The Science of Language

Noam Chomsky is one of the most influential thinkers of our time, yet his views are often misunderstood. In this previously unpublished series of interviews, Chomsky discusses his iconoclastic and important ideas concerning language, human nature, and politics. In dialogue with James McGilvray, Professor of Philosophy at McGill University, Chomsky takes up a wide variety of topics – the nature of language, the philosophies of language and mind, morality and universality, science and common sense, and the evolution of language. McGilvray's extensive commentary helps make this incisive set of interviews accessible to a variety of readers. The volume is essential reading for those involved in the study of language and mind, as well as anyone with an interest in Chomsky's ideas.

NOAM CHOMSKY is Institute Professor (retired) in the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

JAMES MCGILVRAY is Professor of Philosophy at McGill University, Montréal.

The Science of Language
Interviews with James McGilvray

Edited by

Noam Chomsky and James Mcgilvray

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

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© Noam Chomsky and James McGilvray2012

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First published 2012

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Chomsky, Noam.

The science of language : interviews with James McGilvray / Noam Chomsky.

p. cm.

ISBN 978-1-107-01637-8 (Hardback) – ISBN 978-1-107-60240-3 (Paperback)

1. Chomsky, Noam–Interviews. 2. Chomsky, Noam–Philosophy. 3. Cognition

and language. 4. Psycholinguistics. I. McGilvray, James. II. Title.

P85.C47A3 2011

401–dc23

2011030292

ISBN 978-1-107-01637-8 Hardback

ISBN 978-1-107-60240-3 Paperback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Contents

Introduction

Part I The science of language and mind

1 Language, function, communication: language and the use of language

2 On a formal theory of language and its accommodation to biology; the distinctive nature of human concepts

3 Representation and computation

4 More on human concepts

5 Reflections on the study of language

6 Parameters, canalization, innateness, Universal Grammar

7 Development, master/control genes, etc.

8 Perfection and design (interview 20 January 2009)

9 Universal Grammar and simplicity

10 On the intellectual ailments of some scientists

11 The place of language in the mind

12 Chomsky's intellectual contributions

13 Simplicity and its role in Chomsky's work

14 Chomsky and Nelson Goodman

Part II Human nature and its study

15 Chomsky on human nature and human understanding

16 Human nature and evolution: thoughts on sociobiology and evolutionary psychology

17 Human nature again

18 Morality and universalization

19 Optimism and grounds for it

20 Language, agency, common sense, and science

21 Philosophers and their roles

22 Biophysical limitations on understanding

23 Epistemology and biological limits

24 Studies of mind and behavior and their limitations

25 Linguistics and politics

Appendices

I I-concepts, I-beliefs, and I-language

II The several uses of “function”

III On what is distinctive about human nature (and how to deal with the distinction)

IV Chomsky on natural science

V Of concepts and misguided theories of them, and why human concepts are unique

VI Semantics and how to do it

VII Hierarchy, structure, domination, c-command, etc.

VIII Variation, parameters, and canalization

IX Simplicity

X Hume on the missing shade of blue and related matters

XI Syntax, semantics, pragmatics, non-Chomskyan and Chomskyan

XII An internalist picture of how concepts ‘work’

Commentaries

Glossary

Bibliography

Index

Introduction

While this book will be of interest to the specialist, it is intended for a general audience. The title, The Science of Language, might appear daunting, but Professor Chomsky's contributions to the interview can be understood by all and – where readers might want some additional information or aid in understanding why Chomsky adopts the unusual views that he does – I provide ample explanations. However, some might still ask why they should be interested in the science of language at all, and in Chomsky's views of it in particular.

A recent (January 2010) PBS series called The Human Spark starring Alan Alda explored the question of what makes modern humans distinctive. After all, there have been humanoid creatures around for hundreds of thousands of years, but it was only relatively recently in evolutionary time – on a reasonable guess, somewhere between fifty thousand and a hundred thousand years ago – that humans began to display the remarkable cognitive powers that so clearly distinguish us from chimps and other ‘higher’ apes. We form non-kin communities that do not involve direct contact or acquaintance with others; we have science and mathematics and seek ultimate explanations, sometimes in the form of religions; we think about things both temporally and spatially distant, and produce and enjoy fiction and fantasy; we organize and plan for the future in ways that go beyond anything other creatures can manage; we speculate; we draw and employ other forms of artistic media; we produce and enjoy music; we see connections between distant events and seek explanations that will prove reliable and yield good policies; and so on. The conclusion the PBS series reached was that the introduction of language must surely be among the most important factors explaining how these remarkable capacities came to us.

That conclusion makes sense on independent grounds. You cannot speculate and think about matters far and near unless you have some way of constructing an unlimited number of complex thoughts that you can detach from current circumstances and use to range over arbitrary times and circumstances. Language gives you this capacity. You cannot organize and construct projects involving cooperation between individuals unless you have a way of planning well into the future, providing for contingencies, and assigning specific roles; language gives you that. You cannot do science without seeking basic explanations and using mathematics and ways of quantifying exactly; there is good reason to think that language gives you at least the capacity to count things and measures. And so on. Music might be independent of language; it is not clear. However, it is obvious that neither music nor other forms of art can provide all the cognitive benefits that language can, and make these benefits available to all humans who develop language at all. Language is the default way of saying what a work of art expresses. It is the primary expressive – and creative – medium.

So one reason to be interested in the science of language is because it tells us what natural languages are, what gives us, but no other creatures, language, and what explains the introduction of language and the beginnings of our remarkable cognitive capacities.

It is particularly important to understand Chomsky's views on these matters, not only because he virtually created the modern science of language by himself and ever since has influenced the work of many of the individuals who have increasingly improved this science, but because of what he and colleagues have discovered about language – particularly in recent years – and the implications of these discoveries for topics of broad interest, topics that Chomsky takes up in his famous political work and his less known but important philosophical works. For Chomsky, the science of language is an objective natural science that treats language as a biologically based system that evolved in a single individual and was genetically transmitted to progeny. Evolution of the sort he describes – very different from the usual gradualist stories about evolution of complex systems – nicely explains how language came about. And there are important implications of the fact that language is a ‘natural object,’ and that it came about by means of the kind of evolution Chomsky describes.

One implication of the idea that the evolutionary introduction of language may have made us the distinctive species we are is that it – perhaps by itself – explains what is human about human nature. If this is so, there is a naturalistic – not religious, and not merely speculative – account of our distinctiveness and its origins. If so, and assuming that a creature's fundamental needs are based on its nature, we might be able to find a naturalistic basis for views about the good life for this kind of creature. That topic is taken up to an extent in the discussion, but only tentatively – however tantalizing the prospect of a scientific basis for the good life it might be: Chomsky the scientist wants (as any scientist should) a good theory of human nature in place before he is willing to be firm in his commitments. That theory is not yet in place. However, the issue of what the good life is for human beings is important enough to need discussion, at least, and tentative answers.

The core of this volume is a transcript of four discussion/interview sessions I enjoyed with Noam Chomsky in 2004. In January of 2009, I had a chance to do a follow-up interview on the perfection of the language faculty – a prominent theme in Chomsky's Minimalist Program. The relevant parts of the transcript of that 2009 interview are placed in appropriate places in the transcript of our 2004 sessions.

Professor Chomsky's contributions required very little editing – generally, eliminating pre- and post-interview conversation, removing a few false starts, and putting in references. Those changes are not indicated. Where the transcript of his comments seemed to me that they might require some clarification for the general reader, I inserted phrases and words in square brackets. The transcript of my questions to Chomsky and of my contributions to discussion required a bit more editing. I did not indicate the changes I made to them.

The interview sessions were informal, more like discussions between friends who agree on a great deal and want to explore the implications of what has come to be called “biolinguistics” than a formal interview. In part because of that, discussion sometimes jumped from one topic to another and reintroduced themes in different contexts. To aid readers who are unfamiliar or less familiar with the issues and would prefer greater continuity and organization, I rearranged some parts of the transcript and introduced two sections that organize the discussion around two major topics, the science of language and mind, and the study of human nature. Within each, we pursued various coherent argument threads. Each of these is organized in a titled chapter. I eliminated some repetition, but some remains. Where it remains it can, I think, be justified because it places a theme discussed earlier in a new context where we can explore its relevance to a different issue.

I also tried to provide another kind of aid. Readers are likely to come to the text with different assumptions about language and its study, and with varying degrees of background in linguistics and Chomsky's understanding of the human mind. In an attempt to help those who want some guidance as they read, I placed in the main text several pointers that look like this [C]. They indicate that there are explications and commentaries in a separate section of the book. These are indexed by page number to the text. Where commentary and explication is extensive, however, I placed it in appendices under headings that indicate the issue(s) in question. Throughout, I tried to make comments and explications as useful as possible to the rather broad range of prior assumptions and backgrounds of those who might read this volume. Professor Chomsky reviewed the edited and commented text and made many suggestions. These led to changes and improvements. I am grateful for them all, but particularly grateful for those that led to improvements in my explications and appendices. For mistakes that remain, I am solely responsible.

I am also grateful for discussions and exchanges of correspondence on related topics over several years with many others. Among these are Paul Pietroski, Terje Lohndal, Sue Dwyer, John Mikhail, Georges Rey, Anna Maria diSciullo, Cedric Boeckx, Rob Stainton, David Barner, Mark Baker, Sam Epstein, Norbert Hornstein, Lila Gleitman, Laura Petitto, Wolfram Hinzen, Matthias Mahlmann, Lisa Travis, and many others – plus too many students to mention, however much I would like to. I owe them all and thank them.

Thanks too to Jacqueline French for carefully reading and copy-editing the text and making many corrections; it proved to be a rather daunting task. I would also like to acknowledge partial financial support in the preparation of this volume from grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

The topics taken up in the discussions range widely and include human nature, morality and universality, science and common sense, the nature of language and its study, and evolution and Chomsky's views of it. Nevertheless, themes concerning the science of language and mind and their implications for theories of human nature and some social implications dominate. The 2004 interviews took place shortly after Chomsky's presentation at the 2004 Linguistic Society of America's annual meeting of a paper that has come to be known as the “Three Factors” paper. (The published version is available in Linguistic Inquiry; see Chomsky 2005a.) Considerable segments of the discussion centered on the important themes of that paper, a draft copy of which I had read before the interview. Readers might want to read that paper. I also suggest reading Marc Hauser, Tecumseh Fitch, and Chomsky's paper on the language faculty and its evolution in Science (Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch 2002). Some will find the later technical discussion of the theory of language in the Linguistic Inquiry paper a bit daunting, but the first parts of the paper are accessible to a general audience that is willing to read carefully. In any case, our discussion focused on the issues discussed in those accessible parts, and on their background and implications. Our discussions avoided the technical issues, except where they might prove crucial to clarifying Chomsky's still-unusual and often controversial views of language and mind and their study, and some implications of these views for understanding human nature and its implications for politics.

With an occasional exception when discussing a technical issue, Chomsky's remarks are accessible to a general audience while remaining interesting to specialists. I tried to make my contributions accessible too, aiming to make them understandable to the non-specialist undergraduate. Readers might wonder why I sometimes contrast Chomsky's views with those of philosophers, rather than linguists or (given the current emphasis on biolinguistics) biologists. The primary reason is that Chomsky often does so himself. He has little sympathy with much of what goes on in contemporary philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. Indicating just how and why he is critical provides insight into his views and into how he justifies them. It also ties his work in linguistics and the study of the human mind to more general philosophical and related themes that are likely to be of interest to – and within the background knowledge of – everyone.

Chomsky calls himself a rationalist, tying his views to a long tradition in philosophy and psychology (thought of as the study of mind) that included philosopher-scientists and philosophers such as Descartes, the Cambridge Platonists in England, and some Romantics (Wilhelm von Humboldt and A.W. Schlegel, among others). Rationalism as understood by Chomsky consists of a set of proposals – a procedure, strategy, or methodology – for studying the human mind, and language in particular. The methodology is not chosen at random; it is adopted because rationalists believe that it offers the best way to proceed in constructing a naturalistic science of mind and language, a science that while it differs from physics and chemistry in its subject matter is, like them, a natural science.

Rationalists in their study of language and mind try to take seriously two sets of observations about language and its use, and about how language and other human mental capacities develop in the infant and child. One is called the “poverty of the stimulus” observations and applies to all cognitive domains such as vision, audition, facial and object recognition, and so on. The other, the “creative aspect of language use,” is specific to language. The poverty of the stimulus observations concerning language in particular are these: children develop a language automatically, with little or no training, in conditions where data are sometimes limited and often corrupt, and in accord with much the same agenda across the human population without regard to general intelligence and access to schooling. Because of these facts, rationalists assume that it is reasonable to believe that much of the human mind's structure and “content” must somehow be fixed or innate. Beginning around a century and a half or so ago, and with increasing evidence of genomic, physical, chemical, and computational constraints on the ways in which organisms develop and grow, along with improving sciences of the ways in which these constraints affect organic growth, rationalists have come to assume that the best way to make sense of how the mind develops is by assuming that the mind's various parts or ‘organs’ grow or develop in accord with agendas fixed by the human genome and by other constraints on development. That is, they have come to see that the best way to make sense of the traditional rationalist's view that human mental powers develop under poverty of the stimulus conditions is to assume that they must be innate and that they grow into the forms that they do because of biological, physical, and computational constraints on their development. That explains why traditional rationalist study of the language and its growth has come to be called “biolinguistics.”

As for the creative aspect of language use observations, they are that human language use appears to have no causal antecedents (one can think or say anything, without regard to circumstances outside the body or in the head), that the use of language yields an indefinitely large number of structured complexes of concepts (those expressed by sentences) with regard to any context, and yet that the sentences produced on an occasion are almost always appropriate to the circumstances (discourse or other) to which they ‘speak.’ Traditional rationalists generally assumed that these observations indicated that humans must be seen as free in their thought, deliberations, and actions. Current rationalists agree, but because they believe that languages are best understood as computational systems embodied as biologically based organs in the mind/brain, they must also try to make sense of how a deterministic system in the head can play a role in yielding such obviously creative, novel, and coherent use by people. They do so by assuming that the core computational language system is “modular” and operates more or less autonomously and yet can “generate” an indefinitely large number of structured ways of speaking, thinking, and understanding. Plausibly, this is the root of the flexibility of human cognitive powers: human minds can put together in structured forms any number of structured conceptual materials, each of which is discernibly distinct from all others. But along with these assumptions about the capacity of the computational system and what it affords its users, contemporary rationalists believe that the ways that these uniquely human resources are used are not determined by the computational system. The consequences of these assumptions are important. Because of them, it is reasonable to hold that humans really are free in the ways in which they use language, and also to hold that if one wants a natural science of language, the only way to get it is to focus entirely on the nature, development, and operations of a person's “language organ,” not on the uses to which its resources are put as they appear in a person's linguistic actions and behaviors. Because of this, the science of language is the science of an internal system: rationalists are internalists. In sum, then, rationalists now like those of the past are – because they take seriously the poverty and creativity observations – scientists of mind and language who are both nativist and internalist in their assumptions about how to proceed.

Rationalism contrasts with empiricism, which commits itself to minimizing commitments to innateness – or at least, language-specific innateness – in the study of language and related “higher cognitive capacities,” holding instead that much of the cognitive structure and “content” of the human mind results primarily from ‘experience’ and some kind of generalized “learning” mechanism. Empiricists are anti-nativist and committed to including the world and relations to it in the study of mind. They, unlike rationalists, believe that a science of language should in some measure be a science of linguistic behavior and how the mind relates to the world outside the head. Their assumptions and the methodology for the study of mind that they adopt dominate current research in psychology, philosophy, and related ‘cognitive sciences.’ For them, language tends to be seen as a human invention, an institution to which the young are inducted by subjecting them to training procedures so that they adopt the ‘rules of use’ practiced by a community of speakers. They assume that the study of language must proceed on anti-nativist and externalist assumptions.

Obviously, the different assumptions of rationalists and empiricists lead them to devote research to very different subject matters, and they adopt very different views about the prospects of treating language as a “natural object,” to use Chomsky's terminology. I discuss rationalism and empiricism in a bit of detail in Appendix III. For more detail, see Chomsky's Cartesian Linguistics (particularly the 2009 Cambridge third edition, which has an introduction on the topic written by me) and Norbert Hornstein's chapter in The Cambridge Companion to Chomsky (2005). Readers are warned that “empiricism” by no means entails “empirical,” any more than “rationalist” entails “non-empirical.” Rationalists aim toward being no less empirical scientists than do chemists or biologists. Indeed, Chomsky has long insisted that the only methodology appropriate for developing a theory of language is that which is also employed in chemistry and physics. The study of language differs only in subject matter and experimental techniques from other naturalistic scientific endeavors. That this is the appropriate approach is demonstrated by its success – by progress in explanatory and descriptive adequacy, formal and explicit statement, simplicity, objectivity, and accommodation to other sciences (here, primarily biology). For some discussion, see McGilvray (forthcoming).

Part I The science of language and mind

1 Language, function, communication: language and the use of language

JM: I'll begin with a question that concerns the nature of language and the functions that language serves.

It is clear that language is central to human nature: it is likely to be the one thing that makes us distinctive. You think of language as biologically based, and so innate – built into our genomes in such a way that it appears automatically during a normal child's growth. And you acknowledge that language is a very useful cognitive tool that can serve many roles and that has given humans extraordinary cognitive advantages, compared to other creatures. But you resist the idea that language evolved because it improved the human capacity to communicate. Further, you're against the idea that language is some kind of social invention, an institution that was put together by us to help us serve our needs, and transmitted to the young by some kind of training or social inculcation. Could you explain why you hold these views?

NC: First of all, let's begin with the notion of function. That's not a clear biological notion or a psychological notion. So, for example, if I ask you what the function of the skeleton is, and you say: “the skeleton is to keep you straight and keep you from falling on the ground,” that is not false. But that also applies to its function to store calcium or to produce blood cells, or to do any of the other things it does. In fact, why the skeleton? Why do you even pick out the skeleton? We try to look at the organism from a certain point of view in order to build up a full understanding of it from the understanding of its components. But those components do all kinds of things; and what their function is depends on what you happen to be interested in. The usual sort of offhand way in which people identify the particular function of some system is the way in which it is ordinarily used, or its ‘most fundamental’ use, so that for the skeleton example, somehow, something else could store the calcium, and the skeleton would still be needed to keep the body together; so that's its function.[C]

Now let's take language. What is its characteristic use? Well, probably 99.9 percent of its use is internal to the mind. You can't go a minute without talking to yourself. It takes an incredible act of will not to talk to yourself. We don't often talk to ourselves in sentences. There's obviously language going on in our heads, but in patches, in parallel, in fragmentary pieces, and so on. So if you look at language in the way biologists look at other organs of the body and their subsystems – so you take into account all its functions in talking to yourself – what do you get? What are you doing when you talk to yourself? Most of the time you're torturing yourself [laughter]. So you might think you're being conned, or asking why does this person treat me that way? Or whatever. So you could say that the function of language is to torture yourself. Now, obviously, that's not serious.

It's perfectly true that language is used for communication. But everything you do is used for communication – your hairstyle, your mannerisms, your walk, and so on and so forth. So sure, language is also used for communication.

In fact, a very tiny part of language is externalized – what comes out of your mouth, or from your hands if you're using sign. But even that part is often not used for communication in any independently meaningful sense of the term “communication.” If by “communication” you mean any form of interaction, ok, it's used for communication. However, if you want the notion of communication to mean something, let's say conveying information or something like that, a very small part of the externalized aspects of language are for communication. So if you're at a party there's a lot of talk going on. But the amount of communication that's going on is minuscule; people are just having fun, or talking to their friends, or whatever. So the overwhelming mass of language is internal; what's external is a tiny fraction of that [and what's used in communication in some serious sense is a smaller fraction still]. As functions are usually informally defined, then, it doesn't make much sense to say that the function of language is communication.

An interesting topic that should be addressed some day is that our internal speech is very likely fragments of re-internalized external speech, and the real “inner speech” is very likely inaccessible to introspection. But these are questions that open many doors, barely ajar.

Well, let's take a look at language from an evolutionary point of view. There are animal communication systems. Every animal down to ants has a communication system, and there are interesting comparative studies of them. Take, for example, Marc Hauser's book on the evolution of communication. It doesn't really have much to do with evolution; it's a comparative study of different kinds of systems of interaction among animals. And they really do appear to be communication systems. Every animal has a small number of modes of indicating something to others. Some of them we interpret as meaning, “Eagles coming; so run away!” If you look into it, it's just: those leaves are flickering, so some noise comes out of the creature's mouth. Some of them are self-identification: “Here I am”; and some of them are mating calls. But there are not very many.

There's a kind of taxonomy of animal cries, and human language doesn't even fit into the taxonomy, I think, in any of the senses. Whatever those things are, they're apparently a code; there's no relationship to human language. That's not so surprising: apparently, our nearest surviving relatives are about 10 million years apart in evolutionary time; so you wouldn't expect to find anything like human language. So animals do have communication systems, but they don't seem to have anything like a language. Take human language. Where does it come from? Well, so far as we can tell from the fossil record, hominids with higher physiological apparatus were around in a small part of Africa for hundreds of thousands of years. We know by now that human language does not postdate about sixty thousand years ago. And the way you know that is that's when the trek from Africa started. By now you can trace it very closely by genetic marking, and so on and so forth; there's pretty good consensus on it. The trek from Africa starts roughly then and went very quickly in evolutionary time. One of the first places they went to is the Pacific – the southern part of Eurasia. They end up in New Guinea, Australia, and so on, where there are [now] what we call “primitive people” who to all intents and purposes are identical to us. There's no cognitively significant genetic difference anyone can tell. If they happened to be here, they would become one of us, and they would speak English; if we were there, we would speak their languages. So far as anyone knows, there is virtually no detectable genetic difference across the species that is language-related – and in fact, in most other properties. Genetic differences within humans are extremely small, as compared with other species. We pay a lot of attention to them; that's no surprise. So, some time, maybe sixty thousand years ago, language was there, in its modern form, without further changes. Well, how long before that? From here, we can look at the fossil record, and there's not really an indication that it was there. In fact, the effects of having a complex symbolic system are barely there before 60,000–100,000 years ago. Nothing much seems to have changed for hundreds of thousands of years, and then, all of a sudden, there was a huge explosion. Around seventy, sixty thousand years ago, maybe as early as a hundred thousand, you start getting symbolic art, notations reflecting astronomical and meteorological events, complex social structures . . . , just an outburst of creative energy that somehow takes place in an instant of evolutionary time – maybe ten thousand years or so, which is nothing. So there doesn't seem to be any indication that it was there before, and it all seems to be the same after. So it looks as if – given the time involved – there was a sudden “great leap forward.” Some small genetic modification somehow that rewired the brain slightly. We know so little about neurology; but I can't imagine how else it could be. So some small genetic change led to the rewiring of the brain that made this human capacity available. And with it came the entire range of creative options [C] that are available to humans within a theory of mind – a second-order theory of mind, so you know that somebody is trying to make you think what somebody else wants you to think. It's very hard to imagine how any of this could go on without language; at least, we can't think of any way of doing it without a language. And most of it is thinking and planning and interpreting, and so on; it's internal.

Well, mutations take place in a person, not in a group. We know, incidentally, that this was a very small breeding group – some little group of hominids in some corner of Africa, apparently. Somewhere in that group, some small mutation took place, leading to the great leap forward. It had to have happened in a single person. Something happened in a person that that person transmitted to its offspring. And apparently in a very short time, it [that modification] dominated the group; so it must have had some selectional advantage. But it could have been a very short time in a small [breeding] group. Well, what was it? The simplest assumption – we have no reason to doubt it – is that what happened is that we got Merge. You got an operation that enables you to take mental objects [or concepts of some sort], already constructed, and make bigger mental objects out of them. That's Merge. As soon as you have that, you have an infinite variety of hierarchically structured expressions [and thoughts] available to you.

We already had sensory-motor systems [when Merge was introduced], which were probably marginally employed. In fact, the idea of externalizing them might very well have come along later. And we had thought systems of some kind. However, they were rudimentary – maybe we pictured things in a certain way, or whatever. Whatever they are, they don't seem to be like animal systems, for reasons that were well discussed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But they were apparently there. Once you had this technique of construction and an infinite variety of hierarchically structured expressions to make use of these things (these thought systems or [what Chomsky calls] “conceptual-intentional systems”), then you could suddenly think, plan, interpret, in a manner that no one else could. And if your offspring had that capacity too, they would have a selectional advantage. And if, somewhere along the line, the idea came of trying to externalize it [thought] somehow, it would give even further advantages. So it's conceivable that that's it so far as the evolution of language is concerned. And the reason we continue to primarily use language to think [within] ourselves is that that's the way it got started. And, after all, sixty or seventy thousand years [and maybe up to a hundred thousand] isn't a lot of time from an evolutionary point of view; it's [virtually] an instant. So we're still pretty much the same as we were back in Africa whenever this sudden change took place. [C] That's about it, so far as we know.

Now, there are a lot of more complicated theories, but there's no justification for any of them. So, for example, a common theory is that somehow, some mutation made it possible to construct two-word sentences; and that gave a memory advantage because then you could eliminate this big number of lexical items from memory. So that had selectional advantages. And then something came along and we had three-word sentences and then a series of mutations led to five . . .; finally, you get Merge, because it goes to infinity [and this gives our minds a way to put together a limited number of lexical items in an infinite array of combinations]. Well, Merge could very well have been the first step, and it might have had nothing to do with externalization; in fact, it's hard to imagine how it could have, since it would have had to have happened in a person, not in a group or tribe. So there has to be something that gives that person an advantage that leads to advantages for his or her offspring.

JM: They get thought. In that vein, you've sometimes speculated, suggested – I'm not sure what the right word is – that along with Merge come the natural numbers, comes some successor function. Merge in the limiting case where you simply join one element to itself might effectively lead to the successor function.

NC: This is an old problem. Alfred Russell Wallace was worried about it. He recognized that mathematical capacities could not have developed by natural selection; it's impossible, because everybody's got them, and nobody's ever used them, except for some very tiny fringe of people in very recent times. Plainly, they developed some other way. Well, a natural expectation is that they're an offshoot of something. They're an offshoot of – probably like most of the rest of what's called “the human intellectual capacity” [or reason] – something like language.

Now, there happen to be very simple ways to get arithmetic from Merge. Take the concept Merge, which simply says, take two things, and construct a thing that is the set of the two things; that's its simplest form. Suppose you restrict it, and take only one thing, call it “zero,” and you merge it; you get the set containing zero. You do it again, and you get the set containing the set containing zero; that's the successor function. The details are somewhat more complex, but it is fairly straightforward. In fact, there are a couple of other ways in which you can get it; but it's just a trivial complication of Merge, which restricts it and says, when you put everything in just this way, it does give you arithmetic. When you've got the successor function, the rest comes.[C]

There are arguments against that. Brian Butterworth has a book (2000) about it in which he gives many arguments against thinking that the language and arithmetical capacities are related. It's not very clear what the evidence means. The evidence is, in part, dissociations. You can get neural dysfunction in which you lose one capacity and keep the other. However, that isn't going to tell you anything, because it doesn't distinguish competence from performance. It may be that those neural deficiencies have to do with using the capacity. So to take an analogy, there are dissociations in reading a language. But nobody thinks that there is a special reading part of the brain. It's just that there is a way of using language in reading, and that way can be damaged; but the language is still there. And it could be the same thing for arithmetic. The same is true of the other kinds of dissociations that are talked about. It could be true that there are all sorts of ways of explaining them. As a matter of fact, it could turn out that, whatever language is, it is just distributed in different parts of the brain. So maybe it could be copied, so that you could copy one part, and keep it, and get rid of the rest. There are so many possibilities that the evidence just doesn't show very much. So what we're left with is speculation, but when you don't have enough evidence, you pick the simplest explanation. And the simplest explanation that happens to conform to all the evidence we have is that it's just an offshoot of language derived by imposing a specific restriction on Merge.

In fact, there are other specific restrictions, which are much more modern. So take what are called “formal languages,” say . . . arithmetic, or programming systems, or whatever. They're kind of like natural language, but they're so recent and so self-conscious that we know that they're not really much like the biological object, human language.

Notice how they're not. Take Merge [the basic computational principle of all natural languages]. Just as a matter of pure logic, if you take two things, call them X and Y, and you make the set of X and Y ({X, Y}), there are two possibilities. One is that X is distinct from Y; the other is that they're not distinct. If everything is constructed by Merge, the only way for X to be not distinct from Y is for one to be inside the other. So let's say that X is inside Y. Well, if X is inside Y and you merge it, then you've got the set so that if Y = [. . . X . . .] then {X,Y}. In effect, Internal Merge (X,Y) = {X,Y} = {X, [. . . X . . .]}. That's a transformation. So in fact, the two kinds of Merge that are possible are taking two things and putting them together or taking one thing and taking a piece of it and sticking it at the edge. That's the displacement [or movement] property of natural language, which is found all over the place. I had always thought [until recently] that displacement was a kind of strange imperfection of language, compared with Merge or concatenate; but that is just a mistake. As internal Merge, it just comes automatically, unless you block it. That's why language uses that device for all sorts of things; it comes ‘for free.’ Assuming so, then you can ask the question, “How are these two kinds of Merge employed?” And here you look at the semantic interface; that's the natural one. There are huge differences. External Merge is used, basically, to give you argument structure. Internal Merge is basically used to give you discourse-related information, like focus, topic, new information, all that kind of stuff that relates to the discourse situation.[C] Well, that's not perfect, but it's close enough so that it's probably true; and if we could figure it out, or understand it well enough, we would find that it is perfect.

Suppose [now] that you're inventing a formal language. It has no discourse-related properties. So you just use external Merge. You put a constraint on systems – in effect, not to use internal Merge. And then you get, effectively, just argument structure. Now, it's interesting that if these systems give us scopal properties, they do it in particular ways, which happen to be rather similar to natural language. So if you're teaching, say, quantificational logic to undergraduates, the easiest way to do it is to use standard quantification theory – you put the variables on the outside and use parentheses, and so on and so forth. Well, we know perfectly well that there are other ways of doing it – logic without variables, as has been known since Curry (1930; Curry & Feys 1958).

And it has all the right properties. But it's extremely hard to teach. You can learn it, after you've learned it in the ordinary notation. I don't think anyone's tried – and I think it would be extremely hard – to do it the other way, to teach the Curry system and then end up showing that you could also do it in this other way. But why? They're logically equivalent, after all. I suspect that the reason is that the standard way has many of the properties of natural language. In natural language, you do use edge properties for scope; and you do it through internal Merge. Formal languages don't have internal Merge; but they have got to have something that is going to be interpreted as scope. So you use the same device you do in natural language: you put it on the outside with the restricted variables, and so on.

These are things that just flow from having a system with Merge inside you; and probably the same is true of music, and lots of other things. We got this capacity that came along and gives us extraordinary options for planning, interpretation and thought, and so on and so forth. And it just starts feeding into everything else. You get this massive cultural revolution, which is quite striking, probably about sixty or seventy thousand years ago. Everywhere where humans are, it's essentially the same. Now, maybe in Australia they don't have arithmetic; Warlpiri, for example, does not. But they have intricate kinship systems which, as Ken Hale pointed out, have a lot of the properties of mathematical systems. Merge just seems to be in the mind, working on interesting formal problems: you don't have arithmetic, so you have complicated kinship systems.

JM: That suggests that at least the possibility of constructing natural sciences – that that came too with Merge.

NC: It did, it starts right away. Right at this period you start finding it – and here we have fossil evidence and archaeological evidence of recording of natural events, such as the lunar cycles, and things like that. People begin to notice what is going on in the world and trying to interpret what is going on. And then it enters into ceremonies, and the like. It went on that way for a long time.

What we call science [that is, natural science with explicit, formal theories and the assumption that what they describe should be taken seriously, or thought of as ‘real’] is extremely recent, and very narrow. Galileo had a hell of a time trying to convince his funders – the aristocrats – that there was any point in studying something like a ball rolling down a frictionless inclined plane. “Who cares about that? There is all sorts of interesting stuff going on in the world. What do you have to say about flowers growing? That would be interesting; tell me about that.” Galileo the scientist had nothing to say about flowers growing. Instead, he had to try to convince his funders that there was some point in studying an experiment that he couldn't even carry out – half of the experiments that Galileo described were thought experiments, and he describes them as if he carried them out, but it was later shown that he couldn't . . .The idea of not looking at the world as too complicated, of trying to narrow it down to some artificial piece of the world that you could actually investigate in depth and maybe even learn some principles about it that would help you understand other things [what we might think of as pure science, science that aims at basic structures, without regard to applications] – that's a huge step in the sciences and, in fact, it was only very recently taken. Galileo convinced some people that there were these laws that you just had to memorize. But in his time they were still used as calculating devices; they provided ways of building things, and the like. It really wasn't until the twentieth century that theoretical physics became recognized as a legitimate domain in itself. For example, Boltzmann tried all his life to convince people to take atoms and molecules seriously, not just think of them as calculating devices; and he didn't succeed. Even great scientists, such as, say, Poincaré – one of the twentieth century's greatest scientists – just laughed at it. [Those who laughed] were very much under Machian [Ernst Mach's] influence: if you can't see it, touch it . . . [you can't take it seriously]; so you just have a way of calculating. Boltzmann actually committed suicide – in part, apparently, because of his inability to get anyone to take him seriously. By a horrible irony, he did it in 1905, the year that Einstein's Brownian motion paper came out, and everyone began to take it seriously. And it goes on.

