

California in a Time of Excellence

School Reform at the Crossroads of the American Dream

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PREFACE

An Excellent Risk

In 1983, a month before the National Commission on Excellence in Education presented *A Nation at Risk* to the American public, I had just completed a Master's degree in Education at UCLA, which was the first stage in a doctoral program in the school of education. At the time, I was a relative newcomer to the West Coast and not aware that California had already launched its own education reform movement to restore excellence to the state's public school system. When I later entered the doctoral program in 1989, UCLA had become deeply involved in these reforms, particularly in the subject area of history. In all respects it appeared that the state's comprehensive education reform initiatives gave substance to the preamble of the now historic report, which exhorted the American people to make "the imperative of education reform" a reality for the nation's public schools.

I became involved in the reform of the state social studies curriculum through the UCLA history department which, along with the school of education, played a leading role in moving the state social studies curriculum to a more in-depth study of history. By the time I had completed my doctoral studies, the UCLA faculty involved in these reforms had become embroiled in a cascading series of political conflicts. The first was over a series of K–8 history textbooks adopted by the state for its new history-centered social studies curriculum. But this turned out to be merely a warm-up for what followed: a shrill political attack on the making of K–12 national history standards developed at UCLA.

I chose to remain a distant observer of what appeared to be the first of many culture wars over the American school curriculum and, instead, published a largely apolitical book on the design of the controversial California K–8 history textbooks. However, in the process of doing research for this study, I visited several elementary schools to see how the new history textbooks were being used in the classroom.

On one occasion when I was introduced to a class by the teacher, who informed her students that I was writing a book on their social studies textbooks, several students exuberantly proclaimed: "Excellent!" Unexpectedly, similar moments followed. After I overheard students using the same

expression in assessing the work of their peers, I began to wonder. Was this a pedagogical device to model excellence? Was the word a suggestive form of acculturation used by teachers to make their classroom a special place for learning and to attune their students to a culture of excellence?

If teachers could model their attitudes and disposition in such an ingenious way, I wondered about the state's relationship with schools. Was it a version of this pedagogical device at a much grander scale? Had the state managed in some way during the past decade to create a culture of excellence in the schools? And there it was, the moment of inspiration. The enthusiastic exclamation of precocious children gave rise to the present study.

Had I been wise I would have kept my focus on the design of textbooks. For a political novice the confounding state arena of California education politics made a critical reassessment of *A Nation at Risk*, like the era of school reform it catalyzed, appear more like an elusive goal than a doable project. Nevertheless, like my exemplary prodigies, I took the cue. But it turned out to be less about developing an understanding of the educational ideal of excellence than about coming to terms with the institutional culture that supported this reform. A decade would pass between the publication of the monograph on California textbooks and the present study of the political processes that intended to make it an instructional reality in the classroom.

But unlike the printed pages of a textbook, which are fixed, political events unfold in time. You cannot turn the page to get ahead of the story. You can't parse political complexity into a simple temporal sequence of chapters and lessons. If hindsight has placed the key assumptions of *A Nation at Risk* about the performance of the schools and the economy in a highly questionable light, neither has time been kind to California's excellence movement. In itself that basic factor (the uncertain order of change) tends to drive historical assessment, but it is not the primary purpose of this study.

Though I hoped to render a compelling picture of that era of state and national education reform, as the study progressed I returned to my initial impressions of those school children. Yes, I wanted to present a reasonable explanation of the political processes that contributed to making this state reform a reality. But in time I came to realize that if I could understand the conditions that made those children feel that anything was possible, if I could capture that moment, then perhaps such an account would be worth the risk.

Acknowledgments

The history of making this book and the people involved goes back at least a decade. Research on the project began in 1999, when the Spencer Foundation and the National Academy of Education presented me with a postdoctoral fellowship. I am ever grateful for their recognition and support. The award allowed me the opportunity to be a resident scholar at the UCLA Policy Studies Department during 1999-2000, with the assistance of the late Professor Eric Monkkonen. His untimely passing makes it all the more important to express my deepest respects to his memory as a mentor to this project.

After initial research was completed in 2001, there was an extended hiatus outside academe. The project sat on the back burner until 2003, when I presented a paper on the California systemic school reform movement at a Curriculum Division session at the American Educational Research Association's annual meeting in Chicago. It provided the basis for the present book.

With the assistance of Tom McCambridge and Carl and Lois Weinberg of CAPE (the California Association for Philosophy of Education), I presented early drafts of the opening chapters at their 2004 and 2005 fall meetings. Other colleagues graciously read early draft chapters and in some cases, provided invaluable source materials. Tom Adams and Diane Brooks of the California Department of Education, Ed Berenson and Amanda Podany, both former executive directors of the California History-Social Science Project, Charlotte Crabtree of the UCLA School of Education, Kirk Ankeney of McDougal-Littell, Geno Flores, San Diego Unified School District, Bob Polkinghorn, UC Berkeley School of Education, Brooks M. Allen of the ACLU Southern California, as well as Pat Geyer and, sadly, the late Jean Claugus of the California Council for the Social Studies. Jean and Pat both gave invaluable guidance and support at critical points in the project.

In 2006, Lisa Chesnel, then the acquisitions editor for the State University of New York Press took on the project of seeing it through the initial review and revision process. Above all I want to express my deep

appreciation to Lisa for her enthusiastic support, which has continued with the editorial guidance of Amanda Lanne, Ryan Morris, and Jane Bunker.

Lastly, I want to thank Gary Nash, Director of the National Center for History in the Schools at UCLA and Dennis Lyday of the UCLA Office of Campus and Student Life, both of whom read the entire manuscript and offered vital critical and editorial suggestions that improved the final product immeasurably.

An earlier draft of "After Textbooks" (part II, chapter 6) was published in a different form as "The Digital Page" in *Reading Across International Boundaries: History, Policy, and Politics*, eds. Roger Openshaw and Janet Soler (Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, 2007), 131–54.

INTRODUCTION

The Course of Reform

Making the Past Present

> Is it possible for an educational system to be conducted by a national state, and yet, for the full social ends of the educative process not be restricted, constrained, and corrupted?
>
> —John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*

Were a definitive history possible of American public education in the last half of the twentieth century, it would at the outset have to acknowledge that California played a leading role.

The university that built the Bomb that won the war became through its 1960 Master Plan the model for higher education and the modern public research university. After the war the Golden State became like a magnet attracting millions of Americans seeking the future: a mobile suburban lifestyle made possible by a progressive state government that invested heavily in building a free state-supported public school system.

But this story is not about seeking that elusive future, the postwar myth of the California dream. It is about how this once premier public school system changed. It looks at change from the standpoint of educational policy and its enactment. The approach taken is primarily historical along the lines of contemporary study reflecting the *New Institutionalism in Education* (2006), an eclectic methodology that seeks to examine the processes of educational organizations in their complexity by situating, in this instance, the policymaking process within the sociopolitical context of a state system (Meyer and Rowan 2006; Pierson 2004).

First of all it considers educational policy as a complex set of ideas articulated and formalized into legislation. It stresses the political processes involved in its formation and implementation, and examines the political consequence of enactment. *California in a Time of Excellence* tells the story of

the 1980s' state systemic school reform movement to renew K–12 California public schools. Above all it is an institutional policy study that explores the moral power of political ideas and acts that constitute education reform, by examining the political conditions necessary for the renewal of American schools from a historical perspective. Systemic school reform was the state's answer to the imperative of education reform called for by the National Commission on Excellence in Education (NCEE).

At the center of this story is California's response to *A Nation at Risk*. This reconstruction of the political history of education reform in California during the 1980s is meant as a public account of political acts. Because the political economy of a society is determined in part by ideology, in the postwar period California public schools were deeply connected to a unique vision of the future. That makes the political context of education reform in California understandable if considered in light of the American cultural idea of progress.

On the balance sheet of history, the power of political ideas have always had the potential to exert an incalculable moral impact on the course of reform. Seen in this light the crux of this story comes into view: is reform the engine of progress, or is progress the ideal driving reform? Certainly, the narrative reconstruction presented herein turns upon the question of whether the ideal of progress still has genuine relevance for our time. Consequently, this account is directly tied to the political tradition of the early 20th-century California Progressive Movement. That tradition is an important historical antecedent for this study for it provides the political foundation of ideas upon which the events of the 1980s' state systemic school reform movement can be judged.

We begin with a brief overview of that history as it applies to the main themes of this study. In general, the education reform process is based upon institutional structures that regulate the state system of schools. For California, these principles are found in the state constitution. In 1879, the state replaced its original constitution and codified and expanded the education provisions of the 1849 document. As with its predecessor, the provisions for public education are found in Article 9. It provides the basic legal structure for all statutory and administrative law enacted under the present system. In a state the size of California with the largest system of public schools in the nation, such structures may tend to be distant and obscure. Even so the language of Article 9 is straightforward, giving direct expression to the desired end and means of education in progressive thought.

> A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence [is] essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, [and] the

> Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement. (California State Constitution)

If improvement and progress go hand in hand as common goals, the institution of public education established by the state was meant to be an engine of social reform to bring about their realization. The eminent state historian Kevin Starr (1985) recounts how this progressive ideology of reform was born "out of incipient utopian motivations." As Americans, progressives "found it perfectly natural to dream of shaping a public polity that would more completely express its collective desire for a better life" (1985, 208). Thus progressive reform was a fusion of two philosophies: idealism and pragmatism, the latter largely an American invention that parallels the later rise of the Progressive movement.

A national network of late 19th-century American philosophers played important roles in this home-grown philosophical tradition (Menand 2001). Prominent among them was John Dewey. Starr (1985) links Dewey to other Californians who were Dewey's students. They all shared an emerging philosophical frame of reference that William James called "pragmatism." Among its central tenets was the belief that "Ideals-ideas, [were properly] perceived from the point of view of their ethical content, [and that they] provided the motor force behind social evolution." In Dewey's terms, "ideas are not imposed from above; . . . ideas are discovered in action" (Starr 1985, 239). For Dewey, discovery meant research and its "motor force" was the university. There, the "work of engaged intellectual diagnosis in the service of social reform" assumed its constitutional role (1985, 240).

By design, Article 9 shared its political lineage with the 1862 Morrill Act by which Congress established land grant colleges and universities. On March 5, 1868, twenty years after the first public school opened in San Francisco, the University of California was established across the bay in Berkeley (after first occupying a temporary site in Oakland). Like Stanford, the University of California was established as a *public* trust.

These broad historical strokes are intended to trace the progressive influences on the contemporary politics of California education reform in order to bring us to the main theme of the study. If there is one master idea having the power to make the political processes of educational change intelligible, it is the proposition that education reform may be understood *as* a public trust. Article 9, Section 9 created a traditional trust of conservators governed by elected state officials and an appointed board of executors. As such

> The University of California shall constitute a public trust, to be administered by the existing corporation known as "The Regents of the University of California." (California State Constitution)

The point of this study is to go beyond the conventional form of educational governance in Article 9, by suggesting that a more expansive reading of the term "public trust" be made. This reading would stress the subjective quality of trust between parties (e.g., the regents and the university, the state, and the public) rather than simply the formal legality invested in university governance. This account attempts to consider the idea of a *public trust* in two complementary ways that are both pertinent and fundamental to the political processes of public education reform. The study considers the political idea of *trust* as

- A complex set of social relations that exist between state government and the public schools;
- A common institutional resource that is conserved and shared (the K–12 system of public schools).

As the state of trust is assumed to be an ideal precondition, the actual conduct of education reform occurs in a political arena where its presence is not so easily discerned. As a consequence, the guiding assumption of this study is that the ethical content of trust may be revealed through an examination of the public character of political ideas and acts that constitute education reform as a historical process. This public character is fundamental to the expression of trust in a political setting, as it is crucial to the advancement of the reform process.

To consider the state reform process in its entirety, the study is organized chronologically along two consecutive timeframes. The initial timeframe (1966–1983) covers two decades of political events before 1983, the year that *A Nation at Risk* was released. It serves as a necessary prelude to the state systemic school reform movement in California, which also began in 1983, to complete its course two decades later (1983–2006), though 2006 is merely a point of transition in a continuing political cycle.

The main subject of this study is an examination of the systemic school reform policy model in action. The study will focus on two attributes of this innovative model as it was developed in California. One is the involvement of the university as a partner in the implementation of systemic school reform. The other is the crucial role that curriculum development played in this implementation. This makes the main theme of the study entirely appropriate since the institutional role of the university is to act as a cul-

ture of excellence to be emulated by K–12 teachers and students, as it is the principal institution established for their self-improvement (Douglass 2000). The overarching goal of systemic reform was to restore that culture of excellence to the K–12 public school system through the renewal of an academic core curriculum. The new common curriculum was designed to be a collaborative development managed by the state using the expertise and resources of the university system to support curricular innovation and drive implementation.

Curriculum is the key if we are to discover how systemic reform worked. Its development was the site where the progressive policy ideals of systemic reform were meant to take a practical instructional form. The prominent place of curriculum in the California reform leads to the central focus of this study. It provides the only element of continuity in a story of considerable political change. It is the one curricular innovation of the California experiment in systemic school reform that remains; the state-approved instructional guide for K–12 social studies. In particular, the *History-Social Science Framework for California Public Schools* was meant to embody the progressive civic vision of systemic reform to construct a twenty-first-century common culture for a multicultural state.

Embedded in the California systemic school reform movement is the history of this curriculum framework. So it is fitting that the development and implementation of the *History-Social Science Framework* be used to examine the policy and politics of state systemic school reform, for the history of one amply illustrates the history of the other. The objective of this account is to clarify the ideological currents that have shaped the history of American public education by using the systemic school reform movement in California to represent these national trends and to place educational policymaking as fully as possible within the historical context of political time (Pierson 2004).

In the systemic model, curriculum is the linchpin of the reform process that ties the state to the public school classroom. The California systemic reform may be understood through an examination of curricular policy actions made by politicians and education officials. Article 9 provides a master script of the state actors. This study deals primarily with the political relations between elected state officials: the governor, the legislature, and the state superintendent of public instruction (the only elected state office intended by the constitution to be nonpartisan). The governor with the approval of the legislature appoints the State Board of Education. The superintendent of public instruction is elected to manage the California Department of Education and sits on the state board in an advisory capacity.

Part I places the 1980s' systemic reform movement within the context of recent state political history. This account is a fitting prelude to framing state and national political trends, which culminate in 1983 with *A Nation*

at Risk and the state legislative initiatives that launched systemic reform. Nationally, the timeframe marks the political transition from liberalism to conservatism. In California that transition began with the eclipse of the political consensus for progressive state government. This change has had a profound impact on K–12 public schools and marked the entry of the policy architects of systemic reform into California state politics.

Part II uses the *History-Social Science Framework for California Public Schools* (1988) to reconstruct the political history of state systemic school reform. The twenty-year period (1985–2006), in which the development and implementation of the framework occurred, marks the high point of the curriculum-driven systemic reform model, its political apogee, and eventual reconsolidation as standards-based reform. The legislative architects of systemic reform have their necessary complement in the cadres of professional educators who were recruited by the California Department of Education and the University of California to serve in the *three* curricular areas that were essential to implementation: (1) teacher professional development, (2) the design of innovative forms of student assessment, and (3) the complementary new instructional materials (primarily textbooks). All of these were aligned with new curriculum frameworks in the core subject areas that were developed by a professional partnership of exceptional classroom teachers and university scholars.

The study concludes with a historical assessment of California public schools past and present by placing this innovative experiment in educational policymaking within the intellectual tradition of American progressivism and the continuum of public education reform history. In keeping with that heritage, these California reformers sought to create anew the civic promise that the public once held in their schools. Their reform was incomplete. We make history (by telling our stories) in order to make sense of the past and to discover how it affects the present. Change is certain. But we can't know if our ideals will be realized. No one wants to witness the long eclipse of the American dream in public education. But if education reform is the highest form of politics, then it depends upon more than just civic commemoration.

PART I

Architects

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CHAPTER 1

The Nation Idea at Risk

> What was happening in America was a revolution, not a violent, physical revolution driven by guns, but a revolution of political thought, a revolution of ideas.
>
> —Martin Anderson, *Revolution*

In 1966, California politics went south (to southern California). In that year, Ronald Reagan was elected governor of the Golden State by nearly a million votes, ending the political career of Edmund "Pat" Brown, the liberal Democrat. On the eve of Reagan's re-election to a second term in 1970, Brown published a political memoir. In *Reagan and Reality: the Two Californias*, the former governor admitted that he had greatly underestimated the former Hollywood actor and self-cast citizen politician. Brown then warned that he believed Reagan should not be elected to national office.

The book title made what seems a clever distinction between a *real* California, one of great "diversity" and social complexity, and Reagan's world of movies and television. But perhaps the greater political danger lay in Brown's denial of political credibility to his successor. Unlike Brown's long-forgotten warning, in another initially disregarded but now famous 1970 political memoir, Barry Goldwater spoke about how he found himself "becoming a political fulcrum of the vast and growing tide of American disenchantment with the public policies of liberalism" (Perlstein 2001, 460). What Goldwater could not control, Reagan appeared to master. For his opening act Reagan began to redraw the political boundaries of the liberal state, starting with the UC system.

The defining issue of the 1966 gubernatorial election was the Free Speech Movement (FSM). The populist simplicity of Reagan's vision undercut the established power of northern California's political and academic liberal elites. Yet the shift in political terrain that Reagan represented was not reducible as Brown had imagined to Tinsel Town and the fringe politics of

Orange County. One unexpected legacy of the 1964 FSM was to provide Reagan with a campaign platform to launch a new style of politics. Along with Governor Brown, UC President Clark Kerr was the other targeted "liberal" accused of mishandling the student disruption unleashed by the FSM. A few days before Kerr's ouster on January 21, 1967, at a Regents meeting held on the UCLA campus, the newly elected governor released his first "report to the people" of California. In it he proposed that "all phases of government, including the university and college systems," be subject to a 10 percent cut in funding, along with a proposal for tuition fees (Cannon 1969, 130). The report produced an immediate reaction. Early in February student "demonstrators descended upon the state capitol" in Sacramento, marching under a "banner that proclaimed, 'Keep Politics Out of Education.' " The rally was followed a few days later by a raucous crowd led by the American Federation of Teachers. Reagan confronted the demonstrators on the west steps of the Capitol (1969, 234). Unfazed by a strident chorus of boos, the new governor faced down the crowd by announcing that "The people do have some right to have a voice in the principles and basic philosophy that will go along with the education they provide. As governor, I am going to represent the people of the state." The demonstrators countered with a chant that loudly proclaimed "We are people" (1969, 234–35).

Reagan's dramatic confrontation with Berkeley students is an old story. Whether heroic myth or tired, well-worn legend, it depends on one's political persuasion. Like commemorative stamps, the steps in Sproul Plaza, now called the Mario Savio Steps, and the new medical center at UCLA, recently named in Reagan's memory, represent two sixties icons that are part of the national folklore. So what's its use as history? Why dredge up California's past? In the same year of the publication of *Reagan and Reality*, another observer of California politics argued that "when the symbolic political universe of southern California produces a governor of the nation's largest state, it is time to take that symbolic world seriously" (Rogin and Shover 1970, 178). Is there still time?

Put in simple but stark terms: Pat Brown's thesis of the *Two Californias* presents two competing visions of our nation that have been at war ever since. In time, that war spilled over onto the political terrain of *A Nation at Risk* education reform. That symbolic world provides the larger cultural context in which the state and national movements for educational excellence occurred. In part, this war has its origins in California politics. Along with his Republican predecessor, Governor Earl Warren, these two governors formed the political fulcrum that changed American educational history in the last half of the twentieth century. Their legacy: the future of American public education.

The objective of this opening chapter is to place California at a crucial turning point in American political history. In the remaining sections of this chapter, Governor Brown's political dichotomy is used to frame the educational implications of this legacy for 1980s' school reform. The compression and selection of state and national political events is roughly from 1954 to 1983. The narrative deliberately highlights the decades after *Brown v. the Board of Education* (1954) and before *A Nation at Risk* (1983) in order to probe how the legacies of Warren and Reagan are related to later political developments in California, which provide the crucial historical background to the emergence of the systemic school reform movement in 1983.

The account that follows traces the evolution of Reagan's educational policies from the time he was governor through his terms as the nation's president. The story tacks between pivotal events in California politics during the 1970s and 1980s as Reagan moved from Sacramento to Washington. This history forms a counterpoint to Warren's legacy as chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. The account is not meant to be either comprehensive or exhaustive in historical detail but highly focused. Above all, the focus is on selective incidents that illustrate the major tenets of conservative opposition to public education that are crucial to understanding Reagan's education policies as president, which, by contrast, are ultimately dependent upon their opposition to Warren's progressive legacy.

The political expression of their legacies is revealed in how they each articulated three quintessential ideas of classical republicanism in a radically different fashion.

- *The People*: nations have their origin in a particular people and place. They invent tradition and the national identity and culture that sustain it. That national culture is determined by the expression of the people's will as citizens when they act as a
- *Public*. And, the agency used to exercise that public function, the
- *State*

The exposition then is less a revisionist history lesson than a kind of forensic exercise used for public discussion about the educational policy implications of this shared political legacy. In a contemporary form these principles motivated the state school reformers who crafted the legislative initiatives that comprised California's innovative systemic school reform movement. These principles were based on beliefs that were fundamental to the longstanding liberal consensus of progressive government that the new governor would challenge.

RES REPUBLICAN

The *people* who confronted Governor Reagan on the steps of the state capitol managed to check the governor's moral crusade. Backing off on a campaign promise to appoint a special state commission that would "investigate charges of communism and blatant sexual misbehavior on the Berkeley campus," Reagan instead limited his war with Berkeley to an attempt to gain control of the state's education budget (Cannon 1969, 230). But that control was not forthcoming. His proposal to cut the state budget for higher education was at odds with the UC Regents and the Democrats who controlled the state legislature. Likewise, his political objective to use public resentment about student immorality in order to challenge their right to a state-supported university education met with equal scorn. For the time being, the governor had to put his crusade on hold. It took a back seat to a larger fiscal crisis. The state had a huge budget deficit carried over from Governor Brown's last term in office. So Reagan was compelled to enact the largest tax increase in state history (1969, 143).

By the end of his first term many conservatives were wondering whether Sacramento politics had compromised their hero. Those who took the long view were circumspect. The conservative godfather William Buckley looked beyond the tactical shortcomings of Reagan's first term. "What did they expect? They say that his accomplishments are few, that it is only the rhetoric that is conservative. But the rhetoric is the principal thing. It precedes all action, all thoughtful action. Reagan's rhetoric is that of someone who is profoundly committed. . . . His perspectives are essentially undoubting" (1969, 156).

No one would doubt that commitment after People's Park, the epic climax of his first term. An incomparable record of that confrontation is found in Mark Kitchell's documentary film *Berkeley in the Sixties*. It effectively illustrates Reagan's resolute commitment. The defining scene from the movie is the contentious meeting with Berkeley faculty over the issue of closing the park site in May 1969. The distance across the seminar table where the meeting occurred might as well have been in the dead zone between East and West Berlin. The measured reasonable voice of the Berkeley professors was met with a tongue-lashing by the People's parent bent on setting the liberal professors straight.

Had George Lakoff (1996), the now famous Berkeley linguistics professor, been present at this meeting, he might have hit upon his theory of *moral politics* much sooner. Lakoff's theory gets the basic thrust of Reagan's rhetorical style right. Yet the basic Good/Bad template that the governor used to incalculable advantage throughout his political career, especially to create a pervasive aura of distrust for progressive government, falls short.

The histrionics Reagan displayed over People's Park—"If it's a bloodbath they want, let it be now"—suggests that the source for the conservative revolution of ideas went much deeper.

Yet another Berkeley professor, Michael Rogin (1987), the academic sage who realized early on that Reagan was dead serious (Rogin and Shover 1970), comes at Reagan's symbolic world from the standpoint of American exceptionalism. An ideological variant of Manifest Destiny, it was the most fundamental belief in Reagan's canon, one that he frequently extolled. This was the unwavering belief in America's uniqueness in the world and its special exemption from history. In Rogin's analysis Reagan's rhetoric tapped into a "counter-subversive tradition and political demonology" that the Berkeley don believed was at the center of American politics (1987, xiii). The happy warrior's ability to evoke evil empires operated unimpaired throughout his career because it drew on this uncanny source.

That extraordinary quality prevailed throughout his second term as governor and the 1980 presidential campaign. American presidential historian Robert Dallek stresses that Reagan's symbolic politics had such "enormous potency" that by and large public perception bought his "selective version of reality" (1999, 52).

THE COMMON CULTURE IMPERATIVE

When David Gardner, the soon-to-be president of the University of California, met President Reagan on October 9, 1981, as chair designate of the National Commission on Excellence in Education (NCEE), he noted that the president was not among strangers. With Gardner were several prominent California educators, all of whom knew or worked with Reagan when he was governor.

The October meeting however was a preview of things to come. Gardner recalls that, in giving his charge to the Commission, the president made a statement about principles of American education that he believed were essential to its character and conduct.

> First and most important . . . is that education does not begin with Washington officials. It begins in the home, where it is the right and the responsibility of every parent. . . . A second principle, true in education just as in our economy, is that excellence demands competition. Competition among students and among schools. . . . A third principle is diversity, which is absolutely essential to the American way of life. Nowhere is this more important than in education. . . . Finally, let me just say a

> word about a fourth kind of principle—the one that teaches us there really is a difference between right and wrong. I think it's time we too have a good look at this moral side of contemporary schooling. (Gardner 2005, 115)

The full commission would meet only once with the president. But that they were there at all was due to Terrell Bell, the president's secretary of education. However, Bell, unlike Gardner, did feel like a stranger. In a White House dominated by the former California governor's ultraconservative loyalists, the moderate Utah Republican felt like the proverbial odd man out. By April 26, 1983, when the commission would present its report to the president, the nation's first secretary of education would have ample reason to call himself *The Thirteenth Man*.

But in that moment, both Gardner and Bell thought the meeting had gone well. In parting Reagan told them "Just do your best and don't worry about the consequences" (2005, 116). Gardner, a product of the UC system, had gone on to become president of the University of Utah, where he met Bell, who was then serving as the state's commissioner of higher education. When Secretary Bell decided to convene a nonpartisan panel of the nation's top educators to get a strategic assessment of the schools, he felt that Gardner was the one to lead it, and that he would have the support of the president. He was wrong about the latter. When he "took this idea to the White House, it was met with diffidence or scorn" (Bell 1988, 116). However, its source was not the president, but his chief adviser Edwin (Ed) Meese. Meese had been with Reagan since he became governor. But unlike Reagan, who appeared to support Bell, he found in the president's advisor his chief adversary. Meese, Bell recounts,

> had boasted in Washington that the Department of Education was a "great bureaucratic joke." He had promised the early demise of the cabinet agency over which I would have jurisdiction. . . . Here was a man who literally detested the federal government. He viewed the upcoming Reagan presidency as a magnificent opportunity to smash the government programs that had created a "welfare state." (Bell 1988, 2)

Of course, Bell was well aware that, during his presidential campaign, candidate Reagan had promised that the newly created federal Department of Education would be abolished. But when elected, much to Bell's surprise as well as that of administration critics, the president-elect changed his position. When Bell first met Reagan to be considered for the job of secretary, he was encouraged by "the fact that Ronald Reagan showed none of the

scorn or bitterness toward federal financial assistance programs that I had heard from Meese. . . . The president, he believed didn't sound like an enemy of the schools" (1988, 4–5).

Unlike *a* public, whom critics thought were beguiled by the administration's "selective version of reality," it was assumed, not unfairly, by critics that the National Commission on Excellence was the "enemy" too. Fortunately, history proved otherwise. If Bell's account of his dealings with the "keeper of radical rightwing dogma" (1988, 39) in the White House (Ed Meese) is not enough to temper that lasting perception, Gardner had this to say:

> Critics of our report seem to be convinced that this was a grand conspiracy of the Reagan administration, that we were surrogates for the Republican Party's right wing, that the outcome was predetermined, and that the commissioners were all in collusion. In fact, not only was the commission appointed over White House objections, indeed irritation (a courageous act by Bell), but the commissioners could not easily be defined as right, left, liberal, or conservative. . . . The commission's report undid rather than advanced the Republican Party's and the president's education agendas. (2005, 114)

But Gardner would not have the last word. The first sign that things would go awry occurred after their informal morning meeting with the president in the Oval Office on April 26, 1983. Gardner, his vice chair, Yvonne Larson, and Secretary Bell sat down with Reagan and Vice President Bush, with Meese in attendance. Then came the press conference. The *New York Times* education editor waited until the end then launched into a history lesson about Sputnik as a feint to his preemptive attack that quickly followed: "I certainly don't see any appeal for any strong symbolic act by the White House to exercise this kind of leadership. In other words, it seems to me that it's not a terribly profound document [*A Nation at Risk*] and I just wonder whether you [see] the need for a strong symbolic—not necessarily financial—leadership by the White House" (Gardner 2005, 127).

At that moment neither Gardner nor the *New York Times* reporter were aware that the White House had indeed prepared a "strong symbolic" response. That rude awakening followed lunch, when Gardner and Bell were told "that the president's remarks prepared for the ceremony bore little relationship to the commission's report and its recommendations" (Gardner 2005, 128). With the official 4:00 p.m. presentation looming, Bell and Gardner beat back what appeared to be a last-minute effort by Meese to rewrite history. It turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory. When the president finally introduced the commission and their report, a "selective version of

reality" filled the room in their place. The commission's "Open Letter to the American People" became instead a restatement of the president's October 9, 1981, remarks to the commission. The people's parent spoke:

> Your call for an end to federal intrusion is consistent with our task of redefining the federal role in education. I believe that parents, not government, have the primary responsibility for the education of their children. Parental authority is not a right conveyed by the state. Rather, parents delegate to their elected school board representatives and state legislators the responsibility for their children's schooling. (Gardner 2005, 128–29)

While Reagan spoke, Bell could not help but notice that Meese stood nearby listening to the president run through his recommendations for the privatization of public education, "with a big smile on his face" (Bell 1988, 131).

In the high art of symbolic politics David Gardner and Terrell Bell were rank amateurs. Yet, with *A Nation at Risk* irony abounds. The attempt to distort what the document actually said made not a whit of difference. It was both attacked and praised in any event. Yet the hopes of its authors were dashed. Bell had imagined a GI Bill for the schools that never materialized. His lament that, "We would have changed the course of history in American education had the president stayed with us," seems disconnected from what happened. The course change had already occurred, because Reagan's principles were all that mattered (Bell 1988, 159). The only rising tide was that of a strident chorus of freemarket moralism from Washington that foreshadowed the accelerating advance of economic globalization. That ideology was radically restructuring accepted notions of the postwar international order, making the comparative national economic framework in which *A Nation at Risk* was conceived outdated before its release.

The report, however, does stand at a turning point in the history of American education reform. Excellence is the harbinger of the national policy shift that would increasingly focus on individual student performance and classroom instruction. Several of the commission's recommendations paralleled policy developments already underway in California that involved innovative approaches to curriculum development (matters taken up in the chapters that follow).

Over and above these developments, rightwing practitioners of symbolic politics in the Reagan administration had discovered in curriculum an excellent platform to instruct the public in their brand of moral politics.

Terrell Bell's successor William Bennett was the first to pursue this strategy largely by focusing on a little discussed recommendation in the commission report. It was soon goodbye to the culture of deficiency and

disadvantage as the welcome mat was placed for the restoration of the Western tradition, culture with a capital C. To achieve this formidable goal, Bennett focused on another less-hyped area of "concern" in *A Nation at Risk*:

> Well beyond matters such as industry and commerce, [our concern] also includes the intellectual, moral, and spiritual strengths of our people, which knit together the very fabric of our society. . . . A high level of shared education is essential to a free, democratic society and to the fostering of a *common culture* [my emphasis], especially in a country that prides itself on pluralism and individual freedom. (NCEE 1983, 7)

Bennett began his campaign in 1984 while serving as chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). His *To Reclaim a Legacy* (1984) advocated "fostering a common culture" in higher education by returning to an academic curriculum focused on the classics of the Western tradition. In 1986, as secretary of education, Bennett presented similar curriculum recommendations for the elementary grades in *First Lessons: A Report on Elementary Education in America* (1986). That year Bennett gave a speech entitled "Completing the Reagan Revolution," in which he articulated America's first lesson.

> National greatness, in the end, depends on—is embodied in—the character of our people. This in turn depends on these things: first, on our sense of who we are as a nation and what we believe in; second, on the well-being of the institutions we create to express those beliefs; and third, on the values according to which we shape the next generation of Americans. (Bennett 1986, 3)

Lynne Cheney, Bennett's successor at the NEH continued on the same course with the endowment's publication of a K–12 version of Bennett's 1984 *Legacy, American Memory: A Report on the Humanities in the Nation's Public Schools* (Cheney 1987). Taken together these curriculum documents represented a remarkable shift in the government's role. The national education policy community (not a high-visibility elite) were enthralled by Reagan, Bennett, and Cheney's use of their public office as a "bully pulpit" to gain national media attention for educational policy issues. Behind all the symbolism, it was apparent that equal educational opportunity was no longer an educational imperative (Jung and Kirst 1986, 81). Rather these statements of curricular principles, *Legacy*, *First Lessons*, and *American Memory*, were seen as essential to the moral formation of American character and identity. Bennett's goal was to shape the "hearts and minds of the nation"

(Cooper 1988, 286). These reports were primers in a kind of national cultural literacy, a canon of civic lessons that was intended to be a repository of universal ideals that they presumed were the values to which all Americans should aspire. They were meant, it appears, to stand as a bulwark against the real-time reinvention of American national identity that began with the sixties' campus movements.

ACR 71: CALIFORNIA ETHNIC

By their timing, the Cheney and Bennett national reports on conservative curricular ideals reveal a politically savvy strategy that appeared to deny trends in higher education that were transforming their hallowed version of American culture. A critical eye might view their curriculum proposals as shrewd political lessons in cultural amnesia, a rear-guard action to reverse the course of history. That kind of judgment, though accurate, would fall short of the mark. A fair assessment of their policy actions would have to conclude instead that these reports represented the initial stages of a national campaign to make curriculum history, by using their official capacity to propagate their point of view. That was the political objective. Pedagogically, it was intended to link curriculum development directly to matters of American history and culture, as they conceived it. Later events in California involving Cheney and UCLA (recounted in the chapters that follow), confirm this. Bennett and Cheney shrewdly took one key area of recommendations in *A Nation at Risk*, which made a confounding normative question fraught with contention, a central matter of educational policymaking. That question—What should properly constitute the "core of the modern curriculum?"—would soon become an issue of national importance. As states began to politically negotiate the reform of their core curricula, a battle line was drawn in the classroom over whose culture was at risk (NCEE 1983, 24).

In the parallel time and space of California politics, state-directed curriculum initiatives were moving in a similar direction but to different ends, sharing only the recognition that even curriculum could be a significant force in education reform. In July 1984 the California State Assembly approved a measure sponsored by Representative Teresa Hughes, Assembly Concurrent Resolution (ACR) 71. Hughes was already a major player in launching the state's systemic school reform initiatives, but now her immediate goal was to require that California's university system

> review their policies and programs concerning the nature and extent of courses examining the cultural and historical experiences of those nonwhite ethnic groups which have been excluded from the core curriculum. (Yamane 2002, 49)

Even though ACR 71 was the first major legislative initiative to make a course in Ethnic Studies a graduation requirement at UC Berkeley, it was but one small step in a student-led campaign to gain a voice in educational policymaking that evolved out of the Free Speech Movement (FSM).

ACR 71 had it origins in the struggle to recognize ethnic studies at Berkeley. That struggle entered its critical phase in 1968, during Reagan's first term as governor. In the substantial body of sixties scholarship reassessing the legacy of the Free Speech Movement, Julie A. Reuben (2002) recounts a key incident that occurred prior to the establishment of the Department of Ethnic Studies in the fall of 1969. One of the important curricular innovations created "in the wake of the FSM, to encourage educational experimentation" was the Board of Educational Development (BED), which allowed students a way of having alternative courses offered for credit. BED was used by African American students to schedule Eldridge Cleaver, a leader of the Oakland-based Black Panther Party, to teach a course in the fall of 1968 (2002, 485). Governor Reagan denounced the approval of the course, calling it "an affront and insult to the people of California." Soon the UC Regents intervened and the BED-approved course was canceled (2002, 486). The Cleaver incident was merely one of several flash points that year, pitting minority students against the state. The Mexican American Student Confederation (MASC) at Berkeley petitioned the university to support the United Farm Workers (UFW) strike led by Cesar Chavez and stop the purchase of table grapes for student dormitory cafeterias. MASC was also part of the coalition seeking the recognition of ethnic studies on campus.

When university officials agreed not to serve grapes, Governor Reagan stepped in. Along with the conservative superintendent of public instruction, Max Rafferty, Reagan "condemned the grape boycott" and forced the campus administration "to resume serving grapes." The move prompted further demonstrations and sit-ins by MASC. After considerable negotiation the university agreed "to establish a Center for Mexican American Studies" (Wang 1977). In January 1969, African American students led a series of strikes at San Francisco State University (CSUSF) for the approval of a black studies program. The escalating confrontation quickly spread to Berkeley. The CSU-UC student coalition of Blacks, Chicanos, Asians, and Native Americans formed the Third World Liberation Front (TWLF). The TWLF demand was stark and simple: recognition of an ethnic studies program and the creation of an interdisciplinary Third World College (Rorabaugh 1989, 85). The tactics of the TWLF sparked violent confrontations with state and local police. Reagan ordered the National Guard to occupy the Berkeley campus. As with the FSM, Berkeley's academic senate voted to support the students. In the fall quarter of 1969, the Department of Ethnic Studies opened.

The symbolic power of curriculum to present new ways of seeing California and the world was soon recognized as an important instrument

for education reform. This was never more so than in the decades that followed the conflicts at Berkeley, during which California became the first minority-majority state as the latter chapters of this study reveal. Historically, the struggle to change the symbolic boundaries of America's national identity through its school curriculum seem now to fade in significance in comparison to the current California border politics of steel barriers and fences to stop illegal immigration. But in reality it was the same struggle.

Cheney and Bennett understood this struggle. Their political endeavor to gain control of this national narrative was reinforced by one of Ronald Reagan's more amiable talents, which was his remarkable propensity for story telling. Reagan had perfected what the political scientist Roger M. Smith (2003) aptly calls "stories of peoplehood." The symbolic politics of his gubernatorial campaign and his social policies as governor and later as president reflected an uncanny ability to define in moral terms "who is an American." However, one Republican predecessor of Governor Reagan had a different idea about how that story should be told. In order to understand how the later generation of California school reformers sought to transform the "common culture" of *A Nation at Risk*, that difference is crucial.

SHADES OF BROWN

Bennett, Cheney, and Hughes—each posed the classic civic question, Are we a people, or peoples, *E Pluribus Unum*? After World War II, the public schools—the traditional site of nation building—where the *Unum* of a common culture was made became the battleground for the definitive social revolution of the century. A decade before *Brown v. the Board of Education*, Sylvia Mendez, who like Linda Brown was eight years old, wanted to attend her neighborhood school in Westminster, California (an Orange County school district). She was denied admission. In 1945, the Mendez family filed suit in the U.S. District Court of Los Angeles. A year later, the court ruled in Mendez's favor and it was immediately appealed by Orange County. On April 14, 1947, the court of appeals unanimously upheld the district court decision. Then Governor Earl Warren, the next chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, moved quickly to repeal the separate but equal statutes in the California Education Code (Wollenberg 1976, 108). Did the Mendez decision dispose Earl Warren to see public education through the racial lens of ethnic culture?

As chief justice, Warren's reasoning in *Brown* appears profoundly simple and straightforward: Neither race nor ethnicity should matter, for if public education is truly public, it is meant for *all* equally.

> We must consider public education in light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. . . . Today, education is perhaps the most important function of states and local governments. . . . It is the very foundation of good citizenship, it is the principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values. . . . Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. (*Brown v. the Board of Education*)

In the court's language, public education has a vital role to play in the life of the nation. Indeed "it is the very foundation for good citizenship . . . the principal instrument in awakening American children to cultural values." If one accepts the *idea* of culture as a way of life, then its awakening is merely the first stage in a lifelong process of acculturation in which the socialization processes of K–12 public education are but one stage. These processes are wholly situated within a complex milieu of public and private spheres of influence to which the state has only tenuous access at best. Yet the Warren court landmark decision plainly suggests it is only considering the public school's role in support of civic culture. While the decision is a simple affirmation of fundamental American values, the core civic values of inclusion and equality, the court's understanding of the culture concept appears parochial at best, since it was based upon the assumption that minorities could assimilate into the mainstream culture through the agency of the schools. In affirming the basic civil right of equal access to public schools it set in motion a broader socio-political wave of cultural reaction, in which communal movements for ethnic and racial pride would come to supersede the court's integrationist ideal. The paradoxical effect of this national awakening is that *Brown v. the Board of Education* may have also paved the way for multiculturalism.

