regarded it the best place to achieve their goals in 1814. The bay’s extensive shoreline remained exposed, and the region’s two most important cities—Washington and Baltimore—offered inviting targets.

To prepare for the coming campaign, the British established a base on Tangier Island in early April. In accordance with the request from Governor Prevost, Rear Admiral Cochrane in July ordered the commanders on his station “to destroy & lay waste such Towns and Districts upon the Coast as you may find assailable” and to explain to their victims that they were only retaliating for similar depredations committed by American commanders in Upper Canada. Cochrane realized that it would be unwise to completely alienate a population that sold him provisions and other supplies. Hence, he issued a secret companion order that authorized his commanders to spare those places that either supplied the British with necessities or that agreed to pay tribute.[105]

Although it was difficult to counter the British raids in the Chesapeake, the depredations in 1813 had prompted Joshua Barney, a Revolutionary War hero and accomplished privateer captain, to suggest developing “a flying Squadron” of shallow-draft barges or row-galleys, each armed with a naval gun, to annoy small British vessels and deter raids.[106] Congress approved of Barney’s proposal, and the secretary of the navy put Barney in charge of the flotilla.[107] Barney spent the ensuing winter overseeing the construction and manning of the boats. The flotilla was put into service in the spring of 1814, but almost immediately it was targeted by the British squadron in the Chesapeake.[108]

Rear Admiral Cockburn dispatched a naval force under Captain Robert Barrie to find Barney’s boats. On three separate occasions in June, Barrie engaged Barney in tributaries of the Patuxent: once in Cedar Creek and twice in St. Leonard’s Creek. Each time Barney managed to beat back the attack. Slipping into the Patuxent’s main branch, Barney sailed upriver and took refuge at Pig Point. When again threatened by a British force on August 22, Barney ordered his flotilla blown up to prevent it from falling into enemy hands.[109]

Washington Threatened

These operations were conducted perilously close to the nation’s capital, but little was done to prepare Washington for defense. “The shameful neglect of the administration to provide an adequate defence for the capital,” said a Federalist newspaper, “is a just cause of loud complaint among all parties.”[110] Armstrong was convinced that Washington would never be attacked because it had no strategic significance. “Baltimore is the place,” he said; “that [city] is of so much more consequence.”[111] Nor did Armstrong believe that fortifications offered the best way of protecting cities. “Bayonets,” he claimed, “are known to form the most efficient barriers.”[112] With an eye on economy, Armstrong also believed that militia should be called out only after the target of British operations was known.[113]

Other officials in Washington were slow to perceive the danger, too. Not until July 1 did the president authorize the creation of a special military district embracing the nation’s capital with Brigadier General William Winder in charge. Winder appeared to be knowledgeable about military affairs, but the only action he had seen was at Stoney Creek in 1813, when he had been captured and then paroled. His only real asset was that he was the nephew of the Federalist governor of Maryland, whose cooperation was deemed essential for the proper defense of the region.[114]

Winder had only 500 regulars at his disposal, and the militia called into service were slow to respond. Winder’s inexperience told early, and he seemed overwhelmed by the task before him. He spent much of his time traveling through the countryside inspecting the terrain, while the real work of planning strategy and preparing defense works remained undone. In fact, Winder moved around so much that one of Armstrong’s directives—which was characteristically sent by regular mail—followed the district commander around for more than three weeks.[115] The British seemed to sense the confusion in all this. “Jonathan,” said a Royal Navy officer, “is so confounded that he does not know when or where to look for us and I do believe that he is at this moment so undecided and unprepared that it would require but little force to burn Washington.”[116]

By mid-August Cochrane and Ross were in the Chesapeake with twenty warships and several transports filled with veterans from the Peninsular War. Also present was Read Admiral George Cockburn, who knew the area because he had overseen predatory raids the previous year. After sailing up the Patuxent River, the British landed 4,500 men at Benedict, Maryland, on August 19–20. Guided by two local renegades (one of whom was a victim of leprosy), the British marched to Upper Marlboro, where they were joined by Cockburn.

Ross ordered a halt at Upper Marlboro to consider his options. Cochrane, who remained with the fleet, got cold feet, and urged a withdrawal, but Cockburn persuaded Ross to continue.[117] “Having advanced to within sixteen miles of Washington,” Ross later said, “and ascertaining the force of the enemy to be such as might authorise an attempt at carrying his capital, I determined to make it.”[118] Leaving 500 marines at Upper Marlboro, Ross marched his troops toward Bladensburg, where he could cross the Eastern Branch of the Potomac (now the Anacostia River) and approach Washington from the northeast.

By this time American officials realized their peril and began frantically putting the capital in a state of defense. Winder recognized the city’s vulnerability from the northeast and ordered most of the bridges there destroyed. There was no attempt, however, to harass the enemy or obstruct his approach even though he was marching through a dense forest. Secretary of State James Monroe volunteered to serve as a cavalry scout—surely the only time a member of the cabinet has performed this duty. The information he picked up was not vital, although several times he found himself perilously near British units.[119]

Additional militia units were called out, but there was scarcely enough time to prepare them for battle. Most of the men were short on sleep and hungry. The militiamen were joined by 500 regulars under the command of Lieutenant Colonel William Scott. Also present was Captain Barney, who was in charge of 600 sailors and marines and five artillery pieces (three 12-pounders and two 18-pounders). The American force—perhaps 6,000 troops in all—was arrayed in three lines facing the eastern branch of the Potomac River. The third line was too far away to support the first two, and Monroe (who had no authority in the matter) redeployed the troops so that the second line could not support the first. Brigadier General Tobias Stansbury, the Maryland militia officer in charge of these troops, evidently realized that the new deployment was potentially disastrous, but believing that Monroe’s order had Winder’s approval, he did not challenge it. The president and other civilian officials arrived on the scene just before the battle began and were on the verge of crossing the bridge into the approaching British columns when they were warned off by a War Department clerk who was serving as a volunteer scout. No doubt the 100-degree temperature added to everyone’s discomfort.[120]

The Battle of Bladensburg

About 1:00 p.m. on August 24, just as the last militia units took their places, the British appeared on the opposite side of the river. What they saw did not impress them. Most of the American troops, said one officer, “seemed [like] country people, who would have been much more appropriately employed in attending to their agricultural occupations, than in standing, with their muskets in their hands.” One British officer, fooled by their motley appearance, was not even sure they were Americans. “Are these Yankees?” he asked, “or are they our own seamen got somehow ahead of us?”[121]

The defenders had neglected to destroy the bridge although the water was shallow enough to ford anyway. Despite taking heavy casualties, first one British brigade and then another got across the river. The British outflanked the first American line, forcing it to fall back. Among those wounded in the initial assault was the former attorney general, William Pinkney. Just as the British were attacking the second line, Winder—who had radiated confusion and defeatism from the outset—ordered it to fall back. Panic gripped the troops, and the withdrawal turned into a rout—immortalized in wit and poetry as “the Bladensburg races.”[122] The British use of small Congreve rockets, which did little actual damage but could terrify even hardened veterans, probably contributed to the panic.

Only Barney’s troops, who anchored the third line, held firm, tearing into the advancing British units with grapeshot from their heavy guns. The British routed the militia protecting Barney’s flank and then stormed his position. By this time Barney had run out of ammunition anyway. Although he was wounded and captured, most of his men got away. By 4:00 in the afternoon, the British controlled the battlefield. “The rapid flight of the enemy,” said Ross, “and his knowledge of the country, precluded the possibility of many prisoners being taken.”[123] Mindful of how exhausted and overheated his troops were, Ross did not pursue the fleeing militia but instead rested his men for the next two hours. The United States suffered only 70 casualties in the Battle of Bladensburg, while the British sustained 250. The disparity in these figures suggests that with more disciplined troops the United States might have prevailed.[124]

The British Occupy Washington

By the time the battle was over, most people—soldiers, officials, and residents alike—had fled from Washington. Dolley Madison oversaw the removal of cabinet records and White House treasures (including a portrait of George Washington), but she had to sacrifice her personal property.[125] Most of the other government records were saved, although House clerks were hampered by the lack of transportation. “Everything belonging to the office,” they reported, “might have been removed in time, if carriages could have been procured; but it was altogether impossible to procure them, either for hire, or by force.”[126]

President Madison showed up at the White House after his wife had departed. The secretary of the treasury, George Campbell, had given the president a pair of dueling pistols, but Madison had no occasion to use them. He left them in the White House. They were probably stolen by local predators who slipped in after the president had left but before the British arrived. By prearrangement, the president and cabinet were supposed to rendezvous in Frederick, Maryland, but Madison departed with Attorney General Richard Rush for Virginia instead. On the way they were joined by Monroe and reportedly were subjected to various insults for mismanaging the war.[127]

Dolley Madison (1768–1849) served as Thomas Jefferson’s unofficial White House hostess and then transformed the Executive Mansion into the social center of Washington during her husband’s presidency. Not only did she single-handedly invent the First Lady’s role, but she also saved White House treasures when the British threatened the city in the summer of 1814. (Based on a portrait by Gilbert Stuart. Library of Congress)

The British marched into Washington about 8:00 p.m. Ross looked in vain for someone to parley with in order to establish the terms of surrender. The British took sniper fire from one house and responded by burning it to the ground. A group of British officers headed by Cockburn entered the White House. “We found a supper all ready,” one recalled, “which many of us speedily consumed . . . and drank some very good wine also.”[128] Having satisfied their appetites, the British took some souvenirs and then set fire to the building. According to an American who later viewed the ruins, nothing survived but a shell: “unroofed, marked walls, cracked, defaced, blackened with the smoke of fire.”[129] The British also burned the Capitol building (which included the Library of Congress), the Treasury, the building housing the War and State departments, and the arsenal on Greenleaf’s Point.[130]

Dr. William Thornton, an English-born Federalist who was the superintendent of patents, saved the patent office by convincing the British that it contained private property—“models of the arts . . . useful to all mankind”—and that to burn it “would be as barbarous as formerly to burn the Alexandrian Library, for which the Turks have been ever since condemned by all enlightened nations.”[131] The U.S. Marine Corps buildings also survived, probably because the British did not realize what they were. Captain Thomas Tingey, acting on orders from the secretary of the navy, set fire to the navy yard, which was the best-stocked facility of its kind in the country. Tingey also burned two fine new ships that were under construction, the heavy frigate Columbia and the sloop Argus.[132]

Some British officers took special pleasure in the destruction they wrought. “Cockburn was quite a mountebank,” reported the National Intelligencer, “exhibiting in the s[t]reets a gross levity of manner, displaying sundry articles of trifling value of which he had robbed [from] the president’s house.” Most private buildings were spared, but the British burned two rope walks, and Cockburn personally oversaw the destruction of the contents of the semi-official National Intelligencer, amusing spectators “with much of the peculiar slang of the Common Sewer in relation to the editors.” The paper’s owners took this surprisingly well. When the Intelligencer resumed publication, it carried an editorial praising the British for their restraint. “Greater respect was certainly paid to private property than has usually been exhibited by the enemy in his marauding parties. No houses were half as much plundered by the enemy as by the knavish wretches about the town who profited of the general distress.”[133]

The fires set by the British burned all night, and the glow could be seen forty miles away. “The sky was brilliantly illuminated by the different conflagrations,” reported a British officer.[134] A pair of storms followed the next day, one of which was so violent that it blew down several buildings, killing some British soldiers inside.[135] More British soldiers, perhaps fifty to sevety-five in all, were killed or injured when a dry well containing powder exploded. “The effect was terrific,” said the National Intelligencer. “Every one of [the] soldiers near was blown into eternity, many at a greater distance wounded, and the excavation remains an evidence of the great force of this explosion.”[136] The British departed from the city on August 25, re-embarking at Benedict five days later. They left their wounded behind. Barney, who had earned the respect of British officers for his skill and bravery afloat and ashore, had been treated kindly by his captors and promised to look after their wounded.[137]

Surrender of Alexandria

Meanwhile, a sizeable British naval force under Captain James Gordon had sailed up the Potomac River on August 17 to support the assault on the capital. The ships fought contrary winds and currents and repeatedly ran aground. Hence they did not reach Fort Washington—ten miles below the capital—until August 27, two days after Ross had begun his withdrawal. The commander of the fort, Captain Samuel T. Dyson, ordered the fort abandoned and blown up when the first British shells struck. For this he was later cashiered from the army. The abandonment of Fort Washington exposed Alexandria, an affluent Federalist city six miles upriver.[138]

The residents of Alexandria formally capitulated to the British, turning over all their public stores, shipping, and maritime wealth. Captain Gordon sailed off with a huge cache of goods: twenty-one prize ships filled with 16,000 barrels of flour, 1,000 hogsheads of tobacco, 150 bales of cotton, and $5,000 worth of sugar, wine, and other commodities. The withdrawal was harrowing. The squadron had to fend off fire ships and contend with artillery and small arms fire from the banks. Gordon’s larger ships ran aground, forcing him to unload and then reload his heavy naval guns. In spite of all this, he reached the Chesapeake Bay—three weeks after entering the Potomac—having suffered forty-two casualties but with his squadron and booty intact.[139] British naval officials applauded the feat, one calling it “as brilliant an achievement . . . as grace the annals of our naval history.”[140]

Apportioning Blame

Madison and his cabinet returned to Washington on August 27. Some people blamed the destruction of the capital on the president, and rumors were afloat that his life was in danger.[141] Graffiti appeared on the walls of the Capitol that read: “George Washington founded this city after a seven years’ war with England—James Madison lost it after a two years’ war.”[142] Most people in the capital, however, blamed Armstrong, a northerner who many thought had intentionally sacrificed the city. “Universal execration follows Armstrong,” said one resident. “The Cittizens sware,” said another, that if he returns to the city “they will hang him on the Walls of the Capitol.”[143] Local militia refused to take further orders from Armstrong, and after meeting with the president, he retired to Baltimore and subsequently submitted his resignation.[144] Blaming his fall on Monroe, Armstrong said: “I was supposed to be in some body’s way [for the presidency] and it became a system to load me with all the faults and misfortunes which occurred.”[145] As if to prove him right, Madison named Monroe acting secretary of war for the second time during the conflict.

The burning of Washington was denounced on both sides of the Atlantic. The destruction of the capital, said the Annual Register, “brought a heavy censure on the British character, not only in America, but on the continent of Europe.”[146] Some members of Parliament joined in the criticism, and so too did opposition newspapers. “The Cossacks spared Paris,” said the London Statesman, “but we spared not the capitol of America.”[147] Most of the British, however, rejoiced at the obvious embarrassment of their enemy and considered the destruction of Washington just retaliation for American depredations in Canada. The Prince Regent called the Chesapeake campaign “brilliant and successful,” and Ross was officially commended.[148] The park and tower guns in London were fired at noon three days in succession to celebrate the victory, and the Times and Courier were reportedly “nettled that [British] commanders did not date their despatches from the Capitol.”[149]

The Contest for Baltimore

In early September the British decided to follow up on their success at Washington by attacking Baltimore. This city was an attractive target, not only because it was a large commercial center and an important base for privateers but also because it was such a hotbed of anglophobia. “I do not like to contemplate scenes of blood and destruction,” said a British naval officer; “but my heart is deeply interested in the coercion of these Baltimore heroes, who are perhaps the most inveterate against us of all the Yankees.”[150] Ever since early 1813 Samuel Smith, a United States senator and major general in the militia, had been working with other volunteers to prepare the city for defense. By the middle of 1814, Smith had gathered 10,000 to 15,000 troops (mostly militia) and had every available man building earthworks.[151]

Before attacking Baltimore, Vice Admiral Cochrane dispatched twenty-nine-year-old Captain Sir Peter Parker to the Eastern Shore to effect a diversion. Parker was a promising and well-liked young naval officer, scion of a distinguished family and cousin of Lord Byron. When Parker learned from a slave that there was a militia camp on the Eastern Shore near Georgetown, he decided to attack it. On August 31 he landed 250 seamen and marines from his frigate and marched to the American camp. Lieutenant Colonel Philip Reed, a veteran of the War of Independence and a member of the U.S. Senate, was in charge of the camp. When he learned that Sir Peter’s men were on the way, Reed prepared to meet them.

Reed headed a detachment of riflemen that harassed the British from a grove of trees before falling back to the main American line, which was anchored by several fieldpieces. The militia fought surprising well and took a heavy toll on the advancing British, who were silhouetted by a full moon. The Americans were running low on ammunition and were on the verge of retreat, when Parker went down with a deep thigh wound, and the British broke off the attack. Parker bled to death before he could be carried to his ship for medical attention. In the Battle of Caulk’s Field, the British suffered forty casualties, the Americans only three.[152] Although of little strategic importance, the engagement was a rare victory of American militia acting alone against British veterans. It boosted American morale and deprived the Royal Navy of one of its rising stars, who was memorialized in a poem by Byron.[153]

The Battle of North Point

Ross landed his army—about 4,000 regulars and 500 seamen—at North Point at 3:00 a.m. on September 12. Five hours later the troops began their march to Baltimore fourteen miles away. About half way to the city they met a force of 3,200 militia under the command of Brigadier General John Stricker. When Ross raced ahead to investigate, he was mortally wounded. Colonel Arthur Brooke assumed command, and under his direction the British softened the American lines with artillery and then launched a frontal assault that forced the Americans to give way. In the Battle of North Point, the Americans lost 215 men, the British 340.[154] Although the British held the field after the battle, they had sustained heavy casualties and had lost an accomplished and popular general. “It is impossible to conceive the effect which this melancholy spectacle produced throughout the army,” recalled a British officer.[155] As a general officer Ross had earned the right to burial in the mother country, and his remains were shipped home in a cask of rum.

After the Battle of North Point, the British resumed their march to Baltimore. On September 13 they came within sight of the city’s defenses. Unable to secure any naval support or to lure the Americans out from behind their defensive works, Brooke wisely decided not to attack. The British departed at 3:00 a.m. the next morning.[156] The Americans were delighted to see the British leave and made no attempt to pursue them. “When you fight our citizens against British regulars,” said Smith, “you are staking dollars against cents.”[157]

Bombardment of Fort McHenry

Meanwhile, Cochrane had sailed up the Patapsco River with a squadron of bomb and rocket ships to provide the naval support that Brooke needed. Cochrane’s aim was to slip into the harbor and thus get close enough to soften up the American lines. But first he had to silence the guns of Fort McHenry, a star-shaped fort that protected the entrance to the harbor. The fort was defended by 1,000 men under the command of Major George Armistead. The British fired more than 1,500 rounds at the fort over a twenty-five-hour period on September 13 and 14. About 400 of these rounds found their mark. The Americans could not respond because their guns lacked the range of the larger British guns. The damage to the fort, however, was minimal. Only four Americans were killed and twenty-four wounded. The British also failed to silence the guns on nearby Lazaretto Point. Cochrane put 1,200 men in barges to slip by the fort, evidently in the hope of attacking the fort from the rear, but these troops were driven back by heavy fire from the shore. With the harbor blocked by sunken ships, Cochrane realized that he might not be able to get close enough to offer the British army much support anyway. Hence, he ordered his bomb and rocket ships to withdraw.[158]

“The Star-Spangled Banner”

Before the attack on Fort McHenry, Francis Scott Key, a Georgetown Federalist who had come to Baltimore with a volunteer artillery company, had visited the main British squadron at the mouth of the Patapsco River to secure the release of a civilian prisoner, Dr. William Beanes. The British high command had already decided to release Beanes, but the Americans were not permitted to leave until the assault on Fort McHenry was over. Key paced the deck of his truce ship all night, watching the bombardment of Fort McHenry some eight miles away. The next morning, Key noticed that the British squadron was headed his way. He also saw that the huge garrison flag (measuring 30 by 42 feet) had been run up above the fort. With this he realized that the bombardment had been a failure and that McHenry was still in American hands.

Key was so moved that he wrote a poem entitled “Defence of Fort M’Henry.” The poem was distributed as a broadside, which suggested that it could be sung to a British drinking song, “To Anacreon in Heaven.” The new song, which was later renamed “The Star-Spangled Banner,” appeared in newspapers up and down the coast and ultimately became the national anthem. (“The bombs bursting in air” were the British mortar shells that exploded above the fort, and “the rockets’ red glare” referred to Congreve rockets.)[159] The Armistead family preserved the large garrison flag before turning it over to the Smithsonian in the twentieth century.[160] Hence, the successful defense of Fort McHenry produced not only the national anthem but also the nation’s best-known flag.

Francis Scott Key’s famous song celebrating the successful defense of Fort McHenry was initially published in a broadside under the title of “Defence of Ft. M’Henry.” The broadside told how the song had come to be written and suggested that it be sung to the tune of “Anacreon in Heaven.” (Oscar Sonneck, “The Star-Spangled Banner”)

British Depradations

The Battle of Baltimore ended the Chesapeake campaign. Local reports indicated that during the campaign British troops had looted private property, destroyed church property, and even opened coffins in their search for booty. “Their conduct,” said Congressman Robert Wright, “would have disgraced cannibals.”[161] The entire campaign served to enhance the legacy of bitterness left from the previous summer. Niles’ Register called Cockburn a “Great Bandit” and proposed that Ross’s death be commemorated with a monument dedicated to “THE LEADER OF A HOST OF BARBARIANS, who destroyed the capitol . . . and devoted . . . Baltimore, to rape, robbery and conflagration.”[162]

The British were also accused of fomenting a slave rebellion. Although this was untrue, Cochrane did issue a proclamation on April 2 that promised all interested Americans a “choice of either entering into His Majesty’s Sea or Land Forces, or of being sent as FREE Settlers, to the British Possessions in North America or the West Indies.”[163] Many slaves responded to this call. Some 3,600 found refuge with the British during the war, and of these 550 enlisted in a special Corps of Colonial Marines.[164] The runaways made excellent scouts and guides because they knew the land, and those who served in the Colonial Marines impressed the British in combat. Cockburn claimed they made “the best skirmishers possible for the thick Woods of this Country” and that they showed “extraordinary steadiness and good conduct when in action with the Enemy.”[165]

Attack on Cumberland Island

Although most of the British operations on the Atlantic coast targeted New England or the Chesapeake, a campaign against Cumberland Island at the mouth of St. Marys River in Georgia was undertaken as a diversion in favor of Britain’s campaign on the Gulf Coast. On January 10–11, 1815, Rear Admiral Cockburn landed upwards of 1,500 men on the island and two days later overran the American battery at Point Peter (or Point Petre). With only 120 regulars at his disposal, Captain Abraham Massias resisted the British invasion as long as he could and then fled upriver.

Several days later Cockburn sent a force in pursuit, but the British boats had to turn back when they received galling fire from both banks at a point where the river narrowed. American casualties in the two engagements were about fifteen, the British twice this number. The operation failed to divert any troops from the Gulf Coast and actually took place after the Battle of New Orleans. But like Prairie du Chien, Mackinac, Fort Niagara, and coastal Maine, Cumberland Island remained in British hands until the war ended.[166]

The Gulf Coast Campaign

Although the British did not realize it at the time, their campaign on the Atlantic coast, and particularly in the Chesapeake, was the high-water mark of their counteroffensive in 1814. Their final campaign in the war—against the Gulf Coast—ended in disaster.[167] This region attracted the British because it was sparsely populated and lightly defended. There were many potential allies here, including Indians, particularly the Seminoles and Creeks, and black people, both slave and free. In addition, there were Spanish and French people living in West Florida and Louisiana who had never reconciled to American rule. Finally, there were the Baratarian pirates, a lawless band of thieves and smugglers—800 to 1,000 in all—who lived on Grand Terre Island in southern Louisiana.[168]

New Orleans, located 100 miles up the Mississippi River, was a particularly tempting target. With a population of almost 25,000, it was the largest city west of the Appalachian Mountains. It was also the principal outlet for western commodities, and millions of dollars in produce was blockaded in the port. Scottish naval officers like Cochrane were known to have a keen eye for booty, and the British brought cargo ships with them to carry off prize goods.[169] Although British prisoners of war and deserters later claimed that the watchword and countersign on the morning of the Battle of New Orleans was “beauty and booty,” this was almost surely untrue. British officers invariably kept their men on a tight leash whenever they occupied an enemy city.[170]

When the campaign was first conceived in 1812, it was seen as a means of taking pressure off Canada. But by the time it actually got under way, another objective had emerged. The British government instructed General Ross, who prior to his death was supposed to lead the expedition, “to obtain a Command of the Embouchure [mouth] of the Mississippi, so as to deprive the back Settlements of America of their Communication with the sea” and “to occupy some important & valuable possession, by the restoration of which we may improve the Conditions of Peace, or which may entitle us to exact its Cession as the price of Peace.” Ross was to encourage the free inhabitants to revolt but was to make no binding promises about the future. “You must give them clearly to understand that Great Britain cannot pledge herself to make the Independence of Louisiana, or its restoration to the Spanish Crown, a sine qua non of Peace with the United States.”[171]

As a preliminary to the main expedition, in May 1814 Cochrane dispatched a shipload of arms to Indians on the Apalachicola River in Spanish Florida. George Woodbine, an Indian trader, was given a brevet commission as captain of the Royal Marines and appointed agent to the Indians. He distributed the arms and trained the Indians in the use of the bayonet.[172]

Pensacola and Mobile

The next step was the occupation of Pensacola, a Spanish port city that had the best harbor on the Gulf Coast and enjoyed excellent access to the interior. With the tacit approval of Spanish officials, Major Edward Nicolls led 100 British troops into the city on August 14. He subsequently expanded his occupation force by recruiting Indians and (much to the dismay of the Spanish) local slaves.[173] On August 29, Nicolls issued a proclamation calling on the “Natives of Louisiana . . . to assist in liberating from a faithless and imbecile government, your paternal soil.”[174]

The following month Nicolls led an expedition to Mobile, a port city in West Florida that the United States had seized from Spain in 1813. This city was protected from seaborne attack by Fort Bowyer, which was located on a peninsula in Mobile Bay and defended by 160 regulars under the command of Major William Lawrence. On September 12 a British force of 225 marines and Indians was put on shore, and three days later a naval squadron under Captain William H. Percy bombarded the fort. The British land force, however, was too small to assault the post, and the waters of Mobile Bay were too shallow for the British ships. Hence the attack was abandoned. The British lost their flagship, the Hermes (22 guns), which ran aground within range of the American guns and had to be destroyed. The British sustained about seventy casualties compared to only about ten for the United States.[175]

Andrew Jackson, who was now a major general in the regular army, had assumed command of the Gulf Coast region in May 1814. He was convinced that Pensacola was the key to British operations in the region. “Pensacola,” he said, “is more important to the British arms than any other point on our South or Southwest.”[176] Officials in Washington, however, feared that any military action against this city might lead to war with Spain. Hence in late October the secretary of war ordered Jackson not to invade Spanish territory. This directive, however, arrived too late to affect Jackson’s plans.[177]

On November 7, 1814, Jackson attacked Pensacola with a force of 4,100 regulars, militia, and Indians. The Spanish governor, who had perhaps 500 troops at his disposal, could not decide whether or not to offer resistance, and Jackson marched in almost unopposed. Disgusted, the British blew up the forts on Pensacola Bay and retired to the Apalachicola River.[178] With its forts destroyed, Pensacola was neutralized, and Jackson marched to Mobile. Almost belatedly—since he fully expected the British to attack Mobile first—Jackson raced to New Orleans, arriving in the Crescent City on December 1.[179]

New Orleans Threatened

Jackson found that little had been done to prepare New Orleans against attack. Before being transferred north in 1813, Wilkinson had squandered the public funds under his control, and people throughout Louisiana radiated disloyalty and defeatism.[180] “The War of the U.S. is very unpopular with us,” John Windship, a transplanted New Englander, reported in early 1814. French and Spanish residents, who constituted a large majority of the population, were called up for militia duty in New Orleans but “absolutely refused to be marched” and “declared themselves liege [feudal] subjects of Spain or France.” If the British should attack, Windship concluded, “there is no force competent to repell them.”[181] There was also a growing scarcity of cash in New Orleans, and local banks refused to advance the government money. “Few, very few,” lamented an American army officer, “are disposed to aid the General Government in the present crisis.”[182]

Jackson’s arrival had a dramatic effect on the people. “General Jackson,” wrote one contemporary, “electrified all hearts.” “His immediate and incessant attention to the defence of the country,” said another, “soon convinced all that he was the man the occasion demanded.”[183] After making a detailed study of the area, Jackson ordered all the water approaches from the Gulf blocked and batteries established at strategic points. He also established an excellent intelligence system to keep abreast of enemy movements.[184] In addition, he issued a proclamation calling on everyone to assist in the defense of the city. “Those who are not for us,” he said, “are against us, and will be dealt with accordingly.”[185] Jackson’s energetic actions dissipated the defeatism that had prevailed in the city. According to one witness, “The streets resounded with Yankee Doodle, the Marseilles Hymn, the Chant du Depart, and other martial airs.”[186]

Governor William Claiborne (brother of the Creek War general Ferdinand Claiborne) called out all the militia in the area, and troops began to pour in from miles around. John Coffee raced 850 mounted Tennessee riflemen to New Orleans from Baton Rouge, covering 135 miles in three days. Jackson already had appealed to free black men to enlist in the regular army, and he now accepted the services of a special corps of black troops, mostly refugees from Santo Domingo, raised by Captain Jean Baptiste Savary. Speaking on behalf of the white citizens, Governor Claiborne protested against these policies, but Jackson brushed his objections aside.[187]

The Baratarian pirates, headed by Jean and Pierre Laffite (or Lafitte), also offered their services. Even though an American naval force had destroyed their base on Grand Terre Island in September, the Baratarians rejected British overtures to side with them.[188] Instead, they pleaded with American officials to accept their services, no doubt believing that this best served their interests. According to one observer, “this transition from piracy to Patriotism” was due to Edward Livingston. The pirates had promised the influential and well-connected lawyer $20,000 if he could secure their acquittal on charges of violating the trade laws, and he had advised them to enlist under the American banner.[189]

Although Jackson had once described the pirates as “hellish Banditti,” he could use more men who were accustomed to combat and knew the lay of the land.[190] Hence he reluctantly accepted their offer. Some fifty Baratarians joined his force. They proved to be excellent artillerymen, and their knowledge of the local terrain was valuable. Jean Laffite got along so well with Jackson that he became the general’s unofficial aide-de-camp. Although the Baratarians’ contribution to victory that followed was modest, such was their influence in the state that the Louisiana legislature asked Madison to pardon them, which he did. Laffite later resumed his privateering career and served as a spy for the Spanish, but the park commemorating the Battle of New Orleans is now called Jean Lafitte National Historical Park and Preserve.[191]

Meanwhile, the British had been assembling a large army—about 10,000 strong—in Jamaica for their Gulf Coast campaign.[192] After Ross’s death, the command was assigned to Major General Edward Pakenham, the Duke of Wellington’s brother-in-law. Pakenham was an able and experienced officer. According to one subordinate, he was “a hero, a soldier, a man of ability in every sense of the word.”[193] Pakenham had the support of two accomplished officers, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Dickson, who was considered the best artillery officer in the British army, and Lieutenant Colonel John Fox Burgoyne, an experienced engineer who was the illegitimate son of Major General John Burgoyne of Saratoga fame. At the end of November most of the British troops were put on board transports in a large convoy—commanded by Cochrane—and shipped to the Gulf Coast. Although the campaign was supposed to be a secret, it was reported in the press on both sides of the Atlantic.[194]

On December 5 the convoy arrived off the coast of Florida. British officials, hoping to use the Indians in a diversion, issued a proclamation promising to help them recover lands “of which the People of Bad Spirit have basely robbed them.”[195] The Indians who responded, however, were unimpressive. Hence the British, who hardly needed native assistance anyway, proceeded without them. Although the British initially had planned an overland campaign against New Orleans from Mobile, they now decided to attack from the sea instead. Accordingly, the convoy weighed anchor and sailed west, reaching Cat Island—about eighty miles northeast of New Orleans—on December 13.[196] From here the British could attack either from the east via Lake Borgne, from the north via Lake Pontchartrain, or from the northeast via the land mass between the lakes, which was known as the Plain of Gentilly.

The Battle of Lake Borgne

Because they lacked enough small boats to operate further north, the British decided to attack through Lake Borgne.[197] As they moved toward the lake, they found their way blocked by Lieutenant Thomas ap Catesby Jones, who had five gunboats and 185 men. To destroy the American force, the British sent an assault force of forty-five boats under the command of Captain Nicholas Lockyer. The British boats were much smaller than the American gunboats, but they carried 1,200 men and a lot more guns. In the engagement that followed on December 14, the British prevailed but suffered about 100 casualties. Jones lost about forty killed and wounded, and he was among the wounded. The rest of his men were captured. Although the United States could ill afford to lose Jones’s boats, the Battle of Lake Borgne delayed the British advance to New Orleans, allowing Jackson additional time for defensive preparations.[198]

Having disposed of Jones’s force, the British established a base on Pea Island, 30 miles from New Orleans. The weather was cold and windy, and although primitive shanties were erected for the officers, everyone suffered. The morning of December 19, said Rear Admiral Edward Codrington, “produced a N.-W. gale, as bitter cold as we could have felt in England; and the nights of the 19th and 20th were so severe as to produce ice an inch thick in [water] tubs.” The cold weather continued for another a week. “Neither day nor night,” Codrington complained, “can we contrive to make ourselves comfortably warm.”[199]

After hiring some Spanish and Portuguese fishermen as guides, the British advanced across Lake Borgne to Bayou Bienvenu and thence to Bayou Mazant. From here they took a canal to Jacques Villeré’s plantation, which was located on the Mississippi River eight miles below New Orleans. On December 23 a British advance party of 1,600 men, commanded by Colonel William Thornton, occupied the plantation home. The British used Villeré’s house as their headquarters for the rest of the campaign. Thornton’s men captured thirty militia in the process, but Villeré’s son escaped to warn Jackson of the British approach.[200]

The Battle of Villeré’s Plantation

Jackson was determined to meet the British beyond New Orleans and before they were at full strength. Hence as soon as he learned of Thornton’s arrival at Villeré’s, he assembled 1,800 men and marched them to within a mile of the British position. Jackson’s men were supported by two warships, the U.S. Schooner Carolina (14 guns) and the U.S. Sloop Louisiana (22 guns), which was a converted merchantman. At 7:30 at night on December 23, the Carolina opened fire on the British camp.[201] The attack caught the invaders by surprise. A British officer described the scene: “flash, flash, flash, came from the river; the roar of cannon followed, and the light of her own broadside displayed to us an enemy’s vessel at anchor near the opposite bank, and pouring a perfect shower of grape and round shot, into the camp.”[202]

Shortly thereafter Jackson ordered his army to attack. The British troops, who were now under the command of Major General John Keane, were unaware of Jackson’s presence and were again caught by surprise. Much close combat ensued, resulting in a large number of bayonet wounds. The lines were not clearly drawn, and in the darkness, smoke, and fog there was considerable confusion on both sides. Friendly troops fired on each other or blundered into enemy lines. By the time the Battle of Villeré’s Plantation ended, the British had suffered 275 casualties, the Americans 215.[203]

British reinforcements began to arrive the following day, and the day after that (Christmas Day) Pakenham himself arrived with additional troops, bringing total British strength to more than 4,000. Unaware that his army was much larger than Jackson’s, Pakenham failed to press his advantage. This enabled Jackson to pull back unmolested and establish a new line behind a canal about two miles from the British. In the days that followed, the Americans constructed earthworks along the edge of the canal between a cypress swamp on the east and the Mississippi River on the west.[204] At the same time, the American ships in the river continued to fire on British positions, while Tennessee and Choctaw sharpshooters harassed British pickets. The British found the sniper fire infuriating. “To us,” said an officer, “it appeared an ungenerous return to barbarity.”[205]

Pakenham was none too sanguine about breaching Jackson’s defenses but decided to proceed with the campaign. To protect his flank, he had to knock the American ships out of action. Accordingly, he ordered a furnace for hot shot built and then on December 27 launched an artillery attack against the vessels. Contrary winds made it difficult for the ships to pull back, and the Carolina caught fire and blew up. The Louisiana was saved only because her crew ran tow lines to the opposite shore and pulled her to safety.[206]

The British Reconnaissance in Force

The next day—December 28—Pakenham ordered his troops to advance in two columns toward the American lines, which were now defended by about 4,000 men. The British suffered such intense fire, not only from the American troops but also from the Louisiana (which fired 800 rounds), that Pakenham gave up the attack and ordered a withdrawal. In this engagement, known as the British Reconnaissance in Force, the losses on both sides were light: perhaps thirty-five for the United States and fifty-five for the British.[207]

Jackson again used the respite to good advantage to strengthen his position. He extended his defensive works further into the swamp, so that his line was now a mile long. He also established additional artillery batteries in his line, bringing the total to eight. As a hedge against disaster, he built two additional lines closer to the city in case his men had to fall back. In addition, he ordered the construction of a defensive line on the western side of the river to be anchored by naval guns from the Louisiana.[208]

The Battle of Rodriguez Canal

On December 31 Pakenham established four new batteries of heavy guns that had been laboriously brought up from the fleet. The batteries were placed behind earth-filled sugar casks which were not tall enough to offer adequate protection. The following day—January 1, 1815—the British began bombarding Jackson’s main line. The barrage was supposed to destroy the American defenses but most of the rounds either overshot their mark or pounded harmlessly into the earthworks. Although caught unprepared, the Americans recovered quickly and responded with artillery fire of their own, destroying one of the British guns. The remaining British batteries lacked the ammunition to keep pace. “Our fire slackened every moment,” said a British naval officer; “that of the Americans became every moment more terrible, till at length, after not more than two hours and a half of firing, our batteries were all silenced.”[209] With their ammunition exhausted, the British pulled back. In the Battle of Rodriguez Canal (also known as the Artillery Duel at New Orleans), the British suffered about seventy-five casualties, the Americans about thirty-five.[210]

Pakenham now waited for reinforcements that were en route to his camp. Each soldier brought a cannon ball in his knapsack to replenish the supply in the front lines. When a boatload of these troops overturned on Lake Borgne, the extra weight carried many of the men to the bottom.[211] Those troops who made it safely to Pakenham’s camp raised his total strength to about 6,000 men. Meanwhile, Cochrane had taken advantage of the lull in the fighting to dam Villeré Canal. He hoped to bring boats through the canal in order to ferry 1,500 troops across the Mississippi River. But the dam failed, and the number of boats actually brought forward made it possible to move only 600 troops to the opposite shore.[212]

The Battle of New Orleans

The British battle plan called for Colonel William Thornton, who had been wounded at Bladensburg, to lead the troops across the river and launch a night attack against the American position there, which was defended by about 700 ill-trained Louisiana and Kentucky militia under the command of Major General David B. Morgan. Thornton was to seize the American guns and turn them on Jackson’s main line across the river. Then at dawn Pakenham’s principal force, about 5,300 strong, was to advance in three columns across Chalmette’s plantation to Jackson’s main line, which was now defended by 4,700 men.[213]

Thornton fell behind schedule and did not launch his attack until nearly daylight on January 8. His troops routed the militia and gained possession of the American guns, one of which was a brass howitzer that carried the inscription “taken at the surrender of York town 1781.” Even though Morgan’s men had not spiked all their guns before retreating, Thornton had no chance to follow up on his victory. The British attack on the other side of the river had stalled, and Thornton was ordered to withdraw.[214]

The main British force attacked about an hour and a half after Thornton. A fog covered the advance for a time, but it lifted suddenly, leaving the British troops completely exposed to American fire. When the British got within 500 yards, the Americans started firing their big guns. When they were within 300 yards, American riflemen opened up; and when they got within 100 yards, those with muskets opened fire. “The atmosphere,” said one American, “was filled with sheets of fire, and volumes of smoke.”[215] The effect of this fire—particularly the grape and canister from the American artillery—was devastating. According to a British veteran of the Napoleonic Wars, it was “the most murderous [fire] I ever beheld before or since.”[216] The Americans, by contrast, remained under cover, firing their big guns and small arms without exposing themselves to enemy fire.

All along the battle line the British were mowed down before they could get near the American earthworks. Only a small column advancing along the riverbank got to the American line, but these troops suffered such withering fire that they had to fall back. The fire was so intense that many hardened British veterans hit the ground or fled. Pakenham did his best to rally his men, but as he rode across the battlefield he made a conspicuous target. A horse was shot out from under him, and he was twice wounded. Shortly after commandeering another horse, he was “cut asunder by a cannon ball.”[217]

This panoramic view of the Battle of New Orleans is based on a sketch drawn up by Jackson’s chief engineer, Arsène Lacarrière Latour. The drawing understates the height of the American defense works, focuses the viewer’s eye on the British assault column along the river, and shows little of the carnage that the British suffered elsewhere on the battlefield. (Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812)

Major General John Lambert, who took command after Pakenham fell, broke off the engagement. “It was a disastrous affair from beginning to end,” recalled a young British naval volunteer.[218] The battle had lasted only a half hour on the eastern side of the river, and yet the toll was terrific. One eyewitness said the field was a terrible sight to behold, “with dead and wounded laying in heaps”—all dressed in scarlet British uniforms.[219] Those who had thrown themselves to the ground in the heat of battle got up when the fighting ended. A few fled but most surrendered. One officer reportedly surrendered because “these d—d Yankee riflemen can pick a squirrel’s eye out as far as they can see it.”[220]

Lambert asked for an armistice to remove the wounded and bury the dead, and Jackson agreed. The British hastily interred their dead in common graves. “The bodies [were] hurled in as fast as we could bring them,” recalled an officer.[221] Pakenham’s body was shipped to England for burial. “Our lamented General’s remains,” said a fellow officer, “were put in a cask of spirits and taken home by his Military Secretary.”[222] Although Cochrane apparently urged Lambert to renew the attack, the British general refused, convinced that this would only lead to more slaughter. The battle was therefore over.[223]

The battle on January 8, 1815—which was the Battle of New Orleans—was the most lopsided engagement of the war. The British lost over 2,000 men (including close to 500 captured). The United States, by contrast, lost only about seventy men, and only thirteen on Jackson’s side of the river.[224] “The vast disparity of loss,” said the National Intelligencer, “would stagger credulity itself, were it not confirmed by a whole army of witnesses.”[225] During the major engagements in the New Orleans campaign—from December 23 to January 8—the British lost 400 killed, 1,500 wounded, and 550 missing or captured—a total of 2,450 men. The United States, by contrast, suffered only 50 killed, 200 wounded, and 100 missing or captured, for a total loss of 350 men.[226]

The British held their positions for another ten days, and additional skirmishing occasionally took place. Cochrane also brought his fleet into action by sending a squadron of ships up the Mississippi to bombard Fort St. Philip, which was located sixty-five miles downriver from New Orleans. The British reportedly spent 70 tons of shells and 20,000 pounds of powder in the ten-day assault but failed to batter the fort into submission.[227] This was the last battle in the series of engagements around New Orleans. When the British withdrew from the area, they carried off some runaway slaves but left behind eighty seriously wounded soldiers and a large quantity of war material.[228]

Jackson’s Iron Grip

Jackson realized that the British attack was over but was reluctant to loosen his grip on the Crescent City.[229] This exasperated local residents. In late December Jackson had heard that the Louisiana legislature was considering capitulation. Although skeptical of the report, he asked Governor Claiborne to investigate and if the report proved true “to blow up the legislature.”[230] Claiborne responded by dispatching armed men to close down the legislature. Although the legislators reconvened several days later, they were much perturbed with Jackson. When they later voted their thanks to those who had saved the city, Jackson’s name was conspicuously absent.[231]

Jackson had proclaimed martial law in New Orleans on December 16, mainly to prevent spies from moving freely into and out of the city.[232] Although reports of peace arrived as early as February 19, 1815, Jackson refused to lift martial law until official news came on March 13.[233] In the meantime, he continued his dictatorial rule in the city. When a member of the legislature wrote a newspaper article complaining, Jackson had him jailed, and when the federal district court judge, Dominick A. Hall, ordered the victim released, Jackson had the judge jailed. When the war ended, Hall hauled Jackson into court, where he was convicted of contempt and fined $1,000.[234] “The only question,” said the judge, “was whether the Law should bend to the General or the General to the Law.”[235] (In 1844, the year before the aging and now destitute hero of New Orleans died, Congress refunded the fine with interest—$2,733 in all.)[236]

Jackson also dealt severely with 200 Tennessee militia who had allegedly deserted in September 1814. Although ordered out for six months of duty, the men were convinced that they could be required to serve only three months and hence had gone home. Jackson ordered the men seized and tried by military tribunal in Mobile in December 1814. The court found them guilty. Most were sentenced to forfeit part of their pay and make up lost time and then were drummed out of camp with their heads partly shaved. The six ringleaders—a sergeant and five privates—did not get off so easily. Convicted of desertion and mutiny, they were executed by a firing squad on February 21, 1815. Although the Battle of New Orleans catapulted Jackson into the limelight, his enemies never let the public forget his severe brand of military justice.[237]

Capture of Fort Bowyer

The fighting was not quite over on the Gulf Coast, for having failed at New Orleans, the British turned again to Mobile as a consolation prize. In early February, Fort Bowyer was surrounded on three sides by warships, and 5,000 men under Major General Lambert were put on shore. The British landed cannons, which were placed within 100 yards of the fort. On February 11, after some light skirmishing, Major William Lawrence, who had only 375 men with which to defend the fort, surrendered. This closed out the campaign, since news of peace arrived before the British could occupy Mobile.[238]

The United States made a good showing in the fighting on land in the campaign of 1814. On the northern frontier, American troops had been rebuffed at Mackinac but had defeated the British at Chippawa, fought them to a draw at Lundy’s Lane, and beat them twice at Fort Erie. American forces also had compelled the British to retreat from Plattsburgh—a result of Macdonough’s great victory on Lake Champlain. On the Atlantic Coast the British had occupied eastern Maine and burned the nation’s capital but had been repulsed at Baltimore. Moreover, they had suffered one of the greatest military disasters in British history when they attacked New Orleans. The American victories were largely a tribute to good leaders—Scott, Brown, Macomb, and Macdonough in the North; Smith at Baltimore; and Jackson at New Orleans—and effective troops. After two years of campaigning, Madison finally had found competent generals and soldiers to fight his war.

Loss of the President

Most American warships were bottled up in port in 1814, and the U.S. Navy actually lost more vessels inland than on the high seas. The occupation of Washington forced the destruction of the Columbia (rated at 44 guns) and the Argus (rated at 22 guns), and the conquest of eastern Maine led to the burning of the Adams (28 guns). Ships in the North had the best chance of getting to sea because westerly winds sometimes blew blockading vessels off their assigned stations. Finding enough experienced seamen for a crew, however, was not always easy because of competition from privateers and the army.[239]

The nation’s greatest loss at sea was the U.S. Frigate President (53 guns). This heavy frigate had such a fine reputation that in 1812 Captain William Bainbridge, who commanded the Constitution, had offered Captain John Rodgers $5,000 to trade ships.[240] Rodgers had refused, which enabled Bainbridge to make his reputation in the Constitution. By 1815 Captain Stephen Decatur commanded the President. Taking advantage of a severe snowstorm, he slipped out of New York harbor on January 14, 1815. His plan was to sail to the Straits of Malacca and target the East India Company’s rich China fleet. Although considered a good sailer, the ship ran aground on a sand bar shortly after leaving port and got so twisted around before breaking free that she evidently lost some of her speed.[241]

The following day the President was chased by a squadron of British ships that included one heavy frigate, the Endymion (47 guns), and two light ones, the Pomone (47 guns?) and Tenedos (47 guns?). The Endymion was one of the fastest ships in the Royal Navy, and her commander, Captain Henry Hope, made the most of her speed. In a superb display of seamanship, Hope kept his ship on President’s starboard quarter and repeatedly battered the American ship. Decatur could not respond with his superior firepower unless he brought his ship around, and he could not do this for fear of being caught by the trailing British ships. Decatur eventually forced the Endymion off by disabling her with star-shot, but by then he had lost a fifth of his crew, his ship was badly damaged, and the rest of the British squadron was upon him. Decatur therefore surrendered. The British carefully studied this heavy frigate before she was condemned. They also built an exact copy as a trophy ship.[242]

Last Cruise of “Old Ironsides”

The Constitution (52 guns), on the other hand, continued her run of good luck. Commanded now by Captain Charles Stewart, she slipped out of Boston harbor in December 1814. On February 20, 1815, 200 miles from Madeira, she met two British ships, the Cyane (33 guns), Captain Gordon Falcon commanding, and the Levant (21 guns), Captain George Douglass. The British commanders were so confident of their seamanship that instead of fleeing they engaged the more powerful American ship. The Constitution was superbly handled by Stewart and his men, and their gunnery was equally sharp. The Constitution was able to rake both her antagonists without being raked herself, and as a result both British ships were forced to surrender. The Constitution had to flee from a British squadron, but “Old Ironsides” made it back to port with her reputation much enhanced. The British recaptured the Levant, but a prize crew made it to the United States with the Cyane.[243]

The United States constructed six new sloops during the war. Like the heavy frigates, they were designed to outsail any ship they could not outfight, but their principal purpose was commerce destruction. Although finding guns and crews for these vessels was difficult, three of them—the Hornet (20 guns), Peacock (22 guns), and Wasp (22 guns)—made successful cruises in 1814. These vessels defeated a number of British ships, including the Penguin (19 guns), Reindeer (19 guns), Avon (18 guns), and Epervier (18 guns), the last of which was carrying $128,000 in specie. The British, in turn, captured the Frolic (22 guns), Syren (16 guns), and Rattlesnake (16 guns). The Wasp was lost at sea when she went down with all hands for unknown reasons.[244]

In 1814 the United States launched two ships-of-the-line, the Independence in June and the Washington in October. Apart from a small battleship given to France during the Revolution, these were the first such vessels constructed in America. Both were poorly designed and neither was ready for sea before the end of the war. Robert Fulton launched the world’s first steam frigate, Fulton the First (32 guns) at the end of October in 1814. This vessel was built for the protection of New York harbor, but the war ended before she could be given a fair test. Fulton and others also did pioneering work in the development of submarines and mines (which contemporaries called “torpedoes”). Several attempts were made to use crude submarines to attach mines to blockading British ships but without much success.[245]

Impact of Privateers

American warships and privateers continued to harass British commerce in the last year of the war. According to the Naval Chronicle, “The depredations committed on our commerce by American ships of war, and privateers, has attained an extent beyond all former precedent.” “On the ocean, and even on our own coasts,” the Morning Chronicle complained, “we have been insulted with impunity.”[246] Although warships usually burned their prizes to prevent them from being retaken, privateers generally put a prize crew on board to try to get the vessel to a friendly port.

The Atlantic swarmed with so many American privateers and Royal Navy warships in 1814 that some British merchantmen were captured and recaptured several times. Insurance rates for British ships sailing from Liverpool to Halifax jumped to 30 percent, and underwriters publicly complained about their losses.[247] “Each daily book at L[l]oyd’s [of London],” said one, “presents a tremendous list for our contemplation.”[248]

The favorite haunt of American privateers in 1814 was the British Isles. British merchantmen trading in these waters were not required to sail in convoy and thus made easy targets for privateers, which “in summer weather and light breezes eluded all attempts of the king’s ships to catch them.”[249] American privateers were particularly active in the Irish Sea, and insurance rates for ships trading between England and Ireland rose to an unprecedented 13 percent.[250] According to the Naval Chronicle, this rate was “three times higher than it was when we were at war with all Europe!”[251]

People living in Greenock, an unfortified city on the coast of Scotland, reportedly gave up their trade with the Continent and “live[d] in constant apprehension of a visit from an American national ship or privateer.”[252] Merchants in Bristol complained that American depredations had “increased to a most alarming extent,” forcing them to suspend much of their trade.[253] In Glasgow, merchants bitterly protested the lack of protection, calling the situation “discreditable to the directors of the naval power of the British nation.”[254] There were similar complaints from London and Liverpool.[255] “In the chops of the Channel . . . in our own seas,” said a member of Parliament, “the American privateers had come and carried off our vessels.”[256]

In the interest of economy, the British government had demobilized part of its fleet after Napoleon’s defeat, including many smaller vessels that had the best chance of catching privateers.[257] Much to the chagrin of protesting British merchants, the Admiralty still claimed that “there was a force adequate to the purpose of protecting the trade, both in St. George’s Channel and the Northern Sea.”[258] The Admiralty also criticized British merchants for not sailing in convoy, although, as the Times pointed out, even convoys were sometimes unsafe. “The American cruisers,” the paper said, “daily venture in among our convoys, seize prizes in sight of those that should afford them protection, and if pursued ‘put on their sea-wings’ and laugh at the clumsy English pursuers.”[259] Such was the public outcry that members of the opposition were able to secure a Parliamentary investigation into the conduct of the war at sea.[260]

A number of privateers recorded spectacular cruises in 1814. The Prince-de-Neufchatel (17 guns) captured or destroyed $1 million in British property in a single cruise. The Governor Tompkins (14 guns) stripped and burned 14 prizes in the English Channel, while the Harpy (14 guns) returned to the United States after a 20-day cruise with booty worth more than $400,000.[261] Captain Thomas Boyle, who commanded the Chasseur (16 guns)—“the pride of Baltimore”—added insult to injury by sailing into a British port and issuing a proclamation that mocked British blockade notices. Boyle announced a blockade of “all the ports, harbours, bays, creeks, rivers, inlets, outlets, islands and sea coast of the united kingdom of G. Britain and Ireland.”[262]

Privateers usually fled from British warships, and when unable to escape surrendered. But there were exceptions. In September 1814 boats from a squadron of Royal Navy ships attacked the General Armstrong (14 guns) while she was anchored in the territorial waters of the Azores, a Portuguese possession. Twice the privateer beat back the British boats, each time inflicting heavy casualties. Ultimately the privateer had to be scuttled, and her crew took refuge on shore. The British had suffered close to 200 casualties compared to only nine on the American privateer. “The Americans,” said an British observer, “fought with great firmness, but more like bloodthirsty savages than anything else.”[263] Royal Navy officials were so embarrassed by their losses that they refused to allow any mail on the vessels that carried their wounded back to England.[264]

When boats from a Royal Navy squadron attacked the American privateer General Armstrong in the Azores in 1814, the British sustained heavy casualties. The privateer was eventually abandoned, the American crew escaping to the shore, but for the British it was a costly victory. (Lithograph by N. Currier. Library of Congress)

The following month H.M. Ship Endymion (47 guns) found herself becalmed off Nantucket in sight of the privateer Prince-de-Neufchatel (17 guns). The American ship had just completed a successful cruise and had more than $200,000 in prize goods on board. She had manned so many prizes that her original crew had shrunk from 150 to 40. The captain of the British frigate sent his boats to capture the American vessel, but the attack failed. The British lost 100 men, while the Americans lost only thirty. The privateer had only ten healthy seamen at the end of the engagement, but she managed to slip away and reach port safely.[265]

On February 26, 1815, near Havana, Cuba, the Chasseur, now carrying 14 guns but still commanded by Captain Boyle, fell in with H.M. Schooner St. Lawrence (15 guns). Mistaking the British vessel for an armed merchantman, Boyle closed. By the time he discovered his mistake, it was too late to escape. “I should not willingly perhaps, have sought a contest with a king’s vessel,” he reported, “knowing it was not our object; but my expectations were at first a valuable vessel and a valuable cargo also.”[266] After a bloody fifteen-minute engagement, the St. Lawrence struck her colors.[267] This, of course, was an exceptional case, for the Royal Navy succeeded in capturing many privateers. But those that remained free continued to bedevil British commerce, although it is doubtful that they had much of an impact on the outcome of the war.

Results of the Campaign

All in all, the campaign of 1814 turned out well for the United States. Although thrown on the defensive everywhere but in the West, the nation was able to defeat British offensives at Plattsburgh, Baltimore, and New Orleans. The only notable successes of the British were the occupation of Maine and the burning of Washington. In all three campaigns during the war (1812, 1813, and 1814), the defending side had fared better than the attacking side. This was because most offensive operations required moving men and material long distances, often over rough and heavily wooded terrain. Defending armies, by contrast, operated closer to home and their sources of supply. Thus, after three years of campaigning, neither the United States nor Great Britain could claim any great advantage in the war, let alone victory. Militarily, the War of 1812 ended in a draw.

Chapter 9

The Crisis of 1814

By the fall of 1814 it was clear to everyone that the United States faced a crisis. The war had changed dramatically since the beginning of the year. Freed from the contest in Europe, Great Britain was able to mount one campaign in the Chesapeake and prepare a second against the Gulf Coast while still maintaining a large army in Canada. “We are contending with an exasperated foe,” said a Republican paper, “whose mighty power will soon be levelled at our liberties.”[1] Menaced on every front, Americans viewed the war with a growing sense of foreboding. “Our affairs,” said Secretary of the Navy William Jones, “are as gloomy as can well be.” “These may be truly said to be the times that try men’s souls,” added the New York National Advocate.[2]

Problems with the Army

The most pressing problem the nation faced was raising troops to wage the next campaign. Although the actual strength of the army was about 40,000, the reporting procedures were so bad that the administration thought there were only about 30,000 men in uniform.[3] Even though the army was larger than supposed, it was still well below the authorized level (62,500) and well below the nation’s needs.

Without enough regulars to protect its frontiers, the nation was forced to rely increasingly on militia, but these troops were costly and inefficient. James Monroe estimated that it took three times as many citizen soldiers to do the work of regulars. Relying on militia had other disadvantages. Besides disrupting normal life, frequent calls deprived the regular army of potential recruits because they were siphoned off by men willing to pay large premiums to secure substitutes for militia duty.[4] Although most Americans recognized the liabilities of militia, few were optimistic about raising additional regulars by conventional means. “It is nonsense to talk of regulars,” said Jefferson. “We might as well rely on calling down an army of angels from heaven.”[5]

The administration had trouble not only raising troops but also controlling those already in the service. Dueling became so prevalent among officers in 1814 that the War Department had to threaten to dismiss those who engaged in the practice.[6] More serious was the problem of desertion, which increased dramatically in 1814 because of bounty-jumping. Men agreed to join the army, accepted the first portion of the bounty, and then disappeared. “Desertion prevails to an allarming Extent among the Recruits before they join the Army,” complained Major General George Izard in July 1814.[7] A statistical study has shown that 12.7 percent of American troops deserted during the war, and almost half of these were recruited in 1814.[8] In the last year of the war it was not uncommon for newspapers to run side-by-side ads that offered bounties for new recruits and rewards for the capture of deserters.[9]

How to deal with deserters posed a dilemma. Executing those who were caught might serve as a deterrent to others, but, as one officer pointed out, this undermined the recruiting service.[10] Moreover, men who deserted when sickness was prevalent, pay in arrears, or rations short seemed entitled to a measure of mercy. Often what the army did was to sentence first-time deserters to death and then pardon them, while reserving execution for repeat offenders.[11]

As the incidence of desertion increased, however, some people called for tougher measures. “Examples must be made of Deserters,” said William Jones, “as the evil is greatly increasing.” “We believe nothing would put a stop to this growing evil sooner,” added the Lexington Reporter, “than the certainty of suffering death for the first offence.”[12] The president, however, preferred a more cautious policy. In June 1814, he issued a proclamation (as he had in 1812) promising to pardon all deserters who surrendered within three months. In addition, the War Department authorized a $50 reward for the capture of deserters.[13] But the problem continued to plague the nation, and the number of executions carried out by the army steadily mounted: from three in 1812, to thirty-two in 1813, to 146 in 1814.[14]

National Bankruptcy Looms

The nation was also plagued by financial problems. Financial conditions had deteriorated badly since the beginning of the year. The $6 million loan offered in July had netted only $2.5 million at a 20 percent discount.[15] This left the government far short of the funds it needed for 1814, and the prospects for raising money in 1815 were bleaker still. “Something must be done and done speedily,” said William Jones, “or we shall have an opportunity of trying the experiment of maintaining an army and navy and carrying on a vigorous war without money.”[16]

The proportion of military executions during the War of 1812—mostly for desertion or mutiny—was much higher than in any war since. This illustration accompanied what was almost certainly a fictional account of a soldier who was executed for twice deserting to visit his mother. In an extraordinary and improbable twist, the story claims that the firing squad included the elder brother of the condemned man. (United States Military Magazine, February, 1841)

The service chiefs were already scrambling for funds to meet their most pressing obligations. Secretary Jones reported that the Navy Department was “destitute of money in all quarters” and that he had no funds for even “the most urgent contingent purposes.”[17] Captain Stephen Decatur was unable to meet the operational expenses of his ship, and Commodore Isaac Chauncey complained that his men were “very clamorous for their pay.”[18] In some port cities the lack of funds brought recruiting to a standstill. “Not a man can be procured here,” said one officer. “Men will not ship without cash,” declared another. “With treasury notes,” added a third, “it will be impossible to enter men for the service in this part of our country.”[19]

The War Department faced similar problems. Lack of funds idled the Springfield armory, and according to Major General Thomas Pinckney, recruiting was “completely at a stand for want of the necessary means to carry it on.”[20] In Virginia, militia from “the most democratic part” of the state mutinied for want of pay, and in New Hampshire paying off discharged militia with treasury notes “disaffected many of them against the cause of their country.”[21] Elsewhere discharged militia remained in camp for want of funds or sold their government claims at a steep discount.[22] The pay of many regulars was six to twelve months in arrears and in some cases even more.[23] According to one Federalist, it was notorious that the army paymaster “was unable to meet demands for paltry amounts—not even for $30.”[24]

The lack of funds was felt in other ways. Joseph Willcocks, the renegade Canadian who organized the Canadian Volunteers, said that recruits who received no bounty considered themselves in the service only as long as they were actively campaigning and that his authority over them was “slender, Limited and uncertain.”[25] In one district lack of funds prevented army officials from pursuing deserters or paying the reward advertised for their return.[26] In New England government officials could not afford to care for prisoners of war, and in New York the apothecary general was completely destitute of supplies.[27] “The Supply of Hospital stores . . . for the use of Our Armies on the Northern & western Frontier,” he said, “has been for some time exhausted.”[28] Having stretched public credit to the limit, many government officials and contractors had to borrow money on their own signatures to get badly needed supplies.[29] The failure to pay contractors or soldiers could have wider consequences. In faraway St. Louis, members of a Ranger company had borrowed heavily in anticipation of their pay. When the pay was not forthcoming, the local economy shut down. “The bankruptcy of the U.S. Treasury,” said a resident, “causes a complete stagnation of business in this place.”[30]

The government also had trouble meeting its obligations abroad. Funds were needed to support the diplomatic corps, pay the interest on that portion of the national debt held overseas, and provide for the care of American prisoners of war in England. Unable to raise the money it needed, the government fell $128,000 in debt to its Dutch bankers and had to rely on advances from the House of Baring in England. By the end of 1814, these advances totaled almost $200,000.[31]

Public credit, already slipping badly, received another blow in November when the government defaulted on the national debt. Unable to pay the interest in specie (as required by law), the Treasury Department offered bondholders in Boston treasury notes, depreciated bank paper, or government bonds.[32] War bonds fell to 75 percent of their nominal value in most cities and were quoted as low as 60 percent in Boston. Treasury notes also declined in value, often circulating at a 15- to 25-percent discount.[33] To make matters worse, the government defaulted on the notes that fell due in late 1814.[34] By this time, most banks were unwilling to accept treasury notes as security for government loans, and only the neediest of government contractors would take them in payment.[35] “I[t] is impossible to procure wood, labour, or forage, without Cash,” reported a deputy commissary in New Hampshire.[36] Even in the specie-rich West, banks refused to lend money because of “the great amt. of Bills drawn on the Govt. returning under Protest—or unpaid.”[37]

Suspension of Specie Payments

The government’s financial woes were further compounded by the suspension of specie payments in the summer of 1814. After the dissolution of the national bank in 1811, the number of state banks had risen dramatically, from 117 in 1811 to 212 in 1815.[38] According to the Washington National Intelligencer, new banks had sprung up “like a crop of mushrooms in a night,” and many were “unincorporated and irresponsible.”[39] Without a national bank to restrain them, the banks greatly increased their note issue, both to accommodate needy customers and to invest in war bonds. From 1811 to 1815 the face value of bank notes in circulation rose from $66 million to $115 million.[40]

During the same period the amount of specie in the country actually declined. The dissolution of the national bank drained $7 million to pay off European stockholders, and during the war specie flowed from the middle and southern states to New England and from there into Canada to finance illegal imports and the purchase of British government notes and British bills of exchange. According to contemporary reports, $2 million in gold was shipped from the United States to Canada in early 1814 and another $1.8 million the following summer.[41] “The Specie is constantly going in Cart Loads to Canada,” said a Massachusetts Federalist. Between New England and Canada, “there is an uninterrupted trade in Bills of the British Gov’t.”[42] The result was an acute shortage of hard money. “The scarcity of money throughout the UStates,” claimed a Virginia firm, “has never been equalled.”[43]

With their specie reserves shrinking and their note issue expanding, many banks found themselves in a precarious position. In August 1814 the British invasion of the Chesapeake started a run on the banks in Washington and Baltimore, forcing them to suspend specie payments. Other banks in the middle and southern states quickly followed suit, and eventually those in the West did, too. Only the New England banks, which had large specie reserves and were closely regulated by state law, held out. But even they had to retrench in order to remain solvent.[44]

Once the banks went off a specie-paying basis, they stopped honoring each other’s notes. As a result, the administration could no longer transfer funds from one part of the country to another. Although government surpluses accumulated in some banks in the middle and southern states, federal funds were quickly exhausted in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, where most of the interest on the national debt was due. The suspension of specie payments hurt the government in another way. Bank paper circulated at a 15- to 30-percent discount, and yet the Treasury accepted it at par for taxes and loans. With only depreciated bank notes and treasury notes coming into the Treasury, the government had no currency that could readily be used to meet its obligations.[45] For all practical purposes, public credit was extinct and the government was bankrupt. “Public as well as private, credits,” said a government contractor, “are lower than I have ever known either before.”[46]

Growing Trade with the Enemy

Were these problems not vexing enough, the administration also had to contend with trade with the enemy. Although the embargo and non-importation acts had been repealed the previous spring, Americans were still barred from trading with the British or importing British-owned goods. Nevertheless, the influx of British troops into the New World created such a demand for provisions that trade with the enemy rose dramatically in 1814. Smugglers and government officials waged a running battle, and the smugglers were winning.

The mushrooming trade with Canada was particularly alarming. This trade brought British goods into the United States, drained specie from American banks, and put food in the mouths of British soldiers. Much of the trade was carried on by sea, and not all of it violated American law. When the British seized eastern Maine in September 1814, they made Castine a port of entry. Swedish vessels ran immense quantities of British-made goods from Castine up the Penobscot River to Hampden, and from there the merchandise was distributed to other parts of New England. Neutral ships flying Swedish and Spanish colors also operated on Lake Champlain.[47] The trade with Canada ran heavily against the United States, draining specie from the nation’s banks. Nevertheless, the government condoned it as long as it was conducted in neutral ships. “A neutral vessel and Cargo coming from any part of the British dominions,” said a Treasury official, “may be admitted to an entry in any part of the United States.”[48]

The overland trade—both with British-occupied Maine and with Canada—was even greater. Cattle, grain, and other provisions flowed into Castine and other parts of occupied Maine in enormous quantities. “The trade appears as free & open as in time of peace,” said William Eustis; “20, 30, & 50 waggon loads are passing almost daily.”[49] Livestock and provisions also poured across the border into Canada. “From the St. Lawrence to the Ocean,” reported Major General Izard in the summer of 1814, “an open Disregard prevails for the Laws prohibiting Intercourse with the Enemy. The Road to St. Regis is covered with Droves of Cattle, and the River with Rafts destined for the Enemy.”[50] As a result of this trade, British troops feasted on American provisions. “Two thirds of the army in Canada,” Governor George Prevost boasted in August 1814, “are at this moment eating beef provided by American contractors, drawn principally from the States of Vermont and New York.”[51]

Americans also shipped naval stores to Canada. On several occasions Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough seized ship timber and other materials destined for British warships on Lake Champlain.[52] Military intelligence flowed across the border as well. “The turpitude of many of our citizens in this part of the country,” Macdonough complained, “furnishes the Enemy with every information he wants.”[53]

American officials found it difficult to halt this growing trade. Customs officials could not legally search every type of vehicle or make preventive seizures, and the enemy trade act of 1812 was so loosely drawn that some exports to Canada were actually legal. Revenue officials in Vermont were further hampered by a series of unfavorable judicial decisions. The state courts had ruled that the inspectors employed by customs officials had no authority to make seizures and were liable to damages even if the merchandise they seized was condemned.[54]

Federal attorneys could offer little help because it was difficult to indict and almost impossible to convict smugglers. Moreover, the attorney general had ruled that visiting the enemy was not illegal. The prosecution had to prove that the accused furnished “improper information” or “supplies.”[55] Canny New England farmers circumvented the law by marching their livestock to the border, where a Canadian cohort would entice the animals across with a basket of corn.[56]

According to the Salem Gazette, smuggling had become “the most lucrative business which is now carried on.” The profits were so great that smugglers could “afford to lose one half by custom house spies, and yet make money faster than those who follow the ‘dull pursuits’ of regular business.”[57] Moreover, anyone who interfered with the trade risked a damage suit or worse. A Vermont militia officer who sought to prevent livestock from reaching Canada was thrown into jail, and a mob assaulted a Boston customs official who had seized a wagonload of suspected British goods. In the interior, the possibility of violence was greater. Two revenue officers were killed and two others wounded in a clash with smugglers near Belfast, Maine.[58] According to Major General Izard, “Nothing but a Cordon of Troops, from the French Mills [in northern New York] to Lake Memphramagog [in northern Vermont] could effectually check the Evil.”[59]

The Wartime Economy

Lack of men and money and mounting trade with the enemy all contributed to the crisis of 1814. So too did deteriorating economic conditions, which eroded the nation’s tax base and generated political discontent, especially in New England. In spite of their many differences, the South and New England shared a common fate in this war. In different ways both were tied to the sea and both experienced economic hardship. The middle and western states, by contrast, fared much better. In these states money could still be made, especially from government contracts and manufacturing, and the result was at least a modest prosperity.

Pennsylvania fared particularly well. Most of the army’s principal supply officers used Philadelphia as a base of operations, and one of the army’s two major supply routes ran from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh and thence further west. Large quantities of army supplies were purchased in the state, and a great deal of money passed through Pennsylvania’s banks. In the last quarter of 1812 alone, the Treasury Department deposited more than $1 million in two Philadelphia banks.[60] “The pressure of the war,” said a Philadelphia merchant in 1813, “has been as yet but little felt.” “The war-hawks,” added a Federalist newspaper, “are thriving and fattening upon the hard earnings of the industrious and peaceable part of the community.”[61]

According to one report, more buildings were constructed in Philadelphia in the summer of 1814 than at any time in memory. “Real Estate in Town & Country has in general considerably advanced since the war,” said a merchant. “Lands are at least 1/3 higher & many plantations have sold for double what they would have brought three years ago.” Not until the fall of 1814, when several business failures in New York sent shock waves through Philadelphia, did business finally slow down.[62]

New York prospered even more. People in the Empire State were deeply involved in the trade with the enemy, but the real source of their prosperity was the largess of the federal government. The second of the army’s two major supply routes originated in New York City and ran up the Hudson River and then north to the frontier or west to Lake Ontario.[63] To support American troops in the state, the federal government spent enormous sums of money. Although the price of rations varied, it usually cost about $500,000 to feed 10,000 troops for a year, and more than $1 million to pay their wages.[64]

One army contractor in New York sold $500,000 in rations in 1812, $250,000 over three months in 1813, and $850,000 over a seven-month period in 1814. Another received $270,000 from the government over a three-month period in 1814, and this covered less than half of his expenses.[65] The army paymaster also disbursed large sums in the state—$400,000 to pay soldiers in the last three months of 1813 alone.[66] Government expenditures had a particularly buoyant effect on New York agriculture. “The market for the produce of the farmer,” said Governor Daniel Tompkins in late 1812, “has experienced an unexpected and unusual rise.”[67]

The middle states benefited not only from war contracts but also from manufacturing. Many small industrial plants established during the early years of the restrictive system flourished during the war.[68] In Pennsylvania, Republican leaders saw manufacturing as the nation’s salvation because, unlike commerce, it did not lead to foreign entanglements. “Years of experience,” said Governor Simon Snyder in late 1811, “must convince us that foreign commerce is a good but of a secondary nature, and that happiness and prosperity must be sought for within the limits of our country and not in foreign connections.”[69]

Like the middle states, the West also prospered during the war. Military operations in this region brought in large sums of federal money, particularly to Kentucky and Ohio. More than $400,000 was sent to these two states in late 1812, and a contractor there said this was “but a drop in the Bucket.” An additional $1 million would be needed for the first three months of 1813.[70] The Miami Exporting Company of Cincinnati—which was actually a bank—took in over $1 million in government drafts in a seven-month period in 1812–1813.[71] In fact, the government spent so much on its western operations in the first year of the war that John Armstrong accused westerners of profiteering—of selling produce at three times the peace price and of putting everyone on the payroll. “The war is [considered] a good thing,” he grumbled, “and is to be nursed.”[72]

According to Henry Clay, so much specie flowed into the West during the war that eastern bills of exchange (which normally sold at a premium) began passing at a discount. In effect, the West’s traditional debtor relationship with the East was temporarily reversed. Clay attributed this state of affairs to “the effects of the War, and the military operations in that quarter.”[73] Western banks were able to build up large specie reserves and only reluctantly suspended payment when the banking collapse came in 1814. According to Congressman Joseph Hawkins, “the banks of Kentucky and Ohio (where specie abounded) had at length been compelled in self-defence to stop payment.”[74]

Western cities—Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Lexington, Louisville, and St. Louis—all enjoyed a booming prosperity during the war.[75] A Boston merchant visiting Lexington in 1813 was surprised at the prosperity he saw. “I find in this country an entire reverse of New-England in regard to business. Here there is no competition, and every thing [is] brisk and profitable. The war, so far from depressing the people of the Western States, is making the greater proportion of them rich.”[76] Rural areas also benefited because of the army’s huge appetite for provisions. Commodity prices rose, and western farmers had a ready market for their produce.[77] Even after military expenditures fell off in 1814, the western economy continued to flourish. “Blessed with bountiful crops,” said Governor Isaac Shelby in late 1814, “we have great reason . . . to congratulate each other on the plentiful appearance which our country exhibits.”[78]

In sharp contrast to the middle and western states, the South suffered during the war. People living in the Chesapeake region made their share of money from privateering, manufacturing, and government contracts, and when the militia was called out in 1813 and 1814 federal money flowed into the region. But the South was heavily dependent on the export of agricultural produce, and this trade evaporated in 1813 when the British stopped issuing licenses and established their blockade.

Commodity prices began to sag at the end of 1812 and then dropped precipitously in 1813. In response Georgia, Maryland, and North Carolina enacted stay laws to protect debtors.[79] Conditions got worse in 1814, when Virginia wheat fell below 50 cents a bushel, and farmers began feeding it to their livestock.[80] Tobacco farmers fared no better. A North Carolina congressman complained in 1812 that he had “not Sold a Single pound of my Small crops of tobacco for the three Last years,” and by 1814 Jefferson reported that tobacco was “not worth the pipe it is smoked in.”[81] “The whole country watered by the rivers which fall into the Chesapeake,” concluded John Randolph, “is in a state of paralysis.”[82] People living in the lower South were also dependent on the export of produce, and they too suffered from the war. “I believe that if the war should last three years longer,” William Lowndes said in 1814, “I shall not be worth more than 50 negroes after paying my debts.”[83]

New England also suffered during the war, although some critics have suggested otherwise. In late 1814, Niles’ Register, a Republican magazine published by Hezekiah Niles in Baltimore, cited statistics showing that between 1810 and 1814 specie deposits in Massachusetts banks had risen from $1.6 million to $6.4 million. This increase was the result of a favorable balance of trade with the rest of the Union, and Niles claimed that it was proof that Massachusetts was prospering.[84]

In normal times Niles might have been right, but the times were anything but normal. In fact, the banks in Massachusetts pursued a conservative fiscal policy throughout this period, increasing their loans by only 33 percent and their note issue by only 25 percent.[85] Moreover, once the banks in the South and West suspended specie payments, those in New England had to retrench, calling in existing loans and refusing to make new ones. “The solid banks,” said John Quincy Adams, “were enabled to maintain their integrity, only by contracting their operations to an extent ruinous to their debtors, and themselves.”[86] As a consequence, money became so tight that even the state governments could not borrow the funds they needed.[87]

Many New Englanders, to be sure, prospered during the war. Most farmers fared well, and some money could be made from privateering, manufacturing, and trade with the enemy. Those with government contracts also prospered. Paul Revere and Eli Whitney, for example, both supplied munitions to the army.[88] But New England was too far east to profit from the big army contracts, and few regulars were stationed in the region. New England also called out fewer militia than any other region, and the state governments had to bear a larger share of the cost because of a shortage of federal funds and a dispute over the command of the troops.[89] Indeed, of the $12.6 million that the federal government spent on the wages of militia during the war, only 3.5 percent went to New England.[90]

With extensive commercial and fishing operations, New England was too dependent on the sea to prosper in any war with a great naval power. Massachusetts alone owned more than a third of the nation’s ship tonnage.[91] By the fall of 1813 there were 250 idle ships in Boston harbor, and people were moving out of the city to look for work elsewhere.[92] Many of the ships rotted from inactivity—a significant capital loss. Conditions worsened in 1814. By the end of the year, it cost as much as 75 percent of a ship’s value to insure it for a voyage, and a Boston firm reported that it was “extremely difficult” to sell anything except for immediate consumption and impossible to buy anything except for cash.[93]

Other seaports in New England experienced a similar fate. Property values in Newburyport plummeted 37 percent during the war, and the number of people on public relief rose from 20 to 244.[94] “In Newburyport,” said a contemporary, “the Rich have become poor, & those, who were in comfortable Circumstances, are Mendicants.”[95] Summing up, a Massachusetts Federalist said: “We are in a deplorable situation, our commerce dead; our revenue gone; our ships rotting at the wharves. . . . Our treasury drained—we are bankrupts.”[96]

Disaffection in New England

Prosperity in the middle and western states no doubt contributed to the popularity of the war, but deteriorating economic conditions had the opposite effect in New England. By the fall of 1814, all eyes were on what a New Jersey Federalist called “the cloud arising in the East,” a cloud that was “black, alarming, portentous.”[97] Growing sectionalism in New England was a source of grave concern to Republicans. “It is too plain,” William Duane told Jefferson, “that we are not all republicans nor all federalists—and the spirit of faction in the East . . . has been too much encouraged.”[98] A Philadelphia Republican expressed fear that the moderates in New England “would be driven of[f] the stage by Marats Robenspears Bounapartes etc.,” and the Russian minister claimed that “there is not a state in Europe which, in similar circumstances, would not have been considered on the eve of revolution.”[99]

President Madison found New England’s disaffection alarming. William Wirt described him in October 1814 as “miserably shattered and woe-begone.” “His mind seems full of the New England revolt,” said Wirt; “he introduced the subject & continued to press it, painful as it obviously was to him.”[100] The following month the subject still weighed heavily on the president’s mind. “You are not mistaken,” he wrote a friend, “in viewing the conduct of the Eastern states as the source of our greatest difficulties in carrying on the war; as it certainly is the greatest if not the sole inducement with the enemy to persevere in it.”[101]

Federalist Election Gains and Republican Disillusionment

Throughout the war the Republicans had hoped that favorable election results would shore up their majorities and silence the opposition, but their hopes were never fulfilled. In the elections of 1812, the Federalists had gained control of six of the 18 states (Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland).[102] The following year they lost New Jersey but won Vermont and New Hampshire, which gave them control over all of New England. In 1814 they retained control of these same seven states.[103]

The Republicans fared no better in congressional elections. Most states held their elections for the Fourteenth Congress in 1814 even though this Congress did not convene until the end of 1815. In the House, Republican strength, which had declined from 75 percent in the Twelfth Congress to 63 percent in the Thirteenth, rose slightly to 65 percent in the Fourteenth Congress. In the Senate, however, Republican strength continued to slide: from 82 percent in the Twelfth Congress to 78 percent in the Thirteenth, to 67 percent in the Fourteenth. Although the leading Senate “Invisibles”—Samuel Smith, William Branch Giles, and Michael Leib—were not returned to the Fourteenth Congress, the regular Republicans were little better off than they had been in the Thirteenth Congress.[104]

Thus in neither Congress nor the country were the Republicans able to win the decisive majorities they sought. Although they counted on the war to enhance their popularity and silence the Federalists, the effect of the conflict was just the opposite. In New England especially, the war served as a catalyst for a Federalist revival. As a result, Federalists achieved a more commanding position in this region than at any time since the 1790s.

It was not only the Federalists who opposed the administration. Many Republicans did, too. The Clintonians and “Invisibles” disliked the administration’s management of the war, and the Old Republicans objected to the war itself. The election of 1812 had revealed deep-seated hostility to the Virginia Dynasty, and by 1814 even regular Republicans had become disillusioned with the party’s leadership. “If we have another disastrous campaign in Canada,” said George Hay of Virginia, “the republican cause is ruined, and Mr. M[adison] will go out covered with the Scorn of one party, and the reproaches of the other.” “Without a change in the management of the war on the Canadian frontier,” added Nathaniel Macon, “the republican party must go down[.] The people of every part of the Nation, will be disgusted with an administration, who have declared war, without ability to conduct it, to a favorable issue.”[105]

With the disasters of 1814—particularly the burning of Washington—the president and his advisers suffered a further loss in public esteem. “The President is much railed at by many of the Democrats,” said a Philadelphia merchant. “The whole administration is blamed for the late disastrous occurrences at Washington,” declared a Virginia Republican. “Without money, without soldiers & without courage,” concluded Federalist Rufus King, “the President and his Cabinet are the objects of very general execration.”[106]

More Cabinet Changes

The shortage of men and money, expanding trade with the enemy, deteriorating economic conditions, growing disaffection in New England, and discontent within the Republican party—all of these contributed to the crisis of 1814. To compound the nation’s problems, a new round of cabinet changes made it difficult for the administration to respond to the crisis quickly. John Armstrong had resigned from the War Department in August 1814 after being blamed for the burning of Washington.[107] In September Secretary of the Treasury George W. Campbell, who suffered from poor health and was overwhelmed by the nation’s financial problems, followed suit.[108] That same month William Jones, who had fallen deeply into debt, announced that he would resign from the Navy Department no later than December 1.[109] These resignations forced the president to scramble for replacements.