I've been interested in the history of chemistry. Into the 1920s, when I was born – so it isn't that far back – leading scientists would have just ridiculed the idea of taking any of this seriously, including Nobel prizewinning chemists. They thought of [atoms and other such ‘devices’] as ways of calculating the results of experiments. Atoms can't be taken seriously, because they don't have a physical explanation, which they didn't. Well, it turned out that the physics of the time was seriously inadequate; you had to radically revise physics to be unified with and merged with an unchanged chemistry.

But even well after that, even beyond Pauling, chemistry is still for many mostly a descriptive subject. Take a look at a graduate text in theoretical chemistry. It doesn't really try to present it as a unified subject; you get different theoretical kinds of models for different kinds of situations. If you look at the articles in the technical journals, such as, say, Science or Nature, most of them are pretty descriptive; they pick around the edges of a topic, or something like that. And if you get outside the hard-core natural sciences, the idea that you should actually construct artificial situations in an effort to understand the world – well, that is considered either exotic or crazy. Take linguistics. If you want to get a grant, what you say is “I want to do corpus linguistics” – collect a huge mass of data and throw a computer at it, and maybe something will happen. That was given up in the hard sciences centuries ago. Galileo had no doubt about the need for focus and idealization when constructing a theory.[C]

Further, [in] talking about the capacity to do science [in our very recently practiced form, you have to keep in mind that] it's not just very recent, it's very limited. Physicists, for example, don't go commit suicide over the fact that they can't find maybe 90 percent of what they think the universe is composed of [dark matter and dark energy]. In . . . [a recent] issue of Science, they report the failure of the most sophisticated technology yet developed, which they hoped would find [some of] the particles they think constitute dark matter. That's, say, 90 percent of the universe that they failed to find; so we're still in the dark about 90 percent of the matter in the universe. Well, that's regarded as a scientific problem in physics, not as the end of the field. In linguistics, if you were studying Warlpiri or something, and you can't understand 50 percent of the data, it's taken to mean that you don't know what you're talking about.

How can you understand a very complex object? If you can understand some piece of it, it's amazing. And it's the same pretty much across the board. The one animal communication system that seems to have the kind of complexity or intricacy where you might think you could learn something about it from [what we know about] natural languages is that of bees. They have an extremely intricate communication system and, as you obviously know, there is no evolutionary connection to human beings. But it's interesting to look at bee signs. It's very confusing. It turns out there are hundreds of species of bees – honey bees, stingless bees, etc. The communication systems are scattered among them – some of them have them, some don't; some have different amounts; some use displays, some use flapping . . . But all the species seem to make out about as well. So it's kind of hard to see what the selectional advantage [of the bee communication system] is. And there's almost nothing known about its fundamental nature. The evolution of it is complicated; it's barely studied – there are [only] a few papers. Even the basic neurophysiology of it is extremely obscure. I was reading some of the most recent reviews of bee science. There are very good descriptive studies – all sorts of crazy things are reported. But you can't really work out the basic neurophysiology, and the evolution is almost beyond investigation, even though it's a perfect subject – hundreds of species, short gestation period, you can do any experiment you like, and so on and so forth. On the other hand, if you compare the literature on the evolution of bee communication to the literature on the evolution of human language, it's ridiculous. On the evolution of human language there's a library; on the evolution of bee communication, there are a few scattered textbooks and technical papers. And it's a far easier topic. The evolution of human language has got to be one of the hardest topics to study. Yet somehow we feel that we have got to understand it, or we can't go further. It's a highly irrational approach to inquiry.[C]

2 On a formal theory of language and its accommodation to biology; the distinctive nature of human concepts

JM: Let me pursue some of these points you have been making by asking you a different question. You, in your work in the 1950s, effectively made the study of language into a mathematical, formal science – not mathematical, of course, in the way Markov systems are mathematical, but clearly a formal science that has made very considerable progress. Some of the marks of that progress have been – for the last few years, for example – successive elimination of all sorts of artifacts of earlier theories, such as deep structure, surface structure, and the like. Further, recent theories have shown a remarkable ability to solve problems of both descriptive and explanatory adequacy. There is a considerable increase in degree of simplification. And there also seems to be some progress toward biology – not necessarily biology as typically understood by philosophers and by many others, as a selectional evolutionary story about the gradual introduction of a complex structure, but biology as understood by people like Stuart Kauffman (1993) and D'Arcy Thompson (1917/1942/1992). I wonder if you would comment on the extent to which that kind of mathematical approach has progressed.[C]

NC: Ever since this business began in the early fifties – two or three students, Eric Lenneberg, me, Morris Halle, apparently nobody else – the topic we were interested in was, how could you work this into biology? The idea was so exotic, no one else talked about it. Part of the reason was that ethology was just . . .

JM: Excuse me; was that [putting the theory of language into biology] a motivation from the beginning?

NC: Absolutely: we were starting to read ethology, Lorenz, Tinbergen, comparative psychology; that stuff was just becoming known in the United States. The US tradition was strictly descriptive behaviorism. German and Dutch comparative zoologists were just becoming available; actually, a lot was in German. We were interested, and it looked like this was where linguistics ought to go. The idea was so exotic that practically no one talked about it, except the few of us. But it was the beginning of Eric Lenneberg's work; that's really where all this started.

The problem was that as soon as you tried to look at language carefully, you'd see that practically nothing was known. You have to remember that it was assumed by most linguists at the time that pretty much everything in the field was known. A common topic when linguistics graduate students talked to one another was: what are we going to do when there's a phonemic analysis for every language? This is obviously a terminating process. You could maybe do a morphological analysis, but that is terminating too. And it was also assumed that languages are so varied that you're never going to find anything general. In fact, one of the few departures from that was found in Prague-style distinctive features: the distinctive features might be universal, so perhaps much more is universal. If language were biologically based, it would have to be. But as soon as we began to try to formulate the universal rules that were presupposed by such a view, it instantly became obvious that we didn't know anything. As soon as we tried to give the first definitions of words – what does a word mean? etc. – it didn't take us more than five minutes of introspection to realize that the Oxford English Dictionary wasn't telling us anything. So it became immediately obvious that we were starting from zero. The first big question was that of finding something about what was going on. And that sort of put it backwards from the question of how we are going to answer the biological questions.

Now, the fundamental biological question is: what are the properties of this language system that are specific to it? How is it different from walking, say – what specific properties make a system a linguistic one? But you can't answer that question until you know something about what the system is. Then – with attempts to say what the system is – come the descriptive and explanatory adequacy tensions. The descriptive pressure – the attempt to provide a description of all possible natural languages – made it [the system] look very complex and varied; but the obvious fact about acquisition is that it has all got to be basically the same. So we were caught in that tension.

Just recently I started reading the records of some of the conferences back in the sixties and seventies. The participants were mostly rising young biologists, a few neurophysiologists, some linguists, a few others. And these kinds of questions kept arising – someone would say, well, what are the specific properties of this system that make it unlike other systems? And all we could do was list a complicated set of principles which are so different [from each other] and so complex that there is no conceivable way that they could have evolved: it was just out of the question.

Furthermore, beyond the comparative question, there is another question lurking, which is right at the edge for biology currently – it is the one that Kauffman is interested in. That question is, why do biological systems have these properties – why these properties, and not other properties? It was recognized to be a problem back around Darwin's time. Thomas Huxley recognized it – that there's going to be a lot of different kinds of life forms, including human ones; maybe nature just somehow allows human types and some other types – maybe nature imposes constraints on possible life forms. This has remained a fringe issue in biology: it has to be true, but it's hard to study. [Alan] Turing (1992), for example, devoted a large part of his life to his work on morphogenesis. It is some of the main work he did – not just that on the nature of computation – and it was an effort to show that if you ever managed to understand anything really critical about biology, you'd belong to the chemistry or physics department. There are some loose ends that the history department – that is, selectional views of evolution – just happens to have. Even natural selection – it is perfectly well understood, it's obvious from the logic of it – even natural selection alone cannot do anything; it has to work within some kind of prescribed channel of physical and chemical possibilities, and that has to be a restrictive channel. You can't have any biological success unless only certain kinds of things can happen, and not others. Well, by now this is sort of understood for primitive things. Nobody thinks, for instance, that mitosis [the process of cellular DNA duplication, leading to division] is determined by natural selection into spheres and not cubes; there are physical reasons for that. Or take, say, the use of polyhedra as construction materials – whether it's the shells of viruses, or bee honeycombs. The physical reasons for that are understood, so you don't need selectional reasons. The question is, how far does it go?

The basic questions of what is specific to language really have to do with issues that go beyond those of explanatory adequacy [that is, with dealing with Plato's Problem, or explaining the poverty of the stimulus facts for language acquisition]. So if you could achieve explanatory adequacy – if you could say, “Here's Universal Grammar [UG], feed experience into it, and you get an I-language” – that's a start in the biology of language, but it's only a start.[C] The next step would be, well, why does UG have the properties that it has? That's the basic question. Well, one possibility is just one thing after another – a set of historical accidents, asteroids hitting the earth, or whatever. In that case, it's essentially unexplainable; it is not rooted in nature, but in accident and history. But there is another possibility, which is not unreasonable, given what we know about human evolution. It seems that the language system developed quite suddenly. If so, a long process of historical accident is ruled out, and we can begin to look for an explanation elsewhere – perhaps, as Turing thought, in chemistry or physics.

The standard image in evolutionary biology – the reason why biologists think that finding something perfect doesn't make any sense – is because you're looking at things over a long period of evolutionary history. And there are, of course, lots of instances of what François Jacob calls “bricolage,” or tinkering; at any particular point, nature does the best it can with what is at hand. You get paths in evolution that get stuck up here and go from there and not start over and go somewhere else. And so you do end up with what look like very complicated things that you might have done better if you had had a chance to engineer them from the start. That may be because we don't understand them. Maybe Turing was right; maybe they become this way because they have to. But at least it makes some sense to have that image if you have a long evolutionary development. On the other hand, if something happened pretty fast, it doesn't make any sense to take that image seriously.

For a while, it did not seem as if the evolution of language could have happened very quickly. The only approach that seemed to make any sense of language was that UG [or the biological endowment we have that allows us to acquire a language] is a pretty intricate system with highly specific principles that had no analogue anywhere else in the world. And that leads to the end of any discussion of the central problems of biology of language – what's specific to it, how did it get there? The reason for that was the tie between the theory – between the format for linguistic theory – and the problem of acquisition. Everyone's picture – mine too – was that UG gives something like a format for possible grammars and some sort of technique for choosing the better of them, given some data. But for that to work, the format has to be highly restrictive. You can't leave a lot of options open and, to make it highly restrictive, it seems as though it has to be highly articulated and very complex. So you're stuck with a highly articulated and highly specific theory of Universal Grammar, basically for acquisition reasons. Well, along comes the Principles and Parameters (P&P) approach; it took shape around the early eighties. It doesn't solve the problem [of saying what is distinctive to language and how it got there], but it eliminates the main conceptual barrier to solving it. The big point about the P&P approach is that it dissociates the format for grammar from acquisition. Acquisition according to this approach is just going to be a matter of picking up (probably) lexical properties, and undoubtedly lexical properties are picked up from experience, so here was another way in which acquisition is dissociated from the format.

Well, if all of that is dissociated from the principles part of UG, then there is no longer any conceptual reason why they have to be extremely intricate and specific. So you can begin to raise the question, well, have we just been wrong about their complexity and high level of articulation? Can we show that they really are simple? That's where the Minimalist Program begins. We can ask the question which was always lurking but that we could not handle, because of the need to solve the acquisition problem. With the dissociation of acquisition from the structure of language – primarily through the choice of parameters – we can at least address these questions. After the early 1980s, just about every class I taught I started with saying, “Let's see if language is perfect.” We'd try to see if it was perfect, and it didn't work; we'd end up with another kind of complexity. And in fact [pursuing that issue] didn't get very far until about the early 1990s, and then, at that point, things started to come together. We began to see how you could take the latest [theoretical understanding of the] technology and develop a fundamental explanation of it, and so on. One of the things – oddly enough – that was the last to be noticed around 2000 was that displacement [movement] is necessary. That looked like the biggest problem – why displacement? The right answer – that it's just internal Merge – strikes you in the face once you look at it in the right way.

JM: Didn't the story used to be that it was there to meet interface conditions – constraints on the core language system that are imposed by the systems with which language must ‘communicate’?

NC: Well, it turns out that it does meet interface conditions; but that's there anyhow. There have to be interface conditions; [the question we could now answer was] the biggest problem – why use displacement to meet them? Why not use indices, or something? Every system [has to] meet those conditions, but does it with different technology. Well now, thinking it through, it turns out that transformational grammar is the optimal method for meeting those conditions, because it's there for free.

JM: . . . when thought of as internal and external Merge . . .

NC: Yes, that comes for free, unless you stipulate that one of them doesn't happen.

JM: OK, and this helps make sense of why Merge – thus recursion in the form we employ it in language (and probably mathematics) – is available to human beings alone.[C] Is this all that is needed to make sense of what is distinctive about human language, then, that we have Merge? I can assume, on at least some grounds, that other species have conceptual capacities . . .

NC: But see, that's questionable. On the sensory-motor [interface] side, it's probably true. There might be some adaptations for language, but not very much. Take, say, the bones of the middle ear. They happen to be beautifully designed for interpreting language, but apparently they got to the ear from the reptilian jaw by some mechanical process of skull expansion that happened, say, 60 million years ago. So that is something that just happened. The articulatory-motor apparatus is somewhat different from other primates, but most of the properties of the articulatory system are found elsewhere, and if monkeys or apes had the human capacity for language, they could have used whatever sensory-motor systems they have for externalization, much as native human signers do. Furthermore, it seems to have been available for hominids in our line for hundreds of thousands of years before it was used for language. So it doesn't seem as if there were any particular innovations there.

On the conceptual side, it's totally different. Maybe we don't know the right things, but everything that is known about animal thought and animal minds is that the analogues to concepts – or whatever we attribute to them – do happen to have a reference-like relation to things. So there is something like a word-object relation. Every particular monkey call is associated with a particular internal state, such as “hungry,” or a particular external state, such as “There are leaves moving up there, so run away.”

JM: As Descartes suggested.

NC: Yes. That looks true of animal systems, so much so that the survey of animal communication by Randy Gallistel (1990) just gives it as a principle. Animal communication is based on the principle that internal symbols have a one-to-one relation to some external event or an internal state. But that is simply false for human language – totally. Our concepts are just not like that. Aristotle noticed it; but in the seventeenth century it became a vocation. Take, say, Locke's chapter 27 in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding that he added to the essay on persons. He realizes very well that a person is not an object. It's got something to do with psychic continuity. He goes into thought experiments: if two identical-looking people have the same thoughts, is there one person, or two people? And every concept you look at is like that. So they seem completely different from animal concepts.[C]

In fact, we only have a superficial understanding of what they are. It was mainly in the seventeenth century that this was investigated. Hume later recognized that these are just mental constructions evoked somehow by external properties. And then the subject kind of tails off and there's very little that happens. By the nineteenth century, it gets absorbed into Fregean reference-style theories, and then on to modern philosophy of language and mind, which I think is just off the wall on this matter.

. . . But to get back to your question, I think you're facing the fact that the human conceptual system looks as though it has nothing analogous in the animal world. The question arises as to where animal concepts came from, and there are ways to study that. But the origin of the human conceptual apparatus seems quite mysterious for now.

JM: What about the idea that the capacity to engage in thought – that is, thought apart from the circumstances that might prompt or stimulate thoughts – that that might have come about as a result of the introduction of the language system too?

NC: The only reason for doubting it is that it seems about the same among groups that separated about fifty thousand years ago. So unless there's some parallel cultural development – which is imaginable – it looks as if it was sitting there somehow. So if you ask a New Guinea native to tell you what a person is, for example, or a river . . . [you'll get an answer like the one you would give.] Furthermore, infants have it [thought]. That's the most striking aspect – that they didn't learn it [and yet its internal content is rich and intricate, and – as mentioned – beyond the reach of the Oxford English Dictionary].

Take children's stories; they're based on these principles. I read my grandchildren stories. If they like a story, they want it read ten thousand times. One story that they like is about a donkey that somebody has turned into a rock. The rest of the story is about the little donkey trying to tell its parents that it's a baby donkey, although it's obviously a rock. Something or another happens at the end, and it's a baby donkey again. But every kid, no matter how young, knows that that rock is a donkey, that it's not a rock. It's a donkey because it's got psychic continuity, and so on. That can't be just developed from language, or from experience.

JM: Well, what about something like distributed morphology? It might be plausible that at least some conceptual structure – say, the difference between a noun and a verb – is directly due to language as such. Is that plausible?

NC: Depends on what you mean by it. Take the notion of a donkey again. It is a linguistic notion; it's a notion that enters into thought. So it's a lexical item and it's a concept. Are they different? Take, say, Jerry Fodor's notion of the language of thought. What do we know about the language of thought? All we know about it is that it's English. If it's somebody in East Africa who has thoughts, it's Swahili. We have no independent notion of what it is; in fact, we have no reason to believe that there's any difference between lexical items and concepts. It's true that other cultures will break things up a little differently, but the differences are pretty slight. The basic properties are just identical. When I give examples in class like river and run these odd thought experiments [concerning the identities of rivers – what a person is willing to call a river, or the same river that you find in my work], it doesn't matter much which language background anyone comes from, they all recognize it in the same way in fundamental respects. Every infant does. So, somehow, these things are there. They show up in language; whether they are ‘there’ independently of language, we have no way of knowing. We don't have any way of studying them – or very few ways, at least.

We can study some things about conceptual development apart from language, but they have to do with other things, such as perception of motion, stability of objects, things like that. It's interesting, but pretty superficial as compared with whatever those concepts are. So the question whether it came from language seems beyond our investigation capacities; we can't understand infant thought very far beyond that.

But then the question is, where did it come from? You can imagine how a genetic mutation might have given Merge, but how does it give our concept of psychic identity as the defining property of entities? Or many other such properties quite remote from experience.

JM: I've sometimes speculated about whether or not lexical concepts might be in some way or another generative. It seems plausible on the face of it – it offers some ways of understanding it.

NC: The ones that have been best studied are not the ones we have been talking about – the ones that are [sometimes] used [by us] to refer to the world, [such as WATER and RIVER,] but the relational ones, such as the temporal[ly relational] ones – stative versus active verbs[, for example] – or relational concepts, concepts involving motion, the analogies between space and time, and so on. There is a fair amount of interesting descriptive work [done on these]. But these are the parts of the semantic apparatus that are fairly closely syntactically related, so [in studying them] you're really studying a relational system that has something of a syntactic character.

The point where it becomes an impasse is when you ask, how is any of this used to talk about the world – the traditional question of semantics. Just about everything that is done – let's suppose everything – in formal semantics or linguistic semantics or theory of aspect, and so on, is almost all internal [and syntactic in the broad sense]. It would work the same if there weren't any world. So you might as well put the brain in a vat, or whatever. And then the question comes along, well look, we use these to talk about the world; how do we do it? Here, I think, philosophers and linguists and others who are in the modern intellectual tradition are caught in a kind of trap, namely, the trap that assumes that there is a reference relation.[C]

I've found it useful and have tried to convince others – without success – to think of it on an analogy with phonology. The same question arises. All the work in phonology is internal [to the mind/brain]. You do assume that narrow phonetics gives some kind of instructions to the articulatory and auditory system – or whatever system you're using for externalization. But that's outside of the faculty of language. It's so crazy that nobody suggests that there is a sound–symbol relation; nobody thinks that the symbol æ, let's say (“a” in cat), picks out some mind-external object. You could play the game that philosophers do; you could say that there's a four-dimensional construct of motions of molecules that is the phonetic value of æ. And then æ picks that out, and when I say æ (or perhaps cat) you understand it because it refers to the same four-dimensional construct. That's so insane that no one – well, almost no one, as you know – does it. What actually happens – this is well understood – is that you give instructions to, say, your articulatory apparatus and they convert it into motions of molecules in different ways in different circumstances, and depending on whether you have a sore throat or not, or whether you're screaming, or whatever. And somebody else interprets it if they are close enough to you in their internal language and their conception of the world and understanding of circumstances, and so on; to that extent, they can interpret what you are saying. It's a more-or-less affair. Everyone assumes that that is the way the sound side of language works.

So why shouldn't the meaning side of language work like that: no semantics at all – that is, no reference relation – just syntactic instructions to the conceptual apparatus which then acts? Now – once you're in the conceptual apparatus and action – you're in the domain of human action. And whatever the complexities of human action are, the apparatus – sort of – thinks about them in a certain way. And other people who are more or less like us or think of themselves in the same way, or put themselves in our shoes, get a passably good understanding of what we're trying to say. It doesn't seem that there's any more than that.[C]

Supplemental material from interview 20 January 2009

JM: I'll switch to what you called “semantic information” in a lecture in 2007 at MIT on the perfection of the language system and elsewhere. You mentioned that at the semantic interface (SEM) of the language faculty, you got two kinds of semantic information, one concerning argument structure that you assumed to be due to external Merge, and another kind of information concerning topic, scope, and new information – matters like these – that you assumed to be due to internal Merge.

NC: Well, pretty closely. There are arguments to the contrary, such as Norbert Hornstein's theory of control, which says that you pick up theta roles. So I don't want to suggest that it's a closed question by any means, but if you adopt a god-like point of view that you sort of expect that if you're going to have two different kinds of Merge, that they should be doing different things. I don't have proof. But the data seem to suggest that it's pretty close to true, so close to true that it seems too much of an accident. The standard cases for argument structure are for external Merge, and the standard cases of discourse orientation and stuff like that are from internal Merge.

JM: It's a very different kind of information.

NC: It's very different, and if we knew enough about animal thought, I suspect that we would find that the external Merge parts may even be in some measure common to primates. You can probably find things like actor-action schema with monkeys. But they can't do very much with it; it's like some kind of reflection of things that they perceive. You see it in terms of Cudworth-style properties, Gestalt properties, causal relations; it's a way of perceiving.

JM: Events with n-adic properties – taking various numbers of arguments, and the like.

NC: Yes, that kind of thing. And that may just be what external Merge gives you. On the other hand, there's another kind of Merge around, and if it's used, it's going to be used for other properties. Descriptively, it breaks down pretty closely to basic thematic structure on the one hand, and discourse orientation, information structure, scopal properties, and so on, on the other.

JM: It looks like pragmatic information . . .

NC: After all, the interface is semantic-pragmatic.[C]

There is a lot of discussion these days of Dan Everett's work with a Brazilian language, Pirahã – it's described in the New Yorker, among other places. David Pesetsky has a long paper on it with a couple of other linguists [(Nevins, Pesetsky, Rodrigues 2007)], and according to them, it's just like other languages. It's gotten into the philosophical literature too. Some smart people – a very good English philosopher wrote a paper about it. It's embarrassingly bad. He argues that this shows that it undermines Universal Grammar, because it shows that language isn't based on recursion. Well, if Everett were right, it would show that Pirahã doesn't use the resources that Universal Grammar makes available. But that's as if you found a tribe of people somewhere who crawled instead of walking. They see other people crawl, so they crawl. It doesn't show that you can't walk. It doesn't show that you're not genetically programmed to walk [and do walk, if you get the relevant kind of input that triggers it and are not otherwise disabled]. What Everett claims probably isn't true anyway, but even if it were, that just means this language has limited lexical resources and is not using internal Merge. Well, maybe not: Chinese doesn't use it for question-formation. English doesn't use a lot of things; it doesn't use Baker's polysynthesis option. No language uses all the options that are available.

3 Representation and computation

JM: Continuing in the same vein, your understanding of computation seems to differ from the philosophically favored notion where it is understood as tied in with a representational theory of mind. Computation there is understood to be something like the operations of a problem-solving device that operates over symbols understood in traditional (not your) semantic terms, in terms of relationships of items inside the head that represent things outside in the world.

NC: The term “representation” is used in a kind of technical sense in the philosophical literature which I think basically comes back to the theory of ideas. You know there's something out there and the impression of it becomes an idea, and then there's a relation – so, say, in Jerry Fodor's representational theory of mind – there's a causal relation between the cat over there and the concept cat in your language of thought. And Kripke, Putnam, Burge have a picture roughly like that.

JM: Well, it's more than just causal – I mean, for Fodor, it really is a semantic relationship . . .

NC: Yes, but it is causal [in that something ‘out there’ causes the formation of an internal representation which is your ‘idea of’ what causes it]. I mean, that's how you get the connection. There is some causal relation, and then, yes, it sets up the semantic relation of reference. And there is a factual question as to whether any of that happens. Obviously there's some causal relation between what's outside in the world and what's in our head. But it does not follow that there's a symbol–object relationship, [something like the reverse of the causal one]. And the big problem with that approach is – what's the object? Well, here we're back to studying lexical concepts and it was pretty clear by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that there wasn't going to be a relation like that, even for the simplest concepts. We just individuate things in different ways.

Locke's discussion of personal identity is a famous example of how we just don't individuate things that way; [we, or rather, our minds, produce the concept PERSON]. That goes back to Aristotle and form and matter, but then it's very much extended in the seventeenth century; and then it kind of dropped. As far as I know, after Hume it virtually disappears from the literature. And now – these days – we're back to a kind of neo-scholastic picture of word–thing relations. That's why you have books called Word and Object [by W.V.O. Quine] and that sort of thing. But there's no reason to believe that that relation exists. So yes, the representational theories of mind are bound to a concept of representation that has historical origins but has no particular merits as far as I know.

JM: I asked in part because, when you read works of people like Georges Rey, he seems to assume that when Turing speaks of computation, he was essentially committed to something like a representational account.

NC: I don't see where that comes from – I don't see any evidence for that in Turing. That's the way Turing is interpreted by Rey, by Fodor, and by others. But I don't see any textual basis for that. In fact, I don't think Turing even thought about the problem. Nothing in what I've read, at least. You can add that if you like to Turing; but it's not there. Now Georges Rey in particular has carried out a very intensive search of the literature to find uses of the word ‘representation’ in my work and elsewhere, and consistently misinterprets them, in my opinion [see Rey's contribution and Chomsky's reply in Hornstein & Antony (2003)]. If you look at the literature on cognitive science and neurology and so on and so forth, people are constantly talking about internal representations. But they don't mean that there's a connection between what's inside and some mind-independent entity. The term “internal representation” just means that something's inside. And when you add this philosophical tradition to it, yes, you get funny conclusions – in fact, pointless ones. But if we learned anything from graduate school when we were reading the late Wittgenstein, it's that that's a traditional philosophical error. If you want to understand how a cognitive neuroscientist or a linguist is using the word representation, you've got to look at how they're using it, not add a philosophical tradition to it. [To return to an earlier point,] take phonetic representation – which is the standard, the traditional linguistic term from which all the others come. Nobody thinks that an element in a syllable in IPA [International Phonetic Alphabet] picks out a mind-independent entity in the world. If it's called a phonetic representation, that's just to say that there's something going on in the head.[C]

4 More on human concepts

JM: We had spoken earlier about the distinctiveness of human concepts, and I'd like to get a bit clearer about what that amounts to. I take it that, at least in part, it has to do with the fact that human beings, when they use their concepts – unlike many animals – do not in fact use them in circumstances in which there is some sort of direct application of the concept to immediate circumstances or situations.

NC: Well, as far as anyone knows – maybe we don't know enough about other animals – what has been described in the animal literature is that every action (local, or whatever) is connected by what Descartes would have called a machine to either an internal state or an external event that is triggering it. You can have just an internal state – so the animal emits a particular cry [or other form of behavior] ‘saying’ something like “It's me” or “I'm here,” or a threat: something like “Keep away from me,” or maybe a mating cry. [You find this] all the way down to insects. Or else there is a reaction to some sort of external event; you get a chicken that's looking up and sees something that we interpret as “There's a bird of prey” – even though no one knows what the chicken is doing. It appears that everything is like that, to the extent – as mentioned before – that Randy Gallistel (1990) in his review introduction to a volume on animal communication suggests that for every animal down to insects, whatever internal representation there is, it is one-to-one associated with an organism-independent external event, or internal event. That's plainly not true of human language. So if [what he claims] is in any way near to being true of animals, there is a very sharp divide there.

JM: That's a sharp divide with regard to what might be called the “use” or application of relevant types of concepts, but I take it that it's got to be more than that . . .

NC: Well, it's their natures. Whatever the nature of HOUSE, or LONDON, ARISTOTLE, or WATER is – whatever their internal representation is – it's just not connected to mind-independent external events, or to internal states. It's basically a version of Descartes's point, which seems accurate enough.

JM: OK, so it's not connected to the use of the concepts, nor is it connected . . .

NC: Or the thought. Is it something about their nature, or something about their use? Their use depends on their nature. We use HOUSE differently from how we use BOOK; that's because there's something different about HOUSE and BOOK. So I don't see how one can make a useful distinction . . .

JM: There's a very considerable mismatch, in any case, between whatever features human concepts have and whatever types of things and properties in the world that might or might not be ‘out there’ – even though we might use some of these concepts to apply to those things . . .

NC: Yes, in fact the relation seems to me to be in some respects similar to the sound side of language[, as I mentioned before]. There's an internal representation, æ, but there's no human-independent physical event that æ is associated with. It can come out in all sorts of ways . . .

JM: So for concepts it follows, I take it, that only a creature with a similar kind of mind can in fact comprehend what a human being is saying when he or she says something and expresses the concepts that that person has . . .

NC: So when you teach a dog commands, it's reacting to something, but not your concepts . . .

JM: OK, good. I'd like to question you then in a bit more detail about what might be thought of as relevant types of theories that one might explore with regard to concepts. Does it make sense to say that there are such things as atomic concepts? I'm not suggesting that they have to be atomic in the way that Jerry Fodor thinks they must be – because of course for him they're semantically defined over a class of identical properties . . .

NC: External . . .

JM: External properties, yes.

NC: I just don't see how that is going to work, because I don't see any way to individuate them mind-independently. But I don't see any alternative to assuming that there are atomic ones. Either they're all atomic, in which case there are atomic ones, or there is some way of combining them. I don't really have any idea of what an alternative would be. If they exist, there are atomic ones. It seems a point of logic.

JM: I wonder if the view that there must be atomic concepts doesn't have about the same status as something like Newton's assumption that there have to be corpuscles because that's just the way we think . . .

NC: That's correct . . . there have to be corpuscles. It's just that Newton had the wrong ones. Every form of physics assumes that there are some things that are elementary, even if it's strings. The things that the world is made up of, including our internal natures, our minds – either those things are composite, or they're not. If they're not composite, they're atomic. So there are corpuscles.

JM: Is there work in linguistics now being done that's at least getting closer to becoming clearer about what the nature of those atomic entities is?

NC: Yes, but the work that is being done – and it's interesting work – is almost entirely on relational concepts. There's a huge literature on telic verbs, etc. – on things that are related to syntax. How do events play a role, how about agents, states . . .? Davidsonian kind of stuff. But it's relational.

The concerns of philosophers working on philosophy of language and of linguists working on semantics are almost complementary. Nobody in linguistics works on the meaning of WATER, TREE, HOUSE, and so on; they work on LOAD, FILL, and BEGIN – mostly verbal concepts.

JM: The contributions of some philosophers working in formal semantics can be seen – as you've pointed out in other places – as a contribution to syntax.

NC: For example, Davidsonian-type work . . .

JM: Exactly . . .

NC: whatever one thinks of it, it is a contribution to the syntax of the meaning side of language. But contrary to the view of some Davidsonians and others, it's completely internal, so far as I can see. You can tie it to truth conditions, or rather truth-indications, of some kind; it enters into deciding whether statements are true. But so do a million other things.[C]

5 Reflections on the study of language

JM: You used to draw a distinction between the language faculty narrowly conceived and the language faculty more broadly conceived, where it might include some performance systems. Is that distinction understood in that way still plausible?