WE ARE NOT THE STATE

> All the people of a State should be educated by the State.
>
> —Horace Mann, 1847

Many white Americans were not yet ready for Warren's vision of cultural values. The landmark 1954 decision ending segregation precipitated a "chain reaction" (Edsall and Edsall 1992). At its source was a longstanding debate

over the legal interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the text of the court's opinion there is an exhaustive review of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment adopted after the Civil War in 1868.

Did Congress intend "to remove all legal distinctions among all persons born or naturalized in the United States"? The court found that it "cannot be determined with any certainty." A later generation of legal scholars would not find the "Amendment's history" as "inconclusive" as the Warren court did (Nelson 1988). In a historical footnote found in the 1954 opinion, in hindsight prescient for the tumultuous events that followed, it commented on the "status of public education" at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption by Congress.

> In the South, the movement toward free common schools, supported by general taxation, had not yet taken hold. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education. (*Brown v. the Board of Education*)

Chief Justice Warren could not have foreseen the reaction to *Brown* nor how it would erode the mainstay principle of the common schools, "general taxation," that supported the present system of public education. In California, the withdrawal of public support for this longstanding principle would begin in 1978 and have a devastating impact on the state's public school system. That change is linked to the way in which the conservative movement viewed the role of government.

In 1953, the year that the Warren court heard reargument for *Brown*, another California native, a UC sociology professor, Robert Nisbet published *The Quest for Community*. This intellectual assault on the liberal state attempted to link the progressive reforms of FDR's New Deal to totalitarianism (cited in Nash 1996, 45–46). In Nisbet's view the U.S. Federal Government was in danger of becoming authoritarian.

For conservatives, the Supreme Court did not have the constitutional power to impose *Brown*'s version of equality on public schools, which were by tradition under the control of the states and local communities. *Brown* usurped that authority (Nash 1996, 186). In the minds of conservatives, the Warren court misconstrued the historical meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment as Congress and the states had intended it at the time of its adoption. In the matter of public education the states were sovereign. Neither the court nor the federal government had the constitutional authority to enforce *Brown*.

Ronald Reagan shared this view. In the 1970 gubernatorial election, the voters, by a large majority, elected Governor Reagan to a second term.

However, that majority did not ensure the reelection of his conservative ally, Max Rafferty, the state superintendent of public instruction. He lost the election to Wilson Riles, the first African American to be elected to that state office. Riles had recently been appointed by Rafferty to head the new Office of Compensatory Education. The California Department of Education was soon reorganized to implement civil rights era legislation. The department was the administrative conduit for federal programs. Title I, Head Start, and bilingual education had become major state priorities. Under Riles the first state guidelines for multicultural education were developed.

Prior to becoming superintendent of public instruction, Riles had served as chairman of the Urban Education Task Force for the Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW). His time heading up the taskforce provided him a direct view of the gap opening up between the educational priorities of the incoming Nixon administration and the LBJ Great Society programs. His opposition to cuts proposed by Nixon to the Urban Education Act placed him in the position of being a witness to the eclipse of liberal educational policy in Washington. With the accepted "ways and means" of that policy no longer a given, he was cast in the role of mediator (Riles 1970, 4).

The experience would serve him well in Sacramento, where ironically he gained the support of Governor Reagan for his programs; ironic because in 1972, the governor supported the state's first antibusing initiative, Proposition 21. The voter-backed initiative "guaranteed that no student could be forced to attend a particular school for reasons of his or her race, creed, or color" (Allswang 2000, 123).

But in 1973 the governor backed the Riles-sponsored *Early Childhood Education Act*, which established elementary school special education programs matching state funds with Title I grants (CDE 1973). For the duration of the decade Riles held to the political center even as it drifted right. "Under Reagan's regime," he said, "we did not go backward, we went forward" (Wills 2000, 365).

1973 was meant to be the high point of the governor's second term. To advance the regime's Sacramento agenda he called a special election. Responsible for the largest tax increase in state history, Reagan hoped to relegate that event to the memory hole of state history with Proposition 1, a major tax-cut initiative. But his campaign for the initiative faltered and Prop 1 went down to defeat. Nevertheless, the seed was sown.

On June 6, 1978, California voters overwhelmingly passed Proposition 13, which severely cut local property taxes. Proposition 13 abruptly ended a decade-long legal debate in the California courts on the basic inequity of local school finance. The California Supreme Court *Serrano* rulings (1971, 1976, and 1977) found that the traditional common school practice of

funding local public schools through property taxes was unconstitutional. The *Serrano* decisions forced the state legislature to come up with an equitable system of public school finance.

On one hand, Proposition 13 accomplished the main goal of *Serrano* overnight. The control of local public school finance shifted to Sacramento. The *Serrano* rulings had already determined that "quality is the sum of district expenditures per pupil. . . . [Simply put] quality is money." The court leveled the playing field of educational finance by stating that "the quality of public education may not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole" (Sonstelie et al. 2000, 35).

The state would now determine the amount middle-class school districts could spend annually. That amount would be leveled down to match that of poorer districts. But state-imposed equity could not produce instructional quality in the classroom. Proposition 13 reduced the amount the state could collect to fund public education. To make up that difference, Governor Reagan's successor Jerry Brown dipped into the state surplus, but in a few years the surplus was gone. The widespread voter distrust of state government that led to Proposition 13 gave the state greater control of public schools. In the changed political environment, that political irony assumed greater importance as elected officials vied for the control of state educational policy and the public's trust.

IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENCES

> The only redemption lies in restraint imposed by ideas; but our ideas, if they are not to worsen the confusion, must be harmonized by some vision.
>
> —Richard M. Weaver, *Ideas Have Consequences*

An apocryphal story captures best the Reagan view of government and provides a glimmer of insight about the popular distrust that inspired Proposition 13. Making it a matter of conscience, he often cautioned his colleagues to maintain a critical distance from the state capitol. "We had a kind of watchword we used on each other: 'When we begin thinking of government as *we* instead of *They*, we've been here too long' " (Wills 2000, 355). Likewise the scorn that Ed Meese heaped on federal education programs that benefited minorities, which Terrell Bell experienced first hand, fits that mold.

The National Commission on Excellence in Education (NCEE) appears to have heeded the warning. In principle, the commission had affirmed the ideal of equality envisioned by the Warren court. Their notion of a "common culture" was based equally upon "pluralism and individual freedom," as was

their understanding of excellence (NCEE 1983, 7). The "public commitment to excellence and educational reform," they believed, should not "be made at the expense of a strong public commitment to the equitable treatment of our diverse population" (1983, 13). Yet in its Recommendations to the American People, other than high-sounding rhetoric that the nation should "protect [the] constitutional and civil rights [of] students," it affirmed President Reagan's vision for the restoration of local control over public education. If states wanted to reform their schools they would have to finance it. There would be no GI Bill for public education as Terrell Bell had hoped.

The antigovernment ideology that Reagan came to espouse deepened with the cold war. His "evil empire" conception of the Soviet Union became a dark animus projected onto American government. This shibboleth became a rallying point for conservatives. But it had its origins in the actions of one of Reagan's Republican predecessors. In *The Warren Revolution*, Brent Bozell (1966) views the high court with disdain. By judicial decree the Supreme Court sought "to impose the ideology of equality on the American political system . . . irrespective even of the wishes of the people who now live under it" (Nash 1996, 202). The milder version of this antistate ideology may be found in the political effects of Proposition 13. As the Reagan counterrevolution gathered force after 1978, a succession of antigovernment initiatives gradually eroded state institutions. The California vision of progressive state government held by Earl Warren and Pat Brown soon became a distant memory.

In 1983 a new class of education reformers came together in Sacramento. They would attempt to regain the public trust by envisioning a new common school movement appropriate to a global economy and the state's increasingly diverse culture. Well before *A Nation at Risk* they initiated a series of bold legislative reforms to restore quality to California's public schools. Like the National Commission on Excellence in Education, they believed that the nation's future depended upon a strong federal and state commitment to public education. In their estimation progressive government was the solution not the problem. Therein lay the paradox of public education reform during the 1980s.

In the chapters that follow, the story makes its way from top-down architects to bottom-up agents. Ranging over a twenty-year period, the major policies and political processes that constituted the state systemic school reform movement in California are connected chapter by chapter to the instructional realities of K–12 public school classrooms. Making the connection apparent between past progressive ideals and the present political realities of public education reform is a far more difficult task because the historical record is ambiguous at best. Nevertheless, the objective of this opening chapter has been to *place* California at a crucial turning point

in American political history and, by implication, to assess its impact upon national public education reform in the 1980s. That past is crucial to understanding the time in which California's excellence movement emerged.

A sense of that time is best captured by Wilson Riles. His storied career at the California Department of Education would soon be relegated to the state archives by the advance guard of excellence. They too would claim: "We did not go backward, we went forward."

CHAPTER 2

The Distant State

> In a city with a cosmopolitan population drawn from every state in the Union and from most of the European nations, the common-school spirit was relatively weak, and it required the heroic work on the part of teachers and educators to bring public opinion up to a liberal support of the common schools.
>
> —John Swett, *Public Education in California*

> The legislature shall provide for a system of common schools.
>
> —The 1879 California Constitution

When John Swett, California's fourth elected superintendent of public instruction, left Boston on a ship bound for San Francisco in September 1852, the voyage took well over four months. Upon arrival on February 1, 1853, the former New England public school teacher headed east for gold country and for five months toiled fruitlessly on the Feather River near Marysville. Returning to San Francisco, Swett made a fateful decision. By the fall of that year, he was back in the classroom, taking a position in a grammar school on First and Folsom streets. His plan to spend only three years in California gold seeking, and then return to New England to study medicine and become a doctor, quickly unraveled as he became involved in local school politics.

Like other transplanted Yankee educators, Swett saw himself as part of an "advance guard on the shores of the Pacific, cut off from the main body of American teachers" who he believed were meant to bring the common school to the new state (Swett 1911, 120). In a few short years, Swett became disillusioned with the corruption of San Francisco politics because of the humiliating treatment of teachers by the local board. That "treatment" would later compel him to run for state school superintendent. In 1862, Swett ran and won on the Union Party ticket, which fused a

breakaway majority from the Republican and Democratic parties divided over the issue of slavery.

Upon taking office in December 1862, Swett addressed the San Francisco Teacher's Association on "Public Schools and the Commonwealth." In his remarks the new state superintendent argued that

> the only safeguard of republican institutions lies in the general education of all citizens of the state. . . . Our state is one of the richest in its natural resources . . . [but] the real wealth of California lies not so much in gold mines as in . . . the boys and girls that shall preserve this government from future disunion and secession. . . . It is my purpose to canvass the state, not by haranguing political gatherings, but by visiting schools, by encouraging teachers, and by talking of free public schools supported by liberal taxation, in every hall or school house where a dozen men and women will assemble to hear me. (1911, 146–47)

In his zeal, Swett's purpose to travel the length and breadth of California and engage the public in conversation about the necessity of free schooling was animated by Horace Mann, the model and mentor for state superintendents. Swett's plan to "extend the public-school system throughout the state" invoked the great common school reformer Mann at every turn (1911, 148). His tenure as the state's chief school officer culminated in 1866 with the passage by the legislature of the first "omnibus school bill," an "Act to Provide for a System of Common Schools." Its passage was secured only after Swett had mounted a spirited large-scale public relations campaign to convince legislators and the state's business elite "that a liberal expenditure for schools was in the end the truest form of economy" (Hendrick 1980, 13–14).

Swett's argument rested upon a simple premise whose candor would be unspeakable today: "Public schools are synonymous with taxation. . . . And the sooner . . . this democratic-republican doctrine is understood, the better for the state, the better for property . . . the better for the nation" (1980, 12). In Swett's 1866 act the basic architecture for funding and maintaining a statewide system of public instruction was set (through a state levy on taxable property), precedents later articulated and codified and not to be fundamentally altered until Proposition 13 in 1978.

Yet, regardless of its idealistic intent, Swett's act was ill made. A separate but (un)equal common school system would exist in California until the *Mendez v. Westminster* case in 1946. Though an abolitionist, like his mentor Horace Mann, Swett bowed to the uncontestable political reality of the day: segregation and the presumption of racial inferiority. In 1852, the year that Swett made his first voyage to California, Horace Mann, now

in the U.S. Congress, gave an antislavery speech to Ohio blacks, stating a then common assumption that "in intellect, the blacks are inferior to the whites, while in sentiment and affections, the whites are inferior to the blacks" (Kaestle 1983, 89).

Neither reformer could then envision an American society, where equality of opportunity was not based on race (much less religion or gender). A century later, it bears saying again, Earl Warren, then the state's governor, codified the court's decision in *Mendez*, legally at least, ending segregation in California public schools. But not even he would have understood how that equality might later become compromised by a reform driven by the ideal of excellence.

THE UNTROUBLED CRUSADER

> My term of office is now drawing to a close. . . . I sought the office for the purpose of raising the standard of professional teaching and of organizing a state system of free schools. I am willing to leave the verdict to the future.
>
> —John Swett 1867 (cited in Cloud 1952, 43)

> Education reform is not an event it is a process, one that must be sustained over the long haul. . . . We begin that journey with the most fundamental question of all: What is the purpose of the public schools?
>
> —Bill Honig, *Last Chance for Our Children*

Like John Swett, Bill Honig the twenty-third Californian to hold the office of state superintendent of public instruction was on a mission. What Swett had established over a century earlier, Honig was now determined to rescue. In 1983, the year that the National Commission on Excellence in Education presented *A Nation at Risk* to the American People, Honig began his first term. But then his campaign to restore the state's public schools to national preeminence had merely entered its latest phase. In *Last Chance for Our Children: How You Can Help Save Our Schools* (1985), Honig recounts his journey with an idealism that is reminiscent of those nineteenth-century reformers. Like Mann, Honig, a 1963 graduate of Boalt Hall School of Law, left a successful career as a lawyer, in his case, to fight the war on poverty in the late sixties. The political arc of his "second career" as a teacher was foreshadowed perhaps by his "first assignment . . . at the John Swett Elementary School, in downtown San Francisco, an all minority school largely African American" (Honig 1985, 13). Honig was a graduate of Lowell High School, San Francisco's most renowned public high school,

whose alumni included Nobel laureates, world-class artists, and successful corporate entrepreneurs. The basis that appeared to determine such excellence, a traditional academic curriculum, would later serve as the pedagogical counterpoint to his argument that posed the question, How did the minority children he encountered learn best? Though his time as a teacher served to erode his more romantic convictions about alternative education, typical of the sixties, this experience was later crucial. For Honig's labors in Bay-area urban schools did not go unnoticed.

SACRAMENTO AND SYSTEMIC REFORM

In 1975, Ronald Reagan's successor Governor Jerry Brown appointed the first active classroom teacher, Bill Honig, to the State Board of Education. In less than a decade he had moved from the boardrooms of Market St. to the urban classrooms of Hunter Point, and now to the state capitol. Whatever the governor's intent may have been, political folklore had it that Honig was chosen "because Brown thought him to be 'the only person' who was 'smart as' he was" (Kaplan 1985, 11). Given Brown's visionary propensity, the choice of Honig was complemented by the equally fortuitous appointment of Michael Kirst, a professor from Stanford University School of Education.

The coming together of Honig and Kirst on the state board brought about a remarkable synergy directed toward envisioning the appropriate role of the state in the conduct of educational policymaking. The moment could not have been more opportune. By the mid-seventies, the limits, compelling the equalization of educational opportunity through the courts and the legislature (as in the *Serrano* decisions), had been reached. Suburban homeowners, first through their opposition to forced busing and later by their approval of Proposition 13, had forced a serious reconsideration in Sacramento as to how equity could still be pursued in the classroom.

Ronald Reagan, as noted in the preceding chapter, was just as adamantly opposed to court-ordered busing as he was to the Rumford Fair Housing Act passed by the state legislature in 1963. The Rumford Act was intended to prevent longstanding discriminatory housing practices. In reaction, the California electorate passed Proposition 14, which nullified the Rumford Act. Later, the state Supreme Court repealed Proposition 14, finding it unconstitutional (Schuparra 1998, 119). But the passage of Proposition 13 settled neither the problem of school finance nor the more troubling question of educational opportunity as the nation entered the post–civil rights era. Instead it raised the question to an entirely new order of complexity, a policy terrain that was largely uncharted. The widening political chasm

between the lost liberal goals of Johnson's Great Society and *A Nation at Risk* now had to be reconciled by the states.

Yet here, Michael Kirst had labored for well over a decade. His was a leading voice in a national network of educational policy experts who were attempting to articulate a "new role" that states could take to conduct education reform (Doyle and Hartle 1985, xi). Having served on numerous federal and state committees and commissions, Kirst had put the major focus of his published work on school governance and finance. However, the larger intent of his research was to place the closed circle of educational policymaking squarely within the political world (Wirt and Kirst 1972, 9).

In Kirst's view, the "forces of politicization" that had overtaken public education since the 1960s called for moving beyond the longstanding mythology that the school should be "*above* politics" (Wirt and Kirst 1972, 11). As the new federalism shifted the locus of control back to the states, the "myth of apolitical education" was no longer sustainable (5). These conditions compelled, in his estimation, a fundamental reorientation toward the issue of how the state should exercise its power. For Kirst and Honig that exercise proved to be an unparalleled opportunity, a chance to envision a reform of California public education in which the state would attempt to *close* the political distance between Sacramento and local school districts. In Kirst's view the idea of "systemic reform" would channel "public power" into a bottom-up reform movement (1972, 3). Honig believed that effective policymaking could then canalize that "power" by directing it to "leverage" the public school system in a common direction, with a clearly defined program of systemic policy goals coupled with strategic interactions at crucial leverage points in the system (Honig 1985, 129).

THE POINT OF INTERACTION

When Honig left the state board in 1979, he gave Michael Kirst a heavily annotated chart drafted on a yellow legal pad outlining Honig's plan for systemic reform. Honig described it less as a master plan than a common sense set of guidelines that had evolved between them during their time spent on the board. Whereas Kirst through his research had articulated a grand systemic approach to education policy that "sought to generalize about the properties of School and State and their interactions," in Honig's systemic framework, all these "interactions" ultimately led back to the classroom (Wirt and Kirst 1972, 231). Dividing his time on the board in Sacramento with volunteer work at the California Department of Education (CDE), Honing participated in a school site program that focused on staff

development. He believed that the key to teacher staff development was sustained dialogue, just *talk* on an ongoing basis. In the legal profession they talked about everything. The law provided a splendid structure, however contentious, for consultation.

Honig found that school culture inhibited such openness. Talk was rarely collaborative and often, given the division of labor, adversarial. Such an environment prevented extensive discussion and examination of the day-to-day processes of schooling. Schools that did manage to overcome these hurdles and create a community forum for collaboration in an open, sustainable fashion, he believed, had a better shot at reform. It was during this CDE staff development work that Honig conceived his systemic reform guidelines. As Kirst carefully categorized and described crucial interactions that distributed power and feedback up and down the system, Honig similarly sought to conceptualize where all these critical leverage points might be that could make a difference in the classroom. These *leverage points* linked the classroom to the district, by drawing support from the school community (interest groups and educators alike) into a evolving process of reform that Kirst described as a necessary "ongoing struggle over who should control the schools and to what ends" (Wirt and Kirst 1972, 253).

For Honig that end was always the student. To make a difference, children always had to be placed at the center of the reform process. As Honig's systemic schema evolved, he identified sixty-five potential leverage points. He determined that this strategic formation could be aligned to one essential point. The master *lever* for Honig's systemic reform was the curriculum. Out of it all else appeared to follow.

By the time of his campaign for state superintendent of public instruction, Honig's vision of systemic school reform hinged on this central idea. He believed that one could move the K–12 system in a common direction by using the curriculum to spur reform inside the instructional process. Curriculum would be used to align teacher professional development, the design of innovative textbooks and instructional materials, and new forms of assessment and testing. This was the essential triad of systemic reform: teachers, textbooks and tests, with curriculum at the core.

Though instrumentally, a core curriculum was intended to lead the "student through a rigorous curriculum in the academic disciplines—the humanities, natural sciences and mathematics," he also believed that it was the medium through which students tapped into a common American tradition. Embedded in the core was the language of a civic discourse essential to the mission of public schools (Honig 1985, 42). "Because public schools are public," Honig believed, "they must take part in those crucial discussions that vitally concern the community." For students the larger purpose of this civic interaction with the curriculum was normative. The public school

should "serve as a forum for identifying common values and aspirations . . . a place where all children can come together to discover what binds us as a people" (1985, 201).

Honig was restating a ninteenth-century ideal that John Swett would easily recognize. At the same time his belief raises the obvious question of relevance and applicability in a culturally diverse society. But for him, the lesson of history was clear. Public education in this country had been shaped by conflicting forces; its history "a series of pendulum swings between . . . progressive . . . and essentialist" ideals (1985, 88). "Thirty years after . . . the Supreme Court's landmark *Brown v. the Topeka Board of Education* decision," Honig observed that the "socially enlightened modern school" was now "shirking its academic responsibilities." In his mind the goals of academic excellence and equality were "not irreconcilable" and it was the responsibility of the state to "accomplish both" (Honig 1985, 70, 88).

Yet from his vantage point on the state board, Honig knew that equality of educational opportunity was becoming a distant goal. During the years of his appointment, 1975 to 1979, he witnessed a major swing of the "pendulum." In 1976, both the United States and California Supreme Courts rendered decisions that would effectively curb court-ordered school busing. The federal court's decision erected a legal hurdle or barrier between de jure and de facto segregation that effectively curtailed more ambitious interventions by states. In June 1978 the United States Supreme Court ruled against the University of California, Davis, in the *Bakke v. the Regents* case, which ended the "special minority admissions policy" that the university used for entrance to its medical school, further reinforcing the de jure barrier. As Charles Wollenberg (1976) presciently observed, the court's decision established a precedent that would eventually "terminate" the state's "effort to overcome *de facto* segregation in the schools" (1976, 187–90).

In California, the Bakke decision followed only weeks after Proposition 13, which voters approved on June 6, 1978. The control of school finance was radically altered by Prop. 13, opening the door to increasing state oversight of public school programs. For Honig, the broader effects of this political "pendulum swing" meant that the state's approach to control should be adjusted so as to "balance" systemwide reform "without thwarting local initiative." Given this shift, he believed that the state "reform role [was] accordingly more general: to provide broad leadership on such issues as graduation requirements, academic goals, textbook choice, and testing for accountability" (Honig 1985, 146). On this point, Honig and Kirst were agreed.

In his account of the "growth of the state's role in local schools," Kirst observed that, "the state role has focused on establishing minimum standards (for curriculum, pupil promotion and graduation, and even instructional

materials, etc.), while encouraging local districts to exceed them." This role, Kirst noted, had it roots in egalitarian ideals of the common school movement and rests upon the "belief that the general welfare requires a *floor* for educational opportunity," placing everyone on equal footing (Wirt and Kirst 1972, 111–12). The *Serrano* decisions set equitable state standards for that floor. Then Proposition 13 razed the existing foundation for local control, basically giving the state control over the equalization formulas imposed by *Serrano*. Overnight, Proposition 13 gave Honig an opportunity, as the newly elected superintendent of public instruction, to reconstruct that floor using the systemic-reform policy agenda as his "grand plan" to link local school programs to the state (Honig 1985, 110–11).

CALIFORNIA'S *LAST CHANCE*

> Public opinion is in advance of legislation.
>
> —John Swett, *Public Education in California*

The California Constitution makes it the prerogative of the State Board of Education to "determine all questions of policy" for the public schools (Falk 1968, 65). As the decade of the 1980s opened, the state was then, as now, the largest K–12 system in the nation, with well over four million students. The governor is granted power by the constitution to make appointments, as did Governor Jerry Brown, who selected Bill Honig and Michael Kirst, to the state board. The member sits for a term of four years. In 1983, the state legislature added a high school student to serve for a symbolic one-year term.

But state history confirms that the board's formal power does not rest entirely with the governor's appointees. Article 9 of the California Constitution requires that the nonpartisan office of state superintendent of public instruction be determined, like the governor, in a general election. Who then actually makes policy? On that legal point, Article 9 can, depending on the constitutional scholar, appear ambiguous. The superintendent of public instruction is designated as the secretary and executive officer of the State Board of Education; though formally the board's role is usually a matter of executing the policy set by the governor in consultation with the state legislature. The superintendent's other formal power is to serve as the state's chief school officer and administrator of the California Department of Education (CDE).

But the office also comes with heavy symbolic baggage. As John Swett's memoirs attest, the real function of California's chief school officer, as the title of superintendent of public instruction (SPI) suggests, is preaching. True

to its nineteenth-century roots, the purpose of the superintendent is to exhort and instruct the people in the secular ethos of the common good. True to the spirit of Horace Mann and John Swett, Bill Honig took this normative nation building seriously. As superintendent he was intent on building a statewide political consensus for his ambitious reform plans. In that role he was indefatigable. His passionate defense of restoring the public schools was made in support of a broader vision, in which he envisioned nothing less than a renewal of American civic culture. This moralist approach to education reform, which was typically cast in the rationalist terms of social science rather than Honig's pulpit style of a latter-day common school crusader, would soon gain the superintendent national attention, maintaining that special influence over public opinion would become critical as his reform agenda came into conflict with the political priorities of other state elected officials.

Having worked with Wilson Riles on the state board, Honig saw how formidable a political platform the superintendent's office could be. Like Riles predecessor, Max Rafferty, who used the office as a bully pulpit to advance a cold war school culture agenda, the office had the potential to influence state education policy in ways that were not explicit in the language of Article 9. As Michael Kirst observed, under Superintendent Riles the California Department of Education (CDE) was transformed from a "sleepy bureaucracy into a force to be reckoned with." Under his leadership it quickly became "the largest bureaucracy in the state with over 800 professionals" (Kirst 1981, 45–46). During his first term the CDE was restructured to administer the Warren revolution taking shape in Johnson's Great Society programs. Federal funding for Title I and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) were placed under the management of Riles newly formed Office of Compensatory Education. As noted in the previous chapter, in 1972 the state legislature enacted the Early Childhood Education Act, with the support of Governor Reagan. In his second term the department was reorganized again to further advance the superintendent's goals.

What spurred Honig to run for superintendent was Riles's proposal to fund a vigorous expansion of a vocational curriculum for high school that would emphasize manual training and technical job skills instead of an academic curriculum (Stowe 1975, 93). But the real catalyst for Honig was Riles's decision to push for the department to develop a standard K–12 social studies program of study. When Honig learned of Riles's social studies proposal in which the study of history played a minimal role, he entered the race. Honig launched his campaign in 1980. The study of history in the schools was a central plank in his campaign platform. For two years he stumped the state telling anyone who would listen that lasting reform of California's public schools could be done only by a return to "traditional

education" (Honig 1985, 41). That meant a core academic curriculum, with more attention given to the humanities and the sciences. The cafeteria-style general education curriculum prevalent since the 1960s had in his view watered down academic subjects. The Riles approach to beef up general education with more vocational courses would only reinforce the drift away from tradition. Instead, Honig challenged Riles bid for reelection, calling for renewal of a traditional liberal arts curriculum (but updated and cutting edge), which would provide the best common core for all students.

In the general election of November 1982, Tom Bradley, the Democratic mayor of Los Angeles and the first African American candidate to run for governor, was narrowly defeated by Republican George Deukmejian in "the closest gubernatorial election in state history." But that was the only state office Republicans won, and the Democrats retained firm control over the state legislature. Honig made an end run around the state's educational establishment. Riles's strongest support came from the state teachers' union and school administrators. Honig saw that his case for reform had to be won in the court of public opinion. His "view of . . . recent national trends" impelled him, much like Reagan, to exhort the people to reclaim their schools (Honig 1985, ix–x). Honig's timing was perfect. The pendulum had swung back. After twelve years in office Wilson Riles was defeated by 800,000 votes (Ross 1984, 62).

After his election, Bill Honig began a second campaign, "a coalition for excellence," to further advance his traditional education platform. In *Last Chance for Our Children: How You Can Help Save Our Schools* (1985), a book published on the eve of his campaign for a second term, he recounts the grassroots strategies that led to his election. As superintendent he saw that the administrative aspect of the office was simply secondary to what was essentially a platform for symbolic politics. For the next several years, that office would serve as the place to make an ongoing argument for systemic reform. But his immediate goal was to convince those who had opposed his candidacy into supporting his plans.

Just as a Horace Mann could passionately believe that the public school was "the greatest invention ever made by man," Honig saw that a "grassroots, citizen-backed reform movement" could save "one of the truly noble experiments in human history" (1985, ix). History and histrionics aside, Honig, like other national education leaders, saw that the American idea of the public school could still effectively serve as a "symbol of consensus" to stir the public to action and "stimulate policy change" (Yudof 1984, 456). With his electoral base of local school and community groups secure, Honig reached out to the California School Board Association, which had supported Riles. With the association and the state business roundtable he sought common ground to build "a coalition for excellence" (Honig 1985, 113–16).

With the state legislature the new superintendent found political allies, gaining political momentum for his curriculum-centered reforms by supporting a package of legislative measures already moving through the state senate. In contrast to Honig's bold visionary plans, his new colleagues in the state legislature, like Michael Kirst, tended to conceive of reform in more modest, incremental terms. The use of "state political power" might, if circumstances allowed, "help take a small step in the right direction" (Wirt and Kirst 1972, 13). However, political opportunity being what it was, the new superintendent of public instruction would not be satisfied with small steps.

GARY HART—FULL CIRCLE

After two decades in the California Legislature, former state senator Gary K. Hart returned to the classroom. For the last several years Hart has been teaching high school history at John F. Kennedy High School in Sacramento. Then and now Hart has really had only one calling: teaching (Helfand 2002). Even his move into politics in 1974, first to the assembly for eight years, followed by twelve in the state senate, may in retrospect be viewed as a way to advance that calling; above all through the crafting of education policy that would enhance the professional status of teachers. By the time he assumed the chair of the Senate Education Committee in 1983, Hart was a seasoned legislator, having the good fortune to enter the assembly at the height of the state's most "energetic" era of "public-sector expansion and policy innovation" (DeBow and Syers 2000, 133).*

During the 1970s the California Legislature came into its own, rated as "America's best" (Muir 1982, xiii). For the state assembly, that era began in 1961 when Jesse Unruh became speaker (1961–1968). Once the most powerful Democrat in California, next only to Governor Pat Brown, Unruh presided over this transformation to a professional full-time legislature. That turning point to being a full-time legislature occurred in the same eventful year shaping this story, 1966, after the passage of an Unruh-backed state initiative that amended the state constitution (Boyarsky 2004).

For Unruh, the best meant "having a policy-initiating capacity of its own." Key to having that capacity, in Unruh's mind, was the development of an "independent staff system" for the assembly, equally capable of contending with lobbyists (long a problem if not a plague in Sacramento) and the executive branch (Cannon 1969, 116). Having a keen sense of political history, Unruh saw that "the American concept of legislative government [had] failed to keep pace with the tide of time and technology . . . [instead] our legislatures [were] geared to face the problems of Jefferson's day"

*has since retired from teaching

(Cannon 1969, 107). Modern times, for a virtual nation state like California was not a province, he thought, for citizen politicians. Among the new class of professional politicians that came of age in Sacramento in the 1970s, Gary Hart, the teacher, sensed he really hadn't left the classroom. For the legislature Unruh made was simply another kind of school, where he would now learn how to "study the public's business" (Muir 1982, xii–xiii).

SENATE BILL 813: A TIMELY CONVERGENCE

After reelection to a second term in 1977, Hart was appointed to the Assembly Appropriations Committee. His work in committee provided him an exceptional opportunity to consider policy issues systemically. As recounted in William Muir's (1982) richly informative study of the California Legislature, Hart observed, "I'm looking forward to it [appropriations] because I'm really fascinated how the whole thing fits together; . . . on appropriations you get the overview." Muir goes on to say that Hart "had found that he could fit all the pieces of his knowledge together into a pattern: energy, tort, crimes, health, [and] education" (1982, 33). But after Proposition 13 passed the following year, Hart, like Honig, saw that the emerging pattern for education was redrawing the lines of power back to Sacramento.

As one surveyed this power shift, the pattern presented something of a paradox, one which would politically constrain the kind of education reform that was possible. The shift was in part driven by a larger national trend of public distrust of government, catalyzed in part by Reagan, that paralleled the withdrawal of support for school integration and large-scale compensatory programs to equalize educational opportunity. An early sign of that weakening support was reflected in Governor Jerry Brown's veto in 1976 of a major bill sponsored by Wilson Riles. The intent of that bill was to put into law the RISE Commission Report (1975), which Riles established in 1974 (Griffin 2004). The RISE recommendations for the Reform of Intermediate and Secondary Education, presented an ambitious attempt to deal with the kind of problematic environmental conditions of the urban inner city that the Coleman Report argued were largely out of a school's control (Coleman 1969).

Sensitive to the social intent of Riles's effort, Brown saw that a pared-down, leaner version of the bill passed instead. The School Improvement Program (SIP) combined "the legislative language of RISE with existing Early Childhood Education statutes that Riles had sponsored a few years earlier" (Fortune 2004). The title of the amended bill alone suggests the move away from the political priority of school integration. With the state taking charge

of school finance, Hart, like Honig, began to look for potential legislative *leverage points* that could advance improvement of the system.

CONSTITUENCY–CREATING CONTROL

Well before the May, 1983, release of *A Nation at Risk*, a consensus had been reached in Sacramento that would galvanize a new reform constituency, one determined to place the state public school system on the path to excellence. Senator Hart, chair of the Senate Education Committee, recalls this unlikely but fortuitous convergence of political forces. In Hart's estimation, Bill Honig played a critical role because he helped to foster the necessary interest and involvement among business and school groups that created a political environment where education became an issue statewide.

Hart, on the other hand, was intent on building consensus for education reform through the legislative process. Over time his principal legislative focus became teacher professional development. For him, to make the education system more responsive meant improving teacher education. Hart was less concerned with what was taught (curriculum) than with how it was taught. Instead, his long-term goal was to develop a consensus within the legislature that would support legislation that was considerate of teacher needs and sensitive to the conditions under which teachers flourished and grew—in a word, legislation that regarded teachers as professionals. As chair of the State Senate Education Committee, he viewed SB 813 as a step in that direction. So he drew Honig into the legislative cycle for 813, using his exceptional talent for publicity to create political momentum and stimulate public interest even as he maintained support with Teresa Hughes, chair of the Assembly Education Committee, to secure its passage.

Curriculum and teacher professional development were the two main policy strands of SB 813 for which its provisions were written. For curriculum there were provisions for model curriculum standards, textbook selection criteria, and new state CAP tests (California Assessment Program) for the eighth grade. For teaching, Hart had provisions for a mentor teacher program, certification requirements for teacher evaluators, and additional staff development for teachers and administrators (Odden and Marsh 1987, 7).

But to gain broader support for the bill's provisions in curriculum and teaching, Hart wisely included a third category of programs to balance 813's major changes with some measure of legislative continuity. Hart carried over the established provisions of Wilson Riles's School Improvement Program (SIP). However, the SIP "categorical services for special students" would be

based upon the new model curriculum standards approved for development by SB 813 (Odden and Marsh 1987, 17).

But SB 813 had an even larger goal, for none of the sixty-five policy components in the legislative package that Hart devised would become law unless agreement could be reached with the new governor, George Deukmejian, to substantially increase funding. Having been witness to the ongoing crisis in school finance wrought by Proposition 13 and having participated in the "stop-gap solutions" enacted by the legislature to deal with its after-effects, Hart sought to build a post–Proposition 13 education coalition that would effectively make adequate funding a state priority (Rubinfeld 1995, 437). Here Honig was a valuable ally. Like Hart, Honig was equally strong in the belief that SB 813 would not be successful unless there was a trade-off between Republicans and Democrats. Hart wanted to have more money for the schools above COLA (cost-of-living adjustment) and growth. Republicans, though, did not want to spend more money but wanted to see changes. A tentative consensus was reached. More money meant more accountability, seeing change meant measuring it dollar by dollar. But this fragile consensus did not hold, for the Democratic notion of reform was based upon the principle of public investment—that you cannot have substantial reform without adequate funding. They could not conceive of a zero-sum political reality where less is always more.

In principle, the new governor supported SB 813, but by the 1982–1983 state election, the state was deep in debt and had entered a recession. Deukmejian, who was elected by the slimmest of margins, really had only one issue: crime. If schools had been prisons, California would have then entered a new era, for there were "no limits" to what the governor achieved in funding his anticrime measures (Rawls and Bean 1998, 455). Expecting to lead, he instead confronted an unprecedented coalition for education reform. Given the crisis, Deukmejian cautiously offered less than half of the $950 million proposed by SB 813. The governor, a former state senator, reasonably believed he had the upper hand and that the Democrat-controlled legislature would yield. They did not.

Early in July, extreme contention gave way to compromise. A new budget was approved with deep cuts in state spending, except for education. Risking great political capital, the new superintendent of public instruction went to Deukmejian and, in a face-to-face meeting, Honig presented the governor with a fait accompli, that the education coalition behind him was tantamount to a force of nature. A seasoned Sacramento politician, the governor was unsure how to deal with the visionary reformer. Nor did he want to be seen on the wrong side of so important an issue. In their initial clash, the governor relented. On July 7, 1983, the Hart-Hughes Educational Reform Act, Senate Bill (SB) 813, was approved with $850 million

in state funding, less than requested. The superintendent's brinksmanship was the beginning of an ongoing war over control of state policy and the annual education budget, described hereinafter as Honig and Deukmejian's war over ADA (Average Daily Attendance)—the state-mandated formulae that determined the average amount of per-pupil funding annually allotted to school districts. For example, between 1972 and 1992, California's national ranking fell from nineteenth to thirty-sixty in spending per ADA (Rubinfeld 1995, 441–42).

THE CONTROL DILEMMA

In 1984, the year after the California Legislature enacted Senate Bill 813, the Hart-Hughes Educational Improvement Act, an article appeared in the educational journal *Phi Delta Kappan*. Another Stanford professor of education, Larry Cuban, dismissed SB 813 "as a garbage can, in which to toss every bright idea and private bias that non-educators had about school reform" (Cuban 1984, 213). A less pejorative expression than "garbage can" surely would be comprehensive, which in fact SB 813 was, though the former term had become popular in policy circles as an alternative expression to describe the actual messy political process of conflict and compromise involved in policymaking. Cuban's critique is valuable, to the extent that it reveals his own predilections about the role of the state. What should be the locus of legitimate state control? For a state as large and diverse as California, what power should be exercised to improve public schools?

Cuban's doubt reflects a growing divide developing since the 1970s in the educational policy community about keeping the state out of the classroom. Proponents of systemic reform, like Michael Kirst, were challenged by advocates of "local control." Control, for Cuban, meant teachers in charge of schooling, not distant "technocratic" policymakers in Sacramento, whom he accused of being "engineers at heart," mindlessly devoted to an "assembly line" vision of reform. That the "noneducators" who shepherded SB 813 through the legislature had been teachers (not entirely out of touch with the realties of the classroom) is a fact Cuban omits. If SB 813 was based, as Cuban said, on "seriously flawed assumptions," might his assumptions about SB 813 have been flawed too? (1984, 213).

The same overblown shibboleth against government appears to dominate Cuban's argument against SB 813. The seminal policy text for Cuban's position may just as easily have been Arthur Wise's highly influential analysis of post-1965 education policy, *Legislative Learning: The Bureaucratization of the American Classroom* (1979). Even after the revolutionary social gains of the Civil Rights movement, which could only be upheld by the force

of the courts and federal legislation, Wise argues, fairly convincingly, that "while educational opportunity can be advanced by regulation, the *quality* of education . . . cannot easily be solved by edict" (Wise 1988, 329–30). Only a grassroots resurgence of local control, it seems, can reverse "the trend toward state control" (1988, 331). However, neither Wise nor Cuban seem to address the issue that the most ardent conservative advocates of local control have come to have as their chief apostle in the 1980s—Ronald Reagan—as David Gardner's account of events in the last chapter surrounding *A Nation at Risk* stunningly reveals. For embedded in his tale is the larger political paradox of that decade, which is that state and federal mandates could just as easily be used to reduce equality as well as quality, and that ultimately the public realization of one condition, morally as well as pragmatically, cannot be separate from the other.

So while Cuban may have had a deeper insight about SB 813, in reality the Hart-Honig legislation that launched systemic reform was less about legislating learning than it was about restoring the basic conditions to support it. The political distance between the state and its schools, which is peculiar to the "control dilemma" of California politics, would remain. The more urgent problem addressed by SB 813 was simply to arrest the decline of California schools brought on by the failure of public vision (Cain 1997, 340).

THE FIRST WAVE

Passage of the omnibus SB 813 marked the first major political collaboration of Hart and Honig. Honig's ability to achieve a delicate reciprocity between his and Hart's respective policy agenda was crucial to successful implementation of the school reform bill, SB 813. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss their later work on legislation crucial to advancing the systemic school reform now launched. By contrast, the superintendent's strained relationship with the governor only deepened as Deukmejian made appointments to the state board.