Monroe, who had taken over as acting secretary of war after Armstrong’s departure, accepted the position on a permanent basis.[110] Madison offered Monroe’s old State Department post to Daniel D. Tompkins, governor of New York, but he declined, fearing that his enemies would ruin him if he left the state before justifying some unauthorized defense expenditures.[111] Madison therefore left Monroe in charge as acting secretary of state. The Navy Department, always a difficult post for Republicans to fill, was offered to Captain John Rodgers, but he declined after learning that he would have to give up his naval commission. The president’s next choice was Benjamin W. Crowninshield, a Massachusetts merchant who accepted the post only reluctantly. Although able enough, Crowninshield was without political clout and did not assume office until the war was nearly over.[112]

Alexander J. Dallas of Pennsylvania took over as head of the Treasury Department. Although he had refused to join the cabinet earlier in the year, with Armstrong now gone Dallas agreed to serve, even though he regarded the Treasury Department as “the forlorn hope of executive enterprize.”[113] A Jamaica-born lawyer educated in Great Britain, Dallas sported aristocratic clothing, had a bearing of social and intellectual superiority, and was known to be conservative on many issues.[114] A Virginia Republican described him as “a man of great labor and some talents” but without “that weight of character, which the times require.”[115] Many Pennsylvania Republicans disliked Dallas, but such were his known talents and such was the deplorable condition of the Treasury that even his enemies agreed to accept his appointment. “Tell Doctor Madison,” Senator Abner Lacock reportedly said, “that we are now willing to submit to his Philadelphia lawyer for head of the treasury. The public patient is so very sick that we must swallow anything the doctor prescribes, however nauseous.”[116]

Congress Convenes in Crisis Mode

With the nation in the throes of a crisis and his cabinet in a state of flux, President Madison summoned the Thirteenth Congress for its third and last session. Normally Congress met in November or December, but the previous spring congressional Republicans had called for an October meeting.[117] By August, however, the nation’s military and financial situation had deteriorated so badly that Madison pushed the date up to September 19. An early meeting was essential, he said, to deal with “great and weighty matters.”[118]

Many congressmen were surprised at the extent of damage they found in Washington. “The ruins of the public edifices,” said Jonathan Roberts, “is more complete than I had anticipated.”[119] With government buildings destroyed, everyone had to find new quarters. Madison stayed for a month with his brother-in-law, Richard Cutts, and then moved into the Octagon House, the former residence of the French minister. Cabinet officials rented private buildings to house their departments.[120] With the exception of the French mission, the diplomatic corps fled to Philadelphia, the Russian minister complaining that Washington had “become still more uncomfortable and more expensive than before.”[121] Crawford’s Hotel, a popular Georgetown haunt for congressmen and capital visitors, was more crowded than usual. “I am surrounded,” said William Wirt, “by a vast crowd & bustle of legislators and gentlemen of the turf assembled for the races which commence here tomorrow.”[122]

Alexander J. Dallas (1759–1817) took control of American finances near the end of the war when he was appointed secretary of the treasury. Although his aristocratic bearing did not endear him to many of his fellow Republicans, they swallowed his appointment in the hope of averting national bankruptcy. (Portrait by Freeman Thorp after an original by Gilbert Stuart. Wikimedia Commons)

Congress commandeered the patent office—one of the few undamaged government buildings. According to William Jones, members of Congress were “in bad temper, grumbling at everything.”[123] No doubt the cramped quarters contributed to this mood. Federalist Daniel Webster called the new chambers “confined, inconvenient, and unwholesome,” and Republican Jesse Bledsoe said that the representatives’ room was “too small” and that “Every Kind of privation is enormous.”[124]

The British torched both the White House (then commonly called the Executive Mansion) and the Capitol Building when they occupied Washington, D.C., in August 1814. All that remained of each building was a shell. The president did not move back into the White House until 1817, and members of Congress did not meet again in the Capitol until two years later. (White House: Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812. Capitol: Ink and watercolor by George Munger. Library of Congress)

President Madison dispatched his opening address to Congress on September 20. Hoping to put the best face on events, he brushed aside British victories in order to focus on American triumphs. But he could not deny that a crisis was at hand. “It is not to be disguised,” he said, “that the situation of our country calls for its greatest efforts.” Appealing to the spirit of ’76, Madison expressed confidence that the American people would “cheerfully and proudly bear every burden of every kind which the safety and honor of the nation demand.”[125]

Madison was not optimistic about the prospects for peace, and he gave force to this point in mid-October by sending a bundle of diplomatic documents to Congress. These documents, just received from the nation’s peace envoys in Europe, showed that, while the United States had dropped its own demands, Britain would not restore peace without certain concessions. The British demanded the creation of an Indian reservation in the Old Northwest, territorial concessions in northern Maine and present-day Minnesota, American demilitarization of the Great Lakes, and an end to American fishing privileges in Canadian waters. These terms demonstrated that the two nations were still far apart and that an early end to the war was unlikely.[126]

Response to the Crisis

Given the deepening crisis, all Republicans agreed on the need for forceful measures. “I am deeply impressed with the importance of the present crisis,” said Joseph Varnum of Massachusetts, “and the importance of the adoption of strong and energetic measures.” “If ever a body of men held the destinies of a country in their hands,” John C. Calhoun told the House, “it [is] that which [I am] now addressing.”[127] The only problem was that Republicans could not agree on the best way to meet the crisis. The administration favored extreme measures—raising an army by conscription and creating a national bank—but these proposals stirred so much controversy that neither became law. Although congressional Republicans had shown signs of closing ranks in the previous session, at the height of the war crisis they remained divided.

Federalists also conceded that a crisis was at hand. “I admit the distress of the nation exists to the full extent stated,” said Senator Jeremiah Mason of New Hampshire. “We see and feel it, and have too much reason to believe it will soon become universal. The crisis demands all the wisdom and virtue of the country.”[128] But like the Republicans, the Federalists were also divided. In the hope of working out a common policy, congressional Federalists held a grand strategy meeting at Crawford’s Hotel. The meeting revealed much difference of opinion over whether to support the war. A committee was appointed to study the matter, and it issued a report just after the British peace terms were made public. The report declared that the character of the war had changed and urged Federalists to support bills to raise men and money.[129]

Federalists from the middle and southern states responded favorably to the report. Appalled by the British terms, most now agreed that it was their duty to support the war. Alexander Hanson, the target of the Baltimore mob in 1812, rose in the House to denounce the British terms and to pledge his support for “the most vigorous system of honorable war, with the hope of bringing the enemy to a sense of justice.”[130] Other Federalists from the middle and southern states joined in the cry, calling the British terms “arrogant,” “inadmissible,” “humilating,” and “disgraceful.” Most agreed with the Alexandria Gazette that whatever the war’s origins it had “from the arrogance of the enemy, become a war of necessity.”[131]

Federalists in New England, however, took a different view. They were more appalled by the views of their friends to the south and west than by the terms themselves. Most agreed with the Boston Gazette that, having declared war and failed, the United States must now pay the price.[132] “I have uniformly thought that G. Britain might justly demand Some indemnity,” declared Timothy Pickering.[133] “We shall have no objection here to better terms,” added Harrison Gray Otis of Massachusetts. “But I religiously believe, that 90 out of every 100 men in this State would if left to themselves prefer treating on the proposed basis at least, to the continuance of the war one day.”[134]

Bipartisanship Fails

Although Federalists seemed to be deeply divided by the crisis, the breach in their ranks was more apparent than real. No sooner had Federalists from the middle and southern states proclaimed their support for the war then they began to drift back into New England’s camp. “The opposition,” said one Republican, “continues as malignant and unreasonable as ever, with a few honourable exceptions only.”[135] This was partly the result of New England’s influence, which was always a potent force in party councils, but other factors played a role, too.

In October Monroe publicly called for pushing the war into Canada again, telling Congress that this was the best way to secure the friendship of the Indians, protect the coast, and win peace.[136] “The great object to be attained,” Monroe told Major General Jacob Brown, “is to carry the war into Canada, and to break the British power there, to the utmost practicable extent.”[137] Monroe’s plans convinced many Federalists that (as one New Englander put it), the “character of the war [had] not changed” and the administration was still “eager for conquest and aggrandizement.” “The Notion of some Federalists,” concluded Gouverneur Morris, “that this War had become defensive . . . must vanish with Mr Munroe’s late Declaration that their Object is to conquer Canada.”[138]

Federalists were alienated not only by the administration’s military strategy but also its political exclusiveness. There was a good deal of speculation, even among New Englanders, about the possibility of Federalists joining the cabinet. The Federalist caucus that recommended supporting the war had called for “an entire change of the Heads of Departments,” and establishing a bipartisan cabinet was a common theme in Federalist speeches and editorials.[139] Some Republicans responded favorably to these overtures. George Hay told Monroe that the president “ought to accede to the proposal of the federalists in relation to the cabinet,” and many other Republicans—including some in Congress—agreed.[140] But the president demurred. According to Hanson, Madison thought it would be “a passport to the Presidency” if he acknowledged the talents of any Federalist by appointing him to the cabinet.[141]

In late November, after Vice President Elbridge Gerry died, Federalists tried to install Rufus King as president pro tem of the Senate. Often mentioned as a potential cabinet member, King was well regarded by both parties. Even Republicans, said a Federalist, considered him “the very Oracle.”[142] Senate Republicans, however, refused to elevate him to so high a post. With the vice presidency vacant and Madison once again ailing, Republicans were unwilling to put a Federalist next in the line of succession.[143] According to a letter from Washington published in a Federalist paper, “Mr. Madison had declared, that the democratic party would be put down, if Mr. King was chosen,” and “Mr. Eppes had declared . . . that ‘he would assist to TAR AND FEATHER the democratic Senator who dared vote for Mr. King.’”[144] Annoyed by these rebuffs, Federalists murmured that the administration had no interest in conciliation and that the war was still a party war. “The delusion has vanished,” said a Federalist paper. “The call to union means nothing.”[145]

Exasperated by the administration’s war strategy and politics, Federalists from the middle and southern states were already deserting the war movement when a new set of British terms was submitted to Congress on December 1. These showed that Great Britain was willing to restore peace on the basis of uti possidetis, which meant that each side would retain whatever territory it held.[146] If these terms were acceded to, the United States would lose eastern Maine but little else. This was a settlement that Federalists everywhere could live with, and doubtless many Republicans could, too.

Fearing the impact these dispatches might have on the war spirit, Republican congressmen at first tried to suppress them, and when they were published, the National Intelligencer professed to believe that the prospects for peace were still “very faint.”[147] No one was fooled, least of all the Federalists, most of whom thought peace was near. According to a New Hampshire Republican, “informed men of both parties in this part of the country” expected peace within a few months.[148] The result was a flood of peace rumors that continued until the war was over.[149]

Heartened by the news and unwilling to encourage the administration to hold out for better terms, Federalists from the middle and southern states closed ranks behind their friends from New England. “The war-pitch,” recalled a Republican congressman, “fell as much at Washington as it did in London. The salutary apprehension of October turned to hopeful confidence in December. The nerve of opposition was strung afresh.”[150]

The Capital Stays in Washington

Although partisanship played an important role in this session (as it did throughout the war), the first issue that Congress faced was not a party issue at all, but a sectional one—the question of relocating the nation’s capital. Many northerners saw the destruction of Washington as an opportunity to move the capital from the crude city in the wilderness on the Potomac to a more cosmopolitan and comfortable setting in the North. “The removal of the seat of government,” said John Quincy Adams, “may prove a great benefit.”[151] City officials in Philadelphia, anxious to regain the capital they had lost in 1800, promised suitable accommodations, and most congressmen appeared to be favorably disposed.[152] “The Majority Seem determined to go,” said Nathaniel Macon, “& Philadelphia Seems to be the place.”[153]

On September 26, Jonathan Fisk of New York introduced a resolution calling for the appointment of a committee to study the expediency of temporarily moving the capital. Fisk, doubtless thinking of New York or Philadelphia, favored “a place of greater security and less inconvenience” and “a place more connected with the moneyed interest of the nation.”[154] But southerners, fearing that any move might become permanent, claimed that abandoning Washington would set a bad precedent and would be unfair to those who had invested in the city. “If the Seat of Government was once set on wheels,” Macon warned, “there was no saying where it would stop.”[155]

The French minister graciously agreed to vacate the Octagon House so that the president might use it when he returned to Washington after the British had burned most of the public buildings. President Madison signed the Treaty of Ghent on the top floor of this house. The building still stands and is now owned by the American Architectural Foundation. Although open to the public, its significance as the president’s temporary residence is not well known. (Library of Congress)

Fisk’s resolution was approved, and a committee was appointed to study the matter. Although the committee recommended against removal, the House rejected this recommendation on a close vote when Speaker Langdon Cheves of South Carolina stunned nearly everyone by voting for removal.[156] “The reason for this vote,” he said, “was, that this District could not be defended except at an immense expense.”[157] A bill was accordingly prepared that provided for moving the seat of government to Philadelphia for the duration of the war. Only two concessions were made to the opponents of removal: money was appropriated to rebuild Washington and a pledge was made to return to the city after the war.[158]

When the bill was put to a vote in the House, it was defeated by a nine-vote margin, largely because several Republicans (including three from Pennsylvania) succumbed to executive influence.[159] After defeating this bill, Congress approved another that merely provided for rebuilding Washington.[160] A companion measure authorized the purchase of Thomas Jefferson’s 10,000-book library, which was the largest private collection in the nation. The British had burned the congressional library, and the ever-needy Jefferson offered his as a replacement. Appraised at $23,950, this collection became the basis for the modern Library of Congress.[161]

Defeat of Conscription

With the location of the capital resolved, Congress turned to other matters more directly related to prosecuting the war. On October 17 Monroe submitted a report to Congress outlining his recommendations for raising troops.[162] He estimated that 100,000 men would be needed to prosecute the war successfully in 1815. Since the regular army was believed to contain only about 30,000 men, it would be necessary to raise 70,000 more. Monroe rejected militia as too costly and inefficient. Instead, he called for raising 40,000 volunteers for local defense and 30,000 regulars for use against Canada.

Monroe saw no difficulty in raising the volunteers since their duties would be confined to the locality in which they were raised. Recruiting additional regulars, however, would not be easy. Monroe presented several options but made it clear that he favored the most extreme, a conscription plan that called for dividing all eligible males into classes of 100 men each and requiring each class to furnish four recruits, with replacements in case of casualties. Each recruit would receive the standard land bounty from the government, but any cash bounty would have to come from other members of his class.

Anticipating criticism, Monroe argued that “the conservation of the State is a duty paramount to all others” and that the militia provided a precedent for compulsory service.[163] Monroe pointed out that several states had employed draft schemes during the Revolution and that New York had adopted a similar system in 1814.[164] He also said that his proposal was modeled after a plan drawn up by Secretary of War Henry Knox in 1790. Although this plan never became law, it had the blessing of President Washington.[165]

There was little enthusiasm for Monroe’s plan and little likelihood that it would become law. Hoping to forge a consensus behind a compromise proposal, Senator William Bibb of Georgia drew up a bill that provided for using Monroe’s system of classification and draft to raise 80,000 militia for two years’ service. The men would serve under officers appointed by the state, and their service would be restricted to their own or an adjoining state. Bibb’s bill offered military exemptions to those men who provided recruits for the regular army, but otherwise it did not raise regulars. Instead, it raised militia for long-term local service.[166] The bill pleased neither those Republicans who wanted to carry the war into Canada nor the Federalists, who were horrified by any scheme that savored of a French-style conscription.

The bill was reported to the Senate from committee by William Branch Giles on November 5.[167] Republican Joseph Varnum, who told a friend that “no Man can entertain a more despi[c]able Idea of Mr. Giles’ Militia Bill than I do,” delivered a long speech against the measure, detailing its technical flaws.[168] Varnum called the proposal “extremely impolitic” and claimed that it was based on “unusual and arbitrary principles” and that it was “totally incompetent to effect the object” for which it was designed.[169] Federalists joined in the attack, challenging the bill’s constitutionality. Robert H. Goldsborough of Maryland said that raising troops in this manner was “a palpable and flagrant violation of the constitution,” and David Daggett of Connecticut claimed that the measure was “not only unconstitutional” but “unequal, unjust, and oppressive.”[170] In spite of these objections, the Senate passed the bill by a comfortable margin.[171]

The debate then shifted to the House, where young Charles J. Ingersoll, a Pennsylvania Republican, praised the bill: “You may call it by what odious ugly name you will—conscription or what not—but it is the only sufficient, the only republican, the only fair, the only equal plan for applying the physical means to the end of common military defence and protection.” Ingersoll asserted that “vast improvements have taken place in the military art” in the past twenty years. All of Europe had adopted these improvements, “and this country will be left lamentably behind in the march of mankind, unless, like the rest, it adopts them too.”[172]

Ingersoll’s appeal to European precedents was unlikely to win over any Federalists, although proponents of the bill did offer them a sop by lowering the term of service to a year. The limitation on local service was also dropped in the hope of winning the support of the Canadian enthusiasts. In addition, in case any state failed to comply with the law, the president was authorized to call directly on militia officers. In this form the bill passed the House and was returned to the Senate.[173] The two houses, however, were unable to resolve their differences, and on December 28 Rufus King took advantage of light attendance in the Senate to propose indefinite postponement. His motion carried by a one-vote margin.[174] According to one Republican, “Prospects of peace, contrivances of party, and differences of opinion in the dominant party” all conspired to kill the measure.[175]

One of the reasons that Republicans did not insist on conscription was that Federalists in New England were talking openly of resistance. “Our Citizens,” said a Connecticut Federalist, “are not yet prepared to submit to a conscription Law, or to advance all their resources to support a war of Conquest.”[176] In Massachusetts, people at a large public meeting adopted a resolution pledging to bid defiance to the law: “WE DARE NOT SUBMIT, AND WILL NEVER YIELD OBEDIENCE.”[177] Daniel Webster called on the New England states to nullify the measure—“to interpose between their citizens & arbitrary power”—and Republicans in the Connecticut legislature joined with Federalists in denouncing the bill and in urging the governor to call a special session if it became law.[178] Since the bill died in the Senate, New England’s defiance was never put to a test.

Enlistment of Minors

Another measure that generated opposition in New England was a new enlistment law. Like the conscription bill, this measure was drawn up by William Bibb and introduced in the Senate by William Branch Giles on November 5.[179] It provided for doubling the land bounty, so that new recruits would receive 320 acres of land as well as $124 in cash. It also authorized the enlistment of minors 18 or older without the consent of parent, guardian, or master, and it exempted from militia duty anyone who provided a recruit for the regular army at his own expense—presumably by paying a sizeable cash bounty. (The government would still pay the land bounty.)

Federalists in both houses denounced the provision for minor enlistments. Cyrus King of Massachusetts said the proposal struck at “the best feelings of the heart” and was “inhuman, immoral, and oppressive.” According to Thomas P. Grosvenor of New York, the bill would have the effect of “jeopardizing the good order of the community, violating contracts, disturbing the sacred rights of natural affection, and all the felicities of domestic life.”[180] In an obvious attempt to frighten southerners, Daniel Webster declared that the bill could serve as a precedent for taking slaves from their masters.[181] Republicans made little attempt to reply to these arguments. The only concession they made was to give minors a four-day grace period in which to cancel their enlistments. Thus amended, the bill passed both houses and was signed into law on December 10.[182]

Like the conscription bill, the enlistment law unleashed a storm of opposition in New England. Theodore Dwight, a Federalist editor and pamphleteer, told a Connecticut congressman: “We do not believe your right to annul the laws of the States [governing minors], & do not intend you shall do it in Connecticut.”[183] There was talk in Connecticut of prosecuting army officers who enlisted minors, and state judges routinely discharged minors from the service.[184] In Massachusetts a state judge discharged a minor because his consent papers had been signed by only one parent. According to an army officer, this threatened the legality of all minors enlisted in Massachusetts—about 2,500 soldiers.[185] Both Massachusetts and Connecticut passed laws prohibiting the enlistment of minors without consent, although the Bay State judiciously waited until after the war was over and recruiting had been suspended. The Connecticut assembly also strengthened its habeas corpus laws to facilitate the release of minors who were recruited into the service.[186]

State Armies Approved

A third army bill taken up by Congress met with little opposition and in fact had the full support of Federalists. This legislation was framed initially to raise the 40,000 volunteers for local defense that Monroe had called for, but after the defeat of conscription it was modified so that it also raised troops for use on the northern frontier. In its final form, the bill authorized recruiting 40,000 volunteers—which Monroe planned to use in Canada—and accepting up to 40,000 state troops into federal service for local defense.[187]

This bill represented a significant departure from existing policy: hitherto the administration had opposed state armies, fearing that they would siphon off potential recruits from the regular army. Many states, however, preferred state troops over militia because they were more professional and less disruptive. Virginia had authorized a state army in early 1813, mainly out of fear of a slave revolt. This army was disbanded several months later at the request of the national government, but only after the administration promised to keep a body of regulars at Norfolk and pay the expenses of some militia called out without federal authority.[188]

The New England states could not be placated so easily. Connecticut authorized a state army in 1812, and Massachusetts and Rhode Island followed suit in 1814. At first the administration was reluctant to sanction the use of these troops, but by the summer of 1814 British raids along the coast had become so common that the War Department relented. The administration agreed to accept Rhode Island’s troops into federal service in lieu of militia, and other states, at least seven of whom had authorized armies, clamored for the same treatment. The new law put Congress’s stamp of approval on the practice.[189]

Naval Reform and Expansion

Congress also dealt with naval affairs in this session, even though most of the nation’s ships were bottled up in port. On November 15, shortly before leaving office, Secretary of the Navy William Jones delivered a report to Congress making several recommendations for overhauling the service. To facilitate naval administration, he called for the creation of a board of commissioners that would be responsible for overseeing the construction of warships, the procurement of naval stores, and the deployment of the fleet. There was little objection to this proposal.[190] Now that the nation was committed to a long-term naval construction program, a more efficient means of administering the service was needed. Hence Congress passed the necessary legislation with little debate.[191]

Jones also recommended establishing a school to train officers for the navy. This was the first of many times that Congress considered the matter, but most people thought that service at sea was the best school, and the navy’s success in the nation’s wars seemed to confirm this. Hence not until 1845 was the Naval Academy at Annapolis established, and even then it was done without a congressional appropriation. Jones’s final recommendation called for a system of compulsory service to ensure an adequate supply of seamen for the navy. The fleet, Jones said, was desperately short of men, and conscription was justified because most seamen escaped militia duty. But this proposal smacked too much of the British practice of impressment to receive any serious consideration.[192]

Congress also passed another naval expansion bill. With most of the nation’s larger warships blockaded in port, smaller vessels had come to play a greater role in the war. American privateers had been particularly effective against British commerce. “The effects of their enterprises against the commerce of the enemy,” said a Virginia congressman, “had been great and important.” A fleet of “small, swift-sailing vessels . . . would, in all probability, conduce to put a speedy end to the war, by the impression it would make on the enemy’s commerce.”[193] In accordance with this thinking, Congress authorized the purchase or construction of twenty schooners carrying 8 to 16 guns.[194] The conflict ended, however, before any of these vessels could be put to sea.

The Dismal State of Public Finance

The financial problems the nation faced were every bit as pressing as its military problems, and this issue also created divisions in the Republican party. Before leaving office in late September, George Campbell delivered his last financial report to Congress. Conceding that Gallatin’s plan of war finance had broken down, Campbell said that it was no longer possible to finance the war with borrowed money. “The experience of the present year,” he said, “furnishes ground to doubt whether this be practicable.” Estimating a revenue shortfall of $11.7 million for the balance of 1814 and heavy expenses for 1815, Campbell recommended that Congress impose new taxes and raise the interest rate on treasury notes.[195]

While Congress waited for Campbell’s successor to make more detailed recommendations, the Virginia paper money advocates seized the initiative. Thomas Jefferson, who had never been fond of bank paper, wrote to friends to urge the expediency of paper money both to finance the war and to serve as a circulating medium. “Congress may now borrow, of the public and without interest,” he told a friend, “all the money they may want to the amount of a competent circulation, by merely issuing their own promissory notes.” “Our experience,” he told Madison, “has proved [paper money] may be run up to 2. or 300 M[illion] without more than doubling . . . prices.”[196] Monroe shared Jefferson’s views, and so too did a number of congressmen, including Nathaniel Macon, who was fond of saying that “paper money never was beat.”[197] Madison, however, was cool to the idea.[198]

On October 10 John W. Eppes, another advocate of paper money, introduced a compromise proposal from the House Ways and Means Committee. It called for new taxes and a new issue of interest-bearing treasury notes “in sums sufficiently small for the ordinary purposes of society.” Unlike the treasury notes already in circulation, the new notes would not be redeemable in specie, although they could be exchanged for bonds or used to pay taxes or buy public lands. Since they were designed to serve as a national currency, they were essentially a form of paper money.[199]

A week later Dallas submitted his first report on public finance. Although Madison had urged him to be conciliatory to Congress, the Philadelphia financier refused to pull his punches.[200] He painted an even bleaker picture of public finance than Campbell had, estimating a revenue shortfall for the year of $12.3 million. Dallas asked for authority to borrow money and to issue additional treasury notes, but he rejected Eppes’s scheme for relying on treasury notes as a circulating medium because of their high interest rate and their exposure “to every breath of popular prejudice or alarm.” Instead, he argued that the best way to put the nation on a sound financial footing was with new taxes and a national bank.[201]

U.S. Public Finance, 1790–1815. This chart shows a fairly healthy balance sheet for the young republic until the War of 1812 sent expenditures soaring while revenues remained flat or actually fell.

Later in the session Dallas sent two additional reports to Congress. The first, dated December 2, outlined the Treasury’s problems in paying the national debt.[202] The second, submitted on January 17, contained Dallas’s estimates for 1815. Disbursements for the year were expected to top $56 million (including $15.5 million merely to service the debt), while income—even with new taxes—would be a paltry $15.1 million. This meant that the government would have to raise $40.9 million through loans and treasury notes.[203]

According to George Ticknor, who was in the gallery when Eppes read this report to the House, Republicans were dumbfounded by Dallas’s figures. “You can imagine nothing like the dismay with which [Dallas’s report] has filled the Democratic party,” he said. “All his former communications were but emollients and palliations, compared with this final disclosure of the bankruptcy of the nation.” After reading the report, Eppes “threw it upon the table with expressive violence” and, turning to Federalist William Gaston, half in jest said: “Well, sir, will your party take the Government if we will give it up to them?” “No, sir,” replied Gaston, “not unless you will give it to us as we gave it to you.”[204]

New Loans and Taxes

Congress’s first order of business was to give Dallas the authority he needed to raise money to cover expenses for 1814. There was little opposition to authorizing an additional $10.5 million in treasury notes.[205] Dallas also wanted to borrow $3 million to replace an equivalent sum of government bonds that had been shipped to Europe for sale.[206] Federalists tried to limit the interest on the new loan to 8 percent and to pledge specific taxes for the loan’s redemption (which was the practice in Britain), but their amendments were defeated and the bill passed essentially unchanged.[207]

The administration was able to borrow only a fraction of the $3 million authorized by Congress. Three New York banks agreed to accept $600,000 in bonds in exchange for short-term money. The banks paid $80 for each $100 in bonds at 7 percent, but since they paid in depreciated bank notes, the government actually got the equivalent of only $65—which worked out to $390,000 specie value. Since this was short-term money that was paid off in four months, the effective interest rate was just over 60 percent. The subscribers to the earlier loans in 1814 now clamored for additional bonds to make up the 15 percent difference, but the Treasury refused to bow to their demands until Congress finally mandated payment in 1855.[208]

Raising the $40.9 million that Dallas had said would be necessary for 1815 seemed impossible. Dallas had recommended that the government issue $15 million in treasury notes and try to borrow $25 million.[209] But the chances of borrowing this sum were so remote that Congress decided to reverse his figures. The war ended before the necessary legislation was passed, but ultimately Congress authorized $25 million in treasury notes and a loan of $18.5 million.[210]

Besides authorizing additional loans and treasury notes, Congress also imposed new taxes. As unpalatable as this was, everyone recognized that as long as the war continued there was no other way to restore public credit. Accordingly, members of the Ways and Means Committee met and, with “the British list of taxes before them,” drew up bills for a host of new internal duties.[211]

Seven of the bills became law.[212] The most important imposed a direct tax of $6 million. This was twice the direct tax levied in 1814, and it was to be collected annually instead of just once. Any state could secure a 10- or 15-percent discount by paying the tax directly into the Treasury, but in contrast to 1814, when seven states had taken advantage of this provision, only four did in 1815.[213] Congress also imposed a tax of 20 cents on each gallon of spirits distilled in the United States. This duty, which was in addition to the tax imposed on stills in 1813, was greater than the tax that had precipitated the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794.[214]

Southern and western Republicans protested that both the direct tax and the “whiskey” tax bore too heavily on their constituents. “If any thing could revolt our citizens against the war,” Jefferson declared, “it would be the extravagance with which they are about to be taxed. . . . The taxes proposed cannot be paid.”[215] Most northerners, however, considered the taxes fair, and Federalists took special delight in forcing those responsible for the war to pay for it. “You must ‘pay for the whistle which you have purchased,’” said Grosvenor.[216]

The other revenue bills were less controversial. Taxes were imposed on various goods manufactured in the United States, including iron products, candles, hats, umbrellas, paper, saddles, boots, beer, tobacco, leather, jewelry, and gold, silver, and plated ware. Gold and silver watches were also taxed as was household furniture valued at more than $200. In addition, the existing duties on auctions sales, retailers, and postage were increased by 50 to 100 percent, and the duty on carriages by a lesser amount.

All the taxes were to remain in effect until public credit was restored. The total amount that accrued from all the internal taxes—including those adopted in 1813—was $13.7 million in 1815.[217] Although the Republicans were slow to impose internal taxes during the war, the system finally adopted was the most sweeping enacted before the Civil War—far more sweeping than anything envisioned by the Federalists in the 1790s.

A National Bank Defeated

Even more controversial than the tax bills was Dallas’s plan for a national bank. Historically, Republicans had opposed a bank, but as the nation’s financial situation deteriorated, congressional support for a bank mounted. Proponents saw a number of advantages to a bank: as a source for a national currency and government loans, as a means of transferring funds across the country, and as a vehicle for establishing a more orderly system of public and private finance. But even the bank’s proponents could not agree on the details, and there was opposition to the project in both parties. Some Republicans still regarded a national bank as a dangerous and unconstitutional expedient that would open the door to commercial tyranny, and many Federalists feared that it would be “a mere machine for manufacturing paper money.”[218]

In his first report to Congress on October 17, Dallas outlined his own plan for a bank. Much to the dismay of some Republicans, the bank he recommended was an enlarged version of the first national bank—devised mainly by Alexander Hamilton in 1791—though it was to have much closer ties to the government. Like the first bank, Dallas’s bank would have a twenty-year charter and maintain its central office in Philadelphia (still the nation’s financial capital), with branch offices in other cities. The bank’s capital stock was set at $50 million, five times the capital of the first national bank. Of this, $30 million would be offered to the public. Subscribers would have to put up at least one-fifth of the purchase price in specie and the balance in war bonds or treasury notes. The government would take the remaining $20 million in stock in exchange for war bonds. The bank would be governed by fifteen directors, five of whom (including the president) would be chosen by the government. The bank’s notes could be used to settle all obligations with the federal government, and the bank would be required to lend the Treasury up to $30 million at 6 percent interest.[219]

Speaker Cheves had taken care at the beginning of the session to pack the House Ways and Means Committee with pro-bank men, although the chair was still held by the hostile Eppes.[220] On November 7, Jonathan Fisk introduced a bill from committee that provided for incorporating a bank along the lines sketched out by Dallas.[221] Although Dallas had not discussed whether the bank could suspend specie payments, Fisk’s bill expressly authorized the administration to take this action. Federalists were appalled by the entire proposal, fearing that the government would exert too much control over the bank and that the institution would flood the country with bank notes. According to William Gaston, the bank’s specie would be so limited that any sizeable loan to the government would necessitate an immediate suspension of specie payments.[222]

Many Republicans—including John C. Calhoun—agreed with the Federalists. Calhoun forced a series of amendments that fundamentally changed the bank’s character by making it more autonomous. The government’s right to purchase bank stock and to select bank directors was eliminated; so too was the forced loan to the government, the Treasury’s mandatory acceptance of the bank’s notes, and the authority to suspend specie payments. The bank’s capital was also scaled back to $30 million, and the stock could be purchased only with specie or with treasury notes hereafter issued.[223] Nothing was left of Dallas’s proposal, said a Republican, “except the name—every feature and every important principle is changed.”[224]

Dallas vigorously protested that in this form the bank would benefit neither the government nor the country. If the administration issued the large number of treasury notes needed to float the bank, he warned, it would “have an injurious effect upon the credit of the Government; and, also, upon the prospects of a loan for 1815.”[225] These arguments carried some weight in the House. There was also a backlash among regular Republicans against “Calhoun & [the] other giddy young men” who had spearheaded the drive to change the original bill.[226] As a result, Calhoun’s bill was voted down by a large majority.[227]

The Senate, which had been waiting for the House to act, now took the initiative. On December 2 Rufus King reported a bill from committee that incorporated a bank along the lines favored by Dallas. The bill passed the Senate by a three-vote margin but was narrowly defeated in the House when Speaker Cheves voted against it.[228] Calling the proposed bank “a dangerous, unexampled,” and even “a desperate resort,” Cheves claimed that it would never achieve the ends for which it was created.[229]

The House subsequently reconsidered this vote and then sent the bill back to committee. Federalists Richard Stockton and Thomas Oakley pledged to vote for a modified bank bill and expressed confidence that “they would be joined by a majority of their political friends.”[230] The committee produced a bill that once again provided for a small, autonomous bank—one that was free from government control, did not have to loan the government money, and could not suspend specie payments. In addition, it did not have to commence operations until 1816. In this form, the bill won the support of both parties and was approved by large majorities in both houses.[231] Not everyone was happy with the bill, but most preferred this bank to Dallas’s version or to no bank at all. As Daniel Webster put it: “We were obliged to make a bank or let Dallas’s plan go.”[232]

The bill was sent to the president on January 23, 1815. Dallas, who considered Congress so unmanageable that he was already contemplating resigning, was incensed. “I asked for bread,” he said, “and [Congress] gave me a stone. I asked for a Bank to serve the Government during the war; and they have given me a commercial Bank, to go into operation after the war.”[233] Taking Dallas’s views to heart, Madison vetoed the bill. The proposed bank, he said, would not “answer the purposes of reviving the public credit, of providing a national medium of circulation, and of aiding the Treasury.”[234]

Chastened by Madison’s veto, congressional Republicans met in caucus and decided to resurrect the original bill—the one favored by Dallas.[235] Accordingly, on February 6 James Barbour reintroduced this bill in the Senate. Republicans refused to send the bill to committee, claiming that the matter already had been discussed enough and that everyone understood the issues. After beating back a series of amendments, Republicans pushed the bill through the Senate by a two-vote margin. The House also refused to commit or amend the bill, but before a vote on the measure could be taken, news of peace arrived. This gave the bill’s enemies an opening. The bill was first tabled and then postponed indefinitely by a one-vote margin. This killed the project for the session.[236]

A New Enemy Trade Act

Another issue that Congress had to grapple with in this session was trade with the enemy. On September 22, Republican James Fisk of Vermont, whose own state was as guilty as any, offered a resolution to strengthen the enemy trade act of 1812.[237] The House approved the resolution, but for the next two months Congress devoted its attention to other matters, waiting for the administration to take the lead on the trade issue. Finally, on November 19, Dallas sent a report to the House outlining the government’s enforcement problems and recommending legal remedies.[238]

Armed with Dallas’s report, the House Ways and Means Committee drew up a new enemy trade bill, which Eppes introduced in early December.[239] This bill gave government officials more extensive powers than any previous trade restriction, including the enforcement act of 1809 and the embargo of 1813. According to the Federal Republican, “The Bill contains novel, extraordinary, and dangerous provisions, at war with the principles of our free constitution and the established rights of the citizen. It creates a swarm of irresponsible petty tyrants, spies and informers who are clothed with powers exceeding those, of the highest officers of the government.”[240]

The bill authorized customs officials to search without warrant any land or water craft or any person suspected of trading with the enemy and to seize any goods suspected of being illegally imported or of being on their way to the enemy. With a warrant, customs officials could also search any building suspected of containing goods which were likely to be shipped to the enemy or which might have been imported from enemy territory. Inspectors were classified as customs officials, and all such officials were empowered to raise posses and were rendered virtually immune to damage suits. The penalties established in 1812 for trading with the enemy were increased, and no one was permitted to visit the enemy without a presidential or gubernatorial passport.[241]

Federalists offered a host of amendments to the bill, and when these failed, they tried to prevent a quorum by absenting themselves from the House.[242] But Republicans mustered enough votes to push the bill through both houses, and the president signed the measure into law on February 4, 1815.[243] The new law never received a fair test, however, because it expired two weeks later with the restoration of peace. The law was extreme, but whether it would have worked may be doubted. The enforcement machinery of the customs department remained primitive, and people living on the frontier were determined to keep profitable avenues of trade open. In the contest between the government and smugglers, most of the advantages still lay with the latter.

End of a Long Session

By the time Congress adjourned on March 3, 1815, the crisis the nation faced had passed, but only because peace had been restored. During the long session, legislation had been adopted to raise the land bounty, permit the recruitment of minors, establish a volunteer corps, accept state troops into federal service, create a board of naval commissioners, build commerce raiders, curtail trade with the enemy, issue treasury notes, and authorize additional loans and taxes.

Under normal circumstances, this might have been an impressive record of legislation, but given the crisis many people expected more. The administration had asked Congress for energetic and controversial measures, but these measures had divided Republicans and united Federalists. As a result, neither of the administration’s two key proposals—conscription or the national bank—had become law. “The efficient and manly measures proposed by the executive,” complained a Pennsylvania Republican, “were all either totally rejected, or frittered down into insignificance.”[244]

It was not simply that Congress failed to adopt key administration proposals. It was slow to take any action at all. Even though Congress had convened on September 19, no war legislation of any consequence was adopted until December, and the pace of action remained slow throughout the session. Most Republicans attributed the delays to the “inertia” of Congress, the “perverseness” of independents like Calhoun and Cheves, or the “turpitude of federalism.”[245] “Our misfortune,” said Joseph Varnum, “is that we have a number of young Politicians who, although ardent & honest, Suffer themselves to be misled by the pla[u]sible Arguments of the Opposition.”[246]

The failure of Congress to take energetic action led to growing criticism in the press. The Worcester National Aegis accused Congress of “wasting two or three months in useless debate,” and the Boston Yankee echoed this charge.[247] The New York National Advocate suggested that congressmen were “forgetful, or, at least, unmindful of the spirit that prevails among the people,” and the Philadelphia Aurora said that if the British had bribed Congress “that body could not more effectually have served their employer than has been done by procrastination and idle debate.”[248]

No doubt the record of Congress would have been more impressive if Republicans had been able to close ranks or win over the Federalists. But such was not to be. In spite of the crisis, Republicans remained divided, and in spite of their pledges of support, Federalists found few measures they could actually vote for. “Instead of uniting with the majority to defend the country,” complained a Republican newspaper, “they [were], if possible, more infuriate in their opposition than ever.”[249]

The specter of New England disaffection also weighed heavily on Congress. Two months into the session, Republican Charles J. Ingersoll openly discussed the objectives of a meeting in Hartford sponsored by New England Federalists. “Since we assembled,” he said, “a most alarming temper has appeared . . . among some of the Eastern States; and it is said to be intended, by the agitation of the Hartford Convention, to proceed deliberately to the disintegration of New England from the Union.”[250] Although Ingersoll discounted the possibility of secession, many Republicans did not. Throughout this session, Republican leaders had to contend with not only a foreign war but also the possibility of domestic war. “A lowering sky begins to shroud the political horizon,” said the Hartford American Mercury, “and clouds black with uncommon vengeance over-hang us, and portend a dreadful storm.”[251]

Chapter 10

The Hartford Convention

The War of 1812 was one of America’s most unpopular wars. It generated more intense opposition than any other war, including the war in Vietnam. Although most scholars have focused on New England’s opposition, Federalists in the middle and southern states opposed the conflict, too. Except for two brief periods—one in the summer of 1812 and the other in the fall of 1814—the party presented a united front against the war.

Federalist Opposition

In Congress Federalists voted as a bloc on almost all war legislation. They unanimously opposed the declaration of war in June 1812, and thereafter they voted against almost every proposal to raise men or money, to foster privateering, or to restrict trade with the enemy. The only war measures they supported were those they considered defensive—mainly bills to increase the navy or to build coastal fortifications. “The Federal party,” said the Salem Gazette in 1814, “have steadily at all times . . . maintained that in time of Peace, as well as in War, the nation ought to be protected and defended by a Navy and by Fortifications.”[1]

The House took 305 roll-call votes on war-related measures between June 1, 1812 (when Madison sent his war message to Congress), and February 14, 1815 (when the peace treaty reached Washington). Federalists achieved an index of relative cohesion of 94.4 percent on these measures. Thus, on the average war measure, almost 95 percent of House Federalists voted together. The Senate took 227 roll-call votes on war-related measures, and here Federalists achieved a cohesion of 92.5 percent. Since a cohesion of 70 percent has traditionally been considered a sign of party solidarity, the record of the Federalists is extraordinary—surely the most remarkable record of bloc voting in any war in the nation’s history.[2]

Why did Federalists oppose the war? For one thing, they saw it as a party war designed to further the interests of Republicans and to silence the opposition—a view that was reinforced by the Baltimore riots in 1812 and the refusal of the administration to take Federalists into the cabinet in 1814. “I regard the war, as a war of party, & not of the Country,” said Rufus King in 1812. “The people are no more obliged . . . to approve and applaud the measure,” added the Philadelphia United States’ Gazette, “than . . . any other party project.”[3]

Federalists also feared that the war would throw the nation into the arms of Napoleon, who was variously described as “the great destroyer,” the “monster of human depravity,” and “the arch-Fiend who has long been the curse & Scourge of the European World.”[4] The initial protests against the war, particularly in New England, often expressed greater fear of a French alliance than of the war itself. “The horrors of war, compared with it, are mere amusement,” said Timothy Dwight. “The touch of France is pollution. Her embrace is death.” French dominion, added William Ellery Channing, threatened not just the wealth, but “the minds, the character, the morals, the religion of our nation.”[5]

Even after the danger of a French alliance had receded, Federalists continued to oppose the war because they considered it an “offensive” war aimed at Canada. Although willing to support a war to protect American commerce or to defend the nation’s frontiers, they refused to sanction the conquest of Canada. “Let it not be said,” Congressman Morris Miller of New York told the Republicans in 1813, “that we refuse you the means of defence. For that we always have been—we still are ready to open the treasure of the nation. We will give you millions for defence; but not a cent for the conquest of Canada—not the ninety-ninth part of a cent for the extermination of its inhabitants.”[6]

Timothy Pickering (1745–1829) of Massachusetts was one of a number of New Englanders who flirted with secession. Although he held advanced views on the plight of Indians and slaves and had ably managed several cabinet posts in the 1790s, he is best remembered today for his abrasive personality and his secessionist sentiment in the Age of Jefferson. (Engraving by T. B. Welsh and J. B. Longacre after a portrait by Gilbert Stuart. Library of Congress)

Even if the invasion of Canada succeeded, Federalists were convinced that the war would do more harm than good. “Whether we consider our agriculture, our commerce, our monied systems, or our internal safety,” declared the Alexandria Gazette, “nothing but disaster can result from it.”[7] Nor did Federalists expect the nation to win any concessions from the enemy, certainly not on an issue as vital as impressment. “No war of any duration,” said James A. Bayard, “will ever extort this concession.”[8]

In sum, Federalists saw the war as a costly, futile, and partisan venture that was likely to produce little good and much evil. The best way to bring the conflict to an end, most Federalists agreed, was to oppose it. Hence they wrote, spoke, and preached against the war; they discouraged enlistments in the army and subscriptions to the war loans; and they vigorously condemned all who supported the war and worked for their defeat at the polls.[9]

The View from New England

Even though Federalists everywhere opposed the war, those in New England went the farthest. Because they were the dominant party, Federalists here did not have to worry about persecution or violence from an outraged majority. Moreover, they shared an abhorrence of the war—frequently grounded on religious principles—that was unmatched elsewhere (except perhaps in Maryland, where the Baltimore riots had radicalized the party). “Each man who volunteers his services in such a cause,” said a Massachusetts preacher, “or loans his money for its support, or by his conversation, his writings, or any other mode of influence, encourages its prosecution . . . loads his conscience with the blackest crimes.”[10]

Federalists in New England were also able to use the machinery of state and local government to obstruct the war effort. In Hartford, Federalists sought to end loud demonstrations by army recruiters by adopting a pair of city ordinances that restricted public music and parades.[11] In New Bedford, Federalists denounced privateering and voted to quarantine all arriving privateers for forty days—ostensibly on medical grounds.[12] And in Boston, the Massachusetts legislature threatened to sequester federal tax money if militia arms due to the state under an 1808 law were not delivered.[13]

New England Federalists made their opposition felt in other ways. In Massachusetts, after a Republican paper denounced Federalists for applauding naval victories in a war they opposed, Josiah Quincy sponsored a resolution in the state senate declaring that “in a war like the present . . . it is not becoming a moral and religious people to express any approbation of military or naval exploits, which are not immediately connected with the defence of our sea coast and soil.”[14] The senate adopted this resolution, and it remained on the books until 1824, when Republicans expunged it from the record.[15]

In Connecticut, Federalists were accused of aiding the enemy in the “blue light” affair. In late 1813 a squadron of ships under Captain Stephen Decatur tried to slip out of New London harbor at night but was driven back by the British fleet. Decatur later complained that someone had signaled the British by flashing blue lights.[16] Whether the signals were given by a British spy or an American citizen is unknown, but Republicans were quick to fix the blame on Federalists. It was “the blackest treason,” declared Niles’ Register.[17] Connecticut Federalists demanded a congressional investigation to clear the air, but there was no way of ascertaining the truth.[18] By then “blue light Federalist” had already entered the political lexicon. According to one Federalist, the phrase had become an “ornament or embellishment to a speech, such as Old tory, British gold, Henryism, &c.”[19]

The Clash Over Militia

The most persistent source of conflict between New England and the federal government was over the control and deployment of the militia. This was no small matter because the militia played such a vital role in the nation’s defense. The militia problem, in turn, raised the larger issue of who was responsible for New England’s defense. Was it the federal government or was it the states? Federalists never found a satisfactory answer to this question, and the result was the Hartford Convention, a regional conference convened to air New England’s grievances.[20]

The New England militia units were among the best in the nation. They were well armed and well trained and had repeatedly distinguished themselves during the Revolution. The troops were organized in accordance with the uniform militia act of 1792, which meant that each company had 64 privates plus officers and musicians. Five companies made up a battalion, 10 constituted a regiment, 40 a brigade, and 80 a division. In actual practice there were variations to this pattern, but in New England, more so than elsewhere, the militia measured up to federal specifications.[21]

The first clash over the militia took place in the summer of 1812. On June 22, four days after the declaration of war, Major General Henry Dearborn, the army’s ranking officer in New England, ordered out forty-one companies of militia in Massachusetts, five companies in Connecticut, and four in Rhode Island. The War Department was sending the regulars in New England to the northern frontier and wanted the militia to garrison the empty forts that would be left behind. But to facilitate deployment and control, Dearborn asked for detached companies without a full complement of officers. This assured that the regular officer in charge of each post would retain control and would not be outranked by a militia officer.[22]

All three governors—Caleb Strong of Massachusetts, Roger Griswold of Connecticut, and William Jones of Rhode Island (no relation to the secretary of the navy of the same name)—refused to meet the requisition. Acting with the full support of their councils (and in the case of Massachusetts, with the approval of the state supreme court as well), the governors grounded their refusal on the Constitution. Strong and Griswold argued that, internal disorders aside, the militia could not be called out unless the country were invaded or were in imminent danger of invasion, and that no such contingency existed.

Moreover, since the states were constitutionally charged with appointing the militia officers, the Connecticut council and the Massachusetts court held that their troops could not serve under regulars. Rhode Island, on the other hand, did not raise this objection, doubtless because Dearborn’s order called for a suitably high-ranking state officer to accompany the troops. Governor Jones merely said that the militia would be called out when, in his opinion, the Constitution required it.[23]

The three governors refused to comply with Dearborn’s request both to protest the war and to ensure that they retained control over their militia. Convinced that the assault on Canada was unjust and unwise, they were unwilling to subject their militia to the rigors of garrison duty in support of the venture. Moreover, rumors were rife that citizen soldiers called into service would be marched to Canada.[24] Already militia units from New York, Pennsylvania, and the western states were being called up for service on the northern frontier, and New Englanders feared that their militia would meet the same fate.[25] In order to dissociate themselves from an unjust war and to retain control over their only means of defense, New England officials refused to comply with Dearborn’s request.

President Madison condemned this decision, claiming that it was based on “a novel and unfortunate exposition” of the Constitution and that it undermined the very basis of the Union. If the United States could not call up militia in time of war, he said, “they are not one nation for the purpose most of all requiring it.”[26] Joseph Story claimed that every judge on the Supreme Court agreed with the administration’s position, and Eustis and Dearborn argued that the president could bypass the governors and call the militia directly into service.[27] But Madison—ever cautious—refused to press the matter. Although privately he expressed hope that the militia would turn out voluntarily, none did.[28]

The Militia Problem: Connecticut

Even though New England leaders were uncooperative in 1812, they had no objection to calling out their militia when the enemy actually threatened. In different ways, too, each state tried to resolve the command problem. Connecticut was the least flexible. Her officials were unwilling to place the militia under United States officers under any circumstances. To assure control, they simply assigned a high-ranking state officer to any troops called into service. Massachusetts and Rhode Island were more cooperative and tried to compromise whenever possible. But in the end their compromises broke down, and they found themselves in much the same position as Connecticut.

Connecticut officials called out their first militia in June 1813 to protect Captain Decatur’s squadron of ships in New London harbor. Governor John Cotton Smith (who had succeeded Griswold) said that he was “heartily disposed” to assist Decatur, and militia and state troops remained on duty in the city for about five months.[29] Although the number of troops in service fluctuated, it was usually about twenty companies, many of which were understrength. Normally these troops would have rated no more than a brigadier general, but the army’s representative in the city, Brigadier General Henry Burbeck, would outrank any militia officer of the same grade. Hence state officials assigned the command to Major General William Williams. Burbeck was a Federalist and acceded to this arrangement. Although under a state officer, the troops were considered in federal service and were supplied and paid by the federal government.[30]

This arrangement worked smoothly enough in 1813, but the following year it broke down. In early 1814 Burbeck began to quarrel with state officials, perhaps because he resented his anomalous position. In addition, he came under growing fire from political enemies in New England. A Boston Republican told Monroe that Burbeck had repeatedly said “that the war is unjust, unnecessary & impolitic, & that the administration have not talents to carry it on.” Similarly, friends of the government in New London told the president that Burbeck “has not the confidence of any of the Republicans, and they think him not deserving the confidence of the Administration.”[31] In response to these complaints, the War Department transferred Burbeck out of the district in May 1814.[32]

After Burbeck’s departure, the regular command in New London devolved temporarily on Colonel Jacob Kingsbury. State officials described Kingsbury as “a Connecticut Man in every respect” and a “discreet and excellent officer”—meaning that he was a reliable Federalist.[33] Neither his rank nor his politics disposed Kingsbury to challenge the state. Instead he accepted the existing command arrangement and expressed hope that Connecticut would “avoid as far as possible, the burdens of this war.”[34]

Kingsbury was the army’s ranking officer in New London until July 1814, when the new district commander, Brigadier General Thomas H. Cushing, arrived on the scene. Fresh from Massachusetts, where a compromise had enabled him to command the militia, Cushing would settle for nothing less in Connecticut. Able and charming, he soon won the hearts of the people in the city and the respect of many officers in the militia. Unlike Burbeck, however, he insisted on commanding any troops called into service.[35]

Shortly after Cushing’s arrival, a British squadron appeared off the coast. State officials responded by calling out a brigade of militia. These troops and their replacements remained on duty for about three months. During the first month they were under the direction of two militia brigadiers, first Jirah Isham and then Levi Lusk, both of whom considered themselves under Cushing’s command. This arrangement evidently met with the approval of the militia as well as the people of New London.[36] “Brigr Gen Cushing is the Gentleman and the Soldier,” said Isham. “His vigilance, his attention to our Troops, his attachment to this State, his opposition to any surrender of our State rights . . . all conspire to forbid his being superseded in the command here.”[37] State officials, however, were determined to put their own man in charge. Hence Governor Smith ordered Major General Augustine Taylor to take command.[38]

Taylor arrived in New London in September. Acting on orders from the governor, Lusk put his brigade under Taylor’s command.[39] Cushing was furious. Summoning Lusk to an interview, he warned the state officer that if he disobeyed orders he would “be considered as engaged in a mutiny, & be treated accordingly” and that if he withdrew his troops “it would be considered as desertion and treated accordingly.”[40] When these warnings failed, Cushing threatened to use force and even paraded his regulars in front of Taylor’s headquarters. Unwilling to be intimidated, Taylor called out the militia for inspection. Badly outnumbered and facing the prospect of a hopeless and bloody confrontation, Cushing retired from the field.[41] But claiming that the militia units had been withdrawn from national service, he ordered federal agents to stop supplying and paying them.[42] This meant that for the last five months of the war, from September 1814 to February 1815, the state had to assume responsibility for any militia called into service.

The Militia Problem: Massachusetts

Officials in Massachusetts were more flexible, largely because of the influence of Governor Strong. Unlike the governor of Connecticut, who insistently focused on the command issue, Strong was more interested in securing proper deployment of the troops. When he refused to meet the War Department’s initial request in 1812, he left the command issue to his supreme court while addressing himself to the absence of any immediate threat and to defects in Dearborn’s plan of deployment. Shortly thereafter, he demonstrated that effective use of the militia was his chief concern by dispatching three companies for service to the Maine frontier. These troops remained on duty for three months in 1812, commanded by a regular officer and supplied by the federal government.[43]

There were few calls on the Massachusetts militia in 1812 or 1813, but the following year was different. In the spring of 1814, the British blockaded the Massachusetts coast and began raiding and ransoming exposed towns. Royal officials took special interest in those ports that harbored American warships. At first, state officials eagerly cooperated with Captain William Bainbridge to protect his squadron in Boston harbor. Small detachments of militia were called out for service at Marblehead and Charlestown, and an additional 3,000 troops were held in readiness. Later, however, state officials complained that the ships at Charlestown were a liability and urged Bainbridge to move them to an unprotected part of the harbor to spare Boston from bombardment. Bainbridge indignantly rejected this suggestion.[44] He also let it be known that if Boston surrendered to the British without offering resistance (as Alexandria, Virginia, had done), “he should certainly Fire upon the Town.”[45]

Massachusetts officials also had trouble with the army. In the spring of 1814 the state struck a bargain with District Commander Thomas Cushing to coordinate efforts to defend Boston. Governor Strong agreed to permit Brigadier General Cushing to command any militia called out to garrison the forts in the harbor or to protect other vital points near Boston. In return, Cushing promised to interpose no regular officer between himself and the militia, agreeing in effect to keep the militia and regular units under his command entirely separate. This arrangement seemed to satisfy everyone, but before it could be put to the test of a full-scale alarm, Cushing was transferred to Connecticut.[46]

Cushing was succeeded by Major General Henry Dearborn, who assumed command in June 1814. Dearborn continued Cushing’s command arrangement but evidently thought it applied only to Boston. Hence in July, when he called out 1,300 militia because of “the threats and daily depredations of the Enimy,” he put a regular officer in charge of each of the posts to which the troops were assigned.[47] Moreover, in accordance with the new code of army regulations drawn up by John Armstrong in 1813, Dearborn organized the troops into companies of 100 men each. In thus dismantling the state’s existing organization (which was based on 64-man companies), Dearborn deprived some officers of their command, forced some men to serve under unfamiliar officers, and subjected all to a new system of drill and tactics. For men who regarded their militia duties with a deep sense of pride and tradition, this was a serious affront indeed.[48]

Dearborn’s actions led to a host of complaints from displaced officers and disaffected men alike. Such were the objections that when Dearborn asked for an additional 5,000 men in September, Governor Strong complied but insisted on placing the troops under state officers.[49] Strong took this step reluctantly (because the state would have to supply and pay the troops), and he continued to cooperate with federal officials whenever possible. He allowed those units already in federal service to finish their tours, and he supplied 300 troops for service under a United States officer in Portsmouth. Moreover, in an effort to continue the arrangement for the defense of Boston, he assigned 1,400 men to serve in the harbor ports under Dearborn’s son, Henry A. S. Dearborn. Although the younger Dearborn was a brigadier in the militia, he was permitted to take his orders from his father.[50]

Governor Strong also sought to cooperate with federal officials in the defense of Maine, which was too remote to be properly supervised from Boston. Shortly after the breakdown of the command agreement in Massachusetts, Strong dispatched his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Colonel William H. Sumner, to stave off trouble in Maine. Sumner’s principal task was to organize the defense of Portland, whose open harbor and exposed shipping invited attack.[51] Portland, which was called Falmouth in 1775, had been burned by the British that year, and the townspeople feared that “the destressing scenes” of the Revolution might be repeated.[52]

With the governor’s aide serving as mediator, a plan for defending the city was drawn up by the Portland Committee of Public Safety, Brigadier General John Chandler of the United States Army, and Major General Alford Richardson of the state militia. The plan called for maintaining 1,900 militia in service, some commanded by state officers and others by regulars.[53] This arrangement met with “the greatest satisfaction” of all concerned, and state officials praised Sumner for leaving Portland “in so tranquil a state.”[54]

This tranquility, however, did not last, for state officials had reckoned with neither the plans of the War Department nor the wishes of the Republican militia of Maine. On September 20, the day after the troops were called into service, orders arrived from Washington transferring Chandler to Portsmouth and assigning the command in Portland to Lieutenant Colonel Horatio Stark. Although Stark was conciliatory enough, his rank seriously compromised the command agreement. The militia, in any case, had already begun to voice objections to serving under regular officers.[55]

Part of the problem was in Richardson’s division. Some of the men deserted and had to be brought back by force, and some of the officers protested against serving under regulars.[56] The citizen soldiers of Oxford County were even more troublesome. Although this county was the most Republican in the state, its militia showed little interest in making sacrifices for the war.[57] According to Sumner, they were “undisciplined, badly armed, miserably provided, and worse commanded.” Such was the “spirit of disaffection” among these troops that Sumner could see no way of implementing the command agreement except by using force, which meant using militia against militia.[58] Since a British attack on Portland seemed imminent, Sumner decided instead to put all the troops under Richardson’s command. This quieted the men in Richardson’s own division, although the Oxford militia remained obstreperous for the duration of the campaign, often refusing to perform routine duties or to take orders from anyone.[59]

Officials in Boston were distressed by the breakdown of the Portland agreement, but believing that Sumner had done all he could, they supported his resolution of the problem.[60] But this meant that in Maine, as well as in Massachusetts proper, most of the militiamen were serving under state officers. Hence, Massachusetts, like Connecticut, had to assume financial responsibility for militia called into service in the last five months of the war.

The Militia Problem: Rhode Island

Officials in Rhode Island also tried to cooperate with the army, but they too met with disappointment. Although Rhode Island was spared from British raids in the first two years of the war, by the summer of 1814 her citizens were apprehensive. American officials had long recognized that the state offered an attractive target for enemy operations because of its accessibility by water in all seasons, its spacious and weatherproof harbor, and its ample stock of provisions.[61] The British had occupied Newport during the Revolution, and the inhabitants feared that they would “experience the horrors of War and Conquest” again.[62] These fears were well founded. Vice Admiral Alexander Cochrane very nearly targeted Rhode Island instead of Baltimore in September 1814.[63]

In the hope of forestalling an attack, Governor Jones called out four companies of militia in the summer of 1814. These troops were placed in federal service, partly in the hope of getting federal money and partly out of respect for the regular officer in charge of the city’s garrison. But federal agents in Rhode Island were so destitute of funds that the state had to pick up the bill for these as well as five additional companies called out to protect Connecticut.[64] “From the present State of the Treasury,” Monroe told Governor Jones, “much dependence must be placed on the local authorities and the banks of your State.”[65] Thus Rhode Island, like her two sister states, found herself burdened with her defense costs in the last months of the war.

Trouble in New Hampshire and Vermont

Trouble over the militia was not restricted to the staunchly Federalist states in southern New England. There were also difficulties in New Hampshire. This state had a Republican governor in the first year of the war, and he readily complied with requests for troops and agreed to place them under regular army officers.[66] By 1814, however, Federalists had won control of the state and they were less cooperative. In the spring of that year, Governor John Taylor Gilman reported that such was the fear of an enemy attack on Portsmouth (where the ship-of-the-line Washington was under construction) that people there were “moving their Shipping up the River and Valuable Effects out of Town.”[67] To protect the city, Gilman called out seven companies of militia, but he refused to place the troops under regular officers. Federal agents responded by withholding supplies, and Gilman, acting on the advice of the state legislature, sent the men home.[68] Later that summer, however, when the British again threatened Portsmouth, Gilman called out 1,500 men, and this time he let them serve under regular officers.[69]

There was also trouble in Vermont. In September 1813 Republican Governor Jonas Galusha ordered a brigade of militia to New York to assist Major General Wade Hampton in his ill-fated foray into Canada. The following month, after an inconclusive election, the Vermont legislature chose Federalist Martin Chittenden as governor. Chittenden waited until Hampton’s campaign was over and then issued a proclamation ordering the militia home. The troops, he said, were needed for local defense and could not serve under regular officers anyway.[70]

Chittenden dispatched Brigadier General Jacob Davis to New York to execute the order. When Davis arrived in Plattsburgh, he was arrested for sedition, and a group of Republican officers sent Chittenden an open letter refusing to obey his order.[71] Denouncing the governor’s proclamation as “a gross insult,” the officers said: “An invitation or order to desert the standard of our country will never be obeyed by us.”[72] Although the officers insisted that the proclamation had been circulated among the troops without effect, many soldiers had already returned home. The campaign was over, and the remaining men were soon discharged anyway.[73]

The matter, however, did not end here. A Republican paper called Chittenden’s recall order “the most scandalous & unwarrantable stain on the political history of America” and suggested that the governor be tried for treason.[74] Several weeks later Solomon Sharp of Kentucky introduced a series of resolutions in Congress calling for Chittenden’s prosecution. The governor’s proclamation, said Sharp, “was in direct violation of the statute, which makes it penal to entice the soldiers in the service of the United States to desert.”[75]

Although Congress took no action on Sharp’s proposal, Harrison Gray Otis introduced a resolution in the Massachusetts legislature promising to support the people of Vermont in “their constitutional rights whenever the same shall be in danger of infringement from any quarter.”[76] This resolution was tabled, although it elicited sharp reproofs from both New Jersey and Pennsylvania. We view “with contempt and abhorrence,” said the New Jersey legislature, “the ravings of an infuriated faction, either as issuing from a legislative body, a maniac governor, or discontented or ambitious demagogues.”[77]

There was further trouble in 1814. In April Major General James Wilkinson asked Chittenden to call up troops to protect American positions on the eastern side of Lake Champlain. Chittenden responded by ordering 1,000 men to Vergennes and 500 to Burlington.[78] But these troops—like their fellow citizens in Massachusetts—deeply resented being reorganized into 100-man companies. In Vergennes, the officers—Federalists and Republicans alike—were slow to muster their men and were reportedly “very lavish with their furloughs.” According to an observer, the officers were only interested in their pay and popularity and the men were “undisciplined & insubordinate.”[79] The situation was no better at Burlington. Here the men were so incensed by the reorganization scheme that they refused to be mustered. Instead, they simply “discharged themselves.”[80]

Later in the year, when the British threatened Plattsburgh, Chittenden endeared himself to Republicans by urging Vermonters to volunteer for service in New York. After the battle was over, he issued a proclamation announcing that the character of the war had changed and urging everyone to unite in the country’s defense.[81] The state, however, continued to insist on its prerogatives to officer the militia. Shortly after Chittenden’s proclamation was issued, the Vermont council adopted a resolution proclaiming that the militia could serve only under their own officers.[82]

Defense Costs in New England

While all five New England states feuded with the federal government over the militia, the problem was most serious in southern New England because of mounting defense costs there. In Massachusetts, the cost ran about $200,000 a month and eventually totaled $850,000; in Connecticut the monthly bill was $50,000 and the final cost close to $150,000; and in Rhode Island the monthly figure was $15,000 and the total more than $50,000.[83] In discharging these bills, state officials could expect little help from Washington. Government agents were so strapped for funds that they could not even supply those militia units that were in federal service.[84] Moreover, the administration made it clear that it would neither advance money nor promise reimbursement for any militia serving under state officers in violation of federal rules. These expenses, the secretary of war said, “are chargeable to the State, and not to the United States.”[85]

With little prospect of securing federal aid, state officials turned to local sources. But raising money in wartime New England was no easy task. The federal tax burden was already heavy and still growing at a time when the region was in the throes of a depression. With business so slow, only Rhode Island, whose economy was cushioned by a healthy textile industry, was bold enough to impose new taxes, and then only to the extent of $25,000.[86]

Unwilling to raise taxes, New England officials looked to their banks for relief, but these institutions could provide only limited aid. The suspension of specie payments in the middle and southern states had put such a premium on specie that speculators were buying up New England bank notes in order to redeem them for cash. This forced the banks to retrench, which meant they could not meet the states’ needs. In Massachusetts only $631,000 of a $1 million loan offering was taken; in Connecticut, only $50,000 of a $500,000 offering, and in Rhode Island, only $23,000 of a $100,000 offering.[87]

The financial situation in Connecticut was particularly chaotic. The state was inundated with depreciated New York bank paper, which drove specie and Connecticut bank notes out of circulation and created an acute shortage of legal money.[88] Some businessmen issued their own currency, but these notes were easily counterfeited and of doubtful value.[89] For most people, finding enough legal currency to pay their debts and taxes was difficult, if not impossible. “The People cry for relief,” said one Federalist. “All say something must be done.”[90] The state finally authorized the payment of taxes in New York notes and permitted Connecticut banks to issue special notes—known as “facilities”—that did not have to be redeemed until after the war. The banks were also allowed to issue notes whose face value was less than a dollar.[91]

New England’s defense problem was not unique. Other states were also forced to pay for defense measures in the last year of the war.[92] “So far as regards the common defence,” Rufus King concluded, “the Genl. Govt. has deserted its duties.”[93] Virginia ran up the largest bill. Extensive British operations in the Chesapeake forced the Old Dominion to advance the federal government close to $1 million, and the state’s Federalist congressmen insisted that Virginia was “in the most deplorable situation.”[94] Unlike New England, however, Virginia officials had ready access to cheap bank paper and a firm promise of federal reimbursement. The financial crisis was therefore less acute. In New England, on the other hand, Federalists bitterly complained that the administration had squandered its resources in Canada while leaving the region defenseless.[95]

Other Federalist Grievances

The defense problem was one of New England’s chief grievances in 1814, but it was not the only one. Ever since Jefferson’s presidency, Federalists had been critical of Republican foreign policy. Virtually all Federalists agreed that the rejection of the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty, followed by the enactment of commercial sanctions and the declaration of war—in short the whole policy of confrontation with Great Britain—was disastrous. The costs of this policy, in blood and treasure, had mounted steadily since 1807, and yet (except for the belated repeal of the Orders-in-Council) the nation had little to show for its sacrifices. Indeed, by 1814 any hope of winning concessions from the enemy had all but vanished.

Equally disheartening, New England Federalists could see little prospect of winning control of the national government to effect significant policy changes. In spite of the Federalists’ wartime election gains, the Virginia Dynasty remained firmly in control. In addition, the Louisiana Purchase had brought vast new territories under American control, and the flood of immigration (which was only temporarily halted by the war) promised to populate these territories with Republican voters. For New England Federalists seeking a voice in national affairs, the prospects were bleak indeed.

Some Federalists in New England compared their plight to that of Americans in 1776 and saw a corresponding need for radical action. The press was filled with articles that echoed the spirit of ’76. Typical of these was an essay in the Salem Gazette that called for Massachusetts to sequester federal tax money, make a separate peace with England, and invite neighboring states to sign “a convention of alliance, amity and commerce.”[96] Most New England Federalists, however, shrank from such extremism, hoping no doubt that the mere threat of action would force the national government to change its policies.

Call for a Northern Convention

Traditionally, Americans had dealt with crises by calling a convention.[97] The Albany Congress (1754), the Stamp Act Congress (1765), the First Continental Congress (1774), and the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention (1787) were all convened to deal with crises. In New England there was recurring talk of calling a convention: first in 1808–1809, when the long embargo brought trade to a halt; then in the summer of 1812, when the declaration of war threatened to drive America into an alliance with France; and finally in early 1814, after a new embargo had been imposed.[98]

The demand for a convention in 1814 was particularly strong in the interior of Massachusetts. “The people in this part of the Country,” recalled one Federalist, “were much more excited than in most other parts of New England.”[99] According to Noah Webster, the movement began in January when leaders in Northampton called a meeting of “the principal inhabitants” of Old Hampshire (which had recently been divided into three counties) to “consider whether any measures could be taken to arrest the continuance of the war, and provide for the public safety.”[100] At a meeting held on January 19, Federalist leaders approved an address drawn up by Webster and circulated under Joseph Lyman’s name. Arguing that New England’s problems grew out of not just the war but defects in the Constitution, the address urged the towns in Old Hampshire to send memorials to the state legislature requesting “a convention of all the Northern and Commercial States . . . to consult upon measures in concert, for procuring . . . alterations in the Federal Constitution.”[101]

As a result of this address, the Massachusetts legislature was flooded with memorials—more than forty in all—which voiced similar complaints about the war, the restrictive system, executive tyranny, and the lack of New England’s influence in the Union.[102] Eleven suggested a northern convention. Although the tone of most was moderate, a few bristled with extremism. The memorial from Newbury, for example, declared that people there were “READY TO RESIST UNTO BLOOD” to secure their rights.[103]

The memorials were particularly critical of the recent embargo, and there was considerable support in the legislature for taking action against this measure. Francis Blake announced that if the American constitution permitted embargoes, he preferred the British constitution “monarchy and all,” and Samuel Fessenden told cheering galleries that the state should legalize the coasting trade and raise an army to protect its rights.[104] According to Samuel Putnam, it was “the settled determination not to petition Congress again,” and proposals to legalize the coasting trade and outlaw seizures made without a search warrant were “received with great unanimity.”[105]

Much to the dismay of the extremists, however, the moderates refused to condone any radical action. “You cannot sufficiently realize the embarrassments which the Politicks of the Boston Stamp have occasioned,” complained Putnam.[106] The petitions were referred to a committee chaired by former United States senator James Lloyd, and a document was prepared—known as Lloyd’s Report—which condemned the war and the embargo. Although the report recognized the right of nullification, it argued that no action was necessary because the embargo was unconstitutional and therefore void. The report conceded that a convention might be called to deal with New England’s problems but recommended waiting until the will of the people had been registered in the spring elections. By skirting the issue of nullification and postponing a convention, Lloyd’s Report was a victory for moderation.[107]

The Federalists won the ensuing elections, but when the Massachusetts legislature met again in May 1814, the convention project was quietly shelved. The embargo had been repealed, which eliminated one source of complaint. In addition, Napoleon’s defeat had ended the war in Europe, and Great Britain’s offer to open direct negotiations with the United States had raised hopes for an end to the War of 1812 as well.[108]

Genesis of the Hartford Convention

In the summer of 1814, however, circumstances again changed. The negotiations with Britain were delayed, and when they did begin, the envoys found themselves deadlocked. In addition, the war moved closer to New England’s shores as the British occupied eastern Maine and stepped up their raids on the coast. Harassed by the enemy and abandoned by the federal government, New England officials watched hopelessly as their defense costs mounted. A crisis appeared to be at hand, and Massachusetts Federalists responded by reviving the project for a convention.[109]

On September 7, the day after breaking with Major General Dearborn over the command issue, Governor Strong summoned the Massachusetts legislature to a special session.[110] According to Harrison Gray Otis, prior to the session, “a few influential members of the Legislature” met to discuss the possibility of a convention. Although Otis opposed the project, other Federalists argued that it was necessary to satisfy their “country friends.” Accordingly, the decision was made to summon a convention to obtain “security against Conscription, taxes & the danger of invasion” and to restrain “the tendency to excess.”[111]

The defense problem played a central role in the proceedings that followed. In his opening address to the legislature on October 5, Governor Strong focused almost exclusively on this issue. The special session was necessary, he said, because the war had “assumed an aspect so threatening and destructive” that the state had been forced to call out more militia than at any time in its history. “It is an obvious reflection,” the governor said, “that the limited sources of revenue which the state has retained in its own power, bear no proportion to the expenses hereby incurred.” If the state did not find relief, it would be “extremely difficult, if not impossible, to provide even in the first instance for the requisite expenditures.”[112]

The Massachusetts legislature responded to the governor’s address with a report drawn up by Otis. Echoing the governor’s complaints, the report said that the war had “assumed an aspect of great and immediate danger” and that the people could not continue to pay federal taxes and at the same time finance local defense measures. The alternatives were “submission to the enemy, or the control of their own resources.” The report also declared that the Constitution had failed to secure “equal rights and benefits” to New England. To remedy these problems, the report recommended calling a convention of New England states.[113] This proposal was approved 260–90 in the house and 22–12 in the senate, and twelve delegates were chosen to represent the state in the proposed convention.[114]

When the Connecticut legislature met in mid-October, Governor Smith devoted his address exclusively to the defense problem. Because the federal government had withdrawn its support, he said, “we are left to defend ourselves against a formidable and exasperated enemy.”[115] The state legislature responded with a report that concentrated on the same issue. In this “odious and disastrous war,” the report said, “the national government are dooming us to enormous taxation, without affording any just confidence that we shall share in the expenditure of the public revenue.” The report concluded by recommending that Connecticut take part in the proposed convention.[116] The Connecticut house approved this recommendation by a vote of 153 to 36 and chose seven delegates to attend the meeting.[117]

In Rhode Island the concern over defense was no less pronounced. Both the governor’s address in November and the legislative report that followed focused almost exclusively on this issue. Governor Jones declared that the state was “as defenceless as at the commencement of the war” and that the federal government “refused to make the necessary advances for expenses which their own officers have ordered and approved.” Complaining of “great pecuniary embarrassments,” Jones said that even one half of the federal tax money collected in the state “would increase, in a very respectable degree our means of defence.”[118] The legislature agreed. By a margin of 39 to 28, the Rhode Island house voted to take part in the convention and chose four delegates to represent the state.[119]

Although New Hampshire and Vermont were also invited to the convention, Federalist leaders in both states opposed the project. However, two counties in each state chose a pair of delegates each to attend. Although one of the Vermont delegates was denied a seat because he represented a minority in a Democratic district, the other three were seated. This bought the total number of delegates to twenty-six.[120]

A Divided Public Response

Many moderates supported the convention at least partly to silence the extremists, and the prospect of a convention probably did reduce unrest. “It is the opinion of my best informed friends from the Country,” said Otis, “that a reliance on some effectual suggestions from that body, alone prevents a violent ferment and open opposition in many places.”[121] Nevertheless, the demand for extreme action did not entirely subside. Francis Blake, who thought “the Legislature of Massachusetts should speak to the National Government in a voice as loud as thunder,” recommended that the state sequester federal tax money.[122] Although no one in the legislature supported this proposal, innkeepers and retailers in Old Hampshire promised to withhold their federal taxes until after the convention had met.[123] The people of Reading, Massachusetts, made a similar pledge. “Until the public opinion shall be known,” said a resolution they adopted, “we will not enter our carriages [on the tax rolls]—pay our continental taxes—or aid, inform or assist any officer in their collection.”[124]

Timothy Pickering, who described the convention as “the best hope of our best men,” deprecated “every thing which shall simply be put on paper” and called for bold action.[125] Some newspapers echoed his cry. “Advance boldly,” said the Boston Centinel. “Suffer yourselves not to be entangled by the cobwebs of a compact which has long since ceased to exist.”[126] The Centinel even suggested that a new nation was in the making. An article describing the appointment of the Connecticut delegates was headlined “Second Pillar of a new Federal Edifice reared,” and a story on Rhode Island’s action was entitled “Third Pillar Raised.”[127] Josiah Quincy, on the other hand, had a much better sense of what the convention was likely to do. When asked what the result would be, he replied: “A GREAT PAMPHLET!”[128]

Federalists in the middle and southern states did not favor rash action but were sympathetic to the plight of their friends in New England. The Pittsburgh Gazette, for example, said that Otis’s report summoning the convention “breathes the spirit of Old Massachusetts, is dignified and patriotic.”[129] There was hope, too, that the convention would force the administration to modify its policies. John Stanly of North Carolina was not sure what the convention would do, but “if it frighten Madison from his course, I shall be glad of it.”[130]

Republicans, on the other hand, vigorously condemned the project. William Plumer’s view was typical. “I expect no good, but evil from it,” he said; “it will embarrass us, aid the enemy, & protract the war.”[131] Most Republicans, however, were confident—or at least hopeful—that the convention would pursue a moderate course. “With respect to the object of the convention,” said an army officer, “I cannot believe that it is open Rebellion, an actual division of the States, or undisguised union with the public enemy.”[132] “The publick,” added a Republican newspaper, “do not feel any distressing anxiety about the proceedings of the Convention of ‘choice spirits’ at Hartford. . . . There will be much smoke and no fire.”[133]

Some Republicans called for the federal government to suppress New England disaffection. “The people,” said one southerner, “wish now to see some strong steps taken with those traitors in Massachusetts[;] it will not do to temporize.”[134] The administration, however, preferred a more cautious approach. The War Department dispatched Colonel Thomas Jesup to Hartford—ostensibly on a recruiting mission but actually to keep an eye on the convention. Jesup was instructed to pay special attention to the armory at Springfield (which had been threatened by Shays’s rebels thirty years earlier), and to assure “the friends of the union” in New England that the government would aid and protect them.[135] The War Department also made plans to raise volunteers and to send additional regulars to New England if trouble arose.[136]

Republicans need not have worried because by the time the convention met in December, the crisis atmosphere in New England had largely abated. The campaigning season was over, and although the bills were still coming in, New England could expect a lull in British raids until the spring. Moreover, the new British terms, published on December 1, boded well for peace. With the publication of these terms, a wave of optimism swept through the country, and rumors of peace began to circulate freely.[137]

The character of the twenty-six delegates at the convention also boded well. George Cabot, Nathan Dane, and Otis headed the Massachusetts delegation; Chauncey Goodrich and James Hillhouse, the Connecticut delegation; and Daniel Lyman and Samuel Ward, the Rhode Island delegation. Except for Timothy Bigelow and perhaps one or two others, the delegates were moderates, hardly the sort to promote violent measures. Radicals like Blake, Quincy, and Fessenden were purposely excluded from the meeting.[138] “I do not know that we have among [the] delegates a Single bold & ardent man,” lamented John Lowell, Jr.[139]

Although Otis talked of taking bold measures—of treating “the administration as having abdicated the Government”—it was not in his character.[140] As Lowell said: “Mr Otis is naturally timid & frequently wavering. . . . He is sincere in wishing thorough measures but a thousand fears restrain him.”[141] The other delegates did not even promise boldness. Dane reportedly said that he agreed to attend the meeting because “somebody must go to prevent mischief,” and Cabot made the same point.[142] “We are going,” he told a friend, “to keep you young hot-heads from getting into mischief.”[143]

The Hartford Convention Meets

Although no site for the convention was mentioned in the official documents, Federalist leaders chose Hartford, probably to avoid the appearance of Massachusetts domination. Goodrich, who was mayor of Hartford as well as Connecticut’s lieutenant governor, procured the use of the state council chamber.[144] Democrats welcomed the delegates to the city by flying their flags at half-mast and ringing bells, and later the town crier marched a body of regulars around the meeting house “playing the Death march with muffled drums and colors furled.”[145] Although some people turned out to see what the convention would do, most ignored the proceedings. “I am astonished,” said Jesup, “at the little interest excited by the Meeting.”[146]

The Hartford Convention met from December 15, 1814, to January 5, 1815. “We sit twice a day Connecticut fashion,” Otis wrote, “and in the evenings talk politicks over the fire.”[147] At the opening session Cabot was unanimously chosen president, and Theodore Dwight, editor of the Hartford Connecticut Mirror, was chosen secretary. To avoid the intrusion of popular feeling, the delegates conducted their proceedings in secret.[148] Although public bodies often met behind closed doors, in this case the secrecy gave “more plausibility to the cry of treason.”[149] The delegates were remarkably faithful in keeping their pledge of secrecy. Such an injunction, said a Connecticut delegate,” was never more faithfully observed.”[150] Indeed, Federalists in Washington complained of the lack of information.[151]

Harrison Gray Otis (1765–1848) was a moderate Massachusetts Federalist who played a central role in the Hartford Convention. A successful lawyer and financier, he had amassed one of the largest fortunes in Boston by the time of his death. (Wikipedia)

No record of the debates was kept—only a bare-bones journal of the proceedings.[152] “The wise speeches,” said Goodrich, “[were] all left behind within the walls of the venerable chambers.”[153] Even though Otis had originally opposed the convention, he became the driving force in its deliberations. The only known radical, Bigelow, was given no committee assignments and apparently did not play a major role in the proceedings. Nor was there any sign of dissension. “We are progressing very pleasantly, & with great unanimity,” said one delegate, “& shall, I am confident, arrive at a result which ought to satisfy every reasonable man & true friend of his country.”[154]

At their first meeting the delegates established a committee headed by Goodrich to draw up an agenda. It was indicative of the moderate bent of the delegates—and the passing of the crisis atmosphere—that the first draft of the agenda was devoted exclusively to war-related issues: the need for local defense, the waste of money on Canada, the dispute over the militia, and the administration’s plans for enlisting minors and conscripting militia. There was no mention of New England’s long-term problems nor any reference to constitutional amendments. Since this was hardly likely to satisfy radical opinion—particularly among the party’s “country friends”—the delegates subsequently added constitutional reform to their agenda.[155]

Report of the Hartford Convention

The final report of the convention was largely the work of Otis.[156] About half of the report was devoted to immediate concerns: the defense problem, the minor enlistment law, and the proposals for drafting men into the army and navy. To finance defense measures, the report recommended that the states seek authority from the national government to preempt federal tax money collected within their borders. To deal with unconstitutional measures for filling the ranks of the army and navy, the report recommended nullification, asserting that it was the right and the duty of a state “to interpose its authority” to protect its citizens.[157]

The other half of the report was devoted to long-term problems. After cataloguing the failures of Republican policies, the report recommended seven constitutional amendments “to strengthen, and if possible to perpetuate, the union of the states.”[158] These amendments called for: (1) a two-thirds vote in Congress to declare war, interdict trade with a foreign nation, or admit new states to the Union; (2) a sixty-day limit on embargoes; (3) an end to counting three-fifths of slaves in apportioning representation in Congress; (4) a ban against naturalized citizens holding federal office; and (5) a provision that would limit presidents to one term and bar the election of a president from the same state twice in succession.[159]

These amendments represented a catalogue of New England’s grievances over the past decade. They struck at the over-representation of white southerners in Congress, the growing political power of the West, the restrictive system and the war, the influence of foreign-born office holders (like Albert Gallatin), and the Virginia Dynasty and its domination of national politics. Federalists hoped that the adoption of these amendments would restore sectional balance and prevent a renewal of those policies that had threatened New England’s vital interests.[160]

Although the report of the Hartford Convention called for nullifying federal laws, the tone of the document was generally moderate. The report expressly opposed any “irrevocable” step that might lead to disunion and recommended instead “a course of moderation and firmness.”[161] Even if New England’s grievances were not redressed, the report simply recommended that another convention be held in June 1815, or sooner if necessary.[162]

The report of the Hartford Convention was published as an extra in the Hartford Connecticut Courant on January 6 and subsequently reprinted in newspapers across the country.[163] The publication of the report, Otis later recalled, “had the immediate effect of calming the public mind throughout New England.”[164] Federalists everywhere praised the results. Theodore Dwight called the report “an able performance,” and Christopher Gore claimed that the delegates had executed “a difficult task . . . with wisdom and discretion.”[165] Daniel Webster described the proceedings as “moderate, temperate & judicious” and reported that Federalists from the middle and southern states were “very highly gratified” with the results.[166] A Virginia paper predicted that the report would “command respect” and “diffuse light,” and the New York Evening Post said that alarmists would “read with vast satisfaction this masterly report, and rejoice to find [their] fears and alarms groundless.”[167]

Even the extremists professed satisfaction. Pickering thought the report “bears the high character of wisdom, firmness and dignity,” and William Sullivan said that even though he was “prepared to pursue much more efficient measures,” he was satisfied with the results. “It must be born in mind,” he said, “that this may be considered as the first of a series of well considered measures.”[168] A Boston paper made the same point. “No sensible man,” said the Gazette, “ought to expect, that the first New England Convention would do as much as the last out of several congresses of the patriots of the revolution.”[169]

Republicans were relieved by the moderation of the report. The Washington National Intelligencer said that “the proceedings were tempered with more moderation than was to have been expected,” and John Armstrong claimed that the report proved that New England was engaged in nothing more than “a game of bragge.”[170] The Worcester National Aegis considered the report laughable, and the Boston Patriot said that the entire convention project was “so pitiful and insignificant, and so truly contemptible” that no counter-convention was necessary.[171] Andrew Jackson, on the other hand, later said that if he had been stationed in New England, he would have court-martialed the “monarchists & Traitors” who were behind the Hartford Convention.[172] Given his record in the Southwest and later in Spanish Florida, this was probably no idle boast.