NC: We're assuming – it's not a certainty – but we're basically adopting the Aristotelian framework that there's sound and meaning and something connecting them. So just starting with that as a crude approximation, there is a sensory-motor system for externalization and there is a conceptual system that involves thought and action, and these are, at least in part, language-independent – internal, but language-independent. The broad faculty of language includes those and whatever interconnects them. And then the narrow faculty of language is whatever interconnects them. Whatever interconnects them is what we call syntax, ‘semantics’ [in the above sense, not the usual one], phonology, morphology . . ., and the assumption is that the faculty narrowly conceived yields the infinite variety of expressions that provide information which is used by the two interfaces. Beyond that, the sensory-motor system – which is the easier one to study, and probably the peripheral one (in fact, it's pretty much external to language) – does what it does. And when we look at the conceptual system, we're looking at human action, which is much too complicated a topic to study. You can try to pick pieces out of it in the way Galileo hoped to with inclined planes, and maybe we'll come up with something, with luck. But no matter what you do, that's still going to connect it with the way people refer to things, talk about the world, ask questions and – more or less in [John] Austin style – perform speech acts, which is going to be extremely hard to get anywhere with. If you want, it's pragmatics, as it's understood in the traditional framework [that distinguishes syntax, semantics, and pragmatics].[1]

All of these conceptual distinctions just last. Very interesting questions arise as to just where the boundaries are. As soon as you begin to get into the real way it works in detail, I think there's persuasive – never conclusive, but very persuasive – evidence that the connecting system really is based on some merge-like operation, so that it's compositional to the core. It's building up pieces and then transferring them over to the interfaces and interpreting. So everything is compositional, or cyclic in linguistic terms. Then what you would expect from a well-functioning system is that there are constraints on memory load, which means that when you send something over the interface, you process it and forget about it; you don't have to re-process it. Then you go on to the next stage, and you don't re-process that. Well, that seems to work pretty well and to give lots of good empirical results.

But there is a problem. The problem is that there are global properties. So, for example, on the sound side, prosodic properties are global. Whether the intonation of the sentence is going to rise or fall at the end depends on the complementizer with which it begins. So if it's going to be a question that begins with, say, “who” or “what,” that's going to determine a lot about the whole prosody of the sentence. And for this and other reasons it's a global property; it's not built up piece by piece. Similarly, on the semantic side, things like variable binding or Condition C of binding theory are plainly global. Well, what does that mean? One thing it may mean is that these systems – like, say, prosody and binding theory – which we have thought of as being narrow syntax, could be outside the language faculty entirely. We're not given the architecture in advance. And we know that, somehow, there's a homunculus out there who's using the entire sound and entire meaning – that's the way we think and talk. It could be that that point where all the information is going to be gathered, that is where the global properties apply. And some of these global properties are situation-related, like what you decide to do depends on what you know you're talking about, what background information you're using, etc. But that's available to the homunculus; it's not going to be in the language faculty. The language faculty is kind of like the digestive system, it grinds away and produces stuff that we use. So we don't really know what the boundaries are. But you might discover them. You might discover them in ways like these.[C]

In fact, we might discover that the whole idea of an interface is wrong. Take, say, the sound side, which is easier to think about because we have some information about it. It's universally assumed – this goes back to the beginning of the subject – that the internal language constructs some kind of narrow phonetic representation which is then interpreted by the sensory-motor system; it's said in different ways, but it always comes down to this. Well, it's not a logical necessity. It could be that in the course of generating the sound side of an utterance, you send pieces over to the sensory-motor system long before you send other pieces over. So there won't be a phonetic interface. You can make up a system that works like that, and we don't know that language doesn't. It's just taken for granted that it doesn't because the simplest assumption is that there's one interface. But the fact that it's the first thing that comes to mind doesn't make it true. So it could be that our conception of the architecture is just like a first guess. It is not necessarily wrong, but most first guesses are. Take a look at the history of the advanced sciences. No matter how well established they are, they almost always turned out to be wrong.

JM: True, but their construction has often been guided by the intuition that simplicity of structure is crucial; and you get [at least partial] success when you follow that particular lead.

NC: No one knows why, but that has been a guiding intuition. In fact, that's sort of the core of the Galilean conception of science. That's what guided me. And in biology, that's what guided people like Turing in his effort to place the study of biology in the physics and chemistry departments.

JM: History, free action, and accident mess things up and are beyond the scope of natural science. Did you think when you began all this that linguistics might become more and more like a physical science?

NC: I'm kind of torn. I mean, I did believe what I was taught [by Zellig Harris and my other instructors]; a nicely brought-up Jewish boy does. But it less and less made any sense. By the late forties I was working kind of on my own and thinking maybe it – the idea that the study of language is a natural science – was a personal problem. It wasn't until the early 1950s that I began to think that the personal problem made some sense; and I began to talk about it. So it was kind of a difficult process to go through. And then, of course[, I had a long way to go]. For years, when I thought I was doing generative grammar, I was actually taking stuff over from traditional grammar.

[1] Chomsky's point concerning pragmatics seems to be that it is very unlikely to be a naturalistic science (at least, as it is currently understood), even though one might find systematic aspects of the ways in which people use language. See Appendix VI.

6 Parameters, canalization, innateness, Universal Grammar

JM: Still in the vein we've been talking about, I'd like to ask about linguistic development (language growth) in the individual. You've employed the concept of – or at least alluded to the concept of – canalization, C. H. Waddington's term from about fifty or sixty years ago, and suggested that the linguistic development of the child is like canalization. Can parameters be understood as a way of capturing canalization?

NC: Canalization sounds like the right idea, but as far as I know, there are not a lot of empirical applications for it in biology.

With regard to parameters, there are some basic questions that have to be answered. One question is: why isn't there only a single language? Why do languages vary at all? So suppose this mutation – the great leap forward – took place; why didn't it fix the language exactly? We don't know what the parameters are, but whatever they are, why is it these, and not those? So those questions have got to come up, but they are really at the edge of research. There's a conceivable answer in terms of optimal efficiency – efficiency of computation. That answer could be something like this, although no one's proposed it; it's really speculation. To the extent that biology yields a single language, that increases the genetic load: you have to have more genetic information to determine a single language than you do to allow for a variety of languages. So there's kind of a saving in having languages not be too minimal. On the other hand, it makes acquisition much harder: it's easier to acquire a minimal language. And it could be that there's a mathematical solution to this problem of simultaneous maximization: how can you optimize these two conflicting factors? It would be a nice problem; but you can't formulate it.

And there are other speculations around; you've read Mark Baker's book (Atoms of Language), haven't you?

JM: Yes, I have.

NC: . . . well, there's this nice idea that parameters are there so we can deceive each other . . .

JM: . . . and use that option in wartime.[C]

NC: Of course, the understanding of what parameters are is too rudimentary to try to get a principled answer. But those questions are going to arise.

Take phonology. It's generally assumed – plausibly, but not with any direct evidence – that the mapping from the narrow syntax to the semantic interface is uniform. There are lots of theories about it; but everyone's theory is that this is the way it works for every language – which is not unreasonable, since you have only very limited evidence for it. The narrow syntax looks uniform up to parameters. On the other hand, the mapping to the sound side varies all over the place. It is very complex; it doesn't seem to have any of the nice computational properties of the rest of the system. And the question is why. Well, again, there is a conceivable snowflake-style answer, namely, that whatever the phonology is, it's the optimal solution to a problem that came along somewhere in the evolution of language – how to externalize this internal system, and to externalize it through the sensory-motor apparatus. You had this internal system of thought that may have been there for thousands of years and somewhere along the line you externalize it; well, maybe the best way to do it is a mess. That would be the nicest answer, although it's a strange thought for me. And you can think of long-term questions like that all along the line.

JM: Would optimization be required for the conceptual-intentional case?

NC: That is really a puzzle. So, why do our concepts always have this invariant, curious property that they conform to our “cognoscitive powers” to use Ralph Cudworth's terminology, not to the nature of the world? It's really strange. And it seems to be completely independent. There are no sensible origins, selectional advantages, nothing . . .

JM: You've often emphasized the importance of poverty of stimulus facts with respect to knowledge of all aspects of language – namely, structural, phonological-phonetic, and meaning-related conceptual ways. You have pointed out that the facts demand explanation, and that the theory of Universal Grammar is an hypothesis, perhaps the only viable one, that explains these particular facts. Could you speak to what – given the current understanding of UG and of computation in it – the innateness of these domains amounts to?

NC: First of all, I should say – I see this now clearly in retrospect – that it was a tactical mistake to bring up the issue of the poverty of the stimulus. The reason is that it makes it look as if it's only about language, but it's a universal property of growth. The fact that we have arms and legs is a poverty of stimulus property – nutrition didn't determine them. So any aspect of growth – physical, cognitive, whatever – is going to have poverty of stimulus issues. And, at least in the sciences – it's not God, or something – it's universally assumed that it has to do with genetic endowment. So presumably the case of language has to do with genetic endowment. That's Universal Grammar as it has often been conceived.

Now actually, that's wrong, because it's not due to genetic endowment; it's due to genetic endowment plus laws of the way the world works. Nobody knows how it works, but it's taken for granted by serious biologists in the mainstream that some kinds of developmental constraints or architectural factors play a crucial role in growth, and also in evolution – in both forms of development. Some notion of evolution and growth, which in genetic cases aren't so far apart – they're going to play a role. So you really have two factors to consider – or rather, three factors. Experience is going to make some choices. Universal Grammar or genetic endowment will set constraints. And the developmental constraints – which are independent of language and may be independent of biology – they'll play some role in determining the course of growth. The problem is to sort out the consequences of those factors.

Well, what's Universal Grammar? It's anybody's best theory about what language is at this point. I can make my own guesses. There's the question of lexical items – where they come from. That's a huge issue. Among the properties of lexical items, I suspect, are the parameters. So they're probably lexical, and probably in a small part of the lexicon. Apart from that, there's the construction of expressions. It looks more and more as if you can eliminate everything except just for the constraint of Merge. Then you go on to sharpen it. It's a fact – a clear fact – that the syntactic objects you construct have some information in them relevant to further computation. Well, optimally, that information would be found in an easily discoverable, single element, which would be, technically, its label. The labels are going to have to come out of the lexicon and be carried forward through the computation; and they should contain, optimally, all the information relevant for further computation. Well, that means for external Merge, it's going to involve selectional properties – so, where does this thing fit the next thing that comes along? For internal Merge, what it looks like – kind of what you would expect in that domain – is that it's the probe that finds the input to internal Merge and sticks it at the edge because you don't want to tamper with it, just rearrange. Well, that carries you pretty far, and it takes you off to features; what are they, where do they come from, and so on . . .[C]

JM: Noam, that's all the time for today. Thank you very much . . .

JM: [Discussion continues] To pick up on an issue from the last session, we had been discussing innateness and I think we had come to an understanding to the effect that with lexical concepts we have no clear idea of what it means for them to be innate, but they are.

NC: Part of the reason for that – for not knowing what it is for them to be innate – is that we don't have much idea what they are.

JM: Yes. Going further down the list into areas where we have a bit more confidence that we know what is going on, we had come to understand that with regard to structural features the best way to understand innateness now is probably largely in terms of Merge, that is, a conception of language that focuses on the idea that most of the structure of language is somehow due to this introduction of Merge some fifty or sixty thousand years ago. Is that plausible?

NC: Well, that is very plausible. How much of language that accounts for we don't really know – basically, finding that out is the Minimalist Program: how much is accounted for by this one innovation? On Merge itself, every theory agrees; if you have a system with infinitely many hierarchically organized expressions, you have Merge or something equivalent, at the very least, whatever the formulation is. We just take for granted that Merge came along somewhere, and you can more or less time it. Then the question is, given that and the external conditions that language has to meet – interface conditions and independent properties of organisms, or maybe beyond organisms (physical laws and so on and so forth) – how much of language is determined by them? That's a research question – a lot more so than I would have guessed ten years or so ago.

JM: OK, continuing on the list, what about phonological and phonetic features and properties?

NC: Well, there's no doubt that there's a specific array of them and you can't just make up any one. And they are plainly attuned to the sensory-motor apparatus[; they meet interface conditions without, of course, being ‘about’ them]. In fact, the same is true if you use a different modality like sign: what you do is attuned to the sensory-motor apparatus; it [sign] doesn't use phonetic features, but some counterpart. The same kinds of questions arise about them as about lexical concepts. It's just that they – the phonetic features – are easier to study. Not that it's easy. Here at MIT there has been half a century of serious work with high-tech equipment trying to figure out what they are, so it doesn't come easily; but at least it's a much more easily formulable problem. Also, on the sensory-motor side, you can imagine comparative evolutionary evidence. On the lexical-semantic side, you can't even think of any comparative evidence that works. But [on the sensory-motor side] other organisms have sensory-motor systems; they're very much like ours, it appears. So you might be able to trace origins. That's the usual hard problem with evolutionary theory. So far as we know, most of those are precursors of language. It's possible that there's adaptation of the sensory-motor system to language – that's likely – but just what it is is very hard to say.

JM: Is there evolutionary evidence from other primates for sensory-motor systems, or primarily from other creatures?

NC: Other primates? Well, they have tongues and ears, and so on, but it's . . .

JM: Not the famous dropped larynx.

NC: Well, they don't have the dropped larynx, but other organisms do – they've been found in deer, I think (Fitch & Reby 2001); but that doesn't seem critical. It's not very clear what difference it would make. You wouldn't be able to pronounce some sounds but you'd be able to pronounce others. But humans learn language and use it freely with highly defective sensory-motor systems, or no control of the sensory-motor system at all. That's one of the things that Eric Lenneberg found – discovered, actually – fifty years ago. [He discovered] that children with dysarthria [no control over their articulatory systems] – who were thought not to have language by the people raising them, training them, etc – he discovered they did. He discovered this by standing behind them and saying something and noticing their reactions. There's more recent work. So you don't require – in fact you don't even have to use it; sign language doesn't use it – so it's very hard to see that there could be any argument from sensory-motor evidence for not developing language. But also the system seems to have been around for hundreds of thousands of years, as far as we can tell from fossil evidence. But there's no indication of anything like language use or the whole set of cognitive capacities that appear to have developed along with it.

Think about it in plain evolutionary terms. Somewhere along the line a mutation took place that led to the rewiring of the brain to give you Merge. That everyone should accept, whether they like to say it or not. Well, the most parsimonious assumption is that that's all that happened. It's probably not that [alone]; but we have no evidence against it. So unless there's some evidence to the contrary, we sort of keep to that and see how far we can go. Well, mutations take place in an individual, not in a society, so what must have happened at some point is that that mutation took place in one person and then it would be transferred to offspring, or some offspring, at least. It was a pretty small breeding group. So it could be that if it gave a selectional advantage, they'd dominate the breeding group pretty soon, maybe in a few generations. This could all be done without any communication. It gives you the ability to think, to construct complex thoughts, to plan, to interpret . . . It's hard to imagine that that wouldn't yield a selectional advantage, so it could be that over some fairly short time, throughout this breeding group, that the capacity to think was well embedded. The use of it to communicate could have come later. Furthermore, it looks peripheral: as far as we can see from studying language, it doesn't seem to affect the structure of language very much. And it does appear to be largely modality-independent. [No doubt] there are advantages to sound over sight – you can use it in the dark and it goes around corners – things like that. But it's quite possible that it's just a later development that came along, and it may not have had much effect on the structure of language.[C]

JM: Really modality-independent? It's clearly bimodal . . .

NC: Well, at least bimodal. But we just don't know how many modalities you can use. We don't have well-developed senses of smells, so we probably can't do much with that. You can do it with touch. I don't know if people can learn Braille as a first language. It's conceivable . . .

No, actually, there is some evidence for this. Not a ton of it, but there have been studies – actually Carol [Chomsky's wife] was working on this at MIT with people most of whom had had meningitis around age 1 or 2, somewhere around there – and who had lost all modalities except touch. They were blind and deaf – they could speak; they had an articulatory apparatus – but they were blind and deaf. There's a method of teaching them language by putting the hand on the face. So if you're one of those patients, you could put your hand on the face kind of like this – I think the thumb is on the vocal cords and the fingers are around the mouth – and they had an amazing capacity for language.

This is a group at MIT that was working on sensory aids, but Carol was working on [the project] as a linguist to see how much they know. And she had to do pretty sophisticated tests on them – tag questions and things like that – to get to a point where they didn't [seem to] have the whole system [of language] in their heads. They get along fine – nobody would notice that there's a language defect. They have to have constant retraining too, though: they don't get any sensory feedback, so they lose their articulatory capacities, and then they have to be constantly retrained to do that. For example, their prize patient was a tool and die maker in Iowa somewhere. He got here by himself. He had a card which he would show people if he was lost and needed directions – he'd show [it to] them and [it would] say, “May I put my hand on your face,” explaining why. He could get around – got here all right, lived with his wife who was also blind and deaf. The only problem they had was locating each other. So they had a system of vibrators [installed] around the house that they could use to locate each other. But the point is that [he had] a capacity for language that you really had to test to find deficiencies – you wouldn't notice it in ordinary interaction.

Now of course these people are like Helen Keller. [Her condition] was not from birth, and nobody really knows what the effects were of that early – say year and a half – of experience. [It is true that] they have never found a successful case of someone blind and deaf from birth. So a lot is obviously going on in the first year even though nothing is being exhibited. [Nevertheless,] it can be done[; language can appear in modalities other than sound and sight]. Helen Keller did it – and she was a terrific writer.

JM: To go back to another matter we discussed last time, I asked whether canalization could be expressed in terms of parameters and the possible channels or paths for development that they provide. I take it that canalization for language would involve not just contributions by what we might call the innate biological endowment that gives us language, but also by other, non-linguistic systems.

NC: Waddington's point was that there must be architectural constraints and developmental constraints that are independent of the organism, and they function to channel the growth of the organism in particular directions. So, for example, if locality conditions or other efficient computation conditions contributed to the outcome of language – probably it doesn't have anything to do with language, or even humans, perhaps even biological organisms. That's the idea. I don't think that biologists doubt very much that something like that is going on. But how much is hard to determine.

JM: But in terms of your three sets of factors . . .

NC: That's the third factor. The choice of parameters is either the first [genetic] factor or the third [other constraint] factor; but the setting of them has to be the second factor.[C]

JM: OK.

7 Development, master/control genes, etc.

JM: Who was the person who did the interesting work on the eye and the PAX-6 gene; I forgot.

NC: Walter Gehring.

JM: Gehring in Switzerland. That kind of work might throw quite a different kind of light on the question of how a system that had Merge built into it . . .[C]

NC: His work is extremely interesting; and basically, what he shows – I don't have any expert judgment, but it seems to be pretty well accepted – is that all visual systems (maybe even phototropic plants) seem to begin with some stochastic event that got a particular class of molecules into a cell – the rhodopsin molecules that happen to have the property that they transmit light energy in the form of chemical energy. So you have the basis for reacting to light. And after that comes a series of developments which apparently are very restrictive. There's a regulatory gene that seems to show up all over the place, and the further developments, according to his account, are highly restricted by the possibilities of inserting genes into a collection of genes, which probably has only certain physical possibilities . . .

JM: the third factor . . .

NC: . . . yes, the third factor, which gives you the variety of eyes. That's very suggestive; it's quite different from the traditional view.

JM: Does it have any bearing on language?

NC: Only that it suggests that there is another system that seems to have powerful third factor effects.

JM: I've sometimes wondered about – well, take people working on Williams Syndrome children. Their brains have different morphologies – they're really quite extraordinarily different. And yet they have this amazing capacity to . . .

NC: Well, some of Eric Lenneberg's discoveries are even more dramatic, like the work he did on nanocephalic dwarfs, which is really dramatic. They have almost no cortex at all, yet almost perfect language ability.

JM: Well, it certainly throws monkey wrenches into the idea that language must be localized . . .

NC: And it just shows how crude our understanding is. But that's not too surprising. Language is the last thing we should expect to understand, because it's the one system that – for ethical reasons – you cannot directly investigate. Every other system you can investigate in other animals. Since there are no homologous structures for language, there's no comparative work. The only comparative work is on the precursors – like the sensory-motor system.

And the same is true on the conceptual side. I just don't see how you can – with our current understanding, at least – hope to get any possible insight into the evolution of the elementary concepts with their strange internalist properties. [Again] they're universal – if you go to a New Guinea native, he or she's going to have basically the same concept RIVER that we have. But we have no idea how it got that way.

JM: There are lots of just-so stories to the effect that it has something to do with evolution in the sense of selection giving advantages.

NC: But what's advantageous about having a concept RIVER that has the features we seem to be sensitive to that could have no discernible bearing on survival or selection? We can make up thought experiments about RIVER which you couldn't even imagine if you're a New Guinea native. Imagine a small phase change that turns the Charles River into a hard substance, which is apparently possible. And then you paint a line on it, and you start driving trucks on both sides of the line, so it becomes a highway and not a river. You can't explain that to a New Guinea native; none of the other notions you need to entertain the thought of a river undergoing a phase change and becoming a highway are around; so how could selection have played a role in leading us to acquire the features RIVER has that come into play when we engage in thought experiments like these, ones that lead us to declare that a river has become a highway?

In fact, the native has the same concept; if he or she grows up here or there, he or she's going to have the concept RIVER. So he or she's got it. But how could it possibly be selected? What function does it have in human life, for that matter? And since that's true of every elementary concept – take, say, Paul Pietroski's example in his recent paper about France being hexagonal and a republic. Why should we have that notion of France? It can't have any selectional role . . .

JM: That seems pretty obvious to me. Let me get back to Laura Petitto just for a moment and what she had to suggest about the way in which the STG (Superior Temporal Gyrus) looks for certain kinds of patterns. Her idea was that, at least in part, the reason we are bimodal – that we could develop without difficulty in either or both of two ways – was because you're using the same system in both cases.

NC: I suspect that there are other domains in which it could happen. Maybe you could do it in dance. I don't know, but I presume that infants would be capable of externalizing their language in dance motions – with their legs, let's say. Or perhaps any movements of your head, or eye blinking . . . In fact, people with severe paralysis.

JM: But if they did it with dance, say, they'd still require the visual system and certain kinds of patterns . . .

NC: We can't do it with smell, because we're not developed enough; we can't use taste, because we don't have the sensory range – maybe dogs could, but we can't. So you're stuck with vision and hearing. Those are the only adequate sensory capacities that we have. So everything is going to use vision and hearing, and some kind of action that we can carry out with our bodies. That's just given. OK, that leaves certain possibilities. But perhaps any possibility that makes use of those capacities will work for externalization. And she could be right; it's all going to have to fall into certain subcategories, because that's all that our brains can process. So whenever externalization comes along, as an aspect of language, it's going to have to make use of these facts about our nature. If dogs suddenly underwent a mutation in which they got Merge, maybe they'd use the sense of smell.

JM: Another fascinating aspect of her work is that she suggests that rhesus, macaques, and several other species have what seem to be perfectly homologous parts of the brain – the STG – but they just do not have this capacity to develop even the rudiments of speech or sign. Is that because they lack a language faculty in addition? Or why? Do you attribute it to some specific feature of the human STG, or . . .

NC: You could make up different stories. It could be that our hominid ancestors lacked these brain structures, developed Merge, and then developed the brain structures. But there isn't enough time for that. The brain structures had to have been there for a long period before anything like this explosion took place. And we do know that there hasn't been anything since, because of the essential identity of people all over the world. So you've got an upper bound and a lower bound, and they seem to be awful close. So unless something entirely new comes along, the only plausible story seems to be that the apparatus was in place, for whatever reason. And maybe special adaptations like these were used for grunts; after all, you can have polysyllabic lexical items, and maybe polysyllabic lexical items were used, and maybe with the complex characteristics of human concepts, for some unexplained and unintelligible reason. But it still requires the ability to have infinite generative capacity, which apparently comes along in a flash, giving everything else.

JM: If, whatever it is, whatever that gene is that introduced Merge and carries it, if it acted something like a control gene along the Gehring PAX-6 line, it might . . .

NC: . . . it might affect the development of other things. We don't know enough about neurology to tell. So maybe some regulatory gene emerged which both gave Merge and permitted [neural systems to embody it].

JM: Fascinating speculations . . .

NC: . . . so little is known about the evolution of the brain that no one can tell.

JM: Does anyone speculate about these kinds of things . . .

NC: I don't think so, because the overwhelming assumption is that language evolved slowly through natural selection. Yet that doesn't seem at all consistent with even the most basic facts. If you look at the literature on the evolution of language, it's all about how language could have evolved from gesture, or from throwing, or something like chewing, or whatever. None of which makes any sense.

8 Perfection and design (interview 20 January 2009)

JM: I want to ask some questions about the ‘perfection’ of the language faculty. First, a background matter: if you speak of perfection and in particular perfection in design of the language faculty – or at least, the mapping to the SEM interface – you seem to be invited to answer the question, “design for what?”

NC: I think that's misleading. That's because of connotations of the word design. Design suggests a designer, and a function of the designed thing or operation. But in biology, ‘design’ just means the way it is.

JM: The structure, whatever it is . . .

NC: How is the galaxy designed? Because the laws of physics say that that's the way it's designed. It's not for anything, and nobody did it. It's just what happens under certain physical circumstances. I wish there were a better word to use, because it does carry these unfortunate connotations. In a sense – a negative sense – there's a function. If the structure were dysfunctional, it wouldn't survive. And OK, in that sense, it's designed for something. It doesn't mean it's well designed for survival. So take language and communication. Language is poorly designed for communication, but we get by with it, so it's not dysfunctional enough to disappear [or at least, disappear with regard to its use for communication, which isn't its only use, by any means]. Take, for example, trace erasure [or in the more recent terminology of copies, non-pronunciation of copies]. It's good for efficiency of structure, but it's very bad for communication. Anyone who tries to write a parsing program [encounters it] . . . most of the program is about how to find the gaps. Where are the gaps, and what's in them? If you just repeated – if you spelled out [or pronounced or otherwise exhibited] copies – the problem would be gone. But from a computational point of view, that would be poor design, because it's extra computation, so there's no point in it. So you cut it out. And there's case after case like that. So take garden path sentences and islands, for example. Islands prevent you from saying things you would like to say. You can't say, “who did you wonder why visited yesterday.” It's a thought; you know what it means. But the design of language on computational grounds doesn't allow it. To the extent that we understand them, at least, these things follow from efficient computational structure. But computational structure has no function. It's like cells breaking up into spheres instead of cubes: it just works; but if it broke up into cubes, it would work too, it just can't [because of third factor constraints on possible shapes – in this case, physical ones]. Here too I think that what you find more and more is just efficient design from a computational point of view independent of any use you might want to put it to. And I think that from an evolutionary point of view, that is exactly what should be expected. That's what these papers are about that I probably forgot to send you.

We know almost nothing about the evolution of language, which is why people fill libraries with speculation about it. But we do know something. You can roughly fix the time span. You can argue fifty thousand years more or less, but that doesn't matter; it's basically instantaneous [from an evolutionary point of view]. Something suddenly happened, and then there's this huge explosion of artifacts and everything else. Well, what happened? The only thing that could have happened – it's hard to think of an alternative – is that suddenly the capacity for recursive enumeration developed. That allows you to take whatever simple thoughts are that a chimpanzee may have, like act or action or something and turn it into an infinite array of thoughts. Well, that carries advantages. But even that is not so trivial, because Haldane, I think it was, proved – eighty years or so ago now, I guess – that beneficial mutations almost never survive. The probability of a beneficial mutation surviving is almost minuscule. It does, of course, happen sometimes, so you get some changes. But that suggests that whatever it was that gave this may have happened many times and just died out. But at some point, by some accident, the beneficial mutation survived. But it survived in an individual; mutation doesn't take place in a group. So the individual that had this property – which does carry advantages: you can talk to yourself, at least, and you can plan, you can imagine, things like that. That partially gets transmitted to offspring. By enough accidents, it could dominate a small breeding group. And at that point, there becomes some reason to communicate. And so you develop ancillary systems. You know, morphology, phonology, and all the externalization systems. And they are messy. There's no reason for them to be computationally good. You're taking two completely independent systems. The sensory-motor system has apparently been around for hundreds of thousands of years. It doesn't seem to have adapted to language, or only marginally. So it's just sitting there. You've got this other system – whatever developed internally – and there's every reason to expect that it might be close to computationally perfect, for there are no forces acting on it. So it would be like cell division. So then, when you're going to map them together, it's going to be a mess.

JM: But wait, when I think to myself, I think to myself . . .

NC: In English, yes. But that's when you think to yourself consciously. And of course, we don't know what's going on unconsciously. So consciously, yes, because that is our mode of externalization, and we reinternalize it. Here, I think, is where a lot of the experimentation going on is very misleading. There's a lot of work recently that's showing that before people make a decision, something is going on in the brain that is related to it. So if it's a decision to pick up a cup, something is going on in the motor areas before you make the decision. I think it's misinterpretation. It's before the decision becomes conscious. But lots of things are going on unconsciously. There's this philosophical dogma that everything has to be accessible to consciousness. That's just religious belief. Take mice. I don't know whether they're conscious or not, but I assume that they make decisions that are unconscious. So when we talk to ourselves, the part that is reaching consciousness is reconstructed in terms of the form of externalization that we use. But I don't think that tells you much about the internal use of language. It's evidence for it, just like speech is evidence for it.[C]

Anyhow, whatever this first person was who had the mutation, maybe the mutation just gave Merge. That's the simplest assumption. If that happened, that person would not be conscious of thinking; he or she would just be doing it. He or she would be able to make decisions on the basis of internal planning, observations and expectations, and whatever. Now if enough people in the community had the same mutation, there would come a point where someone had the bright idea of externalizing it, so that they could contact somebody else. This may not have involved any evolutionary step at all. It may have [just been a matter of] using other cognitive faculties to figure out a hard problem. If you look at language – one of the things that we know about it is that most of the complexity is in the externalization. It is in phonology and morphology, and they're a mess. They don't work by simple rules. Almost everything that's been studied for thousands of years is externalization. When you teach a language, you mostly teach the externalization. Whatever is going on internally, it's not something that we're conscious of. And it's probably very simple. It almost has to be, given the evolutionary conditions.

JM: If you give up the idea that you have to answer the question, what is it for . . .

NC: It's not for anything . . .

JM: But put it this way: don't you then have to give up also talk about interfaces, and talk about organs, because . . .

NC: It has to relate to the interfaces, for otherwise it would die out. It would be a lethal mutation. But lethal mutations are no different from beneficial mutations from nature's point of view; they just die out. And in fact many of them remain. Why do we have an appendix?

JM: You can't even say that it's for thought, then?

NC: If it weren't adaptable to thought, it probably would just have died out. But functioning for something is a remote contingency; that was Haldane's point. If it's beneficial, it'll probably die out anyway, because statistically that's just what happens. But something may survive. And if it survives, it may be for physical reasons. The more that's being learned about evolution and development, the more it looks like most things happen because they have to; there's no other way. Speculations in the 1970s that suggested – at least for me – the principles and parameters approach to the study of language, such as [François] Jacob's speculations about the proliferation of organisms – well, they turned out to be pretty solid. The idea that basically there's one organism, that the difference – as he put it poetically – the difference between an elephant and a fly is just the rearrangement of the timing of some fixed regulatory mechanisms. It looks more and more like it. There's deep conservation; you find the same thing in bacteria that you find in humans. There's even a theory now that's taken seriously that there's a universal genome. Around the Cambrian explosion, that one genome developed and every organism's a modification of it.

JM: Due to difference of timing in development, difference of gene position . . .

NC: Yes, so it doesn't sound as crazy as it used to. They've found in the kinds of things that they've studied, like bacteria, that the way that evolutionary development takes place seems to be surprisingly uniform, fixed by physical law. If anything like that applies to language, you'd expect that the internal, unconscious system that is probably mapping linguistic expressions into thought systems at an interface ought to be close to perfect.

JM: So language came about as a result of an accident – maybe some minor rearrangement of the human genome – and other creatures don't have it because they didn't have the same accident, at least in a form that survived . . .

NC: In fact, the human line may have had the accident many times, and it just never took off. And the accident could have been – no one knows enough about the brain to say anything – but there was an explosion of brain size around a hundred thousand years ago which may have had something to do with it. It might be a consequence of some change in brain configuration about which people know nothing. And it's almost impossible to study it because there's no comparative evidence – other animals don't have it – and you can't do direct experimentation on humans in the way they used to do at McGill [University] . . .

JM: To our shame . . . What happens then to the strong minimalist thesis?