At this point, the story turns to focus on the curriculum reform movement that Superintendent Honig initiated. Unlike Senator Hart, whose political style was honed through the give-and-take of the legislative process, Honig was on a mission—in part to prove academics like Larry Cuban wrong, that the state was not necessarily an obstacle to a quality education. For Hart SB 813 was just that, a number in a legislative docket, the first in a series of incremental steps that would, hopefully, over the course of several legislative cycles, make restructuring the teaching profession a state priority with bipartisan support. Contentious as the legislature was, the process

involved caution and compromise. A bill could be successfully shepherded through the legislature only to be vetoed, since the process always ended on the governor's desk. With Deukmejian that occurred several times, as Hart advanced his agenda to reform the teaching profession. But to alienate a sitting governor was not an option. To lose meant moving on to the next battle. SB 813 was a rare exception; for Deukmejian it would not become Honig's rule.

For the superintendent, SB 813 was not just a bill but a symbol reflecting "a sea change in philosophy" (Fallon 1986, 32). Instrumentally, it established new graduation requirements that increased high school course requirements in academic subjects. This change prompted the State Board of Education to raise the bar even higher by adopting model high school graduation standards. This set the stage for new curriculum frameworks, whose development would give final form to the academic core curriculum, on which systemic reform turned. By design, these changes constituted a set of legislative leverage points to move the system in a common direction. But more so, this academic core was Honig's curricular vehicle to return the public school system to its traditional role. That role was "to transmit basic beliefs and values to the next generation," so that "students [would] have some broader sense of both themselves and their culture and society so that they can reach a higher place" (Fallon 1986, 30).

There was one constitutional drawback that constrained the superintendent from reaching that higher place. The governor was accorded power to exercise control of education policy through the State Board of Education. That matter was reserved to the state board. But as official secretary to the board, superintendent Honig had made it his forum for curriculum policymaking and in doing so tested the limits of the consultative function of his office. However, as time passed Deukmejian began to exert control over the Board, checking the superintendent's dominance. A staunch fiscal conservative, Deukmejian hastened the systemwide move to accountability; for unlike Hart he "insisted that the key [was] not money but improved performance by school administrators, teachers and parents" (Salzman 1987, 31). Even with the considerable monetary increase of SB 813, the average funding per pupil barely reached the national average (Goldfinger and Blattner 2003, 7). With Honig entirely dependent on the governor's signature, a protracted battle between the two widely popular elected officials ensued as the curriculum reforms progressed.

For the California Department of Education (CDE) the "first wave" hit hardest. Overnight the bureaucracy that Riles had spent the better part of the last decade building became subject to Honig's "sea change" (Kirst 1988). In his first term, the new superintendent cut the department operating budget from thirty-one million to twenty-five million and over time reduced staff

capacity by 15 percent (Honig 1985, 146). The main operational site within the department became the new division of Curriculum and Instructional Leadership. Compensatory education, the department's flagship division under Riles, was now placed under a newly created Specialized Programs branch.

As SB 813 required, in 1984 the superintendent of public instruction set about developing model curriculum standards, first by selecting advisory committees "for [each of the] subject areas in the newly mandated high school course of study." Draft standards, first approved in 1985, were to be considered "a model, not a mandate" that school districts would use as a guide to review with regard to their own locally created curricula (CDE 1985, 5–6). Development of the standards followed the new model graduation requirements approved by the state board in 1983, and together were the first stage in Honig's "overall improvement plan" in which the model standards would serve as templates to develop new curriculum frameworks in mandated subject areas (English-language arts, math, science, history-social science, fine arts, and foreign languages). The new frameworks would then serve as guidelines to select textbooks and instructional materials and as criteria to devise tests (Honig 1985a). The intent of Honig's strategy was to bring all these elements essential to the instructional process into alignment. A later phase of the plan called for an overhaul of state standards for teacher preparation, training and professional development, and school-site restructuring to effectively coordinate this alignment (Kirst 1988). Together these were the essential policy coordinates ("leverage points") that underlay Honig's systemic reform strategy to close the distance between state mandates like SB 813 and classroom practice.

CONTROL OF CONSEQUENCE

The first wave began to crest after Honig was elected to a second term in 1986. The following year Honig and Deukmejian entered the final stages of their ongoing ADA war and control of the state's education policy. While both politicians agreed that public schools should be the state's number-one priority, Deukmejian believed that not money but more systemwide accountability measures were the key to "true reform" (Mehas 1987, 35). In what had become nearly an annual ritual, their negotiations over the 1987 state budget ended badly and bitterly. The superintendent failed to convince the governor that instead of a tax refund, the $1.2 billion in excess tax revenues available that year should be used for the schools. The bipartisan consensus came to a precipitous end (Kossen 1988).

A cascading series of political crises followed between the governor and Honig through his proxies on the state board, while the legislature tried

to maintain a safe distance from the political fallout. For his first term, at least, the state superintendent of public instruction gained increasing national attention and even acclaim for his visionary school reform agenda. Honig was regarded as a "shining light," one of the nation's top education leaders. Inside the Washington Beltway, political commentators on national trends in education observed that "the Honig phenomenon had two main strands: his uncanny prescience in crafting a reform platform that anticipated the mood and content of *A Nation at Risk* . . . and his extraordinary ability to mobilize popular backing" (Kaplan 1985, 11). Given the single-laudatory focus on Honig's "star power," no light was shed on the crucial role of the state legislature in animating and enabling the rising star. By the end of the decade, policy experts had formalized Honig's little chart on systemic school reform grandly sketched on a legal pad.

What made the "systemic school reform model," as it came to be called, worthy of national attention, apart from its scale, was its exceptional boldness in decisively shifting the political focus away from the social imperative of integration and compensatory education policies (Smith and O'Day 1990). In Charles Wollenberg's (1976) definitive history on segregation in California schools, he places the exclusion of minority children from public schools within the larger pattern of social policy and structure of California society and culture. Even after World War II, state government had maintained the long-standing wall of segregation by having no fair-housing laws in place (1976, 185). And even when state laws were finally passed, as with court-ordered busing, there was widespread reaction (as already noted); these laws and legal decisions were highly contested. The legal action taken by minority advocates that led to the *Serrano* decisions in effect reflected an astute political awareness that the political consensus for integration in schools as an accepted social policy was no longer tenable. *Serrano* was a clear sign that California was entering the post–civil rights era. With *Serrano* the pursuit of equal educational opportunity shifted to school finance.

But in Wollenberg's assessment the ideal of integration had other limitations. However admirable, integrationists, he said, "have generally paid little attention to school curriculum, [its] structure and procedure. While great efforts have been made to change the ethnic composition of the student body and staff, what goes on in the classroom has been ignored." It should be noted that what Wollenberg had in mind for "school curriculum" is one that dealt with issues of "racial and religious prejudice." The utopian curriculum he envisioned would reflect and reinforce a larger concerted effort by the state to realize "the goal of a desegregated and non-racist society" (Wollenberg 1976, 185–86).

But that goal in California had become politically elusive. In the increasingly stratified world of the urban classroom, this curriculum like the

ideal of integration became an academic exercise with no political traction. Yet Wollenberg's insight is essentially correct. Unless "public education is reinforced by other parts of the social system," the school alone cannot realize such goals. But while presciently capturing the coming political shift away from the standing imperative for equity in education, Wollenberg added little insight concerning the problem of how the ideal of equal educational opportunity needed to be recast in the *Nation at Risk* era.

Honig saw the dilemma. His systemic school reform model intended to assume control of what is consequential in the classroom, with the antidote excellence. And in so doing he attempted to extend the idea of opportunity beyond merely being present in a white socially mainstream school, to address Wollenberg's emphasis on "what [actually] goes on in the classroom."

Yet paradoxically, even as his systemic school reform agenda reflected a keen sense of political realism, it placed that system on a path to an equally elusive goal. For Honig, SB 813 was in large part symbolic because it reflected his conviction, an underlying ideal, his will to reform. "We are going to make the schools better. . . . We're going to teach [students] at a much higher level than we ever have" (Fallon 1986, 30). Still the state superintendent realized that the success of systemic reform meant closing the distance between the ideal and the real, between top-down state mandates and the people. Ideally, he envisioned "a grassroots citizen-backed reform movement [that would] take charge of our educational system, [where] the people would reclaim their public schools" (Honig 1985, x). Pragmatically such reclamation meant the mobilization of public opinion. His second campaign to gain support for SB 813 really had no terminus. To be in advance of public opinion meant, in effect, perpetual grassroots cultivation. The endgame of reform meant a permanent campaign.

As the first wave of systemic reform ebbed in 1987, Honig organized the California Movement for Educational Reform, a political campaign whose goal was "to enlist two million parents and concerned citizens" to lobby the legislature and governor so that adequate state funding for public education would be maintained. Such a movement was possible because Honig believed that the people could be inspired to act by powerful ideas. Larry Cuban maintained that SB 813 "was stapled together of dreams" (Cuban 1984). To some extent he was right. But what Cuban underestimated was the power of such dreams. When Honig professed to "believe [that] the U.S. public school system is one of the truly noble experiments in human history," he also believed that Californians could still be mobilized by such civic dreams.

This wedding of idealist assumptions with a pragmatic course of action is evident in *Raising Expectations*, the State Board of Education's new "master plan for excellence," which was approved just before the passage of SB 813. In

the foreword to the plan, Honig invoked the Greek poet Hesiod. The "road to excellence" for California schools, he says, would be "long and steep and rough," admitting that "even when we get to the top, it will not be easy to stay there" (CDE 1983, v–vi). *Raising Expectations* claimed to identify eleven major school effectiveness factors, all of which tend to reflect the general reorientation of systemic school reform to an academic curriculum, the shift away from the integrationist paradigm to an instructional one. Honig's road is a narrow one, its destination academe. For the top to be reached, systemic reform required top academic experts in each content area.

The core academic curriculum that Honig proposed could be legitimized only by the university. To this end the Model Curriculum Standards advisory committees, which took their impetus from *Raising Expectations* (1983), by design always had a strong presence of university professors along with an equal representation of public school teachers and district personnel. This combination of academic expertise and professional practice was crucial to the development of the curriculum frameworks that followed the model standards. Symbolic statements aside, the strategic substance of the curriculum reforms mandated in SB 813 could be found in this pairing of professors and teachers. Through this combination of expertise and practice, a framework would represent the most up-to-date consensus on a discipline. The state required that frameworks be produced on a six-year cycle (it had been seven), with a framework completed two years before textbook adoption in that subject (Honig 1989). All this was of consequence for classroom instruction: instructional materials, teaching strategies, assessment, and professional standards. And the process began by effectively coordinating the development and implementation of a core academic curriculum.

During his first term the superintendent oversaw the revision of the existing framework in science, and the development of new curriculum frameworks for mathematics, english-language arts and history-social science. It is with the symbol and substance of this latter framework in history that this account now turns. For with the study of history the superintendent envisioned a means to renew America's common civic culture. It was the discipline that would provide students with the sure-footing in a common culture they would need, on the high road to excellence.

To a great extent, the high road for systemic school reform was one of calculated circumspection. Just as Clark Kerr's 1960 Master Plan for Higher Education assumed an architectonic functional view of three well-coordinated college and university systems, Honig's system was, similarly, a protean attempt to create a state-level master plan for K–12 public education. Political phenomena like the FSM only proved that Kerr's plan of engineered coordination and balance was subject to the less mediated and uncontrollable world of raw politics. Over time, Honig too would learn that

one could only view a system whole on paper. Yet, to save the schools, the quiet mediation of a Quaker like Clark Kerr was out of the question. Still the political consequence of "doing battle on behalf of the schools" was no less apparent to the new superintendent as he set his systemic reform in motion (Colvin 1987, 11). That the high road to excellence would lead to a war over culture was a risk this crusader for an American core curriculum was all too willing to take, since in his mind no less than the future of public education was at stake.

CHAPTER 3

Clio Restored

> Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good. . . . But if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a higher degree than any other, and at the highest good.
>
> —Aristotle, *The Politics*

In August 1984, little over two decades after the Free Speech Movement transformed the Berkeley campus from a cold war knowledge factory to a contested political space for renewing public culture, more than five hundred California teachers walked past the steps of Sproul Hall through Sather Gate on their way to the Clio Conference. The conference theme was "History in the Schools: What Shall We Teach?" It was sponsored by Bernard Gifford, dean of the School of Education (Gifford 1988). The idea for the conference took shape a year earlier, when Gifford was introduced to Bill Honig. It was a carefully arranged affair, held at the home of Chancellor Ira Michael Heyman. Honig had been a student of Heyman's when he taught constitutional law at Boalt School of Law. As Gifford recounts in the introduction to his book on the conference, Honig was curious to know Gifford's views on the state of social studies in the schools. Soon the dean found himself to be the sole audience for Honig and Heyman's impassioned plea that called for a return to the study of history in the K–12 general education curriculum. Their case was so persuasive that when Honig asked Gifford what he thought could be done, without realizing it the dean had already concurred with Honig's readymade answer. The two old-school lawyers had won him over. The School of Education would sponsor a conference with the state Department of Education bringing together the best academic historians along with a select group of the state's best social studies teachers to come up with innovative scenarios for a change of course to the curriculum. From Gifford's meeting came the Clio Conference (Gifford 1988).

Actually the new superintendent had posed this question for quite some time. When he was on the State Board of Education, he had been very active in the deliberations of the 1981 Social Science Framework Committee. The committee was intent on reversing the cafeteria-style social studies curriculum prevalent since the 1960s, which allowed students to do their own thing, typically with an open selection of electives. As Margaret Branson, the 1981 framework's principal editor recalled, their main objective was to design a new core curriculum in the social studies that would balance the social sciences with the humanities. This common core would be integrated with traditional civic values and the principles of American democracy. The principle animating that core is found in the introduction to the 1981 History-Social Science Framework for California Public Schools. It begins with an extensive quotation from James Conant's (1945) *General Education in a Free Society*. Conant, the president of Harvard University, had come to California at Margaret Branson's request and spoke to the Framework Committee as they began their work (CDE 1981, 1).

In the finished document, the committee describes *history* as the "umbrella under which all of the social science disciplines and the humanities [would] find shelter" (CDE 1981, 21). But it was Honig's advocacy that gave history such a new prominence in the 1981 framework. Up to that time, social studies frameworks had no direct reference to history in the title. The previous curriculum was titled the California Framework for the Social Sciences (CDE 1975). But Honig lobbied Superintendent Wilson Riles to change the title. To Riles, the change appeared cosmetic and he soon conceded. But when Riles proposed the turn to vocational education, essentially obviating the need for the study of history and civics in the high school curriculum, Honig made his move to challenge Riles. For Honig, the study of history was absolutely essential to restoring a core academic curriculum, and it soon came to serve as the symbol for that renewal. On January 8, 1981, the California State Board of Education approved the first History-Social Science Framework for California Public Schools, K–12. Soon Honig would set the practice of social studies in the state on a path back to the study of history in the schools, and in so doing would challenge the national norm. That norm had been set by the National Council for Social Studies (NCSS). However during the 1970s a debate arose within the National Council over what the civic purpose of the social studies should be (NCSS 1980, 1984).

THE CLIO IMPERATIVE

The goal of the Clio Conference was twofold. Like the change signaled by the 1981 framework, the event would be used to announce to the teach-

ers, representing the state's social studies community, that a new direction was imminent. That message was delivered less as a bold declaration than a question broadly posed to those present. The answers the audience might make, as the conference book that followed indicated, were many. The book's contributors provide an overview of new and important trends in the academic discipline of history. But in large part the book focused on the pedagogical implications that the renewal of history in the K–12 social studies curriculum might have. *History in the Schools: What Shall We Teach?* (Gifford 1988) featured the most prominent speakers at the conference. The topics ranged widely, from examining the revolution in social history, with an emphasis on minorities and women, to the more traditional role of civics, ethics, and values in history education. New postcolonial visions for world history, which placed the West within the ebb and flow of global civilizations, were presented. Complementing these new approaches were chapters that discussed how global migration trends would change present conceptions of California history, with other contributors drawing upon these same trends to illuminate the inadequacy of a common national identity and culture.

Of the contributors to *History in the Schools*, three stood out: Diane Ravitch, Matthew Downey, and Freeman Butts. Downey, who later was made director of the Clio Project (a spin-off research program located at Berkeley in the School of Education), and Ravitch would soon come to play crucial roles on the 1987 Framework Committee. Butts, who had been influential in the making of the 1981 framework, though not on the 1987 committee, would nevertheless exert a profound influence on how the new framework was to be conceived. But their singular importance as contributors to the book and to the conference was in the view they shared about the field of social studies.

Though he would only be a distant observer to the 1987 committee, Freeman Butts had consulted with Margaret Branson on the 1981 History-Social Science Framework and the advisory committee for the Model Curriculum Standards. Even his presence alone at the Clio Conference, by rights, should have made him legendary. The distinguished emeritus professor from Teachers College, Columbia University, was in 1984 the lone survivor of the Foundations of Education group who, under the leadership of William Heard Kilpatrick and Harold Rugg, virtually defined the progressive cast of teacher education in the United States since the New Deal (Rugg 1941).

His concern at Clio, as for the 1981 framework, was in articulating the "specific role of history . . . as an instrument for civic education" (Butts 1988, 61). The long view, which he traced in his Clio talk, "History and Civic Education," was then doubly important as an historical account, since he had lived through all the major 20th-century changes in the social studies

field that he discussed. In his talk, Butts argued that the "role of history" was to develop "an intellectual frame of reference" to prepare students "to make the political judgments necessary for preserving and strengthening civic values," values that served to "form the common core of American citizenship" (Butts 1988, 72, 78).

Though he had witnessed the growing disenchantment in the field with the new social studies that prompted the return to civics by the National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS), the council's new consensus, to make citizenship education the basic goal of the social studies curriculum, did not include any serious study of history (1988, 67). In fact, the study of history had been in a long decline, and had reached its lowest point during the 1960s, when the new social studies, which emphasized contemporary issues, was in vogue. Its emphasis on objective inquiry, as Butts notes, was "largely a-historical, if not anti-historical," and in its deliberately cultivated value-free vacuum, "indifferent to the civic mission of education" (1988, 67). Even when the NCSS recanted the new social studies, the present-ism of the field remained dominant.

Such persistence would not have surprised Diane Ravitch who, along with Matthew Downey, largely shared Butts's view that the NCSS had long been indifferent to having a place for the serious study of history in the social studies curriculum. That indifference was longstanding. In Ravitch's contribution to the conference book "From History to Social Studies," she plots that move away from the traditional curriculum back to the early decades of the 20th century, noting that progressive educators, some of whom were colleagues of Freeman Butts at Columbia, played critical roles in this change. They regarded the traditional curriculum as elitist, for children of privilege, the few who would not enter the world of work but instead go on to college (Ravitch 1988, 48). That shift began in 1916 when the National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS) issued the "Report of the Committee on the Social Studies," which marked the beginning of a shift away from that traditional orientation in the curriculum, which cultivated a study of the past and the classics, to a forward-looking emphasis on current events and social change (1988, 49). In Ravitch's view, that report and the one that followed, the 1918 report, "Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education," commissioned by the National Education Association (NEA), reflected a major change in the curriculum, in which a more utilitarian view of the public school became dominant. That view emphasized vocational training in manual skills to prepare students to enter America's rapidly growing industrial economy.

Ravitch regarded this utilitarian credo as a radical departure from established precedent. In her estimation, the capstone in the history of the American public school curriculum is the 1893 NEA Report by the

Committee of Ten. Rather than tracking students into vocational training, which was what the "Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education" recommended, the Committee of Ten stressed the study of history. In the section of the 1893 report on "Secondary School Studies" the committee advocated a traditional liberal arts curriculum for all, which involved the study of American history and Western civilization. More importantly, Ravitch notes that the 1893 report, like *A Nation at Risk*, was an historic document because it marked an important collaboration between the university and the schools, a national commission that brought together university presidents, academic historians, and school principals to restore the liberal arts curriculum (Ravitch 1988, 45).

Over time, the study of history in the general education curriculum declined, as the teaching of the social studies became more widespread. This came to be called a lifestyles-type curriculum, and it typically consisted of a potpourri of civics, the social sciences, home economics, and current events mixed with a smattering of American and world history. In Ravitch's view, a return to the spirit, if not the letter, of the 1893 Committee of Ten Report was necessary to restore the study of history to its proper place in the curriculum—a discipline aligned once again with the humanities, as in the traditional liberal arts curriculum (1988, 51). She contended that "history will regain its rightful place in the schools only if" it exists as a discipline, separate from social studies, as she defined it.

Matthew Downey (1988), on the other hand, had more pragmatic concerns. Unlike Ravitch, he felt that, regardless of its current label, the social studies curriculum was in large part involved with the teaching of history. Nevertheless, he had his own reservations about history's place in the curriculum that were no less critical than those of Diane Ravitch. In "Reforming the History Curriculum," Downey explained that over the past half-century, "an unofficial, national history-social studies curriculum" had become institutionalized. In grades K–6, it combined a mix of basic sociology and history, often referred to as the "expanding environments model" (Downey 1988, 198). In the later grades, a sequence with minor variations persisted, with United States history at grades 5, 8, and 11, world history at grades 6 and 10, and capstone courses in American government or social science electives, often economics, at grade 12 (1988, 198–99). Downey saw several major problems with the national model, the most basic being that there was no coherence to the existing K–12 scope and sequence. The "expanding environments" ended at grade 6. This lack of a "cumulative" structure did not prepare students for the later grades. But in Downey's estimation, "the lack of a coherent structure" posed an even larger problem. The "most important failure [was] its inability to provide a structured foundation for studying history" (1988, 199). Downey and Ravitch's prominence at the

conference and their expertise on reform would assure that they would each play a crucial role in the events that followed.

BLUE RIBBON MUSINGS

If the intent of the Clio Conference was to announce to the state social studies community that reform was imminent, Honig's next step sought to gain national attention for the changes ahead. He invited several prominent American historians to a Blue Ribbon Advisory Committee meeting he convened in Sacramento on January 7, 1986. More a public relations gambit to attract press attention, the most prominent invited guests, Daniel Boorstin, Frances Fitzgerald, and Stephan Thernstrom, were no-shows. The one exception was Clio Conference participant Diane Ravtich who was seated next to Honig at the head table as he opened the two-day affair (CDE 1986a).

For the first time, the superintendent of public instruction outlined the three-year plan, which would result in a new history-centered curriculum framework (CDE 1986b, 8). Over the course of the next two days the select group would participate in a series of forums that would make recommendations for a new K–12 curriculum, textbooks, tests, and teacher preparation that would ideally conform to the study of history and would later serve as an operational agenda for the framework committee Honig would soon bring together. At the outset, the Blue Ribbon meeting gave Honig a platform from which to elaborate on the "major shift in philosophy," which he saw as necessary before a new consensus could emerge on the specific process of curriculum reform (CDE 1986b, 8). But that consensus would only come about when his audience believed as he did that history was the most "powerful tool" to put students "in touch with the cultural ideals" of the nation (1986b, 10–11). If Matthew Downey thought "reforming the history curriculum" meant pragmatic incremental change, the call he now heard required not a tool but a titan.

"You just can't talk about the development of the nation," the superintendent said. "You need to teach issues that come up in history, literature and biography" to connect with these "broader cultural issues" (1986b, 10–11). One problem with this approach was that teachers "don't really have a clear case for why we [should] teach history. . . . We, have to get that reason across." Nor was there any "common agreement or core" consensus about what kind of history should be taught. Instead, said Honig, "it's just all over the map." This "confusion" was even more apparent for students (1986b, 13–14). "Mostly," Honig said, "we are fighting a war, and on that front I don't think students . . . have an understanding of the past. They are really not connected to who we are as a nation" (CDE 1986b, 17).

He argued further that "history is one vehicle to do that, to connect kids to [that] broader culture, our ideals, our beliefs, who we are, [and the] four thousand years of human development" in which these common cultural ideals are "wrapped up" (1986b, 18). In Honig's mind, the basic civic "ideas essential to democracy"—the rights of the individual, constitutional government, the electoral process—could best be understood in a historical context. Honig believed that these ideas, like the study of history, should pervade the curriculum throughout a child's career in school. Noting the influence of E. D. Hirsch and William Bennett, Honig opined that "there are certain things that all kids should get. . . . There is a general study of culture, civilizations, and the commonalities" involved, which "we want to give students," so that they have "a sense of who we are as a nation" (1986b, 23–24).

The superintendent's passionate, if not obsessed, musings (as some present did observe) about how the nation's culture, the people's memory, could be restored through the study of history, would soon find form in the History-Social Science Curriculum Framework Committee, which met for the first time in San Francisco early that following March, 1986.

CLIO IN COMMITTEE

One thread of continuity already bound most members of the newly appointed Framework Committee. Nearly all had attended the Clio Conference. Some had served on the Model Curriculum Standards Committee (CDE 1985). And several were invited to participate in the Blue Ribbon Advisory Committee. More by design than chance, Honig was intent on building a consensus and sustaining critical momentum by bringing together the state's best social studies educators and academic historians and having them present at each successive stage as the reform progressed. To some extent he achieved that goal. Ironically, the defining moments of what later proved to be the committee's contentious existence were largely the result of his attempt to maintain control over those whom, by political design, he had brought together.

The majority of the committee members were either teachers or district and county curriculum coordinators (see CDE 1988, xi–xii, for a complete list of committee members). Of these, the most influential was Jack Hoar, the social studies coordinator for the Long Beach Unified School District, who was voted to serve as chair of the committee at that first meeting. Of equal influence were two past presidents of the NCSS: Todd Clark, director of the Constitutional Rights Foundation, and Jean Claugus, a retired teacher and legislative consultant for the CCSS (the latter appointed as vice chair

of the Framework Committee). But the pivotal roles were played by history professors appointed to the committee. Of these, discussed earlier, there were Matthew Downey and Diane Ravitch, major participants at both the Clio Conference and the Blue Ribbon Advisory Committee.

The agenda of the first meeting on March 3 and 4 was in large part taken up with official formalities, but crucial to understanding later developments, which put the work of the committee in jeopardy (CDE 1986c, 1–2). Officially, the committee was given its charge to develop a new framework by the state board. But its actual work was overseen by the Curriculum Commission, who managed the work of development with assistance from the state Department of Education staff. The commission set the timeline and schedule and, as events unfolded, would play a role that in some respects was even more crucial to the new framework's realization than the Framework Committee itself. That steering role was largely assumed by Carol Katzman of the Beverly Hills School District, who was chair of the commission, and Diane Brooks, manager of the history-social science unit at the Department of Education.

The other important issue on the first day's agenda was a review of the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Advisory Committee, in terms of evaluating the strengths of the 1981 framework. Central to the Blue Ribbon recommendations were proposals for a new history-centered K–12 scope and sequence; the larger significance, clearly understood by those present. The message was soon out.

Just after the Framework Committee met next in April, Chair Jack Hoar received a letter from Carol Marquis, president of the California Council for the Social Studies (CCSS), who wrote to "express the concerns of its members." It was the belief of the council that the 1981 framework "should not be replaced." A number of strong reasons had compelled them to take this stand at the outset. Chief among them was that it had "been well received throughout the state" and "implementation . . . has been completed only recently by most districts." Why should teachers so committed to the present document "have to start over once again?" (Marquis 1986).

Though Marquis, on both the Blue Ribbon and Model Curriculum Standards committees, clearly knew what Honig intended, her concerns like that of the CCSS were well founded. She had already expressed those concerns at the Blue Ribbon meeting during the discussion that followed a presentation on teacher preparation. There she spoke of a CCSS report done by their professional standards committee and sent to the state Commission for Teacher Credentialing, which outlined "the kind of things that would be necessary for people to be prepared as history-social science teachers," if the "new framework" went forward (CDE 1986b, 85).

Still, the council was not about to withdraw their support; Marquis reaffirmed that. But with such a strong presence of CCSS members on the Framework Committee it could hardly be otherwise. They had been present since Clio and influential in shaping the emerging consensus for history, though intending to direct it to a mere revision of the 1981 curriculum. As the CCSS board of directors met at their annual March meeting to draft the letter later sent to Jack Hoar, Jean Claugus, his vice chair, also in attendance at the annual event, unexpectedly crossed paths with a colleague who she hoped would be an ally, one who might aid in the stand taken by the CCSS.

Charlotte Crabtree, a professor of education at UCLA, served on the NCSS board of directors when Claugus was president in 1975. Hoping to blunt the influence of Diane Ravitch, who was advocating the introduction of history into the K–3 curriculum (Ravitch 1987), Claugus invited Professor Crabtree to come to Sacramento, which she did in May. Crabtree brought a perspective to the committee that was lacking. She gave a masterful presentation on social studies curriculum planning for the middle and secondary school years (grades 4–8 and 9–12), based upon her most recent research. Basically, she argued that a student's learning experiences, by design, should be considerate of "the important developmental changes occurring throughout childhood and adolescence" (Crabtree 1983). For the first time the committee had a holistic view of how a K–12 curriculum might conform to a child's natural becoming. Crabtree gave them their first vision of what a "common curriculum in the social studies" might look like (1983, 248). Up to that moment the committee had formed several working groups segmenting the scope and sequence by grades (K–3, 4–8, 9–12), with another focusing on developing an overarching philosophy. Those present were so impressed by Crabtree that they voted unanimously to have her appointed to the committee. But Claugus had not found the ally she imagined. By June, Professor Crabtree had joined the K–3 working group and quickly formed a close collegial relationship with Diane Ravitch.

A TELLING STORY

Summer proved to undercut the "stand" taken by the CCSS that spring. If the council had intended to influence the "direction for the 1987 framework," their strongest allies on the committee made their first strategic misstep. With the likelihood of revision diminishing, maintaining momentum was critical if producing a new document was the goal. To spur this resolution, at the June 12 meeting that proved to be the last meeting of the full committee

that summer, Jack Hoar formed two ad hoc summer committees. One, he assigned to "prepare a draft of the philosophy, [and] major . . . goal statements," the other "to discuss the scope and sequence" for "U.S. and world history . . . in grades 5 through 11" (Claugus 1986). Having assigned "summer responsibilities," the chair went on vacation. By the end of the month other members did too. As power abhors a vacuum, their absence precipitated an irreversible action, which assured Clio's restoration.

Summer's drag on the committee's progress did not apply to the K–3 work group. While the other groups were slowly finding their way, by mid-June the synergy of Charlotte Crabtree and Diane Ravitch coming together resulted in a first draft for a K–3 scope and sequence. Ravitch ceded ground to Crabtree's professional insight about the inability of young children to understand history in conceptual terms beyond their grasp. However, both felt, this did not necessarily preclude its introduction in the primary grades. Rather, they embraced another means: *myth*, through the medium of storytelling. This innovative approach would, in the end, give the new framework a powerful unifying symbol. Following the work on narrative by Kieran Egan, a Canadian philosopher of education, the draft K–3 curriculum employed stories, fairytales, legends, and multicultural folktales that would be used to introduce basic historical concepts (Egan 1982, 1986). Egan was dismissive of the traditional social studies model for the primary grades, called "expanding environments" or "communities," that assumed that a child's sense of place and social relations developed as a series of naturally unfolding steps, beginning with home, then community, then the nation, and finally the world (Stallones 2002).

By mid-July the chair of the Curriculum Commission, Carol Katzman, was looking to another horizon. The goal for July the following year was to present a new framework to mark the bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution (1787–1987). With a draft of the K–12 framework due in December 1986, and with barely a third of the sequence complete, Katzman was compelled to act. A meeting had already been scheduled for July 16 and 17 at her district offices in Beverly Hills. But with Jack Hoar on vacation, she took charge of the summer ad hoc committees. No consensus had been reached on the framework's philosophy—or the rationale that would "drive" the scope and sequence. Some thought that a rationale should come first, before proceeding to the curriculum (Bucholz 1986). But Katzman had no such caution, and on July 16 she urged those present to work out a scope and sequence for the remaining grades, 4–12.

If Hoar had thought that the ad hoc committees would spend the remainder of the summer in leisurely discussion, when the full committee met again on August 24 in Sacramento, he was wholly unprepared for what had occurred in the space of only a few days that past July. While there had

been a general consensus that the new framework would be centered on the study of U.S. and world history, there was no agreement on how much and what the order of either should be. The Model Curriculum Standards (CDE 1985) made recommendations only for grades 9–12 and mandated only three years total of social sciences, one year for U.S. history, another for world civilizations, and a third for a semester each of economics and government (9–10). But another proposal by Matt Downey had been circulating since last January (Downey 1986). On July 16, Downey and David Levering, a professor of history at Cal Poly Pomona, worked up a diagram on large sheets of brown paper tacked to the wall of the conference room for those present to view. Their scope and sequence for grades 4–12 closely followed the developmental framework that Crabtree's research had outlined earlier that spring (Levering 1986).

By superficial comparison, Downey's proposal appeared similar to the 1981 framework and the more recent Model Curriculum Standards. It generally followed the scope and sequence in grades 4–12 of each document. Yet it was unprecedented because it made specific a year-long course of study in history that previously had been only general guidelines. And that specific structure proposed three years of U.S. history and three of world history, plus a year directed to the history of California (grade 4); with each of the seven years integrated with geography.

Departing from the standard survey course of study, where a student would be subjected to covering the entire course of United States history, past to present, in one year, Downey and Levering proposed that it instead be broken up into three chronological segments. Downey had viewed the typical "cycle of survey courses in United States and World history, as a major problem," because the sequence "repeatedly covered much of the same ground and . . . [tended to] have no sense of coherence and direction" (Downey 1988, 199). World history and cultures would have a similar order. Spacing the yearly segments again generally followed the 4–12 sequence of the 1981 framework. There would be U.S. history in grades 5, 8, and 11, with interludes of world history in grades 6, 7, and 10. Grade 9 was an elective year and grade 12, like the 1981 framework, called for a semester each of U.S. government and economics. These interludes, referred to by Downey and Levering as the "hump" model, where a student would progressively return to U.S. and world history, but in later time periods, made their scope and sequence most distinctive. On July 16, the Downey and Levering scope and sequence was adopted.

When the full committee met again in Sacramento on August 24, the recently adopted scope and sequence was driving the agenda, with a first draft due for review in October. The Curriculum Commission charged the committee to work in subcommittees to draft course descriptions for the U.S.

and world sequences. A third group would work on the capstone senior-year courses in economics and government, with members from all three groups working to write a philosophy and rationale for the K–12 curriculum. Hoar had left in June as chair, but returned a lame duck. By year's end, events would prove even less to his liking.

On December 10, 1986, the Framework Committee submitted their first draft for the new History-Social Science Framework to the Curriculum Commission. Downey had composed a very academic, scholarly document (over three hundred pages in length) that synthesized the work of the various writing groups, along with his own copious notes culled from the process. In January 1987, much to the shock of everyone, the Curriculum Commission dissolved the committee, two months short of their yearly mandate. All had assumed they would revise the draft and conduct a review of the final document, meeting with representatives of the CCSS. But the commission had other plans. The Downey "compilation" as it came to be called, though he rightfully thought it a first draft of the framework, was apparently far from what the commission had expected. Because of their intervention, their dilemma was to give final form to what the CCSS believed was now a deeply politicized process, so that all involved would still recognize the work they had done.

The commission's solution pleased no one, further alienating the CCSS. With the approval of the state board, Crabtree and Ravitch were appointed to be the principal writers of the new framework, replacing Matt Downey. The commission had been impressed with the resolve they had shown in completing the K–3 draft, especially when development had begun to drift over the summer. But the choice of Crabtree and Ravitch rested largely upon their decision to infuse the primary curriculum with literature and mythic story telling. The "best history," Ravitch believed, resonated, like myth, as powerful dramatic stories (CDE 1986b, 60). Learning to appreciate good literature early on would prepare children for the study of history, but history presented in an engaging narrative form.

By March, Crabtree and Ravitch had transformed the unwieldy academic prose of the Downey draft into a flowing grand narrative, its master leitmotif emphasizing "the importance of history as a story well told" (CDE 1988, 4). 550 copies of their draft were then circulated for field review by the commission. In May, intensive revision began. At this point, Jean Claugus lobbied successfully to serve in an editorial capacity for the two writers. The field review produced more than seventeen hundred responses (1988, ix). But the former vice chair, in her editorial capacity, also made another unexpected confirmation. As she made revisions, she had an opportunity to make a close comparison of Downey's work with that of Crabtree and Ravitch. There was some speculation that it would be entirely different

from Downey's. What she discovered surprised even her: Downey's scope and sequence, the work of the framework subcommittees, line for line, had been distilled down and transformed. Instead, a powerfully coherent narrative was revealed to her, one that transcended the moribund grade-by-grade outline, typical of a course of study, even as it held intact the spirit, if not the letter, of the Framework Committee's labors.

On June 10, 1987, the State Board of Education held a public hearing to review the third and final draft. That day thirty-nine people presented their evaluations of the History-Social Science Framework (CDE 1987a). Most of them represented school districts, but there was a strong presence of prominent ethnic group associations, who were requesting that their histories be included in the document. The issue of inclusion and recognition would loom even larger when the first state adoption of textbooks for the new framework occurred in 1990. But for now their petitions were overshadowed by the first speaker to address the board that day, a member of the Framework Committee.

Though Pat Geyer claimed to speak "as an individual," the "rejection and alienation" she spoke of, that had been caused by the Curriculum Commission dissolving the Framework Committee, was widely shared by the rest of the CCSS community. Hoping that the reform process had not been completely compromised, she asked the state board to reconvene the committee. Geyer was soon followed by a representative of the CCSS. If Geyer had expressed a general sense of "lost opportunity," the council explained in great detail what they believed had been lost (CDE 1987b). Noting that the present development process left much to be desired, they believed that, in the future, members of the Framework Committee should be drawn from "the huge and diverse pool of professionally competent" California "educators." The "use of non-Californians" (like Diane Ravitch) was, in their opinion, a profound waste of local expertise and talent (Mead-Mezzetta 1987).

Yet the appeal to reason and the future would not deter others. A week later, Hoar sent a letter to Superintendent Honig, his candor hitting the mark. The chair of the Framework Committee noted, that he

> had hoped that our process would itself be a model of those democratic ideals which are central to the Framework. [But when] development was taken from the Committee . . . the process became seriously, and I believe fatally, flawed. The subsequent decision-making process [was] autocratic and arbitrary.

Such "total disregard" for democratic principles, compelled him to make a final request. He then asked Honig that his "name no longer be used or associated with the 1987 History-Social Science Framework" (Hoar 1987).

Unlike Hoar, Geyer, who the following year would be elected president of the CCSS, never wavered in her optimism. Even though the committee was not reconvened and the process was flawed, the product, whether by design or default, was not. Her concern turned to the future. Her goal was to see that CCSS not lose its "chance, to forge a . . . commitment to the Framework and its implementation" (CDE 1987b).

LEADERSHIP LOST

On July 10, the State Board of Education convened again to announce their approval of the new curriculum. Claiming the "framework represent[ed] a consensus on history-social science education among those who prepared the document," they "extended [their] appreciation to each member of the . . . Committee." But in the acknowledgment section of the document, where the names of the Framework Committee appeared, Jack Hoar's name was missing. Superintendent's Honig's revival of history in the social studies had taken just under a decade, but its realization had come with a price (CDE 1988, v; xi–xiv).

Even though Honig had remained a distant observer to the committee's deliberations, the intervention of the Curriculum Commission in July appeared to the leadership of the CCSS as tantamount to a coup by the superintendent. But the council's apparent shock at the exercise of legitimate power, like the posturing of Hoar's civic populism, seemed to occur in a strange state of disconnection from political reality. For any of the leaders in the CCSS who had worked closely with Honig since the 1981 framework, his agenda was clear. In keeping with the title of the office, when elected superintendent of public instruction he acted. Yet, if true, his actions severely strained the consensus for reform of the social studies he had painstakingly built up over the years. In pursuit of a higher good Honig had lost sight of something more basic.

Given the early stand by the CCSS against replacement of the 1981 framework, he decided not to risk their full participation in the final revisions, as Hoar had intended. But had Hoar truly believed in the deliberative process, he would not have gone away on vacation. That he did, assuming the summer could be spent in open-ended discussion, virtually assured it would be seen as a delay. By year's end the commission turned to Charlotte Crabtree and Diane Ravitch, not to complete their coup, but more out of genuine fear that an acceptable finished product would never materialize in the spring, if Matt Downey remained as author.

Still, Honig's leadership had been compromised. The interventions, however warranted, alienated those critical to making the new framework a success in the place where it truly mattered, the classroom. On the eve

of its approval by the State Board of Education, capital columnist for the *Sacramento Bee*, Peter Schrag, wondered whether Honig, like the framework, would become "a victim of its own excessive ambitions" (1987, B12–13). In letter, history may have been officially restored, but the breach of trust with the state's social studies community would not so easily be healed. Certainly, Honig's ambition to gain national attention for his reforms made him less concerned with the CCSS. As the Blue Ribbon Committee indicated, his campaign to advance history in the schools was never intended to be a local affair. During the field review, he made sure draft copies went to prominent "university scholars nationwide, and to educators in other states." He was even quite willing to correspond with the consul general of Israel to discuss and consider possible changes to the draft document (Honig 1987).