This cartoon of the Hartford Convention depicts the King of England inviting Harrison Gray Otis to bring the New England states into the British Empire. The three delegates considering the “leap” represent Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Governor Caleb Strong below prays for a successful leap so that he can join the British aristocracy as Lord Essex—a play on the phrase “Essex Junto,” which was thought to be an influential political faction in Massachusetts. Note the heroes of the war whose names are inscribed on the left. (Etching by William Charles. Library of Congress)

Emissaries and Amendments

The Massachusetts and Connecticut legislatures formally approved the convention report.[173] Both states also sent emissaries to Washington to secure federal tax money. Otis was opposed to the mission because he thought the state’s congressional delegation “could do all which can be done.”[174] Other Federalists disagreed, and Otis was chosen to head a three-man commission that included William Sullivan and merchant Thomas H. Perkins. Connecticut sent Calvin Goddard, a delegate to the Hartford Convention, and Brigadier General Nathaniel Terry, head of the state army.[175]

On their way to Washington, the commissioners learned of Jackson’s victory at New Orleans, and as they completed the final leg of their journey they were the butt of much humor. “The grievance deputies from Massachusetts & Connecticutt,” said Winfield Scott from Baltimore, have “afforded a fine Subject of jest & merriment to men of all parties.”[176] The Massachusetts delegation reached the capital on February 13, the Connecticut commissioners two days later. In between, on February 14, the peace treaty arrived. “The joyful event of peace,” said Perkins, “has suspended the mission on which I came.”[177]

In Washington Madison was careful to keep his distance from the “ambassadors.” That “mean and contemptible little blackguard,” complained Otis, ignored the commissioners and told everyone that their mission would have failed anyway.[178] The administration had already rebuffed attempts by Ohio and Virginia to preempt federal tax money, so in all likelihood Massachusetts and Connecticut would have fared no better even if the war had continued.[179]

The commissioners remained in Washington in the hope of persuading Congress to reimburse the states for their militia costs. Massachusetts Republican Joseph Varnum shepherded a bill for this purpose through the Senate, but it was postponed in the House after “a very animated and rather acrimonious debate.”[180] Massachusetts and Connecticut were partially reimbursed in 1831, but not until thirty years later—when the nation faced a secessionist threat from another quarter—did Congress finally authorize full payment.[181]

Massachusetts and Connecticut approved the seven constitutional amendments recommended by the convention, but they were the only states to do so.[182] Although the amendments were introduced in Congress, no action was taken on them. Eight states, including Vermont, adopted resolutions against the amendments.[183] The New York legislature declared that their effect “would be to create dissentions among the different members of the union, to enfeeble the national government, and to tempt all nations to encroach upon our rights.”[184]

Significance of the Hartford Convention

The Hartford Convention was the climax of New England’s opposition to the war. As one scholar has put it, it was “a normal product of abnormal conditions.”[185] New England Federalists called the meeting to let off steam and to ensure that the moderates in their party retained control. They were also looking for a solution to their defense problem and a vehicle for airing their long-term grievances. The Hartford Convention, in other words, was designed to meet several needs. It was not only a party caucus and constitutional convention but a defense conference as well. Although it represented a triumph for moderation, few people remembered it that way in the rush of events at the end of the war.

Chapter 11

The Treaty of Ghent

In the military and naval campaigns, the record of the United States during the War of 1812 was decidedly mixed. There were some successes—most notably on the northern lakes and at New Orleans—and some failures—particularly in the Chesapeake Bay and on the Canadian frontier. In the peace negotiations, however, the nation’s record was much better, not because of what the envoys won but because of what they avoided losing. No single campaign in the field loomed as large as these negotiations. It was here—in Ghent, Belgium, rather than on the Canadian-American border—that the United States consistently outmaneuvered the enemy, and it was here that Americans could claim their most significant victory.[1]

American success at the negotiating table was fitting because it was here that Republicans expected to win the war. Some Republicans—the “scarecrow” party—had supported military preparations in the War Congress in the hope of persuading the British to make concessions. When this failed, some voted for the declaration of war for the same reason. Although most Republicans believed that the conquest of Canada would be a mere matter of marching, many hoped that no marching would be necessary—that the decision for war itself would be enough to win concessions from the British. In this sense, the declaration of war was a kind of bluff designed to force the British to take American demands seriously.[2]

U.S. Peace Feelers

That the president himself harbored these views is suggested by the haste with which he sent out peace feelers in the early days of the war. “The sword was scarcely out of the scabbard,” Madison reported, “before the enemy was apprized of the reasonable terms on which it would be resheathed.”[3] On June 18, 1812, the day that war was declared, Secretary of State James Monroe summoned the British minister, Augustus J. Foster, both to inform him of the decision for war and to urge him to work for peace.[4] Five days later Madison invited Foster to the White House to outline America’s terms. Expressing a desire to avoid “any serious collision,” the president told Foster that the British could restore peace by giving up the Orders-in-Council and impressment.[5] Although Foster had no authority to negotiate on these issues, he was expected to pass the terms on to his superiors in London.

The United States also pursued peace through Jonathan Russell, the American chargé d’affaires in London. On June 26, barely a week after the declaration of war, the administration dispatched a note to Russell authorizing him to open negotiations for an armistice. The British would have to give up the Orders-in-Council and impressment, but in return the United States promised to bar all British seamen from American ships.[6] By the time Russell made this offer in late August, the Orders-in-Council had already been repealed. Hence impressment was the only issue that stood in the way of peace.

Britain’s Response

The British, however, showed no interest in Russell’s offer. Having made one important concession—on the Orders-in-Council—they were in no mood to make another. “No administration,” said Britain’s foreign secretary, Lord Castlereagh, “could expect to remain in power that should consent to renounce the right of impressment, or to suspend the practice, without the certainty of an arrangement . . . to secure its object.” With the war only a few weeks old, Castlereagh expressed surprise at America’s eagerness for peace. “If the American Government was so anxious to get rid of the war,” he told Russell, “it would have an opportunity of doing so on learning the revocation of the orders in council.”[7]

That the repeal of the Orders-in-Council would end the war the British did not doubt. For years British restrictions on neutral trade had been the leading source of Anglo-American friction, while impressment had not been a major issue since the loss of the Monroe–Pinkney Treaty and the attack on the Chesapeake in 1807. Confident that the repeal of the Orders would avert war, the British government in July 1812 instructed the Royal Navy to ignore any attacks from privateers sent to sea before news of the British concession reached America.[8] Even after learning of the declaration of war at the end of July, Castlereagh told Russell that British officials still entertained “great hopes . . . of the favorable effect” which the repeal of the Orders would have on American policy.[9]

The British government waited until October 13—ten weeks after receiving the news of war—before authorizing general reprisals against the United States.[10] In the meantime, the ministry instructed Sir John Borlase Warren, the new British naval commander on the American station, to propose an armistice. Foster, who had heard of the repeal of the Orders after leaving the United States, was already trying to arrange a cease-fire in Halifax. At his suggestion, British officials in Canada signed an armistice with Major General Henry Dearborn. The United States, however, repudiated this agreement because it did not provide for an end to impressment.[11] Hence the negotiations in 1812 ended in failure even though both sides were interested in peace.

Russia’s Mediation Offer

In March 1813, Andrei Dashkov, the Russian minister in Washington, invited the United States to take part in a new round of negotiations, this time under the auspices of his government.[12] Aside from any prestige they might garner, the Russians had several reasons for acting. Great Britain was their most important ally, and they wanted her to concentrate on the war in Europe. In addition, the United States was an important commercial partner whose ships normally carried tropical produce to Russian ports in the Baltic. This trade had come to an abrupt halt with the outbreak of war, and it was not likely to resume until peace was restored.[13]

The administration welcomed the Russian offer.[14] Russia had long championed neutral rights, and American officials expected to profit from her mediation. “There is not a single [maritime] interest,” Monroe wrote, “in which Russia and the other Baltic powers may not be considered as having a common interest with the United States.”[15] American officials were anxious for peace for several reasons. The campaign against Canada had not gone well, Federalist opposition remained as adamant as ever, and the nation’s financial situation was already deteriorating. Furthermore, Napoleon’s retreat from Russia had greatly strengthened Britain’s hand on the Continent. If Britain prevailed in Europe, the United States might find itself alone in the field against her. To avoid this prospect, American officials hoped to liquidate the war in the New World while Britain was still tied up in the Old.[16]

Without waiting to hear Britain’s response, Madison chose three peace commissioners and dispatched them to Europe. Albert Gallatin, who had grown weary of his duties at the Treasury Department, was chosen to head the mission. He was joined by John Quincy Adams, the American minister in St. Petersburg, and James A. Bayard, a moderate Delaware Federalist. The Senate rejected Gallatin’s nomination because he was still a member of the cabinet, but by this time he was already in Europe.[17]

The instructions the commissioners carried with them called for British concessions on a broad range of maritime issues.[18] Later Monroe suggested that Great Britain might consider tossing Canada into the bargain. “It may be worth while,” he told the envoys, “to bring to view, the advantages to both Countries which is promised, by a transfer of the upper parts and even the whole of Canada to the United States.”[19] Only one of the American demands, however, was a sine qua non—a point deemed essential to any settlement—and that was an end to impressment. Bayard, who had earlier declared that if this point were insisted upon he was likely to “grow grey in the war,” suggested an informal understanding on the subject, but the administration was unyielding.[20] Privately Monroe told Gallatin that an informal agreement “would not only ruin the present admn., but the republican party & even the [republican] cause.”[21]

Gallatin and Bayard joined Adams in St. Petersburg in July 1813. There they remained—attending an unending round of parties—waiting for Britain’s official response to the mediation offer.[22] In fact, the British had already rejected the proposal. They had no desire (as Castlereagh put it) to allow the United States “to mix directly or indirectly Her Maritime Interests with those of another State”—and certainly not with those of a great inland power that had long favored a broad definition of neutral rights.[23]

The British rejection was common knowledge, but because the Russians were reluctant to give up the project, the American envoys received no formal notice.[24] By December the lack of any official word had become a source of “much impatience and embarrassment.”[25] Finally in January 1814, six months after arriving in Russia, Gallatin and Bayard took their leave, refusing to wait any longer. The two envoys headed for London, ostensibly en route home but actually to scout out the prospects for peace in the enemy’s capital.[26]

Before leaving Russia, the American envoys had conducted informal negotiations with Alexander Baring, an ardent friend of the United States who had married a Philadelphia socialite and was the nation’s banker in London. Although the Americans had hoped that the foreign seaman act, which authorized the president to bar British tars from American ships, would provide a basis for ending impressment, Baring disabused them of this notion.[27] No British government, he said, could agree to renounce impressment on this basis alone, and even the best friends of peace “would not be bold enough to recommend it.”[28]

The British Counter Offer

Although British officials rejected the mediation offer, they felt obliged to make a counter offer to demonstrate their peaceful intentions. Having already raised the possibility of direct talks through various other channels, Castlereagh dispatched a message in November 1813 offering “to enter upon a direct negociation for the restoration of Peace.” The talks, Castlereagh said, would have to be conducted “upon principles of perfect reciprocity not inconsistent with the established maxims of Public Law, and with the maritime Rights of the British Empire.”[29] This was a thinly disguised promise to insist on the right of impressment.

President Madison accepted this offer and appointed four men to serve on the commission. John Quincy Adams headed the mission; the other members were James A. Bayard, Kentucky War Hawk Henry Clay, and Jonathan Russell, who had conducted the early armistice negotiations in London. Three weeks later, when Madison learned that Gallatin was still in Europe, he was added to the commission. Since everyone now agreed that Gallatin had given up his place in the cabinet, the Senate approved his nomination.[30]

The American delegation was exceptionally strong. Four of the envoys already had distinguished themselves in public life, and Adams and Clay still had long and important careers ahead of them. Only Russell would never achieve any great distinction. With such a strong delegation, differences of opinion were inevitable. Clay and Adams were frequently at odds, though usually on minor issues. “Upon almost all the important questions,” Adams said, “we have been unanimous.”[31] Gallatin played a particularly important role in forging this consensus. According to Adams, the former secretary of the treasury contributed “the largest and most important share to the conclusion of the peace.”[32]

John Quincy Adams (1767–1848) of Massachusetts was read out of the Federalist party when he supported the embargo of 1807. During the War of 1812, he served as the nation’s minister to Russia and as a member of the delegation that negotiated the Treaty of Ghent. After returning to the United States, he served as secretary of state and then as president, but (like his father) he was voted out of office after one term. (Engraving by A. B. Durand after a painting by T. Sully. Library of Congress)

In contrast to the United States, Great Britain had to rely on second-tier men because her top officials were busy with European affairs. The British peace mission was headed by Admiral James Gambier, who was expected to look after Britain’s maritime rights. Also on the commission was Dr. William Adams, an Admiralty lawyer selected because American diplomats were known to favor legal arguments, and Henry Goulburn, an undersecretary in the Colonial Office who was supposed to protect Britain’s interests in Canada. Goulburn was the most ambitious and energetic of the three, and he took charge of the negotiations.[33]

The British envoys were appointed in May but were slow to leave home. According to an American observer in London, they did “not appear in a hurry to leave this Country.”[34] British officials dragged their feet, hoping that victories in America would enhance their bargaining position. Now that the war in Europe was over, the mood in Great Britain was vindictive. “War with America, and most inveterate war,” said a friendly Englishman, “is in the mouth of almost every one you meet in this wise and thinking nation.”[35] The British press contributed to this mood with inflammatory pieces. The American people, said the London Sun, must not be “left in a condition to repeat their insults, injuries, and wrongs.” “Our demands,” added the Times, “may be couched in a single word, Submission.”[36]

The View from the Continent

American officials had hoped that the great powers on the Continent would serve as a counterpoise to Britain, but it soon became apparent that British influence was everywhere paramount, even in the press. “It is something singular,” reported Bayard, “that on the continent you get no news but what comes from England.” “If the War is to be continued,” Clay warned, “we must rely for its prosecution exclusively upon our own resources.” “From Europe,” added Gallatin, “no assistance can for some time be expected.”[37]

Few Europeans gave much thought to the American war. According to Jonathan Russell, the “Great Congress at Vienna” (which was forging a general European settlement) overshadowed “the little congress at Ghent.”[38] Nevertheless everyone—the British included—recognized that the American war hampered Britain’s freedom of action on the Continent, and as time passed, sympathy for the United States mounted. By December 1814 Gallatin reported that the continental powers “rejoiced at any thing which might occupy & eventually weaken our Enemy,” and an American in Paris said that “enthusiasm here in our favor is in full flood.”[39]

The United States profited from this undercurrent of sympathy. Napoleon had allowed American ships to arm in French ports and to bring their prizes in for adjudication, but after his fall the British put pressure on the new regime to halt this practice. Although French officials revoked the authority of American ships to arm in French ports, they refused to close their ports to American privateers. British merchants raised a clamor, and British officials protested, but in vain. American privateers were still cruising from French ports when the war ended.[40]

Negotiations at Ghent

The peace negotiations were originally planned for Gothenburg, Sweden, but the end of the war in Europe made Ghent more convenient because it afforded quicker access to both capitals.[41] The negotiations lasted from August 8, 1814, to December 24, 1814—far longer than anyone expected although not as long as the Congress of Vienna, which met from September 1814 to June 1815.

The negotiations were conducted behind closed doors, but President Madison kept the American people informed of the progress. British officials, on the other hand, kept their people in the dark. “The proceedings at Ghent,” said the London Morning Chronicle, “continue to excite the chief interest in the public mind, but Ministers persist in their silence both with regard to their progress and result.”[42] The Times was reduced to making deductions from the number of messages that were carried between the hotels of the two delegations, and the paper complained that the first real news of the negotiations came from America.[43] In mid-December gamblers were still offering three-to-one odds that peace would not be concluded before the end of the year, and as late as December 24, the very day the treaty was signed, the Morning Chronicle reported that the talks “afforded no prospect of an amiable issue,” and the Times repeated rumors that the negotiations had broken off.[44]

Adams claimed that the tone of the British notes in the negotiations was “arrogant, overbearing, and offensive,” while that of American notes was “neither so bold nor so spirited as I think it should be.”[45] The Massachusetts envoy need not have worried because the British representatives were overmatched and thus outmaneuvered. A London newspaper later complained that the British envoys showed neither “adroitness or skill” and accused them of presenting their demands in a “crude and undigested state.”[46] After overplaying their hand in the early rounds, the British envoys were put on a tight leash by officials in London. Thereafter, as Adams put it, they “were little more than a medium of communication between us and the British Privy Council.”[47] The American envoys were quick to exploit this advantage. “The Americans,” complained Goulburn, “have rather hoaxed us for the number of our references home.”[48]

The Nagging Problem of Impressment

When the negotiations began, the American envoys were still bound to insist on an end to impressment. Six months earlier Monroe had written that even if the war in Europe ended the British still had to give up impressment. “This degrading practice,” he said, “must cease, our flag must protect the crew, or the United States, cannot consider themselves an independent Nation.”[49]

Like other American diplomats in this era, the envoys at Ghent were prepared to violate their instructions if necessary. As early as November 1813, Adams reported that Bayard “seemed anxious to discuss the expediency of giving up the point of impressment.”[50] Six months later Clay said that the issue had become “a mere theoretic pretension” and that if “the interests of our Country demanded of me the personal risk of a violation of instructions I should not hesitate to incur it.”[51] Adams and Gallatin also hinted at a willingness to give up the point.[52]

The envoys never had to take this risk because in June 1814 the administration decided to jettison the issue.[53] The news reached the envoys just as the negotiations got under way.[54] Although Republican leaders later justified their decision by claiming that the end of the European war had brought an end to impressment, privately they conceded that Napoleon’s defeat had killed any chance of winning concessions on the issue.[55]

British Peace Terms

With impressment out of the way, the envoys were able to focus on other issues, and in the first two weeks of the negotiations the British presented their terms. As a sine qua non for peace, they insisted that their Indian allies be included in the settlement and that a permanent barrier or reservation be established for them in the Old Northwest. In addition, they demanded American territory in northern Maine (to facilitate overland traffic between Quebec and Halifax) and in present-day Minnesota (to assure ready access to the Mississippi River). They also called on the United States to demilitarize the Great Lakes—removing all warships from those waters and all fortifications from the shores. Finally, the British declared that the American right to fish in Canadian waters and to dry their catch on the nearby shores would not be renewed without an equivalent.[56]

The British terms were based on several considerations, but uppermost was their concern for Canadian security. It was “notorious to the whole world,” the British said, “that the conquest of Canada and its permanent annexation to the United States was the declared object of the American Government.”[57] When the American envoys denied this, the British produced the annexationist proclamations issued by generals William Hull and Alexander Smyth in 1812.[58] The American envoys, however, blandly replied that neither of these proclamations “was authorized or approved by the Government.”[59] Unable to find any official statement on the subject, the British could only repeat that American designs on Canada were a “matter of notoriety.”[60]

British officials had talked about the desirability of an Indian barrier ever since the early 1790s.[61] Such a barrier would enhance Canadian security by establishing a buffer zone between British and American territories and by ensuring that the western tribes remained loyal to Britain. Control of the lakes and a direct overland route between Quebec and Halifax were also expected to increase Canadian security by making it easier to ward off attacks from the south.

The British were also anxious to protect their Indian allies. Having abandoned them in the Peace of 1783 and again in the Jay Treaty of 1794, British officials had repeatedly promised not to desert them again. In February 1814 Sir George Prevost told an assemblage of western Indians: “Our Great Father considers you as his children and will not forget you or your interests at a peace.”[62] Several months later, Lieutenant Colonel Robert McDouall told the Indians at Mackinac that the King would help them recover their “old boundaries.” Great Britain, he added, would make peace only “on the express condition that your interests shall be first considered, your just claims admitted, and no infringement of your rights permitted in future.”[63] Several British newspapers echoed this pledge. “These sable heroes,” said the Sun, must “be for ever secured against Yankee encroachment and barbarity.”[64]

As a boundary for the Indian reservation, the British suggested the line established by the Treaty of Greenville in 1795, although subject to “such modifications as might be agreed upon.”[65] This treaty had been superseded by others, but if resurrected, it would have secured to the Indians about a third of Ohio, half of Minnesota, and almost all of Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. This territory was not, as the American envoys claimed, a third of the land mass of the United States, but 250,000 square miles, or about 15 percent.[66] The region was inhabited by some 43,000 Indians and about 100,000 whites.[67] When asked what would become of those Americans who found themselves on the wrong side of the new boundary, the British replied that “they must shift for themselves”—meaning that they would have to abandon their homes.[68]

In presenting their demand for an Indian barrier, the British envoys exceeded their instructions in two ways. First, they presented the Indian reservation as a sine qua non, although officials in London saw the barrier as simply one possible means of protecting the Indians.[69] Secondly, even though the British government was only interested in preventing Americans from purchasing land in the barrier, the British envoys demanded that the United States refrain from acquiring territory “by purchase or otherwise.”[70] This would prevent Americans from acquiring lands inside the barrier by conquest in “defensive” wars.

The British terms need not have surprised anyone since they were anticipated by newspaper articles on both sides of the Atlantic.[71] Nevertheless, the American envoys were stunned. Although aware of the strident anti-American feeling in Britain, they had assumed that the British government would be more conciliatory.[72] They failed to realize that with the war in Europe over, British leaders were anxious to end the American war on terms that would ensure that Canada and its Indian allies were amply protected in the future.

America’s Response

The American envoys flatly rejected the British proposals. “A Treaty concluded upon such terms,” they said, “would be but an armistice. It cannot be supposed that America would long submit to conditions so injurious and degrading.”[73] The Indian barrier was particularly offensive. It undermined American sovereignty, ran counter to a tradition of national control over the Indians, and threatened the westward movement. Adams told Goulburn that to condemn such a vast expanse of territory “to perpetual barrenness and solitude [so] that a few hundred savages might find wild beasts to hunt upon it, was a species of game law that a nation descended from Britons would never endure.”[74] This unyielding attitude surprised Goulburn. “Till I came here,” he said, “I had no idea of the fixed determination which there is in the heart of every American to exterpate the Indians & appropriate Their territory.”[75]

Convinced that the prospects for peace were remote, the American envoys sent a truce ship home to notify the administration. In mid-October, President Madison sent the envoys’ dispatches to Congress. Several days later he gave Congress the instructions that authorized the envoys to drop impressment. These documents were published to show the world—and particularly the Federalists—how reasonable the administration was and how unreasonable the British had become. Publication of these documents had the dual effect of generating support for the war at home and embarrassing British officials abroad.[76]

British leaders were annoyed by the publication of the documents. “Mr. Madison has acted most scandalously,” declared the prime minister, Lord Liverpool. To publish terms with a negotiation still in progress was unprecedented “on the part of any civilized government.”[77] British officials were also exasperated by the intransigence of the Americans—their unwillingness to make any concessions. “The doctrine of the American government is a very convenient one,” Liverpool said; “they will always be ready to keep what they acquire, but never to give up what they lose.”[78]

Members of the opposition, on the other hand, attacked the government for making excessive demands. Alexander Baring charged the ministry with setting up “extraordinary pretensions,” and the Marquis of Lansdowne made it clear that he was “no supporter of these new principles upon which the contest was conducted.”[79] The Morning Chronicle declared that the British terms “were any thing but wise and moderate” and accused the cabinet of fighting “a war of aggression and conquest.”[80]

The British Retreat

With the talks apparently stalled, the mood of the American envoys became gloomy. Only Clay retained even a shred of hope for peace.[81] An inveterate gambler who sometimes stayed up all night playing cards, Clay thought the British might be bluffing.[82] The Kentucky War Hawk found it difficult to believe that the British would allow the talks to break up over the issues in question. “Such a rupture,” he said, “would entirely change the whole character of the War, would unite all parties at home, and would organize a powerful opposition in Great Britain.” Perhaps, Clay suggested, the British were “attempting an experiment upon us”—dragging out the negotiations in the hope that “they will strike some signal blow, during the present campaign.” If this were the case, then there was still hope that the British “would ultimately abandon [their] pretensions.”[83]

Clay’s suspicions were well founded. The British demands were what one scholar has called “a probing operation.”[84] Their purpose was to provide a basis for negotiation and to determine what concessions the Americans were willing to make. Even the Indian barrier was not supposed to be a sine qua non, even though it was presented as such by the British envoys. “Our Commissioners,” Liverpool lamented, “had certainly taken a very erroneous view of our policy.” They failed to appreciate “the inconvenience of the continuance of the war.”[85]

Clay’s suspicion that British officials were trying to buy time was also correct. With the balance of power in the New World shifting in their favor, the British were confident that victories in the field would soon strengthen their hand at Ghent. In early September, Liverpool said: “If our commander [Sir George Prevost] does his duty, I am persuaded we shall have acquired by our arms every point on the Canadian frontier which we ought to insist on keeping.” Later that month he suggested that the discussions be drawn out until news arrived on “the progress of our arms.” And the following month he said that the best policy to pursue was “to gain a little more time before the negotiation is brought to a close.”[86]

Unwilling to end the negotiations, the British gradually retreated from their demands. Instead of an Indian barrier, they agreed to settle for a pledge to restore the Indians to their status as of 1811.[87] “Their sine qua non,” said Clay, “has dwindled down to a demand that the Indians shall be included in the peace and put in the condition they stood in prior to the battle of Tippacanoe.”[88] This stipulation was too vague to be meaningful. For all practical purposes, the British once again had abandoned their Indian allies.

Having retreated from their initial terms, the British offered a new basis for peace in October—uti possidetis, which meant that each side would retain whatever territory it held at the war’s end.[89] If this offer were accepted, the British would gain eastern Maine, Mackinac, and Fort Niagara, while the United States would get Fort Amherstburg and Fort Erie. The British suggested that the agreement be “subject to such modifications as mutual convenience may be found to require.”[90] Their hope was to retain northern Maine (for the overland route between Quebec and Halifax) as well as Mackinac and Fort Niagara, but to trade the rest of eastern Maine for forts Amherstburg and Erie.[91] The British gave little thought to the possibility of retaining New Orleans because by this time their projected campaign against the Crescent City had assumed only minor importance in their overall strategy for ending the war.[92]

Britain’s new offer was far more moderate than her original terms, but the American envoys were too close to the situation to appreciate its significance. A week later Bayard said: “It is impossible to tell what is the real intentn. of the British Govt. on the question of Peace or War. They probably mean to be govd by events.”[93] Even Clay thought that obstacles “of a serious and difficult character” still remained and that “the safest opinion to adopt is . . . that our Mission will terminate unsuccessfully.”[94]

Rejecting the new British offer, the American envoys again sent a truce ship to Washington to bring the administration up to date. Madison transmitted the envoys’ dispatches to Congress on December 1. The publication of these documents convinced many people that peace was near, and the result was a steady flow of peace rumors that continued until the conflict was over.[95]

When it became evident that the Americans would not agree to uti possidetis, the British dropped this demand just as they had their others. By this time the shrill attacks against the United States in the British press had given way to protests over war taxes. “Economy & relief from taxation are not merely the War Cry of Opposition,” said one official, “but they are the real objects to which public attention is turned.”[96] The British were also disillusioned by the lack of military progress in America. Reports of the fall of Washington and the occupation of eastern Maine had raised their hopes, but news soon followed of the failures at Plattsburgh and Baltimore.[97] “If we had either burnt Baltimore or held Plattsburgh,” Goulburn said, “I believe we should have had peace on [our] terms.”[98]

The failures in America suggested that another campaign—whose projected cost was £10 million ($49 million)—would be necessary if the British were to exact any concessions.[99] “The contest with America,” grumbled an opposition leader, “was likely to plunge the country in[to] frightful expense.”[100] According to the Morning Chronicle, the prospect of renewing the property tax was greeted everywhere with “a sense of horror and indignation.”[101]

Another year of fighting was also likely to undermine Britain’s position in Europe. “We are certainly anxious to make Peace before the next Campaign,” said a British official. “We do not think the Continental Powers will continue in good humour with our Blockade of The whole Coast of America beyond that Period.”[102] The allies at Vienna were already feuding among themselves, and British officials were wondering how quickly they could recall troops from America.[103] “The negotiations at Vienna are not proceeding in the way we could wish,” said Liverpool, “and this consideration itself was deserving of some weight in deciding the question of peace with America.”[104]

To buttress their position at home and in the field, British officials asked the Duke of Wellington to take charge of the American war.[105] The Iron Duke agreed, but he refused to leave Europe until the spring or to guarantee success. “I feel no objection to going to America,” he told Liverpool, “though I don’t promise to myself much success there.” What the British needed was “not a General, or General officers and troops, but a naval superiority on the Lakes.” Without this, there was little hope of success. Given the existing circumstances, Wellington concluded, “you have no right . . . to demand any concession of territory from America.”[106]

On the eve of war in June 1812, Lord Liverpool (1777–1828) became the prime minister of Great Britain, a position he held until 1827. Liverpool played a central role in forging moderate peace agreements at Ghent and Vienna, thus ushering in the Pax Britannica and a lasting peace on both sides of the Atlantic. (Portrait by Sir Thomas Lawrence. Wikimedia Commons)

Wellington’s opinion was all the cover that British officials needed to jettison their last territorial demands. On November 18 Liverpool wrote to Castlereagh: “I think we have determined, if all other points can be satisfactorily settled, not to continue the war for the purpose of obtaining or securing any acquisition of territory.”[107]

The only important issues that remained unsettled were the status of the American fishing rights in Canadian waters and British navigation rights on the Mississippi River. Since both rights were guaranteed by the Treaty of 1783, both were likely to stand or fall together. Discussion of these rights raised a larger issue: Did the War of 1812 abrogate all previous treaties and any rights or privileges they established? In line with long-standing European practices, the British argued that this was the case, and most European peace treaties acknowledged this by reaffirming all previous treaties. The Americans, however, insisted that rights and privileges spelled out in the Treaty of 1783 (including independence) were so fundamental that no war could annul them.

The debate over these rights also caused a deep division in the American camp. Clay, representing western interests, wanted to close the Mississippi to the British, while Adams, representing Massachusetts fishermen, insisted on retaining the fisheries. Ultimately, both issues were left out of the treaty.[108] This was a victory for Adams because after the war Americans continued to fish in Canadian waters, and the British ultimately confirmed this right in a series of treaties.[109]

The Treaty of Ghent (1814)

The American and British envoys spent close to a month hammering the treaty into final form. Their handiwork—completed on December 24, 1814—is known as the Treaty of Ghent or the Peace of Christmas Eve.[110] The treaty mentioned none of the maritime issues that had caused the war. It simply restored the status quo ante bellum—the state that existed before the war. Each side agreed to evacuate all enemy territory, although the British were allowed to retain several islands in Passamaquoddy Bay (between Maine and New Brunswick) until their ownership was determined. Each side agreed not to carry off any enemy property and to return all prisoners of war “as soon as practicable.”[111] Any prizes taken beyond a certain time—ranging from twelve days off the American coast to 120 days in distant parts of the world—had to be restored to their owners.

Each nation promised to make peace with the Indians and “to restore to such tribes . . . all the possessions, rights, and privileges which they may have enjoyed, or been entitled to, in one thousand eight hundred and eleven, previous to such hostilities.”[112] In addition, the treaty established commissions—three in all—to fix the Canadian-American boundary and to establish the rightful owner of the Passamaquoddy Islands.[113] Both nations also promised to “use their best endeavors” to stamp out the slave trade.[114]

On three earlier occasions—in connection with the Jay Treaty in 1794, a boundary convention in 1803, and the Monroe–Pinkney Treaty in 1806—the United States had insisted on modifications after an agreement had been signed by its envoys in London. This time the British would settle for nothing less than unconditional ratification. They also wanted hostilities to end not when the treaty was signed (which was customary) but only after ratifications had been exchanged. Since this would entail a delay if the British instrument of ratification were lost at sea, the envoys agreed that hostilities would cease when both sides had ratified the agreement. The treaty, however, would not be binding until ratifications had been exchanged.[115]

The Treaty of Ghent was signed on Christmas Eve in 1814. Pictured here the two delegation heads, Admiral James Gambier on the left and John Quincy Adams on the right, are shaking hands surrounded by members of their respective delegations. On the far left is Anthony St. John Baker, secretary to the British delegation, who brought the British instrument of ratification to the United States and exchanged ratifications with Secretary of State James Monroe. (Lithograph of painting by A. Forestier. Library and Archives of Canada)

British Ratification

The British government wasted no time, ratifying the Treaty of Ghent on December 27. British leaders welcomed an end to the war because it undercut criticism at home and gave them a freer hand in Europe. Castlereagh called the restoration of peace “a most auspicious and seasonable event” and congratulated Liverpool on “being released from the millstone of an American war.”[116] In Vienna a British official reported that peace had “produced an astonishing effect,” helping to foil a Russian bid for aggrandizement.[117]

The British people also welcomed peace, although somewhat grudgingly. The Courier, Naval Chronicle, and Annual Register all praised the results of the negotiations, and an army officer said that most soldiers agreed because they “saw that neither fame nor any military distinction could be acquired in this species of milito-nautico-guerilla-plundering-warfare.”[118] The Morning Chronicle rejoiced at the restoration of peace but said that British leaders had “humbled themselves in the dust” and “thereby brought discredit on the country.”[119] The Times and Globe, on the other hand, criticized the government for failing to win any concessions. Calling the treaty “deadly” and “disgraceful,” the Times lamented that the United States had escaped “a sound flogging.”[120]

In Parliament, members of the opposition tried to make political capital out of the negotiations. Richard Wellesley (brother of the Duke of Wellington) complained that “the American commissioners had shown the most astonishing superiority over the British” and that “peace had been concluded under circumstances in which neither honour nor security had been provided for.”[121] Opposition motions that challenged the government’s handling of the negotiations, however, were decisively defeated.[122] In the heady days of the postwar Pax Britannica, few people were interested in this kind of criticism. Indeed, according to the Morning Chronicle, such was the buoyant mood of the British people that, even before peace was restored, “purchases to an immense amount” were made in the stock market, generating “the greatest Bull Account which has been known for years.”[123]

U.S. Ratification

The American envoys feared that they too might be criticized by their constituents. Clay called the agreement “a damned bad treaty” and predicted that “we should all be subject to much reproach.”[124] Except for Bayard, the other envoys shared his apprehension. The only thing the envoys would say in defense of the treaty was that it was the best that circumstances allowed and that it ended the war without sacrificing any honor, territory, or right.[125]

On January 2, 1815, Henry Carroll, Clay’s personal secretary, boarded the truce ship Favourite in London to take a copy of the treaty to the United States. He was joined by Anthony Baker, who carried a copy of the British instrument of ratification. The ship encountered bad weather in the Chesapeake Bay and hence headed for New York harbor, docking around 8:00 p.m. on February 11. Carroll made no secret of his mission. Word quickly spread that peace was at hand, and soon the entire city was celebrating.[126]

From New York reports of the treaty spread in all directions. An express rider carried the news in a record thirty-two hours to Boston, where handbills announcing the treaty were distributed. Schools in Boston were closed, people left their jobs, and the legislature adjourned. In the boisterous celebration that followed, bells were rung, the city was illuminated, troops turned out to fire a salute, and cartmen formed a procession of sleighs, parading around the city with the word “peace” on their hats.[127] Celebrations of this sort took place all over the country.[128] “Grand illuminations are making throughout the United States,” said one American.[129] Everywhere, too, the news of peace drove up the price of war bonds and treasury notes. Goods that were normally shipped to foreign markets also rose in value, while the price of war material and imported goods slumped.[130]

The British were prepared to offer a separate peace to New England if the treaty were not ratified, but there was no danger of this happening.[131] News of the treaty reached the nation’s capital late on February 13, and an official copy arrived the following day. Madison submitted the treaty to the Senate on February 15, and the next day the Senate voted unanimously (35–0) to approve it. Madison gave his own approval later that day, thus completing the ratification process. Since the British had already ratified, this marked the end of hostilities, and both sides notified all army and navy commanders. The treaty became binding at 11:00 p.m. the following day—February 17—when Monroe exchanged ratifications with Baker, who had arrived in Washington earlier that evening.[132]

America Wins the Peace

Although Americans of both political parties rejoiced at the restoration of peace, Federalists had special cause to celebrate. The war, after all, had achieved none of the nation’s goals, neither a renunciation of British maritime practices nor the conquest of Canada. Instead, the Treaty of Ghent seemed to confirm what Federalists had been saying all along about the futility of the conflict. Many Federalists expected to reap significant political dividends once the celebrations died down and the American people took at close look at the peace terms. As Christopher Gore put it; “The treaty must be deemed disgraceful to the government who made the war and the peace, and will be so adjudged by all, after the first effusions of joy at relief have subsided.”[133]

There was one Federalist, however, who was not so optimistic. James Robertson of Philadelphia said that the strategy of Republicans was already apparent. They would ignore the causes of the conflict and portray it as “a war on our part of pure self defence against the designs of the British to reduce us again to subjection.” By portraying the war in this light, they could claim that it was a great triumph. “The President,” Robertson concluded, “will only have to call it a glorious peace, and the party here will echo it.”[134]

Robertson’s prophecy proved correct. In a message to Congress announcing the end of the war, President Madison congratulated Americans “upon an event which is highly honorable to the nation, and terminates, with peculiar felicity, a campaign signalized by the most brilliant successes.” The war, Madison claimed, “has been waged with a success which is the natural result of the wisdom of the Legislative councils, of the patriotism of the people, of the public spirit of the militia, and of the valor of the military and naval forces of the country.”[135]

All across the country Republican orators and editors echoed the president’s cry. “Never did a country occupy more lofty ground,” said Joseph Story; “we have stood the contest, single-handed, against the conqueror of Europe.” “This second war of independence,” crowed the New York National Advocate, “has been illustrated by more splendid achievements than the war of the revolution.”[136] The nation had attained all of its objectives, added a writer for the National Intelligencer: “the administration has succeeded in asserting the principles of God and nature against the encroachments of human ambition and tyranny.” “Yes,” echoed the Worcester National Aegis, “we have triumphed—let snarling malcontents say what they will, we have gloriously triumphed!”[137] Republicans exaggerated, for the United States could not in justice claim to have won the war. But because of the clearheaded determination shown by the American envoys at Ghent, the nation could at least claim that it had won the peace.

Conclusion

The War of 1812 is often called America’s “second war of independence.” The issues and ideology of this conflict echoed those of the Revolution. In addition, this was the nation’s second and last struggle against Great Britain, the second and last time that it was the underdog in a war, and the second and last time that it tried to conquer Canada. Nevertheless, the supposed threat to American independence in 1812 was more imagined than real. It existed mainly in the minds of thin-skinned Republicans who were unable to shake the ideological legacy of the Revolution and interpreted all British actions accordingly.

British encroachments on American rights were certainly both real and serious. But throughout this period the focus of British policy was always on Europe. The overriding objective of the British government was to secure the defeat of France, and this took precedence over all else. Britain’s policy, in other words, was preeminently European. Her aim was not to subvert American independence but to win the war in Europe. Once this objective was achieved, her infringements on American rights would cease.

Not only did Republicans misread British intentions, but throughout this turbulent era they consistently overrated America’s ability to win concessions. Daniel Sheffey, a Virginia Federalist, made this point in a speech delivered on the eve of war in 1812. “We have considered ourselves of too much importance in the scale of nations,” he said. “It has led us into great errors. Instead of yielding to circumstances, which human power cannot control, we have imagined that our own destiny, and that of other nations, was in our hands, to be regulated as we thought proper.”[1] Sheffey’s analysis was borne out, not only by the restrictive system but also by the war.

The War of 1812 lasted only two years and eight months—from June 18, 1812, to February 16, 1815. Although the war was not long, the United States was beset by problems from the beginning. Many of the nation’s military leaders were incompetent, and enlistments in the army and navy lagged behind need. Relying on untrained militia was costly and inefficient, and citizen soldiers repeatedly refused to cross into Canada or to hold their positions under enemy fire. It was difficult to fill the war loans, and the nation’s finances became increasingly chaotic with the government teetering on the verge of bankruptcy. There was also extensive trade with the enemy—trade that Federalists and Republicans alike freely took part in. A combination of Federalist opposition, Republican factionalism, and general public apathy undermined the entire war effort.

Wartime Leadership

Congress was partly responsible for this state of affairs. Endless debate and deep divisions delayed or prevented the adoption of much-needed legislation. Congress was particularly negligent on financial matters. Hoping for a quick war and fearing the political consequences of unpopular measures, Republicans postponed internal taxes and delayed a national bank. As a result, public credit collapsed in 1814, and a general suspension of specie payments ensued. By the end of the war, the administration had to rely on depreciated bank paper and treasury notes. If the contest had lasted much longer, the Revolutionary War phrase “not worth a continental” might have been replaced by “not worth a treasury note.”

A strong president might have overcome some of these difficulties, but Madison was one of the weakest war leaders in the nation’s history. Although his opponents called the contest “Mr. Madison’s War,” it never bore his stamp. Cautious, shy, and circumspect, Madison was unable to supply the bold and vigorous leadership that was needed. In some respects, to be sure, his caution served the nation well. Unlike other war presidents, he showed remarkable respect for the civil rights of his domestic foes. Despite pleas from other Republicans, he refused to resort to a sedition law. Even though Federalists had to face mob violence (particularly at the beginning of the war), they never had to contend with government repression. Madison’s treatment of enemy aliens and prisoners of war was also commendably humane, and his circumspect policy toward New England disaffection was undoubtedly well judged, too.

In other ways, however, Madison’s cautious brand of leadership undermined the nation’s war effort. He allowed incompetents like William Eustis and Paul Hamilton to head key departments, he tolerated John Armstrong’s intrigues and James Monroe’s backbiting in the cabinet, and he retained Gideon Granger as postmaster general long after his hostility to the administration had become notorious. Madison was also slow to get rid of incompetent generals or to promote officers who had proven themselves in battle. Because he lacked a commanding influence in Congress, he was unable to secure vital legislation, and because he lacked a strong following in the country, he was unable to inspire people to open their hearts and purses.

Contemporaries were aware of Madison’s shortcomings, and even Republicans criticized his leadership. “Our President,” said John C. Calhoun in 1812, “has not . . . those commanding talents, which are necessary to controul those about him.” “His spirit and capacity for a crisis of war,” declared a Pennsylvania congressman in 1814, “are very generally called in question.” “Mr. Madison,” added a western congressman in 1815, “is perhaps ‘too good’ a man for the responsible office he holds. He does not like to offend his fellow men for any cause.”[2] Even Virginia Republicans considered Madison “too tender of the feelings of other people.” “The amiable temper and delicate sensibility of Mr Madison,” declared one Virginian, “are the real sources of our embarrassments.”[3]

The British, on the other hand, were pretty well served by their leaders. In London, Liverpool and Castlereagh, with an assist from Wellington, generally made good decisions. Although they had to focus on Europe, they did not neglect the American war. Instead, they gave that war just enough attention to preserve Canada. Their principal mistake was a failure to deploy more warships after the fall of Napoleon to blockade duty off the American coast or to defending against American privateers in British waters.

In North America, Sir George Prevost, the governor-general of Canada, did a good job of managing his limited resources to beat back the American invasions, but his failures in the field, most notably at Plattsburgh, gave his critics an opening, and his reputation never recovered. More than anyone else, however, Prevost deserves to be remembered as “the savior of Canada.”

Costs of the War

No doubt poor leadership in Washington and in the field drove up the cost of this war. At the beginning of the contest, a Federalist newspaper predicted that the war would cost 30,000 lives and $180 million and lead to a French-style conscription.[4] This prediction was not far off. Official sources, although not entirely reliable, indicate that the total number of American troops engaged in the contest was 528,000: 60,000 Regulars, 10,000 U.S. Volunteers, and 458,000 drafted and volunteer militia.[5] Another 20,000 served in the navy and marines.[6] The battle casualties were comparatively light. The official figures are 2,260 killed and 4,505 wounded.[7]

There is no record of how many soldiers died from disease, but before the advent of modern medicine, deaths from disease invariably exceeded those from enemy fire. Epidemics were common, and field commanders sometimes reported 30, 40, or even 50 percent of their troops on the sick list.[8] There were numerous reports of multiple deaths from dysentery, typhoid fever, pneumonia, malaria, measles, typhus, and smallpox. In 1812, a soldier at Buffalo said: “Every day three or four are carried off to their Graves.” In 1813, Governor Isaac Shelby said: “They are dying more or less every day on our March.” And in 1814, General George Izard called the mortality rate from disease and exposure among his troops “prodigious.”[9]

After sampling records from the regular army, one scholar has concluded that two and a half times as many soldiers died from disease or accident as were killed or wounded in battle.[10] If this sample is representative, then military deaths from causes unrelated to combat must have been around 17,000.[11] The army executed an additional 205 men, mainly for repeated desertion, and the navy executed a few men, too.[12] Some privateersmen also died in the war, primarily from disease in British prisons. There were a few civilian casualties as well—mostly victims of Indian raids in the West. Adding all the pertinent figures together suggests that the total number of American deaths attributable to the war was roughly 20,000.[13] British losses were probably around 10,000, and Indian losses perhaps 7,500.[14] American losses were much higher because so many unseasoned regulars and militia contracted camp diseases, but as a proportion of their population, the Indians suffered the largest losses.

The cost of the war to the United States (excluding property damage and lost economic opportunities) was $158 million. This includes $93 million in army and navy expenditures, $16 million for interest on the war loans, and $49 million in veterans’ benefits.[15] (The last veteran died in 1905, the last pensioner—the daughter of a veteran—in 1946.)[16] The government also awarded land bounties to some 224,000 people who had served in the war.[17] The national debt, which Republicans had reduced from $83 million in 1801 to $45 million in 1812, rose to $127 million by the end of 1815. The government borrowed $80 million during the war, but because of discounts offered and paper money received, it probably got only about $50 million specie value. This works out to an interest rate of close to 14 percent.[18]

Winners and Losers

Who won the war? Scholars are still debating this, but according to one interpretation everyone was happy with the outcome. Americans were happy because they thought they had won; Canadians were happier because they knew they had won; and the British were happiest of all because they quickly forgot about the war. This assessment ignores the Indians (who were the biggest losers in the conflict), but otherwise it is not far off the mark.[19]

Although the war ended in a draw on the battlefield, in a larger sense it represented a failure for American policymakers. The nation was unable to conquer Canada or to achieve any of the maritime goals for which it was contending. Indeed, these issues were not even mentioned in the peace treaty, which merely provided for restoring all conquered territory and returning to the status quo ante bellum.

The British, on the other hand, had every reason to be satisfied with the outcome. They had held on to Canada and retained all of their maritime rights, and they had done this without short-changing their war effort in Europe. For the British, in other words, the return to the status quo ante bellum was a triumph, for it had demonstrated that they could defeat Napoleonic France in Europe while still fending off U.S. aggression in North America.

The Legacy in Britain and Canada

Although the war had ended in a military draw, in a host of ways it was fraught with consequences. The conflict had the least impact on Britain. Most British subjects saw the contest as little more than a sideshow, a footnote to the much grander and more consequential Napoleonic Wars. As a result, the war was quickly forgotten, and today in Great Britain the very phrase “War of 1812” is likely to conjure up images of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia.[20] Yet even if most people forgot the war, the British government and the armed services did not. The joint operations that ended in defeat at Plattsburgh and New Orleans exacerbated postwar rivalry between the British army and navy. Moreover, the naval losses on the high seas and the northern lakes left such a sting that several generations of British writers, beginning with the Admiralty court lawyer William James (arguably the first modern naval historian), wrote treatises to explain away these defeats. The British also kept their replica of the President in commission until 1903 to remind people that even the most advanced American frigates could not withstand the power of the mighty Mistress of the Seas.

The war forced the British government to treat the United States with greater consideration. “The Americans,” said Augustus J. Foster, “have had the satisfaction of proving their courage—they have brought us to speak of them with respect.” According to another British subject, the war had “humbled the tone of our ministry and of the nation, and made the United States much more respected in Europe.”[21] The British were careful not to impress any Americans when the Royal Navy went back on a war footing during Napoleon’s Hundred Days in 1815.[22] In fact, Americans were never again subjected to those dubious maritime practices that had caused the war. With Europe generally at peace in the century after Waterloo, the Great Powers had no interest in regulating American trade or in tampering with the nation’s merchant marine.

Few people on either side of the Atlantic thought that this would be the last Anglo-American war, and this meant that British officials had to find some way to safeguard Canada. Rather than invest in costly defense measures, the British concluded that the best way to achieve this end was to cultivate the United States. Hence, in the years after the war officials in London often sacrificed the interests of people living in Canada or elsewhere in the Empire to preserve good relations with the American republic. It took time for this policy to pay off, but ultimately the Anglo-American tension so common in the nineteenth century gave way to an Anglo-American accord.[23] This accord had a profound impact on the history of Europe and the wider world in the twentieth century.[24]

The war had a greater impact on Canada. In 1812 the various provinces in Canada were populated by a jarring combination of French Canadians, native-born British subjects, Loyalists who had fled from the United States, and Americans who had migrated across the border in search of greater economic opportunities. The War of 1812 was the closest thing that Canada has had to a war of independence or a civil war, and it helped forge a common bond among these disparate groups and shaped Canada’s future, first as a loyal outpost of the British Empire and then as an independent nation. In time, too, Canadians looked to the war for those symbols that defined their nation. Isaac Brock, Laura Secord, Tecumseh, and Charles de Salaberry became national heroes, and Queenston Heights, Crysler’s Farm, and Châteauguay were celebrated as battlefield victories that saved Canada from foreign conquest and dominion. Powerful myths also took root—that the militia had saved Canada, that the British and French populations had joined hands to fend off the invader from the south—and these myths served as another glue for the nation.[25]

Fate of the Indians

For the United States, the legacy of 1812 was even more significant. The young republic annexed part of Spanish West Florida in 1813—the only permanent land acquisition made during the war, although it came at the expense of a neutral power rather than the enemy.[26] The war also broke the power of the Indians in the Northwest and the Southwest. Tecumseh’s confederacy was the last great attempt to unite American Indians against further encroachments on their lands. Although this confederacy had the support of the British, it collapsed with Tecumseh’s death in the Battle of the Thames in 1813. In the peace negotiations at Ghent, Great Britain failed to secure a permanent reservation for the Indians, leaving them at the mercy of an expansive people determined to engross lands up to and even beyond the Mississippi River.

John Naudee, a Chippewa leader who was also known as Oshawahnah, was reportedly Tecumseh’s second in command at the Thames. He survived the battle and sat for this daguerreotype many years later. (Alexander C. Casselman, Richardson’s War of 1812)

The Indians never recovered from this blow. The western tribes, said the secretary of war in 1818, “have, in a great measure, ceased to be an object of terror, and have become that of commiseration.”[27] Never again would Indians seriously threaten the United States, and never again would a foreign nation tamper with American Indians. The subjugation of the Indians, in turn, promoted manifest destiny and the westward movement. The heady nationalism and expansionism that characterized American foreign policy throughout the nineteenth century was at least partly a result of the War of 1812.

The War’s Impact on American Culture

The war had a profound impact on American culture. The contest produced several enduring sayings. “Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights” was bandied about by various groups until the Civil War, and “Don’t give up the ship” and “We have met the enemy and they are ours” are still heard today.[28] The conflict also generated powerful symbols. “The Star-Spangled Banner” was a popular patriot tune that Congress made the national anthem in 1931. The U.S. Frigate Constitution—“Old Ironsides”—became the nation’s most famous warship and a symbol of its rising naval power. The trophy ship Macedonian was kept in service until 1871, a powerful reminder of how a U.S. frigate had once bested a British frigate and brought it home as a prize of war. The Fort McHenry flag, probably America’s most treasured relic from the war, has been on display at the Smithsonian since 1907, and long before then it had ignited a broader public reverence for the national banner. Uncle Sam, who made his first appearance in the war, ultimately emerged as the universally recognized symbol for the United States and its government.

The Pennsylvania/Kentucky rifle received inflated credit for some of the western victories, most notably at New Orleans, and has long enjoyed iconic status in the rich history of American firearms. A host of army and naval traditions and legends originating in the war helped forge the identity of the services. The Battle of New Orleans became a powerful symbol for the military prowess of the citizen republic, and for a half century afterwards American cities across the nation held public celebrations on January 8 to mark the occasion. In a broad sense the War of 1812 transformed the cultural landscape, helping Americans understand who they were and where their nation was headed.

Even though the war was an important benchmark in the growth of American nationalism, it also played a significant role in the evolving history of American sectionalism. New England Federalists were determined to insulate themselves from the war. In order to retain control over their militia and obstruct war measures, they resurrected the states’ rights doctrine that Virginia Republicans had used in the late 1790s to fight the alien and sedition laws. Later on, this same doctrine would be employed by southern Democrats to block the tariff and to protect slavery. New England’s opposition to the war was thus part of a larger tradition of sectionalism, one that flourished until the northern victory in the Civil War delivered a body blow to the whole notion of states’ rights.

The Military Legacy

The war also stimulated peacetime defense spending. In his message to Congress announcing the end of hostilities, President Madison echoed an old Federalist cry for preparedness. “Experience has taught us,” he said, “that a certain degree of preparation for war is not only indispensable to avert disasters in the onset, but affords also the best security for the continuance of peace.”[29] Congress agreed. The peacetime army was fixed at 10,000 men in 1815, but since the Corps of Engineers was not considered part of this total, the actual strength of the army was more than 12,000 (almost four times what it had been after the Jeffersonian reduction in 1802).[30] Congress also authorized the construction of nine ships-of-the-line and twelve heavy frigates and launched a far-reaching program to fortify the coast, appropriating almost $8.5 million for this purpose between 1816 and 1829.[31]

The war affected the American military establishment in another way. Those army officers who had outlived their usefulness—Smyth, Wilkinson, Hampton, Dearborn, and the like—were cast aside to make room for younger men, such as Brown, Scott, Gaines, Macomb, and Jackson. A number of naval officers also burned their names into the history books during the conflict. Among these were Perry, Macdonough, Hull, Bainbridge, Decatur, and Stewart. Both services had a decidedly new look after the war, and both enjoyed a significant boost in professionalism. The postwar navy was filled with officers and men who had amassed significant combat experience and profited from the guidance of the newly created Board of Navy Commissioners. The transformation of the army was even more pronounced. The newly created general staff improved the efficiency of the army, and what was once a demoralized frontier constabulary dominated by political officers was now a professional fighting force that had some real experience as well as a credible tradition to draw upon.

The Economic Consequences

The war had a dramatic impact on the American economy, too. Unlike most American wars, this one did not generate a general economic boom. According to Thomas Jefferson, whose heavy debts became unmanageable during the war, the conflict “arrested the course of the most remarkable tide of prosperity any nation ever experienced.”[32] Although people in the middle and western states prospered, those in New England and the South did not. Manufacturing thrived because of the absence of British competition, but whatever gains were made in this sector of the economy were dwarfed by heavy losses in fishing and commerce. For most Americans, the economic opportunities were greater before and after the war than during it.

This portrait, which was used in Andrew Jackson’s successful presidential campaign in 1828, traded on his great victory at New Orleans by depicting him as “PROTECTOR & DEFENDER OF BEAUTY & BOOTY.” (Engraving by C. G. Childs based on a painting by Joseph Wood. Library of Congress)

The war also sparked an interest in suppressing illegal trade. Throughout the war, trade with the enemy had been widespread, particularly on the northern frontier. “You may always buy a Yankee,” a British naval officer observed, “in almost any rank and station!”[33] Congress had tried to halt this traffic with a series of trade restrictions, culminating in the enemy trade act of 1815. Although this measure had expired with the end of the war, there was every indication that smuggling, which had always existed on the Canadian frontier, would continue. Hence Congress adopted a new measure that granted customs officials the same extensive powers in peacetime that they had enjoyed under the last enemy trade act.[34]

The Legacy of Anglophobia

The war left an enduring legacy of anglophobia in the United States. Hatred of England, originally kindled by the American Revolution, was further inflamed by the War of 1812—particularly by the Indian atrocities in the West and British depredations in the Chesapeake. William Henry Harrison predicted that Americans would long remember the “horrible species of warfare” practiced by the Indians allied to Britain. “Ages yet to come,” he told a British officer, “will feel the effect of the deep-rooted hatred and enmity which [this warfare] must produce between the two nations.”[35] People in the Chesapeake felt the same way about the ravages of Cockburn’s men.

Britain’s treatment of prisoners of war further intensified the anglophobia. At one time or another about 20,000 Americans, mostly privateersmen, were held in British prisons.[36] These prisoners were often treated harshly to induce them to enlist in the Royal Navy and to discourage privateering. Even before the war was over, stories of abuse began to filter back to the United States. In March 1814 a captured sailor on board a British prison ship in the Bahamas reported that Americans “have been suffering every deprivation on board of this old prison ship. . . . We are used with as much barbarity as though we were Turks.”[37]

After the war ended, the trickle of stories became a torrent. “The return of our people from British prisons,” said Niles’ Register, “have filled the newspapers with tales of horror.”[38] Many of the stories came from Melville Island and nearby prison hulks in Halifax Harbor, where more than 8,000 American soldiers and seamen were held.[39] “All the prisoners that we have yet seen,” said the Boston Patriot, “agree that their treatment in the Halifax prisons was brutal and barbarous in the extreme.”[40]

Other stories came from Dartmoor, a damp and dreary prison in Devonshire, England. By the end of the war, “this accursed place,” as one prisoner called it, housed some 6,500 Americans.[41] A group of former prisoners from Massachusetts (most of whom were Federalists) said that their experience at Dartmoor had extinguished “every impression we formerly entertained in favor of the British nation, as magnanimous, pious, liberable, and honorable or brave.” The “regular and systematic oppression” practiced by the British was “calculated to render our existence uncomfortable, and by breaking down our spirits and abusing our feelings, to hurry us out of this world into eternity.”[42]

The Dartmoor Massacre

Trouble at Dartmoor reached a climax on April 6, 1815—almost two months after the war ended—when a dispute over responsibility for transporting the men home delayed repatriation. Anxious to regain their freedom, the prisoners became unruly, and the inexperienced guards, who were drawn from the local militia, fired on them, killing six and wounding sixty others. British and American officials were eager to defuse this explosive story. The British government offered to compensate the families of those who were killed, and an Anglo-American commission tried to whitewash the affair.[43] But the prisoners were unmollified and insisted on telling their side of the story. A committee of prisoners issued several reports on the “Dartmoor massacre” that were widely circulated in the United States.[44] “The blood of every man, in whose bosom beats a sound American heart,” said the Richmond Enquirer, “will run cold at the narrative of the base and premeditated murder which was perpetrated within the walls of Dartmoor Prison.” The Enquirer urged parents to share the prisoners’ story with their children to show the depravity of British leaders.[45]

This daguerreotype taken years after the war shows a group of the survivors from Dartmoor Prison. The banner they hold appears to proclaim “Sailors Rights” and perhaps “No Impressment.” It is not clear why a woman is in the group portrait. She may have been a prisoner or the wife of one of the survivors. (John H. Spears, The History of Our Navy)

Americans did not soon forget the brutality of the war. As early as 1813, the House of Representatives published a study—with extensive documentation—that criticized Great Britain for the Indian atrocities, the Chesapeake depredations, and the mistreatment of prisoners.[46] Other stories kept the embers of hatred alive for decades. Long after the conflict, Niles’ Register published war-related anecdotes and documents that showed the British in a bad light.[47] Nineteenth-century histories—culminating in Henry Adams’s magisterial study of the Age of Jefferson—continued this tradition by focusing on Britain’s misdeeds.[48]

The Political Legacy

The war also left an enduring political legacy. Four statesmen—James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, and William Henry Harrison—were able to parlay their public service during the war into the presidency, and three others—Daniel D. Tompkins, John C. Calhoun, and Richard M. Johnson—were elevated to the vice-presidency. Jackson was the biggest winner. In the wake of his victories in the Southwest and at New Orleans, he emerged as such an outsized figure that he became a symbol for the entire postwar period.[49] A host of lesser lights also made political capital out of the war. The Battle of the Thames, which became a kind of Bunker Hill in western legend, helped create one president, one vice president, three governors, three lieutenant governors, four senators, and twenty congressmen. In addition, countless other participants in the battle were elected to lesser offices.[50] In fact, anyone who had seen combat during the war had an advantage in any bid for public office.

The war confirmed Republican hegemony and ushered in an era of one-party rule. “Never was there a more glorious opportunity,” crowed Joseph Story, “for the Republican party to place themselves permanently in power.”[51] The Republicans laid claim to all the victories in the war and blamed the defeats on the Federalists. The Republicans also charged the Federalists with prolonging the war, although the available evidence suggests that opposition in both countries shortened the conflict by making each government more amenable to a compromise peace.[52]

What did the Federalists reap from their opposition to the war? According to a Republican paper, it was “Disappointment!—Disgrace!—Detection!—Despair!”[53] Opposition to the war was popular during the conflict but not afterwards, and Federalists found it particularly difficult to live down the notoriety of the Hartford Convention. Almost twenty years after the war, the convention’s secretary complained that “from the time of its coming together to the present hour, [it] has been the general topic of reproach and calumny.” Even after the convention journal was published in 1823, “the weak, the designing, and the wicked, still made use of the Hartford Convention as a countersign of party, and as a watchword to rally the ignorant and vicious around the standard of the ambitious.”[54] Like “blue lights” and “Henryism,” the phrase “Hartford Convention” entered the political vocabulary as a synonym for treason.

Federalists protested that they had become the scapegoats for the failure of Republican policies. “The charge that opposition encourages the enemy and injures the cause,” said Rufus King, “has at all times been made as an excuse for the failure and defeat of a weak administration.”[55] Federalists also pointed out that Republicans never achieved their war aims and never admitted the war’s true costs. “What we have suffered and what we have lost are carefully concealed,” said a Federalist address. “A Treaty, which gives us peace, is represented as glorious, when it has given us nothing else. And it is attempted to make us believe that all the objects of the war have been obtained, when every thing, for which it was declared has been abandoned.”[56]

Few people thought that the War of 1812 would be the last Anglo-American conflict, but British-born artist John Rubens Smith, who emigrated from London to New York City in 1807, was evidently more optimistic. This painting, which depicts symbolic representatives of the two nations joining hands at the conclusion of peace, provided a prophetic vision of the future. (Ink and watercolor by John Rubens Smith. Library of Congress).

These protests fell on deaf ears. The decline of the Federalist party—begun in 1800 but arrested by the restrictive system and the war—continued apace after the war was over. It mattered not that the war had vindicated so many Federalist policies—particularly the importance of military and naval preparedness and the need for internal taxes and a national bank—and that Republicans themselves admitted as much by adopting these policies during or after the war. It mattered not that Federalists had predicted the futility of the conflict and that the Treaty of Ghent had proven them right. What mattered was that the nation had emerged from the war without surrendering any rights or territory and with just enough triumphs—both on land and at sea—to give the appearance of victory.

Myth and Memory

The Battle of New Orleans, though fought after Great Britain had signed and ratified the peace treaty, played a particularly important role in forging the myth of American victory. The news of Jackson’s great triumph reached the nation’s capital on February 4, followed ten days later by the peace treaty. The sequence was similar elsewhere and helped create the impression that Jackson’s victory had influenced the terms of peace. Even before the peace terms were known, Republicans were touting this battle as a decisive turning point in the war. “The terms of the treaty are yet unknown to us,” said Congressman Charles J. Ingersoll in early 1815. “But the victory at Orleans has rendered them glorious and honorable, be they what they may. . . . Who is not proud to feel himself an American—our wrongs revenged—our rights recognized!”[57]

Republicans boasted of how they had defeated “the heroes of Wellington,” “Wellington’s invincibles,” and “the conquerors of the conquerors of Europe.”[58] “We have unqueened the self-stiled Queen of the Ocean,” crowed the Boston Yankee, and “we have beaten at every opportunity, Wellington’s Veterans!”[59] The myth of American victory continued to grow so that by 1816 Niles’ Register could unabashedly claim that “we did virtually dictate the treaty of Ghent.”[60] Several months later a Republican congressman declaimed on the nation’s triumph. “The glorious achievements of the late war,” said Henry Southard of New Jersey, “have sealed the destinies of this country, perhaps for centuries to come, and the Treaty of Ghent has secured our liberties, and established our national independence, and placed this nation on high and honorable ground.”[61]

As the years slipped by, most people forgot the causes of the war. They forgot the defeats on land and sea and lost sight of how close the nation had come to a military rout and financial collapse. According to the emerging myth, the United States had won the war as well as the peace. Thus the War of 1812 passed into history not as a futile and costly struggle in which the United States had barely escaped defeat and disunion, but as a glorious triumph in which the nation had single-handedly defeated the conqueror of Napoleon and the Mistress of the Seas.

A Note on Sources

The best starting point for any research on the War of 1812 is still the comprehensive bibliography compiled by John C. Fredriksen, Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights: A Bibliography of the War of 1812 (1985). Although replete with errors and marred by an index that is difficult to use, this work is indispensable for identifying the principal published sources on any aspect of the war. Also useful is Dwight L. Smith, The War of 1812: An Annotated Bibliography (1985), and the bibliography at the end of John K. Mahon’s study, The War of 1812 (1972). For British and Canadian sources, the best place to begin is J. Mackay Hitsman, The Incredible War of 1812: A Military History, updated by Donald E. Graves (1999). For an assessment of the work done during the late 1980s and the 1990s, see my article “The War of 1812: Still a Forgotten Conflict?” Journal of Military History 65 (July, 2001), 741–69.

There is no book-length study of the historiography of the war that shows how perceptions of the conflict have changed over time, but I tried to lay the groundwork in “Historiography of the War of 1812,” in Spencer C. Tucker, ed., The Encyclopedia of the War of 1812: A Political, Social, and Military History, forthcoming. I also tried to identify the top books and articles and explain why I thought they were distinctive in “The Top 25 Books on the War of 1812,” War of 1812 Magazine 2 (September, 2007) at http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/Warof1812/2007/Issue7/c_top25books.html, and “The Top 25 Articles on the War of 1812,” War of 1812 Magazine, 3 (May, 2008) at http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/Warof1812/2008/Issue9/c_top25articles.html.

Primary Sources

The primary sources available for the study of this war are voluminous. Fortunately, most have been published or are available in microform or online. Especially valuable is the congressional record: U.S. Congress, Annals of Congress: Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, 1789–1824, 42 vols. (1834–56). Compiled retrospectively from newspapers and official sources, this work is far from complete. Most speeches delivered in the Senate were never recorded, and many House speeches were lost, too. Nevertheless, this work is indispensable for tracing the history of bills, fathoming the intentions of the government, and understanding the opposition. In the course of the debates, congressmen also revealed a great deal about the times in which they lived and the problems they were trying to solve. The index is not entirely reliable because members sometimes talked about one issue during the debate on another. Hence, I found that the best policy was to read the entire record for the war sessions. The Library of Congress has put the Annals online in an eminently usable format.

Members of the cabinet periodically wrote reports that were submitted to Congress. Most of these were published in U.S. Congress, American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States, 38 vols. (1832–61). Many of these reports, as well as a number of other government documents, have been published by Scholarly Resources in a collection under the general editorship of Thomas C. Cochran: The New American State Papers, 205 vols. (1972–81). These two collections are loaded with information on government operations for the period. The Library of Congress has put the original American State Papers online. Many reports issued by later congresses (including some bearing on the War of 1812) were published in the U.S. Serial Set. The Library of Congress has put select volumes online, and the NewsBank’s Readex Division has put the entire run online, although to gain access one needs to find a research library that subscribes to Readex’s service.

Many of the official cabinet records are available on microfilm at regional depositories of the National Archives, and there is an excellent guide: National Archives and Records Service, Catalog of National Archives Microfilm Publications (1974). The National Archives also has more detailed guides for each of its series. I used the War and Navy Department records to trace the military and naval history, to understand the system of supply, and to follow the flow of money. I used the Treasury Department records to explore the wartime restrictive system and the State Department records to trace the diplomacy of the war.

I found the following War Department records most useful: Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Relating to Military Affairs, 1800–1889 (M6); Confidential and Unofficial Letters Sent by the Secretary of War, 1814–1847 (M7); Letters Received by the Secretary of War, Registered Series, 1801–1870 (M221); and Letters Received by the Secretary of War, Unregistered Series, 1789–1861 (M222). The most valuable Navy Department Records were the following: Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy: Captains’ Letters, 1805–1885 (M125); Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanders, 1804–1886 (M147); and Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Navy to Officers, 1798–1868 (M149). The Treasury Department records I found most useful were the following: Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Treasury to Collectors of Customs at All Ports (1789–1847) and at Small Ports (1789–1847) (M175); and Correspondence of the Secretary of the Treasury with Collectors of Customs, 1789–1833 (M178). I used the following State Department records: Records of Negotiations Connected with the Treaty of Ghent, 1813–1815 (M36); Diplomatic Instructions to All Countries, 1801–1906 (M77); and War of 1812 Papers, 1789–1815 (M588).

I found the correspondence of contemporaries—Republicans and Federalists alike—essential for understanding many aspects of the war. The best guide to collections available on microfilm is still Richard W. Hale, Guide to Photocopied Historical Materials in the United States and Canada (1961). Another useful guide is National Historical Publications and Records Commission, Historical Documentary Editions (2000). For other manuscript collections, the best guide is still Philip Hamer, ed., A Guide to Archives and Manuscripts in the United States (1961).

I have indicated in the notes which collections I examined on film by appending a reel number. The most valuable were the papers of James Madison (LC), James Monroe (LC), Thomas Jefferson (LC), Andrew Jackson (LC), William Plumer (LC), Timothy Pickering (MHS), Robert Goodloe Harper (MdHS), William Gaston (UNC), Albert Gallatin (SR), and Richard Rush (SR). I also examined a microfilm edition of the papers of James Monroe (NYPL), but there were no reel numbers.

I consulted many other collections in manuscript form, the most valuable of which were the papers of Harrison Gray Otis (MHS), Henry D. Sedgwick (MHS), Jonathan Russell (BU), Jonathan Roberts (HSP), William Jones (HSP), Alexander Dallas (HSP), Charles J. Ingersoll (HSP), Joseph H. Nicholson (LC), Thomas Jesup (LC), Jacob Brown (LC), Wilson Cary Nicholas (UVA), and Timothy Pitkin (HL). I also profited from the Galloway-Maxcy-Markoe Papers (LC).

Newspapers are another invaluable source—one that scholars of this period still have not fully exploited. According to Niles’ Register, 1 (October 19, 1811), 116, there were 345 newspapers in the United States on the eve of the war, and this does not count country editions of city papers. The vast majority were weeklies, though there were 25 dailies and another 49 that came out two or three times a week. Although only four pages long, most papers devoted considerable space to printing government documents and excerpts from the debates and proceedings of Congress—which suggests that the reading public was remarkably well informed about public affairs. Most papers also published editorials, news from home and abroad, long-winded essays, bits of local gossip, literary pieces, poetry, humor, and advertisements. Some also carried reports from correspondents in Washington or at battle fronts, providing information about important events not available elsewhere.

The papers in the big coastal cities usually had the largest budgets, the widest circulation, and the best access to information. As the Boston Yankee (January 3, 1812), put it: “Our cities have more of that floating intelligence called news than our country towns. They are the eyes through which we perceive what is going on abroad.” Articles and editorials from the city papers were often reprinted in other papers. In fact, the number of times a paper’s material was reprinted was a measure of its influence.

The standard guide to early American newspapers is still Clarence S. Brigham, History and Bibliography of American Newspapers, 1690–1820, 2 vols. (1947). The best guide to papers available in microform is U.S. Library of Congress, Newspapers in Microform: United States, 1948–1983, 2 vols. (1984). NewsBank’s Readex Division, which put most available newspapers published before 1820 on microform, has now made them available online, but the entire collection is available only at libraries that subscribe to the service. Fortunately, NewsBank offers individuals access to all newspapers published since 1800 for a reasonable monthly or annual subscription fee. Since newspapers often underwent minor title changes, I have cited all uniformly with the city in roman type followed by the title in italics.

I profited most from the following Republican papers (which are listed roughly in order of their importance and influence): Washington National Intelligencer (which was the semi-official organ of the government), Philadelphia Aurora (which was hostile to the administration), Boston Independent Chronicle, New York National Advocate, Lexington Reporter (the most important paper in the West), Richmond Enquirer, Baltimore Whig (which was anti-administration), Worcester National Aegis, Boston Yankee, Trenton True American, Salem Essex Register, Concord New-Hampshire Patriot, and Hartford American Mercury. I also mined Niles’ Register, a Republican magazine that specialized in publishing government documents, statistical data, and articles from other magazines and newspapers.

The following are the Federalist papers I profited most from (again listed roughly in order of their importance and influence): Boston Columbian Centinel, New York Evening Post (founded by Alexander Hamilton), Philadelphia United States’ Gazette (the original court paper of the Federalists in the 1790s), Baltimore/Georgetown Federal Republican (target of the riots in 1812), Boston New England-Palladium, Hartford Connecticut Courant (the oldest newspaper still in publication), Alexandria Gazette, Charleston Courier, Raleigh Minerva, Boston Gazette, Trenton Federalist, Salem Gazette, Keene Newhampshire Sentinel, Pittsburgh Gazette, and Chillicothe Supporter.

There are a number of good documentary collections devoted to the military and naval history of the war. The standard collection of American documents, which has long been in need of updating, is John Brannan, ed., Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States, during the War with Great Britain in the Years 1812, 13, 14, & 15 (1823). There is a four-volume documentary history of the war on the lakes and at sea in progress: William S. Dudley and Michael J. Crawford, eds., The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History, 4 vols. (1985-). This work, edited to the highest standard, includes British as well as American material and is a gold mine of information.

For the British side of the story, I used William Wood, ed., Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812, 3 vols. (1920–28), a superb collection of military documents edited to a high standard. In addition, I used the documentary collections (which contain American material, too) edited by the dean of Canadian 1812 scholars, Ernest A. Cruikshank. The most important of these is The Documentary History of the Campaign on the Niagara Frontier, 9 vols. ([1896]–1908). Cruikshank took some liberties with his transcriptions, but his work is still indispensable.

I consulted several British periodicals as well: the London Times, a ministerial paper that published many government documents; the London Morning Chronicle, an anti-ministerial print; the Annual Register, which summarized events and opinion for each year; and the Naval Chronicle, a treasure trove of British naval lore and documents. The Naval Chronicle (which was remarkably moderate on the American war) provided a public forum for debating the naval issues of the day, and considerable space was devoted to letters seeking to explain (or explain away) the American victories at sea. Scholars should avoid the modern truncated reprint, which omits far too much valuable material.

To understand British foreign policy, I used the Foreign Office Papers (PRO). There are transcripts of 5/88, 5/101, and 5/102 in the Library of Congress. I also used the papers of Henry Goulburn (UM), a superb collection that contains most of the pertinent British documents on the peace negotiations. For public debate on the war, I consulted T. C. Hansard, ed., The Parliamentary Debates from the year 1803 to the Present Time, [First Series], 41 vols. (1803–20). I also used various documentary collections, the most useful of which was Duke of Wellington, ed., Dispatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshall Arthur, Duke of Wellington, 15 vols. (1858–72). I found several British memoirs indispensable, most notably George R. Gleig’s A Narrative of the Campaigns of the British Army at Washington, Baltimore, and New Orleans (1821) and A Subatlern in America, Comprising His Narrative of the Campaigns of the British Army . . . during the Late War (1833); and James Scott’s, Recollections of a Naval Life, 3 vols. (1834).

There are a great many publications bearing on the war from the nineteenth century: memoirs, diaries, histories, and life-and-letters biographies. Readex microfilmed those published up to 1820 and now has them available online at subscribing libraries. In an ongoing program to put most of the world’s 130,000,000 books online, Google as of August 2010 had scanned more than 12,000,000 out-of-copyright titles. This has made a host of rare 1812 imprints readily accessible. Some very fine memoirs, diaries, and autobiographies are readily accessible in modern printed editions. John C. Fredriksen has collected some American sources in The War of 1812 in Person: Fifteen Accounts by United States Army Regulars, Volunteers and Militiamen (2010); Donald E. Graves has edited a junior British officer’s contribution in Merry Hearts Make Light Days: The War of 1812 Journal of Lieutenant John Le Couteur, 104th Foot, (1993); and Carl F. Klinck and James J. Talman have edited the journal of a key Mohawk leader in The Journal of John Norton, 1816 (1970).

Secondary Sources

There are several good military histories of the war. Of the older works, the best are John K. Mahon, War of 1812 (1972), which is the most detailed, and Reginald Horsman, The War of 1812 (1969), which is the most balanced and accurate. James R. Jacobs and Glenn Tucker, The War of 1812: A Compact History (1969), is a good popular account with a valuable appendix that explains ordnance, tactics, uniforms, and nautical terminology. Glenn Tucker wrote a longer popular study that is also valuable: Poltroons and Patriots: A Popular Account of the War of 1812, 2 vols. (1954). Of the more recent popular accounts, the best is Walter R. Borneman, 1812: The War That Forged a Nation (2004). In a category by itself is the classic study by Benson J. Lossing, The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812 (1868). Lossing traveled 10,000 miles in the 1850s and 1860s, visiting battle sites and interviewing survivors. His work is a compendium of fascinating detail that includes songs, poems, battle maps, and illustrations. Robert S. Quimby, The U.S. Army in the War of 1812: An Operational and Command Study, 2 vols. (1997), is a thorough study of the war’s land operations.

For the Canadian side of the story, J. Mackay Hitsman’s work, The Incredible War of 1812 (1965) is still the best, but the updated version (1999) prepared by Donald E. Graves and a group of Canadian scholars supersedes the original edition. Graves and his colleagues left the original text mostly intact but added notes and a number of valuable appendices. For the Canadian perspective, scholars should also consult George F. G. Stanley, The War of 1812: Land Operations (1983), which has a particularly good set of maps. Morris Zaslow has compiled an excellent collection of Canadian articles in The Defended Border: Upper Canada and the War of 1812 (1964), although the documentation has been omitted.

There is no good study of the war from the British perspective in London. Jon Latimer professed to present this side of the story in 1812: War with America (2007), but he was seduced by the plentitude of American sources, and his account is marred by plagiarism and by far too many factual errors. Jeremy Black does a better job in The War of 1812 in the Age of Napoleon (2009), but his work also suffers from too many errors as well as a superficial treatment of the battles.

In the last twenty years, the best work on the war has focused on the battles and campaigns. Of special note are the studies of Donald E. Graves, particularly Where Right and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy’s Lane, 1814, rev. ed. (1997), and Field of Glory: The Battle of Crysler’s Farm, 1813 (1999). The master of the battlefield narrative, Graves is unsurpassed in his ability to understand and explain battles. He has also written a number of valuable articles and pamphlets on the technical side of war in this era—tactics, weapons, training, and the like. The late Robert Malcomson, a grade school teacher who became an accomplished naval historian, also produced two fine studies of land battles, A Very Brilliant Affair: The Battle of Queenston Heights, 1812 (2003), and Capital in Flames: The American Attack on York, 1813 (2008).

Two regional studies written by participants in the war stand out: Robert B. McAfee, History of the Late War in the Western Country (1816), and Arsène Lacarrière Latour, Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana in 1814–15 (1816). Readers interested in Latour’s memoir should use the new edition that was edited and expanded by Gene A. Smith (1999). More recent regional studies of note include these: Alec R. Gilpin, The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest (1958); Sandy Antal, A Wampum Denied: Procter’s War 1812 (1997); Allan S. Everest, The War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley (1981); Christopher T. George, Terror on the Chesapeake: The War of 1812 on the Bay (2000); and an anthology edited by R. Arthur Bowler, War along the Niagara: Essays on the War of 1812 and Its Legacy (1991). Another regional study of note is Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies (2010), which stresses how porous the northern border was and how mutable loyalties were.

The pioneering work on the war at sea was done by British attorney William James, who was annoyed by the boasting and puffery of the early American accounts of the naval war. Determined to uphold the reputation of the Royal Navy, James published two works, A Full and Correct Account of the Chief Naval Occurrences of the Late War (1817) and The Naval History of Great Britain, rev. ed., 6 vols. (1878). Although he sometimes twisted his evidence to make the Royal Navy look good, James was arguably the first modern naval historian because he sought to use primary sources to determine the weight of broadsides of opposing ships in a battle. In response to James, Theodore Roosevelt wrote The Naval History of the War of 1812, 3rd ed., 2 vols. (1900), which is available in several modern one-volume editions. Roosevelt ran out of gas in his second volume, but his work is generally judicious and is still the best treatment of a difficult subject. Another valuable work is Alfred T. Mahan, Sea Power and its Relations to the War of 1812, 2 vols. (1905). Although Mahan saw the war as proof of the need of a large blue-water fleet, his masterly analysis of the larger strategic issues has given his work a timeless quality. Wade G. Dudley presents an illuminating account of the British blockade in Splintering the Wooden Wall: The British Blockade of the United States, 1812–1815 (2003), although he has surprisingly little on the impact of the blockade on the American economy and public finance. There are several fine studies of ships, most notably Tyrone G. Martin, A Most Fortunate Ship: A Narrative History of Old Ironsides, rev. ed. (1997), and Stephen W. H. Duffy, Captain Blakeley and the “Wasp”: The Cruise of 1814 (2001).

For the war on the northern lakes, the best place to start is Robert Malcomson’s superb Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario, 1812–1814 (1998). For the contest on Lake Erie, David Curtis Skaggs and Gerard T. Altoff have written a fine study, A Signal Victory: The Lake Erie Campaign, 1812–1813 (1997). There are also two useful anthologies devoted to this battle: the collection of essays in Journal of Erie Studies 17 (Fall, 1988); and William Jeffrey Welsh and David Curtis Skaggs, eds., War on the Great Lakes: Essays Commemorating the 175th Anniversary of the Battle of Lake Erie (1991).

The War of 1812 was the last major war in which privateering played a significant role. Two older works are still indispensable: George Coggeshall (who was a privateer captain in the war), History of American Privateers, and Letters-of-Marque, during Our War with England in the Years 1812, ’13 and ’14 (1856); and Edgar S. Maclay, A History of American Privateers (1899). Although both works contain some dubious claims, they are still essential for understanding the privately financed war at sea. Jerome R. Garitee, The Republic’s Private Navy: The American Privateering Business as Practiced by Baltimore during the War of 1812 (1977), is a superb study of the in-port side of privateering, and Faye Kert has written a fine account of Canadian privateers, Prize and Prejudice: Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic Canada in the War of 1812 (1997).

For the role of Indians in the war, there is no comprehensive study, but several works are useful. In His Majesty’s Indian Allies: British Indian Policy in the Defence of Canada, 1774–1815 (1993), Robert S. Allen traces Britain’s alliance with natives. Carl Benn has written a superb account of the role of Iroquois on both sides of the border in The Iroquois in the War of 1812 (1999), and John Sugden has a good account of the great Shawnee leader’s last days in Tecumseh’s Last Stand (1985). For the Creeks, I found most useful Claudio Saunt, A New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek Indians, 1733–1816 (1999), and Frank L. Owsley, Jr., Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands: The Creek War and the Battle of New Orleans, 1812–1815 (1981).

Several unpublished theses shaped my understanding of the war and its causes, most notably, John R. Grodzinski, “The Constraints of Strategy: Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost as Commander-in-Chief of British North America during the War of 1812” (PhD dissertation, Royal Military College of Canada, 2010), and “The Vigilant Superintendence of the Whole District: The War of 1812 on the Upper St. Lawrence” (MA, Royal Military College of Canada, 2002); Anthony Dietz, “The Prisoner of War in the United States during the War of 1812” (PhD, American University, 1964); Scott Thomas Jackson, “Impressment and Anglo-American Discord, 1787–1818” (PhD, University of Michigan, 1976); and Donald E. Graves, “Joseph Willcocks and the Canadian Volunteers: An Account of Political Disaffection in Upper Canada during the War of 1812” (MA, Carleton University, 1982).

For the domestic history of the war, Henry Adams, History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison, 9 vols. (1889–91), is essential. Although scholars have long used this edition, readers should seek out the modern two-volume edition edited by Earl N. Harbert (1986), which reproduces the revised edition that Adams published in 1901–4 and corrects some typographical errors that appeared in that edition. Adams sought to make almost everyone look bad except his ancestors, John and John Quincy Adams. Characteristically, he criticized Republicans for declaring war and Federalists for opposing the war and came very close to suggesting that both United States and Great Britain had lost the war. Scholars have long since discarded his assessment of the Republicans, although most still accept his view of the Federalists. Adams’s history is still invaluable, but his judgments (many of which are cleverly disguised as facts) must be treated with caution.

The best antidote to Henry Adams is Irving Brant, James Madison, 6 vols. (1941–61). Brant went over much of the same ground as Adams and frequently shows where Adams distorted or misread the evidence. But like so many biographers, Brant fell in love with his subject. He was reluctant to acknowledge Madison’s mistakes, and he labored mightily (though in vain) to prove that Madison was a strong president.