NC: Maybe it's even true. Of course, it would have to be pared down to apply just to the cognitive [conceptual-intentional, or SEM] interface, and the mapping to the sensory-motor interface may not even be a part – strictly speaking, may not even be a part of language in substantial respects – in this technical sense of language. It's just part of the effort to connect these two systems that have nothing to do with each other, and so it could be very messy, not meet any nice computational properties. It's very variable; the Norman invasion changes it radically, it changes from generation to generation so you get dialects and splits, and so on. And it's the kind of thing you have to learn; a child has to learn that stuff; when you study a language, you have to learn it. And a lot of it is probably pretty rigid. It's not that everything goes; there are certain constraints on the mapping. I think that there's a research project there, to try to figure out [just what they are]. That's what serious phonology and morphology ought to be – to find out the constraints in which this mapping operates and ask where they come from. Are they computational constraints? I think it opens up new questions. And the same for syntax. You can find some cases where you can give an argument that computational efficiency explains the principles, but . . .

It's interesting that people have expectations for language that they never have in biology. I've been working on Universal Grammar for all these years; can anyone tell you precisely how it works [– how it develops into a specific language, not to mention how that language that develops is used]? It's hopelessly complicated. Can anyone tell you how an insect works? They've been working on a project at MIT for thirty years on nematodes. You know the very few [302] neurons; you know the wiring diagram. But how does the animal work? We don't know that.

JM: OK. But now what happens to parameters? I guess you're pretty much committed to saying that all of the research on them should shift to focus on the mapping to the sensory-motor interface, PHON.

NC: I guess that most of the parameters, maybe all, have to do with the mappings [to the sensory-motor interface]. It might even turn out that there isn't a finite number of parameters, if there are lots of ways of solving this mapping problem. In the field, people try to distinguish roughly between macroparameters and microparameters. So you get Janet Fodor's serious work on this. You get these kinds of things that Mark Baker is talking about – head-final, polysynthesis [which Baker suggests are among the best candidates for macroparameters]. It's probable that there's some small store that just may go back to computational issues [hence, mapping to the SEM interface]. But then you get into the microparameters. When you really try to study a language, any two speakers are different. You get into a massive proliferation of parametric differences – the kinds of stuff that Richard Kayne does when you study dialects really seriously. Very small changes sometimes have big effects. Well, that could turn out to be one of the ways of solving the cognitive problem of how to connect these unrelated systems. And they vary; they could change easily.

JM: So you think that with the possible exception of the head and polysynthesis parameter, they're all going to have to be shifted over to the PHON mapping?

NC: Well, but take the head parameter – it looks like the most solid of the macroparameters (reinterpreted, if Kayne is right, in terms of options for raising), although it's not really solid because while there are languages like English and Japanese where it works, a lot of languages mix them up and one thing works for noun phrases and something else with verb phrases, and so on – but even that, that is a linearization parameter, and linearization is probably in the externalization system. There's no reason why internal computation should involve linearization; that seems to be related to a property of the sensory-motor system, which has to deal with sequencing through time. So it could be that that too is an externalization parameter. The same is true of polysynthesis, Mark Baker's core parameter. It has to do with whether a sentence's arguments – subject, object, and so on – are internal to the syntactic structure, or are marked in the syntactic structure just like markers, kind of like pronouns, and they hang around on the outside. But that is also a kind of linearization problem.

So it may turn out that there aren't any [computation-]internal parameters; it's just one fixed system.

JM: What happens then to parameter setting?

NC: That's the problem of language acquisition, and a lot of it happens extremely early . . .

JM: As Jacques Mehler's work indicated . . .

NC: All the phonetic stuff, a lot is going on before the child even speaks.

JM: Familiarization with the native tongue . . .

NC: It's known that Japanese kids lose the R/L distinction before they can even speak. So some kind of stuff is going on there that is fine-tuning the sensory apparatus. The sensory apparatus does get fine-tuned very early, in other areas too.

JM: So in principle, it's possible that you don't have to set (‘learn’) any parameters – that it all happens automatically and at an extremely early age, even before the child speaks.

NC: Certainly no kid is conscious of what is going on in his or her head. And then you get a three- or four-year-old child who is speaking the language mostly of their peers.

JM: OK. How does early and automatic acquisition fit with the kind of data that Charles Yang comes up with, data that suggest that when children ‘grow’ a language, they go through a stage at around two and a half where they exhibit a kind of parameter-setting experimentation: their minds ‘try out’ computational patterns available in other languages that are extinguished as they develop a pattern characteristic of, say, English . . .

NC: There is interaction, but it's not so obvious that the feedback makes much difference, because most of the interaction is with children.

I don't know about you, but my dialect is [that of] a little corner of Philadelphia where I grew up, not my parents’ – which is totally different. What about you?

JM: I grew up speaking both English and Tamil.

NC: How's that?

JM: I was born in the southern part of India.

NC: Did your parents know Tamil?

JM: My father did; he learned it by squatting with kids on the floors of their schools.

NC: Did they speak Tamil at home?

JM: No, they didn't. But some of my friends spoke Tamil.

NC: So you picked up Tamil from your friends, from other kids. That's normal. No one knows why, but children almost always pick up the language of their peers. And they're not getting any feedback – certainly not teaching. The parents may be trying hard to teach you something, but all they do is teach you artificialities [irregularities]. So it looks like a tuning problem. It works in other things too. There are styles of walking. If you go to Finland – Carol and I noticed as soon as we were there – they just walk differently. These older women carrying shopping bags racing down the streets; we could barely keep up. It's just the way they walk. People just pick that up.

I remember once when Carol and I were walking down the streets in Wellfleet [Massachusetts] one summer and Howard Zinn was walking in front of us, and right next to him was his son, Jeff Zinn. And the two of them had exactly the same posture. Children just pick these things up. If people really studied things like styles of walking, I'm sure that they'd find something like dialect variation. Think about it: you can identify somebody who grew up in England just by mannerisms.

JM: Assume so, then what gets put into the lexicon in the way of phonological features?

NC: Well, as we both agree, a lot of what ends up in the lexicon comes from inside. Nobody's conscious of it, nor can be conscious of it. It's not in the dictionary . . .

JM: We hope it's accessible to some theory, surely.

NC: It has to be; there has to be some kind of theory about it, if you're going to understand it at all. As far as I know, we can't go much beyond the seventeenth century on this. It looks like they found a considerable amount of what we can be aware of. [But of course, that has nothing to do with what scientific theory can reveal.]

So it [that is, the question of what ends up in the lexicon] is a topic, but it's not going to be investigated until people understand that the externalist story [about language and its sounds and meanings] just doesn't get anywhere. Until people understand that it's a problem, it'll just not be investigated.[C]

Some of the stuff that is coming out in the literature is just mind-boggling. Do you look at Mind and Language?

JM: Yes . . .

NC: The last issue has an article – I never thought that I would see this – you know this crazy theory of Michael Dummett's, that people don't know their own language, etc? This guy is defending it.

JM: Terje Lohndal [a graduate student in linguistics at the University of Maryland] – he and Hiroki Narita [a linguistics graduate student at Harvard] – wrote a response to it. I think it's good; I don't know if it will be published. I hope so. [See Lohndal & Hiroki 2009.]

Is there anything you want to add about design?

NC: Well, the main thing is, we've got to find another term, because it's just too misleading. And it's true for biology altogether. In biology, people aren't usually misled by it, even though the connotations are there. Well, maybe some of them are misled. So if you read, for example, Marc Hauser's book on the evolution of communication – which is a very good book, and he's one of the most sophisticated people working in biology – well, if you read through the chapters, there's almost nothing about evolution there. The chapters are discussions of how perfectly adapted organisms are to their ecological niche. A bat can pick out a random mosquito far away and go right after it. And that shows that animals fit their ecological niche. The assumption [in the background] is, of course, that that's because of natural selection; that they evolved [to fit their niche]. [But the book] doesn't say anything about evolution [– about how it took place in these specific cases]. [So far as the discussion of the book is concerned,] a creationist could accept it: God designed bats to be able to catch mosquitoes. But that move is very fast. To try to demonstrate anything about evolution is extremely hard. Richard Lewontin has a paper coming out on this, about how difficult – just on the basis of population genetics – about what it would take for natural selection actually to have worked. The way it looks, it seems to be a really remote possibility.

JM: Jerry Fodor is against selection too . . .

NC: But he's against it for other reasons concerned with intentionality, and that kind of stuff about what something is for. His instincts are right, but I think that's the wrong line to take. You don't ask whether a polar bear is white for surviving or for mating, or something like that. It just is, and because it fits the environment, it survives. That's why people like Philip Kitcher and others go after him.

Do you think that there's anything else to say about design?

JM: No, although I'm sure that discussion of the topic will not end there.

9 Universal Grammar and simplicity

JM: OK, now I'd like to get clear about the current status of Universal Grammar (UG). When you begin to focus in the account of acquisition on the notion of biological development, it seems to throw into the study of language a lot more – or at least different – issues than had been anticipated before. There are not only the questions of the structure of the particular faculty that we happen to have, and whatever kinds of states it can assume, but also the study of how that particular faculty developed . . .

NC: How it evolved? Or how it develops in the individual? Genetically, or developmentally?

JM: Well, certainly genetically in the sense of how it came about biologically, but also the notion of development in a particular individual, where you have to take into account – as you make very clear in your recent work – the contributions of this third factor that you have been emphasizing. I wonder if that doesn't bring into question the nature of modularity [of language] – it's an issue that used to be discussed with a set of assumptions that amounted to thinking that one could look at a particular part of the brain and ignore the rest of it.

NC: I never believed that. Way back about fifty years ago, when we were starting to talk about it, I don't think anyone assumed that that had to be true. Eric Lenneberg was interested in – we were all interested in – whatever is known about localization, which does tell us something about what the faculty is. But if it was distributed all over the brain, so be it . . .

JM: It's not so much the matter of localization that is of interest to me, but rather the matter of what you have to take into account in producing an account of development. And that seems to have grown in recent years.

NC: Well, the third factor was always in the background. It's just that it was out of reach. And the reason it was out of reach, as I tried to explain in the LSA paper (2005a), was that as long as the concept of Universal Grammar, or linguistic theory, is understood as a format and an evaluation procedure, then you're almost compelled to assume it is highly language-specific and very highly articulated and restricted, or else you can't deal with the acquisition problem. That makes it almost impossible to understand how it could follow any general principles. It's not like a logical contradiction, but the two efforts are tending in opposite directions. If you're trying to get Universal Grammar to be articulated and restricted enough so that an evaluation procedure will only have to look at a few examples, given data, because that's all that's permitted, then it's going to be very specific to language, and there aren't going to be general principles at work. It really wasn't until the principles and parameters conception came along that you could really see a way in which this could be divorced. If there's anything that's right about that, then the format for grammar is completely divorced from acquisition; acquisition will only be a matter of parameter setting. That leaves lots of questions open about what the parameters are; but it means that whatever is left are the properties of language. There is no conceptual reason any more why they have to be highly articulated and very specific and restricted. A conceptual barrier has been removed to the attempt to see if the third factor actually does something. It took a long time before you could get anywhere with that.

JM: But as the properties of language become more and more focused on Merge and, say, parameters, the issue of development in the particular individual seems to be becoming more and more difficult, because it seems to involve appeals to other kinds of scientific enterprise that linguists have never in fact touched on before. And I wonder if you think that the study of linguistics is going to have to encompass those other areas.

NC: To the extent that notions such as efficient computation play a role in determining how the language develops in an individual, that ought to be a general biological, or maybe even a general physical, phenomenon. So if you get any evidence for it from some other domain, well and good. That's why when Hauser and Fitch and I were writing (Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch 2002), we mentioned optimal foraging strategies. It's why in recent papers I've mentioned things like Christopher Cherniak's work [on non-biological innateness (2005) and on brain wiring (Cherniak, Mikhtarzada, Rodriguez-Esteban & Changizi 2004)], which is suggestive. You're pretty sure that that kind of result will show up in biology all over the place, but it's not much studied in biology. You can see the reasons. The intuition that biologists have is basically Jacob's, that simplicity is the last thing you'd look for in a biological organism, which makes some sense if you have a long evolutionary history with lots of accidents, and this and that happens. Then you're going to get a lot of jerry-rigging; and it appears, at least superficially, that when you look at an animal, it's going to be jerry-rigged. So it's tinkering, as Jacob says. And maybe that's true, and maybe it isn't – maybe it looks true because you don't understand enough. When you don't understand anything, it looks like a pile of gears, levers, and so on. If you understood enough, maybe you'd find there's more to it. But at least the logic makes some sense. On the other hand, the logic wouldn't hold if language is a case of pretty sudden emergence. And that's what the archeological evidence seems to suggest. You have a time span that's pretty narrow.

JM: To press a point of simplicity for a moment: you've remarkably shown that there's a very considerable degree of simplicity in the faculty itself – in what might be taken to be distinctively linguistic aspects of the faculty of language. Would you expect that kind of simplicity in whatever third factor contributions are going to be required to make sense of growth of language in a child?

NC: To the extent that they're real, then yes – to the extent that they contribute to growth. So how does a child get to know the subjacency condition [which restricts movement of a constituent to crossing a single bounding node]? Well, to the extent that that follows from some principle of efficient computation, it'll just come about in the same way as cell division comes about in terms of spheres. It won't be because it's genetically determined, or because of experience; it's because that's the way the world works.

JM: What do you say to someone who comes along and says that the cost of introducing so much simplicity into the faculty of language is having to in the long run deal with other factors outside of the faculty of language that contribute to the growth of language, and also consists, in part, at least, of pushing into another area whatever kinds of global considerations might be relevant to not only language itself, but its use?

NC: I don't understand why that should be considered a cost; it's a benefit.

JM: OK; for the linguist interested in producing a good theory, that's plausible.

NC: In the first place, the question of cost and benefit doesn't arise; it's either true or it isn't. If it is true – to the extent that it's true – it's a source of gratification that carries the study of language to a higher level. Sooner or later, we expect it to be integrated with the whole of science – maybe in ways that haven't been envisioned. So maybe it'll be integrated with the study of insect navigation some day; if so, it's all to the good.

JM: Inclusiveness: is it still around?[C]

NC: Yes; it's a natural principle of economy, I think. Plainly, to the extent that language is a system in which the computation just involves rearrangement of what you've already got, it's simpler than if the system adds new things. If it adds new things, it's only specific to language. Therefore, it's more complex; therefore, you don't want it, unless you can prove that it's there. At least, the burden of proof is on assuming you need to add new things. So inclusiveness is basically the null hypothesis. It says language is just what the world determines, given the initial fact that you're going to have a recursive procedure. If you're going to have a recursive procedure, the best possible system would be one in which everything else follows from optimal computation – we're very far from showing that, but insofar as you can show that anything works that way, that's a success. What you're showing here is a property of language that does not have to be attributed to genetic endowment. It's just like the discovery that polyhedra are the construction materials. That means you don't have to look for the genetic coding that tells you why animals such as bees are going to build nests in the form of polyhedra; it's just the way they're going to do it.

JM: Inclusiveness used to depend to a large extent upon the lexicon as the source of the kind of ‘information’ to be taken into account in a computation; does the lexicon still have the important role that it used to have?

NC: Unless there's something more primitive than the lexicon. The lexicon is a complicated notion; you're fudging lots of issues. What about compound nouns, and idioms, and what kinds of constructive procedures go on in developing the lexicon – the kind of thing that Kenneth Hale was playing with? So ‘lexicon’ is kind of a cover for a big mass of problems. But if there's one aspect of language that is unavoidable, it's that in any language, there's some assembly of the possible properties of the language – features, which just means linguistic properties. So there's some process of assembly of the features and, then, no more access to the features, except for what has already been assembled. That seems like an overwhelmingly and massively supported property of language, and an extremely natural one from the point of view of computation, or use. So you're going to have to have some kind of lexicon, but what it will be, what its internal structure will be, how morphology fits into it, how compounding fits in, where idioms come in – all of those problems are still sitting there.

JM: Merge – the basic computational principle: how far down does it go?

NC: Whatever the lexical atoms are, they have to be put together, and the easiest way for them to be put together is for some process to just form the object that consists of them. That's Merge. If you need more than that, then ok, there's more – and anything more will be specific to language.

JM: So in principle, von Humboldt might have been right, that the lexicon is not this – I think his term was “completed, inert mass” . . .

NC: . . . but something created . . .

JM: . . . something created and put together. But if it's put together, is it put together on an occasion, or is there some sort of storage involved?

NC: It's got to be storage. We can make up new words, but it's peripheral to the language [system's core computational operations].[C]

As for Humboldt, in fact, I think that when he was talking about the energeia and the lexicon, I think he was actually referring to usage. In fact, almost all the time, when he talks about infinite use of finite means, he doesn't mean what we mean – infinite generation – he means use; so, it's part of your life.

JM: But he did recognize that use depended rather heavily upon systems that underlie it, and that effectively supported and provided the opportunity for the use to . . .

NC: . . . that's where it fades off into obscurity. I think now that the way that I and others who have quoted him has been a bit misleading, in that it sounds as if he's a precursor of generative grammar, where perhaps instead he's really a precursor of the study of language use as being unbounded, creative, and so on – in a sense, coming straight out of the Cartesian tradition, because that's what Descartes was talking about. But the whole idea that you can somehow distinguish an internal competence that is already infinite from the use of it is a very hard notion to grasp. In fact, maybe the person who came closest to it that I've found is neither Humboldt nor Descartes, but [A.W.] Schlegel in those strange remarks that he made about poetry [see Chomsky, 1966/2002/2009)]. But it was kind of groping around in an area there was no way of understanding, because the whole idea of a recursive infinity just didn't exist.

JM: But didn't Humboldt distinguish . . . he did have a distinction between what he called the Form of language and its character, and that seems to track something like a distinction between competence and use . . .

NC: It's hard to know what he meant by it. When you read through it, you can see it was just groping through a maze that you can't make any sense of until you at least distinguish, somehow, competence from performance. And that requires having the notion of a recursive procedure and an internal capacity that is ‘there’ and already infinite, and can be used in all the sorts of ways he was talking about. Until you at least begin to make those distinctions, you can't do much except grope in the wilderness.

JM: But that idea was around, as you've pointed out. John Mikhail pointed it out in Hume; it was around in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries . . .

NC: . . . something was around. What Hume says, and what John noticed, is that you have an infinite number of responsibilities and duties, so there has to be some procedure that determines them; there has to be some kind of system. But notice again that it's a system of usage – it determines usage. It's not that there's a class of duties characterized in a finite manner in your brain. It's true it has to be that; but that wasn't what he was talking about. You could say it's around in Euclid, in some sense. The idea of a finite axiom system sort of incorporates the idea; but it was never clearly articulated.

JM: And that notion really only had its beginning with your work in the fifties – so far as anyone can tell, in any case?

NC: Well, as it applies to language. But the idea was by then already sort of finished; you had Church's thesis, and concepts of algorithm and recursive procedure were already well understood before him. You could just then sort of apply it to biological systems, language being the obvious case.

10 On the intellectual ailments of some scientists

JM: You mentioned that some who would be scientists are too data-oriented – that they are unwilling to abstract and idealize in the ways needed in order to simplify and construct a science. Is the phenomenon that you've quite often remarked upon – that even distinguished chemists [and other scientists] early in the twentieth century wanted to deny that their theoretical work had anything more than an instrumental value – is this an aspect of what happens in studying human languages, that we wish to talk about what people say, and the circumstances in which they say it – their behavior – and not the principles and systems that underlie it and make it possible?

NC: There's some connection there, but it seems to me a different issue. There was a strong Machian tradition in the sciences, which was that if you can't see it, it's not there – [that theoretical principles] are just some hypotheses you're making up to make your computations work better. This was true in physics too, like in chemistry, late into the 1920s. Poincaré, for example, dismissed molecules and said that the only reason we talk about them is that we know the game of billiards, but there's no basis for them – you can't see them, they're just a useful hypothesis for computing things. And this goes on into the 1920s – leading scientists were saying that Kékulé's structural chemistry or Bohr's atom were simply modes of computation. And their reason was an interesting one: you couldn't reduce [them] to physics. I've quoted Russell in 1929. Russell knew the sciences quite well, and he says that chemical laws cannot at present be reduced to physical laws – the assumption being that the normal course of science is to reduce to physical laws. But as long as they aren't [reduced], it's not real science. Well, we know what happened; they were never reduced. Physics underwent a radical change, and it was unified with a virtually unchanged chemistry. Well, at that point, it was recognized – well actually, it was never explicitly recognized, it was just tacitly understood – that the entire discussion of the last century or so was crazy; it was just sort of forgotten and nobody talked about it anymore. And the history was forgotten. But it's an interesting history.

I've been trying (vainly) to convince philosophers of mind for years that their own discussions today are almost a repetition of what was going on in the natural sciences not that many years ago – up until the 1930s – and we should learn something from that.[C] And that is not the only case in the history of science; there are many such cases. The classic moment in the history of science is such a case – Newton. Newton himself considered his proposals [primarily, the inverse square law of gravitation] as absurd, because they could not be reduced to physics – namely, the mechanical philosophy [of Descartes], which [he and many others thought] was obviously true. So he regarded his proposals as an absurdity that no sensible person could accept. Yet we have to accept them, because they seem to be true. And that was extremely puzzling to him, and he spent the rest of his life trying to find some way out of it, and so did later scientists. But what he actually showed – and in retrospect, it's understood, while forgetting the history, unfortunately – he showed that the truth of the world is not reducible to what was called “physics,” and physics had to be abandoned and revised. That's the classic moment in the history of science, and it goes on and on like that. The quantum-theoretic interpretation of the chemical bond was another such development. Why should we expect the study of the mental aspects of the world to somehow break from the history of the sciences? Maybe it will, but there's no particular reason to expect it.

JM: What about that odd phenomenon of behaviorism? Part of the motivation for it clearly had to do with the first of these factors you have been talking about: behaviorists offered to people in power some kind of legitimacy because they portrayed themselves – or wanted to portray themselves – as experts and scientists . . .

NC: . . . and benign too. We're controlling people's behavior for their own good – kind of like Mill.

JM: Precisely. But another part of the behaviorist rhetoric was of course their Machian effort to stick to the observable.

NC: It's a strange view of science that is not held in the core of the natural sciences anymore, but once was – that science is the study of data. In fact, the whole concept [of behaviorism] is very interesting. In the 1950s, all of the fields of social science and psychology were behavioral science; [and] as soon as you see the word, [you know] something's wrong. Behavior is data – like meter-readings are data in physics. But physics isn't meter-reading science. I mean, you're looking at the data to see if you can find evidence, and evidence is a relational concept; it's evidence for something. So what you're looking for is evidence for some theory that will explain the data – and explain new data and give you some insight into what's happening, and so on. If you just keep to the data, you're not doing science, whatever else you're doing. Behavioral science is, in principle, keeping to the data; so you just know that there's something wrong with it – or should know. But it is based on a concept of science that was prevalent even in the core physical sciences for a long time. In the late nineteenth century, physics was regarded by physicists – leading physicists – as mostly a science of measurement and correlation between measured quantity and pressure and general relations about them, a position that reached its sophisticated form in Mach.

JM: What about recent forms of that, found in connectionism and the like?

NC: They're manifestations of it, I think. Somehow, we've got to start from the simplest thing we understand – like a neural connection – and make up some story that will account for everything. It's like corpuscularian physics in the seventeenth century, which made similar assumptions. People like Boyle and Newton and others recognized, plausibly, that there must be some elementary building blocks of matter – corpuscles – and they must be like the bricks out of which you build buildings. So we'll assume that. And then they try to show how you can account for everything in terms of different arrangements of the corpuscles.

Nowadays, Newton's concern for alchemy is regarded as some sort of aberration, but it was not; it was very rational. It's perfectly correct that if nature consists of simple building blocks, differently arranged, you should be able to turn lead into gold. You just have to figure out how to do it; nothing irrational about that. In fact, in some sense, he's right; there are elementary things – not what he was talking about – but, yes, something like that. And connectionism seems to me about at the level of corpuscularianism in physics. Do we have any reason to believe that by taking these few things that we think – probably falsely – that we understand, and building up a complex structure from them, we're going to find anything? Well, maybe, but it's highly unlikely. Furthermore, if you take a look at the core things they're looking at, like connections between neurons, they're far more complex. They're abstracting radically from the physical reality, and who knows if the abstractions are going in the right direction? But, like any other proposal, you evaluate it in terms of its theoretical achievements and empirical consequences. It happens to be quite easy in this case, because they're almost nonexistent.[C]

JM: There's a new growth in connectionism that amounts to trying to pursue topics that they think of as evolutionary. I guess there was always that sort of connection between certain views of evolution and behaviorism . . .

NC: Skinner, for example, was very explicit about it. He pointed out, and he was right, that the logic of radical behaviorism was about the same as the logic of a pure form of selectionism that no serious biologist could pay attention to, but which is [a form of] popular biology – selection takes any path. And parts of it get put in behaviorist terms: the right paths get reinforced and extended, and so on. It's like a sixth grade version of the theory of evolution. It can't possibly be right. But he was correct in pointing out that the logic of behaviorism is like that [of naïve adaptationism], as did Quine. They're both correct that they're similar, and both wrong – for the same reasons.

11 The place of language in the mind

JM: To get back to business . . . can we talk about the place of language in the mind?

NC: OK.

JM: It's not a peripheral system; you've mentioned that it has some of the characteristics of a central system. What do you mean by that?

NC: Well, peripheral systems are systems that are input systems and output systems. So, the visual system receives data from the outside and transmits some information to the inside. And the articulatory system takes some information from the inside and does some things, and has an effect on the outside world. That's what input and output systems are. Language makes use of those systems, obviously; I'm hearing what you say and I'm producing something. But that's just something being done with language. There's some internal system that you and I pretty much share that enables the noises that I make to get into your auditory system and the internal system that you have is doing something with those noises and understanding them pretty much the way my own internal system is creating them. And those are systems of knowledge; those are fixed capacities. If that's not an internal system, I don't know what the word means.

JM: OK; there are other systems, such as facial recognition. That also is not a peripheral system. It gets information from the visual system.

NC: Well, the facial recognition system is an input system, but of course it makes use of internal knowledge that you have about how to interpret faces. People interpret faces very differently from other objects. Show a person a face upside down; he or she can't recognize it.

JM: So it's not sufficient (to be a central system) that it get information from some other system.

NC: All kinds of internal processing is going on – thinking, whatever that is. And most of it is totally unconscious and beyond the reach of consciousness. But there's plenty of evidence that it's going on. The evidence, of course, is always from the outside. Even if you're doing brain imaging, you're getting evidence of the effects of the internal object; but that evidence pretty conclusively shows that plenty of mental internal operations are going on, using systems of knowledge, interpretation, planning, action, and so on. And language just seems to be one of them. It may well be the one that binds them all together. In fact, that's been proposed in a clear form by people like Elizabeth Spelke (2003, 2004, 2007) at Harvard. She's a major cognitive developmental psychologist, who argues that in her work (with children, mainly) that as language capacities appear to be developing they're always there, but they don't manifest themselves until certain ages. As they begin to manifest themselves, you get interactions among different other kinds of cognitive activity. There are primitive forms of recognition of, say, where you are and where you ought to go that are shared right through the mammalian kingdom and they are used by children. There are more sophisticated ones that are used by adults. So a young child can learn about the difference between a blue wall and a red wall, as can a rat. But if you want to learn about the difference between, say, to my left and to my right, or some more complicated thing that is much more complex – well, she argues that these more complex capacities seem to be integrated at about the time that the language capacities are manifested, and therefore she suggests, plausibly, that the language capacities facilitate this kind of interaction – which certainly makes sense.

The archeological-anthropological record suggests similar conclusions. As mentioned before, there is what is sometimes called a “great leap forward” in human evolution in a period roughly 50,000–100,000 years ago, when the archeological record suddenly changes radically. There are all sorts of indications of a creative imagination, planning, sophisticated use of tools, art, symbolic representation, and taking careful note of external events, such as phases of the moon, things like that. And it looks as though that is about the time that whatever put language together emerged. So it's not an unreasonable speculation that they're connected. If some hominid has a language capacity, it can plan, it can think, it can interpret, it can imagine other situations – alternative situations that aren't around – and make choices among them, or have attitudes toward them. At some stage it can convey some of that to others. All of that could well be the source of whatever brings together the other various capacities, which probably existed – at least, in some rudimentary, unsophisticated form – brought them together and gave rise to this evidence of sudden complex, creative activity.

JM: It's almost certain that language has the place of constituting or providing much more complicated, much more complex, highly structured forms of conceptual ‘objects’ – offering a conceptual range that is just not available to other types of creatures. But it sounds as if language, having that kind of capacity – and being given the capacity of coordinating, and perhaps even integrating information from other systems – that . . .

NC: And also innovating. Language doesn't just bring together information; it's no recording device. We know this by introspection – you can think about what the world would be like if you chose this course and not that course. In fact, you can imagine things that can't even be physically realized. There's a range of possible creative activities available to you – to some extent, you have that available from other internal systems too; with vision, you can imagine pictures, that sort of thing – but it's far richer when you can actually formulate internal expressions. You have propositional attitudes; descriptions of possible organizations and interactions between people; possible physical events, and so on. And that's available to you if you have internal language; we all know it, just by introspection. We all have that capacity. And presumably our hominid ancestors at that point had the same capacity.

One thing we're pretty certain about is that existing humans are virtually identical in this respect. Which means that whatever it was that gave us this capacity – it couldn't have happened later than about fifty thousand years ago, which is about when the trek from Africa starts. In fact, it's likely that whatever happened led to the trek from Africa. Hominids physically very much like us were there for hundreds of thousands of years – as far as the archeological record shows. And it began with a small group, one of many small breeding groups. And that one suddenly exploded all over the world. It's hard to imagine that that's not related to the same developments that led to the human capacity to innovate.

JM: But if language has this role in the mind, is there any need for what Jerry Fodor used to think of as a ‘central processor’? Isn't it sort of taking over the role of the homunculus – being that, whatever it is, that coordinates and brings together all kinds of information, makes decisions, and so on . . .

NC: Is it the central processor? How could you know? Probably not, I would guess. There are ways of integrating, say, sound, and smell, and sight, that you wouldn't even know how to describe in language. And they're certainly part of life. I imagine that there have to be central processors for that.

One suggestion that Jerry [Fodor] proposes which seems to me to require more evidence is that there is a language of thought. And the question is whether the language of thought is any different from whatever our universal, internal language is. As far as I can see, we can't tell anything about the language of thought other than it's a reflection of whatever our language is. And if it's true – as it is likely – that the existing and, indeed, the attainable languages are only superficially different, then the core that they share has a good claim to be the language of thought – so far as I can see.

JM: What, then, about the sciences? They seem to have a syntax that is far different from the syntax of natural languages.

NC: Not only that, but they seem to operate in different ways. There is a debate about this. There are people like Sue Carey, for example, who tried to show that our scientific capacities are just the natural development of our ordinary commonsense capacities for reasoning, exploration, and so on. I'm not convinced. I've got a feeling that science involves quite different capacities of mind.

There's really no serious evidence on these things. But if you just look at the history of the sciences, it looks also as if there was also a great leap forward, but much later, and – unlike the one that came about through language – presumably requiring no biological change. It's not that there weren't precursors, but around the seventeenth century, the attitude toward investigating and understanding the world just changed radically. Right around the time of Newton, there was a dramatic change – so dramatic, that Newton – who basically helped create it – couldn't accept it. The previous assumption – without anybody actually saying it exactly – was that the world was intelligible. God made it perfect, and if we're smart enough, we can see how he did it, and it will be intelligible to us. All we have to do is work hard. The core psychological effect of Newton's discoveries, I think, is that that's not true. It involves what are to us, intuitively, mysterious forces. That's why Newton resisted his own conclusions, which effectively undermined what was called the “mechanical philosophy” – the idea that the world works like a machine, with gears, levers, and things pushing each other, kind of like a medieval clock. It should be something like that. But what he showed is that it just isn't true.

JM: Is this the end of folk physics and folk psychology?

NC: This is the end of folk physics. Folk psychology is not refuted. It just doesn't work for physics. The Cartesian mechanics was a sketch of something that was a kind of folk physics. It's our commonsense understanding of how the world works. If I hit that over there, it will move. But I can't move that thing just by moving my arm. It's intuitively obvious that I can't move it by moving my arm; but it just happens to be false. The idea that there are principles of action and reaction, interaction, growth, development, and so on, that are just not of the mechanical type – over time, it caused a real shift in the standards of intelligibility for science. It's not the world that's going to be intelligible; we give that up. But the theories have to be intelligible. So we want intelligible theories of the world that we can work with and that meet our epistemological criteria, which are just other aspects of our cognitive system. And then science goes off on quite a different course. It's not that people give up the commonsense models; talk to a mathematician studying some abstract topic in topology, and in his study, he's probably drawing pictures and thinking about them, and so on. But you know that there's a gap, and that your intuitive, commonsense understanding of the world is simply not a guide to what the world is. That's an important change, and it leads in other directions. It's only happened in small areas of science. Nevertheless, it's quite clear that the other picture of the world – the scientific one – is quite different from the commonsense.