One of the first national educators to weigh in on the importance of the new framework was Chester Finn Jr., assistant secretary for the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) and a cultural conservative who was a colleague of Diane Ravitch. But its significance was cast by Finn in terms more fitting for the Center of Disease Control than the DOE. Perhaps the secretary's political distance from the state allowed such candor. The new curriculum, he believed, should be seen "as a symbol, [that was] hugely important. . . . In due course, it will affect policy [in other states] in one way or another. . . . California will surely lead the nation in . . . draining . . . the dismal swamp of social studies" (ASCD 1988a, 1988b). Finn's desire to inoculate the school body politic was shared by Ravitch. Their major statement on restoring history to the public school curriculum appeared the same year as the new framework. *What Do Our Seventeen-Year-Olds Know?* was the first national assessment on history and literature, which indicated that high school students were deficient in "factual knowledge of American history" (Jenness 1990, 12). Earlier publications by these two national leaders of the Educational Excellence Network declared there was only one sure cure. In the conclusion of *Against Mediocrity* they argued that

> the phrase "social studies" should be banished from the high school curriculum. What should be taught is history, and this must consist fundamentally of the history of the United States, the enveloping history of Western civilization, and the parallel history of non-Western civilizations. . . . Everything that is worth learning that is commonly found under the rubric of "social studies" can be taught and learned as history. (Finn, Ravitch, and Fancher 1984, 260)

Finn and Ravitch's *animus* to even the *idea* of the social studies was emphatically not shared by one who had played a key role in the 1981 framework and whose conceptualization of basic civic values greatly influenced the

multicultural perspective that Crabtree and Ravitch conceived as a significant characteristic defining the rationale of the new framework. Freeman Butts, the Clio Conference participant and author, was troubled by the tack Finn and Ravitch had taken in *Against Mediocrity*.

> Their parting shot about social studies alienates a large and important body of teachers organized under the banner of the National Council for Social Studies. Many would argue that a blanket condemnation of social studies does not serve the cause of improving the civic knowledge, values, or skills that U.S. youth need to contribute to the democratic ideals America proclaims. (Butts 1989, 9)

The sense of crisis that overtook the CCSS after Downey was replaced and his draft was entrusted to Ravitch was not an unreasonable response, since they were well aware of her intemperate position. If Honig brought Ravitch to California to gain national attention, he succeeded. She was a prominent spokesperson, viewing the framework as "a significant step toward the national revival of the teaching and learning of history," one that "represent[ed] a real departure from the overwhelming majority of state curricula that are in force today" (ASCD 1988b). But for her, too, the committee was just a "step." Her work done, the "non-Californian" departed.

Later though, she and Downey were appointed to a National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS) commission to reconsider the place of history in the NCSS curriculum. The NCSS brought together professional historians from the American Historical Association (AHA), the Carnegie Foundation, and the Organization of American Historians (OAH). The commission's final report: *Charting a Course: Social Studies for the 21st Century* (1989) recommended that the K–12 social studies curriculum be history centered: a scope and sequence organized primarily on the study of United States and world history, integrated with geography and social sciences. But the NCSS rejected the report and, unlike California, took a different direction.

Colleague and cowriter Charlotte Crabtree's ties to Sacramento were not as shallow. Her work, especially in the last stages of revision, brought her into close contact with the state board. More so than Ravitch, she was seen as a mediator, always seeking common ground. Honig needed such a voice on the Curriculum Commission, if he was to bring back the CCSS leadership. She was soon appointed; capping her term with the first history-social science textbook adoption in 1991. By then, she had served with Ravitch on the Bradley Commission on History in the Schools (Gagnon 1989). Soon, without leaving California, Crabtree's path was about to cross

with Lynne Cheney, chair of the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). A distant admirer of the new History-Social Science Framework, Cheney was eager to advance the common culture imperative at the national level, through the creation of national history standards. Without knowing it, the good professor of education was about to become the first casualty in a cold war over culture (Cheney 1992; Symcox 2002).

THE REFORMATION OF REFORM

When the *History-Social Science Framework for California Public Schools, K–12*, was adopted by the State Board of Education on July 10, 1987, Joseph Carrabino "seconded the motion" to adopt (SBE 1987). After Deukmejian became governor, the board that Honig and Kirst served on was gradually filled with his appointees. Carrabino was one of the first. By the time Carrabino became president of the board in 1990, he and Honig were locked in a power struggle. The conflict arose over jurisdiction and control of policy. Carrabino contended that "the board controls it," and the superintendent "just implements" it. Honig argued that the state constitution was at best ambiguous on the matter and that policy formation was a shared responsibility.

The conflict had emerged in 1988, when Francis Laufenberg, then president of the board, testified before the Little Hoover Commission (LHC), asking for an investigation of Department of Education (CDE) budgetary practices. As Honig's systemic reform progressed, Laufenberg became concerned about control of the state's annual allocations for education, which were largely dispensed through the Department of Education. After Laufenberg testified, the Hoover Commission began its own study, basing it, in part, on a report Laufenberg released in March 1988, which reviewed the constitutional and statutory provisions regulating the board's jurisdictional relationship with the superintendent (SBE 1988). The following year, Laufenberg issued a "Mission and Goals Statement," stating that the board's mission "is to provide leadership through the development and support of educational and legislative policy" (SBE 1989).

After Carrabino was appointed president of the state board in January 1990, the Little Hoover Commission released its report that February. Carrabino then used the report, "K–12 Education in California: A Look at Some Policy Issues," to assert his position that the state board had control over the CDE budget and operations. Then he issued a new five-point policy, demanding that Honig implement it (SBE 1990a). Honig denied that there was any conflict, yet he was forced to respond. On October 10, 1990, Honig submitted to Carrabino his response, which attempted to refute the

commission's findings, claiming he was not bound to implement the Board's new policy. The superintendent asserted that

> The finding is a distorted and incomplete analysis of a complex governmental relationship between two constitutional entities which gives the misleading impression that the Superintendent has usurped powers relegated to the Board and that he has failed to follow the Board's direction. The report also fails to note that the relationship between the Board and the Superintendent has generally been harmonious, and marked with a spirit of cooperation. (SBE 1990b)

But the suggestion that harmony reigned between the board and the superintendent was undercut by the department's point-by-point refutation of the commission's report. What followed was purely adversarial. By July 1991, the board decided to take Honig to court. With the backing of Deukmejian, Carrabino hired an outside law firm to clarify the "constitutional and statutory rights" of each office (SBE 1991a). By November "a writ of mandate" was filed with the state Supreme Court, "to force Honig to follow directions from the Board" (SBE 1991b). The court ruled in the board's favor. Honig appealed. On February 18, 1993, the Court of Appeals for the Third Appellate District rendered its opinion.

The court ordered the "State Superintendent to implement disputed policies adopted by the Board in the fall of 1990" (SBE 1993). Honig's systemic school reform was now under total control of the board. Once Carrabino gained access to the department's budget, it was revealed that Honig had awarded contracts to a Bay area group, the Quality Education Project, which was founded and administered by the superintendent's wife, Nancy Honig. Conflict of interest charges were soon filed and later that year Honig was found guilty of four felony charges. Although years later the charges were reduced on appeal to misdemeanors, the conviction forced Honig from office (Bernstein 1996; Coronado 1996). The visionary school reformer, so prone to evoke the wisdom of ancient Greece, was now consumed by this self-made tragedy. It was a great loss for California schools but even more so for the superintendent.

A FRAMEWORK REGAINED

At the November 1994 meeting of the State Board of Education, a year after Honig's departure, the Curriculum Commission presented its recommendation to reapprove the 1987 History-Social Science Framework. In 1990, the

commission had recommended to the state board that the mandated seven-year cycle of curriculum renewal be amended. A "new six-year schedule of revision" would be followed. If it was determined, through "current research and practice in [a] subject area," that no "major changes in direction" were necessary, a standing curriculum could be reapproved with minor revisions (SBE 1994a). Over the course of the year, the commission had met with many individuals and groups involved with implementing the 1987 framework to decide if such a "change in direction" was necessary (SBE 1994b). The commission was assisted in their statewide consultations by a veteran administrator at the California Department of Education.

Diane Brooks, who by the time she retired in 1998, would work for three state superintendents of public instruction, had been intimately involved with the framework from the start. In 1976, the former principal and special programs administrator for Siskiyou County went to work for Wilson Riles. When Honig was elected, she headed up the History-Social Science and Visual Performing Arts unit. Present at the Clio Conference and the Blue Ribbon Committee, she was the main CDE representative providing administrative support to the History-Social Science Framework Committee. Witness to all, her unit was closely involved in the field review process that brought the final draft of the new framework to completion in July 1987.

When the framework made its debut in 1988, her unit organized eleven statewide Regional Awareness Conferences to introduce the new history-centered curriculum to a skeptical audience. But, by 1994, her implementation efforts were beginning to pay off. Throughout that year, she worked closely with the Curriculum Commission to see that the framework was renewed. Critical to this effort was her close collaboration with the California Council for the Social Studies (CCSS) in the design of a survey to appraise the implementation of the framework. The council conducted the survey at their annual March meeting, also collecting information from selected board and committee members and several local councils. They received over one hundred responses. The intent of the survey was "to identify suggested refinements and improvements, for effective framework implementation" (CDE 1994a). In July, Brooks also received input from 124 teachers at summer institutes. And that same month, the national Council on Islamic Education submitted a detailed assessment of the framework to the Curriculum Commission concerning the appropriate historical representation of Islam and Arabic culture (CDE 1994b, 1994c). In addition, over the next two years the state board "conducted regional hearings throughout the state to learn from educators and the public about the effectiveness of the frameworks" (CDE 1997, vii). In 1996 they decided to reapprove the 1987 document with the mere addition of several appendices.

POLITICAL TIME

Don't change; change takes time! To make the case for continued implementation, Diane Brooks had culled that pithy slogan from the surveys and public submissions to the Curriculum Commission. Even the CCSS supported this opinion. Since 1987, teachers and school districts had made the commitment to introduce the new history-centered curriculum into the classroom. They were hoping the state would not undercut their efforts, as they had before. It was now apparent that the new six-year cycle was far too short, more like a first stage, if a concerted statewide implementation was to successfully proceed.

As Honig's political passing indicated, the politics of curriculum reform could change overnight. But real-time reform in the classroom meant a long-term commitment of people and resources. It had taken nearly a decade to reintegrate the social studies community. In that time, a consensus had tacitly emerged, in part through the skillful efforts of Diane Brooks. Her work was gratefully acknowledged when the California Council for the Social Studies (CCSS) presented her with the Hilda Taba Award in 1996 (see Taba 1967). In the spring 2000 CCSS journal, *Social Studies Review*, Pat Geyer, who served on the 1987 Framework Committee, wrote an editorial expressing the council's appreciation for Diane's leadership and service (Geyer 2000).

If Honig's style of visionary leadership matched his systemic school reform model, Brooks's moderate, conciliatory course, applauded by Geyer, made it possible to implement what Honig had envisioned. In actuality, between 1987 and 1993, the superintendent had managed, with the support of the state legislature, to put in place the necessary policies to make systemic reform sustainable, but only if funding was forthcoming. But the superintendent's ambitious plans drew him into an escalating confrontation with Governor Deukmejian. Unlike the pragmatic Senator Gary Hart, Honig, to his undoing, did not know how to cut his losses, even when it was apparent the state board was moving deliberately to challenge his agenda. What *was* salvageable was carried on largely by the creative initiative of the CDE.

Part II of this volume deals with the political history of the three legislative initiatives necessary for systemic reform to run its course. A core curriculum alone was insufficient. Three major "leverage points" were necessary to support classroom learning and instruction: teacher professional development; a statewide system of testing to assess individual student performance; and instructional materials that were aligned to the core curriculum.

For roughly a decade, from 1988 to 1998, there occurred an unusual alignment between these three policies and their execution. The linkage of

these measures, in large part, contributed to the persistence of the History-Social Science Framework curriculum reform. This was due in no small part to a shared understanding, call it a reform mindset, that guided leaders like Diane Brooks as they received the legislative mandates and policy directives for these three initiatives. This shared pattern of institutional memory, sustaining what was left of Honig's systemic reform, was tenuous at best and, as political events in Sacramento unfolded, all too brief. Yet that understanding sustained Brooks and gave a remarkable coherence to the curriculum reform in history-social science, which she now led by default.

Pat Geyer appears to have shared Diane's insight. In the *Social Studies Review* (2000) article highlighting Diane Brooks's career she recounts that when Delaine Eastin became superintendent of public instruction in 1994, she appointed Brooks director of curriculum frameworks and instructional resources. Despite this, Eastin appeared to have no understanding as to why Honig had organized the department the way he did, using curriculum frameworks to mount his systemic reform. In fact, she made major changes in the structure. As Geyer recounts, "No longer were there curriculum units; the services were organized according to Eastin's vision of how school districts were organized: elementary, middle school, and high school divisions" (Geyer 2000, 76). By the time Brooks had departed the department in 1998 that shared pattern of memory was lost to all but a few, who would carry on Diane's "first passion, History-Social Science." Remarkably, that passion remains undiminished.

That period from 1988 to 1998 is recounted in the next two chapters. When Diane Brooks mounted the "Don't change; change takes time" campaign in 1994 in order to have the 1987 framework renewed, she relied heavily upon the recommendations she received from teachers. For it is these collaborative ventures with the state's social studies community that made implementation of the History-Social Science Framework successful. Early on she saw that Honig's curriculum reforms would not gain acceptance unless teachers were brought into the process and made stakeholders. Though the eleven regional awareness conferences held in 1988 revealed that teachers thought the new framework was "do-able and makes sense," their overriding concern was how they would acquire the "appropriate instructional resources and professional development" to accomplish its' goals (Brooks 1997).

By 1994, that concern remained unchanged. The "best implementation" occurred when teachers had the opportunity for professional development where they could share their efforts in the classroom with others. In this regard, Brooks saw that to make a vital connection with the framework, teachers also had to connect with their peers. The only real measure of success was simply the extent to which teachers were seen as central to implementation, such that a professional community was established upon

which teachers could rely and to which they could return as a resource. All else follows from that principle of making teachers central to the reform process. Senator Hart knew this; so did Diane Brooks. In 1988, as the new framework made its debut, this shared insight moved them closer to that center.

PART II

Agents

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CHAPTER 4

A Community of Memory

During summer 1974 a small group of teachers met on the Berkeley campus. Small by comparison to the hundreds of teachers attending the Clio Conference a decade later, they were present for the first summer institute of the Bay Area Writing Project (BAWP). By 1984, the project already proved to have an incalculable impact on teacher's professional lives across the curriculum and, even nationally, beyond California. James Gray, the one who brought them together, had been working toward this special moment for quite some time. Gray had taught English literature in Bay area high schools since the 1960s. Even as the Free Speech Movement (FSM) opened up a *new public* space on the Berkeley campus, among undergraduates the right to speak freely could not gloss over their inability to write.

The decline of writing became evident to Gray through his colleagues at Berkeley and a wider circle of Bay area English teachers, many of whom he trained. Those on the faculty of the English, Rhetoric, and Subject A departments had observed this decline (Gray 2000, 46). Subject A was the test given to all incoming students. Subject A was given for writing; B was for Latin, and C math. If a student did not pass Subject A, which consisted of writing an essay (a response to selected university-level prose), they could take a remedial summer course before entering in the fall. The "writing problem" became sorely evident in 1973 when only half of the incoming class passed. Having been witness to the coming and going of earlier literacy-driven reforms, Gray was struck by the tendency in all these efforts to emphasize reading. Literacy meant the ability to read; and writing was rarely considered integral to its development. Gray thought otherwise. But the inability to see the basic connection between reading and writing, he felt, was part of a larger problem that was reflective of the pedagogical culture of schools and the university.

Invariably, whenever reforms were proposed, teachers were the last to hear about it. This exclusion from the reform process was most evident in the ways schools approached staff development. As a high school teacher, Gray attended numerous one-day "inspirational" sessions, just before the

beginning of the school year, which consisted of "fun" and "food," but "zero staff development" (Gray 2000, 48). Though there was an opportunity for "good talk" with colleagues back from summer vacation, that talk did not continue throughout the school year, nor was it cultivated, except perhaps in one-shot "workshops," often imposed on teachers by well-meaning principals but doing little to bring teachers together. The culture of the school tended to work against that possibility, making "regular, well-planned staff development programs [which] focused on teaching and the content of teaching" a rare exception (2000, 49).

Gray's approach to teacher education had evolved since his university days at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, where he received his MA in English literature after World War II. Early on he renounced an academic career, choosing instead to become a teacher. His choice was guided by a love for the profession that is striking in its idealism and conviction. In this regard, his evocation of entering the school where he first taught is revealing. "I loved the unmistakable school smell. I loved my classroom and loved having it all to myself" (2000, 13). But it was a self that was sensitively aware of others, the students whose lives he would have a role in shaping, but most of all his peers.

In 1953 Gray moved to California and the Bay area and soon found a position teaching high school English in San Leandro, a position he held to 1961, when he was invited to become an English supervisor for the teacher credential program at the UC Berkeley School of Education.

Gray thought Berkeley's program exceptional, because its "longstanding policy" ran counter to the traditional top-down pedagogy common to the university, a policy that in Gray's experience was also typical of school organizations (Gray 2000, 25). What characterized both was how they tended to devalue the role of teachers and for that matter teaching in general. Instead, the School of Education's policy was to have the best teachers (not professors), train prospective teachers. On the basis of this simple but revolutionary idea of "teachers-teaching-teachers," Gray envisioned the pedagogical model of *partnership*, which became foundational to the Bay Area Writing Project (BAWP). Partnership, as he conceived it, was an attempt to bring schools and the university, teachers and professors together (2000, 25). In the case of Subject A, if the university was to improve undergraduate student writing, professors would have to work with high school teachers to find a solution to the problem (2000, 52).

But the model had wider implications. For professional development in schools, it sought to create community, bringing teachers together where they could share their classroom experiences and present their best instructional practices to one another, in order to work out solutions to problems

that were common to classroom curriculum and instruction. Yet beyond that, the policy confirmed what Gray had learned by trial and error but which was rarely done, simply because it went against the grain of school organization and university culture. The "sharing culture" that Gray worked hard to create in programs prior to BAWP, which was fundamental to the idea of partnership, intended not only to level the social hierarchies of the school and university but to change fundamental perceptions about the way teachers were regarded. Over the years, the programs that Gray found exemplary were the ones that made teachers feel valued, such that what they did in the classroom was recognized, respected, and honored (2000, 15). Upon that appreciable difference, Gray believed, the future of public education rested.

> I knew that if there was ever going to be reform in American education, it was going to take place in the nation's classrooms. And because teachers—and no one else—were in those classrooms, I knew that for reform to succeed, teachers had to be at the center. It became a burning issue with me that teachers were not seen as the key players in reform or the true experts on what went on in their classrooms. (2000, 50)

If teachers were a critical leverage point for reform, making their classroom expertise relevant to professors was an even greater perceptual hurdle to overcome. Gray's early attempts to bring these two "alien universes" into contact had not been successful. The kind of dialogue necessary for his *teacher-teaching-teachers* model was a reflex unknown to most professors, at ease only in the lecture hall or seminar room (2000, 46). A similar lack of insight and acceptance had stymied early efforts to implement the model.

In 1968 Gray mounted a prototype of the writing project, the California English Teacher Specialist Program, through the state department of education in Sacramento. But in 1970 it was abruptly canceled when Wilson Riles became superintendent of public instruction (2000, 30). The priorities of the new superintendent (in early-childhood education) Gray later thought fortuitous. The goal of the specialist program, which was to create a "cadre" of English teachers that would then build a statewide network, was far too ambitious a goal given the program's limited resources and its weak administrative control located in Sacramento (2000, 31). In hindsight, Gray saw that effective education reform should best begin locally, with "teachers at the center," building state networks from the bottom up, with the writing project providing access for teachers to the university.

CENTERING IN SACRAMENTO

Without the strong support of Berkeley's provost and dean of the College of Letters and Science the Project could not have been launched in the summer of 1974, though it was not long before a consensus had formed among university administrators who recognized the need for the project (2000, 51). But additional support came from an unexpected source, Sacramento. A far-seeing, just-elected member of the state assembly, Gary Hart, secured core funding for the project. Within a decade the consensus over Gray's simple but powerful idea would extend far beyond the Bay area, even as it continued to shape Sacramento's legislative efforts to reform teacher education.

With the passage of Senate Bill (SB) 813 in 1983, there commenced a series of legislative and state university initiatives (often in collaboration), which systemically altered the way state-approved teacher education programs were organized and conducted, all with the larger intent to raise the professional status of teachers before and after they entered the classroom. These initiatives often reflected, in letter or spirit, the basic working principles of the Writing Project. A central component of SB 813, written by Gary Hart, then chair of the state Senate Education Committee, was the California Mentor Teacher Program. The program provided money to school districts for in-service education. Seasoned expert teachers received recompense over and above their regular salary to give support and training to their novice peers. The year 1983 also marked the release of "Excellence in Professional Education." The report issued by the chancellor's office of the California State University (CSU) system called for comprehensive reform of the state's teacher education programs (Morey 1990, 2). Like the legislature and the Department of Education, the chancellor's office was thinking of teacher education reform, for which, in systemic terms, the CSU system was largely responsible. Again, Gray's notion of partnership informed the initiatives that followed.

In 1985, with funding from the Hewlett Foundation (after Governor Deukmejian vetoed a bill to fund it), state senator Hart helped to sponsor a two-year study, "Who Will Teach Our Children" (CCTP 1985). Among the more prominent recommendations the study called for "restructuring the teaching career and the establishment of rigorous professional standards" (CCTP 1985, 7). The 1985 report, often referred to as the Commons Commission Report (its chairman: Dorman Commons), also called to "redesign the school as a more productive workplace for teachers and students," recommending "professional development programs [that would focus] on educational improvement" (CCTP 1985, 7).

The answer to "Who Will Teach Our Children" by the state legislature was to fund "a number of cooperative initiatives" that involved collaboration

among the "various educational segments" (Honig 1990, iv). In 1986 the first "inter-segmental effort" began. The CSU system along with the state Department of Education and urban public schools formed five collaborative projects with the "expressed purpose to . . . support new teachers in inner-city schools" (Morey 1990, 4). This was followed in 1988 by the California New Teacher Project, which funded fifteen projects where schools could form partnerships, collaborating with campuses in the California State University and the University of California system, or private colleges and universities, county school districts, and even teachers' associations (Morey 1990, 4). As the author of the "Excellence in Professional Education" report observes, "by 1989 [California] had a variety of new teacher programs funded locally, by the state and federal and private foundation sources," which were "trying to implement [locally inspired] innovative ideas" all with the goal of "assisting new teachers" (1990, 4–5).

As important as these reform initiatives were for California teachers, the decade was decisively capped by what is arguably the most innovative piece of reform legislation coming out of the *Nation at Risk* era in California. For Gary Hart in 1988, the source of that innovation was still James Gray. In crafting Senate Bill (SB) 1882 Hart (and cosponsor Senator Rebecca Morgan, 1984–1993) modeled the California Subject Matter Projects to some extent on Gray's Bay Area Writing Project and the California Mathematics Project, which had been established by statute in 1983 (CSMP-TR, 8). Like the writing project, the goal of SB 1882 was to create a professional community where "elementary and secondary school" teachers would come together with "higher education faculty" and educational researchers (LCD 1988, 234). The "cooperative endeavors" envisioned in the legislation had three main objectives:

1. Identify exemplary teaching practices.
2. Examine and develop research on learning, knowledge, and educational materials.
3. Give consideration to the state-recommended curriculum framework in the subject matter area, with particular attention to the learning needs and styles of an increasingly diverse student population, many of whom are underachieving at present. (LCD 1988, 234)

If curriculum was Superintendent Honig's crucial leverage point of reform, SB 1882 conceived it as a dynamic process rather than simply an official product, a document that could come alive through a creative interchange drawing teachers, typically institutionally isolated, into a working relationship and collaboration with university faculty and researchers. There they

could share and draw upon each others' professional experience and subject matter expertise, but also on a wider community of scholars and peers supported by an evolving statewide network. For Honig, as for Hart, the path to excellence led to the university. By opening that path, Senate Bill (SB) 1882 not only connected teachers to the resources of academe but made the K–12 system, in effect, an additional segment linking the K–12 base to the tripartite superstructure of higher education.

Governance of the Subject Matter Projects (SMP) followed a similar path. With the "concurrence of the Trustees of the California State University and the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and in consultation with other institutions of higher educations, . . . the Regents of the University of California would administer the Projects" (LCD 1988, 233–34). By 1993, SB 1882 had established five new projects in foreign languages, literature, and the arts in 1989, history-social science in 1990, and physical education-health in 1993, in addition to the already existing California writing, mathematics, and international studies projects. Each Subject Matter Project had a policy board composed of fifteen members. Each board was largely appointed by the higher education segments. The president of the University of California and chancellors of the California State University, California Community College, and the Association of Independent California Colleges and Universities each appointed two representatives, "one of whom would be a faculty member in the discipline addressed by the project," the other presumably a teacher. The California Postsecondary Education Commission and professional organizations of teachers, like the California Council for the Social Studies (CCSS), could each select one member. But the remaining five members for each policy board were selected by the superintendent of public instruction, "four of whom" would be "classroom teachers in the subject area addressed by the project." The larger intent being to assemble policy boards with a broad but balanced selection of university faculty and classroom teachers (LCD 1988, 235).

SB 1882 gave bureaucratic form to Gray's ideal of partnership through the policy boards. If the operative term for governance of the SMP was "concurrence," then each project board was similarly intended to bring together teachers and academics for a common purpose: the administration and funding of local project sites. With the Subject Matter Projects the University of California made a radical departure from the academic insularity of the 1960 Master Plan. Many project sites would often begin as partnerships with departments on campuses in the UC and CSU systems. However resisted, over time the pedagogical linkage between the state's K–12 classrooms and the university would become apparent. SB 1882 opened that door.

On paper SB 1882 appeared to give life to Gray's pedagogy. But the SMP ideal was already compromised. For behind the legislation was Hart's

reliance on Bill Honig. The superintendent and UC president, David Gardner, now recognized as the chair of the National Commission on Excellence in Education, negotiated the funding mechanism and the governance structure for the projects. But the political partnership of Gardner and Honig put Gray's ideal of partnership at risk. Honig's hand in the legislation also made him influential in the selection of the first six executive directors. Phil Darrow, first executive director of the California Mathematics Project, was a former deputy superintendent for Honig. The superintendent and his former deputy thought James Gray a romantic. Teachers needed to be properly trained in their discipline and the new Subject Matter Projects would be the vehicle. Gray's intellectual partnership, a community of equals, of teachers and faculty coming together to learn and share from each other, was in Honig's view far removed from the reality of the classroom, as was his own agenda. Perhaps the process of writing was conducive to Gray's ideal of teachers-teaching-teachers, but disciplines like math and science, in Honig's view, required the more traditional pedagogical model of expert and novice. On paper, partnership may have been the overarching symbol of SB 1882, but for Honig the real goal of the legislation was implementation. The Subject Matter Projects was the engine for Honig's train of curriculum implementation.

THE BROOKS' CADRE

During the regional Framework Awareness Conferences held to introduce the new History-Social Science Curriculum Framework, many of the over four thousand social studies teachers in attendance responded to a survey administered by Diane Brooks. A majority stated unanimously that if implementation of the new framework was to succeed, two things were "absolutely essential." The state would have to make a strong commitment to professional staff development and it would have to convince publishers that new textbooks and instructional materials designed for the framework should be made.

But even if those conditions could be met, Brooks saw that even more fundamental to this commitment was a wholehearted support for the new framework. Implementation required true believers. Having gone to great efforts to "mend fences" with the leadership of the CCSS—it was she who made sure that Jean Claugus was an editor for the final drafts of the 1987 framework—Brooks was intent on bringing together the state's best social studies teachers, who would serve as leaders to forge that commitment.

Over the summers that followed, the Department of Education sponsored several summer institutes, all held on the UCLA campus. Weeks after the

State Board of Education approved the new framework (on July 10, 1987), a three-week institute on the Constitution and the principles of democracy began at the UCLA Law School. Brooks recruited teachers from throughout the state. The institute was intended as the "first in-service on the [new] framework" and she viewed the teachers selected as the "first representatives" that would "help get the message out." That message was carefully scripted and dramatically staged for the teachers in attendance. One afternoon during the institute they were ushered into a law school lecture hall for an unscheduled event. In ceremonious fashion, Diane Ravitch and Charlotte Crabtree quietly entered with the new framework in hand and began a presentation on it to a hushed audience. This summer institute, like the ones that followed, produced a cadre of teachers who would later play key state roles in the framework's implementation. Among them were a future executive director of the History-Social Science Project, two members of the state Curriculum Commission, one who later would play *the* crucial role in the development of the History-Social Science Content Standards, and a future deputy superintendent for the California Department of Education.

The three-week summer institutes continued through 1990. While viewed by some in attendance as a "precursor" to Senate Bill (SB) 1882, it was but one strategic component in the Department of Education's long-range plan to implement the framework. The next four to five years were seen as a critical window of opportunity, using the summer institutes to reach as many teachers as possible, but at the same time making the sixty institute fellowships (the number of teachers selected) highly competitive. The following year, on November 1 and 2, 1988, Diane Brooks brought together "a special ad hoc task group to rethink the directions for framework implementation." With former Framework Committee members participating, the group developed a comprehensive five-year plan. *The History Project in California* (HPC) set forth priorities in two areas: K–12 instructional resources and teacher professional development (HPC 1988).

Though the summer institute was the standard model of professional development for Gray's writing project, the HPC proposal adapted the institute format for teacher training. The first priority was "to address the needs of elementary and middle school teachers" (K–8) in 1989, to be "followed by a similar proposal for teachers in grades 9–12 in 1990." These priority groups would have "in-depth training on the content" of the new framework "in a planned sequence over the next five years," beginning with a summer institute for K–8 teachers in July, 1989 (HPC, 1988). Like the one that would follow in 1990, the intensive three-week institute had teachers working in small groups collaborating with master teachers and academic experts. Their objective was to design instructional support materials that they would later field test during the following school year. The end product of this work was

a series of *course models* for each grade level, instructional support materials that would follow the unit scope and sequence of the new History-Social Science Framework. From these first summer institutes, it was expected that a "truly gifted" group of leaders would emerge who would conform to the expert model of teachers "as trainers of trainers." These "charter members" of the California History Project would be the nucleus of the department's efforts to influence the direction of the Subject Matter Projects.

A COMMUNITY OF TEACHERS *AND* TRAINERS

In more circumspect politically risk-free moments Bill Honig was inclined to describe his systemic curriculum reform as a freight train. Realizing that his political opportunity for reform was brief, he would use his office to push through as much change as the system would bear, creating the kind of political momentum that, like a freight train, would be nearly unstoppable. But Diane Brooks' proposal for a California History Project was to some extent already checked. Aware that implementation of the new curriculum frameworks "was not generic to the legislation" (SB 1882), she would have to share a table with those having a different vision for the History-Social Science Project.

Robert Polkinghorn was hired by the University of California Office of the President (UCOP) in 1989 to work on one of President Gardner's new projects. As director of the University-School Education Improvement Initiative, part of his job involved managing the new Subject Matter Projects (SMP). A recent doctoral student at Stanford, Polkinghorn's involvement with the SMP grew and then became the topic of his dissertation. *Institutional Poker: Developing and Sustaining State System Collaboration* (1998) was "an exploratory case study" that attempted to "map the dynamics of inter-institutional partnerships involving state education agencies (CDE) and state systems of higher education" (UC and CSU) in their establishment and maintenance of the California Subject Matter Projects. For nearly a decade (1989–1997), he was both principal investigator and subject under study. The goal of his research was to identify the "factors sustaining the cooperation and commitment of the principal partners of this collaboration." He found that three such factors were necessary to sustain long-term collaboration. Stressing the interpersonal dimension of school organizations, "cooperative behavior" and "inter-organizational collaboration" was supported first of all by strongly articulated "core structures and procedures," in effect largely in place if the governance structures of the SB 1882 legislation are considered. Such structures are supportive of the second factor: "an inter-related set of personal commitments, symbolic benefits (real or perceived),

good working relationships, and strategic opportunism" between the three organizational partners. The last factor is most intriguing for it seems to suggest how Polkinghorn perceived his own role. Collaboration was facilitated by "an effective broker operating between the [three] systems . . . to negotiate transactions and reduce costs associated with actual and desired exchanges between systems" (Polkinghorn 1998).

The first major exchange occurred February 23, 1990, in Sacramento. Polkinghorn called together the History-Social Science Study Group. In addition to UC, CSU, and CDE representatives (Diane Brooks and Fred Tempes, Honig's deputy superintendent of the curriculum division), leaders from the state's social science and humanities professional organizations (history, geography, economics, international studies) attended. But of critical importance to the exchange was the presence of Pat Geyer and Carol Marquis, past and present presidents of the California Council for the Social Studies (CCSS). The meeting was viewed as a preliminary step to selecting an advisory board and executive director for the project. The group's role was "to establish a conceptual foundation for the project" (HSSP-SG, 1990). Nine guiding principles emerged from the discussion. Each revealed the formative forces at play that would the shape the project:

1. The Role of the Related Disciplines and Interdisciplinarity.
2. The Relationship of the History-Social Science Project (HSSP) to the History-Social Science Framework.
3. The History-Social Science Project and Student Diversity.
4. The Role of Post-Secondary Faculty in the HSSP.
5. Site Development for the HSSP.
6. Selection of Teacher Participants for the HSSP.
7. Assessment of the HSSP.
8. Pedagogical Methods of the HSSP.
9. Overall Purpose of the HSSP. (1990, 1–7)

Of the nine, only two produced a rigorous exchange of views: the role of the social sciences and humanities (interdisciplinarity) to the project and the relationship of the project to the framework. Polkinghorn found himself in the minority when he suggested, in language suggestive of the original SB 1882 legislation, that the Subject Matter Projects should merely "give attention to" the History-Social Science Framework. In his view, the real work of the projects was teacher professional development, following the

lead of James Gray as reflected in SB 1882. But that was not the position held by the majority. When asked to state what their position was, it could not have been clearer: "We are *not* the Writing Project."

Fred Tempes, like his colleague Diane Brooks, called for a more pragmatic interpretation of the legislation. For the deputy superintendent, K–12 curriculum reform was the "primary objective" of the History-Social Science Project, with the framework its "central document." Though there was a difference of opinion on how the social sciences and the humanities should be integrated at each grade level, the *principle* that came to dominate discussion rested upon a fundamental proposition: that the centrality of the framework to the project be affirmed. In shaping this consensus, the CDE was not alone, with Pat Geyer and Carol Marquis their most articulate allies. Taking a long view of the reform, the current president of the CCSS stressed "that there had been plenty of compromise and discussion during the writing of the Framework, but [that] it was critical to support the Framework [now], because . . . *progress* in the field depended on strong support for [its] implementation" (HSSP-SG 1990, 3–4). That was the last time the study group met. Polkinghorn presented the guiding principles to the Board of Regents, which met in March. The next important exchange began after the advisory policy board was selected over the summer, after which the search began for the first History-Social Science Project executive director. For Diane Brooks, it meant the department had to maneuver in order to make sure that whoever was chosen was supportive of the new framework.

UCLA AT THE CENTER

Having summer institutes at UCLA was not happenstance. Beginning with Kit Salter, the UCLA geography professor who served on the Model Curriculum Standards Committee, but especially after Charlotte Crabtree's service on the Framework Committee, UCLA came to play a fortuitous role in the history-social science reform, one then that even Brooks could not foresee. Her immediate concern was that a history professor become the first executive director. For that she turned to the UCLA Department of History. By national standards the department was among the top ten, and depending on the field, Latin American, American, Jewish, and European history were exceptional, placed it arguably close to, or in the top five. Brooks' personal preference for executive director from the department declined consideration, though they did recommend the person who was chosen, but only after surviving an extensive review of nearly eighty candidates and considerable internal debate between the CDE, UCOP, and its newly appointed policy board. The crux of that debate was over the interpretation of SB 1882 and

whether a balance could be found between the more pragmatic concerns of curriculum reform (in this case the role given to the new framework) and the idealism of James Gray, which was inherent in the legislation. In November 1990, Professor Edward Berenson, a European historian from UCLA, became the first executive director of the History-Social Science Project. With that selection, the vanguard of state systemic curriculum reform shifted south to UCLA.

The Berenson vision for the History-Social Science Project (HSSP) was set forth in a letter that accompanied the Request for Proposals (RFP) application materials to obtain funding to establish regional sites. In "marked contrast" to the priorities of the History Project in California (HPC), it addressed a nascent statewide community of teacher leaders.

> We are dedicated to the professional development of California's teachers and to the improvement of history-social science education for all of their students, especially those from traditionally underrepresented groups and those with limited English proficiency. (Berenson, 1990, 1993)

While stressing the project's firm commitment to the framework, Berenson described it "as a flexible, living document, a set of guidelines open to refinement and interpretation." He made its future "activities . . . consistent" with the framework's spirit and in so doing avoided the narrower regimen of implementation. This more open structure, which placed the project at its inception firmly on a creative middle ground, gave Berenson the space to emphasize what each held in common. Invoking essential characteristics—which distinguished contemporary historical practice and were at the heart of the new framework—it and the project would "share a commitment" to six basic principles:

1. History forms the foundation of a curriculum integrated with geography, the other social sciences, literature, and the humanities
2. The materials of history-social science go beyond textbooks to focus heavily on primary sources
3. History-social science is studied from a multicultural perspective, reflecting the rich diversity of the individuals and groups that compose our state and society
4. A successful history-social science education helps students negotiate our country's often creative tension between unity and diversity, for amidst our diversity, Americans—whatever

their origins—possess in common a set of political institutions, and democratic traditions, a popular culture and an economic outlook that join them together

5. The study of economics and the principles of American government are a crucial part of the history-social science curriculum
6. The study of history-social science emphasizes the importance of religion in the context of history. (Podany, 1996, 3)

By staying close to the language and goals of the actual framework, while at the same time declaring that "these points do not exhaust the expanse of the history-social science curriculum," the executive director could aptly emphasize the common without towing the line (Berenson, 1990). The balance struck by Berenson, to some extent absent in the study group where the influence of the CDE tended to dominate, allowed him to draw on the SB 1882 roots in the writing project notion of partnership. Such evocation was evident in an interview he gave to the CCSS publication *Sunburst* the following spring (March 1991), where he spoke about the History Social-Science Project professional community as an ongoing collaboration between university professors and public school teachers based upon shared realms of academic expertise and pedagogical experience. "University people," he said, "have a lot to learn about teaching from K–12 educators, and I think the project has the potential not only to improve education at the K–12 level but at the university as well" (Podany 1996, 3).

Commitment to the "school-university collaboration" and the "process of building teacher leadership" were at the center of Berenson's vision for the project, whose motto became "Teachers teaching teachers, is meaningful only if it includes K through 16" (Berenson 1993). Berenson moved quickly. By the time of the *Sunburst* interview the Policy Board had chosen five sites to fund for 1991. The following year, Leadership Academies were established at each of the five original sites, after Berenson obtained a grant through the U.S. Department of Education. That same year, 1992, also marked the establishment of three fully funded, year-round sites at UCLA, UC Davis, and CSU Cal Poly Pomona.

By 1993 the project expanded to a total of ten sites and held its first Leadership Retreat. The retreat, which became an annual event, was primarily "designed to help new site directors learn from the experience of the established sites and to develop a statewide community" (Podany 1996, 5). Bringing together leaders from all the sites the retreats became an occasion for much more. The professional community that Berenson envisioned was one of innovation and invention; a place of creative dialogue whose object was to revitalize the pedagogy and practice of history in the K–12

classroom. This could only occur by allowing each site the creative autonomy to develop along lines fitting to their local demography and needs. At the same time, the uniqueness of each site added to the entire network, in effect establishing a growing learning community, where openness and innovation was encouraged. These leaders in turn would attract and cultivate the best teachers, drawing them into closer involvement with the project, extending the network regionally. The retreat was a stimulus for this synergy.

This synergy was evident in the unique character of the three year-round sites. Over time the UC Davis site (of the three, *the* most dedicated site to Gray's teacher-centered model of professional development) became an innovative leader and resource for the application of computer technology and the Internet to history-social science teaching practice. At UCLA, the history and geography departments collaborated to form an extensive program of academically oriented institutes, focused on the integration of history and geography—the two disciplines central to distinguishing the scope and sequence of the new framework.

Cal Poly Pomona, which came to emphasize leadership programs for novice teachers, also became the first major site of transition for the History-Social Science Project. In May 1993, Professor Berenson announced that he would step down by the end of the year. The Cal Poly site director, Amanda Podany codirected the project with Berenson until January 1994. After serving the better part of the year as interim director, she became executive director in October. Podany, a product of the UCLA History Department, was an ancient near east historian and a professor in the History Department at Cal Poly Pomona. Professor Podany advanced Berenson's principal project goal of building teacher leadership capacity by sponsoring the first teacher Fellows' Academy in April 1994 and a second the following year (Podany 1996, 6). The academy brought together outstanding teachers who had attended previous summer institutes given at all the statewide project sites. But this transition consisted of more than a change of the directorship.