Charles J. Ingersoll, a bright and knowledgeable Republican who sat in the Thirteenth Congress, wrote two valuable treatises that further illuminate the domestic history of the war. These are Historical Sketch of the Second War between the United States of America, and Great Britain, 2 vols. (1845–49), and History of the Second War between the United States of America and Great Britain, 2 vols. (1853). J. C. A. Stagg’s modern work, Mr. Madison’s War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American Republic, 1783–1830 (1983), is a first-class study that traces the inner history of the Republican party during the war and explores the impact of politics on the prosecution of the war.

Future Work

In spite of all that has been written about the war and its causes, there is still work to be done. We could use a comprehensive treatment of the pre-war restrictive system and its impact at home and abroad. We also need an account of the war from the British perspective and a comprehensive history of the Indians in the war. We need to know a lot more about the domestic history of Canada during the conflict. We could use modern studies of the naval war on the high seas and of the role played by privateers. We also need to know more about the contributions of the militia and the system of supply on both sides, the history of disease and medicine in the war, the economic and financial history of the conflict in Canada and the United States, the British treatment of American prisoners of war, and the treatment of enemy aliens on both sides. We could also use a comprehensive study of trade with the enemy and of the role of Republican dissidents, particularly De Witt Clinton and the Clintonians. In short, for scholars seeking new topics to investigate or old ones to revisit, the War of 1812 offers a fertile field for study.

Notes

Abbreviations

U.S. OFFICIALS

JM:

James Madison (president)

SN:

Secretary of the navy (Paul Hamilton, William Jones, Benjamin W. Crowninshield)

ST:

Secretary of the treasury (Albert Gallatin, William Jones [acting], George W. Campbell, Alexander J. Dallas)

SS:

Secretary of state (James Monroe) SW: Secretary of war (William Eustis, John Armstrong, James Monroe)

BRITISH OFFICIALS

LL:

Lord Liverpool (prime minister)

CG:

Captain-general and governor-in-chief of Canada (Sir George Prevost)

FS:

Foreign secretary (Lord Castlereagh)

FSA:

First secretary of the Admiralty (John W. Croker)

SSWC:

Secretary of state for war and the colonies (Lord Bathurst)

LOCATIONS AND PUBLISHERS:

AAS:

American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, MA

BEHS:

Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society, Buffalo, NY

BU:

Brown University, Providence, RI

ChHS:

Chicago Historical Society, Chicago, IL

CHS:

Connecticut Historical Society, Hartford, CT

DU:

Duke University, Durham, NC

EI:

Essex Institute, Salem, MA

HL:

Huntington Library and Art Gallery, San Marino, CA

HSP:

Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA

HSW:

State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, WI

HU:

Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

JHU:

Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD

LC:

Library of Congress, Washington, DC

MCNY:

Museum of the City of New York, New York, NY

MdHS:

Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, MD

MeHS:

Maine Historical Society, Portland, ME

MHS:

Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA

NHHS:

New Hampshire Historical Society, Concord, NH

NYPL:

New York Public Library, New York, NY

PRO:

Public Record Office, London, England.

SR:

Scholarly Resources, Wilmington, DE.

UM:

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI

UNC:

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC

UVA:

University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA

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Ingersoll, Historical Sketch: Charles J. Ingersoll, Historical Sketch of the Second War between the United States of America, and Great Britain, 2 vols., Philadelphia, 1845–49.

Ingersoll, History: Charles J. Ingersoll, History of the Second War between the United States of America and Great Britain, 2 vols., Philadelphia, 1853.

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NASP: NA: K. Jack Bauer, ed., The New American State Papers: Naval Affairs, 10 vols., Wilmington, 1981.

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ND (M147): U.S. Department of the Navy, Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanders, 1804–1886, Microfilm Series M147, National Archives, Washington, DC.

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The poetry at the beginning of this study was taken from the Trenton True American, June 29, 1812, and Fred L. Pattee, ed., The Poems of Philip Freneau: Poet of the American Revolution, 3 vols. (Princeton, 1902–7), 3:345–46.

Introduction

1. For more on the debate on the causes of the war, see Warren H. Goodman, “The War of 1812: A Survey of Changing Interpretations,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 28 (September, 1941), 171–86, and Clifford L. Egan, “The Origins of the War of 1812: Three Decades of Historical Writing,” Military Affairs 38 (April, 1974), 72–75. Surprisingly little of note has been written on the causes of the war since the publication of these articles.

2. For examples of the use of the nominal par, see Lord Hawkesbury to Anthony Merry, September 16, 1803, in Bernard Mayo, ed., Instructions to the British Ministers to the United States, 1791–1812 (Washington, DC, 1941), 200; Cartel for the Exchange of Prisoners of War, May 12, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 3:797; Albert Gallatin, Memorandum of Voyage to St. Petersburg, June 21, 1813, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 26.

3. See Lawrence H. Officer, “Dollar-Pound Exchange Rates from 1791,” MeasuringWorth, 2010, at http://www.measuringworth.org/exchangepound/.

Chapter 1. The Road to War, 1801–1812

1. Jefferson’s entire inaugural was spartan. See Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation: A Biography (New York, 1970), 654–55.

2. The literature on the first party system is extensive, though most studies focus on party organization and ideology rather than on policies. The best Federalist studies (which concentrate on the party after it fell from power) are Linda Kerber, Federalists in Dissent: Imagery and Ideology in Jeffersonian America (Ithaca, 1970); David Hackett Fischer, The Revolution of American Conservatism: The Federalist Party in the Era of Jeffersonian Democracy (New York, 1965); James M. Banner, Jr., To the Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789–1815 (New York, 1970); Shaw Livermore, Jr., The Twilight of Federalism: The Disintegration of the Federalist Party, 1815–1830 (Princeton, 1962); Lyle A. Rose, Prologue to Democracy: The Federalists in the South, 1789–1800 (Lexington, 1968); James H. Broussard, The Southern Federalists, 1800–1816 (Baton Rouge, 1978); and Doron Ben-Atar and Barbara B. Oberg, eds., Federalists Reconsidered (Charlottesville, 1998), especially the concluding essay of James M. Banner, Jr. The best Republican studies are Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, 1980); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, 1978); Stuart G. Brown, The First Republicans: Political Philosophy and Public Policy in the Party of Jefferson and Madison (Syracuse, 1954); and Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., The Jeffersonian Republicans: The Formation of Party Organization, 1789–1801 (Chapel Hill, 1957) and The Jeffersonian Republicans in Power: Party Operations, 1801–1809 (Chapel Hill, 1963).

3. For Washington’s views, see Washington to Congress, December 3, 1793, in AC, 3–1, 12.

4. Speech of Benjamin Tallmadge, April 6, 1808, in AC, 10–1, 1982; Boston Weekly Messenger, reprinted in Boston Gazette, December 26, 1811.

5. For a good analysis of Hamilton’s financial program, which stresses his aim to monetize American society, see Forrest McDonald, Alexander Hamilton: A Biography (New York, 1979), chs. 7–13.

6. For the development of Federalist defense policies, see Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783–1802 (New York, 1975); Jacobs, Beginnings of the U.S. Army, chs. 1–9; Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776–1918, rev. ed. (Princeton, 1966), 13–53; Marshall Smelser, The Congress Founds a Navy, 1787–1798 (Notre Dame, 1959); and Donald R. Hickey, “Federalist Defense Policy in the Age of Jefferson, 1801–1812,” Military Affairs 45 (April, 1981), 63–70.

7. See documents in ASP: MA, 1:6, 41, 112, 120, 153, 155, 192–97; Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, 13–15, 25–53.

8. The Jay Treaty can be found in ASP: FR, 1:520–25. The standard account of the treaty is Samuel F. Bemis, Jay’s Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy, rev. ed. (New Haven, 1962). For an analysis of the ideological background, see Jerald A. Combs, The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding Fathers (Berkeley, 1970).

9. Boston Yankee, reprinted in Philadelphia Aurora, February 24, 1812.

10. Nettels, Emergence of a National Economy, 396. For a superb account of the development of Anglo-American friendship in this period, see Bradford Perkins, The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795–1805, 2nd ed. (Berkeley, 1967).

11. The estimate of losses can be found in Report of the Secretary of State, January 18, 1799, in ASP: FR, 2:232.

12. Richard Dobbs Spaight to Jacob Read, March 5, 1797, in Thomas Addis Emmet Papers (NYPL).

13. The standard accounts of the Quasi-War are Alexander DeConde, The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared Naval War with France, 1797–1801 (New York, 1966), which focuses on the domestic and diplomatic history; and Michael A. Palmer, Stoddert’s War: Naval Operations during the Quasi-War with France, 1798–1801 (Columbia, 1987), which is a superb study of the navy’s performance.

14. List of French Armed Vessels Captured by U.S. Men-of-War, in Dudley W. Knox, ed., Naval Documents Related to the Quasi-War between the United States and France, 7 vols. (Washington, DC, 1935–38), 7:311–12; Robert G. Albion and Jennie B. Pope, Sea Lanes in Wartime: The American Experience, 2nd ed. ([Hamden, CT], 1968), 83. The French probably lost additional privateers that escaped from an American attack but suffered enough damage to be knocked out of service or to founder at sea.

15. See List of Vessels Captured or Recaptured by Armed American Merchantmen, in Knox, Quasi-War, 7:439. For more on the underappreciated effectiveness of armed merchantmen in this conflict, see Donald R. Hickey, “The Quasi-War: America’s First Limited War, 1798–1801,” Northern Mariner 18 (July-October, 2008), 74–75.

16. Report of the House Naval Committee, January 17, 1799, in ASP: NA, 1:69; Albion and Pope, Sea Lanes in Wartime, 81–83. Peacetime rates were typically 5–7 percent. British naval operations and a more conciliatory policy on the part of France probably also contributed to the decline.

17. The convention is printed in ASP: FR, 2:295–301.

18. Jefferson to Nathaniel Macon, May 14, 1801, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 23.

19. Republican financial policies are charted in Davis R. Dewey, Financial History of the United States, 12th ed. (New York, 1934); Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War (Princeton, 1962); Alexander Balinky, Albert Gallatin: Fiscal Theories and Policies (New Brunswick, NJ, 1958); Adams, History; and Edwin J. Perkins, American Publican Finance and Financial Services, 1700–1815 (Columbus, 1994). The older accounts take an unfavorable view of Republican finance during the war, and I share this view. Perkins is more sympathetic and even claims that “Alexander Hamilton himself would have been hard pressed to have performed much better” (p. 337).

20. For Republican defense policies, see Jacobs, Beginnings of the U.S. Army, chs. 10–14; and Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, 53–85.

21. AC, 7–1, 1306–12. For an excellent account of Jefferson’s attempt to reform and republicanize the army, see Theodore J. Crackel, Mr. Jefferson’s Army: Political and Social Reform of the Military Establishment, 1801–1809 (New York, 1987).

22. Jacobs, Beginnings of the U.S. Army, 253; Crackel, Mr. Jefferson’s Army, 45–53.

23. AC, 10–1, 2849–52; Crackel, Mr. Jefferson’s Army, 169–76.

24. Winfield Scott, Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, 2 vols. (New York, 1864), 1:35–36. See also Jacobs, Beginnings of the U.S. Army, 270.

25. Speech of Nathaniel Macon, April 16, 1810, in AC, 11–2, 1863.

26. Speeches of James Fisk, January 25, 1812, and Samuel McKee, January 18, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 841 and 968–69.

27. Report of the Secretary of the Navy, December 3, 1811, in ASP: NA, 1:249–50; AC, 7–2, 1565; Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, 53–85.

28. Adam Seybert, Statistical Annals . . . of the United States of America (Philadelphia, 1818), 712. The figure excludes $100,000 appropriated in the 1790s but spent in 1801–2.

29. For more on the militia and privateers, see John K. Mahon, The American Militia: Decade of Decision, 1789–1800 (Gainesville, 1960); Lawrence D. Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and the Militia in American Society to the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill, 1982); C. Edward Skeen, Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812 (Lexington, 1999); and Maclay, American Privateers.

30. See Jefferson to Congress, February 10, 1807, in AC, 9–2, 63–65. The quoted words are from the speech of John Randolph, December 16, 1811, in AC, 12–1, 541.

31. See Report of the Secretary of the Navy, June 9, 1809, in ASP: NA, 1:200; JM to Congress, May 23, 1809, in AC, 11–1, 12; and editorial note in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 1:12. For more on these vessels, see Spencer C. Tucker, The Jeffersonian Gunboat Navy (Columbia, 1993); and Gene A. Smith, “For the Purposes of Defense”: The Politics of the Jeffersonian Gunboat Program (Newark, 1995).

32. Nettels, Emergence of a National Economy, 396.

33. Monroe to [SS], July 1, 1804, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 3. See also Monroe to SS, August 7, 1804, ibid., reel 11.

34. Monroe to SS, October 18, 1805, ibid., reel 11.

35. Perkins, First Rapprochement, 86–89; Nettels, Emergence of a National Economy, 396.

36. Lords Holland and Auckland to Lord Howick, October 20, 1806, in Foreign Office Papers 5/51 (PRO).

37. The Essex decision is printed in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 1:17–20. See also Perkins, First Rapprochement, 177–81; and Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805–1812 (Berkeley, 1961) 77–84.

38. Anthony Merry to Lord Mulgrave, September 30, 1805, in Adams, History, 1:669.

39. Monroe to SS, September 25, 1805, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 11.

40. Perkins, Prologue to War, 104–6.

41. Most of the petitions are printed in ASP: FR, 2:737–73.

42. The best work on this subject is Scott Thomas Jackson, “Impressment and Anglo-American Discord, 1787–1818” (PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 1976). See also James F. Zimmerman, Impressment of American Seamen (New York, 1925).

43. Estimates on the size of the American merchant marine in this era vary. I arrived at my figure by computing the average number of seamen needed for each 100 tons of ship tonnage. See Hickey, Don’t Give Up the Ship, 373n16. The Admiralty thought about 20,000, or 28.5 percent, were British. See Zimmerman, Impressment, 275.

44. Zimmerman, Impressment, 266–67.

45. Ibid., 55–61, 67–68. For a transcription of a “protection,” see ibid., 69n. There are originals in ND (M147), reel 4; Foreign Office Papers 5/55 (PRO); and the collections of the Erie Maritime Museum, Erie, PA.

46. Admiralty to [Rueben G. Beasley], May 26, 1813, in NASP: NA, 8:23.

47. The analysis of the issues in the ensuing paragraphs is based mainly on the following sources: Perkins, Prologue to War; Reginald Horsman, The Causes of the War of 1812 (Philadelpha, 1962); A. L. Burt, The United States, Great Britain, and British North America from the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace after the War of 1812 (New Haven, 1940); Charles S. Hyneman, The First American Neutrality: A Study of the American Understanding of Neutral Obligations during the Years 1792–1815 (Urbana, 1934); W. Allison Phillips and Arthur H. Reede, Neutrality, Its History, Economics and Law: The Napoleonic Period (New York, 1936); and Carlton Savage, Policy of the United States toward Maritime Commerce in War, 2 vols. (Washington, DC, 1934–36).

48. Speech of Barnabas Bidwell, March 8, 1806, in AC, 9–1, 653.

49. Speech of Samuel Smith, March 10, 1806, in AC, 9–1, 168.

50. Fisher Ames, “Political Review III,” in W. B. Allen, ed., Works of Fisher Ames, 2 vols. (Indianapolis, 1984), 1:472–73. See also Boston Repertory, cited in Richmond Enquirer, October 11, 1805.

51. AC, 9–1, 90–91, 109, 112; Anthony Merry to Lord Mulgrave, February 2, 1806, in Foreign Office Papers 5/48 (PRO); Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, March 10, 1808, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 41.

52. Jefferson to William Short, October 3, 1801, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 24.

53. Henry S. Randall, The Life of Thomas Jefferson, 3 vols. (New York, 1858), 3:315. For British attempts to renew the Jay Treaty, see Lord Harrowby to Anthony Merry, August 4, 1804, in Bernard Mayo, ed., Instructions to the British Ministers to the United States, 1791–1812 (Washington, DC, 1941), 207–8.

54. Jefferson to James Monroe, March 10, 1808, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 41.

55. JM to Monroe and Pinkney, May 17, 1806, in SD (M77), reel 1.

56. Lords Holland and Auckland to Monroe and Pinkney, November 8, 1806, in SD (M30), reel 10. Monroe and Pinkney claimed that privately the British promised that if their deserters were returned they would give up impressment except “in cases of an extraordinary nature.” The British envoys, however, denied making this pledge. See Monroe and Pinkney to JM, January 3 and April 22, 1807, and Monroe to JM, February 28, 1808, in ASP: FR, 3:146, 160–61, 174; Lords Holland and Auckland to George Canning, July 28 and August 10, 1807, in Foreign Office Papers 5/54 (PRO). Quotation from p. 174.

57. The Monroe–Pinkney Treaty is printed in ASP: FR, 3:147–51. The analysis in the following paragraphs is based on Donald R. Hickey, “The Monroe–Pinkney Treaty of 1806: A Reappraisal,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser. 44 (January, 1987), 65–88.

58. The established duty for re-exported goods was 3 percent of their value. Under the Monroe–Pinkney Treaty, the duty would be lowered to 2 percent for goods shipped to Europe and 1 percent for goods shipped to the Caribbean.

59. Note of Lord Holland and Lord Auckland, December 31, 1806, in SD (M30), reel 10.

60. Quoted in Jacob Wagner to Timothy Pickering, July 21, 1813, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 30.

61. See Jefferson’s cabinet notes, February 3, 1807, (filed under March 5, 1806), in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 35.

62. There is a good account of the Chesapeake affair in Perkins, Prologue to War, 140–49. For a more extended study, see Spencer C. Tucker and Frank T. Reuter, Injured Honor: The “Chesapeake”-“Leopard” Affair, June 27, 1807 (Annapolis, 1996).

63. Nicholson to Albert Gallatin, July 14, 1807, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 14.

64. For an analysis of the Orders-in-Council, see Perkins, Prologue to War, chs. 6–7, and Horsman, Causes of the War of 1812, chs. 6–8.

65. Quoted in Perkins, Prologue to War, 69.

66. Quoted in Adams, History, 2:486.

67. William Lee to ST, May 22, 1812, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 24; Perkins, Prologue to War, 206–7, 304–7.

68. Charles Francis Adams, ed., Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, 12 vols. (Philadelphia, 1874–77) (December 29, 1809), 2:92.

69. See American Ships Seized by Danish Privateers, October 16, 1809, George Erving to SS, June 23, 1811, and Report of the Secretary of State, July 6, 1812, all in ASP: FR, 3:332, 521, 584.

70. The best overview of the restrictive system is Herbert Heaton, “Non-Importation, 1806–1812,” Journal of Economic History 1 (November, 1941), 178–98. There are also good treatments in Adams, History; Perkins, Prologue to War; and Horsman, Causes of the War of 1812.

71. Boston Independent Chronicle, reprinted in Washington National Intelligencer, December 11, 1805.

72. The law is printed in AC, 9–1, 1259–62.

73. The law is printed in AC, 10–1, 2814–15. There are several good books on the embargo, each of which approaches the subject from a different angle. See Louis M. Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo (Durham, 1927); Walter W. Jennings, The American Embargo, 1807–1809 (Iowa City, 1921); and Burton Spivak, Jefferson’s English Crisis: Commerce, Embargo, and the Republican Revolution (Charlottesville, 1979).

74. Speech of John Randolph, April 14, 1808, in AC, 10–1, 2136.

75. Perkins, Prologue to War, 160–63.

76. ST to Jefferson, July 29, 1808, and Jefferson to ST, August 11, 1808, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reels 41 and 42.

77. See AC, 10–2, 1798–1804. For an excellent analysis of this law, see Leonard W. Levy, Jefferson & Civil Liberties: The Darker Side, 2nd ed. (New York, 1973), ch. 6. Levy’s study is a compelling analysis of Jefferson’s disregard for civil liberties. The “Preface to the Paperback Edition,” which examines the reception of the first edition, is a remarkable commentary on the profession’s attachment to Jefferson at the time.

78. Nettels, Emergence of a National Economy, 396.

79. See Jennings, American Embargo, chs. 7–9.

80. John Armstrong, quoted in Perkins, Prologue to War, 166. For the impact of the embargo abroad, see Jennings, American Embargo, 70–93, and Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo, 276–301, 312–17.

81. Horsman, Causes of the War of 1812, 141–42; Clifford L. Egan, Neither Peace nor War: Franco-American Relations, 1803–1812 (Baton Rouge, 1983), 97.

82. Robert Ferguson, quoted in Horsman, Causes of the War of 1812, 143.

83. The law is printed in AC, 10–2, 1824–30.

84. For more on the Erskine Agreement, see Perkins, Prologue to War, 210–20.

85. The act is printed in AC, 10–2, 2582–83.

86. Quoted in Perkins, Prologue to War, 246.

87. Egan, Neither Peace nor War, 120–22.

88. AC, 11–3, 1338–39. The legislative history of this bill is significant because it marked the first time that the previous question was successfully invoked to cut off debate. See AC, 11–3, 1091–95.

89. Adams, History, 2:321–26; Burt, United States and Great Britain, 292–95; Perkins, Prologue to War, 274–82.

90. See documents in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 1:41–49, and ASP: FR, 3:471–99. See also Adams, History, 2:313–21; and Perkins, Prologue to War, 271–73.

91. Quoted in Perkins, Prologue to War, 273.

92. Donald E. Graves, ed., Merry Hearts Make Light Days: The War of 1812 Journal of Lieutenant John Le Couteur, 104th Foot (Ottawa, 1993), 139n16.

93. Niles’ Register 2 (March 7, 1812), 5.

94. For an illuminating discussion of Harrison’s role in this massive land grab, see Robert M. Owens, Mr. Jefferson’s Hammer: William Henry Harrison and the Origins of American Indian Policy (Norman, 2007), esp. xxiv and chs. 3, 4, and 7.

95. There are two excellent studies of the Shawnee leaders by R. David Edmunds: The Shawnee Prophet (Lincoln, 1983), and Tecumseh and the Quest for Indian Leadership, 2nd ed. (New York, 2007). For a more extended—and more speculative—treatment of Tecumseh, see John Sugden, Tecumseh: A Life (New York, 1997). For the primacy of the Prophet (as opposed to his more famous brother) before 1811, see R. David Edmunds, “Tecumseh, the Shawnee Prophet, and American History: A Reassessment,” Western Historical Quarterly 14 (July, 1983), 261–76.

96. William Henry Harrison to SW, July 10, August 6, and August 7, 1811, in Esarey, Messages of William Henry Harrison, 1:533, 544, 549; McAfee, History of the Late War, 17.

97. Harrison to SW, July 2, 1811, in Esarey, Messages of William Henry Harrison, 1:526.

98. SW to Harrison, July 17 and July 20, 1811, and Harrison to SW, August 7 and August 13, 1811, ibid., 1:535–37, 550, 554; McAfee, History of the Late War, 18–19.

99. Harrison to SW, November 18, 1811, in WD (M221), reel 44; McAfee, History of the Late War, 18–36; Gilpin, The War of 1812 in the Northwest, 16–19.

100. R. I. Snelling to William Henry Harrison, November 20, 1811, in WD (M221), reel 44; Alfred A. Cave, “The Shawnee Prophet, Tecumseh, and Tippecanoe: A Case Study of Historical Myth-Making,” Journal of the Early Republic 22 (Winter, 2002), 637–73.

101. Harrison to SW, May 6, 1812, in WD (M221), reel 45.

102. Trenton True American, December 2, 9, 16, 1811, and January 6, 1812; Salem Essex Register, December 21, 1811; Concord New-Hampshire Patriot, December 24, 1811.

103. Lexington Reporter, November 23, 1811, and March 14, 1812. See also ibid., May 23 and 30, 1812.

104. The best analysis of Republican thinking on the eve of the war is in Roger H. Brown, The Republic in Peril: 1812 (New York, 1964). Another thoughtful, although more diffuse study, is Steven Watts, The Republic Reborn: War and the Making of Liberal America, 1790–1820 (Baltimore, 1987).

105. William Plumer to John Quincy Adams, August 18, 1812, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 2.

106. Lexington Reporter, December 10, 1811.

107. Philip S. Klein, ed., “Memoirs of a Senator from Pennsylvania: Jonathan Roberts, 1771–1854,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 62 (April, 1938), 240; Speech of John C. Calhoun, May 6, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1399. See also Speech of Nathaniel Macon, January 4, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 661.

108. Washington National Intelligencer, November 7, 1811; A. McLane to Peter B. Porter, February 28, 1812, in Porter Papers (BEHS), reel 2. See also Philadelphia Aurora, October 26, 1812; Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, April 12, 1812, in Roberts Papers (HSP).

109. John Binns to Jonathan Roberts, May 5, 1812, in Roberts Papers (HSP); Felix Grundy to Andrew Jackson, December 24, 1811, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 5; Jonathan Roberts to Richard F. Leech, June 14–16, 1812, in Roberts Papers (HSP). See also Gideon Granger to John Tod, December 26, 1811, in Granger Papers (LC).

110. John W. Eppes, quoted in J. C. A. Stagg, “James Madison and the ‘Malcontents’: The Political Origins of the War of 1812,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser. 33 (October, 1976), 575. This is an excellent article on the political origins of the war.

111. The Annals of Congress and contemporary newspapers are filled with Federalist attacks on the restrictive system. For a sampling, see AC, 9–2, 157–58; AC, 10–1, 1704–6, 1850–54, 2118–25; AC, 10–2, 20–27, 29–35, 51–60, 767–79, 865–86; AC, 11–2, 1637–38, 1651–53, 1708–9; AC, 11–3, 910–32, 1011–27; New York Evening Post, December 26, 1811; Hartford Connecticut Mirror, February 10, 1812; Chillicothe Supporter, February 29, 1812; Philadelphia United States’ Gazette, June 26, 1812; and Boston Columbian Centinel, July 25, 1812.

112. Plumer to John A. Harper, April 27, 1812, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 3; Gerry to JM, May 19, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 14. See also John G. Jackson to JM, March 30, 1812, ibid., reel 13; John Binns to Jonathan Roberts, May 3, 1812, in Roberts Papers (HSP).

113. JM to South Carolina House of Representatives, January 8, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 13.

Chapter 2. The Declaration of War

1. Boston Independent Chronicle, September 30, 1812; Washington National Intelligencer, November 7, 1811; Salem Essex Register, October 30, 1811. For similar sentiments, see Philadelphia Aurora, October 26, 1811; Concord New-Hampshire Patriot, October 29, 1811; and Worcester National Aegis, November 6, 1811.

2. The best guide to party affiliation in the War Congress is Kenneth C. Martis, The Historical Atlas of Political Parties in the United States Congress, 1789–1989 (New York, 1989), 81. Martis’s breakdown corresponds to my own, which I worked out on the basis of voting records and speeches and published in “The Federalists and the Coming of the War, 1811–1812,” Indiana Magazine of History 75 (March, 1979), 82–88.

3. Jonathan Roberts to William Jones, May 24, 1812, in Jones Papers (HSP).

4. The standard work on the Old Republicans is Norman K. Risjord, The Old Republicans: Southern Conservatism in the Age of Jefferson (New York, 1965). See also William C. Bruce, John Randolph of Roanoke, 1773–1833, 2 vols. (New York, 1922); and Russell Kirk, John Randolph of Roanoke (Chicago, 1951). The Old Republicans are sometimes called the “Tertium Quids” or simply the “Quids,” meaning a third thing or party. Contemporaries applied the term Quid to several different Republican factions, but (except for occasionally allying with Federalists in state politics) these factions had little in common. For an illuminating discussion of this subject, see Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., “Who Were the Quids?” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 50 (September, 1963), 252–63.

5. There is no monograph on the Clintonians, but for a good introduction, see Steven E. Siry, De Witt Clinton and the American Political Economy: Sectionalism, Politics, and Republican Ideology, 1787–1828 (New York, 1990).

6. For a good analysis of the “Invisibles,” see John S. Pancake, “The ‘Invisibles’: A Chapter in the Opposition to President Madison,” Journal of Southern History 21 (February, 1955), 17–37. See also John S. Pancake, Samuel Smith and the Politics of Business: 1752–1839 (University, AL, 1972); Frank A. Cassell, Merchant Congressman in the Young Republic: Samuel Smith of Maryland, 1752–1839 (Madison, 1971); and Dice R. Anderson, William Branch Giles: A Study in the Politics of Virginia and the Nation from 1790 to 1830 (Menasha, WI, 1914). For a good illustration of the “Invisibles”’ hostility to Gallatin, see speech of William Branch Giles, December 17, 1811, in AC, 12–1, 47–51.

7. [Jonathan Roberts] to ———, February 3, 1812, in Roberts Papers (HSP).

8. Although the term War Hawk is closely associated with the War of 1812 and is sometimes attributed to anti-war critic John Randolph, it had been in general use for at least twenty years. The Boston Gazette used the term on May 7, 1792, and over the next two decades it appeared in the American press more than 100 times.

9. Scholars differ over who (if anyone) ought to be classified as a War Hawk. My list is traditional. It includes those House members who were outspoken proponents of war and supplied leadership to the war movement. Harry W. Fritz makes a good case for the traditional group in “The War Hawks of 1812,” Capitol Studies 5 (Spring, 1977), 25–42. For alternative views, see Reginald Horsman, “Who Were the War Hawks?” Indiana Magazine of History 60 (June, 1964), 121–36; Roger H. Brown, “The War Hawks of 1812: An Historical Myth,” ibid., 137–51; and Ronald L. Hatzenbuehler, “The War Hawks and the Question of Congressional Behavior in 1812,” Pacific Historical Review 45 (February, 1976), 1–22. My critique of Hatzenbuehler’s work, as well as his reply, can be found in Pacific Historical Review 45 (November, 1976), 642–45.

10. William Reed to Timothy Pickering, February 18, 1812, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 30.

11. AC, 12–1, 330.

12. John A. Harper to William Plumer, December 2, 1811, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 3.

13. A correspondent from Washington, quoted in Boston Columbian Centinel, November 16, 1811.

14. Philip S. Klein, ed., “Memoirs of a Senator from Pennsylvania: Jonathan Roberts, 1771–1854,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 61 (April, 1938), 230. See also Jonathan Roberts to Alexander Dallas, December 19, 1813, in Dallas Papers (HSP).

15. Albert Gallatin, notes on president’s message [Fall, 1811], in Madison Papers (LC), reel 26.

16. JM to Congress, November 5, 1811, in AC, 12–1, 11–15. Quotation from p. 13.

17. Philadelphia Aurora, November 7, 1811; Worcester National Aegis, November 27, 1811. For similar sentiments, see Petersburg (VA) Republican, reprinted in Lexington Reporter, December 17, 1811; Benjamin Rush to James Monroe, November 8, 1811, and John Adams to Monroe, December 19, 1811, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 4; Henry Dearborn to Monroe, November 14, 1811, in Monroe Papers (NYPL).

18. Josiah Quincy to Harrison Gray Otis, November 8, 1811, in Otis Papers (MHS).

19. Four of the nine committee members were War Hawks: Porter, Calhoun, Grundy, and Harper. Two other members—Joseph Desha and John Sevier—are sometimes classified as War Hawks and could be counted on to support war measures.

20. Lowndes to Elizabeth Lowndes, December 7, 1811, in Lowndes Papers (UNC), reel 1. See also William A. Burwell to Wilson Cary Nicholas, December 29, 1811, in Nicholas Papers (LC); Felix Grundy to Andrew Jackson, November 28, 1811, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 5; Alexandria Herald, reprinted in Richmond Enquirer, December 10, 1811.

21. Report of the House Foreign Relations Committee, November 29, 1811, in AC, 12–1, 373–77. Quotation from p. 376.

22. Speech of Peter B. Porter, December 6, 1811, in AC, 12–1, 417.

23. AC, 12–1, 419–20, 545–48, 565–66.

24. AC, 12–1, 556–57, 560–66; Washington National Intelligencer, December 17, 1811; Baltimore Whig, reprinted in Philadelphia Aurora, December 18, 1811.

25. Letter from a Federalist, January 6, 1812, reprinted from Alexandria Herald in Richmond Enquirer, January 23, 1812.

26. Speech of Daniel Sheffey, January 3, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 635. See also speech of William Branch Giles, December 17, 1811, in AC, 12–1, 44; Timothy Pickering to Samuel W. Dana, January 16, 1812, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 14; Samuel Taggart to Rev. John Taylor, January 20, 1812, in Mary R. Reynolds, ed., “Letters of Samuel Taggart, Representative in Congress, 1803–1814,” Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society 33 (October, 1923), 376–77.

27. Thomas R. Gold to Nathan Appleton, [December, 1811?], in Appleton Papers (MHS); Harmanus Bleecker to Henry D. Sedgwick, December 27, 1811, in Sedgwick Papers (MHS). See also Josiah Quincy to Harrison Gray Otis, November 8 and 26, 1811, in Otis Papers (MHS); James Milnor to Samuel Bradford, December 10, 1811, in Bradford Papers (HSP); William Reed to Timothy Pickering, January 20, 1812, and Samuel W. Dana to Pickering, January 30, 1812, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 30; James A. Bayard to William H. Wells, January 12, 1812, in Donnan, Papers of James A. Bayard, 188; Samuel Taggart to Rev. John Taylor, December 14, 1811, in Reynolds, “Letters of Samuel Taggart,” 370. For a fuller analysis of Federalist strategy in the War Congress, see Hickey, “Federalists and the Coming of the War,” 70–88.

28. For Federalist votes on these measures, see Hickey, “Federalists and the Coming of the War,” 84–86. See also Nathaniel Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, January 10, 1812, in Nicholson Papers (LC).

29. AC, 12–1, 33, 566–67, 2227–28. The new cash bounty was actually $16 plus three months’ pay. Privates were paid $5 a month. For the old bounty (which was set in 1802), see AC, 7–1, 1309.

30. AC, 12–1, 85, 99, 112, 192–93, 691, 697, 800–801, 1035–36, 2229–37, 2267–69.

31. See JM to Jefferson, February 7, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 13; James Monroe to John Taylor, June 13, 1812, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5; Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, December 20, 1811, in Roberts Papers (HSP); speeches of Joseph Anderson, December 17, 1811, and George W. Campbell, December 18, 1811, in AC, 12–1, 54–84.

32. Speech of William Branch Giles, December 17, 1811, in AC, 12–1, 35–54.

33. See debate in AC, 12–1, 728–801.

34. See Report of House Committee, January 2, 1806, Ebenezer Huntington to Benjamin Tallmadge, January 5, 1810, and Resolutions of Kentucky Legislature, February 8, 1812, in ASP: MA, 1:189, 263–66, 318; Hartford Connecticut Mirror, February 17, 1812.

35. AC, 12–1, 195, 1004, 1021, 1040, 1084–85, 1298.

36. Speech of Langdon Cheves, January 17, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 803–22; SN to Cheves, December 3, 1811, in ASP: NA, 1:248–52.

37. John Adams, quoted in Edmund Quincy, Life of Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts, 4th ed. (Boston, 1868), 248; Philadelphia Aurora, February 27, 1812.

38. Speech of Josiah Quincy, January 25, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 949–68. Quotation from p. 957. Almost every Federalist newspaper in the country (and many Republican ones, too) carried Quincy’s speech.

39. Speech of Adam Seybert, January 18, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 830, 833. For the rest of the debate on naval expansion, see AC, 12–1, 859–1005.

40. AC, 12–1, 164, 999. Lloyd’s speech in support of his proposal is in AC, 12–1, 131–47. This speech was widely reprinted in the press, and in pamphlet form an edition of 12,000 copies sold out in Boston. See Philadelphia United States’ Gazette, June 1, 1812.

41. AC, 12–1, 1002–4.

42. AC, 12–1, 166, 1005, 2261–62. Most Federalists were so disgusted with the failure of naval expansion that they abstained on the final vote of this bill.

43. AC, 12–1, 163, 1030, 1160–61, 2251–52.

44. See Alexander S. Balinky, “Gallatin’s Theory of War Finance,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser. 16 (January, 1959), 73–82.

45. ST to Ezekiel Bacon, January 10, 1812, in ASP: F, 2:523–27. See also Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, November 22, 1811, in ASP: F, 2:495–97.

46. Plumer to John A. Harper, February 4, 1812, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 2.

47. AC, 12–1, 846–47.

48. Speech of Robert Wright, March 2, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1123; John A. Harper to William Plumer, February 17, 1812, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 3.

49. New York Columbian, reprinted in Philadelphia Aurora, January 27, 1812; Baltimore Sun, reprinted in Philadelphia Aurora, January 31, 1812; Albany Register, reprinted in Hartford Connecticut Mirror, March 16, 1812; Washington National Intelligencer, January 28, 1812.

50. Baltimore Whig, January 31, 1812; Concord New-Hampshire Patriot, February 11, 1812; Lexington Reporter, February 15, 1812; Bennington (VT) Green-Mountain Farmer, February 25, 1812. See also Worcester National Aegis, February 5, 1812; Edward Fox to Jonathan Roberts, February 23, 1812, in Roberts Papers (HSP); Henry Dearborn to ST, March 29, 1812, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 24; and George Hay to James Monroe, January 23, 1812, in Monroe Papers (NYPL).

51. AC, 12–1, 167, 1092, 2253–55.

52. James A. Bayard to Caesar A. Rodney, March 9, 1812, in “James Asheton Bayard Letters, 1802–1814,” Bulletin of the New York Public Library 4 (July, 1900), 236.

53. AC, 12–1, 1094–1155.

54. JM to Jefferson, March 6, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 13.

55. JM to Congress, March 9, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1162. The analysis that follows is based on Samuel Elliot Morison, “The Henry-Crillon Affair of 1812,” Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society 69 (October, 1947-May, 1950), 207–31; and E. A. Cruikshank, The Political Adventures of John Henry: The Record of an International Imbroglio (Toronto, 1936). The pertinent documents are printed in AC, 12–1, 1163–81, and in Henry Adams, ed., “Count Edward de Crillon,” American Historical Review 1 (October, 1895), 51–69.

56. Gerry to JM, January 29, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 26.

57. JM to Jefferson, March 9, 1812, ibid.

58. JM to Congress, March 9, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1162.

59. Sir James Craig to Henry, February 6, 1809, in AC, 12–1, 1164.

60. Washington National Intelligencer, March 10, 1812.

61. John A. Harper to William Plumer, March 11, 1812, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 3.

62. Nathaniel Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, March 23, 1812, in Nicholson Papers (LC).

63. Leonard White to Daniel Appleton White, March 11, 1812, in White Papers (EI).

64. Report of the Secretary of State, March 12, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 169.

65. Baltimore Federal Republican, March 12, 1812; statement of Samuel Sterett, in Philadelphia Aurora, March 19, 1812; Benjamin Tallmadge to James McHenry, March 16, 1812, in McHenry Papers (LC); Samuel Elliot Morison, The Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, Federalist, 1765–1848, 2 vols. (Boston, 1913), 2:46.

66. Abijah Bigelow to Hannah Bigelow, March 22, 1812, in Clarence S. Brigham, ed., “Letters of Abijah Bigelow, Member of Congress, to His Wife, 1810–1815,” Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society 40 (October, 1930), 332–33. See also Josiah Quincy to Harrison Gray Otis, March 19, 1812, in Otis Papers (MHS); Samuel Taggart to Rev. John Taylor, March 13, 1812, in Reynolds, “Letters of Samuel Taggart,” 389.

67. John A. Harper to William Plumer, March 11, 1812, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 3. See also Plumer to William Claggett, March 24, 1812, in Plumer Papers (NHHS), reel 2; Boston Independent Chronicle, March 26, 1812.

68. Cruikshank, John Henry, 7; David W. Parker, ed., “Secret Reports of John Howe, 1808,” American Historical Review 17 (October, 1911-January, 1912), 70–102, 332–54; Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time, 6 vols. (Boston, 1948–81), 5:519–20.

69. Louis Serurier to Duc de Bassano, March 23, 1812, in Adams, History, 2:428.

70. Clay to James Monroe, March 15, 1812, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5; Brant, James Madison, 5:428. See also James A. Bayard to Andrew Bayard, May 2, 1812, in Donnan, Papers of James A. Bayard, 196.

71. JM to Congress, April 1, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 186–87.

72. AC, 12–1, 189, 1598, 1612–14, 2262–64.

73. AC, 12–1, 203, 1622–23, 2269–70.

74. Speech of Henry Clay, April 1, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1588. See also speeches of Felix Grundy, Adam Seybert, and John Smilie, April 1, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1587–88, 1592; Richard M. Johnson to Frankfort (KY) Palladium, April 4, 1812, reprinted in Lexington Reporter, April 18, 1812; John C. Calhoun to James Macbride, April 18, 1812, in Meriwether et al., Papers of John C. Calhoun, 1:100.

75. William Reed to Timothy Pickering, April 25, 1812, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 30.

76. JM to Jefferson, April 24, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 14.

77. Speeches of John C. Calhoun and Josiah Quincy, April 7, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1265–66; Nathaniel Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, April 7–8, 1812, in Nicholson Papers (LC); broadside, April 3, 1812, in Shaw Broadside Collection (AAS); Washington National Intelligencer, April 2, 1812; Philadelphia United States’ Gazette, April 14, 1812; Hartford Connecticut Mirror, May 18, 1812.

78. Nathan Appleton to Samuel Appleton, April 5, 1812, in Appleton Papers (MHS). See also Nathaniel Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, April 6, 1812, in Nicholson Papers (LC); diary of Henry Thompson, April 3, 1812 (MdHS); Washington National Intelligencer, April 9, 1812; Richmond Enquirer, April 10, 1812; Harrison, Diary of Thomas P. Cope (April 2, 1812), 269; W. Freeman Galpin, “The Grain Trade of Alexandria, Virginia, 1801–1815,” North Carolina Historical Review 4 (October, 1927), 421; Brant, James Madison, 5:426.

79. Niles’ Register 2 (April 11, 1812), 101. See also John Taylor to James Monroe, May 10, 1812, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5.

80. Niles’ Register 2 (April 11, 1812), 101.

81. Boston Gazette, March 26, 1812; Brant, James Madison, 5:401.

82. Lowndes to Elizabeth Lowndes, [March 23, 1812], in Lowndes Papers (UNC), reel 1; Plumer to John A. Harper, May 11, 1812, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 3. For similar sentiments, see John Taylor to James Monroe, January 2, 1812, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 4; Edward Fox to Jonathan Roberts, May 4, 1812, in Roberts Papers (HSP); Alexander Campbell to [Jeremiah Morrow?], May 6, 1812, in Campbell Papers (ChHS); Lexington Reporter, January 11 and 25 and February 1, 1812; Philadelphia Aurora, March 24, 1812.

83. Speech of Josiah Quincy, January 19, 1809, in AC, 10–2, 1112.

84. Quincy to Harrison Gray Otis, November 8 and 26, 1812, in Otis Papers (MHS).

85. Boston Gazette, December 19, 1811. For other examples of Federalist skepticism, see Benjamin Tallmadge to James McHenry, January 16, 1812, in McHenry Papers (LC); Nathaniel Saltonstall, Jr., to Nathaniel Saltonstall, May 1, 1812, in Saltonstall Papers (MHS); Nathan Appleton to Samuel Appleton, May 12 and June 1, 1812, in Appleton Papers (MHS); Theodore Sedgwick to Daniel Dewey, June 11, 1812, in Sedgwick Papers (MHS); Samuel Yorke and James Schott to Patrick Tracy Jackson, April 2, 1812, in Kenneth W. Porter, ed., The Jacksons and the Lees: Two Generations of Massachusetts Merchants, 1765–1844, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1937), 1:728.

86. James Monroe, quoted in memorandum of [John Randolph?], March 31, 1812, in Samuel Smith Papers (LC), reel 4.

87. Washington National Intelligencer, March 19 and April 7, 9, and 14, 1812; Leonard White to Daniel Appleton White, April 11, 1812, in White Papers (EI); Brant, James Madison, 5:448.

88. JM to Jefferson, April 24, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 14.

89. Davis, Jeffersonian America, 92.

90. Foster to Thomas Barclay, May 10, 1812, in George L. Rives, ed., Selections from the Correspondence of Thomas Barclay, Formerly British Consul-General at New York (New York, 1894), 309.

91. Samuel Taggart to Rev. John Taylor, January 20, 1812, in Reynolds, “Letters of Samuel Taggart,” 377.

92. Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, March 31, 1812, in Nicholson Papers (LC).

93. George W. Campbell to Andrew Jackson, April 10, 1812, Jackson Papers (LC), reel 5.

94. AC, 12–1, 219, 1342, 1353. The Senate voted for a recess, but the House refused to concur.

95. Macon to Joseph Nicholson, April 30, 1812, in Nicholson Papers (LC); Bayard to Rodney, May 6, 1812, in “James Asheton Bayard Letters,” 237. See also Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, May 7, 1812, in Roberts Papers (HSP). The Senate adjourned on May 4 because it had a bare quorum and on May 13 because it had no quorum. See AC, 12–1, 225, 239.

96. Baltimore American, reprinted in Boston Gazette, February 17, 1812. See also Raleigh Minerva, February 21, 1812; Philadelphia Aurora, February 13 and 14, 1812; London Times, March 10, 1812; Edward Fox to Jonathan Roberts, April 7, 1812, in Roberts Papers (HSP); William Reed to Timothy Pickering, February 6, 1812, and Abraham Shepherd to Pickering, February 20, 1812, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 30. The editor of a widely read Republican magazine later published the treaty because it was “frequently referred to:—and its insertion in the Register has been earnestly solicited.” See Niles’ Register 3 (November 28, 1812), 196–201.

97. Augustus J. Foster to SS, November 1, 1811, and SS to Foster, November 12, 1811, in ASP: FR, 3:499–500. The return of the impressed Americans took place after the two nations were at war. See William Bainbridge to SN, July 11, 1812, in ND (M125), reel 24; Boston Independent Chronicle, July 13, 1812.

98. Baltimore Whig and Lexington Reporter, reprinted in New York Evening Post, November 19 and December 12, 1811. For similar sentiments, see Trenton True American, November 25, 1811; and Thomas J. Rogers to Jonathan Roberts, December 1, 1811, in Roberts Papers (HSP).

99. Bradford Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams: England and the United States, 1812–1823 (Berkeley, 1964), 11.

100. Ibid.; Mahan, Sea Power, 1:386.

101. The number of licenses issued annually is often misstated. The correct figures can be found in “An Account of the Number of Commercial Licenses, Granted during the Last Ten Years,” February 13, 1812, in British Sessional Papers: House of Commons, 1812, 343, and in Adam Seybert, Statistical Annals . . . of the United States of America (Philadelphia, 1818), 70.

102. Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805–1812 (Berkeley, 1961), 401.

103. London Times, June 17 and 24, 1812; The Annual Register . . . for the Year 1812 [State Papers], new ed. (London, 1821), 379–81.

104. JM to Henry Wheaton, February 26–27, [1827], in Madison Papers (LC), reel 21; Roger H. Brown, The Republic in Peril: 1812 (New York, 1964), 37–38. For similar sentiments, see JM to Wheaton, July 11, 1824, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 20; Thomas Jefferson to Robert Wright, August 8, 1812, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 46; speech of William King, February 5, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 1001.

105. Perkins, Prologue to War, 310–12.

106. Washington National Intelligencer, May 23, 1812; Adams, History, 2:443.

107. Adams, History, 2:443–44; Perkins, Prologue to War, 399–400.

108. Richard C. Knopf, ed., The Diary of Thomas Worthington: 1812 (n.p., [1956]) (May 27, 1812), 15. For similar sentiments, see Lexington Reporter, June 6, 1812.

109. Henry Clay to William W. Worsley, February 9, 1812, in Hopkins and Hargreaves, Papers of Henry Clay, 1:630. See also James A. Bayard to Andrew Bayard, February 1, 1812, in Donnan, Papers of James A. Bayard, 191.

110. JM to Congress, June 1, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1624–29.

111. Ibid., 1626.

112. Ibid., 1629.

113. Report of House Foreign Relations Committee, June 3, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1546–54. Quotations from pp. 1547 and 1554. There has been some debate over whether Calhoun or Monroe wrote this report. The weight of evidence favors the former. See Charles M. Wiltse, “The Authorship of the War Report of 1812,” American Historical Review 49 (January, 1944), 253–59; Meriwether et al., Papers of John C. Calhoun, 1:123n–24n; and Brant, James Madison, 5:473.

114. Ingersoll, History, 1:94.

115. AC, 12–1, 1630–37; James A. Bayard to Andrew Bayard, June 4, 1812, in Donnan, Papers of James A. Bayard, 198.

116. For details on Senate action on the war bill, see Leland R. Johnson, “The Suspense Was Hell: The Senate Vote for War in 1812,” Indiana Magazine of History 65 (December, 1969), 247–67.

117. Monroe to Albert Gallatin, June 1, 1812, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 24.

118. Brown, Republic in Peril, 116–17.

119. There is a good discussion of the attractions of maritime war in Brown, Republic in Peril, 108–10. See also James A. Bayard to Andrew Bayard, May 2, 1812, in Donnan, Papers of James A. Bayard, 196–97.

120. AC, 10–1, 1852; AC, 10–2, 171, 779, 812, 1191, 1362; Rufus King to Timothy Pickering, January 19, 1808, January 15, 1809, and January 26, 1810, in King, Rufus King, 5:65, 128, 189; Henry Cabot Lodge, Life and Letters of George Cabot, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1878), 491; Quincy, Josiah Quincy, 146.

121. See AC, 9–1, 1064; AC, 10–1, 1064–65; AC, 11–1, 155–56; AC, 11–2, 1324; AC, 12–1, 199–201, 208–9, 220–22, 1353–54.

122. Speech of Josiah Quincy, January 25, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 949.

123. Baltimore Federal Republican, December 4, 1811. See also Boston Gazette, December 5, 1811; Philadelphia United States’ Gazette, December 9, 1811, and May 30, 1812; Newport Mercury, December 14, 1811, and June 20, 1812; Charleston Courier, December 17, 1811; address of New Jersey Federalist Convention, July 4, 1812, in Newport Mercury, August 8, 1812.

124. AC, 12–1, 265–71.

125. AC, 12–1, 271–97.

126. On the liabilities of triangular war, see JM to Thomas Jefferson, May 25, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 14; Jefferson to JM, May 30, 1812, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 46; William A. Burwell to Wilson Cary Nicholas, May 23, 1812, in Nicholas Papers (UVA).

127. Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, June 17, 1812, in Roberts Papers (HSP).

128. AC, 12–1, 297.

129. The act declaring war is printed in AC, 12–1, 2322–23.

130. There have been only eight formal declarations of war in American history: against Great Britain in 1812; against Mexico in 1846; against Spain in 1898; against Germany and Austria in 1917; and against Japan, Germany, and Italy in 1941.

131. Reginald Horsman, “Western War Aims, 1811–1812,” Indiana Magazine of History 53 (March, 1957), 1–18.

132. The causes of the war are developed more fully in chapter 1: The Road to War, 1801–1812.

133. Porter to SW, April 19, 1812, in WD (M221), reel 47. See also memorandum of [John Randolph?], March 31, 1812, in Samuel Smith Papers (LC), reel 4.

134. Quoted in William A. Burwell to Wilson Cary Nicholas, May 23, 1812, in Nicholas Papers (UVA).

135. Monroe to John Taylor, June 13, 1812, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5; Cutts to William Plumer, December 11, 1811, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 3.

136. For Madison’s diplomatic initiative, see chapter 11: The Treaty of Ghent.

137. For Madison’s role in the development of the restrictive system, see Donald R. Hickey, “American Trade Restrictions during the War of 1812,” Journal of American History 68 (December, 1981), 518–19.

138. Speech of Henry Clay, December 7, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 299–300.

139. See, for example, ST to Thomas Coles, April 28, 1812, in TD (M175), reel 2; Coles to ST, April 29, May 2 and 6, 1812, in TD (M178), reel 29.

140. Alexander Dallas to ST, April 5, 1812, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 24; Boston Gazette, May 23, 1812.

141. Speech of John C. Calhoun, June 24, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1541; speech of Langdon Cheves, April 10, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1310. See also speech of William Lowndes, April 9, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1289.

142. See AC, 12–1, 692, 1280–1314. For other attempts to modify the non-importation law, all of which failed, see AC, 12–1, 188–89, 228–35, 239, 1633–34.

143. AC, 12–1, 1511.

144. ST to Cheves, June 10, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1512–13.

145. AC, 12–1, 1543–44.

146. AC, 12–1, 1545–46.

147. Jefferson to JM, August 5, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 26. See also Jefferson to JM, April 17 and June 29, 1812, ibid.; Jefferson to Richard M. Johnson, January 29, 1813, and to William Short, June 18, 1813, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 46.

148. JM to Jefferson, April 24, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 14. See also JM to Congress, November 5, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 14.

149. AC, 12–1, 319, 1532, 1570, 1572, 1574. This act is printed in AC, 12-1, 2354–56, but a crucial word—“such”—is omitted from section 7 so that the law appears to prohibit the use of British licenses to trade with any port in the world. For a more accurate version, see U.S. Congress, The Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America from the Organization of the Government in 1789, to March 3, 1815, 8 vols. (Boston, 1845–48), 2:778–81.

150. ST to Bacon, June 24, 1812, in ASP: F, 2:539. Eventually $8 million was raised under the $11 million loan act. See Revised Statement of the Public Debt, April 14, 1814, in ASP: F, 2:839.

151. AC, 12–1, 305, 1509–10, 2335–37.

152. AC, 12–1, 311, 1531, 2338. See also speech of John C. Calhoun, April 7, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1989.

153. AC, 12–1, 1555–59.

154. James Breckinridge to Dr. Campbell, June 29, 1812, in Breckinridge Papers (UVA).

155. Speech of Harmanus Bleecker, June 22, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1523. See also speech of Elijah Brigham, June 22, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1526.

156. Speech of Abijah Bigelow, June 22, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1517.

157. AC, 12–1, 303, 316, 318, 1516, 1573–74, 1580–81, 2327–32, 2353, 2362.

158. Boston Yankee, July 17, 1812.

159. The War Congress met from November 4, 1811, to July 6, 1812, or for 246 days. The second session of the Fifth Congress, which was in session from November 13, 1797, to July 16, 1798, also met for 246 days. These were the longest sessions until the second session of the Twenty-Seventh Congress, which met for 269 days from December 6, 1841, to August 31, 1842. See U.S. Congress, Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774–2005 (Washington, DC, 2005), 54, 74, 123. Of the 143 laws adopted in this session, 115 were public. See AC, 12–1, 2225–62; and Philadelphia Aurora, July 13, 1812.

160. Washington National Intelligencer, July 8, 1812. For similar sentiments, see New York National Advocate, May 22, 1813.

161. See, for example, the long editorial in the premier issue of the New York National Advocate, December 15, 1812.

Chapter 3. The Baltimore Riots

1. Samuel G. Goodrich, Recollections of a Lifetime, 2 vols. (New York, 1856), 1:439. See also Richard Sedgwick to Henry D. Sedgwick, June 20, 1812, in Sedgwick Papers (MHS); Henry Lee to Andrew Cabot, January 20, 1813, and to Patrick Tracy Jackson, January 30, 1813, in Kenneth W. Porter, The Jacksons and the Lees : Two Generations of Massachusetts Merchants, 1765–1844 (Cambridge, 1937), 2:1071, 1076.

2. Charles J. Ingersoll to Alexander Dallas, June 23, 1812, in Ingersoll Papers (HSP).

3. James W. Hammack, Jr., Kentucky and the Second American Revolution: The War of 1812 (Lexington, 1976), 14–15.

4. Thomas Rogers to Jonathan Roberts, June 21, 1812, in Roberts Papers (HSP); Niles’ Register 2 (July 11, 1812), 305.

5. Gerry to JM, July 5, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 14. See also Richard Rush to Benjamin Rush, June 29, 1812, in Richard Rush Papers (SR), reel 1.

6. Christian Ellery to JM, June 24, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 14; John Bach McMaster, A History of the People of the United States, From the Revolution to the Civil War, 8 vols. (New York, 1883–1913), 3:550.

7. Theodore Sedgwick, Jr., to Henry D. Sedgwick, June 30, 1812, in Sedgwick Papers (MHS); G. Terry Madonna, “The Lancaster Federalists and the War of 1812,” Journal of the Lancaster County Historical Society 71 (Trinity, 1967), 146–47.

8. Gilbert to Sarah Hillhouse, June 20, 1812, in Alexander-Hillhouse Papers (UNC).

9. Philadelphia Freeman’s Journal, reprinted in Chillicothe Supporter, July 4, 1812. For similar sentiments, see Oration of William Winder, July 4, 1812, in Wilmington American Watchman, July 15, 1812; B. D. Rounsaville to citizens of Rowan County, July 1, 1812, in Raleigh Minerva, July 10, 1812; Resolutions of Fayetteville County (NC), June 27, 1812, in Charleston Courier, July 10, 1812; Address of Isaac Auld, quoted ibid., July 21, 1812; Baltimore Federal Gazette, reprinted in Chillicothe Supporter, July 11, 1812.

10. James Lloyd, quoted in Richard Rush to Benjamin Rush, June 29, 1812, in Rush Papers (SR), reel 1.

11. Lloyd, quoted in Charles J. Ingersoll to Alexander Dallas, June 23, 1812, in Ingersoll Papers (HSP).

12. Trenton True American, July 13, 1812.

13. Address of Massachusetts House, June 26, 1812, in Niles’ Register 2 (August 29, 1812), 417–18; Declaration of Connecticut Assembly, August 25, 1812, ibid., 3 (September 12, 1812), 24. See also Boston Gazette, June 29, 1812; Boston New-England Palladium, June 9–26, 1812; Hartford Connecticut Courant, July 7, 1812; Hartford Connecticut Mirror, August 17, 1812; and sermons printed in Providence Gazette, July 25 and August 8, 1812.

14. Otis to John Rutledge, Jr., July 31, 1812, in Rutledge Papers (UNC). For similar sentiments, see Boston Columbian Centinel, July 11, 1812; Address of Middlesex County (MA) Convention, August 10, 1812, in Providence Gazette, August 22, 1812; William Ellery Channing, “Extracts from Sermons,” in The Works of William E. Channing, 6 vols. (Boston, 1841–43), 1:682.

15. Address of Massachusetts House, June 26, 1812, in Niles’ Register 2 (August 29, 1812), 418.

16. Baltimore Federal Republican, June 20, 1812; Alexandria Gazette, June 20, 1812; Philadelphia United States’ Gazette, June 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 1812; New York Evening Post, June 29, 1812. The Charleston Courier reversed itself, initially calling for everyone “to rally around the Rulers of the Nation,” but later upholding the right to criticize policy and calling for the election of men who would restore peace. See issues of June 25, and August 5 and 10, 1812. For other anti-war sentiments, see Address of New Jersey Federalist Convention, July 4, 1812, in Newport Mercury, August 8, 1812.

17. The address was usually referred to as the “Address of the Minority to Their Constituents.” The citations that follow are to the version in AC, 12–1, 2196–2223. For the pamphlet editions, see Ralph R. Shaw and Richard H. Shoemaker, American Bibliography: A Preliminary Checklist for 1812 (New York, 1962), 6–7.

18. “Address of the Minority,” 2196. The previous question was used several times to end debate in the War Congress; both houses employed secret sessions when the pre-war embargo and the war bill were under consideration; and Federalists thought that House Republicans had treated an anti-war resolution offered by John Randolph arbitrarily in May 1812. For an excellent contemporary sketch of the history of the previous question, see speech of William Gaston, January 19, 1816, in AC, 14–1, 699–718. For Randolph’s motion, see AC, 12–1, 1451–78.

19. “Address of the Minority,” 2196, 2218–19.

20. Ibid., 2220–21.

21. “Review of an Address of . . . Members of the House . . . on the subject of war with Great Britain,” in Washington National Intelligencer, July 18 and 23, and August 1, 1812.

22. Speech of Felix Grundy, May 6, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1410; Washington National Intelligencer, May 14, 1812.

23. Niles’ Register 1 (December 7, 1811), 251; Thomas J. Rogers to Jonathan Roberts, May 16, 1812, in Roberts Papers (HSP). For similar sentiments, see Philadelphia Aurora, April 7, 1812; Richard Rush to Benjamin Rush, May 16, 1812, in Rush Papers (SR), reel 1; Republican sources quoted in Alexandria Gazette, November 4, 1811, and May 7 and 15, 1812, and in Baltimore Federal Republican, June 4, 1812; Simon Snyder, quoted in Madonna, “Lancaster Federalists,” 143; speech of John Randolph, May 6, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1400.

24. Washington National Intelligencer, June 27, 1812; Address of Massachusetts Senate, June 26, 1812, in Niles’ Register 2 (July 11, 1812), 309; Augusta Chronicle, quoted in John E. Talmadge, “Georgia’s Federalist Press and the War of 1812,” Journal of Southern History 19 (November, 1953), 493. See also Thomas Rogers to Jonathan Roberts, June 21, 1812, in Roberts Papers (HSP).

25. Baltimore American, July 16, 1812; Wilmington American Watchman, June 26, 1812; John G. Jackson to JM, June 26, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 14.

26. Speech of Robert Wright, May 6, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1413.

27. Jefferson to JM, June 29, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 26 (also in Jefferson Papers [LC], reel 46). Although this letter is readily available, the quoted portion has been discreetly omitted from the older published works of Jefferson and Madison and continues to be ignored by their biographers. See also Jefferson to William Duane, August 4, 1812, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 46.

28. Boston Yankee, May 15, 1812. See also Baltimore Sun, reprinted in Wilmington American Watchman, July 4, 1812; Niles’ Register 2 (June 27, 1812), 284; Governor William Plumer to New Hampshire legislature, November 18, 1812, ibid., 3 (December 5, 1812), 210; New York Military Moniter, reprinted in Washington National Intelligencer, March 24, 1813.

29. My understanding of Baltimore is based on the following sources: J. Thomas Scharf, History of Baltimore City and County (Philadelphia, 1881); Clayton C. Hall, ed., Baltimore: Its History and Its People, 3 vols. (New York, 1912); Hamilton Owens, Baltimore on the Chesapeake (Garden City, 1941); Gary L. Browne, Baltimore in the Nation, 1789–1861 (Chapel Hill, 1980); James W. Livingood, The Philadelphia-Baltimore Trade Rivalry, 1780–1860 (Harrisburg, 1947); Frank R. Rutter, South American Trade of Baltimore (Baltimore, 1897); William T. Howard, Jr., Public Health Administration and the Natural History of Disease in Baltimore, Maryland, 1797–1820 (Washington, DC, 1924); [Jared Sparks], “Baltimore,” North American Review 20 (January, 1825), 99–138; Clarence P. Gould, “The Economic Causes of the Rise of Baltimore,” in Leonard W. Labaree, ed., Essays in Colonial History Presented to Charles McLean Andrews by His Students (New Haven, 1931), 225–51; and Seth Rockman, Scraping By: Wage Labor, Slavery, and Survival in Early Baltimore (Baltimore, 2009).

30. George Rogers Taylor, “Comment,” in David T. Gilchrist, ed., The Growth of the Seaport Cities, 1790–1830: Proceedings of a Conference Sponsored by the Eleutherian Mills-Hagley Foundation, March 17–19, 1966 (Charlottesville, 1967), 39.

31. By contrast, there were 99 females for every 100 males in New York, 104 for every 100 in Philadelphia, and 107 for every 100 in Boston. See Seybert, Statistical Annals, 49. All figures are from the 1810 census.

32. Irish editors aside, Wright was probably the leading anglophobe in the country. For his pardon (issued on January 28, 1809), see Interesting Papers Illustrative of the Recent Riots at Baltimore [Baltimore, 1812?], 80–81. For the history of rioting in Baltimore, see Scharf, History of Baltimore, 778–94; Thomas Scharf, History of Maryland, From the Earliest Period to the Present Day, 3 vols. (Baltimore, 1879), 2:503–4, 590–91; L. Marx Renzulli, Jr., Maryland: The Federalist Years (Rutherford, 1972), 107–11, 167, 253n; Frank A. Cassell, Merchant Congressman in the Young Republic: Samuel Smith of Maryland, 1752–1839 (Madison, 1971), 88, 257–59; Francis F. Beirne, The Amiable Baltimoreans (New York, 1951), 222; and W. Bird Terwilliger, “William Goddard’s Victory for the Freedom of the Press,” Maryland Historical Magazine 36 (June, 1941), 139–49.

33. Niles’ Register 3 (September 19, 1812), 47.

34. Katharine J. Gallagher, “Alexander Contee Hanson,” in DAB, 8:231; Clarence S. Brigham, History and Bibliography of American Newspapers, 1690–1820, 2 vols. (Worcester, 1947), 1:235; Scharf, History of Baltimore, 88. Hanson’s father was chancellor of Maryland, and his grandfather was president of the Continental Congress.

35. Benjamin Merrill to Timothy Pickering, January 14, 1815, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 30.

36. Baltimore Whig, June 6, 1812.

37. Richmond Enquirer, June 26, 1812; Baltimore Whig, reprinted ibid., June 30, 1812. See also Salem Essex Register, October 2, 1813.

38. Gallagher, “Alexander Contee Hanson,” 231.

39. Renzulli, Maryland, 248.

40. The most valuable source for the Baltimore riots is Report of the Committee of Grievances and Courts of Justice of the House of Delegates of Maryland, on the Subject of the Recent Mobs and Riots in the City of Baltimore (Annapolis, 1813) (hereafter cited as Maryland Legislative Report). The report itself is only 12 pages long and was widely reprinted in the press, but the official edition has over 300 pages of depositions appended. Other sources are “Report of the Baltimore City Council,” August 6, 1812; A. C. Hanson et al., “An Exact and Authentic Narrative of the Events Which Took Place in Baltimore on the 27th and 28th of July Last”; “Narrative of John E. Hall”; “Narrative of John Thomson”; and “Narrative of Otho Sprigg.” These accounts were widely reprinted in the press and were collected (along with other papers bearing on the riots) in two contemporary pamphlets: Interesting Papers Illustrative of the Recent Riots at Baltimore [Baltimore, 1812?], and A Portrait of the Evils of Democracy (Baltimore, 1816). (The citations that follow are to the first of these pamphlets.) Another source is Henry Lee, A Correct Account of the Baltimore Mob (Winchester, VA, 1814). I presented a shorter account of the riots in “The Darker Side of Democracy: The Baltimore Riots of 1812,” Maryland Historian 7 (Fall, 1976), 1–19. For other treatments, see Thomas Boyd, Light-horse Harry Lee (New York, 1931), ch. 18; Frank Cassell, “The Great Baltimore Riot of 1812,” Maryland Historical Magazine 70 (Fall, 1975), 241–59; and Paul A. Gilje, “The Baltimore Riots of 1812 and the Breakdown of the Anglo-American Mob Tradition,” Journal of Social History 13 (Summer, 1980), 547–64.

41. Deposition of Isaac Caustin, in Maryland Legislative Report, 318. See also deposition of James P. Heath, ibid., 284; Alexandria Gazette, November 4, 1811, and May 15, 1812.

42. Baltimore Federal Republican, June 1, 1812.

43. Baltimore Federal Republican, June 20, 1812.

44. Depositions of William Gwynn, William Merryman, Edward Johnson, and Isaac Caustin, in Maryland Legislative Report, 22, 107, 174, 318.

45. Deposition of William Gwynn, ibid., 21; Hanson et al., “Exact and Authentic Narrative,” 26–27; Georgetown Federal Republican, July 27, August 3, and October 19, 1812.

46. Deposition of Peter L. White, in Maryland Legislative Report, 66.

47. Deposition of John Worthington, ibid., 241.

48. Deposition of Samuel Hollingsworth, ibid., 336.

49. Although two prominent Federalists were assaulted during the night of violence, the only serious casualty was one of the rioters, who died when he fell from the upper story of the Federal Republican building.

50. Depositions of William Stewart and William Gwynn, in Maryland Legislative Report, 22–23, 63.

51. Depositions of James Sterett, Samuel Sterett, and William Barney, ibid., 200, 203, 278.

52. Deposition of David R. Geddes, ibid., 50; Boston New-England Palladium, July 3, 1812; New York Commercial Advertiser, reprinted in Hartford Connecticut Mirror, July 20, 1812.

53. Depositions of Nixon Wilson, Edward Johnson, and John S. Abel, in Maryland Legislative Report, 149, 163, 307; David Hoffman to Virgil Maxcy, July 11, 1812, in Galloway-Maxcy-Markoe Papers (LC).

54. Maryland Legislative Report, 3.

55. Deposition of John Worthington, ibid., 242.

56. [Henry Lee] to Hanson, July 20, 1812, in Niles’ Register 2 (August 8, 1812), 378. Jefferson’s actual words were: “The mobs of great cities add just so much to the support of pure government, as sores do to the strength of the human body.” See Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, ed. William Peden (Chapel Hill, 1955), 165.

57. John Hanson Thomas to Hanson, [June 28, 1812], in Niles’ Register 2 (August 8, 1812), 375.

58. Hanson to Robert Goodloe Harper, July 24, 1812, in Harper Papers (MdHS), reel 2.

59. Depositions of John Howard Payne and Peter L. White, in Maryland Legislative Report, 14–15, 68; sublease of Jacob Wagner, July 23, 1812, in Interesting Papers, 10.

60. Deposition of John Howard Payne, in Maryland Legislative Report, 15–16; Lee, Correct Account, 5–6. See also John Lynn to Hanson, July 19, 1812, and [Lee] to Hanson, July 20, 1812, in Niles’ Register 2 (August 8, 1812), 376, 378.

61. Georgetown Federal Republican, July 27, 1812. This editorial was partially reprinted in Niles’ Register 2 (August 8, 1812), 378.

62. Hanson et al., “Exact and Authentic Narrative,” 28; “Report of Baltimore City Council,” 2.

63. Deposition of Peter L. White, in Maryland Legislative Report, 70. See also “Narrative of John Hall,” 53.

64. Hanson et al., “Exact and Authentic Narrative,” 28; Maryland Legislative Report, 4–5.

65. Deposition of John Howard Payne, in Maryland Legislative Report, 16.

66. Deposition of James P. Heath, ibid., 282–83; Hanson et al., “Exact and Authentic Narrative,” 29. There were additional injuries on both sides during the night. A spectator in the street was shot to death, and a number of Federalists who left the house were beaten and one was nearly hanged. See depositions of William Stewart, Dennis Nowland, James Gittings, William Barney, and Middleton B. Magruder, in Maryland Legislative Report, 64, 189, 235, 259, 305; Hanson et al., “Exact and Authentic Narrative,” 29; James W. Williams to John W. Stump, July 28, 1812, in War of 1812 File (MdHS).

67. Deposition of Peter L. White, in Maryland Legislative Report, 71.

68. Stricker had the authority to call out the militia without such an order. See letter of Governor Robert Bowie, August 21, 1812, in Annapolis Maryland Gazette, September 3, 1812.

69. Depositions of John Howard Payne, William Gwynn, George H. Steuart, and William Barney, in Maryland Legislative Report, 16–17, 24–26, 216, 256–62. Barney was the son of Joshua Barney, the naval hero of the Revolution and War of 1812.

70. Hanson et al., “Exact and Authentic Narrative,” 29.

71. Testimony of Richard H. Owen, in Georgetown Federal Republican, October 23, 1812 (emphasis omitted).

72. Hanson et al., “Exact and Authentic Narrative,” 30.

73. Testimony of Richard H. Owen, in Georgetown Federal Republican, October 19, 1812.

74. Deposition of John Stone, in Maryland Legislative Report, 98; Georgetown Federal Republican, August 31, 1812. See also deposition of William Gwynn, in Maryland Legislative Report, 27.

75. Hanson et al., “Exact and Authentic Narrative,” 30–31; deposition of Middleton B. Magruder, in Maryland Legislative Report, 304–5.

76. Quoted in Boyd, Harry Lee, 319.

77. Lee, Correct Account, 10–12; “Narrative of John Hall,” 55–56; “Narrative of John Thomson,” 43–44; deposition of William Barney, in Maryland Legislative Report, 271–73.

78. Depositions of Joel Vickers, Thomas Buchanan, and James P. Heath, in Maryland Legislative Report, 41, 104, 283; “Narrative of John Hall,” 56; “Narrative of Otho Sprigg,” 49.

79. Baltimore Whig, reprinted in Georgetown Federal Republican, August 5, 1812 (emphasis omitted).

80. Deposition of Edward Johnson, in Maryland Legislative Report, 169, 174. See also ibid., 7; and deposition of Thomas Buchanan, ibid., 105.

81. John Stricker to governor, August 6, 1812, in Niles’ Register 2 (August 22, 1812), 405–6; depositions of William Gwynn and William Barney, in Maryland Legislative Report, 50, 273–74.

82. Deposition of Edward Johnson, in Maryland Legislative Report, 169–70. Wooleslager probably took part in the tarring and feathering of the British shoemaker in 1808. One of the people pardoned for the crime was “George Wallaslagar.” See pardon of Governor Robert Wright, January 28, 1809, in Interesting Papers, 81.

83. Depositions of William Merryman and Thomas Robinson, in Maryland Legislative Report, 111, 347; Hanson et al., “Exact and Authentic Narrative,” 37–38; “Narrative of John Hall,” 57–58.

84. Maryland Legislative Report, 8.

85. Hanson et al., “Exact and Authentic Narrative,” 38; “Narrative of John Hall,” 58–59.

86. J.P. Boyd to James McHenry, August 2, 1812, in McHenry Papers (LC).

87. Hanson et al., “Exact and Authentic Narrative,” 38–39.

88. “Narrative of John Hall,” 59 (emphasis omitted).

89. Hanson et al., “Exact and Authentic Narrative,” 39; “Narrative of John Hall,” 59.

90. Deposition of Dr. John Owen, in Maryland Legislative Report, 297.

91. Hanson et al., “Exact and Authentic Narrative,” 40–41. See also Felix Gilbert to David Hillhouse, August 12, 1812, in Alexander-Hillhouse Papers (UNC).

92. “Narrative of John Thomson,” 45–46.

93. Letter from Baltimore, July 29, 1812, printed in Hartford Connecticut Courant, August 4, 1812.

94. Deposition of William Merryman, in Maryland Legislative Report, 109.

95. Deposition of William R. Smith, ibid., 100. Stansbury repeated these sentiments after the riot. See deposition of William Gwynn, ibid., 32. See also Georgetown Federal Republican, August 17, 1812.

96. Hanson et al., “Exact and Authentic Narrative,” 37. See also depositions of Richard B. Magruder and John E. Dorsey, in Maryland Legislative Report, 83–84.

97. Hanson et al., “Exact and Authentic Narrative,” 40–41; “Narrative of John Hall,” 59–60.

98. Letter of A.C. Hanson, August 3, 1812, in Boston New-England Palladium, August 14, 1812; John Pierce, “Memoirs,” 18 vols. in MS form (MHS), 2:79; Hanson to John E. Hall, August 22, 1812, and October 15, 1813, in Hanson Papers (MdHS); Timothy Pickering to Elizabeth Pickering, November 13, 1814, in “Unpublished Letters,” Maryland Historical Magazine 20 (June, 1925), 127.

99. J.P. Boyd to James McHenry, August 2, 1812, in McHenry Papers (LC).

100. Pierce, “Memoirs,” 2:62; Boston New-England Palladium, January 5, 1813; Henry Lee to James Monroe, January 7, 1813, in Monroe Papers (NYPL); Lee to Rufus King, November 19, 1813, in King, Rufus King 5:352; Boyd, Harry Lee, 327–29.

101. JM to J. Montgomery, August 13, 1812, in John W. Garrett Papers (JHU).

102. Georgetown Federal Republican, August 3 and 7, 1812; testimony of Richard Owen, ibid., October 19, 1812; depositions of Charles Burrall and Edward Johnson, in Maryland Legislative Report, 155–58, 170–72.

103. Depositions of Edward Johnson and Dr. John Owen, in Maryland Legislative Report, 172, 296–97.

104. Deposition of John Scott, ibid., 122. See also deposition of Charles Burrall, ibid., 157; proclamation of Edward Johnson, August 5, 1812, in Niles’ Register 2 (August 8, 1812), 378–79. Burrall’s firmness made him so unpopular in Baltimore that the administration later removed him from office. See Burrall to JM, March 6 and 7, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 16; Scharf, History of Baltimore, 493.

105. Georgetown Federal Republican, August 31, October 28, and November 27, 1812; Maryland Legislative Report, 9; deposition of Thomas Kell, ibid., 139. Mayor Johnson said that he was “astonished” at the acquittal of Lewis and Wooleslager. See his deposition, ibid., 176.

106. Deposition of William R. Smith, ibid., 101.

107. A. C. Hanson et al. ats State of Maryland, July, 1812, in Harper Papers (MdHS), reel 2; Georgetown Federal Republican, August 28, September 7, and October 19, 1812; Renzulli, Maryland, 285.

108. Deposition of Nicholas Brice, in Maryland Legislative Report, 251; James Williams to John W. Stump, July 29, 1812, and A. Robinson to James McHenry, August 12, 1812, in War of 1812 File (MdHS); William Lansdale to Virgil Maxcy, August 3, 1812, in Galloway-Maxcy-Markoe Papers (LC); Trenton Federalist, August 17, 1812; Baltimore American, August 11, 1812; Alexandria Gazette, August 8, 1812; Baltimore Whig, reprinted in Philadelphia Aurora, August 1, 1812.

109. Mary Grundy, quoted in Jerome R. Garitee, The Republic’s Private Navy: The American Privateering Business as Practiced by Baltimore during the War of 1812 (Middleton, 1977), 80. See also J. P. Boyd to James McHenry, August 2, 1812, in McHenry Papers (LC).

110. Georgetown Federal Republican, August 17 and 19, 1812.

111. See documents in Interesting Papers, 62–78; Renzulli, Maryland, 281–82, 287–88.

112. Renzulli, Maryland, 290–92; Maryland Legislative Report, 1–12.

113. Maryland Legislative Report, 12–13.

114. Niles’ Register 3 (February 20, 1813), 388–89.

115. Newport Mercury, August 8, 1812; Pittsburgh Gazette, August 14, 1812.

116. Report of Boston Town Meeting, August 6, 1812, in Boston New-England Palladium, August 7, 1812.

117. Hartford Connecticut Courant, August 25, 1812. For similar sentiments, see Raleigh Minerva, August 14, 1812; Georgetown Spirit of Seventy-Six, reprinted in Charleston Courier, August 8, 1812; Charleston Courier, August 28, 1812; Trenton Federalist, July 27 and August 3, 1812.

118. Letter of John Mitchell, in Georgetown Federal Republican, August 3, 1812; Alexandria Gazette, June 22, and August 17, 18, and 25, 1812; Philadelphia Tickler, September 1, 1812; Talmadge, “Georgia’s Federalist Press,” 493–99; Myron F. Wehtje, “Opposition in Virginia to the War of 1812,” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 78 (January, 1970), 84. The five men convicted of the Morristown assault were pardoned by Republican Governor Simon Snyder. See Charleston Times, September 17, 1812.

119. Baltimore Federal Republican, May 2, 1812; Georgetown Federal Republican, March 22, June 21, September 24, 1813, and July 2, 1814; Morristown (NJ) Herald, reprinted in Trenton Federalist, January 25, 1813.

120. Abel M. Grosvenor to brother, November 25, 1812, in Annapolis Maryland Gazette, December 13, 1812; Georgetown Federal Republican, November 4 and December 21, 1812.

121. Concord Gazette, reprinted in Keene Newhampshire Sentinel, October 31, 1812; Constant Freeman to SW, August 23, 1812, in WD (M221), reel 44.

122. Niles’ Register 3 (September 19, 1812), 47; Joseph Story to Nathaniel Williams, August 24, 1812, in William W. Story, Life and Letters of Joseph Story, 2 vols. (Boston, 1851), 1:228–29. See also Washington National Intelligencer, August 13 and 27, 1812.

123. Resolutions of Montgomery County (MD) Republican Meeting, August 29, 1812, in Interesting Papers, 71; Samuel Carswell to JM, August 29, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 14. See also Samuel Smith to William Jones, August 1, 1812, in Jones Papers (HSP); Trenton True American, August 10, 1812; Concord New-Hampshire Patriot, August 18, 1812.

124. “Report of Baltimore City Council,” August 6, 1812, in Interesting Papers, 1–4, 71; JM to J. Montgomery, August 13, 1812, in John W. Garrett Papers (JHU).

125. Annapolis Maryland Republican, quoted in Georgetown Federal Republican, August 3, 1812 (emphasis omitted); New York Columbian, August 4, 1812; James W. Williams to John W. Stump, July 29, 1812, in War of 1812 File (MdHS). See also Felix Gilbert to David Hillhouse, August 12, 1812, in Alexander-Hillhouse Papers (UNC); Baltimore American, reprinted in Washington National Intelligencer, September 5, 1812; and Republican sources cited in Hartford Connecticut Courant, August 11, 1812.

126. Hartford American Mercury, August 5 and 12, 1812; Concord New-Hampshire Patriot, August 11, 1812; Washington National Intelligencer, July 28, and August 6 and 13, 1812, and August 14, 1813; Baltimore American, August 1, 12, and 13, 1812; Boston Independent Chronicle, August 17, 1812.

127. Salem Essex Register, August 12, 1812; Hartford American Mercury, August 5, 1812. For similar sentiments, see Worcester National Aegis, July 20, 1814.

128. Joseph Story to William Pinkney, June 26, 1812, Pinkney to JM, July 5, 1812, and Mathew Carey to JM, October 30, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reels 16 and 26; Lexington Reporter, January 23, 1813; Philadelphia Democratic Press, reprinted in Bennington Green-Mountain Farmer, February 17, 1813.

129. Story to Nathaniel Williams, October 8, 1812, and May 27, 1813, in Story, Joseph Story, 1:243–44.

130. The Alexandria Gazette, August 11, 1812, explicitly compared the legal method of repressing dissent in 1798 with the violent methods employed by Republicans in 1812.

131. George H. Stewart to Lemuel Shaw, August 13, [1812], in Record Book, Washington Benevolent Society Papers (MHS), 77; Charleston Courier, August 26 and 28, 1812; Newport Mercury, August 22, 1812; Resolution of Franklin County Federalists, August 10, 1812, in Interesting Papers, 66–67. Aging Federalist Paul Revere took out a two-year subscription (for $10). See receipt, October 21, 1813, in Revere Papers (MHS).

132. Alexander Hanson to Robert Goodloe Harper, November 30, 1812, in Harper Papers (LC).

133. Maryland Legislative Report, 2; Alexander Hanson to Robert Goodloe Harper, July 6, 1812, in Harper Papers (LC).

134. For more on the elections of 1812, see chapter 5: Raising Men and Money.

Chapter 4. The Campaign of 1812

1. Speech of John Randolph, December 16, 1811, in AC, 12–1, 533.

2. Reginald Horsman, “Western War Aims, 1811–1812,” Indiana Magazine of History 53 (March, 1957), 1–18.

3. The works that propounded this thesis were long on speculation and short on evidence. See Howard T. Lewis, “A Re-Analysis of the Causes of the War of 1812,” Americana 6 (1911), 506–16, 577–85; Louis M. Hacker, “Western Land Hunger and the War of 1812: A Conjecture,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 10 (March, 1924), 365–95; and Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1812 (New York, 1925).

4. For the general thrust of American expansion in this era, see Arthur P. Whitaker, The Spanish-American Frontier, 1783–1795: The Westward Movement and the Spanish Retreat in the Mississippi Valley (Boston, 1927), and The Mississippi Question, 1795–1803: A Study in Trade, Politics, and Diplomacy (New York, 1934); Jon Kukla, A Wilderness So Immense: The Louisiana Purchase and the Destiny of America (New York, 2003); Isaac J. Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 1798–1813: A Study in American Diplomacy (Baltimore, 1918); James G. Cusick, The Other War of 1812: The Patriot War and the American Invasion of Spanish East Florida (Athens, 2007); J. C. A. Stagg, Borderlands in Borderlands: James Madison and the Spanish-American Frontier, 1776–1821 (New Haven, 2009); and Reginald Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783–1812 (East Lansing, 1967).