It goes until very recent times. Until the 1920s, chemistry wasn't considered part of the core sciences, but a means of calculation, because it just had these pictures and diagrams and so on, from which you could get very good approximations to the results of experiments. But it was regarded by many leading scientists as a mode of calculation only; it can't be real. It wasn't reducible to physics as then understood. That was because, for reasons that were later discovered, physics just didn't have the conceptual tools needed to incorporate it. Physics underwent another radical change and became even more unintelligible from the commonsense point of view – although the theory, of course, is intelligible. And then chemistry becomes part of the natural sciences. And so it continues.

If you take a look today at the debates that are going on about ‘psychological reality’: can the mind be following the rules, and so on and so forth – you'll see that they're very similar to the debates going on in the 1920s as to whether chemistry can be ‘real.’ What do you mean, chemistry is following laws? Show me how to explain what you observe in terms of Newtonian mechanics, or something else I understand.

JM: That particular dispute – whether the mind is following rules or laws, or whether they're ‘psychologically real’ – has been around at least since Helmholtz, with his idea that the mind somehow carries out inferences, and does so in the case of vision, audition, and faculties like that.

NC: Yes, these ideas keep coming back; it was a Cartesian issue too, in a way.[1] The modern debates about psychological reality in linguistics and cognitive processing – computer metaphors, and so on – they're very similar to the arguments about chemistry and the Bohr atom back in the 1920s. Now it's “How can you explain it in neurophysiological terms?” You can't. But you couldn't explain chemistry in physical terms, as physics was understood then. The conclusion at the time was that there's some problem with chemistry. Later, it was understood that there was some problem with physics. Do we know more about neurophysiology today than people did about physics back in the 1920s? Far from it; quite the opposite. You have to know that you're looking at the right things. And there's nothing in the way of any depth of theory. There's a slogan – that the mind is neurophysiology at a more abstract level. But chemistry wasn't physics at a more abstract level, as it turned out. Rather, a new physics came along, which was chemistry at a different level. And we don't know that that won't happen in the study of mind.

The point is that if you really accept the achievements of the modern sciences since Newton, what you're trying to do is construct the best explanatory theory you can. And you would like to unify it with other guesses about what the best theories of other phenomena are. But if one of them can't be reduced to one of the others, it doesn't say anything. It just shows you that something is wrong.[C]

JM: Returning to your remark about language providing innovation, in addition to coordination, integration, and the like. Science – unlike language – seems to offer a different kind of innovation – although again, unique in the animal kingdom. It provides new conceptual materials, new concepts. Language is innovative, but its innovation is compositional; it takes what is available and puts the pieces together.

NC: The language faculty itself uses the conceptual resources that are available . . . It's a little hard to say what language is ‘itself.’ Does the English language include the word gravitation? We're somewhere in an area now where our linguistic capacities and our science-creating capacities are interacting. We don't understand either of these systems enough to know where to go on.

JM: I'm thinking of language as primarily the core system, the computational system that operates so that one form of Merge yields argument structure and another provides various forms of edge effect, such as focus. That [system] seems best suited to dealing with concepts that are – as it were – available – and that will serve our interests as people who use common sense to try to deal with the world and think about what their position is and how they can change it, and the like. Science, on the other hand, really does seem to offer the opportunity to introduce new conceptual materials in a different kind of way.

NC: The sciences provide completely different kinds of ways of looking at the world, which are completely counter to common sense. In fact, common sense – at least, in the advanced sciences – has been completely abandoned; it's not even a criterion any more. But that's a very modern, very special development, which holds [only in] certain areas.

[1] Descartes offered what amounts to a computational theory of vision, one that indicates that the visual system ‘solves problems’ such as determining visual depth by performing a geometric calculation of sorts entirely in the mind, given ‘input’ concerning the degree of convergence of the eyeballs. It might seem puzzling that he introduced the rudiments of a science of mind that shows how the mind offers humans sensations of depth while insisting that a science of mind that offers sensations of depth and other mental phenomena is out of reach. The puzzle disappears when it becomes clear that what he had in mind by science is a contact mechanics, which – if the discussion above is correct – is heavily tied to common sense and folk physics. For some discussion, see my introduction to the 2009 edition of Chomsky (1966/2002/2009).

12 Chomsky's intellectual contributions

JM: Noam, let me ask about what you take to be your most important contributions. Do you want to say anything about that?

NC: Well, I think that the idea of studying language in all its variety as a biological object ought to become a part of future science – and the recognition that something very similar has to be true of every other aspect of human capacity. The idea that – there was talk of this in Aspects, but I didn't really spell it out – the belief . . .

[Wait; I'll start over. B. F.] Skinner's observation is correct that the logic of behaviorism and the logic of evolution are very similar – that observation is correct. But I think his conclusion – and the conclusion of others – is wrong. Namely, that that shows that they're both correct. Rather, it shows that they're both incorrect, because the logic of behaviorism doesn't work for growth and development, and for the same reason, the notion of natural selection is only going to work in a limited way for evolution.[1] So there are other factors. As I said in Aspects, there's certainly no possibility of thinking that what a child knows is based on a general procedure applied to experience, and there's also no reason to assume that the genetic endowment is just the result of various different things that happen to have happened in evolutionary history. There must be further factors involved – the kind that Turing [in his work on morphogenesis] was looking for, and others were and are looking for. And the idea that maybe you can do something with that notion is potentially important. It's now more or less agreed that you can do something with that notion for, say, bacteria. If you can also do something with it for the most recent – and by some dimension most complex – outcomes of evolutionary history like language, that would suggest that maybe it holds all the way through.

JM: Well, it would be pretty radical progress if we're actually at the stage now where we can begin to ask for language the old question, “Why are things the way they are?” I guess you think we're at that stage.

NC: To some extent. I think that there are even some answers . . . In recent work, I've been trying to compare what now seems plausible with what seemed plausible ten years ago. And a good deal of machinery that was thought to be needed has in fact been cut away. How far you can go with that – who can tell? That's like asking what really is specific to language. These questions were coming up all along; that's why I brought up that 1974 biolinguistics conference [I mentioned before]. When you read through the transcript, the questions kept coming up – what could it be that is specific to language? How could it be so remote from everything else in the biological world? It didn't make biological sense. But you were stuck with it. Well, by now you're less stuck with it, and you can begin to ask more seriously the basic questions of biology of language – some of them, answer even. There are still huge gaps. Take the first point you mentioned, about the nature of the concepts. We have nothing to say about how they evolved.

JM: But you do assume that they have to have been in place at the time that language developed through the introduction of Merge . . .

NC: That seems to be necessary to make sense out of the apparent contributions of language. They had to be, and the reason they had to be is that every living human being has basically the same ones. So they must have been there before the separation – before the trek from Africa – which means roughly fifty thousand years. So they predate fifty thousand years. And there's no real evidence that Merge really existed before roughly that time. Take a look at the work on the evolution of language. It's mostly been misconstrued. There's lots of interesting work showing adaptations of the sensory-motor system that appear to be language-related. So for example, the ear and articulatory muscles seem to be geared to the range of sounds that are used in language. But that doesn't tell you anything. All that that tells you is that whatever grunts hominids were using may have played a role over hundreds of thousands of years in changing the structure of the middle ear. That wouldn't be too surprising. It's like any other animal – take frogs. Take a particular species of frogs; their auditory systems will be correlated with their articulatory system. But that's precursors of language. Yes, that's going to be true for every organism. So everything that's found about the sensory-motor system – at most, what it's telling you is, well, these are precursors to language of the kind that you find in frogs. But there has to be that point at which you suddenly get that explosive growth – this great leap in creative activity going on. It looks as though it's roughly at the point of the separation of the breeding group all over the world. To the extent that that's true, you've got a really narrow window in which something happened, and the simplest assumption is that what happened is the recursive procedure developed.

JM: In the phonetic domain – you know Laura Petitto's work, of course – Laura's been suggesting that the fact that we can be at least bimodal in our use of language has something to do with the fact that somewhere in the [human] superior temporal gyrus there is something that recognizes certain patterns of sounds and signs that repeat themselves on the order of 1, or 1.5 hertz. The suggestion is that this underlies human linguistic syllabic structure of the sort displayed in all natural languages. That raises two questions. One is with respect to what you just said. The language faculty provides instructions to the articulatory systems, whether they be sign or speech. Those instructions have to be of a particular sort . . .

NC: . . . well, those systems are going to have certain characteristics that they evolved over millennia – in fact, maybe millions of years. They're going to have their characteristics, whatever they are. And if the capacity for using an infinite system pretty suddenly develops, they'll make use of those properties. Actually, it doesn't seem to me at all impossible . . . If you think of the most elementary properties of the minimalist logic of evolution, everyone has to agree that at some stage of the game, a mutation led to an infinite generative process. You can't get around that unless you believe in miracles. So at some stage, something like Merge developed. Mutations develop in an individual, not in a community, which means that [Merge] developed in some individual. That individual suddenly had the capacity for an infinite range of thought, planning, interpretation, and so on. He or she didn't have to externalize it. In fact, there would be no point in externalizing it, because it was in an individual. Well, if it's in an individual, it's going to get transmitted through children – through the group, somehow. The ability to plan and think and interpret and so on has selectional advantages. So whatever people happen to have this would probably do well in reproducing relative to the others. So a small breeding group would become dominant in a very short time. Pretty soon everyone has it. Nothing yet may have been articulated. Somewhere along the line, externalization took place; and that has further advantages. But then the externalization is going to make use of the sensory-motor apparatus that's around. It could have been sign; it could have been song; it could have been anything you've got available. And yes, it'll be adapted to that.

JM: But doesn't it at least require a system that involves modulation of a linear signal of some sort?

NC: Well, if you're going to externalize it, it's going to have to come out in time, which means it has to be linearized. The internal system may have no linear order; maybe everything is going on simultaneously.

It's at this point that intricate and interesting questions about the study of the structure of language enter into these considerations. Is there any evidence, for example, that in the narrow syntax mapping to the semantic interface – in that part of language which goes to the semantic interface, but not to the sensory-motor system – in that part of language, is there any evidence for linear ordering? It's an interesting question. It was raised a long time ago by Tanya Reinhart in the seventies when she was the first one to argue that c-command[2] – which everyone was using; they were calling it different names, but it's now called c-command – didn't involve linearity, just hierarchy. It's a surprising proposal; but it looks as if it's plausible. And then comes more and more work trying to ask whether in fact in the generation of objects at the semantic interface – so, narrow syntax, however it maps it on – is there any linearity at all? Well, if there is none – which is the optimal assumption, because it requires the least complexity – then it would suggest from an evolutionary point of view that in fact externalization is something peripheral, and that the effect of the sensory-motor system is minimal on the nature of language. Here you really are integrating deep inquiries into the structure and nature of language with speculations about evolution. They interact.[C]

[1] See also Appendix II's discussion of varieties of views of evolution and emphasis on the idea that evolution now reduce its dependence on what Lewontin and Turing call “history,” and emphasize instead connections to other factors – in Chomsky's terminology, “third factor” considerations.

[2] On c-command and its role, see Appendix VII.

13 Simplicity and its role in Chomsky's work

JM: Could we talk a bit more about the notion of simplicity and its development in your work? There's always been that notion of theoretical simplicity; it's continued throughout all of your work. It's simply taken to be characteristic of the nature of scientific investigation. Then there's also that internal simplicity which you pursued in LSLT [The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory] and Aspects [of the Theory of Syntax] . . .[C]

NC: . . . and also in the earlier work. That second one leads directly to what's called “the Minimalist Program.” That's just another name for it. At some point – sort of like in the fifties when you begin to try to reframe the methodological studies of language into a biological perspective – sometimes you can reframe the methodological conditions into empirical hypotheses about how organic systems, or maybe all systems, are formed. And to the extent that you can do that, you can investigate them as empirical hypotheses and look for evidence elsewhere – say, in the formation of snowflakes, or insect navigation, and so on – and see if there really are principles of computational complexity or whatever that are simply a part of nature, just as other natural laws are. And if you can reduce aspects of language to those, you have an account that – in the technical terminology of linguistics, where explanatory adequacy is solving Plato's problem – goes beyond explanatory adequacy.[C] You can begin to ask why the principles of Universal Grammar have these forms and not other forms. It becomes an empirical problem of biology; and it's on a par with others – actually, the kind that Turing was interested in.

JM: That's the third factor.

NC: That's the third factor.

JM: What about parameters? Are they in any way a development of that notion of internal simplicity?

NC: In a certain sense. What actually happened – not in an instant, but if you look back, you can see what happened – was this. Look at structural linguistics, including [Zellig] Harris's work, which was essentially a set of procedures for reducing linguistic materials – a corpus – to some organized form. Harris, by the way, pursued [this project] with the same kind of integrity that Goodman [discussed below] did – and it led to conclusions that seem to me incorrect for the same reasons. For him there was no truth of the matter: you could do it this way, you could do it that way, depends on which processes work. Those were essentially a set of procedures for reducing organized materials to a structural description of a particular type, and it was guided by some methodological considerations of simplicity, among others, such as utility. I spent a long time trying to work on the procedures, and finally convinced myself that they're not going to work, for fundamental reasons. You can see it at the most elementary level.

Let's rethink these issues in terms of language acquisition [for that leads to parameters]. Harris wouldn't have, but it's a parallel question. Reducing a corpus, or organized materials, to a specific form is analogous to taking the data of experience and ending up with an I-language; it's an analogous procedure, [but] the second one happens to be an empirical problem of biology, and that's preferable to the methodological problem of organizing material. The first step would have to be breaking up noises into small units – maybe syllables, maybe phonemes, or whatever. The next step is going to have to be what George Miller back in the fifties when he was thinking about these things called “chunking”; you have to have larger units. What's the next larger unit above, say, a phoneme or syllable? From the point of view of the organization of the structure of grammar, the next larger unit is morphemes. But that can't be, because there cannot be a procedure to find morphemes. The reason is that a morpheme is a notion that is abstract in its relationship to data; something is a morpheme because of the way that it fits into a much broader system. So you're not going to be able to find them by some procedure. That's why Harris's approach to statistical analysis of sequences of elements to find morpheme boundaries just can't work; it can only work for units that are kind of like beads on a string – one occurs after another, and morphemes just aren't like that. It's more or less like that in English, but English is a morphologically impoverished language. Even in English it won't work, but in slightly morphologically richer languages [it's obvious that] it can't work at all. In fact, the next larger unit is going to be something that's sometimes called a phonological word – something that has integrated phonological properties and is more or less like a word, but it's not going to be what we think of as words, like if I say whyd'ja leave, “whyd'ja” is a phonological word, but it's a complicated thing from the point of view of its syntax and semantics. But that's the next biggest unit. Well, that was supposed to be a peripheral unit for structural linguistics, but it's going to be the fundamental unit from a procedural point of view. If you want to get anything linguistically more significant, like a morpheme or a phrase, or a construction, or whatever, you're not going to be able to find it by these procedures. They break down right at the first step. That leads to the natural, but now I think erroneous, conclusion that what you're given by Universal Grammar, your genetic endowment, establishes a format: here's the kind of system that will count as a language. And then the task of the child – from another point of view, the linguist – is to find the optimal instantiation of the format, given the data. That's where the simplicity measure comes in – what's optimal, by some measure – and then you have to spell out the measure. The measure would be all of the notations that people use – phrases, [t] becomes [š] preceding [iyV], and so on. These, as I always understood them – going way back to the fifties – are simply expressions of your internally set conception of simplicity. They are ways of mapping a rule system into a form where you can assign a number, namely the number of symbols, and measure the simplicity numerically: ultimately, simplicity is going to be a numerical measure. So all of these are ways of assigning a number to a system of rules, and you hope that the method is going to capture authentic linguistic generalizations, and hence they'll really mean something – they'll be a part of the nature of language and your cognitive structure, and so on. So it is an empirical problem, but there's no computationally feasible method for going from data to finding the optimal instantiation of the format. That's why Morphophonemics of Modern Hebrew ([Chomsky] 1951/1979) gives a relative maximum. It says, “Well, let's pick this one and show that it's better than any slight modification of it.” But it's not really picking one from the data. That was in the forties; and it's inconceivable – it can't be done. It's computationally intractable. So it can't be the method of language acquisition; it can't be the truth about language.

Well, this framework – format, instantiation, simplicity measure, evaluation – that framework lasted pretty much through the seventies, and it did raise serious conceptual barriers to trying to find out what's distinctive about language – what's the third factor, so that we can assign it to something else, and the residue will be what's distinctive about language. It's just a barrier: you could raise the question, and pursue it to an extent, but not too much. That's where the principles and parameters approach was important; it separated the question of language acquisition from the question of the format. Language acquisition under this point of view was a matter of setting the values of parameters, and the format for Universal Grammar no longer has to meet the condition that it is so restrictive and so highly articulated that it leads to a small number of choices only and therefore makes the computational task tractable. It could [now] turn out that Universal Grammar is very unrestricted. If you have a format-instantiation framework, it's necessary that the format be highly restricted and highly articulated, or you'll never be able to choose an instantiation, or pick one over another.

It's kind of like the projection problem [that Nelson Goodman discussed in his Fact, Fiction, and Forecast]: if you don't have any constraints, you're not going to be able to solve the projection problem. You're going to have to have very narrow constraints to have a feasible approach to picking an instantiation that's the right one – maybe not just one, but at least a small number. So throughout the whole format-instantiation-evaluation framework [period], it was necessary for the format to be highly restricted and highly articulated, with lots of special mechanisms, and so on and so forth – and therefore very little contribution of the third factor, and lots of highly specific components of language. It also made the problem of studying the evolution of language completely hopeless.

The principles and parameters approach broke that impasse by separating the problem of acquisition entirely from the problem: “What's the format?” It leaves all the questions open. But at least the conceptual barrier to studying the third factor is removed. It is then not impossible – and you can try to show that it is true – that the format for grammar actually does involve, to a high degree, principles of computational efficiency, and so on – which may be not only extra-linguistic, but extra-organic – and the acquisition problem is then shunted aside. It's a matter of fixing the parameters.

Of course, that raises another question, “Why does language have principles and parameters, and why these parameters?” That becomes another interesting empirical question which maybe you can answer on third factor grounds, and maybe not. In any case, [principles and parameters] made it possible to pursue in a much more serious way a search for factors like eliminating redundancy, simple rule systems, computational efficiency, and so on, on the basis of principles that may well be non-linguistic, not a part of Universal Grammar, and therefore not a part of the distinguishing characteristics of language. By the 1990s, a number of people – I was one, but also Michael Brody, Sam Epstein, and others – felt that there had been enough progress in this approach that it was actually an identifiable research domain, and that's when the name [minimalism] came along, just to identify that domain. It was a matter of picking up old problems and looking at them on the basis of new understandings, and plenty of assumptions – like the assumption that the principles and parameters approach is correct. There are plenty of posits there; no one can tell you what the parameters are. The closest that anyone has tried to get is Mark Baker's overview, which is very interesting but, as many people have pointed out, does not get to what are often called “microparameters,” the kinds of things that Richard Kayne particularly has worked on. They're very different. So what the whole picture of the array of parameters will look like is very much an open question.

JM: It's a complicated task disentangling all the various contributing factors, dealing with a child's course of development . . .

NC: But [that's not at all an issue for most linguists]. Most linguists, and social scientists in general, are so data-oriented that they find it scandalous to accept [methodological] principles that really ought to be obvious – for example, the idea [see Chomsky 1986 and the introduction to Chomsky 1980/2005] that you should try to study language acquisition in a pure case, uncontaminated by the innumerable factors that actually enter – your parents speak one language, and the kids on the street speak another. That's obviously going to have all kinds of complicated effects on language acquisition. But if you really want to find the principles of language, you have to abstract away from that. That's why scientists do experiments. Galileo had to fight this battle, one that you would hope would have been over by now. Well, it's not over in his field. And the same thing is true over here [in linguistics]. So, for example, an awful lot of what is in any language – say, Arabic – is the result of historical events that in themselves tell you nothing about the language faculty. Take the Norman Conquest. The Norman Conquest had a huge effect on what became English. But it clearly had nothing to do with the evolution of language – which was all finished long before the Norman Conquest. So if you want to study the distinctive properties of language – what really makes it different from the digestive system – and some day maybe [study] the evolution of those properties, you're going to have to abstract away from the Norman Conquest. But that means abstracting away from the whole mass of data that interests the linguist who wants to work on a particular language. There's no contradiction in this; it's just a sane approach to trying to answer certain kinds of far-reaching questions about the nature of language. But that's often considered scandalous.

JM: [Switching a bit,] what's your view now of the status of LSLT? Is the work you've been doing recently a return to the project you find in LSLT? How do you see the historical relationship between that work and the Minimalist Program?

NC: It's different. LSLT was caught between many conflicting impulses. One was to do a distributional analysis, for methodological reasons, for some entity called “language,” whatever that is; and [that impulse] had in the back[ground] motivation[s] like reducing a corpus to a grammar. Another was the biological framework that was just beginning to be thought about. It was discussed in the Skinner review, which was about the same time – maybe a little later – and in other works that were around. LSLT was sort of caught between them: now drop the first and turn to the second, and [try to] see what you're looking at.

Some of the specific proposals that came along in LSLT – well, it has been possible to resurrect them in different form, such as generalized transformations. On the other hand, as Howard Lasnik pointed out to me recently – and I'd completely forgotten – LSLT does not have in it a rule of movement. That's been a core topic in generative grammar since the sixties – how to formulate the movement rules. I started talking about it in Current Issues in Linguistic Theory; and we were talking about it even before that – around 1960. The idea of trying to formulate the principles of a rule of movement and find the conditions on it – WH-island conditions, and this, that, and the other thing – that's turned into a central topic of the field. There's a volume coming out of papers of a conference on WH-movement and chains. It's a very sophisticated picture of where all this has come to, and one aspect of the rules of movement and the concept of Merge. Internal Merge is an effort to show that it is natural – and indeed, inevitable – for language to have such a process. [Well,] it's not there in LSLT. I'd completely forgotten about it, I'm so used to it by now, but Howard went back and pointed out that in fact what's there are notions of permutation and deletion, which give you the effect of movement, but there's no movement there. So that's a substantial change. And you can see where in the semi-methodological approach of that time, rules of permutation and deletion seemed to make sense, whereas from a more fundamental and principled point of view, they shouldn't exist, and you should only have Merge, which yields movement as a special case.

So it's a matter of constant rethinking, and some old things come back, and some don't. And if they do come back, it's usually in different ways.

14 Chomsky and Nelson Goodman

JM: Can we talk about Nelson Goodman for a while? Your relationship to him as an undergraduate and after is not often documented, while your relationship to Zellig Harris is, in several places, although not always accurately. But as for Goodman: there's not much discussion of what you got from him and what you think is valuable in his work. He was your teacher at Penn. He . . .

NC: We stayed quite close for many years later.

JM: And you must have been his protégé; certainly he must have gone to considerable effort to ensure that you got the position as a Harvard Junior Fellow, which made a very big difference in your life. I know that there are important philosophical differences between you, but there are also respects in which, it seems to me, you owe a debt to him. His conception of constructional systems, for example . . . What about your conception of simplicity – is that in any way owed to Goodman?

NC: My interest in it was certainly stimulated by his work. And you'll see the occasional footnote in his writings where we talked about . . .

I met Goodman when I was about 17 or so. I had never had any background in philosophy and I started taking his graduate courses with people who had a serious background, and he was very accommodating and helpful, and he didn't consider it inappropriate in any way that I didn't know anything. He'd direct me to read things, and the like. He was teaching at the time what became the Structure of Appearance, and the later courses that I took with him were teaching what became Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. What struck me particularly was that, whether you agreed with his conclusions or not, whatever he was doing was pursued with absolute intellectual integrity – and that's unusual, and striking. And it was worth pursuing in detail, even if you didn't agree, because you were witnessing a serious mind at work, taking what he's doing very, very seriously, pursuing the difficulties – trying to find the difficulties, and seeing if he could overcome them – all of it clearly on issues of very considerable significance. And he had a very ambitious project – more so, I think, than my interpretation of it at first. The Structure of Appearance was supposed to be a preliminary study to the Structure of Reality – and, of course, that never came. It got sidetracked into Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.

His nominalism, of course, was also an expression of extreme intellectual integrity. He thought that the concept of a set was incoherent. If things are composed of the same elements, they can't end up being different if you arrange them differently. He wanted to pursue that extremely parsimonious assumption to the limits – anything that didn't fall within it was somehow illegitimate. You can see the merits of that. Actually, my earliest work – which disappeared; it didn't go anywhere – was in fact an effort to give a nominalistic account in his sense of the basic foundations of syntactic structure. There's an article in the Journal of Symbolic Logic about it back then, fifty years ago.

And the other work that I was doing was along the same lines. And yes, the notion of a constructional system and its significance comes straight out of that. Also, the concern for simplicity.

But you have to distinguish two different notions of simplicity. One of them was his interest; I'm interested in it too, but of course focused differently. His notion of simplicity was absolute; he wanted to find a concept of simplicity that's going to hold for everything. He argued, with some plausibility, that the search for simplicity in theory is no different than the search for theory. What you're trying to do is find principles that are true – and their only access to truth is through some form of internal coherence and internal elegance and other properties that he tried to find. Now, there is a different notion of simplicity that is theory-internal. Maybe a different word should be used; sometimes I called it “evaluation.” What you try to do is from within a theoretical framework that you're assuming – maybe you want to change it, but you're working within it – and you want to find the optimal manifestation of it, given particular evidence. That's language acquisition.

JM: That appears clearly in Aspects; does it appear in Logical Structure . . .

NC: It appears in Logical Structure of Syntactic Theory; there's a section in there trying to distinguish notions of simplicity and saying that the simplicity measures . . . actually, it's in The Morphophonemics of Modern Hebrew – 1949 – where there is an internal notion. In fact, most of that is a detailed effort to show that the particular system of grammar that's developed is a relative maximum in terms of simplicity, an internal simplicity measure – meaning that if you change any two rules, it would be less simple. There wouldn't be any way to show that it's an absolute maximum. And a good deal of linguistics since then has been – you can conceive of it as being – concerned with that problem, until it gets to the stage of principles and parameters, around 1980. Every approach to general linguistic theory that I know of that was worked out with any concern or care was looking for essentially a relative fixed maximum within a fixed format. And these notions – though they're not Goodman's notion of simplicity – they are inspired by his search for an absolute notion of simplicity, which was rare. He tried, Pat[rick] Suppes did some work on it, a few others. It's something that runs through all the sciences. Hermann Weyl writes on symmetry; that's a similar kind of conception.

It goes straight back to Galileo. I don't know if Goodman would have seen it this way, but for Galileo, it was a physical point – nature is simple, and it's the task of the scientist to, first of all, discover just what that means, and then to prove it. From the tides to the flight of birds, the goal of the scientist is to find that nature is simple; and if you fail, you're wrong. It was a major issue right through – still is – in the history of the sciences. Newton, for example, had an approach to chemistry that was different from Dalton's – they weren't contemporaries, but the Newtonian approach and what became the Daltonian approach were quite different. The Newtonians wanted to reduce chemistry, the phenomena of chemistry – the fields weren't really separated – to fundamental, elegant principles, rather like the principle of gravitation. That was a principled approach to chemistry that a lot of people worked on through the eighteenth century. Dalton simply said, let's assume whatever level of complexity we need in order to account for the phenomenon; that's his atomic theory – anathema to the Newtonians. It was Dalton's approach that proved successful, at least for a long period – although you could argue that contemporary chemistry is returning to a kind of Newtonian approach with the quantum theoretic interpretation of chemistry. In any event, these issues have always been very much alive, and still are. They show up everywhere in the sciences, and Goodman had sufficient integrity not only to notice them, but to try to do something about them.

JM: He almost made it a necessary condition of doing science that one seek this kind of simplicity . . . What was the status of simplicity, so far as he was concerned? Was it a methodological principle?

NC: That's one thing that we discussed for all the years that I knew him, and I never understood it [what his view was]. And it was the same in every other aspect of his work. So take, say, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. The part of that work that became influential in philosophy was the part that he was less interested in. If you take a look at the book, it's in two parts. The first part is the new riddle of induction; the second part is the solution to it. What he was interested in was the solution to it. I think you can barely find a paper on that in later literature. There are tons of references to grue and green and bleen and blue and this, that, and the other thing. But as far as he was concerned, that was an observation. Even if you could figure out a solution to green and grue, you could find another example just like it. What he was interested in was his solution to the problem – projectibility. And I remember back in 1949 or 1950 – approximately then – discussing with him (because I didn't understand it) how it would possibly work unless you assumed innate principles. So, take a pigeon – or a person, for that matter. It or she sees that emeralds are green, and that gets entrenched, and becomes a projectible predicate, and so forth. But the same person sees that emeralds are grue; so why is that not being entrenched? The only possible answer that I can think of is that green is somehow a part of the nature of the pigeon and the person, and grue isn't. So now we're back to the kind of innatism that he objected to. Quine and Goodman were working together pretty closely, but Quine just cut the Gordian knot at that point. He just assumed that the properties that are going to be projectible are innate; that's his quality space. Goodman didn't want to do that; he wanted an argument for it. The projectibility theory was supposed to be an argument for it, but I don't see how it can possibly work. And the same question arises about simplicity – where is it coming from? Is it a metaphysical fact – the way that, say, Galileo thought? Or is it a cognitive fact – is it something about the way that we look at the world? Well, if it's a cognitive fact, then it's not going to be the way to find out about the truth of the world, but it's going to be a way to discover our best conception of the world, given our cognitive abilities and limitations. He would never have accepted that interpretation; and he also wouldn't have accepted the metaphysical one, I'm sure. And therefore he didn't understand a word I said – and he ended up with neither one nor the other. And that I didn't understand, and still don't. And I can't find any clarification of it in his work, and couldn't find any in our discussions.

JM: I suppose his behaviorism might have played a role. It seems to play a role in his so-called solution to the projectibility problem.

NC: He thought so, but I don't see how. Unless you presuppose some cognitive structure, I don't see any way of distinguishing in the entirety of experience which predicates are going to be projectible, and which not. It won't work just to say that these are the ones that have been used; how do you know which ones can be used?

JM: There are certain parallels there between what he had to say and what Wittgenstein had to say about the “given” – which amounted to “that's just the way we use language.”

NC: Well, I don't really know Wittgenstein in the manner of a true disciple, but one of the reasons I was less impressed with his work was that he evaded the issue. Goodman tried to face it. Why is it “given?” Well, at that point Wittgenstein, so far as I can tell, retreats to saying “We're giving descriptions, not explanations.” It's fine to give descriptions, but to someone looking for answers to “Why?” it's not interesting. Goodman didn't want to do that. He wanted explanations. But it seems to me that the explanations are going to be either cognitive – something to do with our mental structures – or maybe even extra-organic: maybe it has something to do with the ways in which organic creatures can deal with the world, given the laws of physics, or whatever. So either it's going to be cognitive and epistemological. Or it's going to be metaphysical. And I don't see how to be in favor of that, for essentially Kant's reasons – you can't get beyond what we can understand. Or it's [the explanation is] in some kind of methodological domain – which I cannot see how we can ground, except in our cognitive capacities.

JM: Hence, certain aspects, at least, of the science-forming capacity – the cognitive equipment we must have in order to construct a science – must somehow be innate within us. This search for simplicity . . . it's hard to define, of course . . .

NC: Purely personal, but in my own personal development, the ideas [involved in the effort to construct a science of language and, more generally, human nature] kind of grow out of an effort to come to terms with the impossible but exciting project that Goodman was engaged in. And it's a terrific education. The project was a perfect foil, because he was pursuing it with complete integrity and commitment; and it was a very clear project. And if you can respect the project, you can – at least in my own case – you can come to the conclusion that “here's why it can't work.” You are led like me in a different direction which leads to something about universal grammar and, more generally, the universal moral principles, and also to some sort of science-forming capacity – it's [all] just part of our nature.

JM: Kant spoke of [science being guided by] what he called a regulative ideal – I'm not sure what that is, probably a label for something that no one really understands. I take it that your idea that the science-forming capacity is . . .

NC: I prefer Hume's version. He says, look, it's animal instinct. He didn't know where to go from there. But I think that's correct. So his solution to the problem of induction, as distinct from Goodman's, is that it's simply animal instinct. It's our nature; and we can't go beyond that, other than to discover our nature – which leads us into cognitive science. But not for him, of course.