By 1995, it had become "clear" to Podany that the project had to reconsider its basic priorities, as mandated by SB 1882, which was directed to professional development for "practicing teachers" (Podany 2000, 3). With funding from the U.S. Department of Education (DOE), she launched a three-year program, at five university sites, to offer professional development for new and prospective teachers (2000, 3). By the time she stepped down as executive director in 1997, the Eisenhower Program (named after the DOE funding source) had drawn hundreds of novice teachers into the wider state network of history-social science sites. As the original grant proposal stated:

> The program was designed to create a collaborative community of university and school professionals to help develop undergradu-

> ate students into effective, informed teachers of history-social science at all grade levels, K–12. It will also provide them with continuing support during their early years of teaching and beyond, to help them deal with the challenges of those early years.(Podany 2000, 3)

While sharing the goals of the Eisenhower program, to Podany's successor Linda Pomerantz, who served briefly as interim executive director during 1997, the shift in priorities represented the passing of a "golden moment." For nearly eight years, the three-week summer institute had been the annual communal rite of passage, where seasoned teachers converged to reconnect with their peers and deepen their commitment to the profession. At the CSU Dominguez Hills project site Pomerantz was site codirector and a professor of modern Chinese history. The institute was the place "where teachers really engaged in research and experienced the construction of history," in their collaborations with participating academic historians like Pomerantz. Like Podany, she saw that their constituency for the summer institute of more experienced teachers was dwindling. In their place was a growing group of K–3 novice teachers new to the classroom that needed basic training in the discipline.

This prompted Pomerantz and her colleagues "to re-conceptualize and repackage what they were doing." Instead of the intensive three-week institute, they developed a format for shorter institutes of once-a-month meetings, held over an extended period, in which K–3 course models were designed. New elementary school teachers, often working on emergency credentials, were walked through a set of generative grade-specific lessons based upon the framework. These prototype lessons served as the basis for a course model of yearly lesson plans developed by these teachers for their classrooms. With this need, though, "something was lost." The objective reality of California schools would soon make the Subject Matter Projects become a "pale reflection" of the original vision that had established it. That reality would challenge Superintendent Honig's ideal of a common civic culture and demographically involved California's shift to a minority-majority state, in which the state's urban classrooms would become a crossroads for the world.

AZTLAN BY OTHER MEANS

On November 8, 1983, "the common bonds" envisioned by the National Commission on Excellence in Education (NCEE) met their first test in California. San Francisco, long considered the state's bastion of progressive politics, voted by a resounding majority (62%) for Proposition O, which

asked the federal government to end the practice of issuing bilingual ballots for local and state elections. O, and similar state and local initiatives that followed, signaled the opening of the English-only movement in California (Tatalovich 1995, 105–107). The concerns expressed in *A Nation at Risk*, presented by the NCEE to President Ronald Reagan earlier that spring, that one of public education's primary roles was "the fostering of a common culture," were not those of a large majority of California voters, unless that education, like ballots, be exclusively in English.

But the nation was imperiled by more than the apparent superiority of Japanese schools. For William Bennett, Reagan's secretary of education, the national culture was under assault from within. As the English-only movement gained momentum nationally, the secretary targeted bilingual education as a threat to America's common culture. In a speech given on September 26, 1985, later retitled "In Defense of Our Common Language," Bennett argued that the only sure path to a common culture was in making English the primary, if not the only, medium of transmission.

> To be a citizen is to share in something common—common principles, common memories, and a common language in which to discuss our common affairs. Our common language is, of course English. And our common task is to ensure that our non-English-speaking children learn this common language. (Bennett 1992, 358)

Calling bilingual education a "failed path," he proposed wide-ranging changes to the new Bilingual Education Act passed by Congress with an "overwhelming bipartisan majority in the fall of 1984" (Lyons 1992, 364). But the changes he called for, which stressed "local flexibility," were actually intended to narrow the range of acceptable bilingual models of instruction to that which emphasized *transitional* bilingual programs—direct instruction approaches that mainstreamed second-language learners (Crawford 1999, 82).

During the 1980s the California Department of Education struggled to find an approach to bilingual education that was pedagogically sound—and based on the best current research and methodology—as it was supportive of local needs (Crawford 1999, 159–60). But in 1986 after mounting a successful pilot program begun in 1981, funding was cut by the U.S. Department of Education. Politically, 1986 also marked the passage of Proposition 63. The state's first official English-ballot initiative garnered a stunning 73 percent of the votes (Draper and Jimenez 1992, 92). The following year, in June 1987, just days before the State Board of Education approved the History-Social Science Framework; Governor Deukmejian vetoed funding from the

state budget to extend the 1976 Chacon-Moscone Bilingual Education Act (Crawford 1999, 195).

But neither Deukmejian's veto nor his successor's (Pete Wilson) nativist assault on immigrant school children, with Proposition 187 in 1994, could end bilingual education, much less suspend the global diaspora of immigrants seeking to make the state home. By 1998 well over a million children with little or no English-speaking ability had entered California classrooms. Only then did the defense of English take a decisive turn. On June 2 of that year, the "English for the Children" ballot initiative (Proposition 227) was overwhelmingly approved by 61 percent of the voting public. The provisions of Proposition 227 imposed a strict regimen of "sheltered English immersion . . . not normally intended to exceed one year," after which students would enter "mainstream classrooms" (Crawford 2000, 112). Schools, by parent request, could ask for waivers, but changes to its provisions could be made only by "a two-thirds vote of the legislature and the governor's signature," and any violations could trigger lawsuits to bring schools back into compliance (2000, 112).

Like Proposition 13 two decades earlier, 227 sent a shockwave through the K–12 school system, heralding the onset of standardization. Coming from outside the legislative process, 227 only hastened the full-scale realignment of teacher education policy that had been gathering force, which would shift policy focus almost exclusively on K–3 elementary education. That shift was first signaled in 1996. Governor Wilson with the full support of Democrats passed Senate Bill (SB) 1777. The Class Size Reduction Act, as it was called, "provided districts $650 per student for each K–3 classroom with 20 or fewer students" (MR 1996). SB 1777 created an overwhelming demand for new teachers (much less, new twenty-seat classrooms!), which could not be met. That realignment would climax in late summer to early fall, with fateful impact on the Subject Matter Projects. But to some extent that shift had been foreseen. Early on both Amanda Podany and Linda Pomerantz saw the development of new teacher programs as a necessary response to the changing California classroom. But they regarded such programs as a complement to the project's mission of professional development for teachers with long service in the classroom. Yet neither could have foreseen its end.

On August 21, 1998, Governor Wilson signed Assembly Bill (AB) 1734. The bill was sponsored by Kerry Mazzoni, chair of the Assembly Education Committee. But Mazzoni was not the author of AB 1734. State senator Marian Bergeson was. Along with Mazzoni and state senator Dede Alpert, they were the legislative architects to reform professional standards for state-approved teacher education programs. Senate Bill (SB) 2042, which Bergeson initiated in 1992, was the legislation behind this major policy shift.

Earlier that summer Wilson had informed UCOP that annual funding for the Subject Matter Projects would not be renewed unless they adopted the policy changes introduced by AB 1734. While appearing to invoke the language of the original SB 1882, the goal of the bill was to redirect the SMP's away from that kind of teacher professional development. Instead it narrowly focused on the enhancement of "teachers' subject matter knowledge" and "instructional strategies" by linking it to the measurable improvement of "student learning and academic performance." AB 1734 was designed to accomplish five specific goals:

1. Develop and enhance teachers' subject-matter knowledge in core subject areas.
2. Develop and enhance teachers' instructional strategies to improve student learning and academic performance as measured against state-approved content standards.
3. Provide teachers with access to and opportunity to examine current research that is demonstrably linked to improved student learning and achievement.
4. Maintain subject-specific professional communities that create ongoing opportunities for teacher learning and research.
5. Develop and deploy as teacher leaders, teachers with demonstrated levels of expertise in the classroom and certifiable levels of content knowledge. (LCD 1998, 90)

For the goals of AB 1734 to be effective, governance had to assume tighter control over local sites, which meant recasting the more autonomous role of the SMP policy boards in terms of top-down accountability. With the creation of a Concurrence Committee, concurrence as conceived by SB 1882 became more bureaucratically formalized. Representatives were appointed not only by the university and community college segments; instead it extended that appointment capacity to the governor, the State Board of Education, and the California Commission on Teacher Credentialing (CCTC). In doing so, it significantly diminished the role of the superintendent of public instruction as defined under SB 1882. The same was the case with individual project policy boards, which were recast as advisory boards, again with greater appointment capacity passing to the governor, the state board, and the Credential Commission.

Understanding full well the magnitude of the change, UCOP's Polkinghorn had already drafted and circulated a transitional plan informing the executive directors, a month before AB 1734 passed. Though the governor

and the legislature had stacked the deck, Polkinghorn rose to the occasion. He asked executive directors to work with their regional site directors "to develop a Workplan based on elements" in conformity with AB 1734. With recently approved academic content standards to serve as the "foundation, each Subject Matter Project site" was to:

- Develop teacher leadership, with content and pedagogical expertise;
- Serve teachers from low-performing schools;
- Develop and support partnerships with low-performing schools to increase academic achievement;
- Foster and sustain a professional community (or network) that supports K–12 and university educators beyond campus-based initiatives; and
- Evaluate/document the relationship between SMP activities and student learning. (CSMP-TWP, 2)

Partnership, always a key "element" in Gray's conception of collaboration between the university and the school (the professional dyad of sharing between teachers and professors) soon took on a new partner: students. Drawing a more inclusive circle of community, Subject Matter Project sites were asked to establish at least two outreach partnership programs with low-performing schools by 1999. Cognizant of AB 1734, Polkinghorn now conceived of partnership as "an agreement between a school or school districts and a SMP site to work together for a period of one year, or more, to improve student learning against state standards" (CSMP-TWP, 4). A larger arc encompassing, and to a large extent determining, the realignment of teacher education policy reached its latest stage in September. Since 1992, the Commission on Teacher Credentialing had been conducting a "comprehensive review of its requirements for earning and renewing teaching credentials" at the behest of the governor and legislature. The review became the basis for Senate Bill (SB) 2042. Among its many statutes, the omnibus bill set up an "Advisory Panel to develop new standards for teacher preparation programs." The "new standards for both subject matter and professional preparation of teachers" were to be aligned with academic content standards, with great emphasis placed on subject-matter pedagogy for new elementary school teachers (CCTC 2000).

The new political priority, which emphasized professional development for beginning teachers in low-performing schools, signaled the end of an era. For the History-Social Science Project, alignment meant new content standards based on the framework, which was approved by the State Board

of Education in October 1998. With the AB 1734 mandate for a "standards-based professional development," the implementation model that Diane Brooks once envisioned as central to the Subject Matter Projects was, by default, effectively realized.

LEARNING TO FORGET

On the occasion of the 2000 Southern California History Retreat, held on May 12 at Cal Poly Pomona, the History-Social Science Project published the *Handbook for History-Social Science Professional Development*. Designed as a "scholarly summary and practical guidebook," for novice and veteran teacher alike, the handbook was a fitting capstone for the Eisenhower Program, which, like the handbook, was funded by a U.S. Department of Education grant from 1995 to 1998. In the opening chapter Amanda Podany reflected on the enduring significance of the Subject Matter Projects within the larger ebb and flow of state and national reform efforts to improve student learning. "In the early 90s," she recalled, "there was a heady sense . . . of a new community growing that shared a common purpose and had the potential to radically improve the way history and the social sciences were taught" (Podany 2000, 1–2).

That "common purpose" had in no way diminished. Since 1998, Podany observed that "the success of the Project has continued under the adept leadership of Jana Flores." One of the social studies teachers who was among the original Brooks cadre, Flores had been involved with the project through the UCLA site since its inception. But that "tangible sense of power" Podany experienced along with her dedicated colleagues, "to change and improve education," was after 1998 gradually being diverted into fulfilling the statutes mandated by AB 1734. However the Bergeson legislation placed an impossible burden on the Subject Matter Projects. Most project sites had neither the expertise nor resources to sustain the kind of multilingual partnership with low-performing schools needed to effectively boost test scores in order to demonstrate the kind of measurable improvement of "student learning and academic performance" that AB 1734 required. After briefly expanding to seventeen sites in 2001, funding for the History-Social Science Project, as for the other Subject Matter Projects, precipitously declined. In 2002, state budget cuts severely impacted the UC Outreach Program that recruited minority high school students, under which the projects operated.

Early in July of that year, the evaluation study mandated by AB 1734 was submitted to UCOP. The apparent intent of *Evaluation of the California Subject Matter Projects*, or AIR Report (2002), conducted by the American

Institutes for Research, was to present a convincing case for the paradigm shift in "partnership" mandated by AB 1734. As carefully exacting as the AIR Report appears, only three years had passed since AB 1734 took effect, and the projects were still in transition to the new model of partnership with low-performing schools, which was formative at best. Try as its authors did, there was little tangible power to the AIR Report's answer to "what makes" a Subject Matter Project (AIR 2002, 9). And crudely, that was nothing more than to link a project's program to an increase in student achievement. As desirable as a "high-growth partnership" may be, AIR could not say definitively that a partnership with a low-performing school had any substantial impact on a school's yearly academic performance (AIR 2002, 8). Nevertheless, the AIR Report provided a comprehensive set of useful recommendations that provided a strong basis for the direction the legislation prescribed.

What had developed organically over years of classroom interactions, trial and error programs, conferences, in conversation and dialogue with colleagues, was by an abrupt process of legislative conversion, compelled by political necessity, overturned. The History Social-Science Project survived, but due to extensive budget cuts was reduced to eight sites. Soon, the innovative potential of SB 1882 as a model for teacher professional development was but a memory. As standardization took command of the classroom, teachers became partners to an ever-encroaching regimen of testing and accountability and, by doing so, entered the political endgame of systemic reform.

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CHAPTER 5

The Test of Memory

For a decade Gray's insight that teachers are key players in the reform process nurtured a state network of professional discipline-based learning communities that supported the implementation of the state's new core curriculum. Teacher leaders, like the cadre drawn from the emerging ranks of the History-Social Science Project, would prove pivotal to the survival of the history-social science curriculum reform, as well as in steering its transition to standards-based instruction after 1998. But the vitality of the project was sustainable because their community could draw on the collective expertise and institutional memory of the California Council for the Social Studies (CCSS), the long-standing state network of educators who magnanimously embraced the original 1987 framework, even after the work of the Framework Committee was politically compromised. In partnership with the California Department of Education (CDE), the council and the project formed a kind of extended version of the sharing culture that Gray had envisioned, one that provided a forum for consultation and collaboration with the larger purpose of sustaining curriculum reform in the classroom. Together, its leaders would play a decisive role in the design and development of an innovative state system of performance-based assessment and, later, in moving to standards-based instruction and testing that was aligned with the framework.

This chapter recounts the uneven and politically treacherous course run in that transition to standards-based instruction before and after 1998, a period that marked the denouement of Bill Honig's systemic school reform movement, as the state lurched for a time into policy incoherence. As the last chapter indicated, Assembly Bill (AB) 1734 and Senate Bill (SB) 2042 signaled a major turning point in the role and status of teachers and how they were viewed by state education policymakers. That legislation marked the virtual end of an innovative experiment in teacher professional development, the Subject Matter Projects, and redirected state resources to focus on expanding the available pool of new teachers trained in standards-based instruction (SB 2042's Beginning Teacher Support and Assessment [BTSA]

Program). While the shift was in part determined by demographic necessity, with urban classrooms being overwhelmed by an unprecedented influx of school-age minority children, it tended to politicize the next phase of reform in ways that were advantageous to politicians rather than schools. In this politically capricious environment, history-social science reformers would come to have only one imperative: the survival of the 1987 curriculum framework.

FROM CANON TO CRITERION

In 1985, the year in which the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) was conducting pilot tests for *What Do Our Seventeen-Year-Olds Know?* (the first NAEP tests in history and literature), California had already administered its first statewide assessment in history-social science. Since 1969 NAEP has tested American students in reading, literacy, mathematics, science, and citizenship (1987, 3). With funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), in 1986, Diane Ravitch and Chester E. Finn Jr. (1987) tested a full national sample of nearly eight thousand students. The history portion of the test consisted of 141 questions (1987, 43). The national average for history was only 54.5 percent correct (1987, 1).

The California test had occurred because a seasoned cadre of CCSS professionals, several of whom later served on the 1987 Framework Committee, diligently waged a campaign to have Sacramento mandate an expansion of the California Assessment Program (CAP). The coalition brought together several state educational interest groups and professional teacher organizations, the California Council for the Social Studies, the Constitutional Rights Foundation, Law in a Free Society, the Economic Literacy Council of California, and the state steering committee of county Departments of Education. Together they lobbied the State Board of Education and the legislature to make history-social science part of CAP (SSR 1986, 20).

Similar to its NAEP counterpart, CAP had been in place since 1972 and had evolved to become a recognized state model for school accountability (Guthrie et al. 1990, 7). However, unlike California, Diane Ravitch and Chester Finn, the authors of *What Do Our Seventeen-Year-Olds Know?* were fighting an uphill battle at the national level to get the study of history recognized as a basic subject area. The design of the test, as were the results, was widely criticized. National social studies educators judged it to be a politically motivated assessment because of its conservative authorship (see Ayers 1987; Jenness 1990).

Locally, the state social studies community had managed to forge a political consensus where history mattered. In hindsight that effort is remark-

able because it demonstrates an extraordinary level of *trust* placed in teachers by the CDE. In this effort, the CDE coordinator for the new tests, Pete Kneedler, believed that the "overriding concern of all those involved was to develop a testing effort that would provide useful and detailed results that would encourage teachers and others to improve their programs" (Kneedler 1986, 3). That work reflected a high degree of collaboration between educators and state officials, a genuine sense of mutual recognition and reciprocity among stakeholders that would largely be absent a decade later when the state ineptly moved to standardize K–12 learning and instruction.

Development of the new history-social science assessment program generally paralleled implementation of Senate Bill (SB) 813, which established a new accountability program for the state's public high schools (Fetler 1986). This program was discussed in earlier chapters when, as part of SB 813, the State Board of Education approved model graduation requirements (e.g., the 1983 report, *Raising Expectations*) as it moved along the wider path of systemic reform to develop new curriculum frameworks in the core subject areas (CDE 1983). The development of a statewide assessment and testing program in history-social science occurred in three stages, beginning with CAP. Historically and politically, this successive development provides the basic thematic structure for the chapter. CAP was replaced by CLAS, the California Learning Assessment System (1993–1996). Later CLAS was superseded by academic content standards (1997–1998). In illuminating the ever more politicized path of their development, this chapter illustrates that, although there was a great deal of support within the state social studies community for the development of a statewide assessment program, these efforts were disrupted by a succession of crises and politically charged events brought on by the ongoing political battle between Superintendent Honig and Governor George Deukmejian for control of state education policy and the annual budget. This battle was described in previous chapters as the war over ADA (Average Daily Attendance). Honig, like state senator Gary Hart, was determined to increase the annual funding for public schools and the amount per student annually dispersed to school districts, which after *Serrano* and Proposition 13 was determined by the governor and the state legislature. But Hart, unlike Honig, saw Sacramento as a political arena and not a battlefield.

In 1982, Todd Clark, director of the Los Angeles-based Constitutional Rights Foundation and a past president of the National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS) was chosen to lead the committee that would develop the new CAP test for eighth grade students. Clark (1986) described these efforts in CCSS's *Social Studies Review*. Clark, who would later serve on the 1987 History-Social Science Framework Committee, chaired a steering committee that was drawn from eight geographic regions of California

that were designated for the project. The assembled test development group consisted of nearly fifty teachers, curriculum specialists, and district administrators working in close collaboration with the California Department of Education (CDE).

The new test consisted of three types of questions (knowledge, critical thinking, and basic skills) that were derived from four subject areas: United States history, world history, geography/economics, and government. Field testing was conducted during the spring and fall of 1984 with 29,000 eighth grade students. The final form of the test was drawn from "a pool of 720 items divided into 36 separate test forms of 20 questions each" covering each subject area (Clark 1986, 22). Later, ambitious plans were made to develop tests for other grades. Clark viewed CAP and the new test in history-social science "as part of a larger effort to bring state curriculum [frameworks] into alignment with [classroom] instruction and textbook selection criteria" (1986, 22). That view held until the end of the decade. CAP was administered on an annual basis and schools received diagnostic reports highlighting strengths and weaknesses of their instructional programs (Kneedler 1986, 12). However, CAP's apparent success would not shield it from the ongoing war between Superintendent Honig and the governor.

As Governor Deukmejian's final term in office drew to a close in 1990, his longstanding animosity toward Superintendent Honig took an unexpected turn. Deukmejian vetoed funding for CAP in June of that year (Guthrie et al. 1991, 7). His veto set back systemic reform by several years. The California Assessment Program (CAP), in place since 1972, provided basic but vital information on school performance. By 1989 the CAP achievement test was administered annually to grades 3, 6, 8, and 12 for reading, math, and writing. When the governor's veto came down, Clark and his teacher test developers were ramping up pilot tests for these grades as well. CAP scores assessed overall school performance, not individual student achievement, and were used by the California Department of Education to recognize schools that had "met test score goals." These highly publicized "Model Report Cards" were an essential component of the recently passed Proposition 98, Honig's last political triumph, and key to his systemic reform strategy (Alexander 1992; Fetler 1994).

Earlier that year Honig had released the final report of the recently convened California Education Summit (CES 1990, v.). Riffing off President George Bush's 1989 National Education Summit and Goals 2000, the report asked "what strategies" would be necessary to reach the national performance goals. In Honig's mind, "the obvious approach would be to implement a comprehensive reform strategy based on those school districts or states which have successfully improved performance" (1990, 1). Essential to this

strategy was the need to "redesign the current state testing program" and move toward a system that "would eliminate multiple choice tests in favor of performance-based assessment" (1990, 17). With Deukmejian's veto of CAP, Honig's strategic goal would become a priority sooner than expected.

With CAP's demise, the state legislators who had orchestrated the comprehensive education reform agenda set in motion by Senate Bill (SB) 813 in 1983 regrouped with CDE officials to figure out what could replace CAP. The policy vacuum left by CAP's cancellation provided an opportunity where the political agendas of the state legislature and Honig converged for the last time. Once Deukmejian left office, Gary Hart, the legislative sponsor of SB 813 and chair of the Senate Education Committee, devised CAP's replacement.

On October 9, 1991, Governor Pete Wilson signed into law Senator Hart's bill on pupil testing, the first performance-based assessment system in the nation (Mitchell 1991, 6). Senate Bill (SB) 662 "direct[ed] the Superintendent of Public Instruction to design and implement a statewide pupil assessment program" (LCD, 1991, 1). SB 662 was the last essential leverage point necessary to the implementation of systemic reform, along with teacher professional development (SB 1882, the Subject Matter Projects) and textbooks (see chapter 6). As with the development of CAP, the state turned to teachers.

The California Learning Assessment System (or CLAS as it came to be called) was designed to provide schools, teachers, and parents with three kinds of information:

1. Individual pupil scores demonstrating how well each child has learned at selected grade levels and subjects;
2. End-of-course exam [scores] that will measure against fixed standards whether or not . . . pupils have learned material included in curriculum frameworks; and
3. [Test] results that can be reported in terms that have common statewide meaning. (CAPC 1991)

The new assessment program revised the range of grades tested by CAP. Instead of grades 3, 6, 8, 10, and 12, CLAS would "address pupil performance in grades 4, 5, 8, and 10" (LCD 1991, 1). The intent of the CLAS legislation was to complement "multiple-choice testing methods" with alternative forms of assessment that would "require pupils to demonstrate more explicitly that they [could] use their knowledge to solve problems and communicate the

results of their learning" (1991, 3). The legislation called for a five-year plan of implementation in all subject areas (1991, 7). But unlike CAP, which had been in use for nearly two decades, the development of CLAS would come to a halt in just two years.

Field tests for the reading-language arts in the spring of 1993 became the source of a protracted political controversy. In the reading tests for grades 4, 8, and 10, students were asked to write an essay response to sample questions. Conservative parent groups regarded this form of direct writing assessment as highly subjective and intrusive, a violation of their child's right to privacy. Because of the uproar, the CLAS pilot tests were then suspended for nearly a year. Senator Hart consulted with national testing experts and the CDE to craft what he hoped would be an acceptable alternative. A Select Committee headed by the nationally recognized educational testing expert and scholar Lee Cronbach of Stanford, "review[ed] the methods of sampling and scoring tests and producing school district scores in the California Learning Assessment of 1993 and the plans for Spring 1994 assessments" (Cronbach 1994). Their report, *Sampling and Statistical Procedures Used in the California Learning Assessment System*, was submitted to the acting superintendent of public instruction, William Dawson, on July 25, 1994. The committee recommended that CLAS "concentrate" on "school-level scores" and that "scores for individual pupils be limited." The Cronbach committee "applaud[ed] CLAS's success in constructing tests that assess reasoning" and believed that "all the shortcomings of CLAS-1993 [could] be remedied" (Cronbach 1994).

The Hart alternative, Senate Bill (SB) 1273, proposed to end the development of these controversial forms of assessment and redirect the focus to more traditional forms of standardized testing. More like CAP, the compromise CLAS tests were "fact-based multiple choice and short answer questions" and were designed to yield information about the overall performance of schools rather than individual students (Kirst and Mazzeo 1996, 320).

But on September 27, 1994, Governor Wilson vetoed SB 1273, which would have reauthorized the extension of CLAS for five more years. In Hart's estimation the veto

> set back [the] state's momentum in education reform by wiping out the only effective tool we had to send a clear message to California's teachers, that problem-solving skills and effective communication abilities must be taught our students, if they are prepared to compete in the fast-paced, highly competitive global economy of the future. (Merl and Ingram 1994, A1)

The incoming superintendent of public instruction, Delaine Eastin, elected after Honig had been forced to resign a year earlier, viewed the latest veto as "a victory of politics over policy" (1994, A–1). The veto represented more than that. The political consensus for systemic reform in Sacramento, that had held for over a decade, was effectively wiped out.

FROM CADRE TO COMMISSION

Looking back on these events, Robert Calfee, the vice chair of the California Academic Standards Commission (soon to fill the reform vacuum), observed that "this turmoil obscured the strengths of the CLAS design," which he believed was a powerful tool to assess a student's ability in reading and writing (Calfee 2000, 294). Calfee was right. Yet his observation could also extend across the curriculum to history-social science. For also obscured, and now largely forgotten, is how this design and its variations served as a prototype for the development of innovative reading and writing assessments for history and geography. That development began in the spring of 1991, when a field test was administered to a statewide sample for grade 5. The test consisted of twenty multiple-choice questions and one open-ended question covering history and geography from the History-Social Science Framework and was viewed by the CAP committee of teacher developers as "the first stage of the development of performance-based assessments for K–5" (CDE 1991).

The transition from CAP to CLAS was facilitated by the History-Social Science Assessment Advisory Committee, which had been active since spring 1988. In addition to Diane Brooks and Francie Alexander (the associate superintendent of the CDE curriculum division), it included several members from the 1987 Framework Committee and the CCSS. Among them there was Pat Geyer, Jack Hoar, and Charlotte Crabtree, as well as Carol Marquis and Shirley Mead-Mezzetta from the California Council for the Social Studies.

The advisory committee appointed three regional teams to develop tests for grades 5, 8, and 10. Field tests for grades 8 and 10 were conducted in spring 1992 and 1993; grade 5 in the spring of 1994 (CDE 1992). Emerging from these pilot tests was an assessment instrument that balanced multiple-choice questions with short-answer questions. In addition, there were also topical essays that directed students in a historical investigation that integrated close analytic reading with a structured writing process.

The breadth and depth of the content, even for the multiple choice sections of the test, was formidable. The tenth grade world history field test

(which was twenty to twenty-five minutes in length) included on average about fifteen questions. For example:

> Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King both sought to
>
> A. Overthrow established governments in order to promote their goals.
>
> B. Achieve political and social reform through nonviolent civil disobedience.
>
> C. Gain election to national political office as a means of making changes in society.
>
> D. Promote formation of a separate state to escape prejudice and discrimination. (CDE 1993)

The short-answer questions section (which was intended to take from ten to fifteen minutes) in some of the pilot tests consisted of choosing from two topics and then writing a short response. These questions would be no less challenging. For example:

> The power of religion has been a theme in human history. Select ONE of the following locations and explain how religion has been an important part of that area's historical development during the twentieth century.
>
> India-Pakistan
> Northern Ireland
> Israel

The thirty-minute essays, which covered equally difficult ground, required a knowledgeable grasp of the topic and the ability to use historical evidence. These topics were wide ranging and global in scope. For example

- Twentieth-century conflicts in the Middle East;
- Political events shaping the French Revolution;
- The sectarian conflict between Hindus and Muslims leading to the partition of India and Pakistan.

Similar advanced skill was necessary to participate in the capstone assessment of the 1993 spring field tests. Some of the historical investigations

were designed as a collaborative group activity. Designed to be approximately thirty minutes in duration, these activities asked students to review and discuss primary source documents related to the topic and then to present their findings to the class. Topics for the spring field tests included:

- Life in the workhouses (using excerpts from the Charles Dickens's novel Oliver Twist);
- The origins of World War I;
- Women in history. (CDE 1993)

All these "assessment tasks: group performance, open-ended essay, short answer, and multiple-choice questions, emphasize[d] the use of primary sources" and was based upon grade-level content found in the History-Social Science Framework. These innovative and thoughtfully constructed tests were intended by their teacher development teams to assess a student's ability to "act as historians" (CDE 1992, 1). The following spring, CLAS assessed 1.3 million students at grades 4, 5, 8, and 10 in reading, writing, mathematics, and science (CDE 1994, 1). But as it would turn out, the first Elementary History-Social Science Assessment that was administered to a statewide sample of fifth grade students was also the last.

By the spring of 1994, CLAS was caught in a web of political events. When the state's 1994 NAEP scores in reading dropped precipitously and the results of the 1993 CLAS field tests were less than satisfactory, state politicians began to discern a larger pattern of decline, if not an impending crisis (McQuillan 1998, 12). Soon the 1994 test results were consigned to their allotted shelving in the CDE archives. The fate of CLAS was sealed a year later. On October 16, 1995, Governor Pete Wilson signed into law Assembly Bill (AB) 265, which created the Commission for the Establishment of Academic Content and Performance Standards (Colvin 1995). Hereafter, for reasons that will soon become clear, it will be referred to as the Academic Standards Commission (ASC).

The end of CLAS did not go unnoticed by the Curriculum Commission. Its sixteen members, appointed by the State Board of Education, are responsible for implementing the state-approved curriculum frameworks and conducting the cyclical textbook and instructional materials adoption process in each core subject area. Typically, appointees are veteran public school teachers representing each subject area. In 1995, a recent appointee and the sitting commissioner for history-social science would once again cross paths. Kirk Ankeney and Geno Flores first met at the UCLA summer institute in July 1987, organized by Diane Brooks.

Flores having served on the commission since 1990, witnessed the demise of both CAP and CLAS. As a member of both CAP and CLAS advisory panels, he was distressed at the loss of each program, especially CLAS, since he had been closely involved with coordinating the development and administration of the fifth grade assessment.

Ankeney, who was a teacher and administrator from San Diego, was appointed to the commission in 1994. Like Flores, he had first become involved with the history-social science curriculum reform by serving on the teacher development committees for both CAP and CLAS. Ankeney also observed the first textbook controversy over multiculturalism when he served on a state evaluation panel for the first history-social science textbook adoption in 1990–1991. At that time, California's textbook controversy competed with New York State, which was having its own culture war over a new but equally controversial social studies curriculum (see LaSpina 1998, chapter 6). In 1996, Ankeney successfully steered the original 1987 framework through the process of reaffirmation by the state board. He would later serve as chair of the Curriculum Commission for the second, but surprisingly uneventful, history-social science textbook adoption in 1998–1999. All three textbook adoptions, 1990, 1998, and 2005, are discussed in chapter 6.

The Curriculum Commission provided a ringside seat for Sacramento politics. Witness to the CLAS debacle, Ankeney began to have an abiding concern for the future of the History-Social Science Framework. As the work of the Academic Standards Commission (ASC) progressed, his apprehension grew. AB 265 called for a commission comprising twenty-one members. Twelve were appointed by Governor Wilson, six by the superintendent of public instruction, Delaine Eastin, who herself was a member. In addition, the state senate and the assembly appointed one member each. The commission's mandate called for standards to be developed first in math and English-language arts and reading. Content-area committees in these subject areas were formed. Political divisions soon arose after work commenced in 1997. Committee deliberations became increasingly contentious between the Wilson appointees, who were largely conservative Republicans, and Eastin's more liberal faction.

The first sign that things could go awry appeared when the draft standards produced by the math committee were rejected by the State Board of Education. The board only approved a heavily revised version, in which the commission played no part, much to the chagrin of the commission. When the other two content-area committees for science and history-social science met for the first time in November 1997, other troubling signs emerged. Aside from several university academics and administrators, none of the commission members assigned to the history-social science committee were either history teachers or professional historians (see CDE 1998, ii, for the

complete list of commission members). Nor was there anyone who had been involved with the making of the 1987 framework (Smith Bell 1998). Unease grew when the commission circulated the Request for Proposals (RFP's) to develop history-social science standards. The RFP stated plainly that the 1987 framework would not serve as a "starting point" and that the committee would review "standards documents from other nations, states, localities and companies" (CASC 1997). Complicating matters more was the bias of some on the commission, for whom the framework had become identified with the National History Standards controversy a year earlier. This sentiment was further compounded by some of the more conservative commission members, who were vocally channeling their constituencies' opinions of the framework. Conservative Christian groups were clamorous in the extreme over the study of Islam in the seventh grade world history curriculum.

Concerned that a decade of reform was at risk, Ankeney sought an audience with the president of the State Board of Education, Yvonne Larson, former vice chair of the National Commission on Excellence in Education, and past president of the San Diego City School Board. Ankeney's long-standing affiliation with the San Diego Unified School District gave the necessary political formality of his appeal a personal edge. Ankeney's timely intervention compelled Larson to send a delegate from the state board to the commission. The message was blunt: Don't change the framework unless you have good reason to. If you don't want to be embarrassed a second time (as you were with math) the standards that the committee comes up with should look like the framework.

A delicate political balancing act ensued. When the national circulation of the Request for Proposals (RFP's) was unsuccessful, because none of the submissions demonstrated the required expertise, the commission turned to the out-of-state consultant with whom they had already worked on the math standards. Susan Pimentel was not a content specialist in either math or history. Nevertheless she was a nationally recognized education consultant who specialized in standards writing (see http://www.goalline.org/). She was also an astute political practitioner who was adept at mediating the type of fractious power relations and political theater that the Academic Standards Commission had become. While the history-social science content-area committee held its exploratory review of state and national history standards near and far, Pimentel quickly cemented working relations with the CDE and a network of in-house and out-of state content experts on whom she came to rely (Clark and Pimentel 1999). In addition to Tom Adams from the California Department of Education, and Kirk Ankeney, now chair of the Curriculum Commission, there were four content experts. In-house was Charles Bahmuller, from the Center for Civic Education in Calabasas, California, and Jim Charkins, at California State University at San Bernardino,

who represented the National Council for Economics Education. And from out-of-state there was Roger Downs from Penn State (later replaced by the National Geographic Alliance) and Paul Gagnon from Boston University, who had served on the 1987 Bradley Commission on History in the Schools. This largely conservative group, which excluded the historians and veteran teachers who contributed to the development of the 1987 framework, produced a dismal draft.

Reaction to the draft was overwhelmingly negative. This caused Adams and Ankeney, whose role up to that point had been simply administrative, to intervene. Over the course of 1998, they worked with Susan Pimental to revise the in-house draft. This came about through regular working sessions with Ankeney and Adams at the CDE Curriculum Frameworks and Instructional Resources Office. Together they produced a series of revised draft standards. To aid in this process, Adams crafted a multicolumn document in which the 'text' for each grade of the updated 1987 framework was reproduced in the left-hand column with the first and second draft of the History-Social Science Standards which appeared in the adjacent columns. This allowed reviewers to evaluate each draft against the language of the framework. Consultation with the experts was reinforced by the public presence of the California Council for the Social Studies (CCSS), which had been closely following the work of the commission. A "special task force of CCSS members" attended all the scheduled commission public meetings in Sacramento and around the state. The task force submitted a report detailing their recommendations to the commission and, as Pimentel's work progressed, reviewed each draft (Kidwell 1999, 16). In addition to their oversight, well over seventy content specialists, teachers, and academics read and made comments that were incorporated into the final draft, which was adopted by the state board on October 9, 1998.

But Adams's ingenious editorial device provided more than a visual means of comparison to map Pimentel's progress. It also allowed a more circumspect view of the final draft, by providing an iterative picture of what was gained and lost in translation. For in the conversion process the narrative character of the framework gradually took the more formal-focused specificity of criteria. Practically, it provided a means of public editorial oversight. In-house, Adams and Ankeney could check Pimentel's work and align the proposed standards with the original text, to see if the Academic Standards Commission had heeded the board's admonition. In this endeavor, at least, they were successful. Their collaboration with Pimentel had produced a document that was easily recognizable. It was, in Pimentel's words, the framework in "standards language."

Consider, for example, the opening section of a unit in the sixth grade world history and geography curriculum: *West Meets East: The Early*

Civilizations of India and China, by comparing the language of the framework to that of the adopted standard.

History-Social Science Framework

> Alexander the Great's conquest of Persia and its territories provides a bridge to a study of the great Eastern civilization of India. Students should understand that the culture Alexander encountered in 327 to 325 B.C. was not the first civilization of this region. Over a thousand years earlier, a great civilization had developed in the Indus River Valley, reached its zenith, and collapsed. Succeeding waves of Aryan nomads from the north spread their influence across the Punjab and Ganges plains and contributed to the rise of a civilization rich in its aesthetic culture (architecture, sculpture, painting, dance, and music) and in its intellectual traditions (Arabic numbers, the zero, medical tradition, and metallurgy).

History-Social Science Content Standard

> Students analyze the geographic, political, economic, religious, and social structures of the early civilizations of India.
>
> 1. Locate and describe the major river system and discuss the physical setting that supported the rise of this civilization.
> 2. Discuss the significance of the Aryan invasions.
> 3. Discuss important aesthetic and intellectual traditions (e.g., Sanskrit literature, including the Bhagavad Gita; medicine; metallurgy; and mathematics, including Hindu-Arabic numerals and the zero).

Like jumping from a wide-angle lens in color to a close-up in black and white, the real value of Adams's format was in suggesting multiple ways of seeing the old framework and the new standards. In contrast to curricular *text* (Ancient India aside, though the politics of Indian national history will be taken up in chapter 6), the current standards language suggests the chronological space of reform. For with standardization came an encroaching politicization of the history-social science reform. Seen in their political dimension, the two texts represent but two stages in the long arc of social studies curriculum reform in California that began in 1981.

The next stage of standards-based reform would regulate and control the teaching of K–12 history considerably. Before 1987, state curriculum frameworks were developed simply as guidelines for school districts and teachers to design their own programs and courses of study. After 1987 the open generality of guidelines became directed to a grade-by-grade sequence of specified areas of historical study (Burstein 2004). Even a cursory pass over the above paragraphs on ancient India suggests that the narrative had a wider scope and quality of openness that allowed for, even encouraged, historical interpretation. However, with its reformulation into criteria this wider frame of historical context appeared considerably narrowed, if not lost. Seen in political terms, the prescriptive reduction all but suggested that standardized testing was inevitable. Ankeney had saved the framework, all but securing its implementation for the next decade (Ankeney 1998). Diligently producing content standards that were wholly aligned with the original curriculum, he could not have foreseen that politics, not history, would determine the use of tests that would be poorly aligned with the standards.

THE MEASURE OF MASTERY

Like the campaign by Diane Brooks to have the 1987 framework reaffirmed, the tactical moves of her successors demonstrated more than just recognition of the obvious. Reform does indeed take time. The political savvy of Clio's cadre also reflected a deeper appreciation of the conditions necessary for the enactment of the framework in support of its implementation in the classroom. Likewise, the simple clarity of systemic thinking that informed these conditions seemed to elude Sacramento policymakers after Honig's departure. Later, Governor Wilson's secretary of education, former state senator Marian Bergeson, tried to inflate the significance of the educational policy that launched the Academic Standards Commission, by describing it as one of many "giant steps in educational reform" that the state was presently undertaking. But the "major structural changes" that occur after systemic reform (e.g., the California Reading Initiative [English-only phonics] and Wilson's Class Size Reduction Program, like those that his successor Gray Davis would soon impose) all tended to conflate policy reform with expedient political reaction (Bergeson 1999).

Bergeson could perhaps not imagine that the "giant step" taken by the Academic Standards Commission (ASC) could just as easily be characterized as the first in a series of policy missteps—steps that Gray Davis would soon compound with his blinkered educational vision of accountability. As the era of standards-based reform began, more reasonable policy notions of educational progress and improvement were about to become quantified

down and standardized. State policymakers appeared to forget the crucial role teachers had played in the development and implementation of CAP and CLAS and what a profound departure these new standardized test programs represented.