5. Clay to Thomas Bodley, December 18, 1813, in Hopkins and Hargreaves, Papers of Henry Clay, 1:842. See also James Monroe to John Taylor, June 13, 1812, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5. For works that stress the maritime causes, see Adams, History; A. L. Burt, The United States, Great Britain, and British North America from the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace after the War of 1812 (New Haven, 1940); Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805–1812 (Berkeley, 1961); and Reginald Horsman, The Causes of the War of 1812 (Philadelphia, 1962).

6. U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States, 2 vols. (Washington, DC, 1975), 1:8; George F. G. Stanley, The War of 1812: Land Operations ([Toronto], 1983), 49. Great Britain, by contrast, had a population of 12.6 million. See Niles’ Register 2 (June 27, 1812), 284.

7. The strength of the American army has been estimated from figures in J. C. A. Stagg’s illuminating article, “Enlisted Men in the United States Army, 1812–1815: A Preliminary Survey,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser. 43 (October, 1986), 621. For British troop strength in Canada, see General Return of Troops in Upper Canada, July 4, 1812, and General Return of Troops in Lower Canada, July 4, 1812, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 3:98–99; and J. Mackay Hitsman, The Incredible War of 1812: A Military History (1965; updated by Donald E. Graves, Toronto, 1999), 31–32.

8. [Miles W. Smith], ed., “Journal of William K. Beall, July–August, 1812,” American Historical Review, 17 (July, 1912), 797; Stanley, War of 1812, 49–51, 54–58; Taylor, Civil War, 37–38, 52–53, 56–58; Harry L. Coles, The War of 1812 (Chicago, 1965), 38–39.

9. Quoted in Ernest A. Cruikshank, “A Study of Disaffection in Upper Canada, 1812–15,” in Zaslow, Defended Border, 206.

10. Reginald Horsman, The War of 1812 (New York, 1969), 27.

11. Brock to CG, July 12, 1812, and to Edward Baynes, July 29, 1812, in Wood, British Documents, 1:352, 396.

12. Tompkins to Robert Macomb, July 12, 1812, in Hastings, Papers of Daniel D. Tompkins, 3:26–27.

13. Jefferson to William Duane, August 4, 1812, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 46; speech of Henry Clay, February 22, 1810, in AC, 11–2, 580. For similar sentiments, see Jefferson to Pierre Dupont de Nemours, November 29, 1813, and to Thaddeus Kosciusko, November 30, 1813, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 47; Thomas Rogers to Jonathan Roberts, November 17, 1811, in Roberts Papers (HSP); Washington National Intelligencer, April 14, 1812; Boston Yankee, November 6, 1812; speech of John C. Calhoun, May 6, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1397.

14. Speech of John Randolph, December 10, 1811, in AC, 12–1, 447.

15. Speech of Samuel Taggart, reprinted from Alexandria Gazette, June 24, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1640. See also speeches of Elijah Brigham, January 4, 1813, and Josiah Quincy, January 5, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 512–14, 545–48; speech of Artemas Ward, March 5, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1818; and William Gribbin, The Churches Militant: The War of 1812 and American Religion (New Haven, 1973), 28.

16. Memorial of Maryland House of Delegates [early 1814], in AC, 13–2, 1207; A New-England Farmer [John Lowell, Jr.], Mr. Madison’s War (Boston, 1812), 41; speech of Henry Ridgely, January 4, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 518. See also speeches of Elijah Brigham, January 4, 1813, Lyman Law, January 5, 1813, Benjamin Tallmadge, January 7, 1813, and Laban Wheaton, January 8, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 513, 537–38, 646, 653–55; speech of Timothy Pitkin, February 10, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1286–87.

17. Speech of Joseph Pearson, February 16, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1454.

18. Boston Independent Chronicle, November 22, 1813; William H. Crawford to JM, February 18, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 16. See also speech of Richard M. Johnson, December 11, 1811, in AC, 12–1, 457; speech of Thomas Robertson, January 11, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 709; Philadelphia Aurora, September 9, 1812; Washington National Intelligencer, November 9, 1813; Lexington Reporter, December 4, 1813; Reginald Horsman, “On to Canada: Manifest Destiny and United States Strategy in the War of 1812,” Michigan Historical Review 13 (Fall, 1987), 12–18, 21–22.

19. Lexington Reporter, November 13, 1813, and January 8, 1814; Lexington Kentucky Gazette, reprinted ibid., January 22, 1814. See also James W. Hammack, Jr., Kentucky and the Second American Revolution: The War of 1812 (Lexington, 1976), 86–87.

20. Speech of Joseph Pearson, February 16, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1453.

21. SS to Jonathan Russell, June 26, 1812, in SD (M77), reel 2.

22. AC, 12–1, 322–26.

23. See, for example, SW to William Hull, June 24, 1812, in WD (M6), reel 5.

24. Proclamation of William Hull, [July 12, 1812], printed in Boston Columbian Centinel, August 5, 1812.

25. Proclamation of Alexander Smyth, November 17, 1812, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 4:215. Smyth’s proclamation also offered $40 for “the arms and spoils of each savage warrior who shall be killed.” Ibid., 216.

26. SW to Hull, August 1 and 8, 1812, and to Smyth, November 25, 1812, in WD (M6), reel 6.

27. Davis, Jeffersonian America, 100.

28. Richard Rush to Benjamin Rush, June 20, 1812, in Rush Papers (SR), reel 1.

29. Speech of George M. Troup, April 30, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1359–62.

30. Statement on clerks in War Department, January 29, 1813, in WD (M222), reel 6; speech of Felix Grundy, April 30, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1355.

31. JM to Congress, April 20, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 209. See also AC, 12–1, 219, 226, 258, 1354–76.

32. William H. Crawford to James Monroe, September 9, 1812 in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5; Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, March 27, 1812, in Roberts Papers (HSP). See also Richard Rush to Charles J. Ingersoll, February 26, 1812, in Rush Papers (SR), reel 1; Philadelphia Aurora, April 27, 1812; Jacobs, Beginnings of the U.S. Army, 363, 383; Claude M. Fuess, “William Eustis,” in DAB, 6:193–95; Mahon, War of 1812, 63.

33. Winfield Scott, Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, 2 vols. (New York, 1864), 1:31. See also Jacobs, Beginnings of the U.S. Army, 383–86.

34. Richard Rush to [Charles J. Ingersoll], February 11, 1812, in Rush Papers (SR), reel 1.

35. Scott to SW, November 6, 1814, in Monroe Papers (NYPL). See also petition of Ferah Jones et al., May 10, 1813, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 26.

36. Porter to SW, July 27, 1813, in WD (M222), reel 9.

37. Proclamation of James Madison, October 8, 1812, in WD (M222), reel 6.

38. AC, 12–1, 2300; John S. Hare, “Military Punishments in the War of 1812,” Journal of the American Military Institute 4 (Winter, 1940), 230, 235–36.

39. See AC, 12–1, 2229; AC, 12–2, 1314–15.

40. AC, 12–1, 2227–28; AC, 12–2, 1318; AC, 13–2, 2789–90; AC, 13–3, 1838.

41. See chapter 2: The Declaration of War.

42. Richard Rush to Charles J. Ingersoll, August 16, 1812, in Rush Papers (SR), reel 1.

43. Joseph Wheaton to JM, December 10, 23, and 29, 1812, and January 8, 1813, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 14. Quotation from December 10 letter. See also AC, 12–1, 2237; speech of David R. Williams, December 29, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 462–63; speech of George M. Troup, February 3, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1230; SW to House and Senate military committees, December 23, 1812, in ASP: MA, 1:610.

44. Henry Dearborn to JM, September 30, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 14. See also JM to James Monroe, August 19, 1813, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5; Jacobs, Beginnings of the U.S. Army, 381–82.

45. AC, 7–1, 1307; AC, 10–1, 2850–51; AC, 12–1, 2230.

46. AC, 12–2, 1314–15.

47. For civilian wage rates, see Dearborn to JM, September 30, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 14; Timothy Dwight, Travels; in New-England and New-York, 4 vols. (New Haven, 1821–22), 4:352; Donald R. Adams, “Wage Rates in the Early National Period: Phildelphia, 1785–1830,” Journal of Economic History 28 (September, 1968), 406–9; Carroll D. Wright, History of Wages and Prices in Massachusetts: 1752–1883 (Boston, 1885), 77–82; and Seth Rockman, Scraping By: Wage Labor, Slavery, and Survival in Early Baltimore (Baltimore, 2009), 84–85.

48. AC, 12–1, 2232.

49. Ezekiel Bacon to ST, October 13, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 14. See also statement of Alexander Smyth, [late 1812], in ASP: MA, 1:497.

50. See, for example, Thomas Pinckney to SW, September 24, 1814, and George W. Hight to JM, January 23, 1815, in WD (M221), reels 62 and 65; Timothy Upham to SW, December 7, 1814, in WD (M222), reel 14; George Izard to SW, November 26, 1814, and January 15, 1815, in Izard, Official Correspondence, 122, 133; [SW] to John W. Eppes, December 6, 1814, in NASP: MA, 5:154–55.

51. For a general analysis of the supply system, see Marguerite M. McKee, “Service of Supply in the War of 1812,” Quartermaster Review 6 (March-April, 1927), 45–55; Erna Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army: A History of the Corps, 1775–1939 (Washington, DC, 1962), 81–180; Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1801–1829 (New York, 1951), 224–32.

52. AC, 7–1, 1307.

53. A. Parker to [SW], November 29, 1809, in ASP: MA, 1:257.

54. AC, 12–1, 127, 1215, 2257–61. The quartermaster was authorized “to purchase military stores, camp equipage, and other articles requisite for the troops,” while the commissary was “to conduct the procuring and providing of all arms, military stores, clothing, and generally all articles of supply requisite for the military service.” AC, 12–1, 2258–59.

55. JM to William Wirt, September 30, 1813, in Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings of James Madison, 9 vols. (New York, 1900–1910), 8:264. See also SW to Thomas Pinckney, June 13, 1812, in WD (M6), reel 5.

56. See, for example, James Winchester to SW, November 20, 1812, J. Bryant to Willis Alston, January 27, 1813, William Blackledge to SW, January 19, 1813, Thomas Pinckney to SW, December 31, 1812, and February 23, 1813, in WD (M221), reels 49, 50, and 55; Stephen Van Rensselaer to Henry Dearborn, September 1, 1812, in Solomon Van Rensselaer, A Narrative of the Affair of Queenstown: In the War of 1812 (New York, 1836), 37–38.

57. SW to Jacob Brown, June 19, 1814, in Ernest A. Cruikshank, ed., Documents Relating to the Invasion of the Niagara Peninsula by the United States Army, Commanded by General Jacob Brown, in July and August, 1814 (Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario, [1920?]), 36.

58. Thomas Jesup to ———, September 8, 1814, in Jesup Papers (LC).

59. The ration was mandated by Congress. See AC, 12–1, 2230.

60. Statement of Winfield Scott, [July, 1814], in WD (M221), reel 66.

61. Ibid.

62. Samuel T. Anderson to SN, October 8, 1812, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War 1: 323; Jeffrey Kimball, “The Fog and Friction of Frontier War: The Role of Logistics in American Offensive Failure during the War of 1812,” Old Northwest 5 (Winter, 1979), 323–43; Max Rosenberg, The Building of Perry’s Fleet on Lake Erie, 1812–1813 (Harrisburg, 1950), ch. 2; Philip Lord, Jr., “The Mohawk/Oneida Corridor: The Geography of Inland Navigation across New York,” in David Curtis Skaggs and Larry L. Nelson, eds., The Sixty Years’ War for the Great Lakes, 1754–1814 (East Lansing, 2001), 275–90.

63. Alexander Smyth to Henry Dearborn, November 9, 1812, and William Winder to Smyth, November 7, 1812, in ASP: MA, 1:497, 509.

64. Testimony of Dr. W. M. Ross, [fall, 1813], in James Wilkinson, Memoirs of My Own Times, 3 vols. (Philadelphia, 1816), 3:111, 308.

65. Edmund P. Gaines to SW, [late 1814], in WD (M222), reel 11.

66. Morgan Lewis to SW, November 22, 1814, in Monroe Papers (NYPL); Jacob Brown to SW, November 28, 1814, in Brown Papers (LC). For other evidence of the failure of the supply system, see William Henry Harrison to SW, December 12, 1812, Charles Boerstler to [SW], January 20, 1813, and John Graham to SW, October 20, 1814, in WD (M221), reels 45, 50 and 61; George W. Hight to SW, December 31, 1814, in WD (M222), reel 11; B. Tappan to SW, January 13, 1813, in Monroe Papers (NYPL); H. Goddard to John Cotton Smith, May 29, 1814, in Smith Papers (CHS); inspection reports of William King, October 5, 1812, Smyth to SW, October 20, 1812, statement of John R. Fenwick, December 23, 1814, and John S. Gano to William Henry Harrison, January 27, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:491–93, 601, 657.

67. For recognition of the importance of cleanliness, see Division Orders at Fort Niagara, May 12, 1813, in WD (M222), reel 8; and James Mann, Medical Sketches of the Campaigns of 1812, 13, 14 (Dedham, 1816), 38.

68. Mann, Medical Sketches, passim.

69. Ibid. See also John Duffy, The Healers: A History of American Medicine (New York, 1976), chs. 4–8; Mary C. Gillett, The Army Medical Department, 1775–1818 (Washington, DC, 1981), ch. 1.

70. Mann, Medical Sketches, passim. The quotation is from p. 81. See also Isaac Van Voorhis to SW, December 1, 1811 (with enclosure), Francis Le Baron to SW, November 13, 1812, and March 30, 1813, in WD (M221), reels 46, 49, and 54; list of Medicine and Hospital Stores, June 30, 1813, in Esarey, Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, 2:486.

71. SW to Adam Seybert, December 9, 1811, and Decius Wadsworth to George M. Troup, June 19, 1813, in ASP: MA, 1:303, 337; James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775–1953 (Washington, DC, 1966), 114. The returns of weapons manufactured and repaired at Harpers Ferry and Springfield are scattered through WD (M221) and (M222).

72. Eli Whitney to SW, August 17, 1812, in WD (M221), reel 49; White, Jeffersonians, 226n; Jeannette Mirsky and Allan Nevins, The World of Eli Whitney (New York, 1952), ch. 17; Robert S. Woodbury, “The Legend of Eli Whitney and Interchangeable Parts,” Technology and Culture 1 (Summer, 1960), 235–53; Huston, Sinews of War, 107.

73. Report of House Committee, December 16, 1811, in ASP: MA, 1:303; Callender Irvine to SW, March 1, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 54.

74. AC, 12–1, 238, 1376, 2297–98.

75. The best starting point for understanding artillery is Donald E. Graves, “American Ordnance of the War of 1812: A Preliminary Investigation,” Arms Collecting 31 (November, 1993), 111–20, and “Field Artillery of the War of 1812: Equipment, Organization, Tactics and Effectiveness,” Arms Collecting 30 (May, 1992), 39–48. See also the series of articles that Graves has published on the subject in War of 1812 Magazine (January, 2006)–(May, 2011); R. Alan Douglas, “Weapons of the War of 1812,” Michigan History 47 (December, 1963), 322–23; and Hickey, Don’t Give Up the Ship, 230–35.

76. Robert M. Reilly, United States Martial Flintlocks: A Comprehensive Illustrated History of the Flintlock in America from the Revolution to the Demise of the System (Lincoln, 1986), 51–97; René Chartrand, Uniforms and Equipment of the United States Forces in the War of 1812 (Youngstown, NY, 1992), 83–90.

77. Reilly, United States Martial Flintlocks, 123–30; Merrill Lindsay, The Kentucky Rifle (New York, 1972); G. W. Dillin, The Kentucky Rifle, 4th ed. (York, PA, 1959); Henry J. Kauffman, The Kentucky-Pennsylvania Rifle (New York, 1960); Neil L. York, “Pennsylvania Rifle: Revolutionary Weapon in a Conventional War?” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 103 (July, 1979), 302–24

78. See Spencer Tucker, Arming the Fleet: U.S. Navy Ordnance in the Muzzle-Loading Era (Annapolis, 1989), chs. 4–5, passim.

79. John C. Fredriksen, Green Coats and Glory: The United States Regiment of Riflemen, 1808–1821 (Youngstown, NY, 2000), 11–13, 43–45; Richard V. Barbuto, Long Range Guns, Close Quarters Combat: The Third United States Artillery Regiment in the War of 1812 (Youngstown, NY, 2010); 21; René Chartrand, “The US Army’s Uniform Supply ‘Crisis’ during the War of 1812,” Military Collector and Historian 40 (Summer, 1988), 64.

80. CG to LL, May 18, 1812, in Hitsman, Incredible War (updated ed.), 286.

81. Robert S. Allen, His Majesty’s Indian Allies: British Indian Policy in the Defence of Canada, 1774–1815 (1993), 120–22; Carl Benn, The Iroquois in the War of 1812 (Toronto, 1998), ch. 3.

82. See Brereton Greenhous, “A Note on Western Logistics in the War of 1812,” Military Affairs 34 (April, 1970), 41–44; Glenn A. Steppler, “Logistics on the Canadian Frontier, 1812–1814,” Military Collector and Historian 31 (Spring, 1979), 8–10; and John R. Grodzinski, “The Vigilant Superintendence of the Whole District: The War of 1812 on the Upper St. Lawrence” (MA thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, 2002).

83. Chauncey to SN, November 5, 1814, in ND (M125), reel 40.

84. JM to [Thomas Jefferson], August 17, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 14; Brant, James Madison, 6:45.

85. William Hull, Memoirs of the Campaign of the Northwestern Army of the United States, A.D. 1812 (Boston, 1824), 17. See also Hull to SW, December 17, 1811, in WD (M221), reel 44.

86. Taylor Berry to James T. Eubank, August 8, 1812, in Robert C. Vitz, “James Taylor, the War Department, and the War of 1812,” Old Northwest 2 (June, 1976), 117; Hull, Memoirs of the Campaign, 17. See also Julius W. Pratt, “William Hull,” in DAB, 9:363–64.

87. Philadelphia Aurora, June 13, 1812.

88. Hull to SW, June 15, 1811, and March 6, 1812, in Ernest A. Cruikshank, ed., Documents Relating to the Invasion of Canada and the Surrender of Detroit, 1812 (Ottawa, 1912), 3, 22; Hull, Memoirs of the Campaign, 18–23.

89. Quoted in Mahan, Sea Power, 1:341. See also William Hull to SW, June 24, July 3 and 7, 1812, in WD (M221), reel 45; letter from Detroit, August 17, 1812, in Philadelphia Aurora, September 16, 1812; Thomas B. St. George to Isaac Brock, July 8, 1813, in Cruikshank, Surrender of Detroit, 44; [Smith], “Journal of William K. Beall,” 785–87; McAfee, History of the Late War, 52–58.

90. Brock to LL, August 29, 1812, in Adams, History, 2: 516–17. See also Matthew Elliott to William Claus, July 15, 1812, and Daniel Springer to Brock, July 23, 1812, in Wood, British Documents, 1:358, 376.

91. Hull to SW, August 13, 1812, in Cruikshank, Surrender of Detroit, 139–41; Hull, Memoirs of the Campaign, 72–73; McAfee, History of the Late War, 77–82; Gilpin, War of 1812 in the Northwest, 95–104.

92. Porter Hanks to William Hull, August 4, 1812, in WD (M222), reel 8. See also Louise P. Kellogg, “The Capture of Mackinac in 1812,” Proceedings of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin 60 (October 24, 1912), 124–45.

93. Hull to SW, August 26, 1812, in WD (M221), reel 45.

94. Lewis Cass to SW, September 10, 1812, ibid., reel 43.

95. Adams, History, 2:514.

96. Thomas Jesup to ———, August 2, 1812, in Jesup Papers (LC).

97. Mahon, War of 1812, 48–49.

98. Hull, Memoirs of the Campaign, 73; McAfee, History of the Late War, 91.

99. Sandy Antal, A Wampum Denied: Procter’s War 1812 (Ottawa, 1997), 95.

100. Brock to brothers, September 3, 1812, in Ferdinand B. Tupper, The Life and Correspondence of Major-General Sir Isaac Brock, rev. ed. (London, 1847), 284. See also M. C. Dixon to R. H. Bruyeres, July 8, 1812, in Wood, British Documents, 1:351.

101. Brock to Hull, August 15, 1812, in Brannan, Official Letters, 41.

102. Quoted in Gilpin, War of 1812 in the Northwest, 117. See also Hull to SW, August 26, 1812, in WD (M221), reel 45.

103. Adams, History, 2:526; Mahon, War of 1812, 50.

104. John C. Parish, ed., The Robert Lucas Journal of the War of 1812 during the Campaign under General William Hull (Iowa City, 1906)(August 16, 1812), 65. See also Lewis Cass to SW, September 10, 1812, in WD (M221), reel 43; William Hull to SW, August 26, 1812, ibid., reel 45; Brock to CG, August 17, 1812, in Wood, British Documents, 1:465–70. For additional details on the campaign, see Quimby, U.S. Army, 1:ch. 2; and Antal, Wampum Denied, chs. 3–5.

105. Edward Baynes to Isaac Brock, September 10, 1812, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 3:250; Return of Ordnance and Ordnance Stores Taken at Detroit, in Cruikshank, Surrender of Detroit, 154.

106. William Hull to Citizens of the United States, June 1, 1814, in Niles’ Register 6 (July 23, 1814), 346.

107. General Order of April 25, 1814, in Washington National Intelligencer, May 3, 1814.

108. See especially Hull, Memoirs of the Campaign, and Maria Campbell and James Freeman Clarke, Revolutionary Services and Civil Life of General William Hull . . . together with the History of the Campaign of 1812, and Surrender of the Post of Detroit (New York, 1848). Campbell was Hull’s daughter and Clarke his grandson.

109. Nathan Heald to Thomas H. Cushing, October 23, 1812, in Brannan, Official Letters, 84–85; Walter K. Jordan to Betsy Jordan, October 12, 1812, in Esarey, Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, 2:165; McAfee, History of the Late War, 98–101; Gilpin, War of 1812 in the Northwest, 127–28; Quimby, U.S. Army, 1:49–50; R. David Edmunds, “Redefining Red Patriotism: Five Medals of the Potawatomis,” Red River Historical Review 5 (Spring, 1980), 18–19.

110. Pittsburgh Mercury, reprinted in Philadelphia Aurora, September 12, 1812.

111. Zachary Taylor to William Henry Harrison, September 10, 1812, in WD (M221), reel 44; Quimby, U.S. Army, 1:94–101.

112. J. G. Jackson to JM, August 31, 1812, and Isaac Shelby to [SW], September 5, 1812, in WD (M221), reels 46 and 48; petition from Harrison County (IN), December 24, 1812, in WD (M222), reel 6; E. Munger to John S. Gano, August 23, 1812, in Philadelphia Aurora, September 9, 1812.

113. SW to William Henry Harrison, September 1, 1812, in WD (M6), reel 6.

114. SW to Harrison, September 17, 1812, in WD (M6), reel 6; John Gibson to William Hargrove, August 20, 1812, in Esarey, Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, 2:91; Richard M. Johnson to JM, September 18, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 14; Mahon, War of 1812, 64–66.

115. SW to Ebenezer Denny, September 1, 1812, in WD (M6), reel 6; James Morrison to Henry Clay, December 24, 1812, in WD (M222), reel 6.

116. Washington National Intelligencer, November 8, 1813. Harrison’s papers teem with references to purchases of large quantities of supplies. See Esarey, Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, 2:156–359.

117. Harrison to SW, December 12, 1812, in WD (M221), reel 45. See also James Morrison to Henry Clay, December 24, 1812, in WD (M222), reel 6; Morrison to SW, January 19, 1813, in Monroe Papers (NYPL).

118. William Henry Harrison to SW, September 27 and December 12, 1812, in WD (M221), reel 45.

119. William Henry Harrison to [SW], December 24, 1812 (with enclosures), and January 3, 1813 (with enclosures), in William Henry Harrison Papers (LC), reel 1; McAfee, History of the Late War, 162–63, 177–82. Gilpin, War of 1812 in the Northwest, 147–55.

120. Statement of American officers, February 20, 1813, in Brannan, Official Letters, 135.

121. For details on the military engagements and massacre, see William Henry Harrison to SW, January 24 and 26, 1813, Elijah McClanahan to Harrison, January 26, 1813, and Winchester to SW, February 11, 1813, in WD (M221), reels 53 and 58; Henry Proctor to Roger Sheaffe, January 25, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 1:7–9; McAfee, History of the Late War, 211–22; Quimby, U.S. Army, 1:132–38. See also documents in ASP: MA, 1:367–75.

122. Julius W. Pratt, “Solomon Van Rensselaer” and “Stephen Van Rensselaer,” in DAB, 19:210–11; James E. Walmsley, “Alexander Smyth,” ibid., 17:373–74; Robert Malcomson, A Very Brilliant Affair: The Battle of Queenston Heights, 1812 (Toronto, 2003), ch. 4.

123. Stephen Van Rensselaer to Daniel Tompkins, September 17, 1812, in Van Rensselaer, Narrative of Queenstown, 17; Malcomson Brilliant Affair, 117–20.

124. John Lovett to Joseph Alexander, October 14, 1812, and John Chrystie to Thomas Cushing, February 22, 1813, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 4:86, 95–102; letter of John Robinson, October 14, 1812, in Wood, British Documents, 1:610–14; Malcomson, Brilliant Affair, chs. 8–9.

125. Brant, James Madison, 6:91; Philadelphia Aurora, reprinted in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 4:125.

126. Van Rensselaer to [Dearborn], October 14, 1812, in WD (M221), reel 43.

127. Ibid.; Winfield Scott to SW, December 29, 1812, in WD (M221), reel 57; John Chrystie to Albert Gallatin, March 11, 1813, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 26; John Chrystie to Thomas Cushing, February 22, 1813, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 4:102–3; letter of John Robinson, October 14, 1812, and General Orders of October 20, 1812, in Wood, British Documents, 1:614–17, 628; Malcomson, Brilliant Affair, 164–97, and “Clubbed Victory at Queenston Heights,” Military History Quarterly 19 (Spring, 2009), 64–67; Benn, Iroquois in the War of 1812, 88–99.

128. Statement of John Burkholder, October 31, 1812, in Wood, British Documents, 1:641–42; Solomon Van Rensselaer to Morgan Lewis, September 11, 1812, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 3:254.

129. Allan S. Everest, The War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley (Syracuse, 1981), 88; Thomas G. Ridout to cousin, January 5, 1813, in Matilda Edgar, Ten Years of Upper Canada in Peace and War, 1805–1815 (Toronto, 1890), 168.

130. General Orders of November 29, 1812, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 4:313.

131. William Winder to Alexander Smyth, December 7, 1812, in WD (M222), reel 6; Alexander Smyth to Henry Dearborn, December 4, 1812, in WD (M221), reel 43; statement of Peter B. Porter, December 14, 1812, in Philadelphia Aurora, December 30, 1812; Cecil Bisshop to Roger Sheaffe, December 1, 1812, and statement of Alexander Smyth, January 28, 1813 in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 4:253–56, 308–10.

132. Quoted in Tupper, Isaac Brock, 335.

133. Letter from Mifflin County volunteer (militiaman), December 3, 1812, in Philadelphia Aurora, December 25, 1812. See also New York Mercantile Advertiser, reprinted in Philadelphia Aurora, December 17, 1812; New York Evening Post, December 15, 1812; Peter B. Porter to Buffalo Gazette, December 8, 1812, reprinted in Philadelphia Aurora, December 22, 1812; Cyrenus Chapin to Solomon Van Rensselaer, December 13, 1812, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 4:301.

134. Walmsley, “Alexander Smyth,” 374.

135. George Howard to Sarah Howard, July 7, 1813, in George Howard Journal (CHS); Georgetown Federal Republican, November 26, 1813.

136. Julius W. Pratt, “Henry Dearborn,” in DAB, 5:175; Adams, History, 2:505–8; Horsman, War of 1812, 49.

137. SW to Dearborn, July 9, 1812, in Adams, History, 2:506–7. See also SW to Dearborn, August 15, 1812, in WD (M6), reel 6.

138. Zebulon Pike to Henry Dearborn, November 20, 1812, and Dearborn to SW, November 24, 1812, in WD (M221), reel 43; H. A. S. Dearborn, “The Life of Major General Henry Dearborn,” 7 vols. in MS form (MeHS), 5:passim; Everest, War of 1812 in Champlain Valley, 90–92; Quimby, U.S. Army, 1:79–84.

139. Ingersoll, Historical Sketch, 1:102.

140. Bennington (VT) News-Letter, December 23, 1812.

141. This broadside, which is usually portrayed as the first reference to “Uncle Sam,” has been reprinted in Alton Ketchum, Uncle Sam: The Man and the Legend (New York, 1959), 40–41.

142. Donald E. Graves, ed., Merry Hearts Make Light Days: The War of 1812 Journal of Lieutenant John Le Couteur, 104th Foot (Ottawa, 1993)(October 20, 1814), 209.

143. For a fuller analysis of the origins and evolution of Uncle Sam, see Ketchum, Uncle Sam, and Hickey, Don’t Give Up the Ship, 220–24. There was as yet no image attached to the symbol. It was not until the 1870s that cartoonist Thomas Nast popularized the notion that Uncle Sam was a gaunt and bewhiskered older man decked out in striped pants and a top hat.

144. Bennington Green-Mountain Farmer, January 13, 1813. See also Bolling Hall to JM, July 8, 1813, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 15.

145. Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, December 18, 1812, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 25.

146. Washington National Intelligencer, December 22, 1812.

147. Philadelphia Aurora, October 29, 1812.

148. Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, March 25, 1812, in Nicholson Papers (LC). See also Richard Rush to Charles J. Ingersoll, February 26, 1812, in Rush Papers (SR), reel 1; Mahon, War of 1812, 5.

149. SN to Langdon Cheves, December 3, 1811, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 1:53–56; John G. Van Deusen, “Paul Hamilton,” in DAB, 8:189–90.

150. SN to Cheves, December 3, 1811, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 1:56–57. Two frigates, the Boston and New York, had rotted beyond repair.

151. Howard I. Chapelle, The History of the American Sailing Navy: The Ships and Their Development (New York, 1949), 119–34; Tyrone G. Martin, A Most Fortunate Ship: A Narrative History of Old Ironsides, rev. ed. (Annapolis, 1997), 3–8; John H. Frederick, “Joshua Humphreys,” in DAB, 9:376–77.

152. Roosevelt, Naval War, 1:60–69.

153. Samuel Evans to SN, June 24, 1812, Charles Gordon to SN, June 28, July 17 and 28, 1812, Robert T. Spence to SN, September 4, October 8, and November 16, 1813, Thomas Macdonough to SN, March 7, 1814, and Daniel Patterson to SN, November 18, 1814, in ND (M147), reels 4 and 5; John H. Dent to SN, July 14, 1812, Isaac Hull to SN, October 29, 1812, and William Bainbridge to SN, April 30, 1814, in ND (M125), reels 24, 25, and 35.

154. Alexander Murray to SN, March 21, 1813, Hugh G. Campbell to SN, July 30, 1814, and John H. Dent to SN, January 28, 1815, in ND (M125), reels 27, 38, and 42; John Downes to SN, November 17, 1814, in ND (M147), reel 5; SN to Isaac Hull, May 31, 1814, in ND (M149), reel 11.

155. John Shaw to SN, February 17, 1812, in ND (M125), reel 23.

156. SN to Stephen Cassin, November 30, 1812, SN to Jacob Jones, [December, 1812], and SN to Jacob Lewis, February 26, 1813, in ND (M149), reel 10.

157. John Shaw to SN, February 17, 1812, and Samuel Evans to SN, February 8, 1814, in ND (M125), reels 23 and 34; Jacob Jones to SN, February 16, 1813, Lewis Warrington to SN, October 18, 1813, Thomas Macdonough to SN, March 18, 1814, and Thomas Brown to SN, January 31, 1815, in ND (M147), reel 5; SN to John H. Dent, February 4, 1815, to Bernard Henry, February 6, 1815, to Joshua Barney, February 6, 1815, and to commanding naval officer at Erie, February 9, 1815, in ND (M149), reel 12.

158. Ships in Sea Pay, July 1, 1812, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 1:180–82; Julian Gwyn, Frigates and Foremasts: The North American Squadron in Nova Scotia Waters, 1745–1815 (Vancouver, 2003), 134.

159. Nicholas Blake and Richard Lawrence, The Illustrated Companion to Nelson’s Navy (Mechanicsburg, 1999), 67; Barry J. Lohnes, “British Naval Problems at Halifax during the War of 1812,” Mariner’s Mirror 59 (August, 1973), 317–33; James, Naval Occurrences, 46–48.

160. Mahan, Sea Power, 1:388–89, 400–401; Horsman, War of 1812, 57–58; Richard Glover, “The French Fleet, 1807–1814: Britain’s Problem and Madison’s Opportunity,” Journal of Modern History 39 (September, 1967), 233–52.

161. Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, June 16, 1813, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 46; Gallatin to JM, [June 20, 1812], in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 25; Rodgers to SN, June 3, 1812 (filed at the end of February, 1812), and Decatur to SN, June 8, 1812, in ND (M125), reels 23 and 24; Mahan, Sea Power, 1:318.

162. SN to John Rodgers, June 22, 1812, in ND (M149), reel 10. See also SN to Stephen Decatur, June 22 and September 9, 1812, and to Rodgers, September 9, 1812, ibid.

163. Rodgers to SN, September 1, 1812, in ND (M125), reel 25.

164. Letter from British naval officer at Halifax, October 15, 1812, in Naval Chronicle 28 (July-December, 1812), 426. See also Thomas Saumarez to Isaac Brock, July 22, 1812, in Tupper, Isaac Brock, 215; London Times, September 4, 1812; Hartford Connecticut Mirror, August 3, 1812; Mahan, Sea Power, 1:401–4.

165. Tompkins to New York legislature, November 3, 1812, in Hastings, Papers of Daniel D. Tompkins, 3:180. See also JM to Congress, November 4, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 13.

166. Coggeshall, American Privateers, 6.

167. Hull to SN, July 21, 1812, in ND (M125), reel 24; Roosevelt, Naval War, 1: 122–27; Martin, Most Fortunate Ship, 145–51.

168. Quoted in Oliver H. Perry to SN, July 26, 1812, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 1:200.

169. Hull to SN, July 28 and August 2, 1812, in ND (M125), reel 24.

170. Naval Chronicle 28 (July-December, 1812), 343.

171. Quoted in Coggeshall, American Privateers, 26–27.

172. Hull to SN, August 28, 1812, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 1:241. See also Hull to SN, August 30, 1812, in ND (M125), reel 24; James R. Dacres to Herbert Sawyer, September 7, 1812, in Naval Chronicle 28 (July-December, 1812), 347–48; extract from Guerrière Log Book, in Philadelphia Aurora, October 12, 1812; Roosevelt, Naval War, 1:127–36; Martin, Most Fortunate Ship, 152–62; Linda M. Maloney, The Captain from Connecticut: The Life and Naval Times of Isaac Hull (Boston, 1986), 186–91.

173. Moses Smith, Naval Scenes in the Last War (Boston, 1846), 33; Pardon Whipple to friend, 1813, in Norma Adams Price, ed., Letters from Old Ironsides, 1813–1815, Written by Pardon Mawney Whipple (Tempe, 1984), 6; Lexington Reporter, January 6, 1815.

174. Philadelphia Aurora, April 9, 1812; New York Public Advertiser, reprinted ibid., September 5, 1812; London Times, January 2, 1812; SN to Stephen Decatur, April 9, 1812, in ND (M149), reel 10.

175. Bainbridge to SN, January 3, 1813, in ND (M125), reel 26.

176. Journal of William Bainbridge, December 29–30, 1812, ibid.; Henry D. Chads to FSA, December 31, 1812, and testimony of Chads, in Naval Chronicle 29 (January-June, 1813), 346–48, 403–6; Roosevelt, Naval War, 1:160–71; Martin, Most Fortunate Ship, 171–78.

177. Quoted in Maclay, United States Navy, 1:379.

178. Quoted, ibid., 1:384. See also Stephen Decatur to SN, October 30, 1812, in ND (M125), reel 25; B. F. Bournne to Thomas Welsh, Jr., October 29, 1812, in Philadelphia Aurora, December 13, 1812; John S. Carden to FSA, October 28, 1812, in Naval Chronicle 29 (January-June, 1813), 77–78; Roosevelt, Naval War, 1:147–57; Maclay, United States Navy, 1:368–92.

179. Stephen Decatur to SN, December 4, 1812, in ND (M125), reel 25; James Tertius de Kay, Chronicles of the Macedonian (New York, 1995), 103–8.

180. David Porter to SN, July 12, August 15, and September 3, 1812, statement of David Porter and C. S. Hopkins, July 11, 1812, and James Lawrence to SN, March 19, 1813, in ND (M125), reels 24, 25, and 27; Jacob Jones to SN, November 24, 1812, in ND (M147), reel 4; William Crane to SN, July 29, 1812, Thomas Whinyates to John Borlase Warren, October 23, 1812, and James L. Yeo to Charles Sterling, November 22, 1812, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 1:209–11, 539–41, 594; Roosevelt, Naval War, 1:118–20, 139–45, 176, 210–17.

181. John Binns to Jonathan Roberts, November 13, 1812, in Roberts Papers (HSP).

182. Act of June 26, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 2327–32.

183. Coggeshall, American Privateers, 3.

184. London Times, March 20, 1813; Roosevelt, Naval War, 1:180.

185. Joseph Marx to [Wilson Cary Nicholas], September 9, 1812, in Nicholas Papers (UVA).

186. A. Wanderer [Noah Johnson], Journals of Two Cruises aboard the American Privateer “Yankee” (New York, 1967), 61–156; Philadelphia Aurora, September 14, 1812; Log-Book of the Rossie, July 12-October 22, 1812, in Niles’ Register 3 (November 7, 1812), 158; Maclay, American Privateers, 269.

187. Washington National Intelligencer, August 11, 1812; Salem Essex Register, December 16, 1812. See also London Morning Chronicle, August 22, 1812.

188. London Morning Chronicle, September 17 and 18, 1812; London Times, December 30, 1812.

189. London Times, January 1, 1813. See also London Morning Chronicle, December 31, 1812, and January 1, 1813.

190. John Borlase Warren to FSA, February 26, 1813, in Naval Chronicle 29 (January-June, 1813), 250–55.

191. Warren, quoted in Mahan, Sea Power, 1:402.

192. Letter of “Faber,” March 5, 1813, in Naval Chronicle 29 (January-June, 1813), 198. “Jonathan” was a nickname for Americans, the counterpart of “John Bull” for the British.

193. Faye Margaret Kert, Prize and Prejudice: Privateering and Naval Prize in Atlantic Canada in the War of 1812 (St. Johns, 1997), 78, 83–84, 107; and “Private War, Public Service: Maritime Canada’s Private War of 1812,” in Directorate History and Heritage, Canadian Military History since the Seventeenth Century: Proceedings of the Canadian Military History Conference, Ottawa, 5–9 May 2000 (Ottawa, [2001]), 97–100.

194. Thomas Jesup to James Taylor, December 28, 1812, in Jesup Papers (LC); Wilson Cary Nicholas to ———, December 24, 1812, in Nicholas Papers (LC).

195. Speech of Lemuel Sawyer, December 16, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 405.

196. Maclay, United States Navy, 1:vi, 442.

197. London Times, October 21, 1812; London Evening Star, reprinted in New York National Advocate, December 16, 1812.

198. The Earl of Harrowby, quoted in Bradford Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams: England and the United States, 1812–1823 (Berkeley, 1964), 18.

199. London Times, March 18, 1813. See also Naval Chronicle 29 (January-June, 1813), 113–19, 465–70, 472–74.

200. This charge was originally made by Royal Navy officers and then repeated by the navy’s defenders. See John S. Carden to FSA, October 28, 1812, and John B. Warren to FSA, January 25, 1813, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 1:551, and 2:16; Naval Chronicle 29 (January-June, 1813), 37, 288, 472; John Quincy Adams to Thomas Boylston Adams, January 31, 1813, in Worthington C. Ford, ed., Writings of John Quincy Adams, 7 vols. (New York, 1913–17), 4:428; James, Naval Occurrences, 17, 20, 135; James, Naval History, 5:381.

201. Spencer C. Tucker, Handbook of 19th Century Naval Warfare (Annapolis, 2000), 3.

202. Like the claim that American frigates were actually ships-of-the-line, these charges were first made by British navy officers and then picked up by defenders of the Royal Navy. See John S. Carden to FSA, October 28, 1812, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 1: 551; James Dacres, address to court, n.d., in James, Naval Occurrences, appendix, xx; Lieutenant of HMS Java to friend, January 26, 1813, in Naval Chronicle 29 (January-June 1813), 453; James, Naval Occurrences, 75, 95–96, 312; James, Naval History, 5:373, 386–87, 401; Edward Pelham Brenton, The Naval History of Great Britain, from [1783] to [1836], rev. ed., 2 vols. (London, 1837), 2:456, 460.

203. See editorial note, and Jacob Jones to SN, July 21, 1812, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 1:170–71n1, 198; Roosevelt, Naval War, 1:70–78; Theodore Roosevelt, “The War with the United States,” in William Laird Clowes, The Royal Navy: A History, 7 vols. (London, 1897–1903), 6:29; Spencer C. Tucker and Frank T. Reuter, Injured Honor: The “Chesapeake”-”Leopard” Affair, June 27, 1807 (Annapolis, 1996), 117–22.

204. London Times, October 29 and 30, 1812, and January 6, 1813.

205. Ibid., December 29, 1812.

206. London Morning Chronicle, March 20, 1813. See also ibid., October 23 and December 28, 1812.

207. Naval Chronicle 29 (January-June, 1813), 198. See also ibid., 12.

208. Statement of British Naval Force on North American Stations, 1810–1813, in Charles Vane, ed., Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh, 12 vols. (London, 1848–53), 8:292.

209. Report of the Admiralty, February 1, 1815, in Niles’ Register 8 (May 20, 1815), 198; David Milne to George Hume, April 26, 1814, in Edgar E. Hume, ed., “Letters Written during the War of 1812 by the British Naval Commander in American Waters (Admiral Sir David Milne),” William and Mary Quarterly, 2nd ser. 10 (October, 1930), 292; James, Naval History, 6:143–48; Albion and Pope, Sea Lanes in Wartime, 389–91.

210. FSA to Station Commanders, July 10, 1813, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 2:183.

211. Order of Admiralty, July 31, 1812, in Naval Chronicle 28 (July-December, 1812), 139.

212. Naval Chronicle 28 (July-December, 1812), 343.

213. Niles’ Register 3 (December 5, 1812), 221.

Chapter 5. Raising Men and Money

1. William A. Burwell to [Wilson Cary Nicholas], February 1, 1813, in Nicholas Papers (UVA); Joshua Clibbons to Jonathan Russell, February 15, 1813, in Russell Papers (BU).

2. Richard C. Knopf, ed., The Diary of Thomas Worthington: 1812 (n.p., [1956]) (December 1, 1812), 39.

3. The best study of the election is Norman K. Risjord, “Election of 1812,” in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., et al., eds., History of American Presidential Elections, 1789–1968, 4 vols. (New York, 1971), 1:249–96.

4. Philadelphia Aurora, March 11, 1812.

5. Address of Pennsylvania Committee of Correspondence, September 16, 1812, in Washington National Intelligencer, October 10, 1812.

6. Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, May 20, 1812, in Roberts Papers (HSP); Report of J. B. Varnum, May 18, 1812, and Richard M. Johnson to Joseph Gales, May 29, 1812, in Niles’ Register 2 (May 23, 1812), 192–93; John Langdon to John Smilie, William H. Crawford, and Charles Cutts, May 28, 1812, and Report of J. B. Varnum, June 8, 1812, in Niles’ Register 2 (June 27, 1812), 276; Richard P. McCormick, The Presidential Game: The Origins of American Presidential Politics (New York, 1982), 96–97.

7. DeAlva S. Alexander, A Political History of the State of New York, 3 vols. (New York, 1906–9), 1: 184, 201–2; Craig R. Hanyan, “De Witt Clinton and Partisanship: The Development of Clintonianism from 1811 to 1820,” New York Historical Society Quarterly 57 (April, 1972), 111; McCormick, Presidential Game, 97.

8. Address of New York Committee of Correspondence, August 17, 1812, in Niles’ Register 3 (September 12, 1812), 17–19.

9. New York Committee of Correspondence to Harrison Gray Otis, August 25, 1812, in Otis Papers (MHS); Abraham Shepherd to Timothy Pickering, October 4, 1812, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 30; William Gaston and John Stanly to Philadelphia Committee of Correspondence, [Summer, 1812], in Gaston Papers (UNC), reel 1; Boston Columbian Centinel, October 7, 1812; Benjamin Stoddert to John Steele, September 3, 1812, in H. M. Wagstaff, ed., The Papers of John Steele, 2 vols. (Raleigh, 1924), 2:682–85; James H. Broussard, The Southern Federalists, 1800–1816 (Baton Rouge, 1978), 144–47; Marvin R. Zahniser, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Founding Father (Chapel Hill, 1967), 258–59.

10. William Coleman, quoted in statement of Rufus King, July 27, 1812, in King, Rufus King, 5:266.

11. Philadelphia Committee of Correspondence to Joseph Porter, August 10, 1812, in Gaston Papers (UNC), reel 1. See also Philadelphia Committee of Correspondence to Harrison Gray Otis, July 27,1812, and Charles W. Hare to Otis, June 24, 1812, in Otis Papers (MHS); Robert Goodloe Harper to Benjamin Stoddert, September 10, 1812, in Harper Papers (MdHS), reel 2.

12. Philadelphia Committee of Correspondence to John Stanly and William Gaston, August 13, 1812, in Gaston Papers (UNC), reel 1; Robert Goodloe Harper to John Lynn, September 25, 1812, in Bernard C. Steiner, The Life and Correspondence of James McHenry (Cleveland, 1907), 583–86; [William Sullivan], Familiar Letters on Public Characters, and Public Events, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1834), 327; John S. Murdock, “The First National Nominating Convention,” American Historical Review 1 (July, 1896), 680–83.

13. Statement of Rufus King, August 5, 1812, in King, Rufus King, 5:270. See also David B. Ogden to William Gaston, September 21, 1812, in Gaston Papers (UNC), reel 1.

14. Pickering to Edward Pennington, July 12, 1812, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 14. For similar sentiments, see Joseph Pearson to Harrison Gray Otis, November 9, 1812, in Otis Papers (MHS).

15. William Sullivan, The Public Men of the Revolution, ed. John T. S. Sullivan (Philadelphia, 1847), 351n.

16. Memorandum of [Harrison Gray Otis], [1812], in Alexander Washburn Collection (MHS).

17. G. Terry Madonna, “The Lancaster Federalists and the War of 1812, “Journal of the Lancaster County Historical Society 71 (Trinity, 1967), 149; Risjord, “Election of 1812,” 258.

18. Benjamin Romaine to Albert Gallatin, December 13, 1812, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 25. See also David Jones to JM, September 17, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 26.

19. Address of South Carolina Assembly, September 1, 1812, in Risjord, “Election of 1812,” 285.

20. Address of Pennsylvania Committee of Correspondence, October 12, 1812, in Washington National Intelligencer, October 24, 1812.

21. Boston Yankee, October 2, 1812.

22. Pennsylvania newspaper, quoted in Victor Sapio, Pennsylvania & the War of 1812, (Lexington, 1970), 178–79.

23. The play, “Election Scene,” is reprinted from the Worcester National Aegis in Philadelphia Aurora, October 13, 1812. See also William Plumer to John Adams, January 2, 1813, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 2; Risjord, “Election of 1812,” 259–60.

24. John A. Harper to William Plumer, February 6, 1813, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 3.

25. John Stokely to James Monroe, January 30, 1813, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5. See also William A. Burwell to [Wilson Cary Nicholas], February 1, 1813, in Nicholas Papers (UVA); William Wirt to JM, August 29, 1813, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 26.

26. Clay to Caesar A. Rodney, December 29, 1812, in Hopkins and Hargreaves, Papers of Henry Clay, 1:750. For similar sentiments, see John C. Calhoun to James Macbride, April 18, 1812, in Meriwether et al., Papers of John C. Calhoun, 1:99–100; Thomas Flournoy to Thomas Jefferson, August 29, 1812, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 46; Baptist Irvine to Peter Porter, January 6, 1813, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 4:343.

27. Thomas Rogers to Jonathan Roberts, November 1, 1812, in Roberts Papers (HSP); Lexington Reporter, June 17, 1812; Worcester National Aegis, November 18, 1812.

28. Address of Association of Democratic Young Men, in Philadelphia Aurora, October 29, 1812; Thomas Rogers to Jonathan Roberts, November 1, 1812, in Roberts Papers (HSP). See also Anthony Baker to FS, October 31, 1812, in Foreign Office Papers 5/88 (PRO). The Essex Junto was supposed to be a group of arch Federalists in Massachusetts.

29. Samuel Latham Mitchill to Elizabeth Mitchill, November 24, 1812, in Mitchill Papers (MCNY).

30. Morgan Lewis to Albert Gallatin, November 10, 1812, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 25; John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren (Washington, DC, 1920), 40–41; Alexander, Political History of New York, 1:209–10.

31. Sanford W. Higginbotham, The Keystone in the Democratic Arch: Pennsylvania Politics, 1800–1816 (Harrisburg, 1952), 268–69.

32. Rush to Charles J. Ingersoll, November 14, 1812, in Ingersoll Papers (HSP).

33. Address of Pennsylvania Committee of Correspondence, October 12, 1812, in Washington National Intelligencer, October 24, 1812.

34. AC, 12–2, 79; Irving Brant, “Election of 1808,” in Schlesinger et al., History of American Presidential Elections, 1:246. In the contest for the vice presidency, Gerry won 131 votes to Ingersoll’s 86.

35. The best guide to party affiliation in the Thirteenth Congress is Kenneth C. Martis, The Historical Atlas of Political Parties in the United States Congress, 1789–1989 (New York, 1989), 82, although I think his identification of Jacob Hufty of New Jersey as a Federalist is incorrect. (Martis lists Hufty as a Republican in the previous Congress.) My own breakdown for this Congress, which was based on voting records and speeches, can be found in “The Federalists and the War of 1812” (PhD dissertation, University of Illinois, 1972), appendix A. At the opening session of this Congress, the Republicans controlled 114 of 182 seats in the House and 28 of 36 seats in the Senate, but these proportions changed slightly later on because of deaths, contested elections, and resignations.

36. The Federalists had pockets of support in Ohio, Kentucky, and New Orleans, but elsewhere in the West their strength was negligible. Except for Savannah, their strength in Georgia was also negligible. For the election results elsewhere east of the Appalachian Mountains in 1812, see Washington National Intelligencer, October 22, 1812 (for VT); Keene Newhampshire Sentinel, January 9, March 6, and May 22, 1813 (for NH); James M. Banner, Jr., To the Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789–1815 (New York, 1970), 361, 367 (for MA); Richard J. Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, 1775–1818 (Washington, DC, 1918), 290 (for CT); Samuel H. Allen, “The Federal Ascendency of 1812,” Narragansett Historical Register 7 (October, 1889), 390–94 (for RI); Alexander, Political History of New York, 1:213, 215 (for NY); Higginbotham, Keystone in the Democratic Arch, 267 (for PA); Walter R. Fee, The Transition from Aristocracy to Democracy in New Jersey, 1789–1829 (Sommerville, 1933), 179–82 (for NJ); John A. Munroe, Federalist Delaware, 1775–1815 (New Brunswick, 1954), 233–35 (for DE); L. Marx Renzulli, Jr., Maryland: The Federalist Years (Rutherford, 1972), 288 (for MD); Broussard, Southern Federalists, 294–95 (for VA, NC, and SC).

37. Calhoun to James Macbride, December 25, 1812, in Meriwether et al., Papers of John C. Calhoun, 1:146; Adam Seybert to Albert Gallatin, October 3, 1812, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 25; William H. Crawford to James Monroe, September 9, 1812, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5. See also speech of Felix Grundy, April 30, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 1354; Nathaniel Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, April 22, 1812, in Nicholson Papers (LC); George Hay to Monroe, November 1, 1812, in Monroe Papers (NYPL); Clay to Caesar A. Rodney, December 29, 1812, in Hopkins and Hargreaves, Papers of Henry Clay, 1:750; Jonathan Roberts to William Jones, December 28, 1812, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 1:635; Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, December 18, 1812, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 25; Augustus J. Foster to Lord Wellesley, March 12, 1812, in E. A. Cruikshank, The Political Adventures of John Henry: The Record of an International Imbroglio (Toronto, 1936), 129.

38. [SW] to JM, December 3, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 26; John A. Harper to William Plumer, January 5, 1813, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 3.

39. John H. Frederick, “William Jones,” in DAB, 10:205; Senate Journal, 2:315.

40. JM to Henry Lee, February, 1827, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 21.

41. Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, March 22, 1814, in Nicholson Papers (LC).

42. Albert Gallatin to JM, [January 4, 1813?] and [January 7, 1813], in Madison Papers (LC), reel 26; Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson, December 18, 1812, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 25.

43. Albert Gallatin to JM, [January 4, 1813?], and William H. Crawford to JM, January 6, 1813, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 26; George Hay to James Monroe, October 9 and December 13, 1812, in Monroe Papers (NYPL).

44. For an excellent study of this enigmatic figure, see C. Edward Skeen, John Armstrong, Jr., 1758–1843: A Biography (Syracuse, 1981).

45. Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, January 12, 1813, in Roberts Papers (HSP).

46. For an example of Armstrong’s penchant for intrigue, see answers to War Department circular, March 24, 1813, in WD (M222), reel 10, and Armstrong to William Duane, April 3, 1814, in WD (M6), reel 7. Armstrong had asked senior army officers to evaluate Duane’s military handbook and then had passed their comments on to Duane. The officers were almost uniformly critical of the handbook, and Armstrong was careful to tell Duane precisely what each officer had said. Apparently his aim was to isolate Duane (who was an army staff officer) and thus render him more dependent on the secretary of war.

47. William Plumer to John A. Harper, January 13, 1813, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 3. See also Richard Rush to Charles J. Ingersoll, January 13, 1813, in Rush Papers (SR), reel 2.

48. Senate Journal, 2:316. See also Benjamin Tallmadge to John Cotton Smith, January 18, 1813, in Smith Papers (CHS).

49. Monroe to JM, December 27, 1813, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 26.

50. Gallatin to William Few, May 9, 1813, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 26. See also Gallatin to James W. Nicholson, May 5, 1813, ibid.

51. Jones to Alexander Dallas, July 19, 1813, in Dallas Papers (HSP).

52. AC, 12–2, 139–42.

53. Benjamin Tallmadge to James McHenry, December 2, 1812, in McHenry Papers (LC).

54. JM to Congress, November 4, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 11–16.

55. Ibid., 11.

56. Ibid., 11–12, 16.

57. John A. Harper to William Plumer, January 8, 1813, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 3.

58. Speech of John Randolph, January 9, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 678.

59. Speech of Josiah Quincy, January 5, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 562, 600n.

60. John A. Harper to William Plumer, November 21, 1812, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 3.

61. Speech of Stevenson Archer, January 6, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 594, 596.

62. Speech of Jonathan O. Moseley, January 2, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 485.

63. For more on this proposal, see chapter 11: The Treaty of Ghent.

64. Speech of Israel Pickens, February 5, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 1007. For similar sentiments, see Charles Kenny to Jonathan Roberts, February 12, 1813, in Roberts Papers (HSP).

65. AC, 12–2, 1339–42.

66. See letter from Washington, January 28, 1813, in Lexington Reporter, February 20, 1813.

67. Speech of John Clopton, February 12, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 1031; speech of Joseph Desha, February 5, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 995.

68. Speech of Charles Goldsborough, February 12, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 1053. See also Abijah Bigelow to Hannah Bigelow, February 7, 1813, in Clarence S. Brigham, ed., “Letters of Abijah Bigelow, Member of Congress, to His Wife, 1810–1815,” Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society 40 (October, 1930), 357; Samuel Taggart to John Taylor, February 4, 1813, in Mary R. Reynolds, ed., “Letters of Samuel Taggart, Representative in Congress, 1803–1814,” Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society 33 (October, 1923), 424; Washington National Intelligencer, February 13, 1813.

69. AC, 12–2, 108, 111, 1055.

70. Speech of David R. Williams, December 29, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 461–62; speech of George M. Troup, December 30, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 476.

71. John Devereux to William Gaston, July 6, 1813, in Gaston Papers (UNC), reel 2.

72. See [SW] to David R. Williams, November 11, 18, 20, and 25, 1812, in NASP: MA, 5:21–26; SW to Congress, December 23, 1812, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5.

73. AC, 12–2, 63, 459–844, 1322–25.

74. Lowndes to Elizabeth Lowndes, January 16, 1813, in Mrs. St. Julien Ravenel, Life and Times of William Lowndes of South Carolina, 1782–1822 (Boston, 1901), 119.

75. For more on contemporary wage rates, see chapter 4: The Campaign of 1812.

76. AC, 12–2, 26, 44–45, 193, 481, 1314–15, 1318–19.

77. AC, 12–2, 1314.

78. Speech of Ezekiel Bacon, November 9 and 20, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 145, 157–58. For the Federalist view, see speech of Laban Wheaton, November 20, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 157.

79. Story to Nathaniel Williams, May 27, 1813, in William W. Story, Life and Letters of Joseph Story, 2 vols. (Boston, 1851), 1:245.

80. Thomas Jesup to SW, January 20, 1815, in Jesup Papers (LC).

81. AC, 12–2, 108–9, 114, 1146, 1157, 1346–51.

82. AC, 12–2, 1350; “Rules and Regulations of the Army of the United States,” May 1, 1813, in ASP: MA, 1:425–37; Skeen, John Armstrong, 128–29.

83. Speeches of James Milnor and Thomas R. Gold, November 20, 1812, and Josiah Quincy and Timothy Pitkin, November 21, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 161–64, 168–69, 179.

84. Speech of Laban Wheaton, November 21, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 178.

85. AC, 12–2, 24.

86. AC, 12–2, 110, 922–23, 946; Washington National Intelligencer, February 1, 1813.

87. Thomas Jesup to James Taylor, December 28, 1812, in Jesup Papers (LC). See also Boston Yankee, January 1, 1813.

88. JM to Congress, November 4, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 15.

89. Washington National Intelligencer, November 28, 1812; letter from Washington, December 9, 1812, reprinted from New York Mercantile Advertiser in New York National Advocate, December 15, 1812.

90. AC, 12–2, 32, 119, 449–50, 1061, 1315–16, 1352.

91. AC, 12–2, 866–69.

92. Speech of Langdon Cheves, January 23, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 868–69.

93. Memorial of Baltimore Privateering Interests, November 10, 1812, in NASP: NA, 1:273–74; John Ferguson and John Lawrence to Langdon Cheves, November 23, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 433–34. See also John Binns to Jonathan Roberts, November 13, 1812, in Roberts Papers (HSP); Jerome R. Garitee, The Republic’s Private Navy: The American Privateering Business as Practiced by Baltimore during the War of 1812 (Middleton, 1977), 183.

94. ST to Langdon Cheves, December 8, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 434–36.

95. Report of House Ways and Means Committee, December 21, 1812, in ASP: F, 2:591; AC, 12–2, 36, 76, 106, 167, 908, 1168, 1346, 1319–21, 1328–29.

96. Statement of Jonathan Russell, [November, 1812], in AC, 12–2, 1267. See also ST to Langdon Cheves, November 18, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 1251–52.

97. Statement of Jonathan Russell, [November, 1812], in AC, 12–2, 1267.

98. London Morning Chronicle, August 1, 3, 4, 6, 13, 1812; letter from Liverpool, July 20, 1812, in Philadelphia Aurora, September 7, 1812; Worcester National Aegis, October 7, 1812; Jonathan Russell to Reuben Beasley, August 1, 1812, in Russell Papers (BU); Anthony Baker to FS, December 18, 1812, in Foreign Office Papers 5/88 (PRO).

99. Lemuel Trescott to ST, July 4, 1812, Peter Sailly to ST, July 7, 1812, Samuel Buell to ST, July 12 and August 8, 1812, and ST to Cheves, December 10, 1812, all in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 25.

100. William Montgomery to JM, August 25, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 14; Harrison, Diary of Thomas P. Cope (August 24, 1812), 277.

101. Circular of SN, August 28, 1812, in ND (M149), reel 10; Richard Rush to U.S. district attorneys, October 5, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 1257–58; Rush to U.S. district attorneys, October 15, 1812, in Philadelphia Aurora, October 26, 1812.

102. ST to Langdon Cheves, November 18, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 1252–54; Samuel Taggart to John Taylor, December 8, 1812, in Reynolds, “Letters of Samuel Taggart,” 412.

103. ST to Peter Sailly, August 6, 1812, ST to customs collectors, October 5, 1812, and ST to Larkin Smith, October 6, 1812, all in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 25.

104. ST to Langdon Cheves, November 18, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 1255. For Gallatin’s authority to remit fines and forfeitures, see AC, 4–2, 2953–54, and AC, 6–1, 1437.

105. Examination of merchants, [November, 1812], in AC, 12–2, 1259–61; Nathan Appleton et al. to New York committee of merchants, November 2, 1812, John Gore to Appleton, November 23, 1812, and Joseph Sewall and Giles Lodge to Appleton, November 27, 1812, all in Appleton Papers (MHS).

106. Speech of William M. Richardson, December 7, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 297. For similar sentiments, see speech of Langdon Cheves, December 4, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 255; William Plumer to John A. Harper, November 28, 1812, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 2.

107. Giles to Wilson Cary Nicholas, December 10, 1812, in Nicholas Papers (UVA); speech of Langdon Cheves, December 4, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 254.

108. Philip S. Klein, ed., “Memoirs of a Senator from Pennsylvania: Jonathan Roberts, 1771–1854,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 61 (April, 1938), 244. See also Elisha Tracy to ST, December 14, 1812, and Joseph Whipple to ST, December 19, 1812, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reels 25 and 26; Nathaniel Saltonstall to Leverett Saltonstall, November 25, 1812, in Saltonstall Papers (MHS).

109. Speech of Richard M. Johnson, December 3, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 234. See also Lexington Reporter, December 19, 1812.

110. AC, 12–2, 33–34, 100, 450–51, 855, 1126, 1316, 1321–22, 1334–35. See also circular of ST, February 16, 1813, and James Lloyd to ST, February 19, 1813, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reels 25 and 26.

111. Report of House Ways and Means Committee, February 15, 1813, ST to Langdon Cheves, February 9, 1813, and Bill Partially to Suspend Non-Importation, in AC, 12–2, 1062–65.

112. Speech of Langdon Cheves, December 4, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 249.

113. Memorial of the Citizens of Baltimore, February 18, 1813, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 15.

114. Speech of Thomas P. Grosvenor, February 26, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 1138.

115. AC, 12–2, 110, 1099–1100, 1112–13.

116. Benjamin Romaine to ST, December 13, 1812, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 25; London Morning Chronicle, August 12 and September 18, 1812; Anthony Baker to FS, March 22, 1813, in Foreign Office Papers 5/88 (PRO); Edward Fox to Jonathan Roberts, November 10, 1812, in Roberts Papers (HSP); Philadelphia Democratic Press, reprinted in Richmond Enquirer, January 21, 1813; British Order-in-Council, November 13, 1812, in Niles’ Register 3 (February 20, 1813), 400; W. Freeman Galpin, “The American Grain Trade to the Spanish Peninsula, 1810–1814,” American Historical Review 28 (October, 1922), 29–33; Walter R. Copp, “Nova Scotian Trade during the War of 1812,” Canadian Historical Review 18 (June, 1937), 150; Mahan, Sea Power, 1:265, 410–11; Carl Seaburg and Stanley Paterson, Merchant Prince of Boston: Colonel T. H. Perkins, 1764–1854 (Cambridge, 1971), 237.

117. Galpin, “American Grain Trade,” 25.

118. Statement of John Purviance and William Pinkney, October 12, 1812, in Boston Columbian Centinel, October 5, 1814; ST to Larkin Smith, July 24, 1812, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 25. The government did threaten to prosecute the British agent for prisoners of war in Philadelphia and the former British consul at Boston for issuing licenses, but both men were allowed to leave the country instead. See Niles’ Register 5 (September 4, 1813), 4; Brant, James Madison, 6:171.

119. British circular, November 9, 1812, in Niles’ Register 3 (February 27, 1813), 415.

120. JM to Congress, February 24, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 1116–17.

121. AC, 12–2, 121, 1150–51.

122. Speech of Langdon Cheves, December 4, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 250.

123. AC, 12–2, 142–44, 212–14, 216–17.

124. AC, 12–2, 121, 1146, 1153, 1163–64.

125. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December 1, 1812, in ASP: F, 2:580.

126. Gallatin’s revised estimates are summarized in speech of Langdon Cheves, January 23, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 870. See also Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December 1, 1812, in ASP: F, 2:580–81.

127. ST to JM, [November, 1812], in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 25.

128. AC, 12–2, 75, 97, 907–8, 919–20, 1326–28, 1330–33.

129. AC, 12–2, 1065.

130. See AC, 12–2, 1076–79. See also Artemas Ward to Josiah Quincy, June 9, 1813, in Edmund Quincy, Life of Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts, 4th ed. (Boston, 1868), 320.

131. AC, 12–2, 110, 1082–90, 1101, 1110, 1114, 1120–23, 1334.

132. New York National Advocate, March 9, 1813.

133. For more on the Russian proposal, see chapter 11: The Treaty of Ghent.

134. Adams, History, 2:648–50; Brant, James Madison, 6:153–59; Raymond Walters, Jr., Albert Gallatin: Jeffersonian Financier and Diplomat (New York, 1957), 259.

135. John Lovett to Joseph Alexander, June 17, 1813, and to Solomon Van Rensselaer, July 16, 1813, in Catharina V. R. Bonney, A Legacy of Historical Gleanings, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (Albany, 1875), 1:300, 302.

136. Lovett to Joseph Alexander, July 17, 1813, ibid., 303.

137. AC, 13–1, 106, 108, 110.

138. Charles Cutts to William Plumer, June 8, 1813, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 3.

139. Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, May 25, 1813, in Roberts Papers (HSP).

140. JM to Albert Gallatin, August 2, 1813, and to Henry Dearborn, August 8, 1813, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 15; Charles J. Ingersoll to [Alexander Dallas], July 6, 1813, in Ingersoll Papers (HSP); Washington National Intelligencer, July 1, 1813; Lexington Reporter, August 21, 1813; Daniel Webster to Charles March, June 26, 1813, in Claude H. Van Tyne, ed., The Letters of Daniel Webster (New York, 1902), 45; Brant, James Madison, 6:187–88, 192–93.

141. Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, June 21, 1813, in Roberts Papers (HSP).

142. Jeremiah Mason to Jesse Appleton, July 20, 1813, in George S. Hillard, Memoir, Autobiography and Correspondence of Jeremiah Mason, ed. G. J. Clark (Boston, 1917), 61; Calhoun to James Macbride, June 23, 1813, in Meriwether et al., Papers of John C. Calhoun, 1:177. See also Andrei Dashkov to Nikolai P. Rumiantsev, August 7, 1813, in Bashkina et al., United States and Russia, 995.

143. JM to Congress, May 25, 1813, in AC, 13–1, 14–17. Quotation from p. 17.

144. JM to Senate, July 6, 1813, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 15; Senate Journal, 2:347–51, 381–84.

145. Jeremiah Mason to Mary Means Mason, July 11, 1813, in Hillard, Jeremiah Mason, 60–61.

146. Jesse Bledsoe to Isaac Shelby, July 21, 1813, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 26; Christopher Gore to [Timothy Pickering], June 15, 1813, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 30.

147. Senate Journal, 2:346, 389–90.

148. Philadelphia Aurora, January 30, 1812. See also ibid., February 11, 1812.

149. Charles Cutts to Plumer, June 8, 1813, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 3. See also Joseph Alston to William Lowndes, June 23, 1813, in Lowndes Papers (UNC), reel 1.

150. Thomas Hart Benton to Andrew Jackson, June 15, 1813, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 6.

151. Senate Journal, 2:355.

152. Senate Journal, 2:389.

153. Jeremiah Mason to Jesse Appleton, July 20, 1813, in Hillard, Jeremiah Mason, 62.

154. AC, 13–1, 149–52.

155. Speech of Harmanus Bleecker, January 7, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 621.

156. Speech of Felix Grundy, June 18, 1813, in AC, 13–1, 225–26.

157. Speeches of Zebulon R. Shipherd, Alexander C. Hanson, and Joseph Pearson, June 18, 1812, in AC, 13–1, 235–36, 254–56, 285–286.

158. AC, 13–1, 302–3, 308–11.

159. Report of the Secretary of State, July 12, 1813, in ASP: FR, 3:609–12.

160. ST to JM, March 5, 1813, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 15.

161. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, July 28, 1813, in ASP: F, 2:646–47.

162. James Breckinridge to Andrew Hamilton, July 4, 1813, in Breckinridge Papers (UVA); J. L. Shevinester (?) to Andrew Jackson, June 18, 1813, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 6.

163. Quoted in Daniel Webster to Charles March, May 31, [1813], in Charles M. Wiltse et al., eds., The Papers of Daniel Webster: Correspondence, 7 vols. (Hanover, 1974–86), 1:142. See also Charles Cutts to William Plumer, June 8, 1813, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 3; Artemas Ward to Thomas Ward, June 19, 1813, in Thomas Walter Ward Papers (AAS).

164. Benjamin Tallmadge to James McHenry, June 10, 1813, in McHenry Papers (LC).

165. Report of House Ways and Means Committee, June 10, 1813, in AC, 13–1, 149–50. The taxes were supposed to yield $6,365,000, but a proposed tax on foreign tonnage (expected to yield $900,000) was never adopted. This reduced the anticipated yield to $5,465,000. Expenses and losses were expected to reduce the total by an additional $750,000.

166. The tax laws are printed in AC, 13–1, 2717–73.

167. ST to President of Senate, December 27, 1809, in ASP: F, 2:388; U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances for the Year 1866 (Washington, DC, 1866), 306.

168. AC, 13–1, 2759. A state was entitled to a 15 percent discount if it paid its quota by February 10, 1814, and to a 10 percent discount if it paid by May 1, 1814.

169. Ingersoll, Historical Sketch, 1:240.

170. Report of Rhode Island Assembly, in Hartford Connecticut Courant, March 15, 1814.

171. ST to William Bibb, July 19, 1813, in ASP: F, 2:644.

172. AC, 13–1, 78, 477, 2766–68; Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, January 8, 1814, in ASP: F, 2:661–62.

173. Story’s decision is printed in the New York National Advocate, June 26, 1813. See also Washington National Intelligencer, March 8, 1814; Story, Joseph Story, 1:248; Ingersoll, Historical Sketch, 2:40.

174. AC, 13–1, 55, 485, 2777–79. Ships sailing to the United States from Europe, Africa, and the Orient were given a grace period of three to five months before being subject to the law.

175. JM to Congress, July 20, 1813, in AC, 13–1, 499–500.

176. AC, 13–1, 98–101, 500–504.

177. Quoted in Brant, James Madison, 6:197.

178. AC, 13–1, 38–39, 382, 486–87.

179. General Order of the Secretary of the Navy, July 29, 1813, in ND (M149), reel 11; Order of the Secretary of War, August 5, 1813, in Niles’ Register 4 (August 14, 1813), 386.

180. ST to Hugh Nelson, July 21, 1813, in ASP: F, 2:645–46. See also Washington National Intelligencer, August 4, 1813.

181. AC, 13–1, 81, 479, 2766.

182. John Lovett to Joseph Alexander, July 17, 1813, in Bonney, Legacy of Historical Gleanings, 1:304.

183. AC, 13–1, 82, 483, 2773–74.

184. Dallas to Hannah Gallatin, July 22, 1813, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 26; and Dallas, quoted in Brant, James Madison, 6:191. For similar sentiments, see William Jones to Dallas, July 19, 1813, in Dallas Papers (HSP); Worcester National Aegis, November 17, 1813.

185. Washington National Intelligencer, July 26, 1813; John Lovett to Joseph Alexander, July 27, 1813, in Bonney, Legacy of Historical Gleanings, 1:306.

186. AC, 13–1, 83; speech of Elbridge Gerry, April 18, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 776–78; Henry B. Larned, “Gerry and the Presidential Succession in 1813,” American Historical Review 22 (October, 1916), 95–97.

Chapter 6. The Campaign of 1813

1. William Bradford et al., to U.S. Senate, May 2, 1813, in ASP: MA, 1:336; C. Edward Skeen, “Mr. Madison’s Secretary of War,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 100 (July, 1976), 345.

2. Estimates based on figures in J. C. A. Stagg, “Enlisted Men in the United States Army, 1812–1815: A Preliminary Survey,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser. 43 (October, 1986), 621, and J. Mackay Hitsman, The Incredible War of 1812: A Military History (1965; updated by Donald E. Graves, Toronto, 1999), 295–96.

3. Edward Skeen, John Armstrong, Jr., 1758–1843: A Biography (Syracuse, 1981), 129.

4. Pierce Butler to James Monroe, May 2, 1813, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5.

5. SW to cabinet, February 8, 1813, in ASP: MA, 1:439; SW to Henry Dearborn, February 10 and 24, March 29, and April 19, 1813, and to Peter B. Porter, February 23, 1813, in WD (M6), reel 6; Stagg, Mr. Madison’s War, 284–86.

6. Robert Malcomson, Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario, 1812–1814 (Annapolis, 1998), 327–28; David Curtis Skaggs and Gerard T. Altoff, A Signal Victory: The Lake Erie Campaign, 1812–1813 (Annapolis, 1997), 26.

7. JM to Dearborn, October 7, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 14; SN to Isaac Chauncey, January 27, 1813, in ND (M149), reel 10. See also SW to William Henry Harrison, April 3, 1813, in WD (M6), reel 6.

8. Quoted in Mahan, Sea Power, 1:361. See also SN to Chauncey, August 31, 1812, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 1:297–300.

9. Isaac Chauncey to SN, September 3 and 26, October 8, 21, 22 and 27, and November 4 and 5, 1812, in ND (M125), reel 25; Mahan, Sea Power, 1:374–77.

10. Brock to CG, October 11, 1812, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 1:332.

11. Report on the Provincial Marine of the Canadas, n.d., A. Gray to CG, January 29, 1812, Appointment of Sir J. L. Yeo, March 19, 1813, and General Order of April 22, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 1:240, 250–51, and 2:77–78, 81–84; speech of Francis Horner, December 1, 1814, in Parliamentary Debates, 29:644; Isaac Chauncey to SN, November 5, 1814, in ND (M125), reel 40; C. P. Stacey, “Another Look at the Battle of Lake Erie,” Canadian Historical Review 39 (March, 1958), 41–51. Most of the equipment for the American squadron on Lake Erie was manufactured in Pittsburgh. See William W. Dobbins, “The Dobbins Papers,” Publications of the Buffalo Historical Society 8 (1905), 313–14.

12. ST to JM, March 5, 1813, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 15.

13. SW to Harrison, March 17, 1813, in Esarey, Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, 2:386; SW to Harrison, April 4, 1813, in Harrison Papers (LC), reel 1; SW to Harrison, April 27, 1813, in WD (M6), reel 6.

14. Pittsburgh Gazette, reprinted in Richmond Enquirer, April 13, 1813; Larry Nelson, Fort Meigs: War of 1812 Battleground (Columbus, 1999), 5–6; Sandy Antal, A Wampum Denied: Procter’s War 1812 (Ottawa, 1997), 218–19.

15. Procter to CG, May 14, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 2:34; Antal, Wampum Denied, 221–23.

16. General Orders of May 9, 1813, in Brannan, Official Letters, 156.

17. William Henry Harrison to SW, May 9 and 13, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 53; Henry Procter to CG, May 14, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 2:33–37; Diary of the Siege of Fort Meigs, April 25-May 9, 1813, reprinted from Chillicothe Fredonian, in Niles’ Register 4 (June 12, 1813), 242–44; “[Memoir of] Private Nathaniel Vernon, Pittsburgh Blues,” in John C. Fredriksen, ed., The War of 1812 in Person: Fifteen Accounts by United States Army Regulars, Volunteers and Militiamen (Jefferson, 2010), 301–3; McAfee, History of the Late War, 256–77; Gilpin, War of 1812 in the Northwest, 182–89; Antal, Wampum Denied, 226–31.

18. Croghan to Harrison, [July 30, 1813], in McAfee, History of the Late War, 323. See also Croghan to Cincinnati Liberty Hall, September 14, 1813, in Esarey, Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, 2:527–29.

19. Procter to CG, August 9, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 2:44–47. Quotation from p. 46. See also George Croghan to William Henry Harrison, August 5, 1813, in Brannan, Official Letters, 184–86; McAfee, History of the Late War, 321–28; Gilpin, War of 1812 in the Northwest, 206–7; Antal, Warmpun Denied, 256–61; Bruce Bowlus, “A ‘Signal Victory’: The Battle for Fort Stephenson, August 1–2, 1813,” Northwest Ohio Quarterly 63 (Summer/Autumn, 1991), 43–57.

20. Elliott to SN, October 9, 1812, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 1:328.

21. Ibid., 328–31; Nathan Towson to J. D. Elliott, July 6, 1843, and Report of British Court of Inquiry, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 4:50–52, 54–57.

22. Brock to CG, October 11, 1812, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 1:332.

23. Chauncey to Perry, February 1, 1813, in Alexander Slidell Mackenzie, The Life of Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry, 2 vols. (New York, 1840–41), 1:125. See also Perry to SN, November 28, 1812, in ND (M147), reel 4; Chauncey to SN, January 21, 1813, in ND (M125), reel 26.

24. Isaac Chauncey to SN, May 29, 1813, in ND (M125), reel 28.

25. Oliver H. Perry to SN, August 4, 1813, in ND (M147), reel 5; Henry Dearborn to SW, June 8, 1813, and Perry to Isaac Chauncey, June 13, 1813, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 6:55, and 7:272; Mahan, Sea Power, 2:62–64, 69–73.

26. Oliver H. Perry to SN, July 23 and 30, 1813, in ND (M147), reel 5.

27. Perry to SN, August 10, 1813, ibid.

28. Perry to Isaac Chauncey, July 27, 1813, ibid.

29. William Henry Harrison to SW, August 22, 1813, in Esarey, Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, 2:525.

30. Oliver H. Perry to SN, August 21 and September 2, 1813, in ND (M147), reel 5.

31. Speech of Tecumseh, September 18, 1813, in Niles’ Register 5 (November 6, 1813), 174. See also John Sugden, Tecumseh’s Last Stand (Norman, 1985), 19.

32. Estimates of the broadsides vary because the exact number of guns and their arrangement are unknown. I have used those provided by Skaggs and Altoff, Signal Victory, 109.

33. Robert H. Barclay to James Yeo, September 1, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 2:268; testimony of Thomas Stokoe, in Charles O. Paullin, ed., The Battle of Lake Erie: A Collection of Documents (Cleveland, 1918), 151.

34. Narrative of Robert H. Barclay, in Wood, British Documents, 2:303.

35. Barclay to James Yeo, September 1 and 12, 1813, and narrative of Barclay, ibid., 268, 274, 304. See also Robert Gillmor to Edward Couche, September 5, 1813, ibid., 291.

36. This banner is now at the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis. For a facsimile, see Lossing, Pictorial Field-Book, 519.

37. Barclay to James Yeo, September 12, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 2:277; Frederick C. Drake, “Artillery and Its Influence on Naval Tactics: Reflections on the Battle of Lake Erie,” in William Jeffrey Welsh and David Curtis Skaggs, eds., War on the Great Lakes: Essays Commemorating the 175th Anniversary of the Battle of Lake Erie (Kent, 1991), 17–29.

38. Perry to SN, September 13, 1813, in ASP: NA, 1:295.

39. Ibid.; Robert H. Barclay to James Yeo, September 12, 1813, and James Yeo to John B. Warren, October 10, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 2:274–77, 287–88; Niles’ Register 7 (Supplement), 41; John C. Fredriksen, ed., Surgeon of the Lakes: The Diary of Dr. Usher Parson, 1812–1814 (Erie, 2000) (September 10, 1813), 49; Ernest A. Cruikshank, ”The Contest for the Command of Lake Erie in 1812–13,” in Zaslow, Defended Border, 96–104; Mackenzie, Oliver Hazard Perry, 1:215–61; Skaggs and Altoff, Signal Victory, 118–52.

40. Perry to Harrison, September 10, 1813. Although the original note has been lost, there is a facsimile in Lossing, Pictorial Field-Book, 530. Perry actually took two ships, two schooners, one brig, and a sloop.

41. SN to Perry, September 21, 1813, in ND (M149), reel 11. See also Richmond Enquirer, September 28 and October 15, 1813.

42. AC, 13–2, 2838–39, 2855–56; Samuel Hambleton to SN, May 23, 1814 (filed under June 10, 1814), in ND (M149), reel 11.

43. Naval Chronicle 30 (July-December, 1813), 431.

44. Procter to Francis de Rottenburg, September 12, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 2:273.

45. Speech of Tecumseh, September 18, 1813, in Niles’ Register 5 (November 6, 1813), 175.

46. McAfee, History of the Late War, 338; Shelby to Kentucky militia, July 30, 1813, in Washington National Intelligencer, August 18, 1813.

47. Shelby to ———, September 10, 1813, in Isaac Shelby Papers (LC).

48. McAfee, History of the Late War, 331–32; Mahon, War of 1812, 178.

49. Harrison to SW, October 9, 1813, in WD (M222), reel 8.

50. Quoted in McAfee, History of the Late War, 396–97.

51. Quoted in Thomas D. Clark, “Kentucky in the Northwest Campaign,” in Philip P. Mason, ed., After Tippecanoe: Some Aspects of the War of 1812 (East Lansing, 1963), 94. Tecumseh was undoubtedly buried in one of the mass graves on the battlefield, but the myth that his body was carried off and his bones preserved endures to this day. See Guy St-Denis, Tecumseh’s Bones (Montreal, 2005).

52. William Henry Harrison to SW, October 9, 1813, in WD (M222), reel 8; Richard M. Johnson to SW, November 21, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 54; Harrison to SW, September 27, 1813, in Esarey, Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, 2:551; Henry Procter to Francis de Rottenburg, October 23 and November 16, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 2:323–27, 338–41; General Order of September 9, 1815, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 8:160–64; Bennett H. Young, The Battle of the Thames (Louisville, 1903), 29–109; Sugden, Tecumseh’s Last Stand, passim.

53. William Henry Harrison to SW, October 16, 1813, in Esarey, Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, 2:579–81.

54. William Henry Harrison and Lewis Cass to SW, July 17, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 62; Treaty of Peace and Friendship, July 22, 1814, in ASP: IA, 1:326; Gilpin, War of 1812 in the Northwest, 240–41; Sugden, Tecumseh’s Last Stand, 182–207.

55. Harrison to SW, May 11, 1814, in Harrison Papers (LC), reel 2.

56. Isaac Chauncey to SN, August 13, and October 1 and 6, 1813, in ND (M125), reels 30 and 31; Morgan Lewis to Daniel Tompkins, August 15, 1813, and Buffalo Gazette, August 17, 1813, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 7:24, 34.

57. Malcomson, Lords of the Lake, 197–207; James Elliott, “Mulcaster’s Bravery in 1813 Burlington Races,” Hamilton Spectator, August 31, 1999.

58. James F. Cooper, ed., Ned Myers; or, A Life before the Mast (1843; reprint, Annapolis, 1989), 56.

59. Malcomson, Lords of the Lake, 171–73; Daniel A. Nelson, “Hamilton & Scourge: Ghost Ships of the War of 1812,” National Geographic 163 (March, 1983), 289–313.

60. Isaac Chauncey to SN, March 18, 1813, in ND (M125), reel 27; SW to Henry Dearborn, March 29, 1813, and Dearborn to SW, [early 1813], in ASP: MA, 1:442; SN to Chauncey, April 8, 1813, in NASP: NA, 4:278–81; Mahan, Sea Power, 2:31–34.

61. Henry Dearborn to SW, April 28, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 52; Isaac Chauncey to SN, April 28, 1813, in ND (M125), reel 28; Roger Sheaffe to CG, May 5, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 2:89–94; William Chewett et al. to John Strachan et al., May 8, 1813, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 5:192–202; Robert Malcomson, Capital in Flames: The American Attack on York, 1813 (Montreal, 2008), 167–214.