JM: Is there any residue of those early efforts to construct a nominalist program in your work?

NC: I think it's a project for the future. In the work that I've done since The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory – which just assumes set theory – I would think that in a biolinguistic framework you have to explain what that means. We don't have sets in our heads. So you have to know that when we develop a theory about our thinking, about our computation, internal processing and so on in terms of sets, that it's going to have to be translated into some terms that are neurologically realizable. I don't know how helpful pure nominalism will be, but there is a gap there that the nominalistic enterprise is focused on. It's a gap that has to be overcome. There are a lot of promissory notes there when you talk about a generative grammar as being based on an operation of Merge that forms sets, and so on and so forth. That's something metaphorical, and the metaphor has to be spelled out someday. Whether this is a high priority for today or not, I don't know. But in the 1950s as a student of Goodman's – I was terribly impressed by him, as was everybody that knew him – I was convinced that you had to do it that way. But I came to the conclusion that it's either premature or hopeless, and if we want a productive theory-constructive [effort], we're going to have to relax our stringent criteria and accept things that we know don't make any sense, and hope that some day somebody will make some sense out of them – like sets.

JM: Is there anything you want to add to the discussion of Goodman?

NC: We retained a very close personal relationship, until the point where he realized that I was really serious about talking about innate structures – and for him, it was almost a religious principle that you can't be serious about this. Basically, we had to break relations over it, which was unfortunate.

JM: Very sad, actually; it sounds like both a fulfilling and a productive relationship . . .

NC: It was a close personal relationship . . . While Carol and I were students, he and his wife – by our standards, old people, like 40; and they were wealthy, and we were poor – they did what they called “slumming with the Chomskys.” They picked us up when we were backpacking in Europe and drove us around. We had extremely interesting trips with them. For one thing, they happened to be on a Romanesque tour through southern France which was planned by Meyer Shapiro – who I also knew – who was a great art historian. We just sort of followed them around. She (Mrs. Goodman) was an artist; he was an art dealer and specialist on a level of insight and understanding into Romanesque art and other things that we would never have gotten to appreciate without that experience.

Somehow we ended up in Switzerland – I don't remember how, exactly – and we were in (I guess) Basel. I remember that there was a huge Klee museum and we went in and looked at the Klee exhibit. But Goodman wasn't satisfied with that – and he was very imperious. He went to the director of the museum and asked to be shown the actual collection, which was down in some basement somewhere. And the guy very meekly led us all down to the storage room where they had the most immense collection of magnificent Klee paintings that you could ever have imagined. I don't know how many of them were ever shown. And we went through those with an excellent exposition from the director. And there were other things like that.

We used to sit their house over the summer – they had a place out in the suburbs of Philadelphia, where they lived. Sometimes we would bring Carol's sister's children; for various reasons, we had to care for them when they were little. So it was a very personal relationship, as well as an intellectual one. I was very sorry to break it off.

JM: He had a wonderful eye. I remember taking him out once to look at a set of Inuit sculptures, and he immediately went to the very finest pieces there. They weren't the most expensive, but they were beautifully done. His eye must have been honed by those many years of work he did as an art dealer.

NC: After he left Harvard in the early thirties – it must have been about fifteen years or so that he was working mainly as an art dealer. He was always deeply immersed in art – and wrote about it too, of course.

JM: He certainly had an interesting view of the nature of art – and an extraordinary view of the syntax of art, based on his nominalist enterprise.

NC: Of his students – he didn't have many – the one who most seriously pursued his projects and carried them furthest was Israel Scheffler, who was a very good philosopher himself; he took up his projects and applied them. Joseph Ullian did for a while. But it was a pretty hard track to follow. The framework was so parsimonious, and the requirements so strict, that the regimen was pretty hard to keep. It was much easier to accept all sorts of things you can't make much sense out of, and to try to go on from there.

Part II Human nature and its study

15 Chomsky on human nature and human understanding

JM: Now we switch to human nature . . .

NC: OK.

JM: Human beings as a species are remarkably uniform, genetically speaking. Yet humans have proven extraordinarily adaptable in various environments, extremely flexible in their ability to solve practical problems, endlessly productive in their linguistic output, and unique in their capacity for inventing scientific explanations. Some, a great many in fact, have taken all this as reason to think that human nature is plastic, perhaps molded by environment – including social environment – and individual invention. The engines of this flexibility and invention are claimed to lie in some recognition of similarities, in induction, or in some other unspecified but general learning and invention technique. This plastic view of human nature has even been thought to be a progressive, socially responsible one. Clearly you disagree. Could you explain why you think that a fixed biologically determined and uniform human nature is compatible with and perhaps even underlies such flexibility, productivity, adaptability, and conceptual inventiveness?

NC: First of all, there's a factual question – does a fixed biological capacity underlie these human capacities? I don't know of any alternative. If somebody can tell me what a general learning mechanism is, we can discuss the question. But if you can't tell me what it is, then there's nothing to discuss. So let's wait for a proposal. Hilary Putnam, for example, has argued for years that you can account for cognitive growth, language growth and so on, by general learning mechanisms. Fine, let's see one.

Actually, there is some work on this which is not uninteresting. Charles Yang's (2004) work in which he tries to combine a rather sensible and sophisticated general learning mechanism with the principles of Universal Grammar, meaning either the first or the third factor – we don't really know, but something other than experience – and tries to show how by integrating those two concepts you can account for some interesting aspects of language growth and development. I think that's perfectly sensible.

Nobody doubts that there's some kind of acquisition mechanism going on. But unless we're told what it is, it can't do anything. To say it's something like induction doesn't help, because you have to say what induction is and any conception of induction that we have gets us absolutely nowhere. Next move is to say, well it's abduction, Peirce's abduction. The term is used in contemporary philosophy, but missing Peirce's whole point as far as I can see. Now it's called something like induction to the best explanation, or something like that. Ok, that's abduction; but Peirce's point was that it's what is now called a kind of canalization. That is, there must be some fixed and restrictive array of choices, otherwise you can't have abduction, so you don't get anywhere. And he gave some bad arguments as to why this could have been selected but, putting that part aside, the crucial point that Peirce is making – Peirce used abduction a lot of different ways, but in the valuable essays, the ones that are worth looking at and mean something today – he emphasized the point that this is an instinct. He compares it to a chicken pecking seeds: we have an abductive instinct which restricts in advance the array of hypotheses that we can select; and unless you have that, nothing's going to happen. Well, that's sort of the framework that's taken over in generative grammar – [although I did not know] Peirce at the time, of course. Universal Grammar or maybe the third factor gives us an array of options, and acquisition works within that channel. Then come the [very difficult] questions of figuring out the first and third factor and how they contribute to it. Well this part is left out of contemporary philosophical discussion, but if that's left out, everything's gone – there's nothing there. To say we search for the best explanation tells us nothing. How do we decide which path? If there're infinitely many theories that we can choose from, we get nowhere; so you have to have some kind of restriction. Well, now you're back to where it comes from. And if you're not a mystic, it comes from either the first or the third factor. Either it comes from some specific genetic endowment or some general principles of the way the world works. You have to assume that they have to integrate to lead you to the restrictive set of hypotheses that Peirce recognized that you have to assume. So as to the factual question, I simply don't see any way of discussing it. There are some specific proposals and then there's some handwaving; and you cannot debate between handwaving and the specific proposals. Now, the specific proposals don't go anywhere near far enough, but that shouldn't surprise us very much. I mean, we can't answer most of these questions for insects – how do we expect to answer them for humans?

So what we're left with is that some combination of the first and the third factor must be giving us the capacity for developing the best explanations in science – or in ordinary life for that matter. Now is it the same in science and ordinary life? Well that's an empirical question. Sue Carey, for example, is trying to show that that's more or less the same, but we really don't know that. Science in the modern sense is an extremely restricted human achievement, developed in the last few centuries in a tiny corner of the world. Most of the so-called sciences are barely even aware of how it works. So it could very well be some human capacity that's just never used – like the capacity for mathematics. It's around all the time – we know that – but [almost] never used. That was a puzzle to people like Wallace – we happen to have it, but it's never used [so a selectional story just doesn't work]. And the same could be true of the science-forming capacity. It comes to be used under very specific circumstances, and it's used in the way that it's predetermined [to] by the first and third factor. That can yield creativity, just as in the case of language, the classic case. But you can't have it unless you have a pre-given determination. You cannot have creative use of language unless it's predetermined what the system's going to be in a very narrow channel, because otherwise you can't acquire anything. Descartes and his followers recognized that and it's certainly true.[C]

That doesn't tell you how or what you derive the creative use [of language] from. That's a topic we can't deal with. That's a question of will and choice and that's for the moment, maybe permanently, outside the sciences. If you take a look at studies of insect behavior, you get very intricate and interesting investigations of mechanisms. But nobody asks about the choices. Why does a cockroach turn left? That's not a general question to ask in the sciences. And it's true even of very restricted capacities that we think of as rather passive, such as visual perception. Helmholtz put this famous problem around 1850. He somehow noticed that with a fixed retinal image you can focus attention on one part of it or another, at will. What does that mean? Well, there's a lot of contemporary work on the mechanism, but not on the choice. And when we talk about creative use of language, we are just way beyond these questions, and science too, of course. So we certainly can't deal with them with contemporary understanding, and it's entirely possible that it's out of the range of human cognitive capacity.

There's a view now in philosophy called mysterianism, which is supposed to be a bad thing. Mysterianism is the belief that our cognitive capacities are part of the natural world, so therefore these capacities have scope and limits, and if you believe in that, you're somehow a mystic. That's a very odd thing – it's just like saying that adopting elementary scientific rationality is to be a mysterian. We don't know what the boundaries are of course; but there must be fixed cognitive capacities – for Peirce's reasons, or Hume's reasons. [It's an instinct.] It's a little hard to interpret [what mysterianism amounts to in the minds of those who deride it], but you know the tendency. [No doubt] it's [intended] mostly just [as a] kind of ridicule; but I don't think they realize that what they're ridiculing is ordinary scientific rationality. It's a matter of empirical fact what the range of our cognitive capacities happen to be. We're not angels. And they may or may not include answers to questions that bother us. In fact, we may not even know how to formulate the questions. Everyone who's worked in the sciences knows – or in any field, but it's clear in the sciences – that formulating the right questions is a very hard task. You work very hard and go down many false paths before you begin to get what looks like the right question.

Many questions that puzzle people have an interrogative form, but it's not clear what the question is. Take “What is it like to be a bat?” – Nagel's (1974) question. It has an interrogative form but is it a question? If it's a question, there have to be some possible answers to it. In fact, in formal semantics, it's common to propose that the meaning of a question is the set of propositions that are possible answers to it. Maybe that's too strong, but at least it's some kind of condition of the meaning. Suppose there are no possible answers – is it a question? What's a possible answer to “What's it like to be me?” I can't think of a possible answer; so is it a question? Or maybe the question is something like, “How do things work?” which has an interrogative form but is not really a question.

JM: It's precisely that kind of question – if you can call it a question – that exercises philosophers.

NC: It does, but the first thing they've got to do is turn them into meaningful questions. Much of the discussion about consciousness is like that.

JM: But let me press the point a bit – take, for instance, the visual system – the human . . .

NC: Oh, but wait a moment. We never got to the social implications. As far as the social implications are concerned, they may go in any direction. The belief that empty organism theories are somehow socially progressive relies on a hidden assumption, that there's some master somewhere who's going to arrange the environment so that the people are going to be trained the right way. That's Leninism, basically, and that's a natural position for intellectuals, because they're going to be the managers. So you have to be suspicious right away. But there's nothing socially progressive about it. In fact, it's either socially vacuous if you take away the hidden assumption, or else it's basically totalitarian if you add the assumption. On the other hand, what must be true, assuming we're part of nature, is that capacities are fundamentally predetermined. After that, nothing follows unless you tell us what the capacities are. If classical liberalism is right – say Hume, Adam Smith, and so on – and one of the fundamental capacities is sympathy, well then you get one kind of society. If the fundamental capacities are aggression and avarice, well then you get a different kind of society. You can't make an a priori claim about this. When you look at other primates, the ones that are our nearest cousins, they just differ radically. Take bonobo and chimpanzee, they're completely different – one aggressive and violent, the other called nature's hippies. But they're equally distant from us and you cannot make a priori judgments about what their nature is. You have to find it out, and the same with humans. So maybe Adam Smith and Hume were right – they were optimistic about human nature.

JM: There is an assumption built into this, that human nature is fixed.

NC: How can you avoid that? If it's not fixed we can't do anything – we're just formless blobs. Unless you have a fixed human nature you cannot achieve any cognitive or social development, or physical growth or anything else.

JM: Let me move to some related questions, ones that were first raised back in the 1970s. You suggested then that in some sense Universal Grammar, perhaps supplemented by other factors that are not specifically part of our linguistic endowment, contains all biologically possible languages. I wonder if a more general point could be made, that language plus the other biologically based cognitive capacities and affects that we have available to us somehow contain all biologically possible social structures.

NC: I don't see how that can be false. It's the same question – unless there's initial structure, nothing can happen. You can't have any kind of growth. We take that for granted for the visible parts of the body; but it's got to be true for the non-visible parts as well. So yes, of course, the answer is that only certain kinds of social structures are possible and the enquiry into fundamental human nature will give the answer to that.

John Mikhail in his PhD dissertation in philosophy (2000; see also Mikhail 2011) brought to my attention – I hadn't noticed it – that Hume had the basic idea of what becomes generative grammar and everything else in his theory of moral nature. [He points to it] in those passages where he says something like this: the number of our duties is in a manner infinite, and ‘duties’ just means moral responsibilities; so we have an infinite number of moral responsibilities. Then he goes on to say that we know them and we use them in new situations, somehow. We must, then, have gotten them somehow. It can't be by induction or by experience; that's impossible. So, he says, it comes from the hidden hand of nature, which we would now call either genetic endowment or the third factor contribution. But that's the basic point, and if you take it seriously, it's true for our moral nature, and everything else.

JM: I know quite a few Hume scholars who ignore that particular claim.

NC: I never noticed it, I must say. And I'd read it.

JM: OK, I'll pick up on that last question. You once suggested carrying out the project of humanistic social science by studying the biological limits of human capacities, thereby offering a science of human nature; and would propose an ideal form of social organization on that science, and on an understanding of the fundamental needs of human nature. Has the intervening 35 years since you gave that speech and published it – as “Language and Freedom” – led you to a different conception of that project or to any signs of progress or lack of it?

NC: First of all, it [the study of human nature] goes back hundreds of years, of course. And there's been no progress. These are just questions that are too hard.

There is by now some study – like John Mikhail's – some empirical study of elements of human moral nature. Contemporary ethical philosophy has given interesting examples, the kind that Judith Thompson talks about, and Gil Harman and others – the trolley problem and others. There are situations in which we just have an intuition about what the right answer is – and it's a very strange one. For example, sometimes it leads everybody to prefer an outcome that will kill more people when they have a choice of killing one person; and the results are pretty systematic. By now John in his dissertation along with Elizabeth Spelke are doing studies on children, and it's pretty firmly established that in very young children they give the same judgments. The judgments are interesting because in a sense they're counterintuitive – like choosing to kill more people – this isn't about taking organs from people, and things like that. Those are interesting studies of what our fundamental moral nature must be. And there are now some investigations – Marc Hauser's going to do some comparative work on this with other primates – and out of that could come some understanding [too]. But it's going to be primitive – these problems are just too hard. We don't understand anything about how humans behave in complex circumstances.[C]

[Keep in mind that these complex] problems are too hard for physics, even in its own domain. Physics does not study what goes on in the world – it studies what goes on under the highly controlled conditions of extremely artificial experiments. That's the Galilean revolution. What goes on in the world is just too complicated, so you try to discover some principles by studying artificially simple situations. And, of course, that [yields results that are] not obviously true for anything more than the highly simple entities that physics restricts itself to. It has been a non-trivial task to show that engineers, say, can substantially improve their practices by relying on fundamental principles of physics, or medical practitioners on biology, and so on. That's one of the reasons why I'm skeptical about work some friends of mine have done in designing an ideal society. A lot of it's interesting, but I don't think we have any idea of whether humans could live in that society.

JM: Well, little progress has been made; but is the project itself still plausible?

NC: I think it's plausible and everyone is engaged in it all the time. If you're even a moral agent – you care about the effects of your actions – you're presupposing something about human nature. It doesn't matter whether you're a revolutionary or a conservative, or a reformist, or whatever you are. If you regard yourself as a moral agent – you're trying to think about actions, or morals, or plans, or ideas that might make human life better – you're presupposing something about what is fundamental human nature. You can't articulate it. But that's not surprising – most of what we do we can't formulate the reasons for, but it's got to be there, otherwise human action makes no sense. If you deal with your children in a certain way, you're presumably trying to help them, not harm them. You must be presupposing something about what's good for them. Well, where does that come from? It comes from some intuitive conception of what their fundamental nature is. And that must be true of every human interaction.

JM: You aren't going to deny that there are at least some kinds of distinctions that can be made even now?

NC: There are very striking ones. I just gave a talk in England [at the Royal Institute of Philosophy (see Chomsky 2005b)] . . . It was a talk about truisms – moral truisms and why they're important. I started out by apologizing because I'm only going to bring up platitudes. But they must not be dismissed because they're always ignored – almost universally – and ignoring them leads to horrible effects. So take the most elementary truism we can imagine – the principle of universality. We apply to ourselves the same standards we apply to others – probably more rigorous standards if you're serious. If you accept that principle, practically the entire discussion and policy of international affairs collapses, because it's based on denial of the principle of universality. Sometimes it's explicit. I congratulate the people who say straight out that we've got to be similar to Nazis – like Henry Kissinger. So when the president's national security strategy came out in September 2002, there was a lot of criticism of it, although the criticisms were narrow, and most of them were of the form, “Well, the principles are right, but they're going about it the wrong way.” But Kissinger was straight about it. Good for him. He said yes, it's a good principle but – his words were – It must not be “universalized.” It's for us; we have the right of aggression. Maybe we delegate it to clients, but certainly nobody else does. And, as I say, he has to be congratulated for honestly saying what is always presupposed: that we must adopt the doctrines of the Nazis. We can't accept the most elementary moral truism. We have to firmly reject it. And if you look beyond, that's commonly true. So I think you can say a lot about moral truisms which people will accept abstractly, but reject instantly as soon as they are applied to their own actions and affairs.

JM: So there are at least some fairly recognizable facts about our moral nature . . .

NC: Well, if someone doesn't at least accept that, then they should just have the decency to shut up and not say anything. That does wipe out a good part of the commentary on international affairs, at least – and on domestic affairs too. So it's not a small point – even though it's a platitude.

16 Human nature and evolution: thoughts on sociobiology and evolutionary psychology

JM: Looking at how you have studied human nature now, could we begin by looking at some apparent differences between your approach to the biological study of human nature and that pursued by sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists such as Wilson, Pinker, Dawkins, and many others. They seem to think that the science of human nature should aim to explain human behavior, and they conceive of the various biologically based affects and cognitive capacities on which they focus as biologically evolved in the long-term selectional way that neo-Darwinists favor. Your approach to the science of human nature pays scant attention to the explanation of behavior – in fact you've maintained since at least the late 1950s that while our everyday intentional, commonsense accounts of behavior might be successful enough for practical purposes, the scientific explanation of behavior is a hopeless project, except perhaps for extremely simple organisms. And while you have no objection to seeking selectional accounts of the development of affects and cognitive capacities, you emphasize in the case of human language – certainly the most distinctive and central mental faculty, one that no other creature has, and that seems to underlie many of our cognitive accomplishments – there is no evidence that a long-term selectional story will work. There are reasons to think that language was introduced at a single stroke with the introduction of Merge, perhaps some fifty or sixty thousand years ago. Could you comment on these apparent differences, and on what we might hope to accomplish in a naturalistic science of human nature?

NC: First of all, just to be historically accurate, what's now called evolutionary psychology or sociobiology begins with Kropotkin in his critique of social Darwinism. But he was a Darwinist. He argued on selectional grounds that you would expect what he called “mutual aid” – cooperative societies that happened to be his vision of communitarian anarchism. Well, why is Kropotkin disregarded? – because people don't like his conclusions. If you mention him to Dawkins and so on, they'll just ridicule him. Now is it because he didn't have any evidence? Well, he didn't have any relevant scientific evidence. Does anyone have such evidence for anything else? Barely. They don't like his conclusions.

There are several different questions here. What is the nature – what is human nature, or ant nature? Well, those are scientific questions. Separate from that is the question of what role selection had in developing them. And those are just two different scientific questions, not to be intermingled. Part of the problem with the kind of pop biology that's common today is they're just intermingled – it's assumed that if there's a nature, it's got to be selected. It doesn't make any sense – it doesn't make any sense for the kidney or the visual system or anything else, and it doesn't make any sense here.

There is a nature, undoubtedly. People who argue against it for a blank slate – that's just puffery for a popular audience. It doesn't mean anything – nobody ever believed in that who was sensible. So yes, there's a fixed nature and it developed somehow, but we do not know for any aspect of it (whether it's the chin or the visual system or the bones in the ear or whatever it may be) – we don't know the answer to how it evolved until we know the answer. And the answers when we find them will often be very surprising. So there's no issue here about whether natural selection operates – obviously it does – but there are some very big questions about the channel within which it does, and about other factors involved in evolution, of which many are known. So we have to separate totally the kind of rhetorical posturing about selection and the question of intrinsic human nature.

Well, there is recent work – like, say, on kin selection, Hamilton's work – which suggests some plausible evolutionary basis for certain kinds of what appear to be altruism. But it's pretty narrow. If you pursue kin selection to its limits, you're going to have a hard time explaining why humans devote enormous energy and take tremendous risks to save dolphins but don't care how many children are dying in Africa. Something else is happening. It's interesting work; I don't want to denigrate it. But the results that have some human application come down to the fact that I'm going to pay more attention to my children than to my nephews. We didn't need biology to tell us that, and it doesn't really tell us much beyond that. And it also doesn't tell you why I'm going to pay just as much attention to an adopted child as to my own children – and take the same attitude towards it, even though I know it's adopted. [Nor does it tell you] why many people care more about their cats and dogs than they do about their children – or take dolphins, which are the classic case. So it just doesn't get us very far. It's interesting work and we learn something about insects and other organisms and something about social behavior, but very little about humans that has any implications.

We know in advance that that's going to be true. Science deals with simple questions. It can't deal with questions that are beyond the borders of understanding. We kind of chip away at the limits.

Take the evolution of language. It's a question; and so is the evolution of bee communication a question. But just compare sometime the literature on one with the literature on the other. There are libraries of material on the evolution of human language and some scattered technical papers on the evolution of bee communication, which mostly point out that it's too hard to study, although it's vastly easier to study than evolution of human language. This is just irrational. Not that it's wrong to study the evolution of human language and I think there are some directions to look, like the one you mentioned. There's comparative evidence about the sensory-motor system, which may turn out to be very peripheral – but it's there. So sure, study it to the extent you can, but sensibly – knowing when you're talking and producing serious science and when you're gesturing rhetorically to a general public who you're misleading. Those are important distinctions, and I think if we make those distinctions, a lot of this literature pretty much disappears.

To some extent, there are other factors that enter into it which cause it to be misleading. Many of these people, like Dawkins, regard themselves very plausibly as fighting a battle for scientific rationality against creationists and fanatics and so on. And yes, that's an important social activity to be engaged in, but not by misleading people about the nature of evolution – that's not a contribution to scientific rationality. Tell them the truth about evolution, which is that selection plays some kind of a role, but you don't know how much until you know. It could be small, it could be large; it could [in principle even] be nonexistent. We have to find out. In the few cases where something has been learned, it's often very surprising, like the evolution of the eye. What appears to be the case is completely different from what had been speculated for centuries in biology, and the same is true of many other things – it could be true of human language. So there's nothing wrong with sociobiology or evolutionary psychology – the field that Kropotkin basically invented – but it has to be done seriously and without pretense.

JM: There are some specific hypotheses – let me just pursue one. Robert Trivers suggested back in the seventies that cooperative behavior could have evolved among biological creatures that are often conceived, where biologically unrelated, to be essentially selfish. He assumed that cooperation could have evolved among biologically selfish creatures if it were generally to involve reciprocity – when x does something for y, x can expect something in return. The result is a back-scratching conception of cooperation and social behavior. Trivers's work has been given center stage by sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists. They have suggested – in a way reminiscent of utilitarian thinking – that his form of reciprocal altruism offers the key to understanding the biological basis of morality. As I understand your view, you do not think of humans as essentially selfish. You think of people as capable of – and getting satisfaction from – aiding others who are not kin and not even tribe, and cannot be expected to reciprocate. Furthermore you do not think that neo-Darwinian selectional stories exhaust what can be said about the biological foundations for language and perhaps for other domains. Are there alternative, non-Triversian biological grounds for morality, and does something like Humean sympathy offer such an alternative ground?

NC: Trivers's work is quite interesting. I don't think it gets us very far. I don't think it explains why people are willing to support the system of social security that's going to give a disabled widow across town enough food to survive – or the fact that we care more about dolphins than we do about people pretty near us who could help us. It just deals with a very small topic. It's interesting; and there are game-theoretic approaches that try to work out the consequences. All that's fine and should be done. But does it yield conclusions of human significance or scientific interest? Well, not of human significance as far as I can see. Of scientific interest, yes, but within a very narrow domain. Are there other human capacities that enter into our moral nature? I just don't see how that can be doubted. We know too much from our own experience and intuition; it shows that there's a huge domain – in fact, virtually all of human action, thought, and interpretation that doesn't fall within this category.

Is there some other evolutionary explanation for the rest of it? No. But that's true of almost everything. There's no evolutionary explanation for bee communication, or the most elementary questions of how simple organisms function – nematodes, for example. So yes, of course, science shines often-penetrating light on extremely simple questions. One of the reasons that physics is such a successful science is that it is granted the unique privilege of keeping to questions that are extremely simple. If the helium atom is too hard to study, you give it to the chemists. Other fields don't have that privilege but deal with the level of complexity that they're presented with, and as a result they're very shallow by comparison. In these areas – evolutionary explanations – we're just groping in the dark for the moment – there aren't good ideas, even for much simpler organisms. So all this work is fine. If you can achieve some plausible confirmed scientific results, everybody applauds; and there're no issues. What are its implications for human life and society? – well, that you have to investigate, and I think when you do, you find them extremely limited. Hume's and Smith's assumptions are, I think, much more plausible and lead to suggestions about how to behave in the world that are far more reasonable – and in fact that we adopt all the time.

JM: If we're decent, anyway.

NC: If we're decent. And that's why people like Kissinger are important – to tell us that we must reject our fundamental moral nature for reasons of power and so on. OK; that's interesting to hear. Now tell me something about moral human nature.

JM: Kissinger does strike me as pathological.

NC: . . . or maybe honest. I kind of prefer him to people who look at that view with horror and then presuppose it.

17 Human nature again

JM: Could we get back to human nature again? I'm still trying to figure out just what is distinctive about human nature. What I mean by ‘distinctive' is: distinguishing us from other sorts of primates, or apes. Clearly Merge – some kind of recursive system – human conceptual systems; in that, we are distinct. Is there anything else you've thought of?

NC: If you look at language, you can find a thousand things that look different. If you look at a system you don't understand, everything looks special. As you begin to understand it, things begin to fall into place, and you see that some things that look special, really aren't. Take Move – the displacement phenomenon. It's just a fact about language that displacement is ubiquitous. All over the place, you're pronouncing something in one position, and interpreting it in some other position. That's the crude phenomenon of displacement – it's just inescapable. It's always seemed to me some kind of imperfection in language – a strange phenomenon of language that has to be explained somehow. And now, I think, we can see that it's an inevitable part of language: you'd have to explain why it isn't around. Because if you do have the fundamental recursive operation which forms hierarchic structures of discrete infinity, one of the possibilities – which you'd have to stipulate to eliminate – is what amounts to movement – taking something from within one of the units you've formed and putting it at the edge; that's movement. So what looked like a fundamental property of language and also looked like a strange imperfection of language turns out to be an inevitable property of language – and then the question is, how is it used, how does it work, and so on and so forth. That's a serious rethinking of perspective. And that's what happens when you learn something about what looks like a chaotic system.

It's been the same throughout the history of the sciences. Everything you look at appears to be completely chaotic and inexplicable. You begin to tease a few principles out of it, and some of it – maybe a lot – falls into place; and the rest looks chaotic. How far can you go in this? You don't know. But the question of what is unique to humans as distinct from other primates arises right there – how much of what we see in language and human theory of mind and the curious nature of human concepts, which are not referential in the animal sense – how much of this is unique to humans, how much isn't? For example, the special properties of phonological rules – are they unique to humans, or will they be shown some day to be just an optimal way of meeting conditions that phonology has to meet? Phonology has to meet the condition that it relates the sensory-motor system to objects created by the computational operations of hierarchic recursion. Well, maybe phonology is an optimal way of meeting those conditions, and its various apparent complexities arise as a solution to that problem. Nobody knows enough to know whether that's true; but it wouldn't be very surprising. In fact, I strongly suspect that something like that must be true – otherwise, how would anybody ever pick it up?

JM: What about human moral systems?

NC: There is now for the first time some serious research into it. A lot of it grew out of John Mikhail's dissertation; now Marc Hauser is doing work, Elizabeth Spelke, and others. And they're finding some quite interesting things. There are these kinds of paradoxical situations that have been worked on by ethical philosophers for some time – trolley problems, for example – conditions under which you have a choice to make. A typical case is a doctor in a hospital who has five patients who each have different diseased organs, and they're all going to die. And a healthy person comes in and you could kill him and take the appropriate organs and transplant them and save five patients. So, should you kill one person and save five patients? Almost everybody says no, although on any utilitarian grounds, or any other principle you can think of, the answer ought to be “yes.” And that turns out to be cross-culturally valid. It's true of young children. It's an extremely strong principle. And there are many different variants of it. On the other hand, you make slight modifications of it, and it turns out that people say “yes.” If you're driving a trolley and you go this way you kill five people, and go the other and you'll kill one person, you've got to kill the one person. Well, why is it different? These are very sturdy principles. They hold up cross-culturally, children, and so on. And in investigating them, you're investigating our fundamental moral nature, which has deep properties that have paradoxical outcomes.

You can think of this – in fact, Mikhail in his thesis did think of it – as a way of pursuing remarks of Hume's on the nature of moral systems. The remarks do point out the basic problem, although he didn't carry it anywhere. The basic problem that he pointed out is that we have an infinite number of duties, responsibilities, moral commitments, and we can determine how they work in new situations; we're constantly facing new circumstances and applying these moral principles. They can't be stored in our minds. So they must arise from some much smaller set of fixed moral principles that are a part of our fundamental nature and thought of by some generative procedure – now this is not Hume's term, but that's what it amounts to.

JM: You pointed out when we spoke earlier that it's not really a moral competence [he had in mind]; rather, it's some kind of generative procedure for the generation of use, or the generation of action, or . . .

NC: or the generation of judgments also . . .

JM: the generation of judgments, yes.

NC: We can somehow generate judgments and you can't expect that . . .

JM: But he had nothing like the notion of a recursive procedure . . .

NC: No, not at that time. But he did recognize that there must be certain principles from which the others derive. He maybe had in mind something like Euclidean geometry, although it's hard to know. I don't think that there's any development of this anywhere among moral philosophers. But the point is clearly there. And it's correct. That's the core principle of generative grammar, and of any unbounded cognitive system.

JM: I suspect that had he taken it seriously, he wouldn't have worried about the missing shade of blue.[C]

NC: The missing shade of blue is the same problem, and it's got to somehow follow from whatever principles we have that organize colors for us. And it shows – and I suspect that Hume was aware of this; he left it as a paradox – that the idea that we're picking them up by sensation and association can't possibly be right. The missing shade of blue shows that.

JM: If moral reasoning and judgment has this kind of character, is there any suggestion . . . What I'm trying to get clear about is the relationship, if any, between the conceptual domain and a specialized form of it, such as our moral judgment and our moral evaluations. Is that even a part of our conceptual scheme, or is it . . .

NC: Well, the notion of a conceptual scheme is loose enough that it can include anything we want to think of as ‘thought.' So, yes, it's all a part of our thought. What the components are, how they are related, whether they have similar origins, and so on . . . who knows?

Certain aspects of our moral judgments probably can be accounted for in terms of notions like kin selection, and the like. It's no surprise that you pay more attention to your children than to someone you've never seen before. And maybe you can account for that on evolutionary grounds – kin selection, gene survival, and so on. On the other hand, it's very unclear how far that can go. For example, people spend a lot more emotion and time and energy in saving a stranded dolphin than in saving a million children dying in Africa; and the evolutionary distance between humans and dolphins is hundreds of millions of years.