Two weeks after the State Board of Education adopted the History-Social Science Content Standards in October 1998, the commission submitted their final report. For well over a year the Commission for the Establishment of Academic Content and Performance Standards had existed in name only. Early on Governor Wilson made it clear that their mandate was limited to the development of content standards in the four core subject areas (CASC 1997). Performance standards were put on hold. At least Wilson was consistent. The basic post hoc illogic that informed his policy steps was characteristic of the general policy vacuum over the question of assessment that ensued after the demise of CLAS. That vacuum was filled with a plethora of conflicting initiatives that were intent on resurrecting elements of CAP and CLAS in yet another performance-based system that would now be aligned with core standards. The intervening years, 1996 and 1997, during which the Academic Standards Commission was completing its work, were crucial to the formation of the new statewide accountability system that would soon emerge.

In September 1996 the state assembly created the California Assessment of Academic Achievement (CAAA). Though it was soon superseded, the language of Assembly Bill (AB) 2105 based this new "system of individual assessment of pupils" on publisher-developed standardized tests (CASC 1997, 31). In so doing, a threshold was passed. Student 'performance' was being defined down and made reducible to a politically convenient form of statistical inference that ran largely contrary to the complexities of learning and children's cognitive and affective development. The following year, Governor Wilson approved Senate Bill (SB) 376, which authorized the Standardized Testing and Reporting program (STAR). For STAR, Wilson approved the use of an off-the-shelf test published by Harcourt Brace, the Stanford Achievement Test (SAT-9). He then rushed to have it administered statewide in the spring of 1998 to all students in grades 2–11. The SAT-9 was a nationally used norm-referenced test, but it was not aligned with the content standards being developed by the Academic Standards Commission (ASC), whose work would conclude that fall (Guth et al. 1999, 8).

The SAT-9 would also serve as the deus ex machina for Wilson's successor, Gray Davis. The incoming governor's next move was, like Wilson's, largely predicated upon the 1997 report of an obscure legislative committee. "Steering By Results" would forcibly redirect state systemic reform along a different path. According to the Awards and Interventions Advisory Committee, that path would consist of "a comprehensive program of incentives,

positive and negative, that would have as its goal an increase in the number of students who meet or exceed [the] standards" (O'Day and Bitter 2003, 2–3). However, that performance standard would be determined by the SAT-9 and not the academic content standards in the core subject areas set by the ASC. While "school accountability" had long been "firmly established as part of the education landscape in California" since 1983, the Public Schools Accountability Act (PSAA), signed into law by Governor Gray Davis in 1999, was nevertheless a radical departure (Fetler 1986, 44). Previous state accountability programs had sought "to broaden the criteria by which schools are measured [by] allow[ing] educators to take the lead in determining how to measure school progress" (1986, 32). The PSAA did just the opposite. The act had a stark but simple purpose: to either reward or punish schools for their annual performance on the SAT-9 test. This "results or else" accountability scheme was based on three tightly linked components:

1. The Academic Performance Index (API), which was a scale measuring student performance on the SAT-9 (with school scores derived from aggregate student data that could range anywhere from a low score of 200 to a high of 800, with 500 the median score for determining possible sanctions);
2. An intervention program for low-performing schools (the Immediate Intervention/Underperforming Schools Program [II/USP]); and
3. A program to reward schools if they performed well on the SAT-9, the Governor's Performance Award (GPA), also known as the High Achieving/Improving Schools Program (HA/ISP). (AIR 2003, 1–2)

For the next three years the state collected performance data that was used by Davis to mete out cash rewards to schools, so he could pose as the self-proclaimed "education governor." By 2003 the SAT-9 was replaced by the California Standards Test (CST). Though this latter component of the PSAA is no longer in effect, the API has become, for better or worse, a commonplace of California school culture, its "results-based" theory of accountability, which critically diminished the leading role that teachers should play in the assessment of student performance, Governor Davis's only legacy.

PUTTING HISTORY TO THE TEST

A message from Yvonne Larson and Delaine Eastin accompanied the 1998 History-Social Science Content Standards for California Public Schools.

The president of the state board and the superintendent of public instruction observed that seventeen years had passed since *A Nation at Risk*. The era of reform, in which Eastin's predecessor played a defining role, was in their estimation entering a new phase: "With the adoption of content standards, California is going beyond reform. We are redefining the state's role in public education. . . . With student mastery of this content, California schools will be on par with those in the best educational systems in other states and nations" (CDE 1998, iv). However, state politics would assure that this mastery would be considerably delayed. Unlike CLAS, the SAT-9 provided Wilson and Davis with a massive amount of objective data that could be used for maximum political effect. As Wilson intended, parents received annual report cards rating their child's performance. Davis had the numbers at his disposal to conduct his testing jackpot, the short-lived Governor's Performance Awards (GPA) program. Over time the SAT-9 also had considerable unintended effects, beyond the obvious. Students were tested on content unaligned with the standards; for the study of history, the effect, especially on classroom instruction, was subtler but deeper. One teacher described the effect of standardized testing on the manner in which complex historical events were presented.

> Because of the test, [I] stopped teaching students about the causes of World War I. Instead I made sure they knew the dates the war began and ended. . . . So what if you know a date? Don't we want to prevent war? . . . It's really the concept of why the war started that to me is the most important thing." (Garrison 2001)

The instructional dilemma of narrowing the field of inquiry to itemized content was prevalent. In fact, it was even worse for history-social science because some elementary and middle schools had dropped the subject altogether, in order to focus on boosting API scores in math and reading. Such developments compelled the CDE to intervene.

So began an elaborate process of consultation between practicing classroom teachers and the publisher Harcourt Brace (HB) to design what became known as the STAR Augmentation. In spring 2001 the first California Standards Test (CST) in History-Social Science (the STAR Augmentation) was administered statewide to grades 9, 10, and 11, in addition to the history SAT-9 (Burns 2000). In 2002 the Educational Testing Service (ETS) was awarded the contract to develop tests, replacing Harcourt Brace, and the SAT-9 was discontinued along with the CST for grade 9. In its place a new test was developed for grade 8. The tests for grades 10 and 11 continued.

The eighth grade CST consisted of seventy-five items that covered world and U.S history content from grades 6, 7, and 8. The tenth and

eleventh grades tests consisted of sixty items. The CDE sought to mitigate the narrow focus of the test format by appointing Content Review Panels (CRP) that were composed of teachers and academic historians who consulted with the publisher in the design of the test. The panels incorporated the "critical thinking skills" that had made it into the final draft of the History-Social Science Content Standards. This was due to the successful lobbying efforts of the CCSS with the Standards Commission (Kidwell 1999, 16). Three sets of History-Social Science Analysis Skills complemented content standards at each grade level:

- Chronological and spatial thinking
- Research, evidence, and point of view
- Historical interpretation

These skills were embedded in fifteen of the sixty questions for tenth and eleventh grade tests (additional pilot questions for next year's CST were also included). The California Standards Tests (CST) was a long way from the innovative history making of CLAS, where students were required to read and write by analyzing primary source material. The reductive process of standardization was not reversed with the embedded questions that adeptly mixed content with skills. Yet a quiz tapping higher-order thinking skills was certainly better than the unaligned SAT-9.

With the introduction of the California Standards Test in 2003, the Academic Performance Index (API) was recalculated to conform to the new standard-aligned tests. That year the State Board of Education "established five performance levels: Advanced, Proficient, Basic, Below Basic, and Far Below Basic," with "scores reported on a 150 to 600 scale, with 350 being required to attain a "proficient score" (Burns 2004). By 2006, four years of collected CST test data made the SAT-9 scores of previous years a distant memory. The trend line for 2003–2006 showed that the percentage of students scoring at or above proficient in grades 8, 10, and 11 was slightly above or below 30 percent, about a third of all students tested statewide (CDE 2006).

State systemic reform was back on track, with school improvement and student performance defined by the up-tick of a few percentage points derived from a multiple-choice test. By mid-decade, academic content standards had been deployed as the master blueprint to align state and local educational institutions from the classroom up. Standardization had taken command. Strangely, the California Council for the Social Studies (CCSS) was interested "in understanding the reasons for these trends" (Herczog 2004). Recent history was apparently inadequate.

A CIVIC MEME

With each change of California's system of assessment, from CAP to CLAS and finally to the present standards-based accountability system, the role that teachers played in the reform process was substantially altered. The trust placed in teachers by the state to develop the CAP and CLAS systems was displaced by a trust in numbers, the statistical data generated for the Academic Performance Index by standardized tests (Porter 1995, 209). True, the professional judgment of teachers was engaged by the test makers, which soon became an institutional norm, with the CDE forming tight alliances with publishers, who in turn relied on a statewide network of teachers, curriculum specialists, and content experts. This extensive culture of consultation and its impact on the California textbook adoption process is considered in the next chapter. But in this next stage of reform, which in short order became highly formalized after the introduction of academic content standards, the distance between Sacramento and the classroom, which was always great, grew larger.

Was this going *beyond* reform? In a recent article examining the impact of the STAR test on the history-social science curriculum reform, John Burns (2004), an official from the California Department of Education, discussed the instructional tradeoff made necessary by the state, in its cost-conscious embrace of standardized tests. "Many history-social science teachers," he dryly noted, "advocate essay examinations for students in order that they may demonstrate achievement in higher order thinking skills necessary to full civic literacy" (Burns 2004). With the candor of a professional bureaucrat, Burns went on to say that "because of the cost and complexity of scoring," such CLAS-like writing samples were no longer used. Whatever the price of "full civic literacy" is, it may just exceed the level of investment allocated to support the scales of proficiency delineated in the present Academic Performance Index.

Not long after the political demise of CLAS, James Gray (1995) wrote an opinion piece that appeared in a professional journal for California teachers. In "Why Large-Scale Testing Fails," Gray rendered his judgment on the CLAS experiment. The only benefit he saw in CLAS was that it attempted to "assess the quality of student writing by looking at students' writing. . . . This, he says, "may seem obvious, but for most of the history of testing, writing was assessed by objective tests that never require[d] students to write at all." This crucial insight, Gray thought was lost on state reformers, who he observed were about to return to the use of these tests (i.e., the SAT-9). Of course the same can be said for assessing a student's practice of reading and writing history. The pilot history CLAS tests came close to asking students to act like a historian, as was possible in a state test.

Not only did they "assess the quality of student" thinking about historical sources, evident in their writing sample, but more importantly they closed the distance between teacher and test, making the direct assessment of student performance possible. Designed by teachers dedicated to the original 1987 framework, they met its basic criterion, which recognized "the importance of history as a story well told." The API told quite a different story, and in every public school classroom from Shasta to San Diego all paid heed. The tradeoff was the political price for survival.

CHAPTER 6

We Are All Californians Now

On a strikingly cool April morning in 2005, cool even for Sacramento, a large congregation of social studies educators (close to one hundred in all) made their way across Capitol Park to the new glass and steel government office complex bordering the east side of the park on Fifteenth Street. Over a period of three days they were initiated into the politics of textbook adoption. They assembled again in July for final deliberations. July was deadly hot; not atypical for summers in the state capitol. But deliberations were mostly cool and rational, holding to the letter and spirit of established procedures to assess the suitability of the publisher's program submissions for classroom use. The Instructional Materials Assessment (IMAP) and the Content Review (CRP) Panels drafted their recommendations that were then submitted to the state Curriculum Commission. The 2005 History-Social Science primary adoption for K–8 textbooks went quite smoothly. The fireworks would come later.

This was the third primary adoption for history-social science, but the *first* that was organized explicitly around the *History-Social Science Content Standards* (1998). The entire process follows a state-mandated cycle for each core subject area. The first history-social science primary adoption occurred in 1990, the second in 1998. As the previous chapter indicated, only two weeks before the 1998 adoption had concluded, the State Board of Education (SBE) had approved content standards for history-social science based on the History-Social Science Framework. With few exceptions, in 1998 the major national publishers were still hanging back. But 2005 was different. With content standards in place for six years, all the major publishers had decided to make the considerable investment necessary for the design and development of new instructional materials for the California market. Of the twelve programs submitted, ten went on to be approved by the state board. State law mandates the adoption process only for grades K–8 (school districts adopt instructional materials for high school). Yet no textbook will pass muster now without conforming to state-approved academic content standards. Prior to that, the core curriculum frameworks were the only criteria that state evaluation panels followed. With some slight overlap across

grades, in 2005, there was one new K–5 and three K–6 programs. For the middle school grades (6–8) there were an unprecedented six submissions, one of which was for grades 5–8 (see references).

The number of submissions is striking in contrast with the first adoption in 1990. Not long after the original framework was approved in 1987, Bill Honig held a National Forum on Textbooks in San Francisco, late in February 1988. He invited all the major textbook publishers (Schrag 1988). Though all in attendance may have been intrigued by the superintendent's vision that called for a return to the study of history, none were about to seriously entertain what that vision would entail if they entered the California market on his terms. Though he had managed to successfully orchestrate development of the 1987 framework (as recounted in chapter 3), although not without significant damage to his relationship with the state social studies community, there was little about the events surrounding the first adoption process in 1990 that he could control. For publishers the financial risk was simply too great, given the substantial investment involved in developing an entirely new textbook program. Only one publisher, Holt-Rinehart Winston, adapted its current eighth grade textbook to conform to the new framework. Just one publisher, Houghton Mifflin, submitted a new K–8 program designed explicitly for the new framework. Because of its alignment with Honig's curriculum-driven systemic reform model, it was the only program adopted.

Now out of print, the 1991 and 21st century edition of the Houghton Mifflin K–8 program that were approved by the State Board of Education for the first and second primary adoptions have had incalculable impact on the publishing industry by providing a model for the form and content of contemporary social studies textbooks. Whether a model to follow or point of departure, as textbooks have been pushed into the uncharted representational landscape of diversity, while at the same time pulled by advances in digital technology (where the printed page has given way to the multimodality of the Internet), the design of these textbooks has been closely studied if not copied outright. This chapter surveys the current field of social studies textbooks for California using the political and cultural coordinates of the three history-social science primary adoptions as a guide.

The last decade of the twentieth century and the first decade after the millennium are the temporal frame and trajectory for the three primary adoptions. For public education in California this was a time of transition. By 2005 the contentious debates marking the first primary adoption over securing a new national identity for a multicultural state and nation had given way to globalization, where California had become a crossroads for the world. In 2005 the nationalist frame defining America's multicultural identity appeared almost rigid, even parochial, as urban classrooms across

the state were being filled by nearly every nationality. In 2005 publishers made a feeble acknowledgment of this reality by including multilanguage glossaries with their submissions, but with little apparent connection to the history content of their programs.

In 1990, the History-Social Science Framework and the Houghton Mifflin textbooks were attacked for their formulation of American national identity and history. Little was said about how each, framework and textbooks, provided a postnationalist frame for viewing America in the global context of world history (see Bender 2002; Sarkar 2002). Until 2005 there was only one textbook for the study of seventh grade world history, Houghton Mifflin's *Across the Centuries* (1991, 1999). And only after 1999 were there several textbooks to choose from, if school districts were looking for an alternative to Houghton Mifflin's sixth grade text, *A Message of Ancient Days* (1991, 1999). For nearly fifteen years, these two textbooks have provided a template for California teachers and students to engage the complexity of worlds, past and present. For the first half of this chapter these texts will serve to mark the political fault line of an unprecedented clash over cultural identity and historical memory that occurred in 2005—a clash of cultures that could perhaps happen now only in California.

DEEP MULTICULTURALISM

Nationally, the K–12 social studies curriculum has certain perennial features in its structure and content. Typically, the elementary and middle grades are organized according to the "expanding horizons" curriculum model, where students first encounter their immediate environment: home, family, and community. These basic social understandings are then extended to one's home state, the nation, and the world. Yet there are, as David Jenness (1990) observes, considerable variations when state-by-state comparisons are made, especially in the secondary grades where the mix of United States and world history, along with offerings in the social sciences and government, can be markedly different in focus and in the depth and breadth of coverage (1990, 20–27).

Variations aside, the 1987 History-Social Science Framework in grades K–5, still followed the sequential shell of the expanding horizons model, though it extended the basic thinking skills in the elementary grades with an emphasis on storytelling. This concept development approach, popularized by Hilda Taba, was common during the 1970s and was present to some extent in the earlier 1981 History-Social Science Framework. Taba was prominent in the California social studies community. Before her untimely death in 1967, she was a professor at San Francisco State, where she developed an

innovative K–8 social studies curriculum (Fraenkel 1994). The CCSS has a special award in her name, which as chapter 3 recounts was given to Diane Brooks. Bill Honig's push for a history-centered curriculum even in the early grades appears to have been spurred in part by his apparent disregard for Taba's concept development approach in the elementary grades, which he referred to as all that "process stuff." Honig's disregard for cognitive skills-based social studies was a position shared by Diane Ravitch and may have been a decisive factor in her appointment to the 1987 Framework Committee (Ravitch 1985).

The new history-centered curriculum introduced students to myths, legends, and biography in grades K–3. This change reflected the intent of its proponents, Diane Ravitch and Charlotte Crabtree, to give children an enriched literary learning experience through storytelling and narrative that would connect them to their cultural heritage. The other members of the Framework Committee made their most important innovation by articulating a chronological sequence for United States and world history and geography. The world history subcommittee overcame Ravitch's initial resistance to a world history sequence that balanced non-Western civilizations with that of the West.

As with its integration of a strong social history emphasis with the more conventional political narrative of U.S. history, the committee accommodated Ravitch by combining a strong Western heritage orientation that linked the rise of Western civilization to the ancient Hebrews and the Greeks with a more contemporary approach to world history. The committee appears to have incorporated the view of the renowned world historian L. S. Stavrianos, then a member of UC San Diego's history department. Stavrianos held that students "cannot truly understand either Western or non-Western history unless [they] have a global overview that encompasses both" (Dunn 2000, 122). The committee achieved the global field of human "interaction" that Stavrianos advocated by setting three years of American history within a wider backdrop of world civilizations and cultures. Thus the course of study alternated in a rich interplay of Western and non-Western histories.

Grade 5: U.S. History, Pre-Columbian Settlements to 1850
Grade 6: Ancient Civilizations, Early Humankind to 500 A.D.
Grade 7: Medieval and Early Modern Times, A.D. 500–1789
Grade 8: U.S. History, 1783–1914
Grade 10: The Modern World, 1789 to the Present
Grade 11: U.S. History, 20th Century

Transcending the narrow national frame typical of multiculturalism that tended to focus on the more visible markers of race, ethnicity, and

gender, the six-year sequence stressed the formative role of religion and its crucial "importance in human history" (CDE 1988, 7). Culture as a way of life may be the medium and mode in which civilizations arise, given a particular form through language and the arts, but religion more often than not was its taproot and source, the deep structure animating the field of cultural formation and production. Making this important connection between religion and culture was a bold move on the part of the 1987 Framework Committee. Their innovation, which publishers were at first reluctant to follow, appears more relevant now than when it was first articulated as a "distinguishing characteristic" of the original framework.

> When studying world history, students must become familiar with the basic ideas of the major religions and the ethical traditions of each time and place. Students are expected to learn about the role of religion in the founding of this country because many of our political institutions have their antecedents in religious beliefs. Students should understand the intense religious passions that have produced fanaticism and war as well as the political arrangements developed (such as separation of church and state) that allow different religious groups to live amicably in a pluralistic society. (CDE 1988, 7)

This course of study commenced after a year of California state history in grade 4, with grade 9 set aside for elective courses and the senior year for semester-long capstone courses in American government and economics. Within the interplay of world history, *culture* took on meanings not encompassed by the relatively short timeframe of American history. The two centuries of our young nation's existence had to be viewed within a larger continuum. The "multicultural perspective" advanced by the framework, which was intended to "reflect the experiences of men and women and of different racial, religious, and ethnic groups," could expand that perspective to a world stage, where students could trace their cultural origins back to their source in Asia, Africa, the Americas, and Europe (CDE 1988, 5). The study of world history might be viewed as multicultural education by other means. Fortuitously, the scope and sequence on world history was conceived almost in scholarly detachment, a needed calm before the storm of the first history-social science textbook adoption broke in 1990.

The world history sequence proved a formidable obstacle to textbook publishers, who chose not to make the deep-pockets investment necessary to develop new world history textbooks. Yet their caution is understandable if the course of study for grades six and seven is considered. No publisher had yet designed a comprehensive but concise synoptic history that surveyed

the major ancient civilizations, much less the medieval and early modern world, in a comparative global perspective that was age appropriate for middle school use.

In the framework, grade six consisted of a panoramic overview of ancient civilizations in the Near East, Africa, including the Hebrews and Greeks, Rome, India, and China. Grade seven followed a no less daunting course tracing the fall of Rome and the rise of Islam. Yet this was a mere prelude to examining medieval societies in sub-Saharan Africa, the Mayan, Aztecs, and Incan civilizations, and medieval China, Japan, and Europe. The global circuit concluded with an ambitious overview of Early Modern Europe from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment. If representing the world in its entirety was a difficult feat, the greater challenge proved to be in constructing an accurate historical representation of the world's major religions. The risk involved may indeed have proved too great for all but one publisher to develop a seventh grade text, which we now turn to consider.

Like all the units of the Houghton Mifflin K–8 Social Studies Program, Unit 2 of *Across the Centuries*, "The Growth of Islam" opens with a stunning two-page, full-color photograph of Shiite Muslims at prayer in a mosque located in Mashad, Iran (Armento et al. 1991, 1999, 48–49). Starting in 500 A.D., two chapters cover the roots of Islam and its expansion, culminating with an overview of Islamic Spain up to 1492. Six chronological lessons, with text tightly framed by maps, illustrations, and photographs, survey desert culture and present the life of Mohammad and the teachings of Islam (the Five Pillars of Islam). A pilgrimage to Mecca is described and illustrated. The distinctive division between Sunni and Shia is explained, including its political connection to the rise of the Caliphate after Mohammad's death. The unit concludes with a chapter survey of the Islamic empire from Baghdad to Cordoba, Spain, and the Golden Age of Islamic civilization. The treatment of non-Muslims and the often inclusive intellectual community of Muslim and Jewish scholars that would serve as the ground for the later European Renaissance are duly noted. Unit 2 closes with the *reconquest* of southern Spain by Ferdinand and Isabella. In one unit, two chapters and six lessons (a mere fifty-four pages), a concise but comprehensive overview of the Islamic world, circa 500 to 1492, is artfully rendered for seventh grade students.

As the teacher edition of *Across the Centuries* states, the goal of the unit is to "provide a foundation for understanding Islam" and to make students aware of how "Islam is a major force in world events today" (Armento et al. 1999, 50). A statement that was courageous in 1987 seems prescient now. However, the process of constructing this "foundation" was not without serious intercultural error. In the run-up to the 1990 adoption the designers of the prototype textbook made numerous editorial mistakes that reflected

their ignorance of the religion's basic precepts. The designers were part of *Ligature*, a national design firm, who became partners with Houghton Mifflin to produce the K–8 textbook program (see LaSpina 1998). The most egregious was their inclusion of pictures and illustrations depicting the Prophet Mohammad. Like more recent images that caused an international uproar, any depiction of the Prophet is considered blasphemous by Shiite Muslims (thought not necessarily by Sunni). That prototype image never made it into print, though an even more controversial image did. At the time, the illustration of a "Caravan Camel" appeared benign to its designers. Used simply as a pictorial device to depict the extreme material necessity of a desert lifestyle, during the adoption process the image of the camel was attacked. The camel was viewed by some critics as reflecting America's stereotypical perception of Arab culture (Armento et al. 1991, 54). By 1999, Houghton Mifflin appears to have learned its lesson and the camel of contention was dispatched to a distant oasis. Instead, the 21st-century edition presented a full-color illustration depicting the lifestyle of an Abbasid scholar occupying the page in studious silence (Armento et al. 1999, 91).

A COMMUNITY COMMODITY

In a way the image of the scholar reflects a strategy taken by the state, to consult with public interest groups in order to arrive at a consensus as to what should properly constitute a "public past" in a social studies textbook (Seixas 2000, 29). Like the seventh grade textbooks submitted for the 2005 adoption, the 21st-century edition of *Across the Centuries* is based on a consultation process that has developed between the state and scholarly groups concerned about the accurate representation of religious belief in textbooks. Since 1991, the Council on Islamic Education (CIE), a California-based nonprofit institute of Muslim scholars, has consulted with the state and publishers to articulate standards for the historical study of Islam (http://www.cie.org/). It worked closely with Houghton Mifflin in the design of the 21st-century edition of *Across the Centuries*. For the 2005 adoption, it served as a content consultant for McDougal Littell's new *California Middle School Social Studies Series* (2006).

Similarly, just as they had earlier participated in the development of academic content standards and tests, leading scholars and teachers from the California Subject Matter Project (SMP) community played major roles as authors and consultants in the development of new world history textbooks for several of the 2005 middle school submissions. As the reform has progressed, so too has their mode of involvement. The presence of these educators has been an important thread of continuity sustaining implementation. Their

continuing presence is indicative of the larger pattern of consultation that has evolved between the state and private interest groups over the course of the last three adoptions.

But during the course of the 2005 primary adoption the professional boundary between scholarship and advocacy came into question. For as the "public forum" in which the adoption process occurs has become receptive to and regulated by the principle of diversity, its inclusiveness has called into question how the state fairly regulates this forum (Parekh 2000, 306). Is it to serve as a mediator or arbiter? How does it give interest groups a voice in this process, a process that in effect is constructing a "public past," a product that in its final form assumes a normative character that ideally is supposed to be representative of all (Nash 1992, 24).

As the contentious politics of the first adoption in 1990 make plainly evident, accuracy alone is not necessarily sufficient to ensure that the historical representations in textbooks will be accepted or well received. But an unintended consequence of the culture war that ensued during the first primary adoption is that it compelled the state to reform the adoption process. Just as state legislation created the professional community of the California Subject Matter Projects, so too the adoption process has served to enable a scholarly culture of consultation between publishers and the state. This culture may be characterized as a highly directed public sphere of political and pedagogical discourse, in which teachers, academics, and interest groups participate in the development of a commercial product for a public end. To that end the state may be less an agent of reform than its regulator. Nevertheless, its role as mediator and arbiter is necessary. The state adoption process, as uncertain in outcome as it is, still is the forum in which the public voice of history learns to speak.

I. KALI STRIKES BACK

> To take 'religion' as a subject of empirical inquiry and to begin to investigate it as a human reality must have demanded not only great effort but also considerable courage.
>
> —Jacques Waardenburg, *Classical Approaches to the Study of Religion*

One of the more puzzling gaps in the original 1987 History-Social Science Framework appears in the sixth grade course of study. In the unit "West Meets East: The Early Civilizations of India and China," it speaks about "a great civilization" that arises in the Indus River Valley, but when it comes to considering that civilization's religious beliefs, students are asked

to consider only "one of the major religious traditions of India: Buddhism" (CDE 1988, 59). This gap persists in the 1997 updated edition of the framework and remains so until content standards were developed a year later. In Standard 6.5 approved by the state board in October 1998, one may read that students are to "explain the major beliefs and practices of Brahmanism in India and how they evolved into early Hinduism" (CDE 2000a, 25). However, the section of the original framework remains nearly the same, with the exception of a curious add-on sentence in the 2001 updated edition. There the framework states that "Students should also study the development of Hinduism and the role of one of its more revered texts, the Bhagavad Gita" (CDE 2001, 79). More than a revealing afterthought, it appears to indicate that some state official had finally taken note of what was always in the sixth grade Houghton Mifflin textbook, *A Message of Ancient Days*. For a Framework Committee that otherwise was either courageous or foolhardy, such that they proposed that all of world history up to Rome's embrace of Christianity in A.D. 500, be covered in grade six alone, what master script for ancient India were they following that prompted such an obvious omission?

As noted, for nearly a decade, *Message* was the only sixth grade textbook used in California classrooms. In it the lesson on Buddhism appears in a chapter on "Ancient India" (Armento et al. 1991, 1999, 220). The "Beginning of Buddhism" is preceded by a lesson on the Aryan migration into India and a brief exposition on their sacred oral tradition, the Vedas (ancient hymns and poems attributed to the Aryans that are considered foundational to the later development of Hinduism). The lesson that follows, "The Golden Age," explains how the beliefs of Hinduism may be traced to the Bhagavad Gita, which is part of a larger epic poem called the Mahabharata (Armento et al. 1991, 1999, 244). The fundamental tenets of Hinduism are next detailed, with emphasis placed on the importance of the caste system (the ancient class system based on the Vedas), karma (the cosmic law of cause and effect), and rebirth (the transmigration of souls–reincarnation). The lesson concludes with a brief discussion of the three main aspects of the tripartite Godhead that Hindus worship: Brahma (Absolute Spirit), Vishnu (that aspect of the Godhead representing Mercy and Compassion), and Shiva (the Lord of Life and Death).

After the second primary adoption in 1998, two new K–6 programs having similar lessons that were submitted by McGraw-Hill (2000) and Harcourt Brace (2000) were approved for use. With the 2005 primary adoption the choice of world history textbooks for grade six and seven increased considerably, but the standard for exposition begun in *A Message of Ancient Days* on Hinduism largely remained the same: the Aryan migration, the Vedas and the caste system, along with a brief exposition of fundamental

beliefs considered essential to a basic understanding of Hinduism as a religion and way of life.

Deliberations in July 2005 were uneventful and, of the twelve programs submitted, ten were recommended by the IMAP and CRP panels for adoption by the state board. However, during the next stage in which the Curriculum Commission held public hearings on the textbook programs the panels had approved, criticism was raised about one of the programs. It began innocently enough, but by the time it was over several Hindu-American foundations brought a law suit against the state. They asked the state court to annul the findings of the entire 2005 adoption process for all the sixth grade textbooks submitted. This was a stunning request with only one apparent purpose: to overturn the longstanding academic consensus on ancient Indian history and the origins of Hinduism.

To the designers of the Oxford University Press sixth grade text, "The Ancient South Asian World," the title to a feature explaining the spiritual purpose of the Hindu vegetarian diet, appeared innocuous. To capture student interest, they used an expression from American pop culture, "Where's the beef?" Like an incantation (for crude and insensitive it clearly was), it opened the door to an onslaught of criticism that followed. By the time the Curriculum Commission held public hearings late in September, requests for editorial corrections had been submitted by interest groups representing three of the world's major religious traditions. The concerns expressed by the Institute for Curriculum Services (ICS), a Bay-area Jewish educational association, and the California Council for Islamic Education (CIE), who each submitted reports, were overshadowed by the unprecedented intervention of three American Hindu foundations with ties to India's Hindu nationalist parties: the Hindu Education Foundation (HEF), the Vedic Foundation (VF), and the Hindu American Foundation (HAF).

By its conclusion the adoption process involved the resolution of editorial changes requested by the ICS and CIE, among others. The Curriculum Commission diligently addressed their concerns. Once the 1987 History-Social Science Framework made basic historical literacy in world religions a core curricular priority, the proper representation and status rendered to each of the world's major religions had become a prominent issue. In 2005, the issue was particularly sensitive, because several of the sixth and seventh grade textbook submissions appeared to privilege Christianity and the Western tradition over that of Judaism and Islam and their respective roles and influence on the course of civilization. These inadequacies were evaluated by the commission and considerately corrected. However, with Hinduism the problem of historical representation moved to an exaggerated plane of politicization. Control of India's precolonial past took on a politi-

cal significance that only George Orwell could have imagined. Here then the focus shifts to consider the scholarly controversy that ensued over the issue of *whose* history of Ancient India should be represented in the sixth grade textbooks submitted for the 2005 adoption. Deep multiculturalism was about to go transnational.

The unprecedented number of proposed changes by the three foundations, well over five hundred, caused the Commission to form an ad hoc committee of historians to review the politically contentious requests. The committee had only a month to fulfill its task. Its target was the November 9, 2005, meeting of the State Board of Education, when the board would announce its list of approved programs. The ad hoc committee submitted an extensive list of edits to the commission on October 31, supporting nearly all the changes recommended by the three groups. But on November 8 a letter to the board arrived in Sacramento, abruptly upending any possibility of closure.

Michael Witzel, a professor of Sanskrit at Harvard University, wrote to the board on behalf of nearly fifty of the world's leading scholars who in his estimation represented "mainstream academic opinion" on Ancient India. The letter warned that an "international educational scandal" would ensue if the board accepted the changes proposed by the "nationalist Hindu ('Hindutva') groups" involved. The intent of the letter was "to call to the Board's attention the religious-political views" of the Vedic and Hindu Education foundations. "The revisions that Hindu nationalists are now trying to force into California textbooks," Witzel wrote, "have been soundly repudiated in the last two years by Indian educators." Citing a 2003 U.S. State Department report, he observed that a recent culture war on the Indian subcontinent had, by American standards, wrought unimaginable havoc upon India's public education system, when the BJP, the Bharatiya Janata Party, took control of the government (see Bhatt 2001; Dalrymple, 2005; Mishra 2006). The "kinds of historical revisions" made by the BJP were in his opinion a threat to "religious freedom." According to the State Department report that Witzel cited, the "rewriting of textbooks to favor Hindu extremist interpretations of history" was made solely for "the politicized inculcation of Hindu religious and cultural norms" (Witzel 2005).

Needless to say, the Witzel letter unsettled the state board and led it to doubt the academic content of the edits and corrections. The board adopted the programs but sent back to the Curriculum Commission all the proposed edits and corrections. The board asked the panels to "reexamine the ad hoc edits and corrections," but only to "improve the factual accuracy of [the sixth grade textbook] materials" (CDE 2006b). To prepare the commission for this review, the CDE consulted with a new set of scholars. In addition

to Professor Witzel, two University of California professors were selected: James Heitzman of University of California Davis and Stanley Wolpert of UCLA, both highly recognized Indian historians.

On December 2, 2005, the Curriculum Commission rejected the scholarly review that CDE prepared for the commission and approved all the edits and corrections that were being advocated by the Hindu Education Foundation (HEF) and the Vedic Foundation. In addition, the commission modified edits and put additional content in the edits at the request of the HEF and Vedic Foundation. After receiving information about the extraordinary commission actions, Ruth Green, president of the State Board of Education, held a meeting on January 6, 2006, in the State Board of Education's conference room. The board and CDE brought together Professor Witzel and Professor Shiva Bajpai, emeritus professor of religion from California State University, Northridge (CSUN), in addition to Shabbir Mansuri of the Council on Islamic Education (CIE), David Nystrom, Professor of Christianity and History, North Park University, Chicago, and Naomi Janowitz, Professor of Religious Studies, University of California Davis.

One by one, each edit and correction was revisited. However, the bulk of the time was spent with Witzel and Bajpai. They debated the historical merits of each edit that Bajpai had already approved. Of the 400 or so requests for edits and corrections initially made by the two foundations only 153 remained. After considerable debate, "the two scholars came to agreement or compromise on the majority of the edits and corrections," with nearly two-thirds of the original requests made by the Hindu foundations being approved (CDE 2006b). The state board then appointed an additional five-person panel to review the Bajpai-Witzel edits and corrections holding a public meeting on February 27, 2006, with the panel to present the board's final recommendations. That meeting did not go well for the state, and on March 17 the Hindu American Foundation brought suit against the State Board of Education seeking to annul the 2005 history-social science textbook adoption.

MEMORY WARS

> Are we obligated to remember people and events from the past? If we are, what is the nature of this obligation? Are remembering and forgetting proper subjects of moral praise or blame? Who are the "we" who may be obligated to remember: the collective "we," or some distributive sense of "we" that puts the obligation to remember on each and every member of the collective?
>
> —Avishai Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory*

At the opening session of the second history-social science primary adoption in July 1998, a teacher on one of the instructional materials assessment panels (IMAP) rose from the assembly to address those present in response to a discussion on the intent and purpose of the 1987 framework. "Multiculturalism," she said, "is about everything we do in our classrooms." As the state approached the millennium that view had quickly become a *living* idea, present in the majority of the students before them and pragmatically informing their practice and identity as teachers. Much to the surprise of the state officials from the Curriculum Commission and the California Department of Education (CDE) managing the event, the second primary adoption from beginning to end unfolded without controversy. From July to the final deliberations in Sacramento that followed in September, the adoption was largely uneventful. By 1998, multiculturalism had gone mainstream. This reality was reinforced by the new program submissions for the second primary adoption. James Banks, author of the recent National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS) Curriculum Guidelines for Multicultural Education (1991) and perhaps the nation's leading academic advocate for multicultural pedagogy, was the principal author of McGraw-Hill's new K–6 program submission, *Adventures in Time and Place* (1999). Because McGraw-Hill designed it for the Texas market, to enter the California market with this program it had to develop textbooks for grades four, on California history, and grade six, which the above section illustrates is on ancient world history (Blakeslee 1999). Though the Content Review Panel (CRP) for the sixth grade text *The Ancient World* rejected it, finding in it serious factual errors and inaccuracies, the Curriculum Commission overruled their report, and the program went on to be approved by the state board after the necessary editorial changes were made.

That action reflected an emerging approach of accommodation through mediation and compromise taken by the state in order to avoid the kind of controversy that overshadowed the first primary adoption in 1990. This approach was followed even if it meant that programs were examined by additional content review experts and that the findings made by the Instructional Materials (IMAP) and Content Review (CRP) panels were overruled. That alternative course of action can be observed fully developed, and in all its limitations, during the 2005 adoption process. But the pragmatic origins of this approach can be clearly traced to the first primary adoption in 1990, when the inept political moves of Superintendent Bill Honig served to polarize that otherwise innovative process. When criticism escalated as it did during the public hearings in Sacramento when the state board approved the K–8 Houghton Mifflin program (1991), and later in school districts like Oakland, California, which rejected the textbooks, Honig was given a remarkable opportunity to make history. He could have called, as

he did with the Clio Conference in 1984 and the National Textbook Forum in 1988, for a similar type forum on the place of multiculturalism in the social studies curriculum. Instead, the superintendent resorted to name calling, calling prominent multicultural educators and academics "tribalists" and cultural "separatists" (Reinhold 1991, 27). The national debate that ensued, in part catalyzed by similar curriculum reform efforts going on in the state of New York, only sharpened the ideological fault lines (see Cornbleth and Waugh 1995; Gitlin 1995; Glazer 1997). Honig's bold vision of state systemic school reform did not extend to opening a prudent dialogue about the role of *culture* in the core curriculum, with his equally zealous opponents.

But hindsight is not history. A remarkable similarity of sentiment and belief connects the voices raised against the 1990 Houghton Mifflin textbooks to those equally strident voices raised during the 2005 adoption controversy. A "public past" requires that the public *not* be politically instructed as Honig was compelled to do, to the great disservice and diminishment of his reform legacy. Instead, a "public forum" is the place where the opposition rightfully gets to voice their concerns and dissent along with the opportunity to effectively influence the outcome of the adoption process, if their claims merit such consideration (Parekh 2000, 304–13).

The great irony of Honig's witness to "democratic values, common ethical principles, civility and reasonable discourse" is that it was undercut by his own actions, and his maladroit characterization of his critics, who, needless to say, responded in kind (Honig, Waugh, and Cornbleth 1995, 22–27). Accounts of the conflicted events surrounding the first primary adoption depict parties who clearly are talking past each other, often in absolute certainty such that even the simplest facts on either side become burdened by an unfortunate ideological point of view that cannot be countered (Parekh 2000, 304).

However, one timely observation that is worth recounting was made by Todd Gitlin, since it speaks presciently to the dilemma that the state found itself in again in 2005. Commenting on the rejection of the Houghton Mifflin textbooks by the Oakland School Board, he observed:

> The opponents were not in the market for a "responsible compromise." They wanted all or nothing. The debate was not about actual textbooks but about symbols, overloaded with emotional meaning, totems, of moral convictions. (Gitlin 1995, 23)

By 2005 the state had come a long way since the first primary adoption. As in 1990, the process was not perfect. Though the Curriculum Commission and Department of Education made some legal missteps in holding special advisory sessions to resolve the dispute over the sixth grade textbooks, the

Hindu nationalists were in no mood for compromise. It was all or nothing. On September 1, 2006, the state Superior Court in Sacramento made its ruling. In *Hindu American Foundation et al. v. the California State Board of Education*, the court agreed with the petitioners, the Hindu American Foundation (HAF) that the state board had not made its special advisory meetings on the requested edits public (like the debate between professors Witzel and Bajpai). However, the court was unwilling to allow that because of this technical infraction "that the entire process through which the [state board] reviewed and adopted the sixth grade history-social science textbooks was invalid" (SCR 2006).

The heart of the suit was about a people's history, though not about the American national identity and its peoples as found in the 1990 Houghton Mifflin texts, but instead about the representation of Hinduism and ancient India, the distant national identity of Hindu Americans. But the court did not share their opinion about how that identity was represented. They "claim[ed] that the depiction of the Hindu religion in the texts contains factual inaccuracies and generally is not neutral, but portrays the religion in a negative light" (SCR 2006). However, after reviewing the state *Standards for Evaluating Instructional Materials for Social Content* (2000b) and the *Criteria for Evaluating Instructional Materials* (2003) and reading the contested histories, the court found that the "challenged texts" were in compliance. Purported inaccuracies concerning Hindu deities and theology, the Aryan migration, the caste system, and the status of women in Indian society were all turned aside, the court finding the petitioners claims unpersuasive.