62. Malcomson, Capital in Flames, 214–21, 393–98.

63. Samuel S. Conner to SW, May 4, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 51.

64. Journal of Dr. William Beaumont, April 27, 1813, in Genevieve Miller, ed., Wm. Beaumont’s Formative Years: Two Early Notebooks, 1811–1821 (New York, 1946), 46.

65. George Howard to Sarah Howard, May 7, 1813, in George Howard Journal (CHS).

66. Penelope Beikie, quoted in C. P. Stacey, The Battle of Little York, 3rd printing (Toronto, 1977), 17. See also William Chewett et al. to John Strachan et al., May 8, 1813, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 5:200.

67. Isaac Chauncey to SN, June 4, 1813, in ND (M125), reel 29; letter to Baltimore Whig, May 7, 1813, E. W. Ripley to William D. Powell, n.d., and Kingston Gazette, August 17, 1813, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 5:171–73, 8:25; Francis de Rottenburg to SSWC, October 25, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 2:220; Malcomson, Capital in Flames, 228–38.

68. Malcomson, Capital in Flames, 257.

69. CG to SSWC, July 20, 1813, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 6:256. For an assessment of the impact of the fall of York on British operations on Lake Erie, see Hickey, Don’t Give Up the Ship, 63–65.

70. William Allan to Edward Baynes, August 3, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 2:195.

71. Isaac Chauncey to SN, August 4, 1813, in ND (M125), reel 30; Winfield Scott to John Boyd, August 3, 1813, in ASP: MA, 1:450; Grant Powell to CG, August 1, 1813, John Strachan and Grant Powell to Edward Baynes, August 2, 1813, and William Allan to Baynes, August 3, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 2:189–96; Malcomson, Capital in Flames, 310–11.

72. E.B. Brenton to Noah Freer, May 30, 1813, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 5:281–82.

73. Brown to Henry Dearborn, July 25, 1813, in Adams, History, 2:735.

74. See Jacob Brown to SW, June 1, 1813, in Franklin B. Hough, A History of Jefferson County in the State of New York, from the Earliest Period to the Present Time (Albany, 1854), 490–91; Isaac Chauncey to SN, June 2, 1813, in ND (M125), reel 29; Edward Baynes to CG, May 30, 1813, E. B. Brenton to Noah Freer, May 30, 1813, and Brown to Daniel Tompkins, June 1, 1813, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier 5:276–87; Patrick A. Wilder, The Battle of Sackett’s Harbour: 1813 (Baltimore, 1994), chs. 5–7; John D. Morris, Sword of the Border: Major General Jacob Jennings Brown, 1775–1828 (Kent, 2000), ch. 3.

75. Memorandum of J. B. Glegg, May 3 and 5, 1813, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 5:221; Malcomson, Lords of the Lake, 125.

76. Henry Dearborn to SW, May 27, 1813, and Darby Noon to Daniel Tompkins, May 27, 1813, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 5:246–47, 249; Isaac Chauncey to SN, May 28, 1813, in ND (M125), reel 28; John Vincent to CG, May 28, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 2:103–7.

77. Henry Dearborn to SW, May 29, 1813, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 5:266–67.

78. Stuart Sutherland, ed., “A Desire of Serving and Defending My Country”: The War of 1812 Journals of William Hamilton Merritt (Toronto, 2001), 6.

79. John Chandler to Henry Dearborn, June 18, 1813, in WD (M222), reel 7; James Burns to Dearborn, n.d., in ASP: MA, 1:447–48; James FitzGibbon to James Somerville, June 7, 1813, and letter to Buffalo Gazette [June, 1813], in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 6:12–15, 105–6; John Harvey to [Edward Baynes], June 6, 1813, and John Vincent to CG, June 6, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 2:139–45; “[Memoir of] Captain Ephraim Shaler, 25th U.S. Infantry,” in Fredriksen, The War of 1812 in Person, 45–49; Herbert F. Wood, “The Many Battles of Stoney Creek,” in Zaslow, Defended Border, 56–60; James E. Elliott, Strange Fatality: The Battle of Stoney Creek, 1813 (Montreal, 2009), 80–157.

80. Robert Malcomson, Historical Dictionary of the War of 1812 (Lanham, 2006), 82: Taylor, Civil War, 224–25.

81. Narrative of Charles Boerstler, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 6:130–37; James FitzGibbon to Peter de Haren, June 24, 1813, Boerstler to Henry Dearborn, June 25, 1813, Memoir of Laura Secord, February 18, 1861, in Wood, British Documents, 2:159–62, 164–65; Donald E. Graves, ed., Merry Hearts Make Light Days: The War of 1812 Journal of Lieutenant John Le Couteur, 104th Foot, (Ottawa, 1993) (June 24, 1813), 126; Carl F. Klinck and James J. Talman, eds., The Journal of John Norton, 1816 (Toronto, 1970), 330–32; Dianne Graves, In the Midst of Alarms: The Untold Story of Women and the War of 1812 ([Montreal], 2007), 231–34; Carl Benn, The Iroquois in the War of 1812 (Toronto, 1998), 114–21; Quimby, U.S. Army, 1:248–50.

82. FitzGibbon to William J. Kerr, March 30, 1818, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 6: 120–21.

83. Sutherland, War of 1812 Journals of William Hamilton Merritt, 8.

84. Taylor, Civil War, 227.

85. Ingersoll to [Alexander Dallas], July 6, 1813, in Ingersoll Papers (HSP). See also SW to Henry Dearborn, July 6, 1813, in WD (M6), reel 7; Dearborn to JM, August 17, 1813, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 15.

86. Henry Dearborn to SW, July 6, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 52; Peter B. Porter to Dearborn, July 13, 1813, in Niles’ Register 8 (Supplement), 146–47; Buffalo Gazette, July 13, 1813, statement of James FitzGibbon, and Recollections of James Sloan, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 6:226–31; Thomas Clark to John Harvey, July 5 and 12, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 2:174–77.

87. McClure to Daniel Tompkins, December 10, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 55.

88. McClure to SW, December 6, 10, and 13, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 55; McClure to Daniel Tompkins, December 6 and 10, 1813, John A. Rogers et al. to Buffalo Gazette, [December, 1813], in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 8:254, 264, 9:10; Sutherland, War of 1812 Journals of William Hamilton Merritt, 16.

89. George McClure to SW, December 13, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 55; Quimby, U.S. Army, 1:353–56.

90. McClure to SW, December 22, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 55.

91. Tompkins to SW, December 24, 1813, in Hastings, Papers of Daniel D. Tompkins, 3:407. See also George McClure to SW, December 22 and 25, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 55; Lewis Cass to SW, January 12, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:488; Lt. Driscoll, “The Capture of Fort Niagara,” in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 9:18–20; Gordon Drummond to CG, December 20 and 22, 1813, and General Order of December 19, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 2:490–92, 494–97.

92. George McClure to SW, December 22, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 55; Phineas Riall to Gordon Drummond, December 19, 1813, and Timothy Hopkins to Daniel Tompkins, December 20, 1813, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 9:14, 24.

93. Letter to Albany Argus, December 26, 1813, ibid., 55. See also Daniel Tompkins to SW, January 2, 1814, in Hastings, Papers of Daniel D. Tompkins, 3:408.

94. McClure to [SW], December 20, 1813, in WD (M222), reel 8.

95. McClure to Erastus Granger, December 28, 1813, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 9:61. See also Timothy Hopkins to Daniel Tompkins, December 20, 1813, McClure to Tompkins, December 20, 1813, and John C. Spencer to Tompkins, December 26, 1813, ibid., 24–25, 53.

96. Gordon Drummond to CG, December 30, 1813, Phineas Riall to Drummond, January 1, 1814, and Amos Hall to Daniel Tompkins, January 6, 1814, ibid., 67, 70–72, 92–97; Donald E. Graves, “Joseph Willcocks and the Canadian Volunteers: An Account of Political Disaffection in Upper Canada during the War of 1812” (MA thesis, Carleton University, 1982), 68–69; Malcomson, Historical Dictionary, 83.

97. Cass to SW, January 12, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:487.

98. Tompkins to SW, January 2, 1814, in Hastings, Papers of Daniel D. Tompkins, 3:408. See also Amos Hall to [Tompkins], December 30, 1813, in Niles’ Register 5 (February 12, 1814), 394.

99. Proclamation of George Prevost, January 12, 1814, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 9:115.

100. Graves, “Joseph Willcocks,” 64–65.

101. SW to David R. Williams, August 5, 1813, and SW to James Wilkinson, August 8, 1813, in WD (M6), reel 7; SW to Henry Dearborn, April 19, 1813, SW to Wilkinson, September 6 and 22, 1813, Memoranda of Wilkinson and SW, October 5, 1813, and SW to Wilkinson, October 19 and 20, 1813, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 5:148–49, 7:106, 163–64, 197–98, and 8:81–82, 85–86; SW to Wade Hampton, October 16, 1812, in ASP: MA, 1:461; Stagg, Mr. Madison’s War, 331–43; Skeen, John Armstrong, 145–63.

102. Isaac Clark to SW, June 4, 1813, in WD (M222), reel 7; George Taylor to Richard Stovin, June 3, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 2:221–23; Rodney Macdonough, Life of Commodore Thomas Macdonough, U.S. Navy (Boston, 1909), 115–20.

103. JM to SW, September 8, 1813, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 15.

104. Winfield Scott, Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, 2 vols. (New York, 1864), 1:94n; Randolph to Joseph H. Nicholson, June 25, 1807, in Nicholson Papers (LC). See also Charles W. Elliott, Winfield Scott: The Soldier and the Man (New York, 1937), 32–33.

105. Allan B. Magruder to [SW], January 16, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 55. See also William H. Crawford to JM, January 15, 1812, and March 3, 1813, in Madison Papers (LC), reels 13 and 15; Jacobs, Beginnings of the U.S. Army, 344–52.

106. Mahon, War of 1812, 202–5.

107. SW to Wade Hampton, October 16, 1813, in ASP: MA, 1:461; SW to James Wilkinson, October 19, 1813, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 8:81–82.

108. Donald E. Graves, Field of Glory: The Battle of Crysler’s Farm, 1813 (Toronto, 1999), 55–57.

109. Wade Hampton to SW, September 25, 1813, in WD (M222), reel 8.

110. Wade Hampton to SW, November 1, 1813, and Report of L. Thayer [early 1814], in WD (M221), reels 53 and 57; Robert Purdy to James Wilkinson, n.d., in ASP: MA, 1:479–80; Charles de Salaberry to father, October 29, 1813, CG to SSWC, October 30, 1813, and O’Sullivan, “Account of the Battle of Chateauguay,” November 3, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 2:391–95, 401–12; Graves, Field of Glory, 87–111, 350–54.

111. Hampton to SW, November 1, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 53.

112. Wilkinson to SW, October 19, 1813, in WD (M222), reel 9.

113. Wilkinson to SW, September 16, 1813, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 7:133; Ellery Harrison, ed., The Memoirs of Gen. Joseph Gardner Swift (Worcester, 1890), 116. See also Wilkinson to Henry Dearborn, December 4, 1813, in Dearborn Papers (MeHS).

114. Graves, Field of Glory, 77–81.

115. Ibid., 119–58.

116. John P. Boyd to James Wilkinson, November 12, 1813, in Niles’ Register 5 (December 18, 1813), 266–67; Wilkinson to SW, November 16, 1813, and Journal of James Wilkinson, October 21-November 12, 1813, in ASP: MA, 1:475–78; J. W. Morrison to Francis de Rottenburg, November 12, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 2:441–44 Graves, Field of Glory, 219–72, 360–63.

117. George Howard to Sarah Howard, December 19, 1813, in George Howard Journal (CHS).

118. Dr. Lovell, quoted in James Mann, Medical Sketches of the Campaigns of 1812, 13, 14 (Dedham, MA, 1816), 119. See also Journal of James Wilkinson, November 12, 1813, in ASP: MA, 1:478; Secret Information from French Mills, February 7, 1814, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 9:168; Mahon, War of 1812, 215–18.

119. Graves, Field of Glory, 286–90.

120. Ibid., 285.

121. James Wilkinson to SW, March 25, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 58.

122. James Wilkinson to Dr. Bule, March 31, 1814, in Wilkinson Papers (LC); Wilkinson to [SW?], March 31, 1814, in Brannan, Official Letters, 325–26; William Williams to John Vincent, March 31, 1814, in Wood, British Documents, 3:14–16; Albany Register and Middlebury Columbian Patriot, reprinted in Richmond Enquirer, April 16, 1814.

123. For Britain’s southern Indian policy, see John K. Mahon, “British Strategy and Southern Indians: War of 1812,” Florida Historical Quarterly 54 (April, 1966), 285–98; Frank L. Owsley, “The Role of the South in the British Grand Strategy in the War of 1812,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 31 (Spring, 1972), 22–34; and David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, Old Hickory’s War: Andrew Jackson and the Quest for Empire (Mechanicsburg, 1996), 38–50.

124. John R. Swanton, Social Organization and Social Usages of the Indians of the Creek Confederacy (Washington, DC, 1928); Angie Debo, The Road to Disappearance, 2nd ed. (Norman, 1967), 3–71; Michael D. Green, The Politics of Indian Removal: Creek Government and Society in Crisis (Lincoln, 1982), chs. 1–2; J. Leitch Wright, Jr., Creeks & Seminoles: The Destruction and Regeneration of the Muscogulge People (Lincoln, 1986), chs. 1–3; Claudio Saunt, A New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek Indians, 1733–1816 (Cambridge, 1999), chs. 6–8.

125. Niles’ Register 5 (September 13, 1813), 43.

126. Quoted in Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson, 3 vols. (New York, 1977–84), 1:188.

127. Mahon, War of 1812, 232.

128. Benjamin Hawkins to SW, July 20, 1812, in WD (M221), reel 45; Hawkins to SW, September 7, 1812, and William Henry to John J. Henry, June 26, 1812, in ASP: IA, 1:812–13; Shelbyville Tennessee Herald, reprinted in Niles’ Register 2 (June 13, 1812), 256; letter from Creek Agency, July 27, 1813, in Niles’ Register 5 (September 25, 1813), 56; Quimby, U.S. Army, 1:375–79.

129. Harry Toulmin to Willie Blount, July 28–30, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 50; H. S. Halbert and T. H. Ball, The Creek War of 1813 and 1814 (Chicago, 1895), 125–42; Frank L. Owsley, Jr., Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands: The Creek War and the Battle of New Orleans, 1812–1815 (Gainesville, 1981), 30–33; Quimby, U.S. Army, 1:380–83.

130. Quoted in John F. H. Claiborne, Life and Times of Gen. Sam. Dale, The Mississippi Partisan (New York, 1860), 128–29.

131. William Claiborne to Thomas Flournoy, September 2, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 52; Henry Toulmin to Raleigh Register, September 7, 1813, in Niles’ Register 5 (October 16, 1813), 105–7; Halbert and Ball, Creek War, 147–64; Owsley, Struggle for the Borderlands, 35–39.

132. William Claiborne, quoted in Halbert and Ball, Creek War, 299.

133. Harry Toulmin to Raleigh Register, September 7, 1813, in Niles’ Register 5 (October 16, 1813), 105.

134. Claiborne, Sam. Dale, 119–27; Owsley, Struggle for the Borderlands, 45–46; Quimby, U.S. Army, 1:400–402.

135. James White to John Cocke, November 24, 1813, in Richmond Enquirer, December 25, 1813; J. Hoyt to Thomas Pinckney, December 4, 1813, and John Floyd to Thomas Pinckney, January 27, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 56; Owsley, Struggle for the Borderlands, 46–60; Quimby, U.S. Army, 1:426–29, 431–34, 456–57.

136. Quoted in Harry L. Coles, The War of 1812 (Chicago, 1965), 197.

137. General Orders of November 7, 1813, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 61. See also Remini, Andrew Jackson, 1:191–93.

138. John Coffee to Andrew Jackson, November 4, 1813, in Brannan, Official Letters, 255–56. See also Owsley, Struggle for the Borderlands, 64–65.

139. Coffee to Andrew Jackson, November 4, 1813, in Brannan, Official Letters, 256.

140. Andrew Jackson to Willie Blount, November 11 and 15, 1813, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 61; Owsley, Struggle for the Borderlands, 65–66.

141. Jackson to SW, December 16, 1813, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 7.

142. Andrew Jackson to John Coffee, December 11, 1813, and to John Floyd, December 26, 1813, and Willie Blount to Jackson, December 22, 1813 (two letters), in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 7; Jackson to Rachel Jackson, December 29, 1813, in Jackson Papers, Supplement (SR), reel 3; Jackson to Floyd, December 27, 1813, in Sam B. Smith et al., eds., The Papers of Andrew Jackson, 7 vols. to date (Knoxville, 1980-), 2:510; statement of J.W. Sittler, in John S. Bassett, ed., Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, 6 vols. (Washington, DC, 1926–33), 1:434.

143. Andrew Jackson to SW, December 16, 1813, and to Rachel Jackson, January 28, 1814, in Jackson Papers (LC), reels 7 and 8; Jackson to Thomas Pinckney, January 29, 1814, in Bassett, Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, 1:447–54; Owsley, Struggle for the Borderlands, 73–76; Robert Remini, Andrew Jackson & His Indian Wars (New York, 2001), 81.

144. Jackson to William Lewis, February 21, 1814, in Jackson Papers, Supplement (SR), reel 3.

145. General Orders of [March 14, 1814], in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 62.

146. John Reid and John Eaton, The Life of Andrew Jackson (Philadelphia, 1817), 143. See also James Parton, Life of Andrew Jackson, 3 vols. (New York, 1860), 1:504–12.

147. Jackson to Rachel Jackson, April 1, 1814, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 9.

148. Andrew Jackson to Willie Blount, March 31, 1814, in Jackson Papers, Supplement (SR), reel 3; Jackson to SW, April 2, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 54; Jackson to Thomas Pinckney, March 28, 1814, and to Blount, April 2, 1814, in Jackson Papers (LC), reels 9 and 10; Jackson to Blount, March 28, 1814, in Brannan, Official Letters, 321–23; Owsley, Struggle for the Borderlands, 79–81; Remini, Andrew Jackson & His Indian Wars, 75–79.

149. Address of Andrew Jackson, April 2, 1814, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 10.

150. Quoted in letter of Anne Royall, December 15, 1817, in Lucille Griffith, ed., Letters from Alabama, 1817–1822, by Anne Royall (University, AL, 1969), 91–92. See also Jackson to Blount, April 18, 1814, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 10.

151. Jackson to [Thomas Pinckney], May 18, 1814, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 10.

152. Articles of Agreement and Capitulation, August 9, 1814, in ASP: IA, 1:326–27; Parton, Andrew Jackson, 1:535; Owsley, Struggle for the Borderlands, 86–94; Remini, Andrew Jackson, 1:225–32.

153. For more on British naval policy in 1812, see chapter 4: The Campaign of 1812.

154. Statement of British Naval Force on North American Stations, 1810–1813, in Charles Vane, ed., Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh, 12 vols. (London, 1848–53), 8:292; editorial note in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 2:167.

155. Quoted in Mahan, Sea Power, 2:151. See also FSA to John B. Warren, March 20, 1813, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 2:75–78.

156. Thomas Pinckney to SW, October 17, 1812, in WD (M221), reel 48; editorial note in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 1:561.

157. [Lord Castlereagh?] to Anthony Baker, February 3, 1813, in Foreign Office Papers 5/88 (PRO); Notice of Foreign Office, December 26, 1812, in Naval Chronicle 28 (July-December 1812), 507; Proclamation of John Borlase Warren, November 16, 1813, in Niles’ Register 5 (December 18, 1813), 264–65; editorial note in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 1:561; Mahan, Sea Power, 2:9–10; Wade G. Dudley, Splintering the Wooden Wall: The British Blockade of the United States, 1812–1815 (Annapolis, 2003), 85.

158. John Hollins to Wilson Cary Nicholas, April 8, 1813, in Nicholas Papers (UVA). A sharp vessel has a broad bow that narrows considerably below the waterline.

159. Mahan, Sea Power, 2:182.

160. Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, March 1, 1813, in Nicholson Papers (LC); John Lovett to Joseph Alexander, May 18, 1813, in Catharina V. R. Bonney, A Legacy of Historical Gleanings, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (Albany, 1875), 1:297.

161. Niles’ Register 5 (September 13, 1813), 41.

162. John Lovett to Joseph Alexander, May 18, 1813, in Bonney, Legacy of Historical Gleanings, 1:297.

163. Harrison, Diary of Thomas P. Cope (December 18, 1813), 287.

164. New York Columbian, reprinted in Richmond Enquirer, December 28, 1813.

165. Philadelphia Democratic Press, reprinted in Richmond Enquirer, December 28, 1813; Hartford American Mercury, December 21, 1813.

166. Washington National Intelligencer, December 30, 1813, and January 10, 1814; Hartford American Mercury, December 21, 1813; Philadelphia Democratic Press, reprinted in Richmond Enquirer, December 30, 1813; Manuel Eyre to William Jones, January 5, 1814, in Jones (HSP); Harrison, Diary of Thomas P. Cope (January 5, 1814), 289.

167. Nettels, Emergence of a National Economy, 385–86.

168. See James Pack, The Man Who Burned the White House: Admiral Sir George Cockburn, 1772–1853 (Annapolis, 1987); and Roger Morriss, Cockburn and the British Navy in Transition: Admiral Sir George Cockburn, 1772–1853 (Columbia, 1997).

169. Mahan, Sea Power, 2:155–56.

170. Quoted in deposition of William T. Killpatrick, June 25, 1813, in ASP: MA, 1:365.

171. See documents in ASP: MA, 1:358–67; George Cockburn to John Warren, May 3 and 6, 1813, in Naval Chronicle 30 (July-December, 1813), 164–68; Christopher T. George, Terror on the Chesapeake: The War of 1812 on the Bay (Shippensburg, 2000), 27–37; Pack, George Cockburn, 151–55.

172. Ingersoll, Historical Sketch, 1:198.

173. Littleton W. Tazewell to SW, June 22, 1813, H. Beatty to Robert Taylor, June 22, 1813, and Taylor to [SW], June 23, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 57; Norfolk Herald and Beatty to Taylor, June 25, 1813, in Washington National Intelligencer, June 28 and July 10, 1813; George, Terror on the Chesapeake, 40–48.

174. Journal of Charles Napier, August 12, 1813, in William F. P. Napier, The Life and Opinions of General Sir Charles James Napier, 4 vols. (London, 1857), 1:221.

175. John Sherbrooke to CG, July 20, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 3:713. See also James Scott, Recollections of a Naval Life, 3 vols. (London, 1834), 3:153; James, Naval History of Great Britain, 6:234–35.

176. See documents in ASP: MA, 1:375–81. See also S. Crutchfield to James Barbour, June 28, 1813, in Washington National Intelligencer, July 5, 1813; J. Mackay Hitsman and Alice Sorby, “Independent Foreigners or Canadian Chasseurs,” Military Affairs 25 (Spring, 1961), 11–17; Donald E. Graves, “‘Worthless Is the Laurel Steeped in Female Tears’: An Investigation into the Outrages Committed by British Troops at Hampton, Virginia, 1813,” Journal of the War of 1812 7 (Winter, 2002), 4–20; George, Terror on the Chesapeake, 48–51.

177. James Polkinghorne to Henry Baker, August 10, 1813, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 2:381; George, Terror on the Chesapeake, 61–64, 183–84n54; Norman H. Plummer, “Another Look at the Battle of St. Michaels,” Weather Gauge 31 (Spring, 1995), 10–15.

178. Niles’ Register 4 (May 15, 1813), 182; ibid. 5 (January 8, 1814), 312; ibid. 6 (June 25, 1814), 279.

179. Ibid. 5 (October 16, 1813), 119; ibid. 5 (January 8, 1814), 312; ibid. 6 (April 30, 1814), 150; Scott, Recollections of a Naval Life, 3:118–20; Frank A. Cassell, “Slaves of the Chesapeake Bay Area and the War of 1812,” Journal of Negro History 57 (April, 1972), 144–49; Christopher T. George, “Mirage of Freedom: African Americans in the War of 1812,” Maryland Historical Magazine 91 (Winter, 1996), 431–34.

180. John Lovett to Joseph Alexander, July 17, 1813, in Bonney, Legacy of Historical Gleanings, 1:304.

181. SN to American navy captains, February 22, 1813, in ND (M149), reel 10. See also Edward K. Eckert, The Navy Department in the War of 1812 (Gainesville, 1973), 21.

182. Samuel Evans to SN, April 20, 1813, and James Lawrence to SN, May 18, 1813, in ND (M125), reel 28.

183. Roosevelt, Naval War, 1:223–24.

184. Quoted in Mahan, Sea Power, 2:134. See also Roosevelt, Naval War, 1:225–26.

185. Broke to captain of the Chesapeake, June [1], 1813, in ND (M125), reel 29.

186. Philip Broke and Thomas Bladen Capel, An Account of the Chesapeake-Shannon Action, June 6, 1813, and George Budd to SN, June 15, 1813, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 2:129–36; Halifax newspapers, reprinted in London Times, August 16 and 24, 1813; Roosevelt, Naval War, 1:226–43; Maclay, United States Navy, 1:450–68. H. F. Pullen, The “Shannon” and the “Chesapeake” (Toronto, 1970), chs. 5–7; Hickey, Don’t Give Up the Ship, 107–12.

187. London Morning Chronicle, July 9, 1813.

188. Naval Chronicle 30 (July-December, 1813), 41; Maclay, United States Navy, 1:461.

189. Halifax underwriters to Philip Broke, August 25, 1813, FSA to Joseph Warren, July 9, 1813, and “Biographical Memoir of Sir Philip Bowes Vere Broke,” in Naval Chronicle 30 (July-December, 1813), 398–99, 486, and 33 (January-June, 1815), 17–19.

190. Salem Gazette, September 25, 1813.

191. Philip Freneau, “In Memory of James Lawrence, Esquire,” in Fred L. Pattee, ed., The Poems of Philip Freneau: Poet of the American Revolution, 3 vols. (Princeton, 1902–7), 3:313–14.

192. Annapolis Maryland Republican, reprinted in Washington National Intelligencer, July 2, 1813.

193. SN to Perry, July 3, 1813, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 2:488.

194. Porter to SN, October 14, 1812, ibid., 1:528.

195. Porter to SN, July 3, 1814, in ND (M125), reel 37.

196. Frances Robotti and James Vescovi, The USS “Essex” and the Birth of the American Navy (Holbrook, 1999), 177–78, 245–47.

197. David Porter to SN, July 3, 1814, in ND (M125), reel 37. See also David Porter, Journal of a Cruise Made to the Pacific Ocean . . . in the Years 1812, 1813, and 1814, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (New York, 1822), 2:144–58.

198. David Porter to SN, July 3, 1814, in ND (M125), reel 37; Porter, Journal of a Cruise, 2:175; James Hillyar to FSA, March 30, 1814, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:727–30; Roosevelt, Naval War, 2:15–37; Hickey, Don’t Give Up the Ship, 114–15.

199. Edward R. McCall to [Isaac Hull], September 7, 1813, in ND (M125), reel 31; John F. Maples to Edward Thornborough, August 14, 1813, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 2:223; Ira Dye, The Fatal Cruise of the “Argus”: Two Captains in the War of 1812 (Annapolis, 1994), ch. 18; Roosevelt, Naval War, 1:252–65; Mahan, Sea Power, 2:187–92, 216–19.

200. Quoted in Mahan, Sea Power, 2:20.

201. Niles’ Register 6 (March 26, 1814), 69. See also London Morning Chronicle, December 1, 1814.

202. Quoted in Maclay, American Privateers, 275.

203. Niles’ Register 5 (November 20, 1813), 200; ibid. 6 (June 18, 1814), 269; Coggeshall, American Privateers, 219–25.

204. John Drayton to SS, August 24, 1813, and Charles R. Simpson to Thomas Barclay, August 24, 1813, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 2: 214–17.

Chapter 7. The Last Embargo

1. Speech of William H. Murfree, January 10, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 856; William Hunter to James A. Bayard, January 29, 1814, in Donnan, Papers of James A. Bayard, 266. See also speech of Charles J. Ingersoll, February 14, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1431.

2. Richard Rush to Charles J. Ingersoll, October 28, 1813, in Rush Papers (SR), reel 3.

3. JM to Congress, December 7, 1813, in AC, 13–2, 538–44.

4. Senate Journal, 2:451–52, 470; Adams, History, 2:875.

5. Charles Goldsborough to Harmanus Bleecker, February 4, 1814, in Harrier Rice, Harmanus Bleecker: An Albany Dutchman, 1779–1849 (Albany, 1924), 37; William R. Davie to John Steele, February 4, 1814, in Kemp P. Battle, ed., “Letters of William R. Davie, “James Sprunt Historical Monograph 7 (1907), 74. See also John Hoffman to Virgil Maxcy, January 16, 1814, in Galloway-Maxcy-Marcoe Papers (LC); William Hunter to James A. Bayard, January 29, 1814, in Donnan, Papers of James A. Bayard, 266.

6. Senate Journal, 1:453–54, 471.

7. AC, 13–2, 1057.

8. AC, 13–2, 600, 631; Jeremiah Mason to Marsha Mason, February 10, 1814, in George S. Hillard, Memoir, Autobiography and Correspondence of Jeremiah Mason, ed. G. J. Clark (Boston, 1917), 83.

9. Jones to Alexander Dallas, December 21, 1813 in Dallas Papers (HSP).

10. Alexander Dallas to William Jones, February 3, 1814, in Jones Papers (HSP); Senate Journal, 1:471; Adams, History, 2:892–93.

11. Philip S. Klein, ed., “Memoirs of a Senator from Pennsylvania: Jonathan Roberts, 1771–1854,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 61 (April, 1938), 366; Jones to Alexander Dallas, September 15, 1814, in Dallas Papers (HSP). For similar sentiments, see Nathaniel Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, February 17, 1814, in Nicholson Papers (LC).

12. Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, February 8, 1814, in Nicholson Papers (LC).

13. AC, 13–2, 766, 852–53, 1114–15, 2023–24; William Pinkney to JM, January 25, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 15.

14. Nathaniel Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, February 17, 1814, in Nicholson Papers (LC).

15. Senate Journal, 2:472; Adams, History, 2:893–94.

16. Brant, James Madison, 6:243.

17. John A. Harper to William Plumer, November 1, 1812, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 3.

18. Charles J. Ingersoll to JM, January 5, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 15.

19. Dolley Madison to Hannah Gallatin, January 21, [1814], in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 26; Niles’ Register 7 (January 14, 1815), 320; Brant, James Madison, 6:243–44.

20. Memorial of Harrisburg merchants, [1814], and John Binns to JM, July 11, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 16. See also Chandler C. Price to William Jones, February 14, 1814, in Jones Papers (HSP); Sanford W. Higginbotham, The Keystone in the Democratic Arch: Pennsylvania Politics, 1800–1816 (Harrisburg, 1952), 28–86.

21. AC, 13–2, 1245–47, 1837–38; Senate Journal, 2:511; Brant, James Madison, 6:244–45.

22. John Smith to Albert Gallatin, March 27, 1814, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 26. For similar sentiments, see Lexington Reporter, April 2, 1814.

23. Roberts to Alexander Dallas, December 12, 1813, in Dallas Papers (HSP).

24. Speech of William Baylies, February 24, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1656. See also speeches of Elijah Brigham, January 20, 1814, and Artemas Ward, Jr., March 5, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1061, 1818.

25. AC, 13–2, 939, 1054.

26. Speech of Thomas B. Robertson, January 15, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 982.

27. AC, 13–2, 939, 1056.

28. Speech of John C. Calhoun, January 15, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 995. See also speeches of Charles J. Ingersoll, January 15, 1814, and John Bowen, January 20, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1005, 1071.

29. Speech of Zebulon R. Shipherd, January 17, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1030.

30. Speech of James Fisk, January 13, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 934.

31. Speech of Felix Grundy, January 15, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 993. See also Baltimore Whig, reprinted in Richmond Enquirer, May 4, 1814.

32. AC, 13–2, 664, 1807–31.

33. Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, January 24, 1814, in Nicholson Papers (LC); Washington National Intelligencer, January 28, 1814. Timothy Pickering delivered one speech (over two days) that lasted six hours. See speech of Timothy Pickering, February 26 and 28, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1695, 1697–1767.

34. Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, February 14, 1814, in Nicholson Papers (LC).

35. Washington National Intelligencer, December 28, 1813; Henry G. Conner, “William Lewis, 1778–1844,” in William D. Lewis, ed., Great American Lawyers, 8 vols. (Philadelphia, 1907–9), 3:46.

36. Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, January 8, 1814, in Nicholson Papers (LC).

37. Stagg, Mr. Madison’s War, 366–67.

38. James Monroe to JM, December 27, 1813, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 26.

39. AC, 13–2, 597, 979, 2789–90.

40. Speech of Robert Wright, January 13, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 931. See also speech of Cyrus King, January 13, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 931.

41. AC, 13–2, 573, 623, 643, 1113–14, 1191, 1866, 2791–92, 2814–16; [SW] to George W. Campbell, January 14, 1814, in NASP: MA, 5:107; SW to William Branch Giles, October 17, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:514.

42. AC, 13–2, 764, 1931, 2847–50.

43. AC, 13–2, 881. See also speeches of George M. Troup, James Fisk, and Daniel Webster, January 10, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 881–83, 885–86.

44. Speech of Richard Stockton, January 10, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 881. For similar sentiments, see speeches of Thomas P. Grosvenor, Daniel Webster, and Alexander Hanson, January 10, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 883–87.

45. AC, 13–2, 887–88.

46. AC, 13–2, 633, 1803–4, 2799–2800.

47. Speeches of Jotham Post, Jr., Charles Goldsborough, Cyrus King, Alexander McKim, and William S. Smith, March 4, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1802–3.

48. AC, 13–2, 614, 1807, 2804.

49. Speeches of Jotham Post, Jr., Artemas Ward, Jr., Charles Goldsborough, and Alexander McKim, March 5, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1804–6.

50. John Mason to William Plumer, January 20, 1814, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 2. See also JM to SW, November 15, 1813, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 27.

51. Speech of Alexander McKim, March 5, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1805.

52. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, January 8, 1814, in ASP: F, 2:651–53.

53. AC, 13–2, 645, 675, 1588–89, 1798, 2811–12, 2795–98.

54. Speech of Alexander Hanson, February 14, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1374. See also speeches of Joseph Pearson, February 16, 1814, and Zebulon R. Shipherd, February 18, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1447–53, 1504–7.

55. Speech of John C. Calhoun, February 25, 1813, in AC, 13–2, 1689; Washington National Intelligencer, March 12, 1814.

56. AC, 11–3, 346–47, 826; Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War (Princeton, 1962), 209–22.

57. Petition of inhabitants of New York City, December 18, 1813, in AC, 13–2, 873–74. See also Alexander Hanson to Robert Goodloe Harper, April 3, 1814, in Harper Papers (MdHS), reel 2.

58. AC, 13–2, 1578–85, 1949–54, 2023; Raymond Walters, Jr., “The Origins of the Second Bank of the United States,” Journal of Political Economy 53 (June, 1945), 120.

59. Speeches of Zebulon R. Shipherd, June 18, 1813, and Solomon Sharp, June 19, 1813, in AC, 13–1, 236, 295; Philadelphia United States’ Gazette, May 5, 1812; Charles S. Hall, Benjamin Tallmadge, Revolutionary Soldier and American Businessman (New York, 1943), 332.

60. Samuel Elliot Morison, The Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, Federalist, 1765–1848, 2 vols. (Boston, 1913), 2:66–67; John D. Forbes, Israel Thorndike, Federalist Financier (New York, 1953), 112–16.

61. Memorandum of James Lloyd, [April, 1814], and Charles W. Hare to Harrison Gray Otis, April 13 and 26, 1814, in Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:72–75; Otis to George Cabot, July 2, 1819, and Cabot to Otis, July 3, 1819, in [Harrison Gray Otis], Letters in Defence of the Hartford Convention, and the People of Massachusetts (Boston, 1824), 96–97.

62. Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, January 9, 1814, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 3. For similar sentiments, see Nathaniel Saltonstall, Jr., to Nathaniel Saltonstall, May 6, 1814, in Saltonstall Papers (EI).

63. See Boston Independent Chronicle, April 14, 1814; and Boston Gazette, April 14, 1814.

64. James Lloyd to Harrison Gray Otis, May 16, 1814, in Otis Papers (MHS); ST to JM, May 4, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 16; JM to ST, May 7, 1814, in Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings of James Madison, 9 vols. (New York, 1900–1910), 8:277.

65. Georgetown Federal Republican, July 13, 1814; Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, September 23, 1814, in ASP: F, 2:845–46; petition of Jacob Barker, December 22, 1821, in ASP: C, 828.

66. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, September 23, 1814, in ASP: F, 2:846–47.

67. Worcester National Aegis, January 5, 1814.

68. For pre-war evasions of the non-importation act, see Thomas Coles to ST, October 26 and December 4, 1811, John Barnes to ST, December 27, 1811, and [Joseph Whipple] to ST, February 18, 1812, in TD (M178), reels 26, 29, and 34; ST to Thomas Newton, November 26, 1811, in ASP: C & N, 1:873–74; L. Trescott to Henry Dearborn, August 21, 1811, Peter Sailly to ST, September 10, 1811, Samuel Buck to ST, October 18, 1811, Isaac Smith to ST, November 15, 1811, and David Gelston to ST, November 20, 1811, in NASP: C & N, 47: 510–11, 522, 529–30, 533; ST to customs collectors, October 7, 1811, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 13.

69. Proclamation of John C. Sherbrooke, July 3, 1812, in Wood, British Documents, 1:204–5. See also Order of George Prevost, July 11, 1812, in Niles’ Register 4 (March 20, 1813), 46.

70. Walter R. Copp, “Nova Scotian Trade during the War of 1812,” Canadian Historical Review 18 (June, 1937), 141–55; John D. Forbes, “Boston Smuggling, 1807–1815,” American Neptune 10 (April, 1950), 152.

71. Letter from Halifax, November 9, 1812, in Salem Essex Register, December 16, 1812. See also Henry A. S. Dearborn to ST, September 8, 1812, in TD (M178), reel, 11; speech of Robert Wright, January 20, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1089.

72. Joseph Whipple to ST, June 20, 1812, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 25; J. Clason to JM, December 17, 1813, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 15; Henry A. S. Dearborn to ST, October 22, 1813, in TD (M178), reel 12; George Ulmer to William King, January 10, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 52; Manuel Eyre to Jonathan Roberts, January 24, 1813, in Roberts Papers (HSP).

73. Quoted in Samuel Eliot Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 1765–1848: The Urbane Federalist (Boston, 1969), 338. See also R. Kent Newmyer, “Joseph Story and the War of 1812: A Judicial Nationalist,” Historian 26 (August, 1964), 489–98.

74. Boston Columbian Centinel, September 1, 1813. See also speech of Thomas P. Grosvenor, January 25, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1138; Thomas Coles to ST, July 27 and 31, 1813, in TD (M178), reel 29; Raymond Walters, Jr., Alexander James Dallas: Lawyer—Politician—Financier, 1759–1817 (Philadelphia, 1943), 171–72.

75. Henry A.S. Dearborn to ST, September 21 and October 22, 1813, in TD (M178), reel 12; John Lawrence to Jonathan Russell, June 14, in Russell Papers (BU).

76. Henry A.S. Dearborn to ST, October 30, 1813, in TD (M178), reel 12.

77. George Ulmer to Henry Dearborn, March 3, 1813, in WD (M222), reel 9; Martin Jennison to SW, March 23, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 54; H.N. Muller III, “A ‘Traitorous and Diabolic Traffic’: The Commerce of the Champlain-Richelieu Corridor during the War of 1812,” Vermont History 44 (Spring, 1976), 95–96; Barry J. Lohnes, “A New Look at the Invasion of Eastern Maine, 1814,” Maine Historical Society Quarterly 15 (Summer, 1975), 8–9.

78. ST to Abraham Bessent, March 17, 1812, in TD (M175), reel 2. See also Hugh Campbell to SN, January 4, 1812, in ND (M125), reel 23; Edward Channing, A History of the United States, 6 vols. (New York, 1905–25), 4:540–41.

79. William J. McIntosh to William H. Crawford, April 18, 1813, TD (M178), reel 38.

80. See Jane Lucas de Grummond, The Baratarians and the Battle of New Orleans (Baton Rouge, 1961), passim.

81. John Shaw to Paul Hamilton, October 27, 1812, in ND (M125), reel 25.

82. [John Windship] to William Plumer, April 2, 1814, in Plumer Papers (NHHS), reel 2.

83. Daniel Patterson to SN, November 22, 1813, in ND (M147), reel 5.

84. Undated newspaper clipping, in WD (M221), reel 54; Wilburt S. Brown, The Amphibious Campaign for West Florida and Louisiana, 1814–1815: A Critical Review of Strategy and Tactics at New Orleans (University, AL, 1969), 40.

85. T.H. Williams to James Wilkinson, March 14, 1813, in WD (M222), reel 9.

86. John Shaw to SN, January 18, 1813, in ND (M125), reel 26.

87. ST to P.T. Du Bourg, September 27, 1813, in TD (M178), reel 16. See also ST to Du Bourg, August 24, 1813, ibid.

88. Hart Massey to ST, March, 1812, in TD (M178), reel 31.

89. Cornelius Van Ness, quoted in Muller, “Commerce of the Champlain-Richelieu Corridor,” 86. See also John Chandler to SW, March 3, 1813, in WD (M222), reel 7; Keene Newhampshire Sentinel, November 6, 1813; Chilton Williamson, Vermont in Quandary: 1763–1825 (Montpelier, 1949), 275.

90. Pike to SW, February 15, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 55.

91. George Ulmer to SW, March 29, 1813, ibid., reel 58.

92. “Marcellus” to SW, [early 1814], in WD (M222), reel 10.

93. Henry A. S. Dearborn to ST, December 16, 1813, in TD (M178), reel 12.

94. Lexington Reporter, August 7, 1813.

95. Thomas Coles to ST, January 27, 1814, in TD (M178), reel 29; John Smith to JM, January 24, 1814, and Cushing Eells to JM, May 17, 1813, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 15; Caesar Rodney to ST, March 20, 1813 (with enclosure), in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 26; William Hawkins to James Iredell, October 8, 1813, in Iredell Papers (DU); Boston Independent Chronicle, July 5, 1813; James Pack, The Man Who Burned the White House: Admiral Sir George Cockburn, 1772–1853 (Annapolis, 1987), 151, 159.

96. Henry A.S. Dearborn to ST, December 16, 1813, in TD (M178), reel 12.

97. H. Crittenden to Lewis Cass, November 5, 1814, in WD (M222), reel 10; Muller, “Commerce of the Champlain-Richelieu Corridor,” 83, 87.

98. Quoted in John P. Cranwell and William B. Crane, Men of Marque: A History of Private Armed Vessels out of Baltimore during the War of 1812 (New York, 1940), 72. See also Alan S. Taylor, “The Smuggling Career of William King,” Maine Historical Society Quarterly 17 (Summer, 1977), 19–38.

99. Georgetown Federal Republican, May 3 and 31, 1813. Quotation from May 3 issue.

100. Charles Goldsborough to Harmanus Bleecker, April 27, 1813, in Rice, Harmanus Bleecker, 31–34.

101. JM to Congress, December 9, 1813, in AC, 13–2, 2031–32.

102. Washington National Intelligencer, December 28, 1813. See also Georgetown Federal Republican, December 1, 1813; Jeremiah Mason to Jesse Appleton, December 21, 1813, in Hillard, Jeremiah Mason, 69–70; Resolutions of Tennessee Legislature [late 1813], in Lexington Reporter, January 1, 1814. The three men were William Branch Giles of Virginia, David Stone of North Carolina, and Joseph Anderson of Tennessee.

103. AC, 13–2, 551–61, 2032–53.

104. Speech of Zebulon R. Shipherd, February 9, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1266; Memorial of Maryland House of Delegates, [January, 1814], in AC, 13–2, 1208.

105. Washington National Intelligencer, December 28, 1813.

106. AC, 13–2, 554, 2053, 2781–88.

107. Speech of Jeremiah Mason, December 16, 1813, in AC, 13–2, 555.

108. AC, 13–2, 2781–88.

109. ST to Customs Collectors, December 24, 1813, in Niles’ Register 5 (January 29, 1814), 353–54.

110. AC, 13–2, 594, 639, 1121–22, 1269, 2788–89, 2793–95. See also speeches of Cyrus King, January 18, 1814, and John Reed, January 22, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1048, 1117–21; Gideon Granger to JM, January 4, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 15.

111. Henry A.S. Dearborn to ST, January 4, 1814, in TD (M178), reel 12.

112. Petition of Boston Fishermen, [January, 1814], printed in Boston Columbian Centinel, February 2, 1814.

113. Speech of Richard Stockton, December 11, 1813, in AC, 13–2, 2037.

114. Adams, History 2:875.

115. See AC, 13–2, 613, 678–79, 773–74, 1134–35, 1144, 1229.

116. AC, 13–2, 682, 1867–68. See also speech of John C. Calhoun, April 4, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1946–47; circular letters of Thomas K. Harris, April 15, 1814, Israel Pickens, April 16, 1814, and John Sevier, April 20, 1814, in Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., ed., Circular Letters of Congressmen to Their Constituents, 1789–1829, 3 vols. (Chapel Hill, 1978), 2:878–81, 889, 901.

117. Speech of Robert Wright, March 2, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1772.

118. JM to Congress, March 31, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 694.

119. Salem Essex Register, April 16, 1814. For similar sentiments, see Washington National Intelligencer, April 7, 1814; Lexington Reporter, April 15, 1814; Edward Gray to William Jones, April 4, 1814, in Jones Papers (HSP).

120. Circular letter of William Gaston, April 19, 1814, in Cunningham, Circular Letters, 2:896; Nathaniel Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, March 3, 1814, in Nicholson Papers (LC).

121. Nicholas Gilman to Pierre Van Cortlandt, Jr., April 3, 1814, in Jacob Judd, ed., Van Cortlandt Family Papers, 4 vols. (Tarrytown, 1976–81), 3:696.

122. Niles’ Register 6 (April 9, 1814), 100.

123. Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, April 6, 1814, in Nicholson Papers (LC).

124. AC, 13–2, 741, 2001–2, 2830.

125. AC, 13–2, 773, 2017–18.

126. Speeches of John C. Calhoun and Elisha R. Potter, April 12, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 2012–13.

127. There is a good discussion of America’s treatment of enemy aliens in Dwight F. Henderson, Congress, Courts, and Criminals: The Development of Federal Criminal Law, 1801–1829 (Westport, 1985), ch. 5.

128. See returns of marshals, in SD (M588), reels 2–3. The returns indicate that around 4,000 enemy aliens lived in New York and about 2,000 in Pennsylvania. Another 4,000 were probably scattered through the rest of the country. Although these returns are far from complete, they contain considerable data on each alien and thus offer excellent material for a quantitative study.

129. See AC, 5–1, 3753–54. This law should not be confused with the more infamous alien act, which authorized the deportation of aliens in time of peace and expired in 1802.

130. The grace period was established by a provision in the enemy trade act. See AC, 12–1, 2356.

131. State Department Notice, July 7, 1812, in Richard Bache, ed., The Case of Alien Enemies, Considered and Decided upon a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Allowed on the Petition of Charles Lockington, an Enemy Alien, by the Hon. William Tilghman . . . The 22nd Day of November, 1813 (Philadelphia, 1813), iii–iv. Most of the government’s regulations on enemy aliens are printed in this pamphlet, which can be found in SD (M588), reel 3.

132. SS to Anthony Baker, December 30, 1812, in Foreign Office Papers 5/88 (PRO); SS to American commissioners, January 30, 1814, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 26; John Graham to John Mason, October 12, 1814, in SD (M588), reel 4.

133. State Department Notice, February 23, 1813, and SS to U.S. marshals, March 12, 1813, in Bache, Case of Alien Enemies, v, vii.

134. SS to Thomas Barclay, May 13, 1813, in SD (M588), reel 1.

135. State Department Notice, February 6, 1813, and SS to U.S. marshals, February 6, 1813, in Bache, Case of Alien Enemies, v, vii.

136. SS to William Johnson, February 16, 1814, in SD (M588), reel 5.

137. Mason to U.S. marshals, November 12, 1813, in Bache, Case of Alien Enemies, viii.

138. The best study on prisoners in this war is Anthony G. Dietz, “The Prisoner of War in the United States during the War of 1812” (PhD dissertation, American University, 1964), which is practically definitive for the American side of the story. For the British side, see Ira Dye, “American Maritime Prisoners of War, 1812–1815,” Proceedings of the North American Society of Oceanic History, March 19–20, 1977, at Peabody Museum of Salem, Massachusetts, ed. Clark G. Reynolds (n.p., n.d.); Reginald Horsman, “The Paradox of Dartmoor Prison,” American Heritage 26 (February, 1975), 13–17, 85; and Robin F. A. Fabel, “Self-Help in Dartmoor: Black and White Prisoners in the War of 1812,” Journal of the Early Republic 9 (Summer, 1989), 165–90. For a short but excellent overview that treats both sides, see Taylor, Civil War, ch. 13.

139. See, for example, Isaac Baker to James Winchester, February 26, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 50; statement of Abraham Walter, November 22, 1813, in Worcester National Aegis, December 22, 1813; “Thomas King’s Narrative,” in Salem Essex Register, November 6, 1813; statement of W. L. Churchill et al., [Fall, 1814], in Niles’ Register 8 (April 22, 1815), 129; statement of John Stewart and Charles Lyford, October 3, 1813, William M. Scott to C. K. Gardner, October 8, 1813, and Thomas Barclay to John Mason, December 21, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 3:814–17, 834–35. For additional details, see Taylor, Civil War, ch. 13.

140. Dietz, “Prisoner of War,” passim; Dye, “Maritime Prisoners,” passim.

141. Reuben Beasley to Jonathan Russell, October 23, 1812, in Russell Papers (BU); British Transport Office to [Beasley], May 26, 1813, and Beasley to SS, June 10, 1813, in NASP: NA, 8:24–25, 40; Dye, “Maritime Prisoners,” 8; Roosevelt, Naval War, 1:77n.

142. Isaac Hull to SN, June 20, 1812, in ND (M125), reel 24; SN to Hull, July 1, 1812, in ND (M149), reel 10; Christopher Gadsden to [SN], July 4, 1812, in ND (M147), reel 4.

143. David Porter to SN, June 28, 1812, in ND (M147), reel 3; SN to Porter, June 30, 1812, in ND (M149), reel 10.

144. Dietz, “Prisoner of War,” 17, 41–42, 348–52, 378; Dye, “Maritime Prisoners,” 2, 8–9.

145. Provisional Agreement for Exchange of Prisoners, November 28, 1812, in NASP: NA, 8:14–16; Dietz, “Prisoner of War,” 28–34.

146. Cartel for Exchange of Prisoners, May 12, 1813, in NASP: NA, 8:19–22; Dietz, “Prisoner of War,” 35–47. Quotation from p. 19.

147. Dietz, “Prisoner of War,” 47–50; Dye, “Maritime Prisoners,” 10, 15.

148. Thomas Barclay to CG, December 20, 1813, in Wood, British Documents, 3:830–31; Dietz, “Prisoner of War,” 22.

149. Robert Goodloe Harper, Speech . . . Delivered at Annapolis, January 20, 1814 (Boston, 1814), 77; Ralph Robinson, “Retaliation for the Treatment of Prisoners in the War of 1812,” American Historical Review 49 (October, 1943), 65; Dietz, “Prisoner of War,” 258–59.

150. Scott to SW, January 30, 1813, in ASP: FR, 3:634.

151. AC, 12–2, 90, 1145–46, 1362–63; SW to Henry Dearborn, May 15, 1813, ASP: FR, 3:635; Robinson, “Retaliation,” 65–67.

152. CG to James Wilkinson, October 17, 1813, in ASP: FR, 3:635.

153. James Wilkinson to CG, December 3, 1813, and CG to Wilkinson, December 11, 1813, in ASP: FR, 3:637–38; Dietz, “Prisoner of War,” 277.

154. London Courier, quoted in Adams, History, 2:869; London Times, January 27, 1814. See also London Times, December 25, 1813.

155. Memorial of Maryland House of Delegates [January, 1814], in AC, 13–2, 1205; Gouverneur Morris to Rufus King [Spring, 1814], in Anne C. Morris, ed., The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris, 2 vols. (New York, 1888), 2:565. For similar sentiments, see Timothy Pickering to James Pindall, January 27, 1814, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 15; Sermon of Rev. Latrop, printed in Boston New-England Palladium, February 25, 1814; speech of William Gaston, February 18, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1560.

156. Worcester National Aegis, December 8, 1813.

157. Ibid., January 19, 1814; statements of Francis Blake and James Prince, in Boston Columbian Centinel, January 19, 26, 29, and February 5, 1814; Boston New-England Palladium, February 11, 1814; Niles’ Register 5 (January 29, 1814), 359–61; ibid. 6 (March 12, 1814), 38–39; Thomas Walter Ward to James Prince, January 17, 1814, in Ward Papers (AAS); broadside, [January, 1814], in Miscellaneous Broadside Collection (AAS); J. Snelling to SW, January 13, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 57; Dietz, “Prisoner of War,” 170.

158. Speech of Langdon Cheves, February 24, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1649.

159. William Winder to JM, February 1 and 8, 1814, and SS to Winder, May 7, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reels 15 and 26; CG to SS, May 31, 1814, in Wood, British Documents, 3:842–44; Robinson, “Retaliation,” 68–69; Dietz, “Prisoner of War,” 292–96.

160. John Mason to SW, July 25, 1814, in WD (M222), reel 12; Reuben Beasley to Mason, March 18, 1814, in ASP: FR, 3:727; Convention with Supplementary Article, July 16, 1814, and CG to Barclay, July 31, 1814, in Wood, British Documents, 3:844–48; Robinson, “Retaliation,” 69–70; Dietz, “Prisoner of War,” 296–99, 336–37.

161. See documents in ASP: FR, 3:632–34; Dietz, “Prisoner of War,” 224–68.

162. AC, 13–2, 979, 1113, 1797–98.

163. JM to Congress, December 7, 1813, in AC, 13–2, 542.

164. AC, 13–2, 545, 785; Adams, History, 2:891–92.

165. JM to Congress, March 31, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 694.

166. Speech of Daniel Webster, April 6, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1972.

167. Ibid., 1969.

Chapter 8. The British Counteroffensive

1. Leo Gershoy, The French Revolution and Napoleon, 2nd ed. (New York, 1964), 513–21; Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848 (New York, 1994), 485–516; Charles Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars: An International History, 1803–1815 (London, 2007), 513–31; Alan Schom, Napoleon Bonarparte (New York, 1997), 668–705.

2. See Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, “The American Press and the Fall of Napoleon in 1814,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 98 (October, 1954), 337–76. See also Hartford Connecticut Courant, June 14, 1814; and William H. Channing, Memoir of William Ellery Channing, 3 vols. (London, 1848), 2:98–99.

3. Jefferson to Samuel Brown, April 28, 1814 in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 47. See also Albert Gallatin to Marquis de Lafayette, April 21, 1814, in Gallatin Papers, Supplement (SR), reel 3; speech of William Gaston, February 18, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1557.

4. William Wirt to Dabney Carr, February 15, 1814, in Wirt Papers (MdHS), reel 2; Philip Nicholas to Wilson Cary Nicholas, July 13, 1814, in Nicholas Papers (LC); Rutland (VT) Herald, June 1, 1814.

5. Nicholson to William Jones, May 20, 1814, in Jones Papers (HSP). See also Hartford American Mercury, June 7, 1814; Philadelphia Aurora, June 8, 1814; speech of George M. Troup, February 8, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1256; [SW] to state governors, July 4, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:549.

6. Niles’ Register 7 (September 10, 1814), 2, 11; Boston Yankee, October 28, 1814; Trenton True American, November 28, 1814; Philadelphia United States’ Gazette, reprinted in Georgetown Federal Republican, November 19, 1814.

7. Mahon, War of 1812, 317; Donald E. Graves, “The Redcoats Are Coming! British Troops Movements to North America in 1814,” Journal of the War of 1812 6 (Summer, 2001), 16.

8. Cochrane to SSWC, July 14, 1814, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:131; London Times, May 24, 1814.

9. Letter from a congressman, January 8, 1815, in Lexington Reporter, February 8, 1815. See also Jacob Brown to SW, May 8, 1814, in Brown Papers (LC).

10. See SW to William Branch Giles, November 10, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:519; Hartford American Mercury, March 22, 1814.

11. Estimates based on figures in J. C. A. Stagg, “Enlisted Men in the United States Army, 1812–1815: A Preliminary Survey,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser. 43 (October, 1986), 621.

12. George F. G. Stanley, The War of 1812: Land Operations ([Toronto], 1983), 274–75; Taylor, Civil War, 263.

13. John K. Mahon, “British Command Decisions Relative to the Battle of New Orleans,” Louisiana History 6 (Winter, 1965), 55–56; Quimby, U.S. Army, 2: 593, 599–600.

14. Cabinet notes, June 7, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 16; SW to Jacob Brown, March 20 and June 10, 1814, and to George Izard, June 10, 1814, in WD (M6), reel 7; SW to George Izard, May 14, 1814, in Izard, Official Correspondence, 15–16; SW to Jacob Brown, June 19, 1814, in E. A. Cruikshank, Documents Relating to the Invasion of the Niagara Peninsula by the United States Army, Commanded by General Jacob Brown, in July and August, 1814 (Niagara-on-the-Lake, [1920?]), 35–37.

15. Robert McDouall to Gordon Drummond, July 16, 1814, and William McKay to McDouall, July 27, 1814 (with enclosure), in Wood, British Documents, 3: 253–65; Stanley, War of 1812, 288–90; Quimby, U.S. Army, 2:733–37.

16. Arthur Sinclair to SN, June 22, and July 3 and 22, 1814, in ND (M125), reels 37 and 38; A. H. Holmes to George Croghan, July 27, 1814, and Croghan to SW, August 9, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 60; Sinclair to Edmund P. Kennedy, July 12, 1814, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:557–58.

17. Sinclair to SN, August 9, 1814, in ND (M125), reel 38.

18. Ibid.; Croghan to SW, August 9, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 60; Robert McDouall to CG, August 14, 1814, in Wood, British Documents, 3:273–77; Gilpin, War of 1812 in the Northwest, 242–45.

19. [Miles W. Smith], ed., “Journal of William K. Beall, July–August, 1812,” American Historical Review, 17 (July, 1912), 793.

20. Arthur Sinclair to SN, September 3, 1814, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:572–74; ; Barry Gough, Fighting Sail on Lake Huron and Georgian Bay: The War of 1812 and Its Aftermath (Annapolis, 2002), 103–7.

21. Andrew Bulger to Robert McDouall, September 7, 1814, McDouall to Gordon Drummond, September 9, 1814, Arthur Sinclair to SN, October 24 and 28, 1814, and Daniel Turner to Sinclair, November 1, 1814, all in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:604–7, 645–49; Gough, Fighting Sail on Lake Huron, 107–20; Gough, Through Water, Ice & Fire: Schooner “Nancy” of the War of 1812 (Toronto, 2006), ch. 5.

22. James L. Basden to Alexander Stewart, March 13, 1814, in Wood, British Documents, 2:352–54; Quimby, U.S. Army, 2:729–33; Glenn Stott, Greater Evils: The War of 1812 in Southwestern Ontario (Arkona, 2001), ch. 10.

23. Stott, Greater Evils, ch. 13.

24. Campbell to John Walbach, May 18, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 51.

25. Narrative of Alexander McMullen, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 2:370.

26. John B. Campbell to John Walbach, May 18, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 51; Arthur Sinclair to SN, May 19, 1814, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:487–89; deposition of Mathias Steele, May 31, 1814, opinion of court of enquiry, June 20, 1814, and Narrative of Alexander McMullen, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 1:16–18, and 2:369–71; Thomas Talbot to Phineas Riall, May 16, 1814, and Drummond to CG, May 27, 1814, in Wood, British Documents, 3:88–92.

27. Duncan McArthur to SW, November 18, 1814, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 1:311.

28. Ibid, 308–12; Stuart A. Rammage, The Militia Stood Alone: Malcolm’s Mills, 6 November 1814 (Summerland, BC, 2000); McAfee, History of the Late War, 482–89.

29. Quoted in Donald E. Graves, “’I have a handsome little army . . .’: A Re-Examination of Winfield Scott’s Army at Buffalo in 1814,” in R. Arthur Bowler, ed., War along the Niagara: Essays on the War of 1812 and Its Legacy (Youngstown, NY, 1991), 43.

30. Donald E. Graves, Red Coats & Grey Jackets: The Battle of Chippawa, 5 July 1814 (Toronto, 1994), 65–67.

31. Jacob Brown to SW, July 6, 1814, and Brown, “Memoranda of . . . the Campaign on the Niagara in 1814,” 1–7, in Brown Papers (LC); Peter B. Porter to Daniel Tompkins, July 3, 1814, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 1:26; Graves, Red Coats & Grey Jackets, 67–94; Carl Benn, The Iroquois in the War of 1812 (Toronto, 1998), 160–63.

32. Winfield Scott, Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, 2 vols. (New York, 1864), 1: 129. Scott is the source for this widely quoted remark. Where he heard it is unknown, but it is now firmly entrenched in army legend.

33. Jacob Brown to SW, July 7, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 59; Brown, “Memoranda of . . . the Campaign on the Niagara in 1814,” 8–24, in Brown Papers (LC); Thomas Jesup, “Memoir of the Campaigns on the Niagara,” in Jesup Papers (LC); Phineas Riall to Gordon Drummond, July 6, 1814, and Peter B. Porter to W. L. Stone, May 26, 1840, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 1:31–32, and 2:362–65; Jeffrey Kimball, “The Battle of Chippewa: Infantry Tactics in the War of 1812,” Military Affairs 31 (Winter, 1967–68), 169–86; Graves, Red Coats & Grey Jackets, chs. 8–10 and Appendices A–B.

34. See Hickey, Don’t Give Up the Ship, 72–73.

35. Jacob Brown to Isaac Chauncey, July 13, 1814, in Brown Papers (LC); Brown to SW, July 25, 1814, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:553.

36. Chauncey to Jacob Brown, August 10, 1814, in ND (M125), reel 38. See also Chauncey to SN, August 10, 1814 (2 letters), ibid.; Brown to SW, July 25, 1814, in Brown Papers (LC).

37. This exchange was witnessed by Captain David B. Douglass. See John T. Horton, ed., “An Original Narrative of the Niagara Campaign of 1814,” Niagara Frontier 11 (1964), 18; and Donald E. Graves, Where Right and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy’s Lane, 1814, rev. ed. (Toronto, 1997), 294n44. This is now the motto of the U.S. Army’s Fifth Infantry Regiment.

38. Letter from Halifax newspaper, reprinted in Niles’ Register 7 (February 25, 1815), 410.

39. Letter of James Miller, July 28, 1814, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 1:105.

40. Jacob Brown to SW, [August 7, 1814], in WD (M221), reel 59; Brown to Judge Barker, August 7, 1814, in Brown Papers (LC); Brown, “Memoranda of . . . the Campaign on the Niagara in 1814,” 24–50, in Brown Papers (LC); Jesup, “Memoir of the Campaigns on the Niagara,” in Jesup Papers (LC); letter of James Miller, July 28, 1814, and Gordon Drummond to CG, July 27, 1814, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 1:87–92, 105–6; Graves, Where Right and Glory Lead, chs. 6–12.

41. Richard V. Barbuto, Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada (Lawrence, 2000), 234–44; Joseph Whitehorne, While Washington Burned: The Battle for Fort Erie 1814 (Baltimore, 1992), 41–49.

42. John Tucker to Henry Conran, August 4, 1814, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 1:120.

43. Gordon Drummond to CG, August 4, 1814, and John Tucker to Henry Conran, August 4, 1814, ibid., 116, 120; Lodowick Morgan to Jacob Brown, August 5, 1814, in Brannan, Official Letters, 383–84; Graves, Where Right and Glory Lead, 214.

44. Alexander Dobbs to James Yeo, August 13, 1814, Edmund P. Kennedy to SN, August 15, 1814, and Augustus Conckling to Kennedy, August 16, 1814, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:588–91.

45. Secret Orders of August 14, 1815, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 1:139–41.

46. Edmund P. Gaines to SW, August 23, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 61.

47. Ibid.

48. Gordon Drummond to CG, August 15, 1814, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 1:142.

49. Jesup, “Memoir of the Campaigns on the Niagara,” in Jesup Papers (LC); Gordon Drummond to CG, August 15, 1814, and Eleazar W. Ripley to Edmund P. Gaines, August 17, 1814, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 1:141–44, 156–58; Gaines to SW, August 23, 1814, in Brannan, Official Letters, 394–99; Ernest A. Cruikshank, “Drummond’s Night Assault upon Fort Erie, August 15–16, 1814,” in Zaslow, Defended Border, 154–64; Graves, Where Right and Glory Lead, 215–21; Barbuto, Niagara 1814, 247–53.

50. Brown to SW, September 29, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 59,

51. Jacob Brown to SW, September 29, 1814, and Peter B. Porter to Brown, September 22, 1814, ibid.; Gordon Drummond to CG, August 21, and September 2 and 17, 1814, and Louis de Watteville to Drummond, September 19, 1814, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 1:183, 190–91, 201–4; Graves, Where Right and Glory Lead, 225–27; Barbuto, Niagara 1814, 273–79.

52. Jesup, “Memoir of the Campaigns on the Niagara,” in Jesup Papers (LC).

53. Brown to Daniel Tompkins, September 20, 1814, in Brown Papers (LC).

54. Graves, Where Right and Glory Lead, 222–23.

55. Barbuto, Niagara 1814, 286–96.

56. Christopher Myers to [Gordon Drummond], October 19, 1814, in Wood, British Documents, 3:224–26; Donald E. Graves, ed., Merry Hearts Make Light Days: The War of 1812 Journal of Lieutenant John Le Couteur, 104th Foot, (Ottawa, 1993), [October 20,1814], 209; Barbuto, Niagara 1814, 296–301.

57. George Izard to SW, November 8, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 62; Whitehorne, While Washington Burned, 88–89.

58. For this important change, see John R. Grodzinski, “The Constraints of Strategy: Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost as Commander-in-Chief of British North America during the War of 1812” (PhD dissertation, Royal Military College of Canada, 2010), 218–19; Robert Malcomson, Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario, 1812–1814 (Annapolis, 1998), 242–43.

59. Robert Malcomson, “HMS St. Lawrence: The Freshwater First-Rate,” Mariner’s Mirror 83 (November, 1997), 419–33; Malcomson, Lords of the Lake, 341–42; Malcomson to author, July 29, 2006. Malcomson is the source for the figures presented here. See also C. Winton-Clare [R.C. Anderson], “A Shipbuilder’s War,” Mariner’s Mirror 29 (July, 1943), 139–48; and Nicholas Blake and Richard Lawrence, The Illustrated Companion to Nelson’s Navy (Mechanicsburg, 2000), 25.

60. George Mitchell to Jacob Brown, May 8, 1814, and Brown to SW, May 9, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 51; Gordon Drummond to CG, May 7, 1814, and James Yeo to FSA, May 9, 1814, in Wood, British Documents, 3:52–57, 61–63; Rufus McIntire to John Holmes, May 9, 1814, in John C. Fredriksen, ed., The War of 1812 in Person: Fifteen Accounts by United States Army Regulars, Volunteers and Militiamen (Jefferson, 2010), 129–32; Richard V. Barbuto, Long Range Guns, Close Quarter Combat: The Third United States Artillery Regiment in the War of 1812 (Youngstown, NY, 2010), 77–85.

61. Stephen Popham to James Yeo, June 1, 1814, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:509–10; Melancthon Woolsey to Isaac Chauncey, June 1, 1814, and Chauncey to SN, June 2, 1814, in ND (M125), reel 37; William Carpenter to Peter B. Porter, June 1, 1814, in Porter Papers (BEHS), reel 3; Gordon Drummond to CG, June 2, 1814, in Wood, British Documents, 3:73–75.

62. N.W. Hibbard to A. Hunt, February 10, 1859, and Nat Frame, “The Battle of Sandy Creek, and the Carrying of the Cables for the Superior,” in Transactions of the Jefferson County Historical Society 3 (1895), 29–31, 38–40; Lossing, Pictorial Field-Book, 800–801; Patrick Wilder, Seaway Trail Guidebook to the War of 1812 (Oswego, 1987), 57–59.

63. Quoted in C. P. Lucas, The Canadian War of 1812 (London, 1906), 196–97.

64. [Frederick Robinson] to Merry, September 22, 1814, in Francis Bickley, ed., Report on the Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst, Preserved at Cirencester Park (London, 1923), 291; SSWC to CG, June 3, 1814, in J. Mackay Hitsman, The Incredible War of 1812: A Military History (1965; updated by Donald E. Graves, Toronto, 1999), 289–90.

65. Allan S. Everest, The War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley (Syracuse, 1981), 161–62.

66. SW to George Izard, July 27 and August 12, 1814, in Izard, Official Correspondence, 64–65, 69–71. See also SW to Jacob Brown, August 16, 1814, in Brown Papers (LC).

67. General Orders of September 5, 1814, in Plattsburgh Republican, September 24, 1814.

68. Macomb to SW, September 15, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 64. See also Macomb to SW, September 8, 1814, ibid.

69. Alexander Macomb to SW, September 15, 1814, ibid.

70. For the capture of the Eagle and Growler, see chapter 6: The Campaign of 1813.

71. Testimony of Henry Cox, in Wood, British Documents, 3:421; Roosevelt, Naval War, 2:109–15.

72. Niles’ Register 7 (October 1, 1814), 48.

73. Mahon, War of 1812, 324–25; Roosevelt, Naval War, 2:128.

74. Quoted in Matilda Edgar, Ten Years of Upper Canada in Peace and War, 1805–1815 (Toronto, 1890), 324.

75. James Robertson to Daniel Pring, September 12, 1814, in Wood, British Documents, 3:374.

76. Thomas Macdonough to SN, September 11, 1814, in ND (M125), reel 39. See also Charles Budd to Macdonough, September 13, 1814, and Macdonough to SN, September 13, 1814, ibid.; Daniel Pring to James Yeo, September 12, 1814, James Robertson to Pring, September 12, 1814, and statement of Robertson, in Wood, British Documents, 3:368–77, 468–75; Rodney Macdonough, Life of Commodore Thomas Macdonough, U.S. Navy (Boston, 1909), 157–93; Everest, War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley, 179–85; Michael J. Crawford, “The Battle of Lake Champlain,” in Charles E. Brodine, Jr., et al., Against All Odds: U.S. Sailors in the War of 1812 (Washington, DC, 2004), 53–72.

77. [Frederick Robinson] to Merry, September 22, 1814, in Bickley, Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst, 292; David G. Fitz-Enz, The Final Invasion: Plattsburgh, the War of 1812’s Most Decisive Battle (New York, 2001), 165–67.

78. Quoted in Everest, War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley, 187.

79. Alexander Macomb to SW, September 12 and 15, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 64; CG to SSWC, September 22, 1814, in Wood, British Documents, 3:364–66; Everest, War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley, 185–90; Donald E. Graves, “‘The Finest Army Ever to Campaign on American Soil?’ The Organization, Strength, Composition, and Losses of British Land Forces during the Plattsburgh Campaign, September 1814,” Journal of the War of 1812 8 (Fall-Winter, 2003), 6–13

80. SSWC to Henry Goulburn, September 1, 1814, in Goulburn Papers (UM), reel 1; Dudley Mills, “The Duke of Wellington and the Peace Negotiations at Ghent in 1814,” Canadian Historical Review 2 (March, 1921), 22.

81. Alicia Cockburn to Charles Sandys, October 20, 1814, in Wood, British Documents, 3:387–88; London Morning Chronicle, November 18, 1814. See also speech of Samuel Whitbread, November 18, 1814, in Parliamentary Debates, 29:364–65; The Annual Register . . . for the Year 1814 [General History], (London, 1815), 191; LL to FS, October 21, 1814, in Duke of Wellington, ed., Dispatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshall Arthur, Duke of Wellington, 15 vols. (London, 1858–72), 9:367.

82. AC, 13–3, 23, 387, 1962–63; Macdonough, Thomas Macdonough, 193.

83. Quoted in Glenn Tucker, Poltroons and Patriots: A Popular Account of the War of 1812, 2 vols. (Indianpolis, 1954), 2:636. Macdonough had actually been promoted from lieutenant to master commandant in July 1813.

84. Proclamation of Alexander Cochrane, April 25, 1814, in Niles’ Register 6 (May 14, 1814), 182–83; Wade G. Dudley, Splintering the Wooden Wall: The British Blockade of the United States, 1812–1815 (Annapolis, 2003), 117–18.

85. Proclamation of James Madison, June 29, 1814, in Carlton Savage, Policy of the United States toward Maritime Commerce in War, 2 vols. (Washington, DC, 1934–36), 1:287–88. See also SS to American commissioners and ministers, May 24, 1814, in SD (M77), reel 2.

86. Nettels, Emergence of a National Economy, 385, 396.

87. Ibid., 399.

88. For more on the war economy, see chapter 9: The Crisis of 1814.

89. Niles’ Register 6 (July 9, 1814), 317.

90. Ibid.

91. William Williams to John Cotton Smith, April 9, 1814, and Selectmen of Saybrook to Smith, April 12, 1814, in Thompson R. Harlow et al., eds., John Cotton Smith Papers, 7 vols. (Hartford, 1948–67), 2:226–28, 235; Naval Chronicle 32 (July-December, 1814), 171.

92. See James Tertius de Kay, The Battle of Stonington: Torpedoes, Submarines, and Rockets in the War of 1812 (Annapolis, 1990), chs. 1, 10–12.

93. Hartford Connecticut Courant, August 16 and September 6, 1814; Reginald Horsman, “Nantucket’s Peace Treaty with England in 1814,” New England Quarterly 54 (June, 1981), 180–98; Edward Byers, The Nation of Nantucket: Society and Politics in an Early American Commercial Center, 1660–1820 (Boston, 1987), 277–89. The war ended before any of the Nantucket prisoners were released.

94. Walter M. Whitehill, ed., New England Blockaded in 1814: The Journal of Henry Edward Napier (Salem, 1938) (July 9, 1814), 33; John Bach McMaster, A History of the People of the United States, From the Revolution to the Civil War, 8 vols. (New York, 1883–1913), 4:134.

95. Proclamation of John O. Creighton, October 8, 1814, in NASP: NA, 4:246. See also Niles’ Register 7 (November 19, 1814), 167–68.

96. Whitehill, Journal of Henry Edward Napier (May 29, 1814), 18.

97. See Andrew Pilkington to John Sherbrooke, July 12, 1814, and Articles of Capitulation for the Surrender of Moose Island, July 12, 1814, in Wood, British Documents, 3: 301–3, 305–7; Perley Putnam to Henry Dearborn, July 12, 1814, and John Brewer to SW, July 16, 1814, in WD (M221), reels 59 and 61; Stanley, War of 1812, 363–69; Lossing, Pictorial Field-Book, 890.

98. Quoted in Barry J. Lohnes, “A New Look at the Invasion of Eastern Maine, 1814,” Maine Historical Society Quarterly 15 (Summer, 1975), 9.

99. Charles Morris to SN, September 8 and 20, 1814, in ND (M125), reel 39; John Sherbrooke to SSWC, September 10, 1814, Henry John to Sherbrooke, September 3, 1814, Robert Barrie to Edward Griffith, September 3, 1814, and Andrew Pilkington to Sherbrooke, September 14, 1814, in Wood, British Documents, 3:308–18, 323–27, 329–31; William D. Williamson, The History of the State of Maine, 2 vols. (Hallowell, 1832), 2:640–51.

100. Proclamation of John Sherbrooke and Edward Griffith, September 21, 1814, in Niles’ Register 7 (October 29, 1814), 117–18; Williamson, History of Maine, 2:650–53; John Abbott, The History of Maine (Boston, 1875), 420–23.

101. Salem Essex Register, August 3, 1814.

102. Caleb Strong to SW, December 9, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 66.

103. SW to Henry Dearborn, November 14 (filed under November 22) and December 19, 1814, SW to Caleb Strong, December 1, 1814, and SW to William King, January 2, 1815, in WD (M6), reels 7 and 8; SW to King, December 26, 1814, in WD (M7), reel 1; Strong to Harrison G. Otis, Thomas H. Perkins, and William Sullivan, January 31, 1815, in Otis Papers (MHS); Lohnes, “Invasion of Eastern Maine,” 17; Williamson, History of Maine, 2:653–54.

104. SSWC and CG, quoted in Adams, History, 2:997–98. See also CG to Cochrane, July 30, 1814, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 1:176–77.

105. Cochrane to commanding officers (two letters), July 18, 1814, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:140–41.

106. Joshua Barney, Defence of the Chesapeake Bay, July 4, 1813, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 2:373–76. Quotation from p. 374.

107. AC, 13–1, 2680; SN to Joshua Barney, August 20 and 27, 1813, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 2:376–78.

108. Donald G. Shomette, Flotilla: The Patuxent Naval Campaign in the War of 1812, rev. ed. (Baltimore, 2009), ch. 3.

109. Robert Barrie to George Cockburn, June 1 and 11, 1814, and Joshua Barney to SN, June 3, 9, 11, and August 21, 1814, and Cockburn to Alexander Cochrane, August 23, 1814, all in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:76–81, 84–85, 88–91, 194–97; Decius Wadsworth to SW, June 26, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 67; Shomette, Flotilla, chs. 5–6, 9, and 18.

110. Georgetown Federal Republican, August 11, 1814.

111. Armstrong, quoted in John P. Van Ness to Richard M. Johnson, November 23, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:581.

112. Letter of John Armstrong, October 17, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:539.

113. Edward Skeen, John Armstrong, Jr., 1758–1843: A Biography (Syracuse, 1981), 187–90. See also John S. Williams, History of the Invasion and Capture of Washington (New York, 1857), 15–123.

114. John Harvey to Edward Baynes, June 11, 1813, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 6:68; General Order of July 2, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:549; Adams, History, 2:996.

115. Skeen, John Armstrong, 191–97; Walter Lord, The Dawn’s Early Light (New York, 1972), 22–27.

116. Joseph Nourse to George Cockburn, July 23, 1814, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:159.

117. Alexander Cochrane to George Cockburn, August 22, 1814, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:197.

118. Robert Ross to SSWC, August 30, 1814, in London Times, September 28, 1814.

119. Statement of James Monroe, November 13, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:536.

120. Memorandum of James Madison, August 24, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 16; statement of James Monroe, November 13, 1814, Report of Tobias Stansbury, November 15, 1814, and William Simmons to Richard M. Johnson, November 28, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:536–37, 561, 596–97.

121. [George R. Gleig], A Subaltern in America, Comprising His Narrative of the Campaigns of the British Army . . . during the Late War (Philadelphia, 1833), 66–67.

122. See, for example, notice of a new poem, “Bladensburg Races, or, The Devil Take the Foremost,” in Georgetown Federal Republican, January 7, 1815; and “The ‘Bladensburg Races,’” Magazine of History (October–November, 1914), 204–11.

123. Ross to SSWC, August 30, 1814, in London Times, September 28, 1814.

124. William Winder to SW, August 27, 1814, in Brannan, Official Letters, 400–402; Narrative of William Winder, September 26, 1814, and Joshua Barney to SN, August 29, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:557–58, 579–80; Robert Ross to SSWC, August 30, 1814, in Niles’ Register 7 (December 31, 1814), 277–78; Bulletin of Admiralty, September 27, 1814, in Naval Chronicle 32 (July-December, 1814), 247–49; Ingersoll, Historical Sketch, 2:156–80; Tucker, Poltroons and Patriots, 2:501–51; Lord, Dawn’s Early Light, 59–143.

125. Dolley Madison to Lucy Todd, August 23, 1814, in David B. Mattern and Holly C. Shulman, eds., The Selected Letters of Dolley Payne Madison (Charlottesville, 2003), 193; Tucker, Poltroons and Patriots, 2:570–74.

126. S. Burch and J. T. Frost to Patrick Magruder, September 15, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 307. See also Magruder to Speaker of the House, December 17, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 953–57.

127. Memorandum of [James Monroe], [August, 1814], in Madison Papers (LC), reel 16; Brant, James Madison, 6:306–8; William Seale, The President’s House: A History, 2 vols. (Washington, DC, 1986), 1:134–35; Tucker, Poltroons and Patriots, 2:574–75; Lord, Dawn’s Early Light, 151–53.

128. G. C. Moore Smith, ed., The Autobiography of Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Smith, 2 vols. (London, 1902), 1:200. See also [George R. Gleig], A Narrative of the Campaigns of the British Army at Washington, Baltimore, and New Orleans (Philadelphia, 1821), 134–35; letter from midshipman on H.M.S. Espoir, in Niles’ Register 7 (Supplement), 150.

129. William Wirt to Elizabeth Wirt, October 24, 1814, in Wirt Papers (MdHS), reel 2.

130. Mrs. A. Peter to Timothy Pickering, August 28, 1814, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 30; George Cockburn to Alexander Cochrane, August 27, 1814, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:220–23; James Scott, Recollections of a Naval Life, 3 vols. (London, 1834), 3:298–312; Ingersoll, Historical Sketch, 2:180–210; Anthony Pitch, The Burning of Washington: The British Invasion of 1814 (Annapolis, 1998), 99–111.

131. Letter of William Thornton, August 30, 1814, in Washington National Intelligencer, September 7, 1814; Ingersoll, Historical Sketch, 2:184.

132. Thomas Tingey to SN, August 27 and October 18, 1814, in ND (M125), reels 38 and 40; editorial notes in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 1:91, 128.

133. Washington National Intelligencer, August 30–31, 1814. See also letter from Washington, August 27, [1814], in Philadelphia Aurora, August 30, 1814; Margaret Bayard Smith to Jane Kirkpatrick, August 30, [1814], in Gaillard Hunt, ed., The First Forty Years of Washington Society, Portrayed by the Family Letters of Mrs. Samuel Harrison Smith (Margaret Bayard) (New York, 1906), 113.

134. [Gleig], Narrative of the Campaigns, 132.

135. Washington National Intelligencer, September 1, 1814; [Gleig], Narrative of the Campaigns, 132–33, 140–41; Scott, Recollections of a Naval Life, 3:313; Moore Smith, Autobiography of Harry Smith, 1:203.

136. Washington National Intelligencer, August 31, 1814. See also Scott, Recollections of a Naval Life, 3:312–13.

137. Moore Smith, Autobiography of Harry Smith, 1:204.

138. John Rodgers to SN, September 9, 1814, in ND (M125), reel 39; General Orders of November 17, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 66; Report of Alexandria Common Council, September 7, 1814, and Samuel T. Dyson to SW, August 29, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:589–91; Elers Napier, The Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir Charles Napier, 2 vols. (London, 1862), 1:80; Pitch, Burning of Washington, ch. 11.

139. Report of Alexandria Common Council, September 7, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:591; James Gordon to Alexander Cochrane, September 9, 1814, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:238–42; Edward Codrington to wife, September 10, 1814, in Jane Bourchier, Memoir of the Life of Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, 2 vols. (London, 1873), 1:319; Napier, Admiral Charles Napier, 1:80–86.

140. Scott, Recollections of a Naval Life, 3:314–15. For similar sentiments, see Codrington to wife, September 10, 1814, in Bourchier, Edward Codrington, 2:319; and James, Naval History of Great Britain, 6:311–12.

141. Memorandum of James Madison, [August 29, 1814], in Madison Papers (LC), reel 16; Brant, James Madison, 6:312; James W. Hammack, Jr., Kentucky and the Second American Revolution: The War of 1812 (Lexington, 1976), 93–94.

142. Quoted in Lord, Dawn’s Early Light, 216.

143. Margaret Bayard Smith to Jane Kirkpatrick, August 30, [1814], in Hunt, First Forty Years of Washington Society, 115; Mrs. A. Peter to Timothy Pickering, August 28, 1814, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 30. See also George Hay to James Monroe, September 10, 1814, in Monroe Papers (NYPL).