JM: Kin selection – it's by definition restricted. It can't be universalized. Is there an argument to the effect that virtually rules it out of [explaining] the moral domain?

NC: Well, there may be some elements that enter into our moral theories, but it's a good question how far it can go. There are so many obvious counterexamples – like, say, an adopted child. You don't care for the adopted child less than the natural child. And you care for it a lot more than for a cousin, say – or an animal, or a dolphin. Our moral judgments are far more intricate than anything that can be reduced to those realms – which isn't, though, to say that they aren't a part of it. It's possible that there's something to the earliest theories of evolutionary psychology – Kropotkin's. He held that mutual aid is a factor in evolution. But whatever the answer turns out to be, it's still going to be necessary to carry out the task of characterizing the moral faculty. And you can by now begin to understand some aspects of it experimentally.

JM: There was a Canadian provincial premier of oil-rich Alberta, Ralph Klein, who said that Canada ought to get involved in Iraq – Canada ought to commit troops, etc. – because the US is our friend. It strikes me that his is a prudential claim based on interest, and not a moral judgment. The ‘ought’ there is offered to indicate that it is in ‘our’ interests to . . .

NC: Well, it depends on what's in his mind, of course; it might have been a judgment of interest or a moral judgment. But I'd guess it is the former . . .

JM: I think that it was. . . . But, continuing, it certainly seems to be possible, in principle, to make distinctions between prudential or project-related ‘oughts’ and moral ones. Is universalizability a way of characterizing and distinguishing the moral ones?

NC: Well, it might be – by picking out the moral ones from the prudential ones. The prudential ones aren't moral; they're immoral, in fact. We recognize them to be immoral.

JM: . . . as Kant pointed out . . .

NC: So they tell us something about our moral faculty; namely, that these are acts that we regard as immoral.

JM: Is there any hope of systematicity in the conceptual sphere?

NC: I'm sure that there is some. Take the kind of work that has come out of Davidson's ideas on event structure; that's been very productive. It's internal computation, but it's the internal computation that's due to thought systems.

JM: . . . syntactic . . .

NC: Yes, and if there's going to be any systematicity to conceptual systems, it's also going to be syntactic. It'll have something to do with the internal computations that go on – systems of judgment and perception.

JM: . . . in some broad sense of syntactic . . .

NC: Well, if by ‘syntax’ we just mean internal computation of symbols – like, say, Peirce would have meant – then, yes, it's all syntax. It's in the head; it's syntax. There are some parts of it that will relate to motion of molecules; we call that “phonology.” There's another part that will relate to truth-indications. We call that “semantics.”[C]

18 Morality and universalization

JM: You’ve pointed out in your moral/political work that one of the most elemental truths is that you ought to universalize your moral principles. What about people who deny that?

NC: Does anyone actually, literally, deny that?

JM: . . . Not, I suppose, without shifting out of the moral domain.

NC: What people would say, I think, is that yes, we keep to universal principles, but the special circumstances are such that . . .

JM: . . . Wait a minute; the people we’re dealing with are not real people?

NC: . . . No, they are – like Henry Kissinger or somebody. There are people who say that it can’t be universalized. But if you asked Kissinger, who does have the honesty to say it rather than just accept it when it is convenient, he would say that of course, really, at some other level, it is universalized. But it's a deeper principle that is universalized, one that exempts us from the restriction against, say, aggressive war. So the deeper universal principle is, say, that you have to act to make the world the best possible world, but a special case of that is that we have to be exempt from every moral principle. So it's still universalized: immoral, of course, but universalized.[C]

Actually, there's an interesting paper that I don’t understand, but it's interesting. You might want to read it. It's by Akeel Bilgrami. Ask him to send it to you; it's a draft. In it he distinguishes universality from universalizability in a way that is interesting, but I can’t reproduce it, because I don’t quite understand it. It's a paper on Gandhi. He's arguing that Gandhi was in some deep sense an intuitive moral philosopher who had something important to say, and the standard interpretations are wrong. Part of it is a distinction between universality and universalizability. Universalizability means that it's a principle that we have a way to make universal – or something like that. And that's different from a principle that's universal. He does make a distinction, and he has cases that make sense, but I don’t understand it well enough to repeat it. But that might be something relevant; it's an interesting approach. It's a thoughtful paper; I’m sure of that.

JM: Akeel's work is . . .

NC: . . . He compares Gandhi to Mill and others. He also has all sorts of things to say about truth that are interesting – and the search for truth as an objective, which it wasn’t for Gandhi. He argues also that Gandhi wasn’t really interested in persuasion, because he regarded that as violence, and that the meaning of his true non-violence is just to present a model, which others will then decide to follow, or not. Which sounds to me vaguely confusing, from what I’ve read.

JM: To help me get a grip on this, let me get back to that Canadian premier of Alberta who argued that Canada ought to go in with Bush into Iraq. He argued the following way: we have a moral obligation to do so because the US is our friend, and he meant by friend, effectively, that we scratch their back if they scratch our back.

NC: That's a universal principle, presumably. I wouldn’t call it a very moral principle. Here we’re running into questions of conflicting moral systems, and you have the usual problem of trying to work your way through them by seeing if there's some deeper ground from which you can derive something you can agree on. So did he agree that Germany should have declared war on the United States because it was allied with Japan, and Japan had declared war on the US?

JM: Unsurprisingly, no.

NC: Well, why not? That's a case of scratch your back if you scratch mine . . . That's the way to decide whether he really means it.

August 17, 2004 session

JM: When we were together last time, we spoke briefly about Akeel Bilgrami's piece on Gandhi, and the distinction between universals and universalizability. You mentioned that Gandhi had held the principle that you should not persuade, because that was a form of violence. I was interested in that in part because . . .

NC: You can only exemplify . . .

JM: Ok, right. A colleague, now retired, Harry Bracken, used to hold a related view.

NC: Really?

JM: It appeared in his view that rational argument is not a form of persuasion; rather it's a form of display, or a form of deduction from accepted principles, principles on which the participants agree, or can on consideration accept. Persuasion typically involves the use of force, power, authority . . . It is not rational argument. Is that the kind of distinction that you had in mind?

NC: I’d put it differently, but I essentially agree with the position. So, say, you’re with children, or teaching, or involved in a discussion, or talking to an audience . . . Ideally, you should not be trying to persuade them – that is, get them to accept your position. You should be trying to encourage them to think the issue through and arrive at their conclusion, and rational argument presents materials that they can use. So, for example, they may decide that they don’t like the premises, or they may find that there's a flaw in the argument, or something else. It's presenting a framework that people may not have thought of and that they can use for their own purposes. It's a pretty hard distinction to make and observe. When you’re talking to people, it's hard not to try to persuade them. But at least as an ideal, that's what one ought to strive for.

It should be true of teaching. There's no point in persuading people. If you’re teaching, say, physics, there's no point in persuading a student that you’re right. You want to encourage them to find out what the truth is, which is probably that you’re wrong.

JM: Is this policy driven partially prudentially, that people can’t effectively develop any kind of conviction unless they make the decision themselves, basing it on their own grounds?

NC: I think that's probably a fact; you’re not going to arrive at a true understanding unless you somehow reach it yourself. But, quite apart from that, it's [really] just a moral issue. It depends on what your attitude is towards other people: should they obey you, or should they think things through for themselves?

JM: Harry used to put it in terms of Plato's distinction between rhetoric on the one hand and philosophy – by which he meant rational argument – on the other. I think that's plausible, although it does suggest that there's a clear distinction there . . .

NC: I know I’m always put off by people who are called good speakers, by those who can rouse an audience. That's just what you do not want. If you have the capacity to do it, you should suppress it.

JM: But you are a good speaker, you know.

NC: I think I’m a rather boring speaker. But if I had the capacity to be a speaker who could rouse an audience to passion and excitement, I would try, at least, not to use that capacity. Because I think it's wrong.

JM: That's characteristic of your argument style in politics: you just present the facts. It seems to me it's an excellent technique. Even when you use irony, it works because those who hear it know what the facts are . . .

NC: Well, by now quite the opposite is refined into almost a point of principle. A political figure is not supposed to present materials and ask you to make your own judgment. It's also enshrined in one of the greatest tributes to human irrationality that exists, namely, formal debates – you know, debating societies like those found at Oxford, Yale . . . They’re based on a principle of profound irrationality, namely, that you can’t change your mind. The rules of debate are that you must take a position and keep to it, even if you’re convinced that your opponent has a good argument, you’re not allowed to say so. You have to show in some way that it's not right, even though you think it is. There cannot be anything more irrational. That's why I usually refuse when I’m invited to take part in these debating societies, and so on – or even to take part in debates; it's ridiculous.

Suppose it's an area in which people at least try to be reasonable, say, the sciences, where it's a goal to be reasonable. You don’t have debates with people; you interact with them and you see if their arguments are correct. If a student comes in with a paper, we don’t have a debate – or we shouldn’t. What we should have is a discussion to see which parts are right, which parts are wrong, where we change our ideas, and so on. But the very concept of a debate – it's just a tribute to human irrationality.

It's a part of the same thing. Somehow, the point is to persuade, not to find out what is right, or to work out your own ideas, and so on.

JM: Obviously, you’re not in training to be a lawyer.

NC: Lawyers have to do it; they’re paid for it. A lawyer's job is to defend the client, no matter how rotten the case is. You can understand why a legal system should have such a role. It provides a person with some kind of defense. But to regard that as anything that people would enter into voluntarily, without having a role in a system of defending a person's rights, is just totally irrational. All these debating societies should go out of existence, in my opinion.

The one argument you can give for them is that they’re kind of like chess – that they sharpen people's modes of thinking, and so on. I doubt that. But I can’t think of any other argument in their favor. In fact, you can see it in debating societies. A debating team is trained to take both sides, and you don’t know until you get there which side you’re going to take.

JM: And it helps to know who the judges are, and what would convince them too . . .

NC: What convinces them is usually rhetoric, trickery . . . I don’t know if you’ve ever watched or participated in these elite debating societies, like, say, Yale's. I do it occasionally, but I really feel like walking out. It's mostly trickery, or rhetoric, or deviousness . . . and that's considered the ideal. You somehow have to trip up your opponent, even if he's right and you know he's right.

19 Optimism and grounds for it

JM: It's remarkable that, given the evidence of the ease with which people manage to deceive themselves with regard to their social and political motivations, to bond by exclusion, to succumb to racism and tribalism, and to cede their decision-making to leaders, to authority, and to power, you continue to maintain the optimistic view that a democracy in which people make decisions on the full range of issues that concern them – especially economic issues – is still a live vital option. Are there reasons to maintain this or is it perhaps a matter of hope, or even of faith?[C]

NC: It's not so much faith as hope – but there's plenty of empirical evidence for it too. It's true that people cede responsibility, become obedient, become racist, and so on. It's also true if you look at the historical evidence that they overcome it – that they struggle to overcome these things. There's been plenty of progress in every one of these domains in recent years. Take, say, women's rights. [Earlier, people didn’t even consider the matter:] my grandmother didn’t feel oppressed – she didn’t know she was oppressed. My mother knew she was oppressed but didn’t think there was anything you could do about it: it's just the natural order. My daughters aren’t like that. They wouldn’t accept that kind of existence – they’re aware of it, and they wouldn’t accept it. And the society around them doesn’t accept it. That's moral progress; [and] that's progress in understanding our own nature. But it's been achieved. It's not an easy struggle and it's certainly not over. And it's just in our own recent lifetimes, so we can watch it.

The same is true in case after case. There is slavery – there are maybe 30 million slaves in the world. But we no longer approve it, regard it as the natural order, or make up stories about how it's better for the slaves. Yet the arguments that were given for slavery – which were not insubstantial – were never answered; they were just rejected as being morally intolerable through a period of growth of moral consciousness. I haven’t heard a sensible answer to the main argument offered by slaveholders in the United States – it was a perfectly sensible argument, and has implications. The basic argument was that slaveholders are more moral than people who live in a market society. To take an anachronistic analogy, if you buy a car and I rent the same car, and we look at those two cars two years from now, yours is going to be in better shape than mine, because you’re going to take care of it; I’m not going to take care of mine. Well, the same is true if you rent people or you buy them. If you buy them, you’re going to take care of them; it's a capital investment. If you rent people, they’re just tools; you throw them out when you’re done with them – if they can’t survive, who cares, you can throw them out on the dump yard. That's the difference between a slave society and a market society. In a market society, you rent people; in a slave society, you buy them. So therefore slave societies are more moral than market societies. Well, I’ve never heard an answer to that, and I don’t think that there is an answer. But it's rejected as morally repugnant – correctly – without following out the implications, that renting people is an atrocity. If you follow out that thought, slave owners are right: renting people is indeed a moral atrocity. It's interesting that 150 years ago, when there was an independent, free, labor-based press, it was just taken for granted – so fully taken for granted, that it was even a slogan for the Republican Party, that wage labor is fundamentally no different from chattel slavery except that it's temporary, and has to be overcome.

JM: That was a different Republican Party . . .

NC: It was the Republican Party of Lincoln; and actually, there were editorials in the New York Times about it. It was just taken for granted around here, where the industrial revolution began [in the US]. The working-class press – which is extremely interesting – just took it for granted: of course wage slavery is intolerable, and those who work in the mills are rented, and so on.

JM: Why hasn’t wage slavery been recognized for what it is?

NC: I think that that's part of our fundamental human nature – to recognize that – and it has been driven out of people's minds by massive propaganda and institutional structures. And I don’t think that it's very far below the surface. I’ve noticed that when I give talks to what are considered reactionary working-class audiences – you know, Reagan Democrats – when you begin to talk about these things, pretty soon, it seems entirely obvious to all. I think it's just below the surface, and that the system of this moral atrocity is sustained only by extensive efforts to divert people's attention from them, so they come to believe that it's a part of the natural order – just like my grandmother, or my mother, who believed that the oppression of women is the natural order, and that that was all there was to say.

Any kind of activism – say, women's rights – the first step you have to take is what's called consciousness raising: get people to recognize that there's nothing natural about domestic abuse, for example. Until very recently, it wasn’t considered an issue; it's just right – it's the way things work, so what is there to say? Women are property owned by their husbands, and if they want to smack them around, it's ok. That doesn’t work anymore. It doesn’t work because there was at first a step of raising the consciousness of women at least to see that this is not the natural order. It takes work to get to where we are; I don’t think you would ever have convinced my grandmother. After some progress in reaching those affected, similar efforts in the rest of society come. And finally, your true moral nature does emerge. Now, domestic abuse is not officially tolerated: I mean, it happens a lot, but it's not acceptable any more. Well, those are striking changes, and I think the same is true of wage labor. It's accepted in the way domestic abuse was accepted by women, and it requires a period of consciousness raising to get us back to the level of understanding that was standard a century and a half ago. There's been regression on this, and the regression has to do with quite clear and definite institutional structures and, often, conscious propaganda. A tremendous part of the propaganda system is directed to that, and pretty consciously. If you read the literature of the public relations industry – the main propaganda industry – they’re fairly conscious of what they’re doing.

JM: Imagine someone like Foucault who might respond: well, it seems that the other guys are winning now. It's not so much that a basic, intrinsic human nature is coming to be revealed [through consciousness raising and action], it's rather that the small guys are beginning to win.

NC: Whether this was Foucault's position or not, I frankly don’t know, because I don’t understand most of the stuff that he wrote. But in the one interchange that we had (Chomsky & Rajchman 2006), it was very clearly his position . . . I have to say that he struck me as the most amoral human being I have ever met. Also, I think it [his position in the interchange] is intellectually incoherent. If it's just a battle of who's stronger than anyone else, why do we have any judgments at all about right and wrong? My impression, from reading his other work, is that he thought that torture in prisons is wrong. But I really don’t understand why.

JM: When you debated Foucault in the seventies, you claimed against his view that the concept of justice tracks power and authority, that, in fact, justice – and presumably the other concepts of human moral and political virtue – are universal, lodged in a fixed human nature. You haven’t changed your views on this matter, have you?

NC: [I claimed it] namely, for a very elementary reason. If that weren’t true, then none of us in any culture could acquire the conceptions of that culture. There's something deeply incoherent about Rorty-style relativism (cf. Chomsky 1998), which says that this culture does it this way, and that culture does it that way. The question is how does any culture get established in an individual? It's not by taking a pill. It has to be acquired by an individual by the same means as other forms of cognitive growth. And – like other forms of growth – you can acquire the norms of that culture only if you are predisposed – in a very restrictive fashion – to select those norms from the data around you, and not different norms. And now you’re back to strong innatism; so the whole position is just incoherent. As soon as you ask the first question about it, it collapses.

JM: Why are people attracted to plasticity theories and to empiricist accounts of human nature and the mind?

NC: Different reasons for different people, undoubtedly, but I think there is one strain in modern intellectual history that is not insignificant – I don’t want to say that it is everybody. This is an extremely convenient doctrine for managers. I mean, if people have no intrinsic nature – which is incoherent, but let's assume it – then there is no moral barrier to controlling them. You can say to yourself that you’re controlling them for their own good, even though that's incoherent. [It makes it seem that] there is no moral barrier against it. Well, what are intellectuals? They’re managers. They’re economic managers, political managers, doctrinal managers. That's basically their role; we call certain kinds of managers “intellectuals.” We don’t call corporate executives intellectuals, but that's just terminology. Public intellectuals are just other kinds of managers. We happen to use the word intellectuals for them, and not for economic managers; but they’re all basically trying to control actions, attitudes, beliefs, and so on. And for people in a managerial role, it's highly convenient to think there's no moral barrier to controlling people. In fact, it's morally appropriate to do so. If you look through the intellectual history of this, it's very striking. Somehow, we’re exempt from this. Whoever is writing or speaking [holds], “I’m not part of this formless mass of people who have no character or nature; I have a nature, and I know what's right – they don’t. I’m a different creature and it's proper for me to intervene to help them, to control them.” Well, this goes right back through intellectual history.

Take a look at John Stuart Mill's classic essay on what is now called “humanitarian intervention”; it's read in courses in law school, and so on. His argument, which is utterly shocking, is that England is an angelic society – so angelic that other people can’t understand it. They attribute base motives to us because they can’t understand how magnificent we are. There's a debate about whether England should become involved in the problems of other people – in India, or on the continent, etc – and there were some that said that it's none of our business, let's just pursue our own interests. And Mill takes a more ‘moral’ position. He said that, since we are angels, and they’re a different kind of creature, it is our responsibility to intervene to help them and to show them the right way, even though they’re going to attribute base motives to us and heap obloquy upon us, nevertheless; we have to face it and do it. And then he applies it in a particular case, the one that interested him – India. He knew all about India; he was Corresponding Secretary of the East India Company, just like his father, who was involved in it. He knew everything that was going on there. Besides, it was all over the press in England; there was a huge parliamentary outrage over British atrocities there, and so on. He was writing right at the point when Britain was carrying out its worst atrocities in India, right after what in England was called the “Indian mutiny,” meaning that Indians rebelled – from the British point of view, mutiny. They committed some atrocities – they killed some Europeans. And the British reaction was just ferocious. The population was actually reduced in several provinces. Mill was in favor of it; he said that we have to do it, because they are barbarians, we’re angels, and the barbarians need our guiding hand. So even if people are going to condemn us, we’ve got to go in and continue the process of conquering India, for their own good.

JM: As I recall, Marx argued in a similar way.

NC: Yes, in fact, this runs right across the intellectual tradition. Take Mill's article today and just change a few words, and it's the main literature on humanitarian intervention. Is there any better basis than his? Take a look at the cases.

The argument is very simple, and it's the foundation of modern political science – that's Lippman, Lasswell, and the other influential founders of the public intellectual tradition. Not everyone, of course, but it's a very powerful mainstream tradition, and it goes way back in intellectual history, and it's understandable. How do you justify it? Always the same way. We’re somehow different from them; they are malleable, or maybe they have barbaric instincts, or something; and for their own good, we have to control them. For their own good, we have to keep them from running across the street.

If you look at the way that this has been exercised, it's shocking. Take Mill again. He's particularly interesting because it's hard to find a figure of higher moral integrity and intelligence. He was very knowledgeable. Why was England trying to expand its control over India at that time? Partly just in revenge, because the Indians had dared to raise their heads, and they’re not allowed to do that. But in part it was because they were building the biggest narcotrafficking empire in history. It's hard to imagine anything like it today. They were trying to gain a monopoly of opium so they could force their way into the Chinese market, which they couldn’t get into because their own goods were not competitive; and the only way that they could do it was try to turn it into a nation of drug addicts, by force. And they had to conquer large parts of India to try to gain that monopoly. This narcotrafficking empire was huge. It was the foundation for a lot of British capitalism and the British Empire. Mill wasn’t unaware of that. He was writing right at the time of the second opium war. Of course he knew; and it was being discussed all over the place in England. Interestingly, there were critics – the old-fashioned conservatives, classical liberals, such as Richard Cobden: he thought it was horrendous. If you look today, Robert Byrd [who criticized the US invasion of Iraq] criticizes things [like this]; but [he and a few others are] relics of classical liberalism. If you accept classical liberal principles, yes, it was horrendous. But that's on the margin of intellectual history, not mainstream. And for the mainstream – to get back to the original point – it's very convenient to think that humans have no nature and are malleable. I think this accounts for a lot.

There are other factors. I know from particular cases – I won’t mention any names – that there are distinguished figures who think it is necessary to accept this point of view to block religious fanaticism, and literally can’t see any difference between adopting what's called “innatism” – meaning scientific rationality [in the study of mind] – and belief in God.

JM: Is methodological dualism another aspect of the same phenomenon?[C]

NC: That's my feeling. It's quite striking how sensible people, [even those] embedded in the sciences, just take a different approach toward human mental faculties and mental aspects of the world than they do to the rest. There's no issue of innatism regarding the development of the visual system in the individual; why is there an issue regarding cognitive growth and language's role in it? That's just irrational.

20 Language, agency, common sense, and science

JM: Switching topics slightly for a while in order to look at the issue from a different point of view . . . What's on the other side of language [the faculty]? If it has this capacity of integrating, coordinating, and innovating, what are we to think of what lies on the ‘other side’ of its [the faculty's] operations? You spoke of performance systems in some of your earlier works, and in the case of production and perception, it's pretty clear what those are. But what about the conceptual and intentional systems?

NC: . . . Those are internal systems; they're something that's going on in your head and my head.

JM: Those are internal systems. OK, but I'm trying to get clear about what role language has in contributing to agency, action. Let me put it this way: philosophers like to think of people as agents, as decision-makers who deliberate, who take into account various kinds of information and bring them to bear on making decisions in ways that satisfy desires, and the like. What about that notion of an agent? To a certain extent, it seems as though language is being given some of those roles (of gathering information, etc.).

NC: Language can be conceived of as a tool for agents, for agency – whatever that is. It's Descartes's point, basically, that you can use your linguistic abilities to say anything you want about any topic which is in your conceptual range, but when you do it, you're acting as a human agent with a human will, whatever that is.

Most scientists tend to accept the Cartesian dogma that only humans have this capacity, so that insects are automata. But we don't know that. If you ask the best theorists of ants why an ant decides at one point to turn left rather than right . . . well, the question can't even come up [for a scientific answer]. You can talk about the mechanisms, you can talk about the motivations, you can talk about the external and internal stimuli, but they don't predict what the ant's going to do. Maybe that's because we don't know enough and the ant's really an automaton. Or maybe we just haven't captured the notion of agency properly.

JM: Is then the concept of a person and the concept of an agent as we ordinarily think of it – is it something that is a creature of common sense – useful for us, no doubt, but perhaps something that science can't get a grasp on?

NC: Well, it is clearly a concept of common sense. So when Locke devoted a chapter to trying to figure out what a person is, he's discussing our commonsense understanding of what a person is. He's not discussing something in the outside world. He's discussing an internal, mental conception that we have. And it turns out to be a very strange one.

JM: This is his ‘forensic’ notion of a person . . .

NC: . . . his forensic notion. There is a chapter in the Essay, chapter 27 of the first book, or somewhere around there, where he devotes himself to explorations through thought experiments, asking – say – when would you say that somebody is the same person? Well, he basically concludes – what's quite plausible – that it's some manner of psychic continuity – that the whole body can change, and so on; but as long as it remains a continuous psychic entity, you think of it as the same person.

And he does raise questions to which there is probably no answer, such as what would we do if two bodies had exactly the same psychic constitution: is it one person, or two people? Or what about if one of them changed into the other? Well, at that point you're getting to places where our intuitions just break down. There's no reason whatsoever that our commonsense intuitions should give answers to every question. There's a long tradition going back to Plato, Heraclitus, Plutarch, and on and on about the ship of Theseus. Over the centuries, people have made up impossible conundrums about when we would say that it is the same ship. A standard thing that you learn in your philosophy 101 course is that if you keep replacing the planks at sea, it's the same ship, and if somebody takes those same planks that you threw away and makes a replica of the original ship, somehow it's not the same ship. You can make up case after case like this.

These questions were throughout history typically discussed as metaphysical questions – so, is it the same ship, or thing in the world? Well, the ship is not a thing in the world to start with; it's a mental construction that, of course, relates to things in the world when we so use it. The thing that you're discussing is the mental construction. And that mental construction has some answers, but not other answers. And those answers don't really tell you a lot about metaphysics. They just tell us that that's the way we think about the world. We think about the world as involving certain kinds of continuities. They mean nothing to the physicist. As far as the physicist is concerned, if you take out a nail, it's a new ship.

Well, the physicist's way, that's not the way we think about it. All this shows that we're just inquiring into our own internal conceptions, what we call common sense. It has a relation to the world, of course, but it's not the same thing. If these questions – what's the ship of Theseus, what's a person, what's a tree, and so on – if they're re-interpreted as they should be, cognitively, epistemologically rather than metaphysically, well, then, they can be explored as topics of cognitive science. What's the nature of our conceptual systems? And then we discover that it's true that persons have responsibilities and obligations, and trees don't. That's not because we made a discovery about the world. It's because that's the way we think about the world. Persons, apart from infants and the mentally ill, and so on, have responsibilities, deserve praise and censure, and so on, and a dog doesn't, unless you personify it. Is it because we've discovered something metaphysical? Well, there may be something metaphysical underlying that – in fact, there probably is – but that's not what we discover. We discover that this is the way we look at creatures. And in fact, if you go back in pretty recent history – say, again, the seventeenth or eighteenth century, when a lot of these topics really became alive – people are really confused about whether we regard, say, orangutans and negroes as persons. They seemed more or less the same, and they weren't like us; they're creatures of some kind. Were any of them persons? Were all of them persons? You get huge debates about all this because the internal concept PERSON just isn't going to carry you very far in figuring out how the world works – just as [Descartes's] contact mechanics carried you pretty far, but not past Newton, who showed you can't figure out how physical objects [as understood by contact mechanics] work.

This goes right on into contemporary philosophy. A crucial, exciting topic in contemporary philosophy is [still] Kripkean essentialism – Putnam's version – which is based on questions like is water H_2O? Well, it's like your intuitions about the ship of Theseus. You have whatever you have. It's not going to tell you anything about H_2O (the stuff described by scientists) any more than talk about the ship of Theseus is going to tell you about ships from a physicist's point of view. It's telling you about how you look at and interpret the world. And these discussions are particularly odd, for one thing, because the alleged intuitions are mostly inside a philosophical cocoon. People have to be trained to have those intuitions by taking graduate courses in philosophy. And also it's very unclear what the intuitions are even supposed to be about. So take the sentence, water is H_2O; that's the core sentence of the whole discussion. We've all learned – or maybe we've been taught – that a sentence has no meaning outside a language. So what language is this sentence in? It's got to be in some language. Well, it's not English. English doesn't have [the concept] H_2O in it; that's an invented concept that you bring into English. It's not a sentence of physics, or chemistry, because they don't have the concept WATER. It's true that when a chemist writes an article, he or she will use the word water, but he or she's using informal discourse. You're not doing everything in a precise formalism, even if you're doing mathematics. But chemistry has no concept WATER; it has a concept of H_2O, and you can informally call it “water,” if you like, but WATER is not a concept of chemistry. So the sentence is not chemistry, it's not English, it's not French, it's not German; in fact, it's no language at all. It's some amalgam of languages – or rather, symbolic systems and languages – that we pick up. But we can't have any intuitions about things like that. It's meaningless. It's like having intuitions about quantum physics. So far as I can see, the entire discussion on all sides is basically vacuous. And that's a primary theme in contemporary analytic philosophy. It's just not about anything.[C]

JM: . . . You don't have to convince me of that. Returning to your characterization of cognitive science – a very nice characterization, I think, quite unlike Jerry Fodor's, where cognitive science is essentially representation-of-the-world – as an (internalist) investigation of our cognitive structures. Granted we can investigate conceptual structures where we're talking about concepts such as PERSON, but what about the concepts that appear in the sciences? Can you investigate them [as a part of an internalist cognitive science]?

NC: Sure. You can investigate [the concept] H_2O. We don't know the answers. We know how to do it. We try to place it in an explanatory framework that we make as precise as circumstances require. There's no point in formalizing beyond the level of understanding that we have. And then we work within that. That's the way the sciences have always been.

Take, say, mathematics, the clearest case. We all know very well that up until the mid-nineteenth century, when a large part of the great mathematics was done, they didn't even define their concepts. No one had a clear notion of limit. Gauss was proving all these magnificent theorems where a limit just meant ‘getting closer and closer to.’ In fact, Berkeley was finding contradictions in Newton's proofs – a topic that English mathematicians took seriously, standing in the way of progress. One line of the proof treats zero as zero, and three lines later, it treats zero as something that you can get as close to as you want. Those are different concepts, so it's equivocation; the proof is based on an equivocation – it doesn't show anything. Well, on the continent, mathematicians knew it and didn't pay much attention to it and went ahead developing rich mathematics. Finally mathematics got to the point where you just had to understand what a limit is; you couldn't get along any more on these intuitive conceptions. So you get delta-epsilon definitions, Weirstrauss, Cauchy, and so on. OK, at that point, you know what a limit is. But you know it because it's been made explicit. And so it continues. Euclid in a sense had a real geometry. But it wasn't formalized until thousands of years later.

JM: But then to investigate the concepts of science, in effect, you learn the science.

NC: You learn the science, and you try to get as close as you can to a proper kind of scientific theory, whatever that means. We have all sorts of intuitive criteria that we use all the time to decide whether this is or is not a sensible scientific explanation.

JM: Is there a science of scientific concepts in the way in which there is – or will be – a science of commonsense concepts?

NC: I think that there should be. Here is where I tend to disagree with the line of thinking that Sue Carey (1987, 2009) is developing, although she could be right; I don't really know. Her basic position is that there's nothing new to say about how science is done; it's just more of the same. It's a more sophisticated version of what children are doing when they learn how to build houses out of blocks. Maybe; but my guess is that it's something quite different. There is a science-forming capacity that is – to some extent – put to use throughout human history when people make up mythological stories about creation or engage in magic – the transition between magic and science is not so clear. But it takes on a very different form in the modern period when it becomes a very self-conscious endeavor, trying to establish both empirical and epistemological criteria it's supposed to meet. It may change; it's not fixed. But at least it's being pursued as a systematic effort to gain a certain kind of explanation and insight. You can't just tell stories about something; you have to show that those stories have some substance. That's why so much talk about evolution is basically uninteresting; it's just stories. It could have happened that way; it could have happened twenty different ways. You don't know how to formulate the question in such a way that you could answer it. That's storytelling – in the framework of scientific ideas, but still storytelling. If you're serious about it, you try to prove it. Instead of just concocting stories, try to figure out ways in which you can study it [and get evidence for it]. And it's not so simple.

21 Philosophers and their roles

JM: I'd like to better understand your view of what might – this is a question that is partly driven by what a graduate student asked me to ask you – of what you think a philosopher could plausibly contribute now. It seems that some philosophers – philosophers after Descartes's and Hume's time – have been behind the times. They have not fully comprehended how advanced the sciences [and in particular, linguistics] are . . .

NC: There are some philosophers who know the sciences very well, and who have contributed to [the sciences]. They don't question the sciences; they try to clarify what they are doing and even contribute to them at some conceptual level. That's pretty much what Descartes and Kant and others did who were called philosophers. You can be connected to the sciences and know them extremely well. Take someone like Jim Higginbotham. He knows linguistics very well, and contributes to it.

JM: Indeed . . .

NC: and is doing it not the way technical linguists do, but with philosophical interests that relate to traditional questions of philosophy, and so on. I think that that's always a possibility. I suspect that John Austin was right when he said that philosophy should be the mother of the sciences. It's clearing away the thickets and the underbrush and trying to set things up in such a way that the sciences can take over.