Since the first primary adoption in 1990, the history-social science curriculum reform has been a site for making America's multicultural past a public one. Though it has more often than not been a highly contested reinvention of our national tradition, it has largely succeeded in spite of the political shortcomings of the adoption process. But it is those shortcomings that have compelled the state to adapt and change, in effect, to re-form the reform. The reason history textbooks are "fought over," Gitlin suggests, is that the texts represent us, our "shared collective identity" (1995, 23). In 2005 the contested ground shifted from culture to religion, though the collective sentiments of the multiculturalists and the religionists are nearly the same. Each wanted to be represented equally and fairly and they all wanted a voice in the process. Being public, the politics of the adoption process has in large part been about finding common ground and moving toward a suitable resolution to the conflict in such matters. One member of the Curriculum Commission, sympathetic to the claims of the Hindu American groups, felt that the state had to "err on the side of sensitivity toward religion," though one could just as easily assert the need for sensitivity to matters concerning culture (Golden 2006).

The events of the last three history-social science adoptions suggest that the state has been in an institutional process of cultural capacity building, though often in a politically haphazard catch-up mode. Between the first and third primary adoptions, California had become the crossroads for a global *diaspora* of peoples and cultures. Perhaps nobody could have foreseen that the crucible of national identity could shift from questions about culture to those of religion, albeit tinged by ethnic nationalism. If the state appeared unprepared for the political reaction of Hindu Americans intent on rewriting their imagined past, in order to have it conform to a distant nationalist ideology, arguably more akin to myth than history, how will it deal will the future?

Herein may lie the answer to the "master script" the Framework Committee was following for the unit on ancient India alluded to earlier. In large part the sixth grade course of study, like the Houghton Mifflin textbook *A Message of Ancient Days*, appears to be based on the work of the renowned Indian historian Romila Thapar. It explains the framework's emphasis on Buddhism, most notably the Buddhist king Asoka, for which Thapar has written the seminal text (1961). It places the rise of the Indus Valley civilization in the wider historical and cultural context of the Aryan migration and the Vedas and Brahmanism, in which Hinduism, like Buddhism, emerges and develops. The Hindutva nationalist movement had a longstanding antipathy to this Indian academic consensus. When the BJP took power in 1999, the party removed Thapar and other prominent historians from government agencies responsible for historical research (Dalrymple 2005, 64). As part of their campaign to rewrite Indian history the BJP revised her textbook *Ancient India* "without her permission" (2005, 65). Thapar was one of the cosignatories of the Witzel letter to the state board and, like him, was against nationalist ideologies like the Hindutva that seek to interpret history "in terms of monolithic religious identities" (Thapar 2004, 20). Politically, the power of the BJP to change history was checked, when they narrowly lost control of the national government in May 2004, just short of a year before the 2005 adoption began.

II. AFTER TEXTBOOKS

The Hindu-American lawsuit represents a provocative reversal in the way Americans approach their nation's story. Rather than wanting to be included into America's multicultural family of immigrants, the American side of our hyphenated national identity, they demanded that the state recognize and represent their primary identity, their Hindu religious and cultural heritage solely on their terms. In this legal battle they were largely successful. The state later settled out of court. This kind of cultural capital, the power to

effectively challenge the state, may in part reflect the rising preeminence of Hindu-American elites. Their presence and influence is now well-established in California's Silicon Valley. Like India, the Valley's culture of digital innovation is driving the present accelerated phase of economic globalization. This cosmopolitan class may be a harbinger of a new kind of post-national history, in which political clout need not be constrained by national boundaries. While the impact of the Hindu-American challenge to the state was sudden and abrupt and its legal denouement relatively swift, another far slower moving reversal, the shift from an *Anglo* to a Latino dominated California, is changing the educational landscape in ways far deeper and more lasting. These historic reversals portend a larger transformation that is changing how America's story is told. This change in story has been shaped by several trends that have converged in California over the past decade shaping the form and content of K–8 instructional textbooks. These include the revolutionary impact of digital technology on the design of textbooks (Nunberg 1996); the political standardization wrought by an "English-only" core curriculum; and an integrally connected third trend, a global *diaspora* of immigrant English learners into the state public schools (Cope 1999). In this concluding section, the impact of these trends on the design of the 2005 program submissions is examined, using the Houghton Mifflin K–8 program as a standard for comparison.

This California textbook phenomenon may certainly have bearing upon how the education publishing industry, whether deliberately or unwittingly, is redefining the act of reading in terms suitable for learning in a digital-based computer culture. In retrospect, the "visual/verbal textbook," as it was called by Houghton Mifflin's partner, the *Ligature* designers, may be viewed as an iterative step in the opening of a dialogue about a larger transformation taking place in the field of curriculum and instruction. That pedagogical dialogue may be described as the transition from the printed textbook to a multimedia information space of the computer screen (Bolter 1990; LaSpina 1998, 2001; Snyder 1997). In the past decade, especially since the inception of the Internet and the rapid emergence of the World Wide Web (3W) this transition has accelerated (Berners-Lee 1999; Huberman 2001). All the major American publishers of educational materials (now largely subsidiaries of transnational media conglomerates) are struggling to come to terms with this trend (Epstein 2001; Kilgour 1998).

One can view this struggle in the product submissions publishers made for the history-social science adoption held by the state in 2005. It is important to understand that this trend unfolded in California during a major political and pedagogical paradigm shift in the English language arts curriculum. This radical, if not politically reactionary shift was reinforced by the development of academic content standards for all the core subject

areas (http://www.cde.ca.gov/be/st/). As previous chapters recounted, in 1998, the year of the second primary adoption for history-social science, state voters overwhelmingly passed Proposition 227, a ballot initiative that overnight ended bilingual education and mandated an English-only curriculum (Crawford 2000; Gibbs and Bankhead 2001).

By 2005 standardization ruled the public school classroom. Textbooks based on an English-only curriculum in all core subjects were aligned to state standards and tests, and the ten new textbook programs submitted and approved for the 2005 adoption were designed to be aligned not only to history-social science standards but also to the English and reading language arts standards. With "English only" the rule, elementary grade classrooms largely in unison across the state were using programs like the phonics-based reading program *Open Court*, published by SRA/McGraw Hill.

eHISTORY

In the remarkable twenty-year implementation of the History-Social Science Framework, this was the first time that publishers had designed programs precisely aligned with state-approved academic content standards in this subject area. Standards for history-social science had been in effect since October 1998 (CDE 2000a). Prior to 1998, the year of the second primary adoption, the Houghton Mifflin textbooks were the only K–8 program approved for classroom use. Though all of the 2005 adopted programs are textbook based, only *one* is "text" based in a traditional linear narrative sense, this being the *Oxford History-Social Science Program for California*, for grades 5–8, published by the prestigious Oxford University Press. In addition to the Oxford texts, there are four elementary and five middle school programs:

Harcourt School Publishers, *Reflections: California Series*, K–6.
Houghton Mifflin, *Houghton Mifflin History-Social Science*, K–6.
Macmillan/McGraw-Hill, *California Vistas*, K–6.
Pearson Scott Foresman, *Scott Foresman History-Social Science for California*, K–5.
Glencoe/McGraw-Hill, *Glencoe Discovering Our Past*, 6–8.
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, *Holt California Social Studies*, 6–8.
McDougal-Littell, *California Middle School Social Studies Series*, 6–8.
Pearson Prentice Hall, *Prentice Hall Social Studies*, 6–8.
Teacher's Curriculum Institute, *History Alive! California Middle Schools Program*, 6–8.

Of the other programs adopted in 2005, only one was intended to stand apart in the same way as was the Houghton Mifflin program. This was the

Scott Foresman History-Social Science for California, which as a trail blazer in the digital transition from page to screen was something in-between. Touted by the publisher as "revolutionary," it was less avant-garde innovation than a cautious next step. Hyperbole aside, the panel of social studies teachers and academics that evaluated the program for the state was given a set of newspaper-print-quality consumable workbooks, which in fact were the core texts, in addition to a laptop computer in which the same printed content of the program was loaded, along with what was called the "Digital Path." That path was one of three. "Core instruction" would occur on the "Text Path," which was found in the ("write-in") consumable workbooks. But that content was also reproduced on the digital path, which was dubbed as an "alternate" path for instruction. So as not to emphasize the dichotomy between the dual paths of page (Text Path) versus screen (Digital Path), an additional "Active Path" paralleled the digital path, which consisted merely of student activities related to the core text lessons.

The instructional program was designed as a sequence of lessons each covering one of the History-Social Science (HSS) Standards (CDE 2000a) for grades K–5. Teacher resources for each grade and every unit linked each standard to relevant state-approved English Language Arts Content Standards (ELA 1998) and the Reading/Language Arts Framework (RLA 1999). Teacher resources also provided "Universal Access" strategies for every lesson and support for reading, writing, and vocabulary skills (e.g., SF-TR, 4–5; SF-OV, 13). Each lesson of the Digital Path contained:

- A video or animated introduction to the lesson;
- A 3–5 minute instructional video;
- An interactive practice software activity;
- The online Student Text with audio;
- Vocabulary support, content reading support, and paper and pencil assignments. (SF-DP 2005, 1)

Of these features, the audio student text was the most compelling. English-language learners can model their pronunciation of words and text on a precisely articulated computer-generated voice of the text in view on screen. Any section of the text could be listened to again, simply by clicking on an icon for the "Digital Student Text." Vocabulary covered in the content of a lesson could also be listened to by clicking on a "Vocabulary" icon. In K–2 lessons, students click on an "Introduction" icon that is drawn exactly as a movie clapper, the clapboard device that is "clapped" at the beginning of a shot on a movie set. These "short lesson introductions" are animated with talking cartoon characters that preview the content of a lesson. Grades

3–5 have "voiceover" for the introduction segments. "Explore" and "Help" interfaces provide additional support again by *talking* students through a lesson. On the toolbar of the student digital path interface there are, among others, icons for movies, software, and web links (SF-DP 2005, 31).

The Digital Path unit openers that used animated or video segments to introduce and preview the text content of lessons are little more than the fulfillment in real time digital media of the unit opener visual format in the Houghton Mifflin textbook series, which similarly used vivid full-color, two-page spreads to introduce the lessons that followed. The opening visual in the Houghton Mifflin textbooks was always in support of the narrative, this in keeping with the general *visual/verbal* design principle for presenting content followed by the graphic designers of the program. Typically a dramatic anecdote, perhaps an excerpt from a primary source historical document or an imaginative reconstruction of an important event as seen through the eyes of an observer would serve as a lead in to the theme and content of the lesson. This visually evocative rendering was used to engage the reader and was in keeping with the History-Social Science Framework, that emphasized "the importance of history as a story well told" (CDE 1988, 4).

DIGITAL FUTURES

In a recent issue of *Communications of the* ACM (The Association for Computing Machinery), which was devoted to the theme of "Interaction Design and Children" (IDC), the internationally acclaimed expert on learning and computers Seymour Papert had this to say about the future of the printed page:

> The fundamental question is how deeply the school is shaped by the properties of pen and paper and writing. My own view is that truly significant change will not come until the paper-based technology cedes its primacy to electronic-based digital technology—and even then it will need time for knowledge to reform itself to fit the new medium of expression. If this is true then small changes within a paper-based school do not add up to much and this is why school reforms have had such a history of failure. *Perhaps* I am wrong. . . . Perhaps there is some fundamental factor that makes education the exception. But if so, let's see some serious effort made to discover this fundamental factor. (Papert, 2005, 38; see: http://www.papert.org/)

The use of a visual opening for each unit has become a standard device that can be seen in all the later history-social science textbook programs

adopted by the state in 1998 and 2005. For example, in the McDougal-Littell *California Middle School Social Studies Series*, all the units begin with the feature "Starting with a Story." That story text is embedded within a visual image complementing the text on the page. But like the Scott Foresman Digital Path audio features, the McDougal Littell program also gives student readers the option of listening to the story in an "eEdition" of the textbook. On the printed page opposite to the *Starting with a Story* feature, one can see a small icon with an embedded arrow that refers to the eEdition version of the text. These unclickable icons appear throughout the program and suggestively signal that the printed page has an equivalent digital page that may be listened to as well as viewed. Holt, Macmillan/McGraw-Hill, and the Pearson-Prentice Hall middle school programs also have digital versions that reproduce the printed textbook page by page (with an audio version), that can be accessed by password at an online website or loaded into a computer by CD-ROM disc.

McDougal Littell prominently displays the digital advantages that can be accessed at their online site in an advertisement that appears inside the cover of their teacher edition textbooks. In addition to the eEdition version of the text, ClassZone.com, the McDougal Littell site, has links to teacher resources and student tools that are accessible only by password to schools that adopt the program (http://classzone.com/). The grand theory of connectivity underlying the hype of the ClassZone is capsulized in an ad that states: "Now it all Clicks!" It may be found inside the teacher edition in a section on student reading that appears after a section on instructional technology.

The section "Helping Students Read History," written by a noted reading specialist, starts out by setting forth three attributes of the "active and engaged reader":

- Build associations among ideas
- Create visual images of what they are reading
- Continually revise their interpretations as they gather more information

Then promotional information appears suggesting how the instructional design of the text supports these readers by being sensitive to "Various Learning Styles" and using "Visual Information." That use is explained in a graphic example of what a "Visual Summary" of text content looks like. This is followed on the next page by a large illustrated graphic called "Skillbuilder," which shows students how to interpret visuals. Above this graphic device a subheading appears that explains the rationale behind the visuals. "Evolving Forms of Reading" announces that

> Students need to be able to read in new ways.
>
> Nonlinear Materials—Today's students must:
>
> - Gather ideas from multi-sources, resource books, magazines, computer databases, CD ROMs, and the Internet.
> - Find their way through nonlinear materials, such as by deciding which area of the computer screen contains the information they want.
>
> Graphic Layouts—Today's readers must deal with informational materials that come in various formats.
>
> - Varying columns of text with many pictures, graphs, and maps, such as 3D graphics;
> - Single-column texts with large marginal areas used for illustrations, highlighted information, and thought-provoking ideas.
>
> [The *California Middle School Social Studies Series*] familiarizes students with these multiple text formats and teaches students reading strategies for effectively obtaining information from each format. (McDL-TE, 32)

Similarly, the *Holt California Social Studies* teacher edition textbook also touts "a new way to read," but its approach is much more narrowly focused and deals only with the perceptual problem of reading text on a computer screen. Their solution, "Live Ink" is available to readers using the online version of their social studies program. The two-page spread promoting *Live Ink On Line Reading Help* states that the Holt social studies program "integrates research-based reading instruction and offers support so students can understand and remember what they learn" (H-TE, T52-T53). *Ink* reformats the font size of "traditional block text" to a "visually friendly, cascading phrase style" by "a single click on the online textbook, which opens a window with the modified text layout." *Live Ink* was developed by a software firm. The Holt press release notes that the software designers

> reviewed 50 years of published research in cognitive neuroscience, linguistics, visual perception, information processing, and reading psychology to develop fundamental algorithms for processing text into a format that is easier for the eyes to scan and for the brain to comprehend. (HRW, January 27, 2005)

Holt and McDougal Littell come at the same pedagogical issue (the necessity of online learning in a fast-emerging digital culture) from different angles. One offers a technical solution to deal with a real problem affecting

students trying to read a computer screen. The other makes a claim, fait accompli, that students need to be literate in media other than print—though each is done in terms suitable to making a commercial product salable. Nevertheless, a tacit acknowledgment is made that a profound cultural shift is underway. That the arc of change has occurred through the course of state implementation for the history-social science curriculum reform during the 1990s, the pivotal decade for this shift and that, in the progression of its three primary adoption cycles, one may track this change in its textbook product submissions, is not so much a claim for its importance, than a sign of the ubiquity and pervasiveness of digital technology's intrusion into everyday life and, by extension, the social studies classroom.

Early on, the designers of the 1991 Houghton Mifflin Social Studies program saw this change coming and that learning with even traditional media like textbooks required "a different model of reading" (LaSpina 1998, 123). Though digital technology provided them with a new medium to make a paperbound textbook, it was the first program made on screen (without paper page layouts) using Macintosh computers and QuarkXpress publishing software. Nevertheless they recognized that the technology alone would not change the terms of learning. A simple change in technology, a change of media, from printed page to computer screen, was not sufficient. Rather a fundamental change in perception and understanding had to occur. For the makers of the Houghton Mifflin texts, the first fundamental boundary to cross was in the acceptance of visual imagery *as* content. This led to the visual/verbal design principle that determined the ratio of image and text on the page. Visual information, as in the unit openers for the 2005 programs, would always serve to complement and support the text. But reading visual information was not easy. So the Houghton Mifflin textbooks incorporated a unique visual learning strand throughout the program, a feature that advanced the proposition that was strikingly similar to that of the later McDougal Littell program. In a planning document for the design of 1991 Houghton Mifflin Social Studies program (HM), one can read that

> Children live in an increasingly complex and highly visual society. . . . Some children spend many hours with visual media such as television, videos, and computers. The HM program recognizes that some children are more receptive to information presented in a visual format and that all students need training in visual learning skills so that they can process visual information critically. The HM visual learning program is both explicit and implicit. Selected visual learning skills are explicitly taught along with learning skills at every grade level, and are integrated into the overall comprehensive scope and sequence of the program. (Ligature 1989, 25)

Visual information and visual learning, as conceived in the Houghton Mifflin program, has been readily adapted by publishers and is evident in the 2005 programs. The Holt program "involves students in the study of history and helps them discover a story well told" with the use of "stunning visuals" that are intended to "put students into the context of the time period, bringing people, places, and concepts to life" (H-T51). A major visual feature in the Holt program is called the "Infographic," which is designed to give students "information in a visual format, using captions and call-out boxes to help establish the intent of the drawing" (H-T inside front cover). The Infographic appears directly derived from a similar visual/verbal feature, *A Closer Look*, found in the 1991 Houghton Mifflin program.

All the 2005 adopted programs are caption rich. All visual features—whether illustrations, photographs, maps, timelines, or diagrams are framed by captions, call outs, titles, and subheadings. Discrete windows of text placed inside or at the margins of the image that didactically name, identify, describe, and if necessary query the reader about what is being viewed. With these extensive visual and graphic aids, the story is not so much "well told," as the History-Social Science Framework intended, which meant powerful dramatic historical narrative. Rather, the story in the 2005 adopted textbooks is "well structured" with the text chunked into discrete thematic segments that conform exactly to the specifications of the history-social science content standards. For example, in the Glencoe/McGraw-Hill middle school program *Discovering Our Past*, each section (lesson) page opener is dominated by a large text box titled "Guide to Reading." In it are described several ways to approach the text, a series of conceptual devices that provide a script structuring the act of reading:

- Looking Back, Looking Forward
- Focusing on the Main Idea
- Locating Places
- Meeting People
- Content Vocabulary
- Academic Vocabulary
- Reading Strategy

Directly adjacent to the Guide is an icon posting the pertinent History-Social Science Standard. Such graphic structural features are determined in large part by the *Criteria for Evaluating Instructional Materials in History-Social Science* (2003). The criteria used by state evaluation panels during

the adoption process are fairly explicit. Category 4: Universal Access is the most relevant. It states:

> Instructional materials shall provide access to the curriculum for all students. Therefore, the following design principles for perceptual alternatives shall be used. (CDE 2003, 8)

Universal Access is the principal reason why content standards must appear in the text, why publishers have a digital online and audio version of their textbooks, and why "written captions" and "relevant descriptions" accompany all visual information (2003, 8–9). The design principles (there are ten), in large part, follow from the graphic structures and visual aids developed for the innovative Houghton Mifflin program. Just as the 2005 adopted programs generally follow the visual/verbal design structures for information in that program, so too are the present reading strategies for English-language learners derived from the visual learning strand of the Houghton Mifflin program.

PHONETIC PICTURES

As the opening section of this chapter described, up until 2005 there was only one seventh grade textbook approved for use in California classrooms, the Houghton Mifflin text *Across the Centuries* (1991, 1999). Likewise, for nearly a decade there was only one sixth grade textbook available, *A Message of Ancient Days*, also by Houghton Mifflin (HM). Although that changed with the 1998 adoption, something was missing from most of the program submissions. Though all mimed to some degree, some better than others, the visual style of the HM program—full-color pictures, photographs, maps, graphs, and graphic organizers could be viewed throughout—none it appeared had taken seriously the visual learning strand that gave some justification to the HM designers' argument that visuals be read, analyzed, and discussed as one would *text* content.

For the first time that adoption year, Oxford University Press submitted two United States history textbooks for the framework's course of study in grades five and eight. *A History of Us* was highly unusual in that it was written not by committee but by an individual author, a former journalist and school teacher by the name of Joyce Hakim. That same year a scathing article on the textbook industry appeared in the *New York Review of Books* (NYRB). *The Betrayal of History*, written by the prolific historian and journalist, Alexander Stille, was more than just a review of Joyce Hakim's new books. Stille compared it to several other current U.S. history textbooks produced by major publishers for the national market (three of whom had

even submitted textbooks to California's second history-social science adoption in 1998). Praising Hakim's evocative narrative style, Stille decried the "astonishing decline of literary quality" that he found evident in these other programs—the "decline" was precipitated in his view by the "shift from words to images," which he believes is "robbing the books of content" (1998, 16). For Stille, with the exception of Hakim, "the most striking difference between the current textbooks and their predecessors is visual."

> During the last few decades, illustrations have become more frequent and elaborate. The most recent textbooks appear to be designed on the debatable premise that they must compete with Nintendo video games and MTV. The books bombard the reader with images, maps, charts, broken-out quotes, and a rainbow of colors and typefaces. (Stille 1998, 16)

A similar refrain has echoed across the last three primary adoptions. It began with an article that appeared in the *New York Times Magazine* in September 1991, "Class Struggle: California's Textbook Debate," which followed the contentious first primary adoption process (Reinhold 1991). *International Design* magazine (I.D.) soon weighed in, with a final word by the conservative American Textbook Council (Rock 1992; Sewall 1992). The echo-chamber iconoclasm of such critics tends to be formulaic (brooding over the passing of the Word and the decline of Western civilization wrought by MTV and *USA Today!*), but it reflects a pre-Internet mindset that has somewhat diminished as cognitive psychologists and reading specialists observe that school children now tend to open their web browser just as easily and avidly as they do Harry Potter. This was the basic point of the designers of the Houghton Mifflin textbooks. Visual information *is* content too, though of a nondiscursive order. Well before the rise of the Internet, Edward Tufte, a mentor of the Houghton Mifflin designers, observed that in a multimedia age, text and image need each other:

> Words and pictures are sometimes jurisdictional enemies, as artists feud with writers for scarce space. An unfortunate legacy of these craft-union differences is the artificial separation of words and pictures. . . . What has gone wrong is that the techniques of production instead of the information conveyed have been given precedence. Words and pictures belong together. Viewers need the help that words can provide. (Tufte 1983, 180)

This is not to say that Stille's critique does not bear heeding. The "techniques of production" can be used badly (Tufte 1983, 180). For example,

one of the textbook programs that Stille critiqued, which was approved for use in K–6 California classrooms during the second primary adoption in 1998, betrayed not only history but the innovative design standard set by the Houghton Mifflin program. The Macmillan/McGraw-Hill's *Adventures in Time and Space, K–6* offered a visual and graphic excess guaranteed to induce Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD). But Stille was not alone. The 1998 IMAP teacher panel that evaluated the K–6 program would have concurred. The latest 2005 history-social science adoption tends to bear Tufte out. The state has provided a space where traditional narrative history programs like Oxford's don't have to "feud" with programs like Scott Foresman. Like it or not, textbooks are on a digital path, and the culture and practice of reading, like the printed word, are interfacing with a culture rapidly being encoded into digital form (Bolter and Grusin 1999; Manovich 2001, 69–70).

But if the 2005 California social studies adoption represents the best of all textbook worlds—a pluralism of pedagogies, a multicultural marketplace where school districts can pick and choose the program most suited for their assumed needs—the current offerings approved for classroom use reflect not only the transition from page to screen (observable over the course of the last three adoption cycles) but choice dictated less by the patterns of pedagogical consumption than the diktat of political necessity and the forces of cultural reaction.

In 1998, California became the first minority-majority state. That same year was marked by two major political events that had an enormous impact on the instructional design of textbooks. As recounted in chapter 4, in May of that year, bilingual education abruptly ended with the passage of Proposition 227 by voter referendum and, later that year, the California Commission for the Establishment of Academic Content and Performance Standards concluded its work, recommending new History-Social Science Content Standards to the State Board of Education, which were adopted by the board on October 9, 1998 (CDE 2000a).

But a prior phase of this culture war, which was really about who would dominate and determine education policy in the English language and reading arts curricula, occurred two years earlier at a May 1996 meeting of the Education Committee of the California State Assembly (California's house of representatives). Denny Taylor (1998) has a fascinating account of these hearings in which whole language pedagogy, up to then the state-approved approach to reading, was summarily deemed apostasy and its advocates banished to an academic gulag. Phonics soon filled this pedagogical vacuum, hastened along by bilingualism's demise and the rise of an official English-only policy, which provided the ideal political opening for phonics-based programs like McGraw-Hill's *Open Court*.

Though the pedagogical borders of California's core curriculum were sealed, federal political and economic policy (e.g., President Reagan's amnesty program in 1986 for illegal immigrants and President Clinton's NAFTA agreement in 1993) guaranteed that California, like other southwest border states, would be the destination of first and last resort for migrants (Bigelow 2006; Rockenbach 2001). As this trend reached critical mass in the classroom, the once innovative Houghton Mifflin K–8 program became more a burden than a boon for social studies teachers, even with its visual learning strategies, features like graphic organizers and visual/verbal dictionaries (words with pictures), that were specifically designed to make the text more accessible for English-language learners. In acknowledgment of this trend, Houghton Mifflin submitted a revised version for the 21st-century edition of the K–8 social studies program only for grades 3–8 in 1998 for the second primary adoption.

For the elementary grades, the original 1987 History-Social Science Framework course of study outlined a rich literary children's curriculum that would emphasize "biography, story, folktales, and legends" (CDE 1988, 32). Ideal as this was—since it was conceived as an alternative to the concept and thinking skills curriculum taught in elementary social studies—a strange thing happened in elementary classrooms across the state. All the major urban districts, from Sacramento to San Diego, stopped adhering to the framework and instead focused on the teaching of English to their burgeoning population of English-language learners (Rumbaut and Cornelius 1995)—a trend that has now become even more pronounced, after the onslaught of standardized testing required by *No Child Left Behind* (NCLB), "the federal legislation signed into law in January 2002" (Peterson and West 2003, 1).

While this may have given some relief to elementary school teachers, it was minimal, because now the time usually spent on social studies was devoted instead to teaching phonics-based programs like SRA/McGraw-Hill *Open Court*. Middle school teachers were in a worse bind. Teaching world history, which was required in grades six and seven, was made nearly impossible if the Houghton Mifflin texts were used. The reading level for *A Message of Ancient Days* and *Across the Centuries* was simply too high (written in a lively but nevertheless academic style). Even with all the visuals and graphics, the texts designed for an era of excellence were now barely accessible to English learners. This situation did in fact substantially improve with the 2005 adoption. Reading experts, named as authors or consultants, were omnipresent in all the newly adopted programs. Visual learning had returned, but it was largely superficial and gimmicky, like the Infographic or something called a "Foldable," in the Glencoe/McGraw-Hill program, which is nothing more than a graphic organizer in 3-D, intended to improve "Active Reading and Study Skills." Other than the recogni-

tion that students read in "new ways," neither Holt nor McDougal Littell articulated the pedagogical implications in any in-depth way. Their teacher editions suggested that visual learning was already naturalized outside the classroom, a near universal informal curriculum. Given this, the presence of visuals in their products, like their suggested teaching strategies (e.g., "Visual Summary," the most common of the graphic devices in all the approved programs, used to recall the main idea of a text), appear more as a selling device, used to engage the eye of potential buyers, than one used for learning. There was no attempt to integrate these devices into a larger ensemble of visual learning strategies connected to a coherent rationale that was meaningfully articulated throughout the program.

But visual literacy was not a state priority. Basic English literacy was. Publishers who submitted programs for the 2005 history-social science primary adoption provided comprehensive teacher resources to assist English-language learners. *Reading Study Guides* were a common instructional support included with each grade-level textbook. Every lesson of the textbook was designed to support the formation of what one program submission referred to as the "strategic reader" (McDL–RSG). But with the act of reading broken down into a rote mechanical process, the story was lost. The narrative power of history became reduced on the page to a well-organized field of atomized information.

PARSING THE POLITICS OF MEMORY

Not long before the history-social science primary adoption concluded in July 2005, the Lenovo Group (a China-based firm that had recently acquired the IBM Personal Computer Division), and Nokia (the Finnish mobile phone company) introduced new tablet-size Internet PCs to the international market. Earlier that year the MIT Media Lab launched its One Laptop Per Child initiative (OLPC), which proposed to develop a $100 laptop PC for children in developing countries (http://laptop.org/). More recently, these tablet-style PC ventures have been superseded, at least in the realm of computer industry hype that follows the latest wave of innovation, by *ebooks*. Major electronics and software companies like Adobe, Philips, and SONY, and the online bookseller Amazon.com have produced ebook technology, portable handheld digital devices that present printed books in a small electronic screen-based format (see Levy 2007).

After the State Board of Education adopted the K–5 Scott Foresman program, the Los Angeles Unified School District chose it above others for elementary school use. However, few district schools had the network capacity required for the Digital Path as it was proposed to the state IMAP

panel that evaluated it, in which schools that adopted the program would either access a district server or the publisher's. Instead, the consumable Text Path workbooks were supplemented by DVDs that included the video lesson openers and the Text Path in a digital format. Publishers are cautiously straddling Papert's digital divide holding on to pen and paper. That may be a wise strategy, even though their actual products appear to reflect the values of the market more than they do an assured pedagogy that is sensitive to the differences in media and their potential to support the practice of reading.

From a different perspective both Papert and publishers engage in the modernist myth typical of advanced technological societies, the cult of the new. Papert is convinced he is in the vanguard on the digital cutting edge of history. Publishers, if their hype is to be believed ("Its Revolutionary!") are perhaps more like wannabes riding the imagined wave into the future. Both also largely focused on the tool, the technical skill, with little regard for the culture of the school or society, except to assume such institutions are backward, in Papert's terms: a "failure," the other, to sell however needed a product.

In July 1996, the year before the History-Social Science Framework was reaffirmed, the then California superintendent of public instruction, Delaine Eastin, was riding a similar wave. Larry Cuban captures the futurist "moment" and discerns Papert's "fundamental factor" in Eastin's words: "Technology is an essential part of education as we approach the 21st century. Ninety percent of the jobs created from this moment on will require advanced technological training. To compete for these jobs, our children will have to be skilled in the use of information technology. . . . If we allow our educational system to fall behind the tide of change in the larger world we prepare kids for bit parts at best" (Cuban 2001, 33).

Later that year an article appeared in the *Harvard Educational Review* that considered the implications of the wave for educational systems in a global context. In *A Pedagogy of Multiliteracies: Designing Social Futures*, the New London Group (1996) called for "rethinking the fundamental premises of literacy pedagogy." Though the group was international in makeup, all were from English-speaking countries: Australia, Great Britain, and the United States. In their assessment two trends were changing the traditional terms of literacy today. In their view, our awareness of one, cultural and linguistic diversity, was largely the consequence of the other, digital technology, mass media, and the Internet. In such a world, the skills and knowledge that students needed had to transcend national boundaries. Today students needed to be multilingual and literate in new media. The New London Group's most provocative and perhaps prescient assertion was "that there was not [a] singular, canonical English that could or should be taught anymore." In the present

> Effective citizenship and productive work now requires that we interact effectively using multiple languages, multiple Englishes, and communication patterns that more frequently cross cultural, community, and national boundaries. (NLG 1996)

A decade hence, the question of what form "multiple Englishes" may take was answered. In January, 2006, the British Council announced the findings of the major research study they had sponsored. *English Next* received considerable attention around the world, though none it seems in English-speaking California, or for that matter in any of the major U.S. newspapers. Coverage was high in Commonwealth countries. But the greatest attention occurred in East Asia, in postcolonial nations like India.

The conclusion of *English Next* is troubling. "Monoglot English graduates face a bleak economic future as qualified multilingual youngsters from other countries are proving to have a competitive advantage over their British counterparts in global companies and organizations" (Graddol 2006, ii). Change the nationality, and the literacy policy implications hit closer to home. Like the New London Group, the British Council study finds that

> the new language which is rapidly rising ousting the language of Shakespeare as the world's lingua franca is English itself—English in its new global form. . . . This is not English as we have known it. . . . It is a new phenomenon. (Graddol 2006, 11)

This new "global form" of English may be greatly shaped by Asian countries, especially the emerging high-tech digital economies of China and India. That change may be observed in the rapid rise of non-English-speaking users of the Internet. *English Next* (2006) cites the study by the University of California linguist Geoffrey Nunberg, "Will the Internet Always Speak English?" Nunberg (2000) found that in 1998 about 85 percent of web pages were in English. By 2000, the *Next* study shows that that proportion had fallen to 68 percent. Mapping this trend indicates that this number will continue to drop as more non-English speakers use the Internet and software is increasingly written for language groups and nationalities other than English (Graddol 2006, 45).

But a more important political event shadows the year of Nunberg's study. 1998 is the year that the "English for the children" initiative—Proposition 227—was overwhelmingly passed by voters in California. The sponsor of that state initiative was the highly successful Republican, Ron Unz, a Silicon Valley software entrepreneur (http://www.onenation.org/). As the *Next* study observes: "It is often claimed that English dominates computers and the Internet and that those wishing to use either must first learn English."

That reality is no longer the case, for "what began as an Anglophone phenomenon has rapidly become a multilingual affair" (Graddol 2006, 44–45). Since 1998 California has been designing a monolingual social future for its school children, trapping them in 19th-century models of assimilation. As China and India are ramping up to English on the opposite edge of the Pacific, California has been narrowing down and emptying out the meaning of educational opportunity with its standardization of the core curriculum.

In the foreword to the 1987 History-Social Science Framework, Delaine Eastin's predecessor Bill Honig spoke about the significance of history for California's children:

> History is the glue that makes the past meaningful, the lens through which children and adults can come to understand the world that they live in and understand how it was shaped. (CDE 1988, vii)

Of course the "glue" in the framework's conception of a "story well told" was and is English. But as the voices in the state's K–8 classrooms have become polyphonic, that story has changed, often told in media other than words.

The objective of this review has been to render visible the evolution of textbook conventions being transformed by digital media. As the visual design code of these programs has evolved, taking on more of the burden of print, the standards of literacy has changed. As the "text" has thinned on the page and become more basic, so too perhaps has the possibility of engaging history in any depth. In making the story more accessible—a necessity if English learners are to be reached—the test of memory has also largely been reduced to the recall of mere facts (CDE 2006a). What began as a grand civic experiment in creating a common culture and restoring historical literacy to the curriculum may now be in need of a different lens.

CHAPTER 7

California Makes Its Way

> An occasion like the present would seem to call for an absolutely untechnical discourse rather than logic. I ought to give a message with a practical outcome . . . but do not judge me harshly, I cannot produce it on the present occasion. I humbly apologize; I have come across the continent to this wondrous Pacific coast—to this Eden, not of the mythical antiquity, but of the solid future of mankind—I ought to give you something worthy . . . of your great destiny . . . and yet, I cannot.
>
> —William James, Philosophical Union of the University of California, Berkeley, August 26, 1898

The 1898 lecture of William James, *Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results*, was a historic moment for American philosophy. With it he introduced the principles of pragmatism to America's West Coast academic frontier. Had John Swett been present, he may have nodded in assent as James described California as the Eden of the future. John Dewey on the other hand may have become uneasy with the latter half of his talk, in which James tried to wed the practical insight of pragmatism to theological questions and the manifestation of a transcendent will in history. Dewey had largely dispensed with such traditional notions of divine intervention. Progress to his "Great Community" (a secular version of the City of God) could be realized without James's belief in a "providential" spiritual power influencing the course of human history (Westbrook 1991, 79). A century later, state political commentators tended to view the Eden of the future as a "paradise lost" (Schrag 1995). In 1983, the latter-day California progressives who mounted the state's systemic school reform movement managed to briefly restore the semblance of nonpartisan state government that Republican politicians of an earlier era like Governor Earl Warren came to expect as necessary to fulfill the state's "great destiny." It was Warren's destiny to empower the civil rights revolution, as it was the role of his Republican successors to reverse that course. After *A Nation at Risk*, state and national

educators who still believed in government as a social force for progress and the common good were forced into an ideological war of attrition over the legitimacy of state intervention in public education. With the rise of free-market ideology and the retreat of the federal government from playing, as it had during the civil rights era, an active (dare we say providential) role in defining the nature and scope of equal educational opportunity, states had to fill the gap. The California excellence movement, and the systemic school reform policy model it employed, was one such solution.

In this concluding chapter we review what systemic school reform (1983–1998) failed to do and how the standards-based reform policy that followed after 1998 tended to codify that failure. The conservative political turn in state and national politics, noted above, weakened the institutional capacity of the state to effectively respond to these shortcomings, which had a profound impact on the schools. Two prominent instances reflecting these shortcomings, of great consequence for the conduct of state educational policymaking, are described. The first instance stems from the gradual resegregation of and disinvestment in the public school system, which developed after the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. Over time, the conditions created by the buildup of these structural inequities forced the state into court. That legal battle, the *Williams v. the State of California* lawsuit and its political denouement, is recounted here.

The second instance is a structural limitation built into the system itself that diminished the institutional capacity of the state for innovative strategic policy planning. One prominent innovation of the systemic school reform model was its use of the university system to leverage change in the classroom. However, the possibility for systemwide educational innovation reached its political nadir with the development of the 2002 Master Plan for California Education and the response to its proposals by the entrenched bureaucracy. This innovative policy document proposed revolutionary changes to the academic mission and structure of the state university system that had been in place since the 1960 Master Plan for Higher Education. The most innovative of these policy proposals, which were wisely systemic in their orientation and approach, came up against the institutional power arrangements set up by the 1960 plan, which effectively thwarted their implementation.

In either case, these conditions are reflective of a profound shift in values wrought upon California and the nation and are captured, I believe, by the perilous moral shift away from the public ideas that go to the heart of this narrative. In the recounting of this history, I have sought an elusive goal: the recollection of progressive ideals and within the educative processes of the state systemic school reform movement a renewal of the public trust, which America once placed in the institutions designed for their realization.

RENEWING THE WARREN REVOLUTION

> California is not another American state. It is a revolution within the states.
>
> —Carey McWilliams, 1949

On August 13, 2004, minority students in California had reason to celebrate. After four years of legal wrangling, a newly elected Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger settled an ACLU lawsuit brought on behalf of a San Francisco middle school student, Eliezer Williams. In the political continuum of national school reform history, *Williams v. the State of California* was a hopeful sign. The ACLU invoked the historic legal precedent of *Mendez v. Westminster* and *Brown* by linking the *Williams* settlement to the legacy of Earl Warren. But was playing catch-up a sign of progress?

Nationally, California had finally joined ranks with the state of Kentucky, which in 1990 revolutionized the way that states conceived of equal educational opportunity (Schrag 2003, 61). The 1990 Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA) was based on a 1989 ruling by the Kentucky Supreme Court, *Rose v. the Council for Better Education*. In language identical to the California state constitution (see opening quotation chapter 2), the court sought to resolve "whether the Kentucky General Assembly has complied with its constitutional mandate to 'provide an efficient system of common schools throughout the state' " (KSC 1989). The court found that the assembly had violated that basic mandate.

But a decade later California was in denial about the same issue. The *Williams v. the State of California* lawsuit filed in State Superior Court on August 13, 2000, described a shocking reality: "Tens of thousands of children attending public schools located throughout the state of California are being deprived of basic educational opportunities." The schools that the plaintiffs were "forced to attend . . . lack the bare essentials required of a free and common school education that the majority of students throughout the State enjoy" (ACLU 2000, 6). After nearly two decades of reform dedicated to the pursuit of excellence, what had gone wrong?

A year before the Kentucky Supreme Court made its ruling in *Rose v. the Council for Better Education* California voters passed Proposition 98, after an intense political campaign led by State Superintendent Honig, who was a zealous supporter of the initiative. For the superintendent, Proposition 98 was meant to be the decisive battle in his annual ADA war with Governor George Deukmejian, who was just as adamantly opposed to its passage. But Honig's last victory over the governor was short lived. State school funding did not substantially improve. One reason for this situation was the limitations built into Proposition 98 itself. Honig's former colleague on the State

Board of Education, Michael Kirst (2007), observed that "voter initiatives" like Proposition 98 and Proposition 13 "have put the state finance system in a double bind." The problem is that they "set both a *de facto* floor and ceiling" on the amount of money the state may raise and allocate to fund the K–12 system (2007, 2). Though Proposition 98 required the state to earmark roughly 40 percent of the general fund to schools, the state had no control over cyclical downturns in the economy. Depending on the year, less money coming into the state's coffers meant that this defined percentage was adjusted down. In the aftermath of systemic reform, as the state transitioned to a standards-based system, California still ranked about thirtieth in the nation for annual per-pupil expenditures. Over time, the reduced levels of state funding became a de facto policy of disinvestment.

To remedy this problem, upwardly mobile suburban school districts soon came to supplement the uncertain annual state funding by creating community-based educational foundations to enhance the overall quality of their instructional programs. By the time of the *Williams* lawsuit, the state was thought to have the largest number of school district nonprofits in the nation (http://www.cceflink.org/). Typically, urban minority schools did not have the same kind of access to resources and had to rely on the money the state allocated to their district.