144. Memorandum of James Madison, [August 29, 1814], in Madison Papers (LC), reel 16; John Armstrong to Baltimore Patriot, September 3, 1814, reprinted in Washington National Intelligencer, September 8, 1814; Williams, Invasion of Washington, 105–6.

145. Armstrong to Joseph Desha, October 2, 1814, in Desha Papers (LC).

146. Annual Register for 1814 [General History], 185. See also Trenton True American, December 5, 1814.

147. Quoted in Niles’ Register 7 (December 31, 1814), 275 (most capital letters omitted). See also ibid., (February 18, 1815), 392; Annual Register for 1814 [General History], 206; speeches of Samuel Whitbread, November 8, 1814, and James Mackintosh, April 11, 1815, in Parliamentary Debates, 29:47 and 30:526; London Morning Chronicle, November 2, 1814; Trenton True American, December 5, 1814.

148. Prince Regent to Parliament, November 8, 1814, in Parliamentary Debates, 29:2. See also Naval Chronicle 32 (July-December, 1814), 247, 249; London Morning Chronicle, September 28, 1814.

149. Cobbett’s Weekly Register, reprinted in Niles’ Register 8 (Supplement), 34. See also ibid. 7 (December 31, 1814), 276.

150. Edward Codrington to wife, September 10, 1814, in Bourchier, Edward Codrington, 1:320. See also Mahon, “British Command Decisions,” 63.

151. The details of Baltimore’s preparations can be followed in Samuel Smith Papers (LC), reels 3–4. See also Frank A. Cassell, “Baltimore in 1813: A Study of Urban Defense in the War of 1812,” Military Affairs 33 (December, 1969), 349–61; Frank A. Cassell, Merchant Congressman in the Young Republic: Samuel Smith of Maryland, 1752–1839 (Madison, 1971), 182–204; and Joseph A. Whitehorne, The Battle for Baltimore, 1814 (Baltimore, 1997), 162–74.

152. Henry Crease to Alexander Cochrane, September 1, 1814, and Philip Reed to Benjamin Chambers, September 3, 1814, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:234–37.

153. Lord Byron, “Elegiac Stanzas on the Death of Sir Peter Parker, Bart.,” October, 1814, in George Gordon Byron, The Poetical Works of Lord Byron (London, 1935), 76.

154. John Stricker to Samuel Smith, September 15, 1814, in Brannan, Official Letters, 420–24; George Cockburn to Alexander Cochrane, September 15, 1814, and Arthur Brooke to SSWC, September 17, 1814, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:279–85; [Gleig], Subaltern in America, 128; Niles’ Register 7 (December 3, 1814), 200–201; Whitehorne, Battle for Baltimore, 176–83.

155. [Gleig], Narrative of the Campaigns, 178.

156. Samuel Smith to SW, September 19, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 66; George Cockburn to Alexander Cochrane, September 15, 1814, and Arthur Brooke to SSWC, September 17, 1814, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval History, 3:279–85; [Gleig], Narrative of the Campaigns, 197.

157. Quoted in John S. Pancake, Samuel Smith and the Politics of Business: 1752–1839 (University, AL, 1972), 130.

158. George Armistead to SW, September 24, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 59; Alexander Cochrane to FSA, September 17, 1814, and Cochrane to Viscount Melville, September 17, 1814 in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:286–91.

159. Washington National Intelligencer, September 26, 1814; Tucker, Poltroons and Patriots, 2:585–90; Lord, Dawn’s Early Light, 240–46, 291–97; Oscar Sonneck, “The Star Spangled Banner,” rev. ed. (Washington, DC, 1914), 9–63.

160. Hickey, Don’t Give Up the Ship, 87–89.

161. Letter of Robert Wright, October 19, 1814, in Brannan, Official Letters, 449–50. See also William Wirt to ———, August 21, 1814, in Wirt Papers (LC), reel 1; Nathaniel Fenwick to SW, September 26, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 61.

162. Niles’ Register 7 (October 27, 1814), 110, and (Supplement), 158.

163. Proclamation of Alexander Cochrane, April 2, 1814, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:60.

164. Henry Clay to Rufus King, May 10, 1825, in ASP: FR, 6:342; John McNish Weiss, “The Corps of Colonial Marines, 1814–1816: A Summary,” Immigrants and Minorities 15 (March, 1996), 80–84. The figure of 3,600 represents only proven claims. Counting all others, including those who escaped from Spanish Florida, the figure is probably close to 4,000. The British recruited another 325 Colonial Marines from the backcountry of Georgia and Florida.

165. Cockburn to Alexander Cochrane, July 17, 1814, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:156; and Cockburn, quoted in Frank A. Cassell, “Slaves of the Chesapeake Bay Area and the War of 1812,” Journal of Negro History 57 (April, 1972), 151.

166. The pertinent documents on this campaign can be found in [Scott Butler and Patricia Stallings], Phase III Archaeological Data Recovery for the War of 1812 Military Cantonment at Point Peter (Sites 9CM244 and 9CM 245), Cumberland Harbour Development, Camden County, Georgia. This unpublished study was produced by Brockington and Associates of Atlanta, Georgia, in 2008. See also Mary R. Bullard, Black Liberation on Cumberland Island in 1815 (DeLeon Springs, 1983), chs. 5–6, and Cumberland Island: A History (Athens, 2003), 118–22; and Quimby, U.S. Army, 2: 938–40.

167. There are a number of good accounts of the Gulf Coast campaign. See Charles B. Brooks, The Siege of New Orleans (Seattle, 1961); Wilburt S. Brown, The Amphibious Campaign for West Florida and Louisiana, 1814–1815: A Critical Review of Strategy and Tactics at New Orleans (University, AL, 1969); Frank L. Owsley, Jr., Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands: The Creek War and the Battle of New Orleans, 1812–1815 (Gainesville, 1981); and Robin Reilly, The British at the Gates: The New Orleans Campaign in the War of 1812, rev. ed. (Toronto, 2002). Of special note is a contemporary history written by Andrew Jackson’s chief engineer that includes many documents: Arsène Lacarrière Latour: Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana in 1814–15 (1816; edited and expanded by Gene A. Smith, Gainesville, 1999).

168. London Courier, reprinted in Niles’ Register 5 (December 11, 1813), 250; John K. Mahon, “British Strategy and Southern Indians: War of 1812,” Florida Historical Quarterly 44 (April, 1966), 285–302; Frank L. Owsley, Jr., “The Role of the South in the British Grand Strategy in the War of 1812,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 31 (Spring, 1972), 22–38.

169. Brown, Amphibious Campaign, 36, 172.

170. For more on this matter, see Hickey, Don’t Give Up the Ship, 279–81.

171. SSWC to Ross, September 6, 1814, in Admiralty Records 1/4360, pp. 58–65 (transcript supplied by Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC).

172. Alexander Cochrane to Edward Nicholls, [July 4, 1814], Admiralty Records 1/506, fols. 480–85 (transcript supplied by Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC); Andrew Jackson to SW, June 27, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 63; Owsley, Struggle for the Borderlands, 98–100; Mahon, War of 1812, 341–43.

173. Owsley, Struggle for the Borderlands, 105–7; Mahon, War of 1812, 345–47.

174. Proclamation of Edward Nicolls, August 29, 1814, in Niles’ Register 7 (November 5, 1814), 134–35.

175. William Lawrence to Andrew Jackson, September 15–16, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 63; Latour, Historical Memoir (expanded ed.), 33–41.

176. Jackson to SW, July 30, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 63.

177. SW to Andrew Jackson, October 21, 1814, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 13.

178. Andrew Jackson to SW, November 14, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 63; Jackson to Willie Blount, November 14, 1814, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 14; Latour, Historical Memoir (expanded ed.), 42–46.

179. Brooks, Siege of New Orleans, 71.

180. Brown, Amphibious Campaign, 47.

181. [John Windship] to William Plumer, March 20, 1814, in Plumer Papers (NHHS), reel 2.

182. Thomas Flournoy to SW, March 14 and 25, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 52. Quotation from March 14 letter.

183. Latour, Historical Memoir (expanded ed.), 59; Francois-Xavier Martin, The History of Louisiana, From the Earliest Period, 2 vols. (New Orleans, 1827–29), 2:340. See also letter from New Orleans, December 16, 1814, in Richmond Enquirer, January 14, 1815; George Poindexter to SW, February 5, 1815, in Monroe Papers (NYPL).

184. Jackson to SW, December 27, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 63; Brooks, Siege of New Orleans, 74–75, 84–87; Brown, Amphibious Campaign, 63–69.

185. General Orders of December 16, 1814, in Niles’ Register 7 (January 14, 1815), 316–17.

186. Latour, Historical Memoir (expanded ed.), 59.

187. Proclamation of Andrew Jackson, September 21, 1814, and William Claiborne to Jackson, October 17 and 24, 1814, in Jackson Papers (LC), reels 13 and 62; General Order of December 14, 1814, in Niles’ Register 7 (January 28, 1814), 345; Jackson to SW, December 27, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 63; Jackson to Claiborne, October 31, 1814, in John S. Bassett, ed., Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, 6 vols. (Washington, DC, 1926–33), 2:88; Latour, Historical Memoir (expanded ed.), 55–56; Brooks, Siege of New Orleans, 118.

188. Daniel Patterson to SN (2 letters), October 10, 1814, in ND (M147), reel 5.

189. George Poindexter to James Monroe, February 5, 1815, in Monroe Papers (NYPL).

190. Proclamation of Andrew Jackson, September 21, 1814, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 62.

191. See documents in Latour, Historical Memoir (expanded ed.), 188–92; Andrew Jackson to David B. Morgan, January 8, 1815, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 62; and Proclamation of James Madison, February 6, 1815, in AC, 13–3, 1829–30. Jean Laffite’s contribution to the ensuing victory has been exaggerated, in part because of a spurious Laffite memoir that surfaced in the 1950s. See Robert C. Vogel, “Jean Laffite, the Baratarians, and the Battle of New Orleans: A Reappraisal,” Louisiana History 41 (Summer, 2000), 261–76; William C. Davis, The Pirates Laffite: The Treacherous World of the Corsairs of the Gulf (New York, 2005), ch. 11; and Hickey, Don’t Give Up the Ship, 282–84.

192. Brown, Amphibious Campaign, 93.

193. Moore Smith, Autobiography of Harry Smith, 1:247.

194. Brooks, Siege of New Orleans, 68.

195. Quoted in Mahon, War of 1812, 352.

196. Ibid., 352–53; Mahon, “British Strategy and Southern Indians,” 298.

197. Brown, Amphibious Campaign, 76–77; Owsley, Struggle for the Borderlands, 126–27.

198. Thomas ap Catesby Jones to Daniel Patterson, March 12, 1814, in Brannan, Official Letters, 487–89; Latour, Historical Memoir (expanded ed.), 50–54; Gene A. Smith, Thomas ap Catesby Jones: Commodore of Manifest Destiny (Annapolis, 2000), 26–29; Brooks, Siege of New Orleans, 90–97.

199. Codrington to wife, December 23 and 27, 1814, in Bourchier, Edward Codrington, 1:332–33.

200. Letter of Eligius Fromentin, December 30, 1814, in Niles’ Register 7 (February 4, 1815), 360; Latour, Historical Memoir (expanded ed.), 66–72; Brooks, Siege of New Orleans, 129–35.

201. Daniel Patterson to SN, December 28, 1814, in ND (M147), reel 5; Edward Codrington to wife, December 27, 1814, in Bourchier, Edward Codrington, 1:333; Brooks, Siege of New Orleans, 140–44.

202. [Gleig], Subaltern in America, 221.

203. Andrew Jackson to SW, December 27, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 63; John Keane to Edward Pakenham, [December, 1814], in The Annual Register . . . for the Year 1815 {Appendix to Chronicle] (London, 1816), 144–47; [Gleig], Subaltern in America, 219; Brooks, Siege of New Orleans, 144–50, Reilly, British at the Gates, 254–58.

204. Brooks, Siege of New Orleans, 164–73.

205. [Gleig], Narrative of the Campaigns, 310. See also Brown, Amphibious Campaign, 179.

206. Andrew Jackson to SW, December 29, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 63; John D. Henley to Daniel Patterson, December 28, 1814, and Patterson to SN, December 29, 1814, in ND (M147), reel 5; Brooks, Siege of New Orleans, 178–79.

207. Andrew Jackson to SW, December 29, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 63; Brooks, Siege of New Orleans, 183–93.

208. Brooks, Siege of New Orleans, 197–98; Brown, Amphibious Campaign, 119–20.

209. [Gleig], Subaltern in America, 250.

210. Edward Codrington to wife, January 4, 1815, in Bourchier, Edward Codrington, 1:334; Brooks, Siege of New Orleans, 198–206; Brown, Amphibious Campaign, 121–28; Reilly, British at the Gates, 291–301.

211. Brooks, Siege of New Orleans, 213.

212. Ibid., 210–12; Brown, Amphibious Campaign, 128–31.

213. Brooks, Siege of New Orleans, 220–25.

214. Daniel Patterson to SN, January 13, 1815, ND (M147), reel 5; William Thornton to Edward Pakenham, [January, 1815], in Annual Register for 1815 [Appendix to Chronicle], 147–49; Brooks, Siege of New Orleans, ch. 19; Brown, Amphibious Campaign, ch. 9.

215. Letter from New Orleans, January 13, 1815, in Richmond Enquirer, February 11, 1815.

216. Moore Smith, Autobiography of Harry Smith, 1:247. For similar sentiments, see [Gleig], Subaltern in America, 260–62.

217. Letter from New Orleans, January 13, 1815, in Niles’ Register 7 (February 11, 1815), 379.

218. Gene A. Smith, ed., A British Eyewitness at the Battle of New Orleans: The Memoir of Royal Navy Admiral Robert Aitchison, 1808–1827 (New Orleans, 2004), 65.

219. Letter from New Orleans, in Niles’ Register 7 (February 11, 1815), 378.

220. Quoted in Niles’ Register 8 (Supplement), 184.

221. Moore Smith, Autobiography of Harry Smith, 1:241.

222. Ibid., 244.

223. Andrew Jackson to [SW], January 9, 1815, in WD (M221), reel 63; Jackson to SW, January 13, 1815, in Jackson Papers, Supplement (SR), reel 4; John Lambert to SSWC, [January, 1815], in Annual Register for 1815 [Appendix to Chronicle], 141–44; Moore Smith, Autobiography of Harry Smith, 1:238; Brooks, Siege of New Orleans, ch. 19; Brown, Amphibious Campaign, ch. 9.

224. Report of American Loss, in Brannan, Official Letters, 461; Return of [British] Casualties, in Latour, Historical Memoir (expanded ed.), 315–17; Brooks, Siege of New Orleans, 250–52.

225. Washington National Intelligencer, February 7, 1815.

226. Report of American Loss, in Brannan, Official Letters, 461; Return of [British] Casualties, in Latour, Historical Memoir (expanded ed.), 315–17, 327–29; Brooks, Siege of New Orleans, 151, 192, 206, 250–52.

227. W.H. Overton to Jackson, January 19, 1815, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 15; Latour, Historical Memoir (expanded ed.), 128–33.

228. Andrew Jackson to SW, January 19, 1815, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 15; Brooks, Siege of New Orleans, 260–63.

229. Jackson to SW, January 19, 1815, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 15.

230. Quoted in Jane Lucas de Grummond, The Baratarians and the Battle of New Orleans (Baton Rouge, 1961), 106.

231. Resolutions of Louisiana Legislature, [early 1815], in Latour, Historical Memoir (expanded ed.), 294–97.

232. General Orders of December 16, 1814, in Niles’ Register 7 (January 14, 1815), 317.

233. Andrew Jackson to John Lambert, March 13, 1815, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 17; Address of Andrew Jackson, February 19, 1815, and General Orders of March 13, 1815, in Latour, Historical Memoir (expanded ed.), 266, 274–75,.

234. Niles’ Register 8 (June 3, 1815), 245–48, (June 10, 1815), 249–253, and (June 17, 1815), 272–74; Alexander Dallas to Andrew Jackson, April 12, 1815, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 18; Parton, Andrew Jackson, 2:300–321; Matthew Warshauer, Andrew Jackson and the Politics of Martial Law: Nationalism, Civil Liberties, and Partisanship (Knoxville, 2006), ch. 1.

235. Report of Court, [March 21, 1815], in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 17.

236. Warshauer, Andrew Jackson and the Politics of Martial Law, ch. 3.

237. Proceedings of General Court Martial Held at Mobile, December 5, 1814, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 64; Parton, Andrew Jackson, 2:277–300.

238. William Lawrence to Andrew Jackson, February 12, 1815, and James Winchester to SW, February 17, 1815, in WD (M221), reel 63; John Lambert to SSWC, February 14, 1815, in Latour, Historical Memoir (expanded ed.), 329–31.

239. For more on this problem, see chapter 4: The Campaign of 1812.

240. William Bainbridge to SN, October 5, 1812, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval Documents, 1:510.

241. Stephen Decatur to SN, January 18, 1815, in ND (M125), reel 42.

242. Ibid.; New York National Advocate, reprinted in Washington National Intelligencer, April 11, 1815; Naval Chronicle 33 (January-June, 1815), 283; Andrew Lambert, “Taking the President: HMS Endymion and the USS President,” in Douglas M. McLean, ed., Fighting at Sea: Naval Battles from the Ages of Sail and Steam (Montreal, 2008), 86–127.

243. Charles Stewart, Minutes of Chase and Action of Constitution, [May, 1815], in ND (M125), reel 44; Naval Chronicle 33 (January-June, 1815), 466–67; Roosevelt, Naval War, 2:155–67; Maclay, United States Navy, 2:48–54.

244. Lewis Warrington to SN, April 29 and May 12, 1814, and Joseph Bainbridge to SN, June 3, 1814, in ND (M147), reel 5; Johnston Blakeley to SN, July 8, 1814 (with enclosure), in ASP: NA, 1:315–16; W. H. Watson to SN, March 2, 1815, in NASP: NA, 4:264–65; Stephen W. H. Duffy, Captain Blakeley and the “Wasp”: The Cruise of 1814 (Annapolis, 2001), chs. 13–17; Roosevelt, Naval War, 2:38–43, 48–55, 57–63, 167–73.

245. William Bainbridge to SN, June 23, 1814, and Isaac Hull to SN, October 2, 1814, in ND (M125), reels 37 and 40; Robert Fulton to JM, November 5, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 16; New York National Advocate, November 22, 1814; Naval Chronicle 30 (July-December, 1813), 403; Howard I. Chapelle, “The Ships of the American Navy in the War of 1812,” Mariner’s Mirror 18 (July, 1932), 299; Wallace Hutcheon, Jr., Robert Fulton: Pioneer of Undersea Warfare (Annapolis, 1981), 120–24, 129–38.

246. Naval Chronicle 32 (July-December, 1814), 244; London Morning Chronicle, November 2, 1814. See also John M. Forbes to Jonathan Russell, September 27, 1814, in Russell Papers (BU).

247. Concord New-Hampshire Patriot, December 13, 1814.

248. Letter to London Statesman, September 29, 1814, reprinted in Lexington Reporter, December 31, 1814.

249. Speech of Joseph Marryat, December 1, 1814, in Parliamentary Debates, 29:650. See also FSA to James Fowler, September 16, 1814, in Niles’ Register 8 (Supplement), 187.

250. Ingersoll, History, 1:38–39.

251. Naval Chronicle 32 (July-December, 1814), 244.

252. Letter to the editor, August 18, 1814, ibid., 211.

253. Memorial of Bristol merchants, reprinted from London Statesman, in Niles’ Register 8 (Supplement), 186.

254. Resolutions of Glasgow meeting, September 7, 1814, in Niles’ Register 7 (November 26, 1814), 190–91.

255. London Times, September 6, 1814; FSA to London Assurance Corporation, August 19, 1814, in Niles’ Register 7 (November 19, 1814), 174–75.

256. Speech of Alexander Baring, December 1, 1814, in Parliamentary Debates, 29:651.

257. Notice of Admiralty, April 30, 1814, in Naval Chronicle 31 (January-June, 1814), 497–98; letter to the editor, September 10, 1814, ibid. 32 (July-December, 1814), 219.

258. FSA to London Assurance Corporation, August 19, 1814, in Niles’ Register 7 (November 19, 1814), 174–75.

259. London Times, February 11, 1815. See also [Gleig], Narrative of the Campaigns, 213–14.

260. Parliamentary Debates, 29:640–70.

261. Niles’ Register 7 (October 29, 1814), 120, and (January 7, 1815), 291; Adams, History, 2:1047–48; John P. Cranwell and William B. Crane, Men of Marque: A History of Private Armed Vessels out of Baltimore during the War of 1812 (New York, 1940), 321–28.

262. Proclamation of Thomas Boyle, [August, 1814], in Niles’ Register 7 (January 7, 1815), 290–91.

263. Quoted in Maclay, American Privateers, 498.

264. Samuel C. Reid to New York Mercantile Advertiser, October 4, 1814, in Brannan, Official Letters, 445–49; John B. Dabney to Secretary of State, October 5, 1814, in Niles’ Register 7 (December 17, 1814), 253–55; Maclay, American Privateers, 493–502.

265. Niles’ Register 7 (October 29, 1814), 120–21; Maclay, American Privateers, 377–90.

266. Thomas Boyle to George P. Stephenson, March 2, 1815, in Niles’ Register 8 (March 25, 1815), 62.

267. Ibid., 61–62.

Chapter 9. The Crisis of 1814

1. Hartford American Mercury, October 25, 1814.

2. Jones to Alexander Dallas, September 15, 1814, in Dallas Papers (HSP); New York National Advocate, September 10, 1814.

3. See Stagg, Mr. Madison’s War, 456n.

4. SW to George M. Troup, October 17, 1814, and to William Branch Giles, October 26, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:515, 519. See also Memorial of Baltimore Committee of Vigilance and Safety, January 26, 1815, ibid., 602–3.

5. Jefferson to James Monroe, October 16, 1814, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5.

6. [SW] to George Izard, May 25, 1814, in Izard, Official Correspondence, 25; JM to [SW], August 13, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 27; Washington City Gazette, reprinted in Bennington Green-Mountain Farmer, August 23, 1814.

7. Izard to SW, July 3, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 62.

8. J. C. A. Stagg, “Enlisted Men in the United States Army, 1812–1815: A Preliminary Survey,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser. 43 (October, 1986), 624. Both sides relied heavily on deserters for information, and sometimes they were surprisingly well informed.

9. See, for example, Hartford American Mercury, February 1, April 19, May 31, June 28, August 9, October 4, and November 22, 1814, and January 17, 1815.

10. J. Laval to [SW], December 21, 1812, in WD (M221), reel 46.

11. See, for example, Thomas Pinckney to SW, December 25, 1812, Robert Taylor to SW, November 15, 1813, Alexander Macomb to Daniel Parker, January 20, 1815, in WD (M221), reels 55, 57, and 64; Proclamation of James Madison, July 22, 1812, and December 20, 1814, and SW to Pinckney, January 7, 1813, in WD (M6), reels 6 and 7.

12. SN to Arthur Sinclair, May 19, 1814, in NASP: NA, 4:348; Lexington Reporter, December 31, 1814.

13. Proclamation of James Madison, June 17, 1814, in Niles’ Register 6 (June 25, 1814), 279; Order of Secretary of War, in Lexington Reporter, July 9, 1814.

14. There were 24 additional executions in 1815. See John S. Hare, “Military Punishments in the War of 1812,” Journal of the American Military Institute 4 (Winter, 1940), 238. For more on this subject, see Hickey, Don’t Give Up the Ship, 255–62; and Taylor, Civil War, 333–35.

15. See chapter 7: The Last Embargo.

16. Jones to Alexander J. Dallas, September 15, 1814, in Dallas Papers (HSP).

17. SN to JM, [October 15, 1814], in Madison Papers (LC), reel 16.

18. Decatur to SN, September 8, 1814, and Chauncey to SN, August 30, 1814, in ND (M125), reels 38 and 39.

19. John H. Dent to SN, January 28, 1815, Hugh G. Campbell to SN, February 13, 1815, and William Bainbridge to SN, January 26, 1815, in ND (M125), reel 42.

20. SW to Daniel Tompkins, November 21, 1814, in WD (M6), reel 7; Pinckney to SW, May 20, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 56.

21. Georgetown Federal Republican, November 24, 1814; William Plumer to Charles Cutts, November 21, 1814, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 2. See also John Kerr to [SW?], January 31, 1815, in WD (M221), reel 63; John T. Gilman to SW, November 17, 1814, in WD (M222), reel 11.

22. Moses Porter to SW, July 25 and August 3, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 65.

23. See chapter 4: The Campaign of 1812.

24. Speech of Alexander Hanson, November 28, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 656.

25. Willcocks to SW, July 1, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 67.

26. Timothy Upham to SW, December 7, 1814, in WD (M222), reel 14.

27. John Graham to John Mason, November 7 and December 13, 1814, in SD (M588), reel 2.

28. Francis Le Baron to SW, January 20, 1815, in WD (M221), reel 63.

29. Henry Dearborn to SW, December 22, 1814, and Joseph Wingate to SW, January 4, 1815, in WD (M222), reels 11 and 18; Wright Hall to SW, August 15, 1814, William D. Cheever to SW, October 7, 1814, Samuel Russell to SW, October 18, 1814, and Robert McCoy to Thomas Cadwallader, December, 1814, and January 16, 1815, in WD (M221), reels 60, 62, 64, and 65; Daniel Tompkins to SW, December 24, 1814, in Hastings, Papers of Daniel D. Tompkins, 3:629; Anthony G. Dietz, “The Prisoner of War in the United States during the War of 1812” (PhD dissertation, American University, 1964), 73; Adams, History, 2:1105–6.

30. Christian Wilt to Thomas Hill, January 7, 1815, in Michael D. Harris, ed., “The Christian Wilt Papers of St. Louis,” Dispatch 17 (May-June, 2004), 9.

31. Gallatin to ST, December 24, 1814, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 27; Ralph W. Hidy, The House of Baring in American Trade and Finance: English Merchant Bankers at Work, 1763–1861 (Cambridge, 1949), 52.

32. ST to John W. Eppes, December 2, 1814, in ASP: F, 2:878; ST to Commissioner of Loans at Boston, November 9, 1814, in Niles’ Register 7 (December 24, 1814), 270.

33. Thomas H. Cushing to SW, December 4, 1814, in WD (M222), reel 10; Henry Dearborn to SW, November 5, 1814, and James Byers to SW, January 4, 1815, in WD (M221), reels 59 and 61; Oliver H. Perry to SN, February 12, 1815, in ND (M125), reel 42; Niles’ Register 7 (Supplement), 176; Keene Newhampshire Sentinel, December 3, 1814; speeches of Charles J. Ingersoll, November 17, 1814, Elijah Brigham, November 21, 1814, and Thomas P. Grosvenor, November 28, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 609, 626, 669; Perkins & Co., Boston, to Perkins & Co., Canton, November 17, 1814, in Thomas G. Cary, Memoir of Thomas Handasyd Perkins (Boston, 1856), 300; Ingersoll, Historical Sketch, 1:249 Adam Seybert, Statistical Annals . . . of the United States of America (Philadelphia, 1818), 749.

34. ST to John W. Eppes, December 2, 1814, in ASP: F, 2:878; James Robertson to Timothy Pickering, November 22, 1814 (with enclosure), in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 30.

35. See, for example, Samuel Smith to SW, October 5, 1814, William D. Cheever to SW, October 22, 1814, Henry Dearborn to SW, November 10 and 21, 1814, and Thomas Cadwallader to SW, December 22, 1814, in WD (M221), reels 60, 61, and 66; John T. Gilman to SW, November 17, 1814, in WD (M222), reel 11.

36. John Langdon, Jr., to SW, November 1, 1814, in WD (M222), reel 12.

37. James Morrison to SW, November 16, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 64. See also John Anderson to Andrew Jackson, November 25, 1814, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 14.

38. J. Van Fenstermaker, The Development of American Commercial Banking, 1782–1837 (Kent, 1965), 111.

39. Washington National Intelligencer, March 28, 1814.

40. Fenstermaker, Commercial Banking, 111.

41. Christopher Gore to Rufus King, July 28, 1814, in King, Rufus King, 5:403; Ingersoll, Historical Sketch, 2:48; Davis R. Dewey, Financial History of the United States, 12th ed. (New York, 1934), 145. See also John Haff to JM, January 28, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 15; James Robertson to Timothy Pickering, March 17, 1814, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 30; Washington National Intelligencer, July 22, 1814; Niles’ Register 6 (July 23, 1814), 353; Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War (Princeton, 1962), 182–83.

42. Christopher Gore to Rufus King, July 28, 1814, in King, Rufus King, 5:403.

43. Joseph Marx and George Marx to Wilson Cary Nicholas, July 27, 1814, in Nicholas Papers (UVA). See also Harrison, Diary of Thomas P. Cope (June 28, 1814), 293.

44. Niles’ Register 7 (Supplement), 175–77; Erick Bollman to James A. Bayard, August 24, 1814, in Donnan, Papers of James A. Bayard, 319; Albert S. Bolles, The Financial History of the United States, From 1789 to 1860, 3rd ed. (New York, 1891), 273; Paul Studenski and Herman E. Krooss, Financial History of the United States, 2nd ed. (New York, 1963), 74.

45. ST to John W. Eppes, December 2, 1814, in ASP: F, 2:877–81; Bolles, Financial History, 268.

46. William D. Cheever to SW, October 7, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 60.

47. Joseph Whipple to ST, December 21, 1814, in TD (M178), reel 26; Rutland (VT) Herald, August 17, 1814; Portland Gazette, reprinted in Salem Gazette, November 29, 1814.

48. J. A. Douglas to Henry A. S. Dearborn, November 23, 1814, in TD (M175), reel 2. The administration later reversed this policy, ordering the seizure of all goods imported from Castine. See Niles’ Register 7 (December 24, 1814), 270.

49. Eustis to Richard Rush, December 10, 1814, in Rush Papers (SR), reel 3. See also John Chandler to SW, November 21, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 60; Jacob Ulmer to John Brooks, September 29, 1814, in ASP: MA, 3:859.

50. Izard to SW, July 31, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 62.

51. CG to FSA, August 27, 1814, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 1:180. See also Joseph Whipple to ST, August 23, 1814, in TD (M178), reel 26; Thomas Macdonough to SN, July 23, 1814, in ND (M147), reel 5; letter from Burlington, VT, August, 1814, in Boston Gazette, August 29, 1814; Bennington Green-Mountain Farmer, August 23 1814; Thomas G. Ridout to George Ridout, February 19 and May 15, 1814, in Matilda Edgar, Ten Years of Upper Canada in Peace and War, 1805–1815 (Toronto, 1890), 275, 282; H.N. Muller III, “A ‘Traitorous and Diabolic Traffic’: The Commerce of the Champlain-Richelieu Corridor during the War of 1812,” Vermont History 44 (Spring, 1976), passim.

52. Macdonough to SN, June 29, and July 9 and 23, 1814, in ND (M147), reel 5. See also Plattsburgh Republican, reprinted in Bennington Green-Mountain Farmer, August 9, 1814; Concord New-Hampshire Patriot, January 3, 1815.

53. Macdonough to SN, June 8, 1814, in ND (M147), reel 5.

54. ST to John W. Eppes, November 19, 1814, in ASP: F, 2:881–82.

55. Richard Rush to U.S. district attorney for Massachusetts, July 28, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 1823–27. Quotation from p. 1823.

56. Niles’ Register 8 (Supplement), 149. See also Dwight F. Henderson, Congress, Courts, and Criminals: The Development of Federal Criminal Law, 1801–1829 (Westport, 1985), ch. 6.

57. Salem Gazette, September 2, 1814. See also Windsor Vermont Republican, reprinted in Bennington Green-Mountain Farmer, March 15, 1814.

58. H. Storrs to SW, October 21, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 66; Henry A. S. Dearborn to ST, November 14, 1814, in TD (M178), reel 12; Washington National Intelligencer, April 4, 1814.

59. Izard to SW, July 31, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 62.

60. Statement of Callender Irvine, December 26, 1812, in WD (M222), reel 8; SW to John Shelby, September 17, 1812, in McAfee, History of the Late War, 118; Victor Sapio, Pennsylvania & the War of 1812 (Lexington, 1970), 192–93; Sanford W. Higginbotham, The Keystone in the Democratic Arch: Pennsylvania Politics, 1800–1816 (Harrisburg, 1952), 288–89; Jacobs, Beginnings of the U.S. Army, 375. See also correspondence scattered through WD (M6), reels 5–6.

61. Harrison, Diary of Thomas P. Cope (October 25, 1813), 287; Philadelphia United States’ Gazette, October 11, 1813.

62. Harrison, Diary of Thomas P. Cope (July 18 and September 28, 1814), 294, 300.

63. Jacobs, Beginnings of the U.S. Army, 375.

64. Henry Dearborn to Elbert Anderson, Jr., September 28, 1812, in WD (M222), reel 5. The figure for wages is based on the scale approved by Congress in late 1812. See AC, 12–2, 1314–15.

65. Elbert Anderson, Jr., to SW, February 6, 1813, and August 13, 1814, in WD (M221), reels 50 and 59; Anderson to SW, September 3, 1813, and statement of William D. Cheever, December 1, 1814, in WD (M222), reels 7 and 10.

66. Washington Lee to SW, September 2, 1813, in WD (M222), reel 8.

67. Tompkins to New York Legislature, November 3, 1812, in Hastings, Papers of Daniel D. Tompkins, 3:180.

68. Victor S. Clark, History of Manufactures in the United States, 2 vols. (Washington, DC, 1916–28), 1:chs. 9, 18–20.

69. Simon Snyder to Pennsylvania Legislature, December 5, 1811, in Niles’ Register 1 (December 21, 1811), 282. For similar sentiments, see JM to Congress, December 7, 1813, and speech of Charles J. Ingersoll, February 14, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 543, 1431; Washington National Intelligencer, November 25, 1813; Boston Independent Chronicle, August 16, 1813.

70. James Morrison to Henry Clay, December 24, 1812, in WD (M222), reel 6. See also SW to Morrison, October 29, 1812, in WD (M6), reel 6; and Morrison to SW, January 28, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 55.

71. Martin Baum to SW, March 25, 1813, in WD (M221), reel 50.

72. SW to William Duane, April 29, 1813, in William Duane, ed., “Selections from the Duane Papers,” Historical Magazine, 2nd ser., 4 (August, 1868), 62.

73. Clay to SW, June 25, 1813, in Hopkins and Hargreaves, Papers of Henry Clay, 1:806–7.

74. Speech of Joseph Hawkins, January 18, 1815, in AC, 13–3, 1081. See also ST to SW, April 17, 1813, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 15; Lewis Sanders to [Wilson Cary Nicholas], June 2, 1814, in Nicholas Papers (UVA); Thomas P. Abernethy, “Andrew Jackson and the Rise of Southwestern Democracy,” American Historical Review 33 (October, 1927), 65.

75. Richard C. Wade, The Urban Frontier: The Rise of Western Cities, 1790–1830 (Cambridge, 1959), 39–71.

76. Letter from Boston merchant, October 17, 1813, in Boston Patriot, November 10, 1813.

77. See Ebenezer Denny to SW, April 10 and 23, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 52; Thomas P. Abernethy, The South in the New Nation, 1789–1819 ([Baton Rouge], 1961), 456–57.

78. Shelby to Kentucky Legislature, December 6, 1814, in Lexington Reporter, December 17, 1814.

79. State of Georgia, Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia [1812] (Milledgeville, 1812), 3–8; State of Maryland, Laws Made and Passed by the General Assembly of the State of Maryland [1813] (Annapolis, 1813), 15–20; State of North Carolina, Laws of North Carolina [1812] ([Raleigh, 1813]), 8–9; State of North Carolina, Laws of North Carolina [1813] ([Raleigh, 1814]), 6–7; Peter Early to Georgia Senate, November 11, 1814, in Lexington Reporter, February 8, 1815.

80. Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, October 16, 1814, and to William Duane, November 24, 1814, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 47.

81. Nathaniel Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, December 23, 1812, in Nicholson Papers (LC); Jefferson to William Short, November 28, 1814, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 47.

82. Randolph to Josiah Quincy, August 30, 1813, in Edmund Quincy, Life of Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts, 4th ed. (Boston, 1868), 336. See also John Hollins to [Wilson Cary Nicholas], June 1, 1814, and Joseph Marx and George Marx to [Wilson Cary Nicholas], August 9 and 23, 1814 in Nicholas Papers (UVA); W. Freeman Galpin, “The Grain Trade of Alexandria, Virginia, 1801–1815,” North Carolina Historical Review 4 (October, 1927), 424–27; Jerome R. Garitee, The Republic’s Private Navy: The American Privateering Business as Practiced by Baltimore during the War of 1812 (Middletown, 1977), 52–54.

83. Lowndes to Elizabeth Lowndes, November 6, 1814, in Lowndes Papers (UNC), reel 1. See also Sarah Lemmon, Frustrated Patriots: North Carolina and the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill, 1973), 192–96.

84. Niles’ Register 7 (December 3, 1814), 193–97. For similar sentiments, see New York National Advocate, reprinted in Philadelphia Aurora, March 1, 1814; Memorandum of [Virgil Maxcy], March 15, 1814, in Galloway-Maxcy-Markoe Papers (LC); William C. Bradley to SW, May 5, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 51; Adams, History, 2:915–16; Edward Channing, A History of the United States, 6 vols. (New York, 1905–25), 4:542–43; Samuel Elliot Morison, The Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, Federalist, 1765–1848, 2 vols. (Boston, 1913), 2:52–53; Marshall Smelser, The Democratic Republic, 1801–1815 (New York, 1968), 292.

85. W. B. Smith, “Wholesale Commodity Prices in the United States, 1795–1824,” Review of Economic Statistics 9 (October, 1927), 177.

86. John Quincy Adams, An Eulogy on the Life and Character of James Monroe (Boston, 1831), 74. See also Rufus King to Christopher Gore, July 11, 1814, in King, Rufus King, 5:398.

87. For more on the state loans, see chapter 10: The Hartford Convention.

88. Paul Revere & Son to SW, May 4, 1812, and Eli Whitney to SW, March 8, 1813, in WD (M221), reels 56 and 58.

89. The command problem is dealt with in chapter 10: The Hartford Convention.

90. Statement of Third Auditor’s Office, December 12, 1820, in ASP: MA, 2:280–81.

91. Tonnage for the Year 1813, in ASP: C & N, 1:1018.

92. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783–1860, rev. ed. (Cambridge, 1961), 205–6; Charles Warren, Jacobin and Junto; or, Early American Politics as Viewed in the Diary of Dr. Nathaniel Ames, 1758–1822 (Cambridge, 1931), 264.

93. Perkins & Co., Boston, to Perkins & Co., Canton, November 17, 1814, in Cary, Thomas Handasyd Perkins, 300.

94. Christopher Gore to Rufus King, July 28, 1814, in King, Rufus King, 5:403; Benjamin W. Labaree, Patriots and Partisans: The Merchants of Newburyport, 1764–1815 (Cambridge, 1962), 200.

95. Christopher Gore to Rufus King, July 28, 1814, in King, Rufus King, 5:403.

96. Speech of Daniel Sargent, [October 11, 1814], in Synopsis of Debates in the Massachusetts Legislature [Boston, 1814], 13. See also Timothy Pitkin, A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States (Hartford, 1816), 41–42, 45–46; Robert A. East, “Economic Development and New England Federalism, 1803–1814,” New England Quarterly 10 (September, 1937), 442–44; Mahan, Sea Power, 2:179–83.

97. Speech of Richard Stockton, December 10, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 849.

98. Duane to Thomas Jefferson, September 26, 1814, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 46.

99. James Ronaldson to Jonathan Russell, February 17, 1814, in Russell Papers (BU); Andrei Dashkov to Nikolai Rumiantsev, January 1, 1815, in Bashkina et al., United States and Russia, 1100.

100. Wirt to Elizabeth Wirt, October 25, 1814, in Wirt Papers (MdHS), reel 2.

101. JM to Wilson Cary Nicholas, November 25, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 16.

102. See chapter 5: Raising Men and Money.

103. Federalists had little strength in Georgia or the West. For the election results elsewhere in 1813–1814, see Keene Newhampshire Sentinel, October 23 and 30, 1813, and Zadock Thompson, History of Vermont, rev. ed., 3 vols. (Burlington, 1853), 2:94–95, 118 (for VT); Keene Newhampshire Sentinel, June 12 and 19, 1813, and April 2 and June 11, 1814 (for NH); James M. Banner, Jr., To the Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789–1815 (New York, 1970), 61, 367 (for MA); Hartford Connecticut Courant, October 25, 1814, and Richard J. Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, 1775–1818 (Washington, DC, 1918), 291–92 (for CT); Samuel H. Allen, “The Federal Ascendency of 1812,” Narragansett Historical Register 7 (October, 1889), 390–94 (for RI); DeAlva S. Alexander, A Political History of the State of New York, 3 vols. (New York, 1906–9), 217, 226 (for NY); Higginbotham, Keystone in the Democratic Arch, 284, 299 (for PA); Walter R. Fee, The Transition from Aristocracy to Democracy in New Jersey, 1789–1829 (Sommerville, 1933), 195, 203 (for NJ); John A. Munroe, Federalist Delaware, 1775–1815 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1954), 233–35 (for DE); L. Marx Renzulli, Jr., Maryland: The Federalist Years (Rutherford, NJ, 1972), 307–10 (for MD); James H. Broussard, The Southern Federalists, 1800–1816 (Baton Rouge, 1978), 294–95 (for VA, NC and SC).

104. See Kenneth C. Martis, The Historical Atlas of Political Parties in the United States Congress, 1789–1989 (New York, 1989), 83. At the opening session of this Congress, the Republicans controlled 118 of 182 seats in the House and 24 of 36 seats in the Senate. The Republicans picked up a House seat and two Senate seats when Indiana joined the Union in late 1816, but otherwise the party balance remained the same for the duration of the Congress. Martis has the Republicans losing a Kentucky Senate seat when Martin D. Hardin took over after a resignation, but I believe Hardin was a Republican.

105. Hay to James Monroe, March 14, 1814, in Monroe Papers (NYPL); Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, February 4, 1814, in Nicholson Papers (LC). For similar sentiments, see Thomas Jesup to ———, July 15, 1813, in Jesup Papers (LC); Robert Whitehill to James Hamilton, July 25, 1813, in Hamilton Papers (HSP); William Jones to Alexander Dallas, January 4, 1814, in Jones Papers (HSP).

106. Harrison, Diary of Thomas P. Cope (September 2, 1814), 298; George Hay to James Monroe, September 10, 1814, in Monroe Papers (NYPL); King to Jeremiah Mason, September 2, 1814, in King, Rufus King, 5:414.

107. See chapter 8: The British Counteroffensive.

108. ST to JM, September 26, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 16; George W. Campbell to John Norvell, January 19, 1815, in Campbell Papers (LC); Stagg, Mr. Madison’s War, 432.

109. SN to JM, September 11, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 16.

110. JM to James Monroe, October 1, 1814, in Monroe Papers (NYPL); Senate Journal, 2:530.

111. JM to Daniel Tompkins, September 28, 1814, and Tompkins to JM, October 6 and 8, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reels 16 and 26.

112. JM to John Rodgers, November 24, 1814, Memorandum of Attorney General, December 4, 1814, JM to Benjamin Crowninshield, December 15, 1814, and Crowninshield to JM, December 26 and 28, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 16; Senate Journal, 2:597; Andrei Dashkov to Nikolai Rumiantsev, January 1, 1815, in Bashkina et al., United States and Russia, 1100.

113. Dallas to William Jones, October 2, 1814, in Jones Papers (HSP).

114. J. Harold Ennis, “Alexander James Dallas,” in DAB, 5:36–38; Raymond Walters, Jr., Alexander James Dallas: Lawyer—Politician—Financier, 1759–1817 (Philadelphia, 1943), passim.

115. George Hay to James Monroe, October 16, 1814, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 10.

116. Abner Lacock, quoted in Ingersoll, Historical Sketch, 2:253; Senate Journal, 2:533.

117. AC, 13–2, 766, 2003, 2835.

118. Proclamation of James Madison, August 8, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 9.

119. Roberts to Matthew Roberts, September 27, 1814, in Roberts Papers (HSP). See also Nathaniel Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, September 22, 1814, in Nicholson Papers (LC).

120. Washington National Intelligencer, September 9, 1814; Brant, James Madison, 6:323.

121. Andrei Dashkov to Nikolai Rumiantsev, November 14, 1814, in Bashkina et al., United States and Russia, 1097.

122. Wirt to Elizabeth Wirt, October 24, 1814, in Wirt Papers (MdHS), reel 2.

123. Jones to Alexander Dallas, September 25, 1814, in Dallas Papers (HSP).

124. Daniel Webster, quoted in speech of Joseph Lewis, February 8, 1815, in AC, 13–3, 1137; Jesse Bledsoe to William Worsely, September 26, 1814, in Worsely Papers, Lyman C. Draper Collection (HSW), reel 6cc. See also Ingersoll, History, 2:264.

125. JM to Congress, September 20, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 12–15.

126. These documents are printed in ASP: FR, 3:695–710.

127. Speeches of Joseph Varnum, November 16, 1814, and John C. Calhoun, October 25, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 58, 465.

128. Speech of Jeremiah Mason, November 16, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 78.

129. Memorandum of Rufus King, October, 1814, in King, Rufus King, 5:422–24; Alexander Hanson to Robert Goodloe Harper, October 9, 1814, in Harper Papers (MdHS), reel 2; Timothy Pickering to Gouverneur Morris, October 29, 1814, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 15.

130. Speech of Alexander Hanson, October 10, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 382. Hanson reported that his speech was received “almost with acclamation” by the Republicans. “Even old [Robert] Wright was ready to embrace me . . . but while I am willing to go all honourable lengths to defend the country I can have no connection or understanding with scoundrels.” Hanson to Robert Goodloe Harper, October 11, 1814, in Harper Papers (MdHS), reel 2.

131. Alexandria Gazette, October 15, 1814. See also Speech of Thomas J. Oakley, October 10, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 382–83; Stephen Van Rensselaer to Rufus King, October 25, 1814, in King, Rufus King, 5:431; Charles Cotesworth Pinckney to F. D. Petit de Villers, October 31, 1814, in Pinckney Papers (DU); Robert Goodloe Harper to William Sullivan, November 2, 1814, in Harper Papers (MdHS), reel 2; Robert Patterson to Jonathan Russell, November 6, 1814, in Russell Papers (BU); Samuel Dana to [William Eustis], November 2, 1814, in Eustis Papers (LC), reel 2; William Polk to William Hawkins, October 17, 1814, in Raleigh Minerva, October 21, 1814; Georgetown Federal Republican, October 11, 1814; Resolutions of New York Legislature, ibid., October 31, 1814; New York Evening Post, October 12 and 13, 1814; Philadelphia United States’ Gazette, October 14, 1814; Norfolk Ledger, reprinted in Salem Essex Register, November 19, 1814.

132. Boston Gazette, November 7, 1814.

133. Pickering to Caleb Strong, October 12, 1814, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 15.

134. Otis to Robert Goodloe Harper, October 27, 1814, in Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:181. See also Caleb Strong to Timothy Pickering, October 12, 17, and 18, 1814, John Lowell, Jr., to Pickering, October 19, 1814, Pickering to Gouverneur Morris, October 29, 1814, and Manasseh Cutler to Pickering, November 28, 1814, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reels 15 and 30; Samuel Taggart to John Taylor, November 2, 1814, in Mary R. Reynolds, ed., “Letters of Samuel Taggart, Representative in Congress, 1803–1814,” Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society 33 (October, 1923), 430–31; Henry Lee to ———, February 18, 1815, in Kenneth W. Porter, ed., The Jacksons and the Lees: Two Generations of Massachusetts Merchants, 1765–1844, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1937), 2:1122; Boston New-England Palladium, October 18 and 28, 1814; Boston Columbian Centinel, October 19 and 26, 1814; Keene Newhampshire Sentinel, October 22, 1814; Boston Daily Advertiser, reprinted in Salem Gazette, November 1–15, 1814.

135. Letter from Washington, December 24, 1814, in New York National Advocate, December 28, 1815. See also Nathaniel Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, October 24, 1814, in Nicholson Papers (LC).

136. SW to George M. Troup, October 17, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:515.

137. SW to Brown, February 10, 1815, in WD (M7), reel 1. See also SW to Daniel D. Tompkins, February 4, 1815, ibid.; SW to Chairman of Senate Military Committee, December 23, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:610; speech of John C. Calhoun, October 25, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 467; New York National Advocate, September 10 and November 6, 1814; William Wirt to Elizabeth Wirt, October 25, 1814, in Wirt Papers (MdHS), reel 2; Lexington Reporter, January 6, 1815.

138. Speech of Lyman Law, December 17, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 944; Morris to Harrison Gray Otis, November 8, 1814, in Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:183. See also speeches of Jeremiah Mason, November 16, 1814, Morris Miller, November 28 and December 8, 1814, Thomas P. Grosvenor, December 3, 1814, and Zebulon R. Shipherd, December 9, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 90–91, 687–88, 739, 742, 791–92, 821; Alexandria Gazette, December 17, 1814; New York Evening Post, November 4 and 5, 1814; Ontario (NY) Repository, reprinted in Pittsburgh Gazette, January 10, 1815.

139. Memorandum of Rufus King, October, 1814, in King, Rufus King, 5:424. See also Frederick Wolcott to Oliver Wolcott, October 16, 1814, in Wolcott Papers (CHS); John Jacob Astor to James Monroe, September 2, 1814, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5; speeches of Thomas Bayly and Cyrus King, October 22, 1814, Zebulon R. Shipherd, October 25, 1814, and Lyman Law, December 17, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 440, 452, 472, 948; Boston Columbian Centinel, August 31, 1814; Boston New-England Palladium, September 2, 6, and 9, 1814; Boston Gazette, September 5, 1814; Portsmouth Oracle, reprinted in Chillicothe Supporter, November 19, 1814; Baltimore Federal Gazette, reprinted in Pittsburgh Gazette, January 21, 1815.

140. George Hay to James Monroe, November 27, 1814, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5; Monroe to [Hay?], December 2, 1814, in Monroe Papers (NYPL); Alexander Hanson to Robert Goodloe Harper, October 9, 1814, in Harper Papers (MdHS), reel 2; Alexander Dallas to William Jones, September 18, 1814, in Jones Papers (HSP); Elkanah Watson to JM, September 8, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 16.

141. Hanson to Robert Goodloe Harper, October 9, 1814, in Harper Papers (MdHS), reel 2.

142. John Lovett to Solomon Van Rensselaer, June 22, 1813, in Catharina V. R. Bonney, A Legacy of Historical Gleanings, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Albany, 1875), 1:301. See also Jonathan Roberts to [Matthew Roberts], March 16, 1814, in Roberts Papers (HSP).

143. Georgetown Federal Republican, November 25, 1814; AC, 13–3, 110–11.

144. Letter from Washington, November 25, 1814, in Salem Gazette, December 9, 1814.

145. Georgetown Federal Republican, November 26, 1814. See also Ingersoll, History, 3:292–93.

146. These documents are printed in ASP: FR, 3:710–26.

147. Washington National Intelligencer, December 2, 1814. See also Boston New-England Palladium, December 9, 1814; AC, 13–3, 701.

148. William Plumer to Jeremiah Mason, December 29, 1814, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 2. For similar sentiments, see William Lowndes to Elizabeth Lowndes, November 30, 1814, in Lowndes Papers (UNC), reel 1; Ebenezer Stott to Duncan Cameron, December 12, 1814, in Cameron Papers (UNC); Worcester National Aegis, December 14, 1814; New York Evening Post, December 5, 7, and 8, 1814; Trenton Federalist, December 5, 1814; Philadelphia United States’ Gazette, December 13, 1814; Georgetown Federal Republican, December 2, 1814; Alexandria Gazette, December 3, 1814; Baltimore Federal Gazette, reprinted in Charleston Courier, December 20, 1814.

149. For the peace rumors, see Joseph Lyman to John Treadwell, December 14, 1814, in Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:188; Edward Lloyd to Elijah Davis, December 21, 1814, in “Unpublished Letters,” Maryland Historical Magazine 21 (September, 1926), 283; Salem Gazette, January 13, 1815; Boston Columbian Centinel, January 14, 18, and 28, 1815; Providence Gazette, January 14, 1815; Newport Mercury, January 14, 1815; New London Connecticut Gazette, January 18, 1815; Chillicothe Supporter, December 24, 1814; Niles’ Register 4 (January 14, 1815), 331.

150. Ingersoll, History, 2:282.

151. Adams to Louisa Catherine Adams, September 27, 1814, in Worthington C. Ford, ed., Writings of John Quincy Adams, 7 vols. (New York, 1913–17), 5:149.

152. Resolution of Philadelphia City Council, August 27, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 16. See also AC, 13–3, 19, 335.

153. Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, October 7, 1814, in Nicholson Papers (LC).

154. Speech of Jonathan Fisk, September 26, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 312, 314. For similar sentiments, see Charles J. Ingersoll to [Alexander Dallas], September 30, 1814, in Ingersoll Papers (HSP).

155. Speech of Nathaniel Macon, September 26, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 313. See also Washington National Intelligencer, September 2, 1814.

156. AC, 13–3, 311–12, 323, 341–42.

157. Speech of Langdon Cheves, October 3, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 342.

158. AC, 13–3, 387–88, 395–96.

159. AC, 13–3, 396; Ingersoll, History, 2:264.

160. AC, 13–3, 223, 1143, 1911–12.

161. AC, 13–3, 120, 1105–6; Thomas Jefferson to Samuel H. Smith, September 21 and October 29, 1814, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 47; Niles’ Register 7 (December 31, 1814), 285.

162. SW to George M. Troup, October 17, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1: 514–17.

163. Ibid., 515.

164. For the New York law, see State of New York, Laws of the State of New-York [1814] (Albany, 1815), 15–20. Pennsylvania rejected a similar plan. See Mathew Carey, The Olive Branch; or Faults on Both Sides, Federal and Democratic, 10th ed. (Philadelphia, 1818), 355n.

165. For Knox’s plan, see Report of the Secretary of War, January 18, 1790, in ASP: MA, 1:6–13.

166. The bill is printed in Niles’ Register 7 (November 26, 1814), 181–83. See also George Bibb to SW, November 1, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 59; Stagg, Mr. Madison’s War, 459–61.

167. AC, 13–3, 38.

168. Varnum to William Eustis, November 12, 1814, in Eustis Papers (LC), reel 2.

169. Speech of Joseph Varnum, November 16, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 58–70. Quotations from pp. 69–70.

170. Speeches of Robert H. Goldsborough, November 22, 1814, and David Daggett, November 16, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 73, 104.

171. AC, 13–3, 109.

172. Speech of Charles J. Ingersoll, December 9, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 808–19. Quotation from p. 815.

173. AC, 13–3, 713–14, 869–70, 928–29.

174. AC, 13–3, 132, 136, 141, 976, 993–94.

175. Ingersoll, History, 2:297. See also Harrison, Diary of Thomas P. Cope (January 5, 1815), 302.

176. James Hillhouse to Timothy Pitkin, November 7, 1814, in Pitkin Papers (HL).

177. Resolutions of Northampton Convention, November 16, 1814, in Boston New-England Palladium, November 29, 1814.

178. Speech of Daniel Webster, December 9, 1814, in Claude H. Van Tyne, ed., The Letters of Daniel Webster (New York, 1902), 67; Resolution of Connecticut Legislature, October, 1814, in State of Connecticut, Public Records of the State of Connecticut, 19 vols. to date (Hartford, 1894-), 17:193–94. The Maryland House of Delegates also threatened to nullify the law. See Resolution of Maryland House, December 17, 1814, in Boston Columbian Centinel, December 28, 1814.

179. Bibb to SW, November 1, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 59; AC, 13–3, 38; Stagg, Mr. Madison’s War, 461–62.

180. Speeches of Cyrus King and Thomas P. Grosvenor, December 3, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 725–26, 733–34.

181. Webster’s speech is not printed in the Annals, but his argument is summarized in the speech of Thomas P. Grosvenor, December 3, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 734.

182. AC, 13–3, 45, 753–54, 756, 1837–38.

183. Dwight to Timothy Pitkin, January 9, 1815, in Pitkin Papers (HL).

184. Joseph L. Smith to John R. Bell, October 29, 1814, in Rush Papers (SR), reel 3; Thomas Jesup to SW, January 20, 1815, in Jesup Papers (LC).

185. George W. Hight to SW, January 12, 1815, in WD (M221), reel 62.

186. State of Connecticut, Public Records, 17: 280–81, 284–85; State of Massachusetts, Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts [1814–1815], (Boston, [1815]), 640–41; Jesup to SW, January 31 and February 3, 1815, in Jesup Papers (LC).

187. AC, 13–3, 162, 755, 1896–99.

188. Richard Hildreth, The History of the United States, rev. ed., 6 vols. (New York, 1854–55), 6:402, 404.

189. SW to Nathaniel Searle, Jr., July 9, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:608; Robert Taylor to SW, September 29, 1814, and Daniel Tompkins to SW, December 12, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 66; Hartford Connecticut Courant, September 8 and November 10, 1812; Boston New-England Palladium, October 28, 1814; Hildreth, History of the United States, 6:554–55; Adams, History, 2:1105. Connecticut actually had state troops in federal service as early as 1813. See chapter 10: The Hartford Convention.

190. Report of the Secretary of the Navy, November 15, 1814, in ASP: NA, 1:323–24.

191. AC, 13–3, 223, 1085, 1908.

192. Report of the Secretary of the Navy, November 15, 1814, in ASP: NA, 1:322–23.

193. Speech of James Pleasants, November 8, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 542.

194. AC, 13–3, 35, 548, 1834.

195. ST to Senate, September 23, 1814, in ASP: F, 2:840–43. Quotation from p. 843.

196. Jefferson to Thomas Cooper, September 10, 1814, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 47; Jefferson to JM, October 15, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 16.

197. Nathaniel Macon, quoted in Ingersoll, Historical Sketch, 2:254. See also speech of Nathaniel Macon, January 4, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 663; James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, September 10, 1814, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 47; Monroe to Jefferson, December 21, 1814, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5.

198. See JM to James Monroe, October 23, 1814, in Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings of James Madison, 9 vols. (New York, 1900–1910), 8:313n-314n; and JM to Thomas Jefferson, October 23, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 16.

199. Report of House Ways and Means Committee, October 10, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 378–81. Quotation from p. 378.

200. Ingersoll, Historical Sketch, 2:254.

201. ST to John W. Eppes, October 17, 1814, in ASP: F, 2:866–69. Quotation from p. 866.

202. ST to John W. Eppes, December 2, 1814, in ASP: F, 2:877–81

203. Report of the ST, January 17, 1815, in ASP: F, 2:885–89.

204. Ticknor to Edward T. Channing, January 22, 1815, in George S. Hillard et al., Life, Letters, and Journals of George Ticknor, 2 vols. (Boston, 1876), 1:30–31.

205. AC, 13–3, 134, 771, 1855–57.

206. Dutch bankers later told American agents that this loan could probably be filled at 75—a 25 percent discount—but the peace treaty was signed before any action was taken. See American commissioners to ST, December 25, 1814, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 27.

207. AC, 13–3, 38, 511–13, 1834–36.

208. ST to Speaker of the House, April 12, 1816, in ASP: F, 3:121; Bolles, Financial History, 233–34.

209. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, January 17, 1815, in ASP: F, 2:887.

210. AC, 13–3, 258, 291, 1148, 1264, 1921–24, 1939–41.

211. Alexander Hanson to Robert Goodloe Harper, October 9, 1814, in Harper Papers (MdHS), reel 2.

212. These laws can be found in AC, 13–3, 1839–1925.

213. Ingersoll, Historical Sketch, 1:240.

214. As revised in 1792, the tax on whiskey was 7 to 18 cents per gallon, depending on the proof of the product. See AC, 2–1, 1375.

215. Jefferson to William Short, November 28, 1814, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 47. For similar sentiments, see Daniel Webster to Moody Kent, December 22, [1814], in Van Tyne, Letters of Daniel Webster, 69.

216. Speech of Thomas P. Grosvenor, November 29, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 698.

217. ST to Henry Clay, December 31, 1816, in ASP: F, 3:190, 209.

218. Timothy Pickering to John Pickering, February 11, 1815, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 3, part 1.

219. ST to John W. Eppes, October 17, 1814, in ASP: F, 2:867.

220. Ingersoll, Historical Sketch, 2:252–53.

221. AC, 13–3, 534–35.

222. Speech of William Gaston, November 14 and 15, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 564–65, 568–81, esp. 574.

223. AC, 13–3, 587–88, 631–34, 655–56.

224. Joseph Anderson to George W. Campbell, November 23, 1814, in Campbell Papers (LC).

225. ST to William Lowndes, November 27, 1814, in ASP: F, 2:872.

226. Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, November 20, 1814, in Roberts Papers (HSP).

227. AC, 13–3, 686.

228. AC, 13–3, 119, 126–27, 1025–26.

229. Speech of Langdon Cheves, January 2, 1815, in AC, 13–3, 1025.

230. AC, 13–3, 1039, 1044–45

231. AC, 13–3, 177, 1039, 1044–45.

232. Daniel Webster to Ezekiel Webster, January 22, 1815, in Fletcher Webster, ed., The Private Correspondence of Daniel Webster, 2 vols. (Boston, 1875), 1:250.

233. Alexander Dallas to William Jones, January 29, 1815, in Jones Papers (HSP). See also John Norvell to George W. Campbell, February 10, 1815, in Campbell Papers (LC).

234. JM to Senate, January 30, 1815, in AC, 13–3, 189–91. Quotation from p. 189.

235. Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, February 2, 1815, in Roberts Papers (HSP); Washington National Intelligencer, February 4, 1815.

236. AC, 13–3, 226, 229, 231–32, 1151–53, 1168.

237. AC, 13–3, 305.

238. ST to John W. Eppes, November 19, 1814, in ASP: F, 2:881–82.

239. AC, 13–3, 757.

240. Georgetown Federal Republican, January 6, 1815.

241. AC, 13–3, 1889–1906.

242. AC, 13–3, 181–88, 1033–38; Washington National Intelligencer, January 6, 1815.

243. AC, 13–3, 188, 1061–62.

244. Robert Patterson to Jonathan Russell, February 20, 1815, in “Letters of Jonathan Russell,” Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society 54 (November, 1920), 80.

245. Peter Du Ponceau to Alexander Dallas, January 5, 1815, in Dallas Papers (HSP); John Norvell to George W. Campbell, February 10, 1815, in Campbell Papers (LC); Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, November 4, 1814, in Roberts Papers (HSP).

246. Varnum to William Eustis, February 17, 1815, in Eustis Papers (LC), reel 1.

247. Worcester National Aegis, December 21, 1814; Boston Yankee, December 23, 1814.

248. New York National Advocate, December 28, 1814; Philadelphia Aurora, January 14, 1815. See also Georgetown Federal Republican, November 30, 1814.

249. Worcester National Aegis, February 1, 1815.

250. Speech of Charles J. Ingersoll, November 17, 1814, in AC, 13–3, 612.

251. Hartford American Mercury, November 8, 1814.

Chapter 10. The Hartford Convention

1. Salem Gazette, July 4, 1814.

2. A party’s cohesion is measured by dividing the party majority on roll-call votes by the party’s total vote and then converting the result to a percentage. For example, if there were 10 Federalists and they divided 10–0, 9–1, and 8–2 on three roll call votes, the party’s cohesion would be 27/30, or .9, which is 90 percent. See Lee F. Anderson et al., Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston, 1966), 36. For a fuller analysis of party voting during the war, see Harry Fritz, “The Collapse of Party: President, Congress, and the Decline of Party Action, 1807–1817” (PhD dissertation, Washington University, 1970), 250–308; and Donald R. Hickey, “Federalist Party Unity and the War of 1812,” Journal of American Studies 12 (April, 1978), 26–31.

3. King to Christopher Gore, July 17, 1812, in King, Rufus King, 5:272; Philadelphia United States’ Gazette, June 23, 1812. For similar sentiments, see [William Sullivan], Familiar Letters on Public Characters, and Public Events, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1834), 327, 311–12, 354; Felix Gilbert to David Hillhouse, July 24, 1812, in Alexander-Hillhouse Papers (UNC); Hartford Connecticut Courant, April 26, 1814.

4. Speech of Harmanus Bleecker, January 7, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 619; Wilkes-Barre Gleaner and Luzerne Advertiser, reprinted in Pittsburgh Gazette, May 1, 1812; Richard Peters to Timothy Pickering, April 4, 1814, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 30. For similar sentiments, see speech of Daniel Sheffey, January 11, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 698; speech of Alexander Hanson, June 16, 1813, in AC, 13–1, 180–82; speech of Richard Stockton, December 11, 1813, in AC, 13–2, 2040; Rufus King to Sir William Scott, December 11, 1814, in King, Rufus King, 5:443; and Report of Connecticut Legislature, October, 1813, in Niles’ Register 7 (November 19, 1814), 164.

5. Timothy Dwight, A Discourse, in Two Parts, Delivered July 23, 1812 (Utica, 1812), 43; William H. Channing, Memoir of William Ellery Channing, 3 vols. (London, 1848), 1:337. For a sampling of similar sentiments, see A New-England Farmer [John Lowell, Jr.], Mr. Madison’s War (Boston, 1812), 5; Boston New-England Palladium, August 7, 1812; Resolutions of Providence (RI) Meeting, April 7, 1812, in Newport Mercury, April 11, 1812; and Georgetown Federal Republican, September 30, and October 2 and 7, 1812.

6. Speech of Morris Miller, January 14, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 958. For similar sentiments, see speech of Josiah Quincy, November 21, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 170; and speech of John Culpepper, February 12, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1364.

7. Alexandria Gazette, June 5, 1812.

8. Speech of James A. Bayard, June 16, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 293.

9. Federalist predictions that the war would prove both costly and futile are legion. See, for example, speech of Daniel Sheffey, January 3, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 625; Hartford Connecticut Mirror, January 20 and February 10, 1812; Hartford Connecticut Courant, June 30, 1812; Newport Mercury, March 7, 1812; Boston Columbian Centinel, May 20, 1812; Philadelphia United States’ Gazette, June 24, 1812; Trenton Federalist, June 22, 1812; New York Herald, reprinted in Chillicothe Supporter, May 23, 1812; and Charleston Courier, August 19, 1812.

10. David Osgood, A Solemn Protest against the Late Declaration of War, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1812), 9. See also William Gribbin, The Churches Militant: The War of 1812 and American Religion (New Haven, 1973), chs. 1–2; and Lawrence D. Cress, ‘“Cool and Serious Reflection’: Federalist Attitudes toward War in 1812,” Journal of the Early Republic 7 (Summer, 1987), 123–45.

11. Joseph Smith to SW, December 26, 1814, and Thomas Jesup to SW, January 23, 1815, in WD (M221), reels 63 and 66; Samuel G. Goodrich, Recollections of a Lifetime, 2 vols. (New York, 1856), 2:51–52. The Connecticut Assembly passed a law explicitly affirming a city’s right to regulate parades and music. See State of Connecticut, Public Records of the State of Connecticut, 19 vols. to date (Hartford, 1894-), 17:175–76.

12. Resolutions of New Bedford Town Meeting, July 21, 1814, in Niles’ Register 6 (August 6, 1814), 386. See also Samuel M. Worcester, The Life and Labors of Samuel Worcester, 2 vols. (Boston, 1852), 2:226.

13. Report of Massachusetts Legislature, June 10, 1813, in Niles’ Register 4 (June 19, 1813), 252–53. Massachusetts finally got the arms. See Caleb Strong to Massachusetts Legislature, January 13, 1814, in Boston New-England Palladium, January 14, 1814.

14. Resolution of Massachusetts Senate, June 15, 1813, in Niles’ Register 4 (July 3, 1813), 287. For the Republican criticism that prompted this resolution, see Boston Independent Chronicle, March 6 and 15, 1813.

15. Ingersoll, Historical Sketch, 2:23.

16. Decatur to SN, December 20, 1813, in Washington National Intelligencer, December 28, 1813. See also Ingersoll, Historical Sketch, 2:53–54; Adams, History, 2:814–15.

17. Niles’ Register 5 (January 1, 1814), 299.

18. See AC, 13–2, 1123–28.

19. Speech of Jonathan O. Moseley, January 24, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 1126.

20. Some of the material that follows has been taken from Donald R. Hickey, “New England’s Defense Problem and the Genesis of the Hartford Convention,” New England Quarterly 50 (December, 1977), 587–604.

21. See AC, 2–1, 1392–95; Adams, History, 2:1063; John K. Mahon, The American Militia: Decade of Decision, 1789–1800 (Gainesville, 1960), 65.

22. Dearborn to Caleb Strong, June 22, 1812, in ASP: MA, 1:322; SW to Strong, July 21, 1812, in WD (M6), reel 6; Dearborn to Roger Griswold, June 22, 1812, in Hartford Connecticut Courant, September 1, 1812; William Jones to Rhode Island Legislature, November 6, 1812, in Niles’ Register 3 (November 21, 1812), 179–80.

23. John Cotton Smith to SW, July 2, 1812, Roger Griswold to SW, August 13, 1812, Strong to SW, August 5, 1812 (with enclosure, giving state supreme court advisory opinion), and Jones to SW, August 22, 1812, in ASP: MA, 1:326, 610–12, 615, 621; Hartford Connecticut Mirror, reprinted in Hartford Connecticut Courant, August 11, 1812.

24. Speech of John Holmes, [October 10, 1814], in Synopsis of Debates in the Massachusetts Legislature [Boston, 1814], 8; Hartford Connecticut Courant, November 17, 1812; Theodore Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention (New York, 1833), 255.

25. For the use of militia on the Canadian frontier, see SW to Daniel Tompkins, March 24, 1812, and to Return J. Meigs, March 26, 1812, in WD (M6), reel 5; SW to Joseph Anderson, June 6, 1812, in WD (M222), reel 5.

26. JM to Congress, November 4, 1812, in AC, 12–2, 13. See also Memorandum of [Albert Gallatin?], June, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 25.

27. SW to [Henry Dearborn], July 1, 1812, in Eustis Papers (LC), reel 1; Dearborn to James Monroe, July 8, 1812, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5; Dearborn to Monroe, July 30, 1812, in Monroe Papers (NYPL); Lynn W. Turner, William Plumer of New Hampshire, 1759–1850 (Chapel Hill, 1962), 220. In Martin v. Mott in 1827, the Supreme Court ruled that the president had the authority to determine when to call out the militia. See Henry Cabot Lodge, Life and Letters of George Cabot, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1878), 513.

28. JM to Henry Dearborn, August 9, 1812, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 14.

29. Smith to SW, June 7, 1813, in ASP: MA, 1:615.

30. For documents bearing on this matter—too voluminous to cite in detail—see John Cotton Smith Papers (CHS). Most of the pertinent documents have been published in Thompson R. Harlow et al., eds., John Cotton Smith Papers, 7 vols. (Hartford, 1948–67), vols. 1 and 2. See also Stephen Decatur to SN, July 7, 1813, in ND (M125), reel 29; and Hartford Connecticut Courant, November 10, 1813.

31. Benjamin Waterhouse to James Monroe, July 21, 1813, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5; Nicoll Fosdick et al. to JM, January 6, 1814, in WD (M222), reel 11.

32. JM to SW, May 24, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 27.

33. Jirah Isham to John Cotton Smith, May 16, 1814, and Smith to Isham, September 21, 1814, in Harlow et al., John Cotton Smith Papers, 3:62 and 4:89.

34. Quoted in Jirah Isham to John Cotton Smith, May 16, 1814, ibid., 3:62.

35. John Cotton Smith to Thomas H. Cushing, August 4, 1814, ibid., 182.

36. Jirah Isham to John Cotton Smith, August 22, 1814, ibid., 221; Thomas H. Cushing to SW, September 8, 1814, in ASP: MA, 4:888.

37. Jirah Isham to John Cotton Smith, August 18, 1814, in Smith Papers (CHS).

38. John Cotton Smith to Augustine Taylor, August 27, 1814, in Harlow et al., John Cotton Smith Papers, 4:12.

39. Augustine Taylor to Levi Lusk, September 11, 1814, ibid., 44.

40. Quoted in Levi Lusk to John Cotton Smith, September 14, 1814, in Smith Papers (CHS). See also Augustine Taylor to John Cotton Smith, September 11, 1814, and [September 12, 1814], ibid.

41. Augustine Taylor to John Cotton Smith, [September 12, 1814], ibid.

42. Order of P. P. Schuyler, September 12, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:621.

43. Jacob Ulmer to SW, September 26, 1812, in WD (M221), reel 49; Caleb Strong to SW, August 5 and 21, and September 10, 1812, and Statement of Massachusetts Militia in U. S. Service, January 30, 1828, in ASP: MA, 1:324–25, 610–11, and 3:922–23.

44. William Bainbridge to Arnold Welles, April 6 and 20, 1814, and Report of Third Auditor’s Office, August 1, 1825, in ASP: MA, 3:77–78, 87, 179; Bainbridge to Henry A. S. Dearborn, September 27, 1814, in ND (M125), reel 39; Ingersoll, Historical Sketch, 2:121; Alden Bradford, History of Massachusetts, 3 vols. (Boston, 1822–29), 3:184; Henry A. S. Dearborn, The Life of William Bainbridge, ed. James Barnes (Princeton, 1931), 192–93.

45. Sarah Dearborn to Henry Dearborn, September 1, 1814, in Dearborn Papers (MeHS).

46. SW to Thomas H. Cushing, June 2, 1814, in WD (M6), reel 7; Caleb Strong to John Brooks, June 12 and October 1, 1814, and Alden Bradford to Brooks, November 22, 1814, in ASP: MA, 3:13–14, 78–79.

47. Henry Dearborn to SW, July 14, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 61.

48. Rules and Regulations of the Army of the United States, May 1, 1813, Henry Dearborn to Caleb Strong, July 8, 1812, Strong to Dearborn, July 12, 1812, Report of House Committee, March 10, 1818, and Alden Bradford to John Brooks, November 22, 1822, in ASP: MA, 1:433, 612, and 3:13–14, 84; William H. Sumner, A History of East Boston (Boston, 1858), 739; speech of John Davis, March 25, 1826, in RD, 19–1, 1778–79.

49. Henry Dearborn to SW, September 5, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 61; Caleb Strong to SW, September 7, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:613.

50. Henry Dearborn to SW, September 26, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 61; Dearborn to Caleb Strong, September 4, 1814, James Lloyd and William Sumner to George Graham, February 3, 1817, Report of House Committee on Massachusetts Claims, March 10, 1818, Report of Third Auditor’s Office, July 28, 1825, in ASP: MA, 3:63–64, 84, 179, 881; speech of Peleg Sprague, April 7, in RD, 19–1, 2115–16; Bradford, History of Massachusetts, 3:185.

51. Commissioners for Seacoast Defense to William Sumner, September 10, 1814, and Caleb Strong to William Sumner, September 10, 1814, in ASP: MA, 3:890–91.

52. Selectmen of Portland to SW, [Spring, 1813], in WD (M222), reel 9.

53. William Sumner to John Brooks, September 15, 1814, Report of Third Auditor’s Office, May 11, 1825, in ASP: MA, 3:171, 896–97; Sumner, East Boston, 734–42.

54. William Sumner to John Brooks, September 19, 1814, and Brooks to Sumner, September 24, 1814, in ASP: MA, 3:897–98.

55. Alford Richardson to William Sumner, September 24, 1814, Sumner to John Brooks, September 22 and 28, 1814, Alden Bradford to Brooks, November 22, 1822, in ASP: MA, 3:13–16, 897, 899–900; Alden Bradford, Biography of the Hon. Caleb Strong (Boston, 1820), 24n.

56. Pelatiah Smith et al. to Alford Richardson, September 24, 1814, and Richardson to William Sumner, September 24, 1814, in ASP: MA, 3:898–99.

57. For the political character of Oxford County, see election results in James M. Banner, Jr., To the Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789–1815 (New York, 1970), 359.

58. Sumner to John Brooks, September 25 and 28, 1814, in ASP: MA, 3:899–900.

59. William Sumner to Alford Richardson, September 30 and October 1, 1814, in ASP: MA, 3:900.

60. John Brooks to William Sumner, September 27, 1814, in ASP: MA, 3:899.

61. SN to JM, April 25, 1800, in ASP: NA, 1:87; Henry Dearborn to Samuel L. Mitchill, November 20, 1807, and SW to William Branch Giles, January 20, 1810, in ASP: MA, 1:220, 258; John O. Creighton to SN, October 6, 1814, in ND (M147), reel 5.

62. Petition of the inhabitants of Newport, [Summer, 1814], in WD (M221), reel 66. See also Jeremiah Howell and [Arthur?] Fenner to SW, June 27, 1814, ibid., reel 62.

63. See Cochrane to Viscount Melville, September 3 and 17, 1814, in Dudley and Crawford, Naval War, 3:269, 289.

64. William Jones to SW, September 8, 1814, in ASP: MA, 1:622; Report of Rhode Island Assembly, November 5, 1814, in Niles’ Register 7 (November 26, 1814), 180–81; Clarence S. Brigham, “History of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations,” in Edward Field, ed., State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations at the End of the Century: A History, 3 vols. (Boston, 1902), 1:299.

65. SW to William Jones, October 4, 1814, in WD (M6), reel 7.

66. William Plumer to Henry Dearborn, June 24, and July 6 and 20, 1812, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 2; Turner, William Plumer, 209–13, 219.

67. Gilman to SW, May 20 and June 30, 1814, in WD (M221), reels 53 and 61. Quotation from May 20 letter.

68. Thomas H. Cushing to SW, May 21, 1814, ibid., reel 60; Ingersoll, Historical Sketch, 2:120; John N. McClintock, History of New Hampshire (Boston, 1889), 502.

69. Henry Dearborn to SW, September 26, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 61.

70. Order of Martin Chittenden, November 10, 1813, in Niles’ Register 5 (November 27, 1813), 212.

71. Niles’ Register 5 (December 4, 1813), 229.

72. Vermont militia officers to Martin Chittenden, November 15, 1813, in Niles’ Register 5 (November 27, 1814), 230.

73. John L. Heaton, The Story of Vermont (Boston, 1889), 123–24; Richard Hildreth, The History of the United States, rev. ed., 6 vols. (New York, 1854–55), 6:452–53.

74. Hartford American Mercury, November 30, 1813.

75. Speech of Solomon Sharp, January 6, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 859.

76. Quoted in Samuel Elliot Morison, The Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, Federalist, 1765–1848, 2 vols. (Boston, 1913), 2:64–65.

77. Resolutions of New Jersey Legislature, February 12, 1814, in Niles’ Register 6 (March 5, 1814), 11. See also Resolutions of Pennsylvania Legislature, ibid. 5 (February 26, 1814), 423.

78. James Wilkinson to Martin Chittenden, April 5, 1814, and Alexander Macomb to SW, April 19, 1814, in WD (M221), reels 55 and 58.

79. Samuel Mackay to Alexander Macomb, April 24, 1814, ibid., reel 55.

80. Alexander Macomb to SW, May 24, 1814, ibid. Pennsylvania also had trouble over reorganization. According to the governor, William Duane’s “rudeness & tyrannical conduct” in reorganizing a regiment “so disgusted the officers and influenced the men that he was obliged precipitately to retreat from the camp, where he never after showed himself.” Simon Snyder to SW, January 16, 1815, in WD (M221), reel 66.

81. Chittenden to John Newell, September 4 and 5, 1814, in Niles’ Register 7 (Supplement), 103; Proclamation of Martin Chittenden, September 19, 1814, ibid. (October 15, 1814), 65.

82. Resolution of Vermont Council, October 28, 1814, ibid. (Supplement), 105–6.

83. Report of Connecticut Comptroller, October 31, 1816, Statement of Militia Claims, January 13, 1817, and Report of Third Auditor’s Office, January 30, 1828, in ASP: MA, 1:667, 3:926–27, and 4:878–82.

84. See A. Stetson to SW, September 12, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 66; John O. Creighton to SN, December 12, 1814, in ND (M147), reel 5; and documents in ASP: MA, 3:901–8, 4:883.

85. SW to governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut, September 17, 1814, ASP: MA, 1:614.

86. Newport Mercury, September 17, 1814; Victor S. Clark, History of Manufactures in the United States, 2 vols. (Washington, DC, 1916–28), 1:538; Brant, James Madison, 6:236.

87. Newport Mercury, November 12, 1814; Ebenezer Huntington to John Cotton Smith, September 14, 1814, Andrew Kingsbury to Smith, September 20 and November 30, 1814, Smith to Elizur Goodrich, November 9, 1814, and Goodrich to Smith, November 25, 1814, in Harlow et al., John Cotton Smith Papers, 6:61, 85, 167–68, 196, 204; Adams, History, 2:1118–19.

88. Chauncey Goodrich to [Timothy Pitkin], January 10, 1815, in Pitkin Papers (HL); William W. Woolsey to John Cotton Smith, January 11, 1815, in Harlow et al., John Cotton Smith Papers, 4:241; Dwight, Hartford Convention, 339.

89. Goodrich, Recollections of a Lifetime, 1:493.

90. Chauncey Goodrich to [Timothy Pitkin], January 30, 1815, in Pitkin Papers (HL).

91. State of Connecticut, Public Records, 17:171, 281–83, 285–86; Chauncey Goodrich to Timothy Pitkin, February 6, 1815, in Pitkin Papers (HL).

92. Statement of Militia Claims, January 13, 1817, in ASP: MA, 1:667.

93. King to Jeremiah Mason, September 2, 1814, in King, Rufus King, 5:414.

94. Quoted in Timothy Pickering to Samuel P. Gardner, November 23, 1814, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 38. See also N. Everett to SW, September 29, 1814, in WD (M221), reel 61.

95. Boston Gazette, September 1 and 15, 1814; Boston Weekly Messenger, reprinted ibid., October 17, 1814; Boston New-England Palladium, September 30, 1814; Hartford Connecticut Mirror, August 29, September 12, and October 3, 17, and 24, 1814.

96. Salem Gazette, September 23, 1814. For similar sentiments, see Hartford Connecticut Courant, September 13, and December 6 and 13, 1814; Frank M. Anderson, “A Forgotten Phase of the New England Opposition to the War of 1812,” Proceedings of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association 6 (May, 1913), 178–79.

97. Morison’s Harrison Gray Otis still has the best account of the Hartford Convention although it understates the importance of the defense problem. This study should be supplemented with Morison’s shorter revised study of Otis, Urbane Federalist, and with Banner’s Hartford Convention, and my article, “New England’s Defense Problem and the Genesis of the Hartford Convention.” These works are sympathetic to the Federalists. For a hostile view, see Adams, History, and Richard Buel, Jr., America on the Brink: How the Political Struggle over the War of 1812 Almost Destroyed the Young Republic (New York, 2005).

98. For details on these convention movements, see L. Nash to Daniel Appleton White, July 24, 1812, in White Papers (EI); Worcester National Aegis, September 23, 1812; James T. Adams, New England in the Republic, 1776–1850 (Boston, 1926), 270; Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:4–13, 59–61, 85–95; Morison, Urbane Federalist, 305–11, 342–43, 355–56; and Banner, Hartford Convention, 303–6, 308–10, 313–21.

99. Joseph Lyman to Noah Webster, January 2, 1835, in Emily E. F. Ford, Notes on the Life of Noah Webster, ed. Emily E. F. Skeel, 2 vols. (New York, 1912), 2:498.

100. Noah Webster, “Origin of the Hartford Convention in 1814,” in A Collection of Papers on Political, Literary and Moral Subjects (New York, 1843), 311.

101. Address of Joseph Lyman, January 5, 1814, in Ford, Noah Webster, 2:125–28. Quotation from p. 128.

102. Banner, Hartford Convention, 314–17.

103. Petition of Newbury, January 31, 1814, in Niles’ Register 6 (March 5, 1814), 8.

104. Francis Baylies to William Baylies, January 24, 1814, in Miscellaneous Bound Collection (MHS); Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:89.

105. Putnam to Timothy Pickering, February 11, 1814, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 30.

106. Putnam to Timothy Pickering, February 12, 1814, ibid.

107. Boston Columbian Centinel, February 23, 1814; Report of the Massachusetts Legislature, February 18, 1814, in Niles’ Register 6 (March 5, 1814), 4–8.