The long-term effect on the schools was described in the *Williams* lawsuit. The state's centralized finance system had aggravated the existing socioeconomic divisions in school districts across the state, over time creating a dual system, one composed of privileged, largely ex-urban school districts, and the other largely made up of urban districts with large concentrations of underfunded schools, which the *Williams* lawsuit described as "overwhelmingly populated by low-income nonwhite students and students who are still learning the English language" (ACLU 2000, 60).

Rather than acknowledge that California had unwittingly created its own separate but unequal system and negotiate with the plaintiffs, Gray Davis, the self-proclaimed education governor, chose to fight, albeit at taxpayer expense. After two decades of post–Proposition 13 control over local school finance, the governor who had just instituted the state's first centralized accountability system (the Public School Accountability Act) claimed that it wasn't the state's fault that school districts were giving their students a substandard education (Schrag 2003, 102). The court rejected this argument. *Williams*, the court ruled, was about "the State's system of oversight and that system's alleged deficiencies and failures. . . . That the State has chosen to carry out certain of its obligations through local school districts does not absolve the State of its ultimate responsibility" to provide an equal educational opportunity to all its students (Schrag 2003, 103).

No matter. The governor's phalanx of lawyers spent the next four years using every legal tactic to delay and stall a negotiated settlement, assuming

the state would prevail in court. Then a higher order of law intervened: politics. On October 7, 2003, Governor Gray Davis was removed from office in a special recall election.

WITNESS TO WILLIAMS

> In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
>
> —*Brown v. the Board of Education*, 1954

> The Constitution and laws of California require the State to ensure the delivery of basic educational opportunities for every child in California and vest the State with ultimate responsibility for the State's public elementary and secondary school system. The State therefore has a nondelegable duty to ensure that its statewide public education system is open on equal terms to all and that no student is denied the bare essentials to obtain an opportunity to learn.
>
> —*Williams v. the State of California*, San Francisco County, complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief, August 14, 2000

On September 29, 2004, Governor Schwarzenegger signed into law a package of bills implementing the terms of the *Williams v. the State of California* settlement. Mark Rosenbaum, the *Williams* lawsuit lead attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union, was jubilant. "With this settlement, Governor Schwarzenegger has held California accountable for assuring equal educational opportunity for all of its children. . . . Fifty years after *Brown*, the dream will no longer be deferred" (ACLU 2004).

The settlement legislation set "new standards" for "all California public schools" (ACLU 2005, 2). Senate Bill (SB) 550 and Assembly Bill (AB) 2727 established "minimum standards regarding school facilities, teacher quality, and instructional materials and accountability systems to enforce those standards" (2005, 1). The settlement legislation designated County Offices of Education as the principal enforcers of the new standards. Though *all* public schools were accountable under the new law, "schools ranked in deciles one to three, inclusive, on the 2003 base Academic Performance Index (API) [would] receive additional funds and oversight" (2005, 2).

The principal focus of this oversight was on the 2115 schools on the state's 2003 base API list, which would be subject to annual visits by the county superintendent of schools (LACOE 2005). Low-performing API

schools, like the one attended by Eliezer Williams, were largely concentrated in inner-city urban areas. Statewide, the majority were located in Los Angeles County. In spring 2004, 598 schools in thirty-nine districts were designated deciles 1–3, and in accordance with the law were scheduled for site visits by the Los Angeles County Office of Education (LACOE). The following spring visits began. In an April press release with the headline "County Education Officials Embark on New Efforts to Ensure All Students Have the Basics," the county superintendent, Darline Robles, stated that it was her goal to "improve conditions for students" through the "efforts" of her office and that it would be "a key player in helping to fulfill Williams's purpose," which was, in her view, to achieve "educational equity for all children in California" (LACOE 2005a).

Following the third history-social science primary adoption in July 2005 (recounted in the previous chapter), the Los Angeles County Office of Education began its second round of school site reviews, adding to the initial visits made that spring. In June 2005, the newly formed Williams Legislation Project hired and trained close to a dozen teams (about 70–80 professional educators, many of whom were retired teachers) to conduct instructional materials school site reviews. What follows is an account of daily life in Los Angeles schools on the marginal side of the instructional divide where the effect of chronic disinvestment has taken its toll. *The Two Californias* have created two public school systems. Three schools are profiled. The names of the schools are pseudonyms. The portraits rendered are based on the collective impressions of three Williams Legislation Implementation Project review teams and are drawn from annual site visits conducted over a three-year period, from July to December of 2005 to 2007.

MAINSTREAM ELEMENTAL

It is 7:00 am. Entering the Dolores Huerta Elementary School, one encounters the solicitous buzz of the Spanish-speaking mothers who are dropping their children off for another school day. The streets surrounding the school are still quiet. As 8:00 am approaches, many cars file through the dropoff zone one by one, at the school entrance to complete the daily ritual. The school recently had a name change to Dolores Huerta Elementary. Though an illustrious founding father was retired, his name remains engraved in the archway above the school foyer. In the main office the review team meets the principal, a warm and engaging Latina woman. The team leader goes over the visitation protocol with the principal. Its guidelines are followed to conduct the Instructional Materials Site Review.

Typically a team is scheduled for no more than two elementary schools a day. Unless there are problems, it's a quick walk through, and the team does only a random sample of classrooms in each grade, on average 25 percent of the school's total enrollment. If they do find an insufficiency of state-approved instructional materials, they then have to visit every classroom. The definition of *sufficiency* according to the Williams legislation is:

- That each pupil, including English learners, has a standards-aligned textbook, or instructional materials, or both, to use in class and take home.
- There must be a one-to-one correspondence between each student and each textbook.
- Class sets of textbooks *only* are not sufficient, e.g., one class set of textbooks is not sufficient for six classes of thirty students, even if a no-homework policy is adopted.
- In combination classrooms, there must be grade-level materials for students at both grades. (LACOE, 2005b)

Lack of textbooks was common at the Luther Burbank Middle School, where Eliezer Williams was a student, as it was in the schools the other *Williams* plaintiffs attended. Eliezer's classmates had to share a well-worn class set of out-of-date social studies textbooks that the teacher used for all periods. Nor could they be taken home. During the 2005 visitations many teams would encounter similar insufficiencies at several elementary schools, though as the last chapter indicated, the more pervasive problem for elementary social studies was that it simply wasn't taught at all. One might find classrooms that had sufficient copies of the 1991 Houghton Mifflin social studies textbooks, but they were no longer used. However, these schools were still in compliance, because publishers like Open Court had developed a set of standards-aligned materials for K–3 social studies that followed the scope and sequence of the framework. These materials were acceptable to the state.

DOWN THE MIDDLE

Dolores Huerta is located in the eastern edge of the San Fernando Valley of Los Angeles. The East Valley is fast becoming a port of entry for immigrants from Asia and Latin America (Covarrubias 2006; Waldinger 1996, 445). A similar shift is occurring in schools along the north/south corridor

from downtown Los Angeles to San Pedro and the port of Los Angeles. The Alameda Middle School is located in an industrial zone south of downtown and south of Slauson Avenue. The avenue is a main thoroughfare that runs east and west through South Central Los Angeles. On the west side it begins just north of the Los Angeles International Airport. Starting in the west, you pass through Baldwin Hills, an upwardly mobile middle-class area. As you descend heading east on Slauson and cross Crenshaw Boulevard and Central Avenue (close to the epicenter of the 1992 Los Angeles riot), the landscape begins to change. Socioeconomically, you are soon in a different world, where the African American community of South Central is slowly giving ground to a growing Latino influx. By the time you reach the formerly Anglo working-class communities of Huntington Park and Bell, the transition is complete. The signage and storefronts are a mélange of Spanish and English. The street culture of Mexico and Latin America, source of California's emerging minority-majority, is rapidly becoming the future face of Los Angeles.

Alameda Middle School sits on the uneasy divide between the African American and Latino communities. Like the streets, the school has the feeling of contested ground. The aging facility is vintage art deco. Architecturally, it could easily be a heritage site. The outside walls and the inside corridors have been painted repeatedly, hastily it would seem, to meet current Williams code. Stairwells are rarely cleaned and the recent overpainting has already been tagged with graffiti. Ideally, weathered and cracked wooden window frames in the complex should be refitted with more up-to-date aluminum or steel. But a coat of paint would do, broken window panes here and there still bear replacing. There are few trees in the school yard, which is paved and pock marked.

The team visit is unannounced as, according to the Williams settlement, a small percentage of site visits must be. The team's arrival sends a wave of anxiety across the front office. The principal, who is soon to retire, is late this morning. The vice principal that ushers the team into a side conference room has only just arrived at Alameda three weeks ago. He is unfamiliar with the Williams site procedures. The team leader puts him at ease. Reports of overzealous Williams teams have lately circulated, even though the county has stressed that a team's role is meant to be collaborative, not adversarial.

That day the team member assigned to review Alameda's social studies program reports that many of the social studies classes don't have sufficient books. As the law now requires, there should be one for each student. Instead there are class sets of well-worn first-edition Houghton Mifflin textbooks that are shared across periods and by other tracks. This is a year-round multitrack school. The team leader is informed that the principal has been calling around to other schools in the area trying to obtain extra books. Teachers expect things won't change until the new textbooks from the 2005 adoption

arrive. But that won't be until early next year. The district has yet to decide which of the half-dozen new middle school programs it will adopt.

But a deeper problem haunts Alameda. Even if there were sufficient textbooks, the school doesn't feel like a quiet haven for learning. Class time was barely different from the skittish unchecked chaos that spilled out into the hallways between periods. Subs standing in for absent teachers are common. One class was so out of control the substitute teacher had decided to end the period early and began moving the students out into the corridor since the next period was lunch. Gleeful disarray ensued as the students refused to form a column of twos as the teacher had asked, his timid command drowned out in a din of exuberant adolescent Spanglish.

Just across the street from the main entrance to Alameda stands a long high white fence that appeared to mirror the minor chaos in the hallway. Its entire length was covered with graffiti in an indecipherable code. Later a member of the team knowledgeable about Los Angeles gang culture commented that the graffiti was a local gang logo. The school sat on the fault line between rival gangs.

DIPLOMA

Truman High School is located in an urban industrial zone south of downtown Los Angeles. The campus perimeter is defined by a gray fence of thinly spiked steel columns rising twenty feet or more in height with the top bent defensively outward. No one could easily climb over without being impaled. Mirroring the demographic shift along Slauson Avenue, photographs of past graduating classes hang along the hallway to the main office. Among the older photos, year by year, each black and white image marked the transition from white to black. As one neared the office, the march of black and white images changed to color photographs of graduates from the now largely African American and Latin American student body. In dramatic silence, these photographs capture the entire course of the civil rights movement from integration to political reaction and white flight, and the present transition of California to a *Latino* majority state.

The team was informed by the assistant principal that they were still giving out textbooks in some subject areas even though they were three weeks into the semester. There were book shortages due to an unexpected increase in enrollment at certain grade levels. Consequently there was a stock availability problem at the district level where books had to be ordered late to fulfill the unforeseen demand, as well as a distribution problem at the school once the books arrived. Through the attrition of school staff, an apparent lack of coordination between staff, teachers, and school administrators was compounded by having no standing procedures in place to inventory and

distribute books. Truman was unprepared to effectively deal with the problem. For the team it meant having to sample nearly every class across each period of the day to get an overall estimate of how large the shortages were in each core subject. Classes with no books stood in long lines outside the school library where textbooks were distributed, closing the library for use by students. As the day progressed the lines got longer.

The most severe shortages were in tenth grade Advanced Placement (AP) world history. The team leader spoke with the chair of the social sciences to get a handle on the problem. The acting chair was a thirty-year veteran who was only a semester from retirement and had been trying unsuccessfully for several months to get an order for Advanced Placement (AP) world history textbooks fulfilled by the school's textbook office. The team leader made copies of the orders and letters sent to the administration to document the insufficiency.

Like Alameda middle school, the Truman campus did not feel entirely like a school. The grounds were partitioned by a labyrinth of chainlink fences and gates. To get from one side of the campus to the other, students had to pass through one gate. A building complex at the far end of campus was a warren of corridors and unmarked classrooms. Doors were locked and during the day the team encountered students roaming the halls unsupervised during class periods. Some of the student restrooms were trashed and not fit for use.

The defining moment for the team that day occurred in a tenth grade world history class. As the reviewer entered the room, she noticed that every student had a new textbook on their desk. But when she asked the class if they had each been assigned a textbook for home and class use, the teacher interrupted. "They don't understand a word you've said. They don't speak English." This world history class was one of many that were being held in Spanish with textbooks printed in English. The teacher was a substitute who had been hired full time only two weeks before. He addressed the class in Spanish announcing why the reviewer was there. They laughed. Truman had a growing population of Mexican migrants, some of whom, like the teacher, were quite new to the school. The Title I coordinator had given him one workbook aligned with the textbook that was in Spanish. He had been making copies of the chapter exercises that accompanied a Spanish version of the textbook, which by law the school could not use. There was no money available to purchase more copies of the workbook.

TEXTBOOKS FOR ALL

At the November 2005 board meeting of the Los Angeles County Office of Education the first annual report of the Williams Legislation Implementa-

tion Project was presented to the county superintendent, Darline Robles. During the 2004–2005 school year site teams had visited 275 schools. By November 2006, after the next cycle of visitations, the project reported that the total had reached 595 schools—an important figure. It represented the total number (more or less) of the estimated deciles 1–3 schools located in the greater Los Angeles area that the county office was required by law to inspect on an annual basis (LACOE 2005c, 2006; ACLU 2007).

During the first annual visitation in 2004–2005, 63 of the 275 schools were found to have insufficient textbooks for students. The following year, only 86 of the 595 schools visited were insufficient. Any insufficiency set in motion a remediation process in which the county made a report to the California Department of Education (CDE), giving the school and the district a brief grace period during which the district would resolve the insufficiency. If that did not occur, the CDE stepped in and purchased books for the school deducting the amount from that district's annual allotted funding.

The ACLU also published its own report in 2005. It stated that, of the 2115 deciles 1–3 schools statewide, 1800 were actually visited by forty-three county offices of education, who reported that more than 395 schools had insufficient textbooks and instructional materials (ACLU 2005, 13). Notwithstanding their accuracy, the ACLU held that the numbers alone could not "adequately capture the value of the county visits." Like Superintendent Robles, the ACLU believed "that the Williams [visits] can be a force for change. . . . The new laws are having their intended effect" (ACLU 2005, 17). One definitive effect to which the county office pointed with great satisfaction was that all of the insufficiencies cited in the initial annual reports were remediated. As part of that process, teams had to return to a number of schools where they had reported insufficiencies to see if the problem had been resolved. In some cases they returned several times. During the second season of site visitations, teams often encountered teachers who thanked them for coming. Apparently, the visits made a difference. Most of the schools they visited in 2006 had adapted as they became more conscious of their obligations before the law. Nevertheless, teams visited numerous schools, like the three described earlier, that had either adequate textbooks or had resolved their insufficiencies through timely district intervention, thus forgoing the remediation process, but were deficient in a more elusive sense, in ways that the law could not capture.

Situations like this graphically illustrate both the promise and limitations of the *Williams* settlement. When Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger settled the *Williams* suit he also got "rid" of the commission that may have pushed the *Williams* settlement to the next level. In 2002, the state legislature created the Quality Education Commission (QEC) "to give the state the kind of planning and analysis that would have provided a chance

to determine how best to know and meet real need." But as Peter Schrag observed, "Schwarzenegger refused even to consider the commission. He apparently feared that it might show how much the state was shortchanging its neediest students" (Schrag 2004). A recent "advisory committee" hand-picked by the governor came to the same conclusion. After decades of chronic disinvestment, bringing the state system back would require well over a trillion dollars (Rubin and Blume 2007).

Instead California got *Williams*, a settlement that the current superintendent of public instruction, Jack O'Connell, warned "relies heavily on bureaucratic solutions" (Helfand and DiMassa 2004). The real force of the *Williams* suit may have been preempted by a shrewd political maneuver, leaving county superintendents merely tinkering at the threshold of quality.

EXCELLENT SPHERES

In the summer of 2002, two years before the *Williams* settlement, State Senator Dede Alpert prepared the final draft of the new California Master Plan for Education. Since the fall of 1999, Alpert had chaired a Joint Senate and Assembly Committee to update the landmark 1960 Master Plan for Higher Education. That same summer, Professor Jeannie Oakes of the UCLA School of Education met with lawyers for the ACLU to plot their final legal strategy against a recalcitrant Governor Gray Davis who adamantly refused to settle the *Williams* lawsuit (Schrag 2003, 108). Professor Oakes had played a key role in its litigation by filing a scathing report with the court on behalf of the plaintiffs that provided a comprehensive overview of the sorry state of minority public schools in California (Oakes 2002). Then a special election in 2003 removed Governor Davis from office. The rest is history. Senator Alpert appointed Oakes to co-chair one of several working groups who were critical to articulating the language and vision of the new Master Plan.

In crucial respects the language of the key recommendations of the 2002 plan prefigures the terms of the *Williams* settlement as it does the strategic policy approach of systemic school reform. The presence of systemic reform thinking that was clearly evident in the later plan was due to the indomitable presence of Michael Kirst, Honig's former colleague on the State Board of Education. Kirst was appointed a member of the Student Learning Working Group that Oakes co-chaired. Other leaders from the 1980s systemic reform era made a reprise by serving on the select working groups for the 2002 plan, including several notable players from the history-social science curriculum reform. There were six working groups:

- School Readiness
- Student Learning
- Professional Personnel Development
- Governance
- Workforce Preparation
- Emerging Modes of Delivery

Among the history-social science reformers was Carol Katzman, who had been chair of the Curriculum Commission for the 1987 History-Social Science Framework and was now appointed to the Student Learning group. Former State Senator Gary Hart chaired the Professional Personnel Development working group. And finally, Dean Bernard Gifford, chief sponsor of the 1984 Clio Conference, was appointed by Alpert to be co-chair of the Emerging Modes of [instructional] Delivery working group.

Comparison of the 2002 plan with the previous Master Plan tends to reveal the limitations of the once-innovative 1960 document. In 1960, a similar number of committees made sixty-three recommendations to then Governor Brown to accommodate the state's postwar growth and the baby boom generation (often referred to as tidal wave I). The 1960 plan is for an Anglo-American California, a top-down model of meritocracy for higher education that paralleled an emerging technological society mirrored in the California aerospace industry, the nation's West Coast military-industrial complex. By contrast, the fifty-six recommendations made by the 2002 working groups present a bottom-up view of the state public school system developed to meet the demands of a second wave, heralding California's emergence as the first minority-majority state. Amid the retiring boomer generation is emerging a Latino minority-majority (Hayes-Bautista, Schink, and Chapa 1988). In response, the 2002 plan extends the systemic model by linking K–12 with postsecondary education. That extension is expressed in the opening section of the 2002 document titled "Access to Quality Education," wherein we learn that

> to be responsive to Californians' needs, our state must have a comprehensive, coherent, and flexible education system in which all sectors, from pre-kindergarten through postsecondary education, are aligned and coordinated into one integrated system. (MP 2002, 9)

Access to quality at the base of the system had become a priority because of its increasing absence after Proposition 13 and two decades of persistent disinvestment. Master of the 1960 plan, Clark Kerr had designed the superstructure of excellence as an exclusive reserve, drawing only the best and brightest to the top. The 2002 plan reversed this priority. The Alpert Plan sought instead to generalize the state of excellence down to a more elementary level, one centered on the child, making nurturance, childcare, and preschool the precondition for excellence. In the Alpert Plan "school readiness" was no less important than the UC priority for research. By design, Kerr's excellence engine worked against the kind of alignment and integration that the Alpert Plan sought.

While the 1960 Master Plan delicately balanced a tripartite system in which "Public higher education shall consist of the junior colleges, the State College System, and the University of California," the unstated strategy was nothing less than classical ivory tower isolation: "Each shall strive for excellence in its own sphere" (MP 1960, 1–2). The explicit "differentiation of function" which Kerr had so carefully negotiated was intended to prevent "unwarranted expansion and unhealthy competition among the segments of public higher education" (1960, 27). The trade-off that Kerr crafted gave the three segments internal autonomy and the right of governance. Autonomy for the UC derived from Article 9 of the State Constitution, which made the university a public trust governed by the regents. The 1960 plan amended the state constitution so that the state college system, now the California State University (CSU) system, was reconstituted as a public trust. The 2002 plan recommended that the California Community College system be governed likewise (2002, B-15). Governance of the K–12 system was another matter. As complex as the university was, the line between the UC Regents and the CSU Trustees with their respective academic senates was relatively clear and simple.

The Alpert Plan sought to use Kerr's "machinery of co-ordination" to link the three segments to the public schools. In 1974 the Coordinating Council established by the 1960 plan was replaced by the California Postsecondary Education Commission (CPEC). The 2002 draft plan proposed that CPEC be "reconstituted as a planning agency for both K–12 and higher education." Like the recommendations for "school readiness," it gave a kind of tacit recognition to the K–12 system as a fourth segment, leveling the apex of excellence. UC President Richard C. Atkinson balked at this democratizing gesture and Alpert's committee backed off.

Instead the 2002 plan made a recommendation that "membership of the Intersegmental Committee of the Academic Senates (ICAS) be augmented with faculty from California's preK–12 schools" (2002, B-10). What that augmentation might mean in practice was suggested by Atkinson's "formal

response" to the Alpert draft of the 2002 plan in which he stressed that "the different mission and culture of higher education" were not appropriate to "K–12 conceptions" of schooling. How "proper coordination" might be conceived between the first segment (the university) and the public schools would ultimately be decided by the university alone (UCOP 2002). As a result the clear line from the schools to the university envisioned by the Alpert Plan was more like the rope attached to a life preserver.

Nor was the link strong between the segments in the discipline that matters most for the K–12 system. The latest academic initiative to develop and implement joint doctoral programs in educational leadership (EdD), conceived of as partnerships between the UC and CSU systems, while no doubt a timely and important initiative, it is a piecemeal approach to a systemic problem and appears to reflect the same kind of intersegmental arms-length caution of UC president Atkinson, whose response to the recommendation for K–16 integration offers little optimism that the kind of alignment necessary for educational innovation is possible. For the time being it appears that Kerr's machinery has managed to keep the spheres separate. His strategic vision of California's educational future was for a state and political culture whose time has passed, inappropriate to a state at the crossroads of an emerging global culture and economy. The cold war industrial state of California arranged it own creative destruction by creating a postwar generation of high-tech wizards who invented the postindustrial economy of Silicon Valley. Other than economic appropriation, the new transnational order of digital capitalism may have little use for the public university.

However innovative the 2002 Master Plan reform appeared to be, some of its key recommendations on educational governance would tellingly serve as a policy platform to settle old political scores. The governance working group proposed that the present constitutional order of state-level educational governance be restructured in order to establish "clear lines of accountability" between the present "key players," the superintendent of public instruction (SPI), the State Board of Education (SBE), the secretary of education, and the governor (MP 2002, 91). Recommendations 26.1–3 and 27 of the 2002 plan appeared to provide a remedy for the endemic political dispute that occurred between Governor George Deukmejian and State Superintendent of Public Instruction Bill Honig over control of the state's education policy agenda. The recommendations proposed a major redistribution of power between the office of the governor and the superintendent.

Recommendation 26.1 proposed to give the governor authority to "appoint a cabinet level Chief Education Officer" (CEO). The newly appointed CEO would "carry out, on behalf of the governor, all state-level operations, management, and programmatic functions, and [would] serve as the director of the California Department of Education" (CDE). Recommendation

26.2 continued to give the governor authority to appoint the State Board of Education. But the superintendent of public instruction would no longer be the official secretary of the board. Its sole function would be "limited to state policy matters specified by the legislature." Recommendation 26.3 transferred management of the CDE to the governor's office (MP 2002, 93). Since the recommendations did not have the force of law, State Senator Alpert introduced Senate Bill (SB) 6 to the legislature.

SB 6 envisioned "a healthy and complementary relationship . . . between the governor and the superintendent." In political language designed to end the type of annual ADA war that had existed between Superintendent Honig and Governor Deukmejian, SB 6 sought to repeal existing law making "the Superintendent of Public Instruction the ex officio Director of Education." SB 6 would transfer "all governing and policymaking functions of the State Department of Education" to the "Secretary of Education" (instead of creating a Chief Education Officer (CEO) as Recommendation 26.1 proposed). Following Recommendation 27 of the 2002 plan, SB 6 proposed that the superintendent of public instruction would be "responsible [only] for all aspects of accountability for public education." No longer in control of the CDE, nor a member of the State Board of Education, the superintendent of public instruction, as defined in SB 6, would be taken out of the political arena where matters of "fiscal accountability [for] California's K–12 education system" were always in contention (MP 2002, 94). The Alpert legislative initiative would sacrifice to the partisan agendas of future governors the only state official who is elected on a nonpartisan ballot to represent *all* California school children. Given the record of the state's chief executives who held office during the implementation of systemic reform and its later policy reversal, on this matter the strategic vision of the 2002 Master Plan appears strangely myopic, drawing the wrong lesson from recent history. Honig's passionate defense of the public trust against the regressive cost-cutting depredations of Governor George Deukmejian saved what was left of the K–12 system. As fate would have it, Senate Bill (SB) 6 never got out of committee.

A STATE OF ENGAGEMENT

> While it is always both feasible and desirable to formulate ideal programs of reform, it is asking too much to expect that history will move, so to speak, in a straight line to realize them.
>
> —Richard Hoftstader, *The Age of Reform*

On the cusp of the millennium, in January 1999, Governor Gray Davis heralded his Public School Accountability Act as the way "to restore the

greatness of California education" (Ruenzel 2000, 2) His invocation of post-war myth gave little cover for the tenuous hold on past greatness his reform agenda would have. One former president of the State Board of Education, Michael Kirst, and his colleagues had a more tempered but equally critical assessment. In a report released by PACE (Policy Analysis for California Education), they remarked that the "dizzying array of educational reform ideas" represented "an ambitious if less than coherent reform agenda" (Kirst, Hayward, and Fuller 2000, 92). In the muddled transition to standards-based reform, the Davis reform initiatives resembled "puzzle pieces" that did not "fit together into a coherent theory of action" (Ruenzel 2000, 2). Past, present, future—the *Williams* lawsuit, the Davis legislative agenda, and the current Master Plan for Education represent in full the limitations that politics placed on the institutional processes of educational policymaking after the political eclipse of the Honig-era excellence movement.

Coming to the end of this story, we are now in the appropriate place to return to the question posed by John Dewey at the beginning of this study to ask how this account of California systemic school reform fits within the historical continuum of past progressive ideals and present political realities.

> Is it possible for an educational system to be conducted by a national state, and yet, for the full social ends of the educative process not be restricted, constrained, and corrupted?

When Dewey first formulated this question in *Democracy and Education* in 1916, the progressive movement was nearing its end, and in the years preceding the Great Depression and the onset of the New Deal, he engaged in a public debate with Walter Lippmann, the nationally syndicated journalist, about what kind of *public-making* institutions a modern democratic state should support. That debate commenced with the publication of Lippmann's book *Public Opinion* in 1922 and a companion volume, *The Phantom Public*, in 1925. Dewey hailed *Public Opinion* as "perhaps the most effective indictment of democracy as currently conceived ever penned" (Steel 1980, xv). He responded in 1926 with a series of lectures at Kenyon College, Ohio, published the following year as *The Public and Its Problems* (1927, 1988).

For our story, what is still relevant about this distant debate is how it provides a prescient ground for political insight about

- The pivotal moment in American political history in which it occurred, and
- How it mirrors a persistent national dilemma over who we are and imagine ourselves to be through our schools.

Both instances point back to Dewey's original question: How are the *social* ends of the educative process met through the political processes of reform? The debate between Dewey and Lippmann has a direct bearing on a persistent moral dilemma about the purpose of education politics in general. What should be the public's role in determining the conduct of educational policy and the exercise of state power to reform American schools? The fullness of that dilemma is captured by the political acts of two Californians, Earl Warren and Ronald Reagan, who changed the course of American history and together placed the future of public education at an uncertain crossroads.

Lippmann and Dewey's abiding insight was that the classic democratic idea of the public had, in Lippmann's estimate, become an elusive phantom. The transformation of America into a national state, the coast-to-coast modern urban society it is today, was a change that fragmented the political myth of a civic unum into a plurality of publics and competing interests. This profound social change had above all called into question another cherished civic myth that all politics is local, a community affair of self-informed deliberative citizens (Dewey 1988, 213). Nowhere was the eclipse of these local conditions better indicated, Dewey thought, than in the transformation of "our system . . . of public education" from a local community school district into the state institution it is has now become (1988, 305–306). "We have inherited," he said, "local town-meeting practices and ideas. But," he continued, "we live and act and have our being in a continental national state" (Dewey 1988, 306).

Reagan took that inheritance and recast this localism into a powerful symbolic politics against government, which was a crucial symbol in the conservative movement's lexicon used to end the progressive social policies of the federal government and roll back the civil rights movement in which Earl Warren was a leading catalyst. When Reagan as governor invoked the "people of the state," his conception of the public interest reflected a kind of mythic localism, the moral rectitude, fiscal conservatism, and worldview of a Main Street Middle America. Not that these values are suspect; they're not. But projected onto present-day California and later, during Reagan's presidency, the entire nation, it was meant to stand against any use of state power for progressive social ends. Above all it was to prevent, in Dewey's terms, the development of a "new public" which the civil rights revolution made possible (1988, 255), an America Earl Warren as governor and later as chief justice sought to realize. For Dewey, the problem of the *public* was to engage history not escape it. The reality is that Warren and Reagan did not just engage history but made it. However, unlike Warren and his later successor Governor Gray Davis, Reagan was unconcerned with past "greatness." Rather, as seen in his approach to *A Nation at Risk*, his strategic goal never changed: the use of government to advance a public policy for

privatization. But to what end? From one standpoint the political legacy of Earl Warren and Ronald Reagan seems to undercut whatever faith one could place in the progressive ideals on which this narrative has turned: progress and reform. Is there a moral to their story? For it appears to present a classic ethical quandry peculiar to the exercise of statecraft, which is that policy does not necessarily lead to the intended outcome (Orfield 1996).

From the election of Ronald Reagan as governor in 1966 to the settlement of the Hindu-American Foundation lawsuit with the state in 2006, the socioeconomic realities of a "national state" system, like the rhetoric of decline that was so crucial to the vision of education reform in *A Nation at Risk*, has undergone considerable revision (Ravitch 2003). California, the fifth largest economy in the world, is integrated along with the continental United States in a global economic system. However, a transnational vision of America, like the "world class" system of public schools envisioned by the other architect of California's systemic school reform, Bill Honig, has remained elusive (Honig 1992). Given this time frame (1966–2006), and how it bears upon this political history of public education reform in California, are we now in a position to provide a suitable answer to John Dewey's question?

The answer is probably not. The use of history in this study was not to spin a simple morality tale but to examine the paradoxical edge to politics in its unavoidable necessity to both produce and impede change and, by so doing, illuminate the political ground for moral choice and action when it comes to educational policymaking. Consequently, the narrative has focused on political acts and their outcomes (rather than theory), which for better or worse can be approached only by taking a step back into the historical record.

So if there is a guiding imperative to this account it has been to ask whether there was a moral politics to systemic school reform and to educational excellence as an ideal and goal. Like the California history-social science curriculum reformers, I believe that history is the missing piece to understanding the reform puzzle. It appears that Dewey shared this belief too. Elsewhere, he argued that the study of history in schools "has an ultimate ethical value" (Dewey 1964, 127). He believed that

> The one thing needful is that we recognize that moral principles are real in the same sense in which other forces are real; that they are inherent in community life, and in the running machinery of the individual. If we can secure a genuine faith in this fact, we shall have secured the only condition which is finally necessary in order to get from our educational system all the effectiveness there is in it. (138)

Of course a similar moral principle informs the answer Dewey provides in *Democracy and Education*. The "full social ends of the educative process" cannot be met unless "society . . . makes provision for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms" (Dewey 1916, 99). However, within the political context of the conservative ascendancy that has dominated American educational discourse over the past several decades, this basic progressive principle has, apart from politically expedient rhetoric, largely been absent. The "greatness" invoked by Governor Gray Davis depended on it. However as the *Williams* lawsuit indicates, he was willing to dispense with it, as State Senator Alpert was of the office of superintendent of public instruction.

In hindsight, what stands as his last defense of the common civic culture that Superintendent Honig envisioned as the fitting civic goal of his systemic school reform plan now appears prophetic. In the essay *Why Privatizing Public Education Is a Bad Idea*, his optimistic scenario for California public schools played out, like history does, not in the way he imagined. After witnessing "the most ambitious period of school reform in the nation's history," Honig believed that history was on the side of progress, not privatization. In his mind such proposals risked a return to the "two-tiered system [of] the nineteenth century." Holding steadfast to his progressive vision, he asserts, "We shouldn't go back a hundred years in search of the future" (Honig 1992, 249).

But the state has gone back. The *Williams* settlement was a tacit admission of a political reality that Davis sought to avoid: over the past several decades there has been a gradual disinvestment in California public education, which had led to the virtual privatization of the system. Governor Pat Brown's warning to citizens of the state and nation has become a reality. In the chapter from his 1970 political memoir, titled the "War on Education," Brown recounts that "in early 1968, Milton L. Schwartz, outgoing vice president of the State Board of Education [and a Republican], said, in a farewell statement, that Reagan was "the greatest destructive force and enemy of public education in fifty years" (Brown 1970, 175). Nearly fifty years hence, the moral ethos of righteous self-interest espoused by Reagan and his successors has made a hollow promise of the progressive ideals found in the California Constitution.

This brings us to the last point about the pivotal moment in American political history during which the public debate of John Dewey and Walter Lippmann occurred. In *Democracy and Education*, Dewey asserted that "knowledge of the past is key to understanding the present. History deals with the past. But this past is [in actuality] the history of the present" (Dewey 1916, 214). As this story attests we should consider educational change within a historical context, because the "full social ends of the educative process" can only be revealed in time. As history bears down upon these processes it is

usually the case that the reform process is flawed and its ends incomplete. Ideals remain unfulfilled and the issue of the extent to which these "social ends" may be viewed as "restricted, constrained, and corrupted" is a matter left to the observer. If there is a lesson to be drawn by making the past present, it may be to find that tragically we have been here before.

In 1916, the year *Democracy and Education* appeared, America's leading race theorist Madison Grant published *The Passing of the Great Race*. Grant's highly regarded pseudoscientific study purported to show that the darker races who had immigrated from Asia and Southeastern Europe should not be allowed to become Americans. Grant argued that these ethnic groups were diluting the Nordic stock of America's founding Anglo-Saxons. The book would play a major role in the national campaign to sway public opinion that led to the passage of the 1924 Immigration Act by Congress. The 1924 National Origins Act virtually ended Asian immigration until 1965 and also severely curtailed the flow of European immigration to the United States until after World War II.

Since 1994 in California, and of late in a post–9/11 nation, American public education has come around again to the question of immigrant origins. The theoretical terrain of this debate has shifted. But it is hardly a sign of progress when the national identity of a threatened Anglo-Saxon ethnic group has for now become America's imagined core Anglo-Protestant culture (Huntington 2004).

In a time when educational innovation is called for and the urban school, from Los Angeles to New York, is the site of a cultural revolution that will make anew America's national identity, the public is once again chasing phantoms.

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CODA

Education Reform as a Public Trust

> Place yourselves . . . in the real world we live in, the world that has a future, that is yet uncompleted as we speak.
>
> —William James, August 26, 1898.

At twilight the view from the Bay Area transit bus that descends the hills to the Berkeley campus can, in moments, extend to the horizon where the Pacific Ocean meets the Golden Gate Bridge. If the mood is right, those brief seconds can stir recollection. Did a transcendent line of sight direct the gaze of the school's founders? Did they feel certain that the university was the next link in the chain of civilization's ascent? At the groundbreaking ceremony, it would seem so. The new campus, they announced, was "destined to be a disposing power on the earth" . . . the first public university on the Western shores of America would be a beacon of light to "keep watch and ward at the morning and evening sun" (Douglass 2000, 45). Though their vision was an intellectual version of American manifest destiny, it still reflects a boundless sense of optimism and possibility, of a hope vested in public institutions dedicated to humanity's future.

If the heights above the Berkeley campus inspire, that vision fades as you board the southbound bus at the campus entrance on Telegraph Ave. By the time one disembarks in downtown Oakland near UCOP, the University of California Office of the President (location of the main administrative offices for the UC system), the progressive end of California history seems less assured. For the distance traversed along Telegraph Ave. from Berkeley to Oakland cannot be measured in miles alone, but may be understood in the cultural geography of the Two Californias.

From there the TransBay bus leaves daily from downtown Oakland a few blocks from UCOP and heads across the Oakland Bridge to Mission and Market streets in San Francisco. If you take a bus heading south, you will come to the middle school Eliezer Williams once attended. However, the

destination is not in the present but the past. If you turn west off Mission onto Geary, you eventually come to the Fillmore district. Where Geary crosses Buchanan you are in a mixed residential area once known as Little Osaka. On May 20, 1942, the last Japanese Americans living in San Francisco were told by the War Relocation Authority (WRA) to assemble at the Raphael Weill School. A month earlier, Dorothea Lange had photographed the Weill School students at their morning assembly reciting the pledge of allegiance (Lange 1942). From April 16 to April 20, Lange documented daily school life at Raphael Weill. What her photographs show is a multicultural California of an earlier era. A group of young Asian, African American, Latino, and Anglo-American boys stand behind a student holding the American flag. Another photo taken at the opposite end of the schoolyard shows a group of young Japanese, Latino, and Anglo American girls and, in their midst, one lone Asian boy. All the boys look formal and serious, the girls smile into the camera. Some have their hand over their hearts.

Less known are the local events leading up to the mass evacuation. Lange was taking photographs while General James Doolittle's squadron of B-25s bombed Tokyo in retaliation for Pearl Harbor. California was at war. The state's progressive godfather, Senator Hiram Johnson, was mobilizing the state's "anti-Oriental" movement to deal with the "Japanese problem." On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066. But what "tipped the scales of national opinion in favor of mass evacuation," as the California historian Carey McWilliams (1978) recounts, occurred only days earlier. "On February 12 and 14, two extremely influential columns by Walter Lippmann, based on talks with Earl Warren, then attorney general" appeared in the nationally syndicated *New York Tribune* (1978, 104). In "The Fifth Column on the Coast," wired from San Francisco on February 12, 1942, Lippmann described a looming Japanese threat: "The Pacific Coast is in imminent danger of a combined attack from within and without" (Lippmann 1942).

The Raphael Weill School has since been renamed the Rosa Parks Elementary School. Today, a large colorful mural of Rosa Parks graces the playground of the school in her name, where Japanese American school children boarded buses bound for Manzanar.

Not long after I visited Rosa Parks Elementary School, I stood with a county review team for the *Williams* legislation, beneath the flagpole in an elementary school yard in East Los Angeles. Children and parents, teachers and staff gathered for the pledge of allegiance. Standing there, the faces of the children took me back to those pictures of 1942. For a brief moment the two flags became one.

Earl Warren changed and made history. In the bright cold morning of an East Los Angeles schoolyard California's future called to America: Would we ever again risk sitting in Rosa Park's seat?

The Rosa Parks Elementary School and Raphael Weill Child Development Center, San Francisco, California, April 2006. *Photograph by author.*

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HISTORY-SOCIAL SCIENCE 2005–06 ADOPTION PROGRAM SUBMISSIONS

Abbreviations: Textbook Programs

H-TE: Holt-Teacher Edition
McDL-TE and RSG: McDougal Littell-Teacher Edition and Reader Study Guide
SF-DP: Scott Foresman-Digital Path Guide
SF-TR: Scott Foresman-Teacher Resources
SF-TOV: Scott Foresman-Teacher Overview

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Interviews

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Daniel Chernow, California Curriculum Commission
Todd Clark, Constitutional Rights Foundation, Los Angeles, CA
Jean Claugus, California Council for the Social Studies
Charlotte Crabtree, Professor Emeritus, UCLA Graduate School of Education
Matthew Downey, University of Northern Colorado
Geno Flores, San Diego Unified School District
Pat Geyer, California Council for the Social Studies
Gary Hart, California State Senator (has since retired from teaching)
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California in a Time of Excellence follows the Golden State's efforts to reform its public school system from 1983 to the present. Beginning with progressive curriculum reform initiatives that were launched even before the National Commission on Excellence in Education (NCEE) issued *A Nation at Risk* in 1983, James Andrew LaSpina traces these reform efforts through recurring culture wars, major clashes of personality, and a conflict between the state's tradition of progressive educational policy and a culture of conservatism that colored much of the so-called Left Coast's history since the sixties. While the battles over curriculum reform in California reflect those at the national level, the political world surrounding this conflict reveals the enormous significance of the conflict and its implications for our national future.

"In the glory years of the 1950s and early 1960s, California's public educational institutions became the envy of the world. James Andrew LaSpina's remarkable book explains how that happened, and why it is going away. Readable and scholarly, a recommended work for all students, educators, and citizens alike who are interested in the history of American education, public policy, and the politics of reform."

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