108. Worthington C. Ford, ed., “A Letter of Noah Webster to Daniel Webster, 1834,” American Historical Review 9 (October, 1903), 103; Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:95; Banner, Hartford Convention, 320–21.

109. Webster, “Origin of the Hartford Convention,” 314; Ford, “Letter of Noah Webster,” 103; Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:96.

110. Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:99.

111. Otis, quoted ibid., 101–2.

112. Strong to Massachusetts Legislature, October 5, 1814, in Niles’ Register 7 (October 29, 1814), 113–14.

113. Report of Massachusetts House, October 8, 1814, ibid. (November 12, 1814), 149–51. See also John Phillips and Timothy Bigelow to New England governors, October 17, 1814, ibid. (November 26, 1814), 179.

114. Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:103–5.

115. Smith to Connecticut Legislature, October, 1814, in Niles’ Register 7 (November 19, 1814), 162–63.

116. Report of Connecticut Legislature, October, 1814, in State of Connecticut, Public Records, 17:182–86. Quotations from pp. 183–85.

117. Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:106.

118. Jones to Rhode Island Legislature, November 1, 1814, in Niles’ Register 7 (November 26, 1814), 177–78.

119. Report of Rhode Island House, November 5, 1814, ibid., 180–81; Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:107.

120. Keene Newhampshire Sentinel, December 10, 1814; Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:107–8.

121. Otis to Christopher Gore, December 3, 1814, in Samuel Eliot Morison, ed., “Two Letters of Harrison Gray Otis on the Hartford Convention, 1814–1815,” Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society 60 (November, 1926), 27.

122. Speech of Francis Blake, October 7, 1814, in Synopsis of Debates in Massachusetts Legislature, 5.

123. Ibid., 6; Resolutions of Innkeepers and Retailers of Hampshire, Franklin, and Hampden Counties, December 28, 1814, in Hartford Connecticut Courant, January 3, 1815.

124. Resolutions of Reading Meeting, January 5, 1815, in Salem Gazette, January 10, 1815.

125. Pickering to John Lowell, Jr., November 28, 1814, and to James Hillhouse, December 16, 1814, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 15.

126. Boston Columbian Centinel, December 21, 1814.

127. Ibid., November 9, 1814.

128. Edmund Quincy, Life of Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts, 4th ed. (Boston, 1868), 358. For similar sentiments, see John Lowell, Jr., to Timothy Pickering, December 3, 1814, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 30.

129. Pittsburgh Gazette, October 26, 1814.

130. John Stanly to William Gaston, November 11, 1814, in Gaston Papers (UNC), reel 2. See also Robert Goodloe Harper to William Sullivan, November 2, 1814, in Harper Papers (MdHS), reel 2; Georgetown Federal Republican, November 9, 1814, and January 11, 1815.

131. Plumer to Jeremiah Mason, December 29, 1814, in Plumer Papers (LC), reel 2.

132. Joseph L. Smith to [Thomas Jesup], December 26, 1814, in Jesup Papers (LC).

133. Worcester National Aegis, December 28, 1814. For similar sentiments, see Bennington Green-Mountain Farmer, November 28, 1814; Hartford American Mercury, December 13, 1814; and Lexington Reporter, December 31, 1814.

134. William Pope to James Monroe, October 28, 1814, in Monroe Papers (NYPL).

135. SW to Thomas Jesup, November 26, 1814, in WD (M7), reel 1.

136. SW to Daniel Tompkins, November 26, 1814, and to Jacob Brown, November 26, 1814, ibid.; Brown to SW, December 29, 1814, in Brown Papers (LC); Memorandum of Tench Ringgold, January 10, 1815, in Monroe Papers (NYPL).

137. For the peace rumors, see chapter 9: The Crisis of 1814.

138. Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:130–37; Morison, Urbane Federalist, 358–62.

139. Lowell to Timothy Pickering, December 3, 1814, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 30.

140. Otis to Christopher Gore, December 3, 1814, in Morison, “Two Letters,” 27.

141. Lowell to Timothy Pickering, December 3, 1814, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 30. For similar sentiments, see Pickering to Samuel Putnam, February 3, 1814, ibid., reel 15.

142. Nathan Dane, quoted in Robert C. Winthrop to Henry Cabot Lodge, August 23, 1878, in Lodge, George Cabot, 602.

143. Cabot, quoted ibid., 519.

144. Ingersoll, Historical Sketch, 2:233.

145. Letter from Hartford, December 16, 1814, in Boston Gazette, December 19, 1814. See also letter from Hartford, December 16, 1814, in Concord New-Hampshire Patriot, December 22, 1814; Goodrich, Recollections of a Lifetime, 2:53

146. Jesup to SW, December 15, 1814, in Jesup Papers (LC). See also Hartford American Mercury, December 20, 1814.

147. Otis to Sally Foster Otis, [December 22, 1814], in Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:190.

148. Secret Journal of the Hartford Convention, December 15, 1814, in Dwight, Hartford Convention, 383.

149. Zilpah Longfellow, quoted in Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:140.

150. Calvin Goddard to David Daggett, January 3, 1815, in William E. Buckley, ed., “Letters of Connecticut Federalists, 1814–1815,” New England Quarterly 3 (April, 1930), 327. See also Concord New-Hampshire Patriot, January 3, 1815.

151. George Ticknor Curtis, Life of Daniel Webster, 2 vols., 4th ed. (New York, 1872), 1:136.

152. The Secret Journal of the Hartford Convention is printed in Dwight, Hartford Convention, 383–98.

153. Goodrich to [Timothy Pitkin], January 10, 1815, in Pitkin Papers (HL).

154. Stephen Longfellow, Jr., to Zilpah Longfellow, December 22, 1814, in Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:189.

155. Secret Journal of the Hartford Convention, December 16 and 24, 1814, in Dwight, Hartford Convention, 386–87, 392.

156. Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:148. The Report of the Hartford Convention is printed in Dwight, Hartford Convention, 352–79.

157. Report of the Hartford Convention, in Dwight, Hartford Convention, 361.

158. Ibid., 370.

159. Ibid., 377–78.

160. For more on the Federalist use of the slave issue during the war, see Matthew Mason, Slavery and Politics in the Early American Republic (Chapel Hill, 2006), ch. 2.

161. Report of the Hartford Convention, in Dwight, Hartford Convention, 353.

162. Ibid., 378–79.

163. Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:147.

164. Otis, quoted in Morison, Urbane Federalist, 396.

165. Dwight to Timothy Pitkin, January 9, 1815, in Pitkin Papers (HL); Gore to Caleb Strong, January 14, 1815, in Lodge, George Cabot, 560.

166. Webster to ———, January 11, 1815, in Daniel Webster Papers (HU).

167. Winchester (VA) Gazette, reprinted in Salem Gazette, February 7, 1815; New York Evening Post, January 7, 1815. See also [Robert Goodloe Harper] to [Alexander Hanson], January 19, 1815, in Galloway-Maxcy-Markoe Papers (LC); William R. Davie to William Gaston, February 4, [1815], in Gaston Papers (UNC), reel 2; letter from a congressman, January 10, 1815, in Boston Columbian Centinel, January 21, 1815; Christopher Gore to Caleb Strong, January 14, 1815, in Lodge, George Cabot, 560.

168. Pickering to John Lowell, Jr., January 23, 1815, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 15; Sullivan to Henry D. Sedgwick, January 6, 1815, in Sedgwick Papers (MHS).

169. Boston Gazette, January 9, 1815.

170. Washington National Intelligencer, January 13, 1815; Armstrong to Joseph Desha, January 16, 1815, in Desha Papers (LC).

171. Worcester National Aegis, January 11, 1815; Boston Patriot, January 7, 1815. For similar sentiments, see Salem Essex Register, January 18, 1815; and Charles Warren, Jacobin and Junto; or, Early American Politics as Viewed in the Diary of Dr. Nathaniel Ames, 1758–1822 (Cambridge, 1931), 280.

172. Jackson to Monroe, January 6, 1817, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 71.

173. State of Connecticut, Public Records, 17:254; Adams, History, 2:1117–18.

174. Otis to Gore, January 21, 1815, in Morison, “Two Letters,” 28.

175. See documents in Samuel Eliot Morison, ed., “The Massachusetts Embassy to Washington, 1815,” Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society 48 (March, 1915), 343–51; John Cotton Smith to Calvin Goddard and Nathaniel Terry, February 4, 1815, in Smith Papers (CHS).

176. Scott to James Monroe, February 15, 1815, in Monroe Papers (NYPL).

177. Perkins to John P. Cushing, February 16, 1815, in Thomas G. Cary, Memoir of Thomas Handasyd Perkins (Boston, 1856), 219. See also Harrison Gray Otis to Sally Foster Otis, February 14, 1815, in Morison, Urbane Federalist, 390.

178. Otis to Sally Foster Otis, February 23, 1815, in Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:168.

179. ST to SW, January 14, 1815, and to Thomas B. Worthington, January 17, 1815, in WD (M221), reels 61 and 67.

180. AC, 13–3, 225, 230, 250, 1264–65, 1279. The quotation (from the stenographer) is on p. 1264. See also Georgetown Federal Republican, March 3, 1815.

181. J. R. Poinsett to James K. Polk, December 23, 1837, in ASP; MA, 7:775; James Schouler, History of the United States under the Constitution, rev. ed., 7 vols. (New York, 1894–1913), 2:508n.

182. Boston New-England Palladium, February 7 and 10, 1815.

183. AC, 13–3, 280–81, 284, 1269–70; Herman V. Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States during the First Century of Its History (Washington, DC, 1897), 46.

184. Report of New York Legislative Committee, in Niles’ Register 8 (April 8, 1815), 100. See also Report of New Jersey House, ibid. (March 4, 1815), [16].

185. Morison, Harrison Gray Otis, 2:80.

Chapter 11. The Treaty of Ghent

1. There are three excellent studies of the diplomatic history of the war. The oldest account is Frank A. Updyke, The Diplomacy of the War of 1812 (Baltimore, 1915); Fred L. Engelman, The Peace of Christmas Eve (New York, 1962), is a first-rate popular study (although without documentation); and Bradford Perkins presents a brilliant and incisive modern analysis in Castlereagh and Adams: England and the United States, 1812–1823 (Berkeley, 1964).

2. See chapter 2: The Declaration of War.

3. JM to Congress, March 4, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 123. For similar sentiments, see speech of Stevenson Archer, January 6, 1813, in AC, 12–2, 597.

4. Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams, 3–4.

5. Davis, Jeffersonian America, 100.

6. SS to Jonathan Russell, June 26, 1812, in SD (M77), reel 2.

7. Jonathan Russell to SS, September 17, 1812, in ASP: FR, 3:594–95.

8. Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams, 11.

9. Jonathan Russell to SS, September 17, 1812, in ASP: FR, 3:593.

10. British Order-in-Council, October 13, 1812, in Naval Chronicle 28 (July-December, 1812), 303–5.

11. John Graham to Jonathan Russell, August 10, 1812 (with enclosure), and SS to Russell, August 21, 1812, in SD (M77), reel 2; Henry Dearborn to SW, August 9, 1812, in Ernest A. Cruikshank, ed., Documents Relating to the Invasion of Canada and the Surrender of Detroit, 1812 (Ottawa, 1912), 127–28; Articles of Agreement for an Armistice, August 21, 1812, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 3:197–98; John B. Warren to SS, September 30, 1812, and SS to Warren, October 27, 1812, in ASP: FR, 3:595–97; Anthony Baker to FS, October 31, 1812, in Foreign Office Papers 5/88 (PRO).

12. Andrei Dashkov to SS, March 8, 1813, in Bashkina et al., United States and Russia, 933–34.

13. Albert Gallatin to Alexander Baring, August 27, 1813, in SD (M36), reel 1; letter of Pavel P. Svin’in, [April, 1812], and Levett Harris to SS, October 27, 1812, in Bashkina et al., United States and Russia, 836, 894; Alfred W. Crosby, Jr., America, Russia, Hemp, and Napoleon: American Trade with Russia and the Baltic, 1783–1812 ([Columbus], 1965), ch. 14.

14. SS to Andrei Dashkov, March 11, 1813, in Bashkina et al., United States and Russia, 937.

15. SS to American commissioners, April 15, 1813, in SD (M77), reel 2. See also SS to American commissioners, April 27, 1813, ibid.

16. Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams, 20–21.

17. See chapter 5: Raising Men and Money.

18. SS to American commissioners, April 15, 1813, in ASP:FR, 3:695–700, and (for confidential paragraphs) in Donnan, Papers of James A. Bayard, 204–6.

19. SS to American commissioners, June 23, 1813, in SD (M77), reel 2. See also Robert Walsh to Robert Goodloe Harper, December 2, 1813, in Harper Papers (MdHS), reel 2.

20. Bayard to Andrew Bayard, February 14, 1813, in Donnan, Papers of James A. Bayard, 203.

21. SS to Albert Gallatin, May 6, 1813, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 26.

22. Engelman, Peace of Christmas Eve, ch. 2.

23. FS to Henry Goulburn, October 8, 1813, in Henry Goulburn Papers (UM), reel 1.

24. Alexander Baring to Albert Gallatin, July 22, 1813, in SD (M36), reel 1; John Quincy Adams to William H. Crawford, November 15, 1813, and to Abigail Adams, December 30, 1813, in Worthington C. Ford, ed., Writings of John Quincy Adams, 7 vols. (New York, 1913–17), 4:531, 534.

25. James A. Bayard, European Diary, December 14, 1813, in Donnan, Papers of James A. Bayard, 493.

26. Albert Gallatin to SS, November 21, 1813, in SD (M36), reel 1; Gallatin to SS, January 7, 1814, and to Alexander Baring, January 7, 1814, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 26.

27. See American commissioners to Emperor Alexander, August 14, 1813, in Henry Adams, ed., The Writings of Albert Gallatin, 3 vols. (Philadelphia, 1879), 1:559–61.

28. Baring to Albert Gallatin, July 22, 1813, in SD (M36), reel 1. See also Charles King to Rufus King, January 20, 1814, in King, Rufus King, 5:366.

29. FS to SS, November 4, 1813, in SD (M36), reel 1.

30. See chapter 7: The Last Embargo.

31. John Quincy Adams to John Adams, December 26, 1814, in Ford, Writings of John Quincy Adams, 5:253.

32. John Quincy Adams to Louisa Catherine Adams, January 13, 1815, ibid., 267.

33. Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams, 59–61.

34. Reuben Beasley, quoted in Engelman, Peace of Christmas Eve, 120.

35. Letter from England, March 29, 1814, reprinted from Baltimore American in Lexington Reporter, June 18, 1814. See also Georgetown Federal Republican, June 9, 1814.

36. London Times, June 2, 1814; London Sun, quoted in Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams, 63. For similar sentiments, see Captain Fairman, quoted in Naval Chronicle 30 (July-December, 1813), 225; London Evening Star, reprinted in Washington National Intelligencer, April 2, 1813; Reuben Beasley to Jonathan Russell, February 16, 1813, and Thomas O’Reilly to Russell, August 5, 1814, in Russell Papers (BU); James A. Bayard to Henry Clay and Jonathan Russell, April 20, 1814, in SD (M36), reel 2; Albert Gallatin to Clay, April 22, 1814, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 26; William H. Crawford to Clay, June 10, 1814, in Hopkins and Hargreaves, Papers of Henry Clay, 1:932; Charles Francis Adams, ed., Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, 12 vols. (Philadelphia, 1874–77), (October 26, 1814), 3:58.

37. Bayard to Andrew Bayard, March 19, 1814, in Donnan, Papers of James A. Bayard, 281; Clay to SS, August 18, 1814, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5; Gallatin to SS, June 13, 1814, in SD (M36), reel 1. See also Rufus King to Gouverneur Morris, October 11 and 13, 1814, in King, Rufus King, 5:417, 419.

38. Russell to John L. Lawrence, October 7, 1814, in Russell Papers (BU).

39. Gallatin to SS, December 25, 1814, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 27; William Shaler to Jonathan Russell, December 8, 1814, in Russell Papers (BU). See also Duke of Wellington to FS, October 4, 1814, in Duke of Wellington, ed., Dispatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshall Arthur, Duke of Wellington, 15 vols. (London, 1858–72), 9:314.

40. Letter from Washington, January 28, 1813, and French Imperial Decree, April 14, 1813, in Lexington Reporter, February 20 and October 9, 1813; FS to SSWC, March 3, 1814, in Charles Vane, ed., Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh, 12 vols. (London, 1848–53), 10:4; William H. Crawford to American commissioners, May 28, 1814, in Hopkins and Hargreaves, Papers of Henry Clay, 1:926; R. Gordon to Comte de la Forest, May 10, 1814, and to SSWC, May 19, 1814, in Wellington, Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington, 9:92–93; James Fowler to Admiralty, September 15, 1814, and FSA to Fowler, September 16, 1814, in Niles’ Register 8 (Supplement), 186–87; Crawford to [SS], November 1, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 26; Crawford to SS, December 16 and 21, 1814, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5; Lawrence Kaplan, Entangling Alliances with None: American Foreign Policy in the Age of Jefferson (Kent, 1987), 147–49.

41. Henry Clay to Jonathan Russell, May 1, 1814, in Hopkins and Hargreaves, Papers of Henry Clay, 1:887–88.

42. London Morning Chronicle, September 7, 1814. See also Naval Chronicle 32 (July-December, 1814), 247.

43. London Times, September 26 and November 21, 1814.

44. For the gambling odds, see London Morning Chronicle, December 16, 1814. For the erroneous reports, see ibid., December 24, 1814, and London Times, December 24, 1814.

45. Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, (October 12, 1814), 3:51.

46. London Morning Chronicle, November 21, 1814. For similar sentiments, see Worcester National Aegis, January 4, 1815.

47. Quoted in Engelman, Peace of Christmas Eve, 297.

48. Goulburn to SSWC, December 13, 1814, in Francis Bickley, ed., Report on the Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst, Preserved at Cirencester Park (London, 1923), 316.

49. SS to American commissioners, January 28, 1814, in SD (M77), reel 2. See also SS to American commissioners, February 14, 1814, ibid.

50. Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (November 19, 1813), 2:550.

51. Clay to [William H. Crawford], July 2, 1814, in Hopkins and Hargreaves, Papers of Henry Clay, 1:938.

52. Gallatin to SS, June 13, 1814, in SD (M36), reel 1; Gallatin to Emperor Alexander, June 19, 1814, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 27; Adams to John Adams, February 17, 1814, in Ford, Writings of John Quincy Adams, 5:22.

53. Notes of cabinet meeting, June 23, 24, and 27, 1814, in Madison Papers (LC), reel 27.

54. SS to American commissioners, June 25 and 27, 1814, in SD (M77), reel 2; Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams, 72.

55. Washington National Intelligencer, November 5, 1814; SS to American commissioners, June 25, 1814, in SD (M77), reel 2.

56. See FS to British commissioners, July 28 and August 14, 1814, in Goulburn Papers (UM), reel 1; and documents in ASP: FR, 3:705–10.

57. British commissioners to American commissioners, September 4, 1814, in SD (M36), reel 1.

58. American commissioners to British commissioners, September 9, 1814, in Goulburn Papers (UM), reel 1; British commissioners to American commissioners, September 19, 1814, in ASP: FR, 3:718.

59. American commissioners to British commissioners, September 26, 1814, in Goulburn Papers (UM), reel 1. In fact, the administration had explicitly approved of Hull’s proclamation. See chapter 4: The Campaign of 1812.

60. British commissioners to American commissioners, October 8, 1814, in SD (M36), reel 1. See also John Quincy Adams to SS, September 5, 1814, ibid.; FS to British commissioners, July 28, 1814, in Goulburn Papers (UM), reel 1; James A. Bayard, Memorandum of Conferences, August 27, 1814, in Donnan, Papers of James A. Bayard, 338.

61. See Samuel F. Bemis, Jay’s Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy, rev. ed. (New Haven, 1962), esp. ch. 6.

62. CG, quoted in John Sugden, Tecumseh’s Last Stand (Norman, 1985), 196.

63. Robert McDonall, quoted ibid., 205.

64. London Sun, quoted in Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams, 82.

65. Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (August 19, 1814), 3:18.

66. American commissioners to British commissioners, August 24, 1814, in Goulburn Papers (UM), reel 1; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, 2 vols. (Washington, DC, 1975), 1:39.

67. American commissioners to SS, August 19, 1814, in ASP: FR, 3:709; American commissioners to British commissioners, August 24, 1814, in Goulburn Papers (UM), reel 1; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, 1:27–37; Carl Benn, The Iroquois in the War of 1812 (Toronto, 1998), 175.

68. Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (August 19, 1814), 3:19.

69. FS to British commissioners, July 28, 1814, in Goulburn Papers (UM), reel 1; FS to LL, August 28, 1814, in Vane, Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh, 10:100–101.

70. British commissioners to American commissioners, August 19, 1814, in SD (M36), reel 1. See also Henry Goulburn to SSWC, August 21, 1814, in Wellington, Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington, 9:188–89; LL to SSWC, September 14, 1814, in Bickley, Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst, 287.

71. See, for example, London Times, May 24, 1814; Portland Eastern Argus, August 18, 1814; New London Connecticut Gazette, August 17 and September 7, 1814; Quebec Gazette, reprinted in Boston Gazette, September 1, 1814; New York Evening Post, September 23, 1814.

72. Albert Gallatin to William H. Crawford, April 21, 1814, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 26.

73. American commissioners to British commissioners, August 24, 1814, in Goulburn Papers (UM), reel 1.

74. Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (September 1, 1814), 3:28.

75. Goulburn to SSWC, November 26, 1814, in Goulburn Papers (UM), reel 2.

76. See chapter 9: The Crisis of 1814.

77. LL to Wellington, November 26, 1814, in Wellington, Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington, 9:456; speech of Lord Liverpool, November 21, 1814, in Parliamentary Debates, 29:368.

78. LL to Wellington, October 28, 1814, in Wellington, Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington, 9:384.

79. Speeches of Alexander Baring and Marquis of Lansdowne, November 21, 1814, in Parliamentary Debates, 29:383, 414. See also speeches of Earl Donoughmore and George Ponsonby, November 21, 1814, ibid., 385, 415–16.

80. London Morning Chronicle, November 22, 1814. For similar sentiments, see Naval Chronicle 32 (July-December, 1814), 425.

81. John Quincy Adams to William H. Crawford, October 5, 1814, in Ford, Writings of John Quincy Adams, 5:152.

82. See Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (September 8 and 21, 1814), 3:32, 39. Clay had once reportedly bet $50,000 on a hand of cards, but the hand was never played out because “a bystander swept the cards from the table & thus broke up the game.” The story may be apocryphal, but it illustrates Clay’s reputation for high stakes gambling. See Harrison, Diary of Thomas P. Cope (May 15, 1812), 272.

83. Clay to SS, August 18, 1814, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5; Clay to William H. Crawford, August 22, 1814, in Hopkins and Hargreaves, Papers of Henry Clay, 1:972.

84. Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams, 69.

85. LL to FS, September 2, 1814, in Wellington, Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington, 9:214; LL to SSWC, September 15, 1814, in Bickley, Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst, 289, See also LL to FS, September 23, 1814, and LL to Wellington, September 27 and November 4, 1814, in Wellington, Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington, 9:278, 290, 406.

86. LL to FS, September 2, 1814, to SSWC, September 11, 1814, and to Wellington, October 28, 1814, in Wellington, Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington, 9:214, 240, 384.

87. British commissioners to American commissioners, September 19, 1814, in ASP: FR, 3:718. See also SSWC to Henry Goulburn, September 20, 1814, and to British commissioners, September 27, 1814, in Goulburn Papers (UM), reel 1.

88. Clay to William H. Crawford, September 20, 1814, in Hopkins and Hargreaves, Papers of Henry Clay, 1:979.

89. British commissioners to American commissioners, October 21, 1814, in SD (M36), reel 1.

90. Ibid.

91. SSWC to British commissioners, October 17, 18 and 20, 1814, in Goulburn Papers (UM), reel 1.

92. See James A. Carr, “The Battle of New Orleans and the Treaty of Ghent,” Diplomatic History 3 (Summer, 1979), 273–82. The British also gave little thought to Astoria, a trading post on the Columbia River that had been sold to the British North West Company in October 1813 and then claimed by the Royal Navy two months later, or to Prairie du Chien, a frontier outpost in present-day Wisconsin that they had captured in July 1814. They occupied Cumberland Island in Georgia at the end of the war but had only just seized it in January 1815.

93. Bayard to Erick Bollman, October 29, 1814, in Donnan, Papers of James A. Bayard, 351.

94. Clay to SS, October 26, 1814, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5.

95. See chapter 9: The Crisis of 1814.

96. Nicholas Vansittart, quoted in Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams, 99.

97. See London Times, September 27, and October 18 and 19, 1814; LL to SSWC, September 30, 1814, in Bickley, Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst, 294–95; LL to FS, October 21, 1814, in Wellington, Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington, 9:367.

98. Goulburn to SSWC, October 21, 1814, in Wellington, Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington, 9:366.

99. LL to FS, October 28 and November 2, 1814, ibid., 383, 402.

100. Speech of Samuel Whitbread, November 18, 1814, in Parliamentary Debates, 29:364.

101. London Morning Chronicle, November 17, 1814. See also ibid., November 3, 1814.

102. SSWC to Henry Goulburn, September 12, 1814, in Goulburn Papers (UM), reel 1.

103. LL to George Canning, December 28, 1814, in Charles D. Yonge, The Life and Administration of Robert Banks, Second Earl of Liverpool, 3 vols. (London, 1868), 2:74–77; Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams, 100–101.

104. LL to George Canning, December 28, 1814, in Yonge, Earl of Liverpool, 2:76.

105. LL to FS, November 4, 1814, and to Wellington, November 4, 1814, in Wellington, Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington, 9:405–6.

106. Wellington to LL, November 9, 1814, ibid., 425–26.

107. LL to FS, November 18, 1814, ibid., 438.

108. Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (November 28, 1814), 3:71–76; SSWC to Henry Goulburn, November 21, 1814, and Goulburn to SSWC, November 26, 1814, in Goulburn Papers (UM), reel 2; John Quincy Adams, Remarks on a Paper Delivered by Mr. Jonathan Russell, May 3, 1822, in ASP: MS, 2: 947–56.

109. See Updyke, Diplomacy of the War, 466–78. Although the British retained access to the Mississippi River, this right had never been very important, and the rapid decline of the fur trade, coupled with the development of an improved transportation network east to Montreal, destroyed whatever value it had. The British effectively abandoned the right when this part of the Canadian-American boundary was defined in the Convention of 1818. See John Quincy Adams, Remarks on a Paper Delivered by Mr. Jonathan Russell, May 3, 1822, in ASP: MS, 2: 947–56.

110. The treaty is printed in ASP: FR, 3:745–48.

111. Ibid., 746. Great Britain later paid $1.2 million (£244,000) for slaves carried off at the end of the war. For the history and settlement of these claims, see John Bassett Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to Which the United States has Been a Party, 6 vols. (Washington, DC, 1898), 1:350–90.

112. Treaty of Ghent, in ASP: FR, 3:747. This clause was a dead letter from the beginning. See Colin G. Calloway, Crown and Calumet: British-Indian Relations, 1783–1815 (Norman, 1986), 240–48.

113. The commissions rendered their decisions between 1817 and 1842. See Updyke, Diplomacy of the War, 421–36.

114. Treaty of Ghent, in ASP: FR, 3:748.

115. Ibid., 746, 748; FS to British commissioners, July 28, 1814, and Henry Goulburn to SSWC, December 30, 1814, in Goulburn Papers (UM), reels 1 and 2; Worthington C. Ford, ed., “Intended Instructions [to the British commissioners at Ghent],” Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society 48 (December, 1914), 161; Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams, 121.

116. FS to LL, January 2, 1815, in Wellington, Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington, 9:523.

117. Edward Cooke (an undersecretary in the Foreign Office), quoted in LL to SSWC, January 16, 1815, in Bickley, Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst, 324.

118. London Courier, reprinted in Washington National Intelligencer, February 16, 1815; Naval Chronicle 33 (January-June, 1815), 70–71; Annual Register for 1814 [Preface], v; G. C. Moore Smith, ed., The Autobiography of Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Smith, 2 vols. (London, 1902), 1:251.

119. London Morning Chronicle, December 27, 1814.

120. London Times, December 27 and 30, 1814. See also London Globe, reprinted in Niles’ Register 7 (February 25, 1815), 407.

121. Speech of Marquis Wellesley, April 13, 1815, in Parliamentary Debates, 30:589 and 598. See also ibid., 205–6, 209, 500–33, 587–607, 649–52.

122. Ibid., 513–14, 533, 600, 607.

123. London Morning Chronicle, December 31, 1814.

124. Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (December 11 and 14, 1814), 3:104, 118.

125. Albert Gallatin to SS, December 25, 1814, in Gallatin Papers (SR), reel 27; Henry Clay to SS, December 25, 1814, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5; James A. Bayard to Andrew Bayard, December 24, 1814, in Donnan, Papers of James A. Bayard, 364; John Quincy Adams to Louisa Catherine Adams, December 23, 1814, and January 3, 1815, and to Abigail Adams, December 24, 1814, in Ford, Writings of John Quincy Adams, 5:245–46, 248, 260–61.

126. SSWC to British commissioners, December 26, 1814, in Goulburn Papers (UM), reel 2; Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams, 142.

127. Benjamin Russell to Jonathan Goodhue, February 11, 1815, in Boston Columbian Centinel, February 15, 1815; John Bach McMaster, A History of the People of the United States, From the Revolution to the Civil War, 8 vols. (New York, 1883–1913), 4:275.

128. Boston Yankee, February 17, 1815; Hartford American Mercury, February 21 and 28, 1815; Washington National Intelligencer, February 18 and 20, 1815; Updyke, Diplomacy of the War, 365–66; Sarah M. Lemmon, Frustrated Patriots: North Carolina and the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill, 1973), 200–201.

129. Otis Ammidon to Jonathan Russell, February 20, 1815, in “Letters of Jonathan Russell,” Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society 54 (November, 1920), 78.

130. Washington National Intelligencer, February 16 and 17, 1815; Hartford Connecticut Courant, February 21, 1815; Boston Gazette, February 13 and March 6, 1815; Georgetown Federal Republican, February 20, 1815; Updyke, Diplomacy of the War, 368–69; Adams, History, 2:1224–25.

131. LL to FS, December 23, 1814, in Wellington, Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington, 9:495.

132. Washington National Intelligencer, February 14, 15, and 18, 1815; Senate Journal, 2:618–20; Parliamentary Debates, 30:218.

133. Gore to Caleb Strong, February 18, 1815, in Henry Cabot Lodge, Life and Letters of George Cabot, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1878), 563.

134. Robertson to Timothy Pickering, February 14, 1815, in Pickering Papers (MHS), reel 30.

135. JM to Congress, February 18, 1815, in AC, 13–3, 255.

136. Story to Nathaniel Williams, February 22, 1815, in William W. Story, Life and Letters of Joseph Story, 2 vols. (Boston, 1851), 1:254; New York National Advocate, February 20, 1815.

137. Washington National Intelligencer, February 23, 1815; Worcester National Aegis, February 22, 1815. For similar sentiments, see Boston Yankee, February 17, 1815; Richmond Enquirer, February 18, 1815; Philadelphia Aurora, February 20, 1815; Trenton True American, March 6, 1815; Concord New-Hampshire Patriot, March 7 and April 11, 1815; Address of Massachusetts Republicans, February 23, 1815, and Address of John Dickinson, March 18, 1815, in Washington National Intelligencer, March 27, 1815; speech of John C. Calhoun, February 27, 1815, in AC, 13–3, 1236; Niles’ Register 8 (March 4, 1815), 417–19.

Conclusion

1. Speech of Daniel Sheffey, January 3, 1812, in AC, 12–1, 627.

2. Calhoun to James Macbride, April 18, 1812, in Meriwether et al., Papers of John C. Calhoun, 1:99–100; Charles J. Ingersoll to James Monroe, June 8, 1814, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5; letter from a congressman, January 8, 1815, in Lexington Reporter, February 8, 1815.

3. Richmond Enquirer, December 24, 1812; William A. Burwell to [Wilson Cary Nicholas], February 1, 1813, in Nicholas Papers (UVA).

4. Annapolis Maryland Gazette, October 15, 1812.

5. Robert B. Atkinson to John B. Floyd, February 22, 1858, in NASP: MA, 5:339; U.S. Congress, Report of the Third Auditor relative to the Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Soldiers of the Militia, Volunteers, and Rangers of the Late War, [U.S. Serial Set, #302] (Washington, DC, 1836), 78–79.

6. U.S. Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics ([Washington, DC], 1974), 19.

7. Ibid., 63.

8. See Edmund P. Gaines to SW, August 11, 1814, and Moses Porter to SW, July 25, August 10, and September 10 and 21, 1814, in WD (M221), reels 61 and 65; James Wilkinson to SW, August 16, 1813, in WD (M222), reel 9; Dr. G. Proctor to F. K. Huger, July 31, 1813, in Lowndes Papers (UNC), reel 1; Alexander Smyth to Henry Dearborn, November 9, 1812, Report of Hospital Surgeon, 1814, and George Izard to SW, November 8, 1814, in Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 2:298, 452–53, and 4:187; William Henry Harrison to SW, September 8, 1813, in Esarey, Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, 2:538; James Mann, Medical Sketches of the Campaigns of 1812, 13, 14 (Dedham, 1816), 66, 89, 125; McAfee, History of the Late War, 183–86; Gilpin, War of 1812 in the Northwest, 230; Sarah M. Lemmon, Frustrated Patriots: North Carolina and the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill, 1973), 44, 51, 89, 91, 199.

9. Isaac A. Coles to Richard Rush, November 16, [1812], in Monroe Papers (NYPL); Shelby to Susannah Shelby, October 28, 1813, in Shelby Papers (LC); Izard to [SW], June 25, 1814, in Izard, Official Correspondence, 38. See also Samuel Huntington to SW, October 1, 1812, in WD (M221), reel 45.

10. J. C. A. Stagg, “Enlisted Men in the United States Army, 1812–1815: A Preliminary Survey,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser. 43 (October, 1986), 624.

11. This figure must be taken with a grain a salt because Stagg’s 2.5 ratio is for the regular army, and it may have been different for the militia and other classes of land troops.

12. John S. Hare, “Military Punishments in the War of 1812,” Journal of the American Military Institute 4 (Winter, 1940), 238; Benjamin Homans to Isaac Chauncey, December 19, 1814 in ND (M149), reel 11. Andrew Jackson’s military courts handled a particularly large number of desertion cases. See Proceedings of General Court Martial Held at Nashville, October 19, 1814, in Jackson Papers (LC), reel 64.

13. In Don’t Give Up the Ship, 297, I scaled back my estimate to 15,000, but I now think my original figure of 20,000 is closer to the mark.

14. For a fuller discussion of this matter, see Hickey, Don’t Give Up the Ship, 296–99.

15. U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States, 2 vols. (Washington, DC, 1975), 2:1140.

16. New York Times, January 16, 1946, p. 17, and January 17, 1947, p. 10; President’s Commission on Veterans’ Pensions, The Historical Development of Veterans’ Benefits in the United States (Washington, DC, 1956), 100.

17. George C. Whiting to J. Thompson, March 2, 1858, in NASP: MA, 5:341.

18. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances for the Year 1866 [U.S. Serial Set, #1287] (Washington, DC, 1866), 304. My estimate assumes that all the money was borrowed at 6 percent and redeemable in thirteen years, which was the norm during the war. In 1830 the House Ways and Means Committee issued a report estimating that the administration got only $34 million in specie value. That seems too low to me, but if correct, the administration’s interest rate was over 20 percent, and this does not factor in the payment mandated by Congress in 1855 to compensate the early subscribers to the war loan in 1814 who paid a higher price than later subscribers. See Report of Ways and Means Committee, April 13, 1830, in RD, 21–1, Appendix, 115; and Chapter 9: The Crisis of 1814.

19. This is actually a loose paraphrase of what a Canadian historian said over a half century ago. See C. P. Stacey, “The War of 1812 in Canadian History,” Ontario History 50 (Summer 1958), 153.

20. See, for example, Christopher Duffy, Borodino and the War of 1812 (New York and London, 1972).

21. Davis, Jeffersonian America, 5; letter from an Englishman, July 21, 1815, in Niles’ Register 9 (October 28, 1815), 156.

22. Bradford Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams: England and the United States, 1812–1823 (Berkeley, 1964), 160–62.

23. See Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895–1914 (New York, 1968).

24. For more on the war’s impact on Great Britain, see Hickey, Don’t Give Up the Ship, 317–20.

25. For more on the war’s impact on Canada, see Hickey, Don’t Give Up the Ship, 312–17.

26. See Isaac J. Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 1798–1813: A Study in American Diplomacy (Baltimore, 1918), ch. 16.

27. Report of the Secretary of War, December 5, 1818, in ASP: IA, 2:183.

28. See Paul A. Gilje, “Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights,” Journal of the Early Republic 30 (Spring, 2010), 1–23; and Gilje to author, July 11, 2011.

29. JM to Congress, February 18, 1815, in AC, 13–3, 255–56.

30. See AC, 13–3, 297–98, 1272–73, 1934–35; AC, 14–1, 363, 1374, 1886–87; Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898 (New York, 1986), 43. The Senate preferred an army of 15,000 men, and the administration favored 20,000. See AC, 13–3, 286; and SW to William Branch Giles, February 22, 1815, in Monroe Papers (LC), reel 5. The force level adopted did not survive the revenue shortfall that followed the Panic of 1819. In 1821 Congress cut the size of the army to 6,200 men. See Coffman, Old Army, 140; Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America, rev. ed. (New York, 1994), 128.

31. K. Jack Bauer, “Naval Shipbuilding Programs, 1794–1860,” Military Affairs 29 (Spring, 1965), 34; C. Gratiot to John Eaton, March 8, 1830, in ASP: MA, 4:305. See also Board of Engineers to John C. Calhoun, February 7, 1821, ibid., 2:305–12; speech of Samuel Smith, March 9, 1820, in AC, 16–1, 1620. The revenue shortfall of 1820s slowed down the naval construction program, and most of the larger ships were taken out of service to save money. See Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 124.

32. Jefferson to William Short, November 28, 1814, in Jefferson Papers (LC), reel 47.

33. Walter M. Whitehill, ed., New England Blockaded in 1814: The Journal of Henry Edward Napier (Salem, 1938) (May 29, 1814), 20.

34. AC, 13–3, 285, 1271, 1945–49. For the renewal of this act, see AC, 14–2, 1343–45.

35. Harrison to John Vincent, November 3, 1813, in Esarey, Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, 2:592–94. See also Georgetown Federal Republican, March 31, 1813.

36. Annual Register for 1814 [General History], 205; and Reginald Horsman, “The Paradox of Dartmoor Prison,” American Heritage 26 (February, 1975), 14. The United States held about the same number of British prisoners. See Anthony G. Dietz, “The Prisoner of War in the United States during the War of 1812” (PhD dissertation, American University, 1964), 106–7.

37. Samuel Davis to mother, March 10, 1814, in Niles’ Register 8 (Supplement), 120. For similar sentiments, see A Narrative: A Short and Thrilling Narrative of a Few of the Scenes and Incidents That Occurred in the Sanguinary and Cruel War of 1812-’14, between England and the United States (Norway, ME, 1853), 24–32.

38. Niles’ Register 8 (April 22, 1815), 127.

39. Robert Malcomson, Historical Dictionary of the War of 1812 (Lanham, MD, 2006), 330–32.

40. Boston Patriot, March 25, 1815. See also Salem Essex Register, April 5, 1815; statements of W. L. Churchill et al., and of Ebenezer A. Lewis et al., in Washington National Intelligencer, April 6, 1815. See also ibid., April 7, 1815; and Short and Thrilling Narrative of a Few of the Scenes and Incidents, 48–62.

41. Letter of J. Odiorne, November 1, 1814, in Niles’ Register 8 (March 25, 1815), 56. See also Horsman, “Paradox of Dartmoor,” 13.

42. Resolutions of William Harmon et al., August 31, 1815, in Niles’ Register 9 (October 28, 1815), 154.

43. Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams, 165–66. For the official report, see Report of Charles King and Francis S. Larpent, April 26, 1815, in Niles’ Register 8 (July 22, 1815), 354–57.

44. The prisoners’ reports are printed in Niles’ Register, 8 (June 17, 1815), 269–71, (July 8, 1815), 321–28, and (August 5, 1815), 389–92.

45. Richmond Enquirer, June 17, 1815. See also Washington National Intelligencer, May 31 and June 1, 1815. The British usually sought to follow international law, but a student of the subject has concluded that in the War of 1812 the Americans did a better job. Robin F. A. Farbel, “The Laws of War in the 1812 Conflict,” Journal of American Studies 14 (August, 1980), 199–218.

46. Report on Spirit and Manner in Which the War is Waged by the Enemy, July 31, 1813, in ASP: MA, 1:339–82.

47. Niles’ Register ran a column entitled “War Events” for eight months after the war and continued to publish this kind of material long after the column had been discontinued.

48. Henry Adams, History, displays the same anglophobia that is evident in the writings of John Adams and John Quincy Adams.

49. See John William Ward, Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age (New York, 1955).

50. Bennett H. Young, The Battle of the Thames (Louisville, 1903), ch. 8; Stagg, Mr. Madison’s War, 330n.

51. Story to Nathaniel Williams, February 22, 1815, in William W. Story, Life and Letters of Joseph Story, 2 vols. (Boston, 1851), 1:254.

52. See Richard Archer, “Dissent and the Peace Negotiations at Ghent,” American Studies 18 (Fall, 1977), 5–16.

53. Boston Yankee, March 3, 1815.

54. Theodore Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention (New York, 1833), 4, 382.

55. Statement of Rufus King, [1814?], in King, Rufus King, 5:405. For similar sentiments, see speech of Daniel Webster, January 14, 1814, in AC, 13–2, 942.

56. Address of Boston Federalists, February 27, 1815, in Boston Gazette (Supplement), March 2, 1815.

57. Speech of Charles J. Ingersoll, February 16, 1815, in AC, 13–3, 1159, 1161. See also Dwight, Hartford Convention, 381.

58. Arsène Lacarrière Latour: Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana in 1814–15 (1816; edited and expanded by Gene A. Smith, Gainesville, 1999), 100; Niles’ Register 8 (March 4, 1815), 1; speech of George M. Troup, February 16, 1815, in AC, 13–3, 1156. See also letter from New Orleans, January 19, 1815, in Richmond Enquirer, February 15, 1815; Address of Andrew Jackson, March, 1815, in Brannan, Official Letters, 469.

59. Boston Yankee, March 3, 1815.

60. Niles’ Register 11 (September 14, 1816), 40.

61. Speech of Henry Southard, January 17, 1817, in AC, 14–2, 584.

Index

The index that appeared in the print version of this title was intentionally removed from the eBook. Please use the search function on your eReading device to search for terms of interest. For your reference, the terms that appear in the print index are listed below.

USS designates U.S. warships even though this abbreviation was rarely used by contemporaries.

HMS (for His Majesty’s Ship) and PM (for Provincial Marine) designate British warships.

The military rank given is usually the highest achieved during the war.

Adams, John

Adams, John Quincy, appointed to peace commission, and peace negotiations, postwar career of, in Russia

Adams, USS

Adams, William

Address of the Minority (Federalist anti-war address)

Albany Congress (1754)

Alert, HMS

Alexander, Czar

Alexandria (Va)

Amelia Island (Fla.)

America. See United States

American Revolution, See also War of 1812: as second war of independence

Ames, Fisher

Amiens, Peace of

Anacostia River

“Anacreon in Heaven, To”

Anderson, Joseph

Anglo-French wars (1793-1815)

anglophobia

Apalachicola River (Fla.)

apothecary general, U.S.

Appling, Maj. Daniel

Archer, Stevenson

Argus, USS (20 guns)

Argus, USS (rated at 22 guns)

arming merchantmen

Armistead, Maj. George, family of

armistice: negotiations for, rumors of

Armstrong, John, appointed secretary of war, blamed for capture of Washington, and campaign of 1813, character of, creates military districts, and defense of Washington, favors conscription, as judge of talent, resigns, view on Hartford Convention, writes army code of regulations

Army, British

Army, U.S., actual size of, and arrest for debt, authorized size of, casualties of, code of regulations for, condition of, and conscription, and desertion from, 231, 407n8; discipline in, disease in, and dueling, enlistment bounty of, and enlistment of minors, , enlistment period of, officers of, pay of, in the postwar period, ration of, recruiting problems of, reorganization of, supply of, weapons of, See also individual battles

arsenals, U.S.

artillery

Artillery Duel at New Orleans (La.)

Astor, John Jacob

Astoria (Ore.)

attorney general, U.S.

Austerlitz (Czechoslovakia), Battle of

Autosee (Ala.), Battle

Avon, HMS

Bache, Richard

Backus, Col. Electus

Bacon, Ezekiel

Bainbridge, Capt. William

Baker, Anthony

Baltic Sea

Baltimore (Md.), British assault on, and privateering, riots in 54-65, trade of

Baltimore Federal Republican

Bangor (Maine)

banks: number of, and public finance, and specie reserves, and suspension of specie payments, See also National bank

Baratarian pirates

Barclay, Commander Robert H.

Baring, Alexander

Baring, House of

Barney, Capt. Joshua

Barney, Maj. William

Barrie, Capt. Robert

Baton Rouge (La.)

Bayard, James A., appointed to peace commission, and peace negotiations, in Russia, view of impressment, view of Treaty of Ghent

Baynes, Col. Edward

Beanes, William Dr.

Beasley, Maj. Daniel

Beaver Dams (Ontario), Battle of

Beckwith, Col. Thomas Sidney

Belfast (Maine)

Benedict (Md.)

Benton, Jesse

Benton, Thomas Hart

Berkeley, Rear Adm. George

Berlin Decree. See Continental Decrees

Bermuda

Bibb, William

bicentennial (of War of 1812)

Bidwell, Barnabas

Bigelow, Abijah

Bigelow, Timothy

Bissell, Brig. Gen. Daniel

Blackbird

black people, See also slaves

Black Rock (N.Y.)

Black Swamp (Ohio)

Bladensburg (Md.), Battle of

“Bladensburg Races,” 206

Blake, Francis

Bledsoe, Jesse

Bleecker, Harmanus

blockades (British): in Europe, of U.S.

Block Island (R.I.)

blue light affair

Boerstler, Lt. Col. Charles

Bonaparte, Napoleon. See Napoleon

Boston (Mass.): and Baltimore riots, and British blockade, effect of war on, and election of 1812, and enemy trade, and Hartford Convention, and Massachusetts militia problem, and Treaty of Ghent, and U.S. embargos, and war loans

bounty, enlistment. See Army, U.S.; Navy, U.S.

Boxer, HMS

Boyd, Brig. Gen. John P.

Boyle, Capt. Thomas

Brant’s Ford (Ontario)

Brent, Richard

Bristol (England)

Britain. See Great Britain

Brock, Maj. Gen. Isaac, and Battle of Queenston Heights, and capture of Detroit, and control of Lake Erie

Broke, Capt. Philip

Brooke, Col. Arthur

Brown, Maj. Gen. Jacob, and Battle of Hoople’s Creek, and defense of Sackets Harbor, feud with Chauncey, at French Mills, and Niagara campaign of 1814

Buck, Maj. Thomas

“buck and ball,”

buckshot

budget, U.S.: for 1812, for 1813, for 1814, for 1815

Buffalo (N.Y.)

Bunker Hill (Mass.), Battle of

Burbeck, Col. Henry

Burgoyne, Maj. Gen. John

Burgoyne, Lt. Col. John Fox

Burlington (Vt.)

Burlington Heights (Ontario)

“Burlington Races,”

Burnt Corn (Ala.), Battle of

Burrall, Charles

Burr Conspiracy

Byron, Lord

Cabot, George

Calabee Creek (Ala.), Battle of

Caledonia, PM

Calhoun, John C., 165, 259, and crisis of 1814, and declaration of war, and executive leadership, and party spirit, and public finance, and restrictive system

Campbell, George W.

Campbell, Col. John B.

Canada, British defense plans for, British seek security for, as a cause of war, Federalists oppose conquest of, and Indians, and legacy of war, U.S. attempts to conquer, U.S. boundary with, U.S. favors voluntary transfer of, U.S. proposals for governing, U.S. trade with

Canadian volunteers

Canoe Fight (in Ala.)

Cape Cod (Mass.)

Capitol, U.S.

Carden, Capt. John S.

Caribbean Sea. See West Indies

Carolina, USS

Carroll, Henry

Cartagena (Columbia)

Cass, Col. Lewis

Cassin, Capt. John

Castine (Maine)

Castlereagh, Lord

casualties, See also individual battles

Cat Island (Miss.)

Caulk’s Field (Md.), Battle of

Cedar Creek (Md.), Battle of

certificate of citizenship

Chandler, Brig. Gen. John

Channing, William Ellery

“Chant du Depart,” 216

Chapin, Col. Cyranius

Charleston (S.C.)

Chasseur (American privateer)

Châteauguay (Quebec), Battle of

Chauncey, Isaac, and assault on Fort George, and Battle of York, and command of the lakes, and conquest of Canada, and dispute with Brown, and Lake Erie, and Lake Ontario

Cherub, HMS

Chesapeake, USS

Chesapeake affair

Chesapeake Bay, British blockade of, British justification of depredations in, British raids in, and enemy trade, and legacy of depredations, and suspension of specie payments, U.S. response to depredations in, wartime economy of

Cheves, Langdon, elected speaker of house, and national bank, and naval expansion, and prisoners of war, and removal of capital, and restrictive system

Chippawa (Ontario), Battle of

Chippawa River (Ontario)

Chippewa, USS

Chippewa Indians

Chittenden, Martin

Chub, HMS

Civil War, U.S.

Claiborne, Brig. Gen. Ferdinand L.

Claiborne, William

Clark, William

Clarke, Col. Allen

Clay, Brig. Gen. Green

Clay, Henry, appointed to peace commission, on Canada, gambling of, leadership of, on Madison’s leadership, and peace negotiations, and postwar career, and prewar embargo, on restrictive system, as speaker of house, on specie in West, view of Treaty of Ghent

Clinton, De Witt

Clinton, George

Clintonians

Clopton, John

coastal fortifications, U.S.

Cochrane, Vice Adm. Alexander, and campaign in Chesapeake, and Gulf Coast campaign

Cockburn, Rear Adm. George, and attack on Cumberland Island, and Chesapeake campaign, opinion on Colonial Marines, reviled in America

Codrington, Rear Adm. Edward

Coffee, Brig. Gen. John

Cognawauga (Caughnawaga) Indians

cohesion index

Colonial Marines (British)

Columbia, USS

commissary department, U.S.

Confiance, HMS

Congress, U.S., Federalist bloc voting in, party breakdown in, Republican factions in, secret sessions of

Congress, USS

Congress of Vienna

Congreve rockets

Conjocta Creek (N.Y.), Battle of

Connecticut: creates state army, defenses costs of, financial condition of, and Hartford Convention, and militia problem, nullifies minor enlistment law, protests war

Connecticut River

conscription. See Army, U.S.

Consolato del Mare,

Constellation, USS

Constitution, U.S., proposed amendments to

Constitution, USS, defeats HMS Guerrière, defeats HMS Java, defeats HMS Levant and HMS Cyane, earns nickname of “Old Ironsides,” outruns British squadron, postwar fame of

Constitutional Convention (1787)

Continental Congress, First (1774)

Continental decrees

contraband

convention movement (in New England), See also Hartford Convention

Convention of 1800

Cook’s Mills (Ontario), Battle of

Covington (N.Y.)

Covington, Brig. Gen. Leonard

Cornwall (Ontario)

Craig, Sir James

Crawford, William H.

Crawford’s Hotel (in Washington, D.C.)

Creek War

Crillon, Count Edward de

Crockett, Davy

Croghan, Col. George

Crowninshield, Benjamin W.

Crutchfield, Maj. Stapleton

Crysler’s Farm (Ontario), Battle of

Cumberland Island (Ga.)

Cushing, Brig. Gen. Thomas H.

Cutts, Charles

Cutts, Richard

Cuyahoga (American merchantman)

Cyane, HMS

Dacres, Capt. James R.

Daggett, David

Dale, Capt. Sam

Dallas, Alexander J., appointed secretary of the treasury, and enemy trade, financial reports of, and national bank

Dana, Samuel W.

Dane, Nathan

Dartmoor Massacre

Dartmoor Prison (in England)

Dashkov, Andrei

Davis, Brig. Gen. Jacob

Dearborn, Maj. Gen. Henry, and armistice of 1812, and assault on York, and campaign against Montreal in 1812, and Hull’s court martial, and New England militia problem, and Niagara campaign in 1813, and U.S. strategy in 1812

Dearborn, Brig. Gen. Henry A. S.

Decatur, Capt. Stephen, and blue light affair, captures HMS Macedonian, loses USS President, reputation of, and U.S. naval strategy

declaration of war: British, U.S.

Delaware

Delaware (Ontario)

desertion. See Army, U.S.: and desertion from

Desha, Joseph

Detroit (Mich.), captured by British, recaptured by U.S.

Detroit, PM (6 guns)

Detroit, PM (19 guns),

Detroit frontier

Detroit River

Dickson, Lt. Col. Alexander

direct tax

disease. See Army, U.S.: disease in

Dobbins, Daniel

Dobbs, Capt. Alexander

“Don’t give up the ship,”

“Don’t give up the soil,”

Douglass, Capt. George

Dover (Ontario)

Dover Mills (Ontario)

Downie, Capt. George

“Dr. Chapin and the Forty Thieves,”

drugs

Drummond, Lt. Gen. Gordon

Drummond, Lt. Col. William,

Duane, Col. William

Ducharme, Capt. Dominique

Duck River (Tenn.)

dueling (in U.S. Army)

Dupont & Company

Dwight, Theodore

Dwight, Timothy

Dyson, Capt. Samuel T.

Eagle, USS (11 guns)

Eagle, USS (20 guns)

East India Company

East Indies

Eastport (Maine)

economy, U.S., impact of war on

Eisenhower, Dwight

elections: of 1800, of 1812, of 1814

Elkton (Md.)

Elliott, Lt. Jesse

Elliott, Matthew

embargo, of 1807, of 1812, of 1813, and Hartford Convention

Emuckfau (Ala.), Battle of

Endymion, HMS

enemy aliens

enemy trade, proposals to curtail

enforcement act (of 1809)

England. See Great Britain

Enotachopco Creek (Ala.), Battle of

Enterprise, USS

Eppes, John W.

Era of Good Feelings

Erskine, David M.

Erskine Agreement

Essex (Conn.)

Essex, USS

Essex decision

Essex Junto

Europe, and Anglo-American peace negotiations

Eustis, William

exports, U.S., See also non-exportation; re-exports

Falcon, Capt. Gordon

Favourite, HMS

Federalists: and Baltimore riots, and Canadian war, and crisis of 1814, and declaration of war, decline of, and elections, and fall of Napoleon, and French alliance, and Hartford Convention, and Henry affair, and maritime war, and military preparedness, and militia problem, and national bank, and navy, and opposition to war, and peace terms, and prisoners of war, and restrictive system, and tax policy, and Treaty of Ghent, unity of, violence of, and war loans

Federal Republican (Baltimore). See Baltimore: riots in

Fessenden, Samuel

Finch, HMS

Fischer, Lt. Col. Victor

fishing privileges, U.S., in Canadian waters

Fisk, James

Fisk, Jonathan

Fitzgibbon, Lt. James

floating battery

Florida: and Creeks, and Gulf coast campaign, and U.S. expansion, and U.S. trade

Floyd, Brig. Gen. John

foreign seaman act

Forsyth, Maj. John

Fort Amherstburg (Ontario)

Fort Bowyer (Ala.)

Fort Dearborn Massacre (Ill.)

Fort Defiance (Md.)

Fort Erie (Ontario), Battle of, U.S. capture of, U.S. evacuation of, U.S. sortie from

Fort George (Ontario), British siege of, U.S. capture of, U.S. evacuation of

Fort Harrison (Ind.)

Fort Jackson (Ala.), Treaty of

Fort Madison (Iowa)

Fort McHenry (Md.)

Fort Meigs (Ohio)

Fort Mims Massacre (Ala.)

Fort Niagara (N.Y.), captured by British

Fort Ontario (N.Y.)

Fort Schlosser (N.Y.)

Fort Shelby (Wis.)

Fort Stephenson (Ohio)

Fort St. Philip (La.)

Fort Strother (Ala.)

Fort Sullivan (Maine)

Fort Tompkins (N.Y.)

Fort Washington (Md.)

Fort Wayne (Ind.), treaties of

Foster, Augustus J.

Four Corners (N.Y.)

Fox, Charles James

Fox Blockade

France, and Continental System, and declaration of war, and fear of alliance with, and Great Britain, and Quasi-War, and restrictive system, and trade, See also Napoleon

Franklin County (Pa.)

Fredericktown (Md.)

free ships--free goods

“Free trade and sailors’ rights,”

French Mills (N.Y.)

Frenchtown (Md.)

Frenchtown (Mich.), Battle of

Freneau, Philip

frigates: British, U.S., See also individual frigates

Frolic, HMS

Frolic, USS

Fulton (N.Y.)

Fulton, Robert

Fulton the First, USS

Gaines, Brig. Gen. Edmund P.

Gallatin, Albert, appointed to peace delegation, and peace negotiations, and restrictive system, and taxes, and U.S. strategy, and war, and war finance

Galusha, Jonas

Gambier, Adm. James,

Gaston, William

General Armstrong (American privateer)

General Pike, USS

Georgetown (D.C.)

Georgetown (Md.)

Georgia

Georgian Bay (Ontario)

Gerry, Elbridge

Ghent (Belgium)

Ghent, Treaty of, ratification of, reception of, negotiated, terms of

Gibson, Jacob

Gilbert, Felix H.

Giles, William Branch

Gilman, John T.

Girard, Stephen

Glasgow (Scotland)

Goddard, Calvin

Goldsborough, Charles

Goldsborough, Robert H.

“Good Bess,”

Goodrich, Chauncey

Goodrich, Samuel G.

Gordon, Capt. James

Gore, Christopher

Gothenburg (Sweden)

Goulburn, Henry

Governor Tompkins (American privateer)

Grand River (Ontario)

Grand River Iroquois Indians

Grand Terre Island (La.)

Granger, Gideon

Grant, Ulysses

Gratiot, Capt. Charles

Great Britain: and declaration of war, and European war, and legacy of war, maritime policies of, and peace negotiations, and policy of conciliation, strategy of

Great Lakes

Greenleaf’s Point (D.C.)

Greenock (Scotland)

Greenville (Ohio), Treaty of

Gregg, Andrew

Grenadier Island (N.Y.)

Grenville, Lord

Griffith, Rear Adm. Edward

Griswold, Roger

Grosvenor, Thomas P.

Growler, USS

Grundy, Felix

Guadaloupe (West Indies)

Guerrière, HMS, ii, 93,

Gulf Coast: British invasion of

gunboats: British, U.S.

Halifax (Nova Scotia), and British naval squadron, and prisoners of war, and road to Quebec

Hall, Maj. Gen. Amos

Hamilton (Ontario)

Hamilton, Alexander

Hamilton, Paul

Hamilton, USS

Hampden (Maine)

Hampton (Va.)

Hampton, Brig. Gen. Wade

Hannibal

Hanson, Alexander C., and Baltimore riots

Hardy, Capt. Thomas

Harper, John A.

Harper, Robert Goodloe

Harpy (American privateer)

Harrison, Maj. Gen. William Henry, and Battle of Tippecanoe, and Battle of the Thames

Hartford (Conn.)

Hartford Convention,

Harvey, Lt. Col. John

Havre de Grace (Md.)

Hawkins, Benjamin

Hawkins, Joseph

Hay, George

Heald, Capt. Nathan

Henry, John

Henry affair

Hermes, HMS

Hillhouse, James

Hillyar, Capt. James

Hislop, Lt. Gen. Thomas

Holland River (Ontario)

Holmes, Capt. Andrew

Holy Ground (Ala.), Battle of

Hoople’s Creek (Ontario), Battle of

Hope, Capt. Henry

Hornet, USS

Hornet, USS, (built during war)

Horseshoe Bend (Ala.), Battle of

Houston, Sam

Hudson River (N.Y.)

Hull, Capt. Isaac

Hull, Brig. Gen. William

Humphreys, Joshua

imports, U.S., See also enemy trade; non-importation

impressment, as a cause of war, and Monroe-Pinkney Treaty, in peace negotiations

Impressment Bill

Independence, USS

Indians, atrocities of, casualties of, and causes of war, and legacy of war, and peace negotiations, as warriors, See also entries for individual tribes; individual battles

Ingersoll, Charles J.

Ingersoll, Jared

insurance rates, marine: for British merchants, for U.S. merchants

international law

International Rapids

“Invisibles” (Senate faction)

Isham, Brig. Gen. Jirah

Isle-aux-Noix (Quebec)

Iroquois Indians, U.S., Grand River

Izard, Maj. Gen. George

Jackson, John G.

Jackson, Maj. Gen. Andrew, and Creek War, and discipline of troops, and Gulf Coast campaign, and Hartford Convention, and Louisiana legislature, and martial law, and legacy of war

Jamaica (West Indies)

Jay Treaty

Jefferson, Thomas, and Canada, and Chesapeake affair, on economic impact of war, on fall of Napoleon, favors paper money, and gunboats, on mobs, and regulars, and restrictive system, sells library to government, on taxes of 1814, and treaties, on war opposition

Jesup, Col. Thomas

Johnson, Col. Richard M.

Johnson, Edward

Johnson, Lt. Col. James

“Jonathan,” defined

Jones, Lt. Thomas ap Catesby

Jones, William (of Pennsylvania), appointed acting secretary of the treasury, appointed secretary of the navy, and crisis of 1814, and enemy trade, and privateering, and public finance, recommends naval reforms, resigns

Jones, William (of Rhode Island)

Julia case

Keane, Maj. Gen. John

Kent Island (Md.)

Kentucky, and Canada, and declaration of war, and Harrison’s western campaign, and Indian raids, and prisoners of war, wartime economy of

Kentucky rifle

Key, Francis Scott

Key, Philip Barton

Kickapoo Indians

King, Cyrus

King, Rufus, and election of 1812, as possible president pro tem of Senate

King, William

Kingsbury, Col. Jacob

Kingston (Ontario)

Knox, Henry

Lacock, Abner

Lacolle Mill (Quebec): First Battle of, Second Battle of

Laffite, Jean

Laffite, Pierre

Lake Barataria (La.)

Lake Borgne (La.), Battle of

Lake Champlain, Battle of, and enemy trade

Lake Erie, Battle of, struggle for control of, and supply route, U.S. command of

Lake Huron

Lake Memphremagog

Lake Ontario, and enemy trade, struggle for control of, and supply route

Lake Simcoe (Ontario)

Lambert, Capt. Henry

Lambert, Maj. Gen. John

Langdon, John

Lansdowne, Marquis of

Late Loyalists

Lawrence, Capt. James,

Lawrence, Maj. William

Lawrence, USS,

Lazaretto Point (Md.)

leadership (wartime)

Lee, “Light-Horse” Harry,

legacy (of war)

Leib, Michael

Leipzig (Germany), Battle of

Leonard, Capt. Nathan

Leopard, HMS

Levant, HMS

Lewis, Maj. Gen. Morgan

Lewis, Philip

Lewiston (N.Y.)

Lexington (Ky.)

Library of Congress

licenses (British): prewar, wartime:

Lincoln, Abraham

Lingan, James M.

Linnet, HMS

Little Belt affair

Liverpool (England)

Liverpool, Lord

Liverpool Packet (British/Canadian privateer)

Livingston, Edward

Livingston, Robert Le Roy

Lloyd, James

Lloyd’s of London

loans (war): of 1812, of 1813, of 1814, of 1815, interest rate on, total during war

Lockyer, Capt. Nicholas

London (England)

Long Sault

Longwoods (Ontario), Battle of

Louisiana

Louisiana, USS

Louisiana Purchase

Louisville (Ky.)

Lovett, John

Lowell, John, Jr.

Lower Canada (now Quebec)

Lowndes, William

Loyalists

Lucas, Capt. Robert

Lundy’s Lane (Ontario), Battle of

Lusk, Brig. Gen. Levi

Lyman, Daniel

Lyman, Joseph

Lyon’s Creek (Ontario), Battle of

Macdonough, Master Commandant Thomas

Macedonian, HMS/USS

Mackinac (Mich.), captured by G. B., U.S. attempt to recapture

Macomb, Brig. Gen. Alexander

Macon, Nathaniel

Macon’s bill #2

Madison, Dolley,

Madison, James, and Baltimore riots, and British blockade, and British capture of Washington, and cabinet, and causes of war, and civil liberties, and crisis of 1814, and declaration of war, and diplomatic appointments, and election of 1812, and enemy trade, and Henry affair, illness of, leadership of, and national bank, and naval expansion, and New England disaffection, opening messages to Congress of, and peace negotiations, and prisoners of war, proclaims war a success, and public finance, and restrictive system, and strategy

Maine: British occupation of, and enemy trade, and Massachusetts militia problem, and peace negotiations

Malcolm’s Mills (Ontario), Battle of

manifest destiny

manufacturing

Marblehead (Mass.)

maritime provinces (of Canada)

maritime war

“Marseilles,”

Marshall, John

Martin, Luther

Martinique (West Indies)

Maryland: and Baltimore riots, and elections, See also Chesapeake Bay

Mason, Jeremiah

Mason, John

Massachusetts: and British occupation of Maine, and conscription, defense costs of, and enemy trade, and Hartford Convention, and militia problem, and minor enlistment law, and prisoners of war, protests war, and state army, and wartime economy, and wartime elections

Massias, Capt. Abraham

Maumee Rapids (Ohio)

Maumee River

McArthur, Brig. Gen. Duncan

McClure, Brig. Gen. George

McDonough, Lt. Patrick,

McDouall, Lt. Col. Robert

McIntosh, William

McKay, Maj. William

McKim, Alexander

McRee, Lt. Col. William

medicine (practice of)

Meigs, Return J.

Melville Island (Nova Scotia)

merchant bond problem

merchant marine, American, See also impressment

merchantmen, American: arming of, seized by European belligerents

Miami Exporting Company

Miami Indians

Milan Decree. See Continental decrees

militia, American, act authorizing use of, act increasing judicial power over, act organizing, and Baltimore riots, bills to arm and classify, and carrying of the Superior cable, and conscription, discipline of, inefficiency of, New England’s dispute over, as prisoners of war, refusal of to serve in Canada, See also individual battles

Military Academy, U.S.

Miller, Lt. Col. James

Miller, Morris

Milnor, James

Minnesota

minors: enlistment of

Mississinewa (Ind.), Battle of

Mississippi River, British navigation rights on

Mitchell, Lt. Col. George E.

Mitchill, Samuel Latham

Mobile (Ala.)

Mohawk, USS

Mohawk Indians

Monmouth (N.J.)

Monroe (Mich.)

Monroe, James, appointed acting secretary of state, appointed acting secretary of war, appointed secretary of war, and Canada, and conscription, and declaration for war, and defense of Washington, and enemy aliens, and Henry affair, and John Armstrong, and legacy of war, and militia, and Monroe-Pinkney Treaty, and naval strategy, and New England’s defense problem, and paper money, and peace negotiations, and St. Cloud decree

Monroe-Pinkney Treaty

Montreal (Quebec), and campaign of 1812, and campaign of 1813, and campaign of 1814

Moraviantown (Ontario), Battle of

Morgan, Maj. Gen. David B.

Morgan, Maj. Lodowick

Morris, Capt. Charles

Morris, Gouverneur

Morrison, Lt. Col. Joseph W.

“Mosquito fleet,”

“Mr. Madison’s War,”

Mumma, John

Murray, Daniel

Murray, Col. John

muskets

Myers, Col. Christopher

myth of American victory

Nancy, HMS

Nantucket (Mass.)

Napier, Lt. Col. Charles

Napoleon (Bonaparte), and American privateers, and Continenal decrees, defeated and exiled, defeated at Leipzig, invades Russia, rebuilds French fleet, and restrictive system, returns for Hundred Days

Nast, Thomas

national bank, 315; first, second

national debt, U.S.

National Intelligencer (Washington), destroyed by British

Naudee (Oshawahnah),

Nautilus, USS

Naval Academy, U.S.

naval armaments

Navy, Royal (British): and blockade of U.S. coast, and British opinion, and conciliatory policy, condition of in 1812, and control of northern lakes, and defense of Canada, and impressment, and U.S. prisoners of war, See also individual ships

Navy, U.S., academy for, and American opinion, board of commissioners for, condition of in 1812, and conscription, and control of northern lakes, created, enlistment bounty for, enlistment period for, expanded, and illegal trade, pay of, in postwar period, and prizes, in Quasi-War, recruitment for, reduced, and strategy, weaponry of, See also individual ships

Newark (Ontario)

New Bedford (Mass.)

New Brunswick

Newburyport (Mass.)

New England, and Baltimore riots, and British blockade, British raids of, and declaration of war, defenses costs of, and elections, and embargo of 1807, and enemy trade, and fear of French alliance, grievances of, and Henry affair, and militia problem, and opposition to war, and a separate peace, and specie, and state armies, and war loans, and wartime economy

Newfoundland

New Hampshire: and anti-war violence, and cash shortage, and Hartford Convention, and militia problem, and wartime elections

New Jersey

New London (Conn.)

New Orleans (La.), Battle of, illegal trade at, martial law in, and myth of American victory

New Orleans, USS

New York (N.Y.), and arrival of peace treaty, and British imports, and commodity speculation, and Lawrence funeral, as potential capital, on supply route, and war loan

New York (state), and elections, and enemy aliens, and enemy trade, and Hartford Convention amendments, invasion of, and origins of “Uncle Sam,” -89; wartime economy of, See also Niagara front

Niagara, USS,

Niagara front, and campaign of 1812, and campaign of 1813, and campaign of 1814

Niagara River. See Niagara front

Nicholson, Joseph H.

Nicolls, Maj. Edward

non-exportation

non-importation, act of 1806, act of 1811

non-intercourse

Norfolk (Va.)

Norristown (Pa.) Herald, assault on

North Carolina

North Point (Md.), Battle of

Northwest, Old, and causes of war, and control of Lake Erie, and Indians, and legacy of war, and peace negotiations, and supply route

North West Company

Norton, Maj. John

Nottawasaga (Ontario), Battle of

Nova Scotia

Nullification

Oakland (Ontario)

Oakley, Thomas

Octagon House (in D.C.),

Odelltown (Ontario)

Ohio

Ohio, USS

Ohio River

Old Hampshire (Mass.)

“Old Ironsides.” See Constitution, USS

Old Northwest. See Northwest, Old

Old Republicans

Old Southwest. See Southwest, Old

Oneida, USS

Oneida Indians

opposition. See Clintonians; Federalists; “Invisibles”; Old Republicans

Orders-in-Council, as a cause of war, repeal of

ordnance, U.S.

Oswego Falls (N.Y.)

Otis, Harrison Gray, and British peace terms, ; and declaration of war, and election of 1812, and Hartford Convention, and Vermont militia problem

Ottawa Indians

Oxford (Ontario)

Oxford County (Maine)

Pakenham, Maj. Gen. Edward

paper money

Parish, David

Parker, Capt. Peter

parties, political: cohesion of defined, in Congress, in states

Passamaquoddy Bay

patent office, U.S.

Patuxent River (Md.)

Payne, John Howard

peace: negotiations in 1812, negotiations in 1814, news of, rumors of

peace commission: British, U.S.,

Peacock, HMS

Peacock, USS

Pea Island (La.)

Pearson, Joseph

Pearson, Col. Thomas

Pechell, Capt. Samuel J.

Pelican, HMS

Penguin, HMS

Pennsylvania: and Baltimore riots, and declaration of war, and election of 1812, and enemy aliens, and militia problems, and New England disaffection, and U.S. Volunteer law, wartime economy of

Pennsylvania rifle

Pensacola (Fla.)

Perceval, Spencer

Perkins, Thomas H.

Perry, Master Commandant Oliver H., appointed to command of Lake Erie, and attack on Fort George, and Battle of Lake Erie, builds squadron, and Harrison’s campaign, and death of Lawrence

Pettipaug (Conn.)

Philadelphia (Pa.), and election of 1812, and embargo of 1812, and feud over postmaster, and national bank, and national debt, as potential capital, on supply route, and war loans, wartime economy of

Phoebe, HMS

Pickering, Timothy

Pig Point (Md.)

Pike, Brig. Gen. Zebulon M.

Pilkington, Lt. Col. Andrew

Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth

Pinckney, Maj. Gen. Thomas

Pinkney, William

Pittsburgh (Pa.)

Plattsburgh (N.Y.), Battle of

Plumer, William

Point Peter (Petre) (Ga.)

Polly decision

Pomone, HMS

Pontiac’s Rebellion

Popham, Capt. Stephen

population: of U.S., of Canada, of Great Britain

Port Dover (Ontario)

Porter, Capt. David

Porter, Brig. Gen. Peter B.

Portland (Maine)

Portsmouth (N.H.)

Port Talbot (Ontario)

Portugal

Potawatomi Indians

Potomac River

powder (for guns)

Prairie du Chien (Wis.)

Preble, USS

preparedness (military)

President, HMS

President, USS

Presque Isle (Pa.)

previous question

Prevost, Sir George, and Battle of Plattsburgh, and Battle of Sackets Harbor, and defense of Canada, and Indians, and predatory warfare, and prisoners of war

Prince-de-Neufchatel (American privateer)

Prince Regent, HMS

Prince Regent (of Great Britain)

“Prince Regents,”

Princess Charlotte, HMS

Principio (Md.)

prisoners of war, bounty offered for, and Dartmoor massacre, killing of, treatment of

privateers, American, and Baltimore, and campaign of 1812, and campaign of 1813, and campaign of 1814, and Federalists, in French ports, and illegal trade, and prisoners of war, recruiting for, U.S. regulations for

privateers, British/Canadian

privateers, French

prize money

Procter, Maj. Gen. Henry

Prophet, the (Tenskwatawa)

Prophetstown (Ind.)

“protections,”

Provincetown (Mass.)

public finance, U.S., chart showing, for 1812, for 1813, for 1814, for 1815, and national bankruptcy

Purdy, Col. Robert

Put-in-Bay (Ohio)

Putnam, Maj. Perley

Putnam, Samuel

quartermaster department, U.S.

Quasi-War

Quebec, British defense of, and peace negotiations, on supply route, as U.S. target

Queen Charlotte, PM

Queenston Heights (Ontario), Battle of

Queenstown (Md.)

Quids

Quincy, Josiah, favors naval expansion,; and Hartford Convention, on war, writes Federalist address

Randolph, John, and Canada, and embargo of 1807, and embargo of 1812, and Wilkinson

Rangers, U.S.

ransom of ships

rate of exchange (between U.S. and Great Britain)

Rattlesnake (American privateer)

Rattlesnake, USS

Reading (Mass.)

recess, congressional, proposal for

reconnaissance in force, British (at New Orleans)

Red Eagle, See also Weatherford, William

Red Jacket

Red Sticks

Reed, Col. Philip

re-exports, U.S.

Reindeer, HMS

“Remember the Raisin,”

Republicans: and Baltimore riots, and Battle of New Orleans, and Canada, and crisis of 1814, and declaration of war, and elections, factions of, and Hartford Convention, and Henry affair, and maritime war, and military preparedness, and political exclusiveness, and success of war, and Treaty of Ghent, and war preparations

restrictive system: birth of, end of, See also embargo; enemy trade; non-importation; non-exportation; non-intercourse

Revere, Paul

Rhode Island, and defense costs, and direct tax, and elections, and Hartford Convention, and manufacturing, and militia problem, and state army

Riall, Maj. Gen. Phineas

Richardson, Maj. Gen. Alford

Richardson, William M.

rifles

Ripley, Brig. Gen. Eleazar W.

River Raisin Massacre (Mich.)

Roberts, Jonathan

Robertson, James (Philadelphia Federalist)

Robertson, Lt. James (Royal Navy officer)

Robertson, Thomas B.

Robinson, Maj. Gen. Frederick

Robinson, Jonathan

Rodgers, Capt. John

Rodriguez Canal (La.), Battle of

Roosevelt, Franklin

Ross, Maj. Gen. Robert

Rossie (American privateer)

Rule of 1756

Rush, Richard

Russell, Jonathan

Russia: and European war, and mediation offer

Sackets Harbor (N.Y.), Battle of

Salaberry, Lt. Col. Charles de

Sandy Creek (N.Y.), Battle of

Saratoga (N.Y.), Battle of

Saratoga, HMS,

Saratoga, USS

Sault Ste. Marie (Ontario)

Savannah (Ga.) American Patriot: assaulted by mob

Savary, Capt. Jean Baptiste

Sawyer, Vice Adm. Herbert

“Scarecrow” party

Scorpion, USS

Scott, Col. Hercules

Scott, Lt. Col. William

Scott, Brig. Gen. Winfield, view of fellow officers, view of Wilkinson, critical of supply system, drills troops, and Battle of Queenston Heights, and assault on Fort George, and Battle of Hoople’s Creek, and Niagara campaign in 1814, and prisoners of war, and Hartford Convention emissaries

Scourge (American privateer)

Scourge, USS

Secord, Laura

sectionalism, See also Hartford Convention; New England

sedition

Sevier, John

Seybert, Adam

Sharp, Solomon

Shays’ Rebellion

Sheaffe, Maj. Gen. Roger

Sheffey, Daniel

Shelby, Isaac

Sherbrooke, Sir John

Shipherd, Zebulon R.

“Sidmouths,”

Sinclair, Capt. Arthur

slave revolt: fear of

slaves, assist British invaders, enlist in Colonial Marines, carried off by British

slave trade

Smith, John Cotton

Smith, Maj. Gen. Samuel, and Baltimore riots, and defense of Baltimore, See also “Invisibles”

Smith, Lt. Sidney

Smith faction. See “Invisibles”

Smyth, Brig. Gen. Alexander

Snyder, Simon

Somers, USS

Soubiran, Paul Emile

Southard, Henry

South Carolina

Southwest, Old, and supply route, and Creek War, and legacy of war

Spain, U.S. trade with, and W. Florida, and Gulf Coast campaign

specie: in West, in New England, in Canada, in Great Britain, export of banned in 1812, proposal to ban export of fails in 1814, and national debt, and suspension of payments

Stamp Act Congress (1765)

Stanly, John

Stansbury, Brig. Gen. Tobias

Stark, Lt. Col. Horatio

“Star-Spangled Banner, The,”

state armies

St. Barthelemy (West Indies)

St. Cloud Decree

St. Davids (Ontario)

Stewart, Capt. Alexander

Stewart, Capt. Charles

St. Joseph (Ontario)

St. Lawrence, HMS (13 guns)

St. Lawrence, HMS (105 guns)

St. Lawrence front: and campaign of 1812, and campaign of 1813, and campaign of 1814

St. Lawrence River

St. Leonard’s Creek (Md.)

St. Louis (Mo.)

St. Michaels (Md.)

Stockton, Richard

Stone, David

Stone, Lt. Col. Isaac

Stoney Creek (Ontario), Battle of

Story, Joseph: and arrest of soldiers for debt, and Baltimore riots, and Julia case, and need for a sedition law, and New England’s militia problem, and outcome of war, and prospects of Republican party

Straits of Malacca

strategy, British: in 1812, in 1813, in 1814

strategy, U.S.: in 1812, in 1813, in 1814, in 1815

Street’s Creek (Ontario)

Stricker, Brig. Gen. John

Strong, Caleb,

Sullivan, William

Sumner, Lt. Col. William H.

superintendent general of military stores, U.S.

Superior, USS

Sweden

Swift, Brig. Gen. John

Syren, USS

Taggart, Samuel

Talladega (Ala.), Battle of

Tallmadge, Benjamin

Tallushatchee (Ala.), Battle of

taxes, British

taxes, Canadian

taxes, U.S., and British blockade, in 1802, in 1812, in 1813, in 1814, in Monroe-Pinkney Treaty, and Nantucket, and New England, in 1790s, and suspension of specie payments

Taylor, Maj. Gen. Augustine

Taylor, John W.

Taylor, Brig. Gen. Robert B.

Taylor, Capt. Zachary

Tecumseh, and Battle of Fort Stephenson, and Battle of Thames, and Battle of Tippecanoe, and Creek War, and fall of Detroit, and siege of Fort Meigs

Tenedos, HMS

Tennessee

Tenskwatawa. See Prophet, the

territorial waters

Terry, Brig. Gen. Nathaniel

Tertium Quids

Thames (Ontario), Battle of

Thomson, John

Thornton, Col. William

Thornton, Dr. William

Ticknor, George

Ticonderoga, USS

Tigress, USS

Tingey, Capt. Thomas

Tippecanoe (Ind.), Battle of

Tompkins, Daniel D., and postwar career

Towson, Capt. Nathan

trade, U.S., chart showing, See also enemy trade; embargo; exports; imports; non-exportation; non-importation; non-intercourse; restrictive system

Trafalgar, Battle of

treasury notes, and national bank, and national debt, and paper money, and peace, problems with, U.S. issues

“Triangular war,”

Trianon Decree

Tripolitan War

troops: terminology explained

Troup, George M.

True-Blooded Yankee (American privateer)

Tucker, Lt. Col. John

“Uncle Sam”, origins of

uniforms

United States: declares war, and legacy of war, negotiates peace, prepares for war, wages war

United States, USS

Uphold’s Creek (Ontario), Battle of

Upper Canada (now Ontario)

Upper Marlboro (Md.)

U.S. Military Academy

U.S. Navy Academy

Ussher’s Creek (Ontario)

Van Buren, Martin

Van Horne, Maj. Thomas

Van Rensselaer, Col. Solomon

Van Rensselaer, Maj. Gen. Stephen

Varnum, Joseph

Vergennes (Vt.)

Vermont, and enemy trade, and Hartford Convention, and militia problem, and origins of “Uncle Sam,”

Victory, HMS

Vienna, Congress of

Vietnam War

Villeré, Jacques

Villeré’s Plantation (La.), Battle of

Vincent, John

Virginia, defense costs of, and election of 1812, and militia problem, pro-war violence in, and state army, and wartime economy, See also Chesapeake Bay

Virginia Dynasty

Vixen, USS

volunteers, U.S.

Wadsworth, Col. Decius

Wagner, Jacob

War Congress

Ward, Samuel

War Department, U.S.

War Hawks

War of 1812: act declaring, casualties of, causes of, cost of, diplomacy of, legacy of, military and naval campaigns of, opposition to, preparation for, as second war of independence

Warren, Adm. John Borlase

Washington, George, portrait of

Washington, USS

Washington (American privateer)

Washington Benevolent Society of Maryland

Washington (D.C.), British capture of, defense of, proposal to remove capital from

Wasp, USS (18 guns)

Wasp, USS (22 guns)

Waterloo (Belgium), Battle of

Watmough, Lt. E. C.,

weapons

Weatherford, William

Webster, Daniel, and Hartford Convention, and national bank, and nullification, and restrictive system, and St. Cloud Decree

Webster, Noah

“We have met the enemy and they are ours,”

Wellesley, Richard

Wellington, Duke of, in European war, officers of, and War of 1812

Wells, Capt. William

Westbrook, Andrew

West Indies, and American privateers, and runaway slaves, and U.S. trade

Wheaton, Laban

White House,

Whitney, Eli

Wilkinson, Maj. Gen. James, and campaign against Montreal, and Second Battle of Lacolle Mill

Willcocks, Lt. Col. Joseph

Williams, David R.

Williams, Maj. Gen. William

Wilson, Thomas

Wilson, Woodrow

Winchester, Brig. Gen. James

Winder, Brig. Gen. William

Windship, John

Winnebago Indians

Wirt, William

Wolfe, HMS (21 guns)

Wolfe, HMS (rated at 100+ guns)

Wood, Capt. Eleazer

Woodbine, George

Woods, Private John

Wool, Capt. John E.

Wooleslager, George

Woolsey, Master Commandant Melancthon

World War II

Worsley, Lt. Miller

Wright, Robert

Yankee (American privateer)

“Yankee Doodle,”

Yeo, Commodore James

York (Ontario), Battle of

Donald R. Hickey is a professor of history at Wayne State College in Wayne, Nebraska. He is the author of seven books, including Don’t Give Up the Ship! Myths of the War of 1812, and numerous articles.

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