JM: So the job of philosophers is to beat around in the bushes and see if they can scare up any birds . . .?

NC: Not only in the sciences, but in people's lives. . . . Take for example [John] Rawls[, the political philosopher]. He's not working in the sciences. He's trying to figure out what concepts of justice we have that underlie our moral systems, and so on. And it does verge on the sciences. So when John Mikhail [who has a degree in philosophy but is also developing a science of a moral faculty that distinguishes permissible from impermissible actions] picks it up, it becomes a science.

JM: OK, that's a plausible suggestion. I wonder if there aren't other issues here that bear on the question of the nature of the task that these people conceive that they are undertaking. Take, for example, Jim Higginbotham. He's very much taken by Fregean notions of minds and thoughts and seems to want to cash out what he contributes in Fregean terms. And I'm not sure that I would take that part as a particularly useful contribution . . .

NC: Which part of what he's doing? What do you have in mind?

JM: Well, he at least used to in many cases talk about propositions and thoughts, and the like, and gave these a very Fregean kind of reading. The idea wasn't that these were somehow biological entities; at least, that didn't come out in what I've read of his.

NC: His view, if I understand it correctly, is what he calls “weak conceptualism” – that these entities are independent of, but reflections of, internal mental events. But then the question comes, well, what function are they performing? If they're just a one-to-one image of what's inside, why not dispense with them? We could say the same about chemistry. There are the elements, and compounds of them; and then there are images of them in some Platonic universe that we could study, if we wanted. Unless they have some other properties that are not determined by the internal events that they are reflections of, then they're dispensable.

JM: But wouldn't it then be at least useful for philosophers to reconceive of themselves as engaged on an internalist project as opposed to the kind of externalist one that most of them imagine that they are engaged upon?

NC: Well, can you make up a sensible externalist project? There certainly are externalist projects – when you and I are talking, it's not just what is going on in your head and what's going on in my head; we're interacting. So the study of how parts of the world interact, depending on their internal natures and lots of other things – that's a topic, but I don't understand why it's a particular topic for philosophers. That's just another topic. Maybe philosophers have something interesting to say about it; that's fine. There's interesting work on pragmatics. But what doesn't seem to exist, so far as I can see, is externalist semantics. Did you take a look at Tyler Burge's latest book?[C]

JM: No, I haven't . . .

NC: You should; this comes up. There are a lot of critical essays on his work; one of them is mine [see “Internalist Exploration,” in Chomsky 2000]. What I wrote is mainly on the externalism, and he has interesting responses (Hahn & Ramberg 2003). You can see if you can make something of them. I don't personally think that they come to anything. He's an intelligent person trying to engage with the issues; most philosophers don't even engage with them; and – of its type – it's as good a job as I know of. Paul Pietroski is writing about these things now.

JM: Yes, he is; I admire his work. I particularly like some of his contributions to semantics (Pietroski 2005); a good internalist understanding of it too . . .

NC: and a good critical analysis of what's going on in the field, which I think is rare.

22 Biophysical limitations on understanding

JM: Incidentally, your LSA paper and the emphasis on the third factor threw a bit of a monkey wrench into my efforts to write a chapter on innateness as a contribution to a book on cognitive science . . .[1]

NC: Well, you just don't know . . . The more you can attribute to the third factor – which is the way that science ought to go; the goal of any serious scientist interested in this is to see how much of the complexity of an organism you can explain in terms of general properties of the world. That's almost like the nature of science. Insofar as there is a residue, you have to attribute it to some specific genetic encoding; and then you've got to worry about where that came from. Obviously, there's got to be something there; we're not all amoebas. Something has got to be there; so, what is it?

JM: It might be nice to have answers.

NC: I'm not sure; I like the edges of the puzzle.

JM: OK, you're right. They're much more fun.

NC: Think of how boring the world would be if we knew everything we can know, and even knew that we can't understand the rest.

JM: Yes, Peirce's millennial form of science does sound boring.

NC: Well, the nice thing about it is that his view can't be true, because he was making a serious error about evolution – assuming that we're basically angels by natural selection. But you could have something like it. You could imagine that the species would reach the point that everything knowable is known, including the limits of knowledge. So you could know that there are puzzles out there that can't be formulated. That would be ultimate boring.

JM: Yes, worse than heaven.[C]

[1] The chapter that eventully (2005) took into account third factor considerations in what it had to say about the innateness of language.

23 Epistemology and biological limits

JM: You've suggested many times that human cognitive capacities have limitations; they must have, because they're biologically based. You've also suggested that one could investigate those limitations.

NC: in principle.

JM: . . . in principle. Unlike Kant, you're not going to simply exclude that kind of study. He seems to have thought that it's beyond the capacity of human beings to define the limits . . .

NC: . . . well, it might be beyond a human capacity; but that's just another empirical statement about limitations, like the statement that I can't see ultraviolet light, that it's beyond my capacity.

JM: OK; but is the investigation of our cognitive limitations in effect an investigation of the concepts that we have?

NC: Well, it may be contradictory, but I don't see any internal contradiction in the idea that we can investigate the nature of our science-forming capacities and discover something about their scope and limits. There's no internal contradiction in that program; whether we can carry it out or not is another question.

JM: And common sense has its limitations too.

NC: Unless we're angels. Either we're angels or we're organic creatures. If we're organic creatures, every capacity is going to have its scope and limits. That's the nature of the organic world. You ask “Can we ever find the truth in science?” – well, we've run into this question. Peirce, for example, thought that truth is just the limit that science reaches. That's not a good definition of truth. If our cognitive capacities are organic entities, which I take for granted they are, there is some limit they'll reach; but we have no confidence that that's the truth about the world. It may be a part of the truth; but maybe some Martian with different cognitive capacities is laughing at us and asking why we're going off in this false direction all the time. And the Martian might be right.

JM: . . . assuming that the Martian could understand our cognitive capacities.

NC: . . . right.

JM: The project of investigating the limits of our cognitive capacities seems to me to be quite different from the kinds of projects that philosophers are fond of, or have been fond of, when they have introduced various kinds of epistemic constraints on what counts as meaningful or sensible or whatnot. Investigating the limits is a scientific project, not what too often amounts to a stipulative one.

NC: My own interpretation of those proposals is that they're suggestions about our science-forming capacities. So these epistemic limits . . . your proposals should be consistent, try to avoid redundancy, try to unify different aspects of science – physical reductionism, say – I think that all of those can only be understood as explorations of the way that we, as particular creatures, try to proceed to gain our best understanding of the world in a systematic fashion. That's the way we do it . . . But if you want a proof that it's the right way, well, I don't see how that can be possible. All you can say is that it's the best that we can do. We may discover that we're always going off track, in which case maybe that's irremediable. If we can't find a different track, it's irremediable. And sometimes – if you look at history – humans have found a different track by lowering their sights. So, for example, lowering one's sights from understanding the world to understanding theories about the world led to a rather significant change, and it's a change – it's sort of symbolized by Newton – that took several centuries to become internalized.

JM: It gives you a very interesting understanding of Wittgenstein's Tractatus and a number of other works in that genre. Was Russell engaged on that sort of project, at least as you understand him – in his early work?

NC: Pre-Tractatus?

JM: Russell before [Wittgenstein's] Tractatus.

NC: He was engaged in a kind of conceptual analysis that I think he regarded as giving us insight into the nature of reality. But it was conceptual analysis – as, for example, the theory of descriptions.

JM: By the time of Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, he was quite explicit about making proposals, based on an understanding of human nature.

NC: There it is explicit. It becomes a much more subtle and sophisticated approach that does appear to recognize – as the very title of the book indicates – that we're dealing with some organic phenomenon that is going to have its scopes and limits. He doesn't quite say it like that, but I don't know any other way of reading it.

JM: You do get normative overtones in a lot of philosophical writing – this is the way you ought to proceed . . .

NC: There's nothing wrong with that: you ought to do it by our lights, by the way we see things. It's the same with moral judgments.

JM: How does that differ from saying, “this is the way we have to do it?”

NC: It would be “this is the way we have to do it” if we knew enough about ourselves to say that there aren't any choices. Like “I have to fall off a cliff if I jump; I can't help it.” But we don't have that kind of understanding of much more complex things, like great areas of our lives.

These kinds of questions come up in naturalistic moral theories and naturalistic epistemological theories, and in both – which are the traditional ones – you can try to work out what our moral instincts are and what our moral faculties are. But there's a gap between that and what's objectively right – an unbridgeable gap from the standpoint of some non-human creature that can be understood to be right, something of which our moral nature has only a partial grasp.

And the same is true of epistemology. What makes the best theory? People use the term “best theory” freely, but what is the best theory? Well, we can try to sharpen up our criteria, as we understand them, but we're doing something analogous to investigating our own moral nature. We're investigating our epistemological nature, and within that framework you can come up with some notion of best theory that is on a par with our notion of right behavior. But again, from some point of view or standpoint that is external to us – which we can't take, because we're us, not that external thing – it could be evaluated in quite different ways.

JM: You're not assuming that we can make sense of the notion of an objective right or an objective truth?

NC: I do believe that there is an objective truth; ok, so I'm a naïve realist of sorts – I can't help it. But I think that if we think about ourselves, we will see that there is no way to have any confidence about it. We can have confidence about the fact that this is the best I can do with my cognitive capacities – and we can have less confidence, because we understand less, that this is the right way to behave in accordance with our moral nature. And I presume that we all have the same cognitive capacities and moral nature. But – and here we get to the last line of the Tractatus [of Wittgenstein] – beyond this, we just have to keep silent.

JM: But there are people such as Peirce who tried to give some kind of content to the notion that there is an objective truth. Whatever an ideal science happens to discover . . .

NC: He was putting it in the framework of an extremely poor evolutionary argument. It was a fallacious argument. If you take that argument away, then the conclusion collapses. His argument was that we were selected to attain the truth. We wouldn't have survived if we didn't have a truth-seeking capacity, and therefore if we just pursue it to the end, we would have the truth. That's the core of the argument. But it just doesn't work. Nothing in human evolution selected people who were good at quantum theory . . .

JM: If one believed that the mind were – counterfactually – something like a universal device, that we have some kind of capacity to be able to solve every problem we might encounter . . .

NC: . . . and to pose any kind of question . . .

JM: . . . and to pose any kind of question . . .

NC: I just don't know what that would mean. That's no organic entity that we can even conceive of.

JM: Still, a person who held that kind of belief might have a different kind of view about human cognitive capacities and objective truth . . .

NC: A person who held such a belief would be saying that we are somehow angels. There couldn't be a creature in the universe that would incorporate our cognitive capacities as a sub-part, maybe reject them the way we reject commonsense contact mechanics, and maybe go on to ask further questions that we don't know how to pose, and maybe find answers to those questions, without limit. How can we say that? How do we go beyond the limits of possible organic development?

JM: When you speak of investigating the limits of our cognitive capacities, I assume that you are allowing that there might be cognitive capacities that we simply have not been able to . . .

NC: . . . have not produced thus far. Yes; that's not at all surprising. Take, say, your arithmetical capacity. That wasn't used throughout almost all of human evolutionary history. There's just a tiny little fleck of time during which that capacity has ever been used. This is what bothered Anthony Wallace in his debates with Darwin. He argued that things like a mathematical capacity couldn't have been selected, because they were never used. If you don't use it, it can't be selected. But they've got to be in there somehow. And, he suggested, there must be some other forces like gravitation, chemical reaction, and so on that entered into the development of what he called human moral and intellectual capacities. That was regarded at the time as a kind of mysticism. But we should regard it as just sane science. It's on a par with what Newton was unable to accept, but should have: there are forces in nature that are beyond interaction through contact. Newton said it [there are such forces – specifically, gravity], but he didn't believe it. But it was right.

JM: If one had a view of human biology or perhaps biology in general rather more like Turing's or D'Arcy Thompson's, then you'd want to allow that proving useful is not a condition of a biological entity having some structure or being some kind of thing.

NC: Take D'Arcy Thompson. If biophysical laws determine the general shape of the properties of creatures, it doesn't say that you can't build submarines.

24 Studies of mind and behavior and their limitations

JM: I wanted to ask you some questions about social science, but I'm reluctant to switch the topic that much. Well, maybe we can.

NC: It should be a short conversation [both laugh].

JM: The social sciences, and many philosophical approaches to mind, take very seriously the idea of mind as essentially a causal mechanism that is driven by some sort of belief-desire psychology. That raises questions about the status of this particular kind of enterprise. It's very tempting to think of it as an outgrowth of folk science, never breaking with common sense as the serious sciences have done – hence, not a serious science. However, there are people such as Hilary Putnam – in his functionalist days, at least – who simply adopted the framework of belief-desire psychology, presented it in functionalist terms, and claimed that it could be conceived of as a science. Could I get your views on the status of this kind of exercise?

NC: Let's take something concrete; let's take some of the standard examples. I look out the window, I believe it's raining, I desire to stay dry, I take my umbrella. So my belief and my desire caused me to take my umbrella.

I think that that's just a description of what I did. There's no independent notion of belief, desire, or cause that enters into this discussion. It's just a way of describing what we regard as rational action. If instead of taking my umbrella I take my clothes off, we say it's irrational. But there's no more or less notion of cause, and we don't even know that there are such entities as beliefs and desires. In fact, plenty of languages don't have those words. What you would say is, well, I think it is raining, and I want to stay dry, and so I'm going to take my umbrella. There's no [mental representation] belief, there's no [mental representation] desire; just [my saying] here's what I want, here's what I think, here's what I do. What I think and what I want are probably related in some way or another to what I do, but that's not a sufficient basis for a science.

You get the feeling that it might be a science because you nominalize. If you talk about beliefs, then ok [you think], there must be some sort of system of beliefs, and we can try to say something about it, and so on. But maybe that's just the wrong way of looking at it. English happens to be a highly nominalizing language, so we're led down that path very easily. But it doesn't tell you that this is the right thing; in most languages you just can't say that kind of thing. You might claim that it's right to say these kinds of things, as it's right to talk about tensors, molecules, and so on. But you've got to show that. You can't just tell a story using “tensor” and “molecules” and then say, ok, we did it. You have to say what they are, and what the theoretical framework is in which you embed them, and so on. In these [belief-desire] cases, it's just not done.

Well, could it be done? You could have some kind of empirical study of what people believe and why they believe it, and so on. It might turn out – if that kind of study gets anywhere – that you could develop theories that postulate entities that they call “beliefs” and place them in some appropriate framework. Then you could talk about the belief component of the system. And the same with the desire component, perhaps. But even if you could do that, it's not at all clear that that's the right way to go. You would still have the non-trivial problem of bringing in causality. Now we're back to Descartes's problem. Does it cause you to do this? No; it just says that you're acting rationally, whatever that means. You can also choose to act irrationally; to take Descartes's example, you can choose to put your finger in the flame.

JM: Davidson in his “Mental Events” (1970) rejects belief-desire psychology as a science, but he wants to insist that action is caused – it's just that it's caused ‘physically.’ I was reminded of another article of his while you were speaking – “Psychology as Philosophy” (1980) in which he reports carrying out an experiment on a class of students at Stanford, and effectively showed that there is no possible way of measuring beliefs, desires, and the like. If there's no way of measuring them, there's no possible way of putting them into a theory.

NC: I don't know the article; what's a sketch of the proof?

JM: As I recall, he asked students to rank preference order for objects – some twenty or so – and then asked them to go over the list again and, pairwise, rank preference of one object over another: do they prefer a to b, b to c, and so on . . .

NC: . . . and it doesn't come out consistent.

JM: . . . it doesn't come out consistent.

NC: There's a lot of work on that; for example, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982). There are a lot of strange phenomena. Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (1994) has an interesting book in which he includes many paradoxical conclusions that people come up with. But that doesn't tell us that there's no belief system, just that they won't be consistent.

JM: That's right. Davidson used this in an argument to show that psychology is essentially philosophy, not science, because . . .

NC: It would say that a scientific psychology shows that people's belief systems are not consistent. That doesn't surprise me; I'm sure it's true of mine. And in fact, we know it's true. We do certain things because we feel, somehow, that that's what's happening, while some other part of our mind tells us that that's not what's happening. I can't imagine anyone not having that experience.

This is interesting work because Kahneman and Tversky spell out what happens. In fact, they come up with criteria that show why certain kinds of questions will give one kind of ranking, while another kind of question will give a different ranking. You're looking at the questions in some different kind of framework.

As for irrational beliefs: it's in front of us every moment. Take a look at the election that's coming this year [2004]. Probably large numbers of the people who are voting for Bush are doing it on the basis of irrational beliefs. These are poor working people who are getting completely shafted and have objective facts right in front of them that tell them that that's what's happening to them, and can with a trivial argument see that it's the result of these policies [of Bush]. But they nevertheless accept the view that this guy is standing up for us against the rich and powerful elitists. You couldn't have more obvious irrational beliefs.

JM: Is that really what they believe? I would have thought that the Republicans had managed to press the ‘family values’ button very hard, and also somehow in addition managed to mobilize the jingoist attitudes . . .

NC: Partly; but somehow, the end result is that many people – perhaps the majority – have the feeling that this guy is defending us against the liberal elitists . . .

JM: If so, it's even more irrational than I already imagined . . .

NC: But apparently that is the range of possible, testable attitudes. Maybe there are all kinds of reasons for it. But if you explore it a bit, it's clearly a system of extremely irrational beliefs. And that happens all the time.

JM: Returning to Davidson very quickly . . . He in “Mental Events” used what he took to be the non-scientific character of our psychological explanations – basically, belief-desire folk psychology – and used this as the basis for claiming the anomalism of the mental, and this in turn to claim token (not type) mind-brain identity. We speak of causing actions and perceptions being caused, so mental events cause and are caused by physical events. Causation is deterministic. Science as he understood it seems to require some kind of deterministic, law-like principles . . .

NC: Well, we don't know that the mind does not work by deterministic, law-like principles, we just know that the belief-desire type of description doesn't have those properties. You can say the same about the anomalism of the folk ‘physical.’ The ways we talk about the world – our intuitive understanding of the world in folk physical ways – is also not deterministic in the sense of Newtonian (or later) science.[C]

JM: Yes. But now, in your view of science, not folk science, are we committed to determinism?

NC: Well, if we are, that's a comment on our cognitive capacities. There's no external criterion that requires it.

JM: So causality has the status of a Kantian regulative principle . . .?

NC: . . . except that it's human-specific . . .

JM: . . . human-specific, not rational beings in general – whatever they are?

NC: Human-specific, unless we take ourselves to be the criterion for a rational being, in which case we end up being logical. If we have some other concept of rationality, we may conclude that humans are inherently irrational.

Suppose it's true. There's a lot of work now that suggests that religious beliefs of one kind or another – that's a broad category, belief in some supernatural force or whatever it may be – is inherent in human nature. You can imagine how that might be true. Take children; you can show experimentally that if there's something moving over here and something else moves over there in a systematic way unconnected to it, they will assume that there is some lever or something or other that's connecting them that they can't see. You look for mechanical causes; it's just in our nature. That's why it was so hard even for Newton himself to accept his law of gravitation; it's in our nature to look for mechanical causes. Well, you take a look at the world around you; the number of things that you can account for in terms of mechanical causes is infinitesimal, and if that is the way you have to look at things, you're going to have to look for some other cause. So you go to a supernatural cause, not a natural. So it could be that our cognitive capacities – I'm not suggesting it, but it could be – that the cognitive capacities of this creature will compel it in the actual world to conjure up supernatural forces. “There must be a mechanical causal law that explains this” happens to be an irrational belief. But it might be that we are just destined by our very nature to have that belief; that's just the way we are. I can certainly imagine a creature that worked like that, and it could well be us.

JM: There are any number of examples of individuals – like myself – who don't accept those beliefs in supernatural causes, meaning by that ones that don't accord with science as we have developed it . . ..

NC: No, we don't accept it consciously; but of course consciously we don't accept the fact that motion requires contact. On the other hand, our commonsense intuitions tell us that that's nonsense. So we're kind of living with two worlds, the world of our commonsense intuition, and some other world that we've been able to construct, in which we have a different conception of rationality. And it's a hard one to hang onto. We probably fail all the time in ordinary life.

JM: What about authority? Are we somehow set up in such a way that it is going to be something to which we will respond with obedience?

NC: We can make up stories in both directions. We don't know. There haven't been human societies in which there isn't some kind of authority. And among other primates it's certainly commonly the case – maybe universally the case – that there is some authority structure. It could be. You could make up a reason for that too. We all grow up in an authoritarian atmosphere by definition; we couldn't survive otherwise. Maybe there's something built-in about submission to authority. But you can make up the opposite story too. Children grow up in that framework, and they reject it. Maybe there's something about us that says that you reject authority. You can have it either way; it's one of the joys of evolutionary psychology. You can have it any way you like.

JM: But the enlightenment conception of the human being that you seem to hold – that is not a conception of human beings that is programmed to respond to authority . . .

NC: . . . the opposite; we are somehow free. But that's just a hope.

JM: Just a hope?

NC: Yes. We can't say we know it. Rousseau argued, “look at savages, animals struggling for their freedom, if we Europeans can't see that that's a part of our nature, it's just because we're so degraded.” OK, that's a kind of an argument, but not a very convincing one.

JM: But then you don't hope for some scientific evidence in favor of the view that human beings . . .

NC: . . . have innately an instinct for freedom? I'd like to. I don't anticipate it.

JM: So you don't think that there's evidence now?

NC: Not scientific evidence. There's conflicting evidence from history, experience, anthropology, and so on – but conflicting. If it were to be proven that some people are simply born to be slaves, and they will never be fulfilled and satisfied unless they're slaves – if that were proven, I wouldn't like the conclusion, but I couldn't show that it's false.

JM: Well, that's consistent.

NC: We can't say now; we don't know. We only hope that things will turn out a certain way, and we can work to try to achieve it because our moral intuition tells us that the world is better off that way, but we may be pushing it to [against] impenetrable barriers.

JM: Well, the evidence is far from conclusive, but at least at this stage, there's little in the way of firm evidence that people are born to be slaves, I take it.

NC: No evidence – no firm evidence at all, other than the fact that societies that have existed have authoritarian structures. There was a time that societies that existed had kings and princes; but that didn't show that that was a necessary form of social organization.

JM: But there might have been some societies in some environments in the past where authority might have been reasonably easily justified – perhaps just due to the need for survival of a particular group or community.

NC: Or it might be deeper. Dominance hierarchies in animals probably have selectional value; at least, you can make up reasonable stories about that.

JM: But they seem also to be – to a certain extent – plastic. I read an article recently about a baboon population. Typical baboon populations have male dominance, with a lot of aggression shown on the part of the dominant male against any possible usurpers of that position. But this studied population of baboons had been located near a garbage dump where apparently the dominant males were the only ones to feed, because they excluded all the other members of that population. There was poison in this food, and the dominant males died out; the females took over. The remaining males did not try to assume dominant roles. It became a far more pacifist society and, interestingly, apparently when male newcomers came into this population, they didn't try to take over either. They adopted the mores of that particular population. It might be environmental; who knows what it is.

NC: Interesting. It's consistent with what we know about human society. Slavery seemed the natural condition; how could you exist without it? It's pretty much the way wage slavery seems to be the natural condition today.

JM: Very quickly, then, to return to the social sciences: what do you think of them?

NC: I like Gandhi on Western civilization: it sounds like a good idea . . . [Both laugh]

Well, there are rudiments of social science, and some of them are interesting. It's hard to criticize researchers just because they can't go beyond what anybody can now understand. So take out of it what's interesting.

What does merit criticism is posturing and pretentiousness – the pretense of having some kind of significant science when in fact it's just the superficial trappings of science.

JM: Well, [calling themselves scientists] serves the interests of some social scientists, of course, because they can act as consultants . . .

NC: . . . and also it looks better in the academic setting. Physicists are using all these complicated words; we'll use the complicated words. There are all kinds of reasons for it, but . . .

JM: They introduce ever more sophisticated statistical programs . . .

NC: . . . and it tends to make the economists look like physicists, and then the political scientists want to look like economists. But you have to show that there's a point to that. Probably there is, for some things. If you want to figure out the effect of changing the interest rate on the purchase of cars, then yes, you probably have some sophisticated models for that. But if you want to figure out how the economy works, it doesn't tell you a lot. It tells you very little about where computers came from.

JM: So it might yield reasonable descriptions of various interrelationships . . .

NC: Yes, and even explanations of some things that you probably wouldn't have known. But it's way out on the periphery of the economy.

Take economics, which is the most advanced of the social sciences. It has a lot of things to say about some topics, but it tells you virtually nothing about the contemporary economy. Its principles – entrepreneurial initiative, consumer choice, markets, and so on – most have marginal relation to core elements of the economy, like, say, computers; they didn't come out of those things. Actually, they came out of the labs that I was working in fifty years ago, all happily paid for by the Pentagon.

JM: As, indeed, a lot of technological innovations.

NC: Yes.

JM: What can one hope for from the social sciences?

NC: You can hope for insight and understanding. There is work in them that seems to me significant. It sometimes uses fairly sophisticated statistics. Take, say, what Tom Ferguson (1995) calls the “investment theory of politics.” That is a significant thesis, and trying to justify and argue for it takes hard work and regression analyses, good statistics, and so on. And I think that out of it comes evidence that a significant factor – not the whole story, but a significant factor – in the direction of the political system is in fact how groups of investors coalesce to invest to control the state. It's not the answer to everything, but it's a significant social science thesis that took hard work.

JM: Will the social sciences ever overcome the conceptual scheme of common sense, or people as agents – as thinkers and doers and deciders?

NC: Maybe not. Maybe in fact that's the right scheme. Maybe they'll show that there's a scientific basis for that. It's not just our intuitive way of doing things, but it's our intuitive way because it's true.

JM: Because it's true, or it's our only way?

NC: Maybe our only way. You can't predict the course of science. The kinds of questions where real progress has been made are typically very simple ones. That's part of the reason that physics has made such progress.

JM: Galileo's inclined planes . . .

NC: . . . yes: keep it really simple. If a molecule gets too big, give it to the chemists. It's hard to get around that.

JM: Simplification just doesn't seem to work in the case of human behavior?

NC: If it does, we haven't found the way. But you never know. Look at linguistics. Fifty years ago it looked as if – as the linguists around then said – there's nothing general you can say about languages, except maybe feature reality. Languages differ in every imaginable way. That's just how things appeared to everyone – also to some of the more technical linguists, such as Martin Joos. And it didn't seem unreasonable; it was what I was learning when I was a student. It looked like that. Now it doesn't look like that.

JM: But on that way of looking at it, the social sciences might make progress and become serious scientists if they ‘turn inside’ – as linguistics did.

NC: Well, they can't do better than humans are capable of doing. You have to constantly be thinking of what are the right ways of looking at complex topics, so that you can extricate some things from them that are significant, so that they can be studied in greater depth, leaving the residue of complexity aside. Again, linguistics is the same. So the points of progress have almost nothing to do with why most people are interested in language. I get a flood of letters from all over the world – students and others – asking me for help in giving them ideas for their project on language. They found my name on the internet, or something. And 99 percent of them are topics that are perfectly sensible to be worried about, but there's nothing to say about them. They're mostly questions about sociolinguistics, power and dominance . . . fine questions, but they're not the questions where linguistics has made, or is likely to make, much progress.

JM: Right. But if the complexity of language arises in cases where we use language, where we . . .

NC: I'm not sure it's complexity; it's that so far as we know, there's nothing very general we can say about it, other than our commonsense observations which, maybe, can be dressed up a little. Either that's because we don't understand, or because there's nothing to understand.

JM: But still, a parallel to linguistics would suggest what the social scientist would have to do would be to look to whatever conceptual structures we employ when we make decisions, when we . . .

NC: It's one way for someone to proceed, but it's not the only way. Take the investment theory of politics. That proceeds without asking why investors coalesce to control the state, or why, when they do so, they act in such a way as to advance certain narrowly conceived interests. It just works within a different framework of factors, leaving these factors out. Those factors are ok; it's the same in . . .

Look, for example, at most political analysis. Why does the government do so-and-so? Almost all of political analysis tries to explain it in terms of the personal characteristics of the leaders. I don't think that that is very useful, but I have nothing very illuminating that you can look at that will give you much more insight. It's got to be shown.

JM: You might get insight by doing that, but would you get a science – without looking inside the head?

NC: You might, because it might turn out that what's going inside in your head is – though a factor – a peripheral factor in the choices you're making. For example, let's take something that we do more or less understand. Take the CEOs of corporations. Here, we kind of understand the institutional framework in which they function. If a CEO doesn't increase profit and market share, he or she's not going to be the CEO of a corporation, for various institutional reasons. By looking at that, we can explain a lot about how businesses operate. We haven't yet asked why he or she does that, but it's enough to know that if he or she doesn't, he or she's not going to be in that position. It's an institutional position that requires that behavior. As for why, who knows? Perhaps childhood made him or her agree to keep the institutional structures he or she keeps to; it might be an interesting question about his or her personal life, but it tells you essentially nothing about the business. So there are plenty of cases where you can say something about what's happening in the world without inquiring into extremely difficult, perhaps impenetrable, questions about why people do things.

It's the same with studying insects. You can study a bee colony and come to understand a lot about what they're doing – what the waggle dance is, what role the queen plays; you can say an awful lot about these things. In doing so, you're assuming that bees don't have choices, that they're automata. But you're assuming that without any evidence.

JM: When you're investigating that, what are you investigating?

NC: You're investigating complex systems at a certain level of abstraction. When you study the corporation, you're not studying how the person [the CEO] got to be six feet tall. He or she did, say, and perhaps that has some marginal role in what he or she does, but . . . Anything you study, you're abstracting away from a mass of complexity that you take to be irrelevant for the purpose at hand.

That's why scientists do experiments, after all. Why not just take videotapes of what's happening in the world? An experiment is an abstraction: this is the very narrow slice of the world that I want to look at. And it can be one that you create, that didn't exist in nature – as, say, with superconductivity, setting up conditions that – I'm told – never existed in nature. That's what you study, because you think it'll tell you something.

JM: Would this be like investigating third factor considerations in linguistics?

NC: Well, if you took a look at that . . . This is something I can talk about, because I'm aware of it. It was pretty obvious to a few of us who were interested in this in the fifties that there were going to be these three factors, and the great battle at the time was to show that the first factor – genetic endowment – actually was a factor. We had to struggle against the belief that everything was the result of generalizations from behavior, and so forth. So there wasn't much talk about the third factor – it might be mentioned, but nothing was done with it. Finally, it got to be more or less accepted – at least among people who had been bothered to address the issue – that yes, there is some innate component, there's a genetic component. The first factor is there, and in fact, the first factor determines what has been called the second factor, experience. Experience is constructed; it's constructed by our genetic endowment on the basis of data. So you get to the point where you grant that there is a genetic component, there is experience that is the result of the way that the genetic component deals with data, and there is that third factor there. And it's got to be there. But it could only be mentioned.

For a long time, it was implicit at a methodological level – at a kind of ‘best explanation’ level. So if you find that you have written up some rules that are overlapping in their predictive outcomes, you try to think up some other rule system that will not involve redundancy, typically put as and thought of as a methodological point. But at some stage of understanding, it becomes a third factor component. You're saying that, well, we're suggesting that there's a property of the world – not language, maybe not even organisms – that says that efficient computation works in a certain kind of way, whether it's language or organization of distribution of neurons [Cherniak's work], foraging strategies, or whatever. There are just certain laws of nature that are applying, and they apply in such a way as to impose the following structure on systems that meet certain criteria – being accessible to the sensory-motor system, for example. OK, at that point, you're switching a methodological discussion to an empirical discussion, and that's always a step forward, because in the case of methodological discussions we can just appeal to our intuition about what seems to make sense. But when you can turn it into an empirical discussion – here's an economy principle – you can investigate it empirically elsewhere. You can see whether that is the way the world really works: I'll look at something else, the distribution of arteries and veins in the body, and see if that meets similar conditions. And you can also hope that you might find a more fundamental theory of efficiency that would give some mathematical substance to the principles that you detect empirically in many parts of the world. And if you can get that far, you can show that it really does apply to, say, eliminating redundant rules in language. OK, then you have a deep explanation, and now in terms of the third factor. That's been hard to do.

In the early years, it was barely possible to think about it. For one thing, the main battlefield was somewhere else. And secondly, it was hard enough to try to show that there was anything regular about languages – that there was something similar among them. Finally, it got to the point where you had some sort of sense of universals and principles about them that go beyond the complexities of individual languages, but there still remained a fundamental conceptual barrier that no one really understood, and that I think is not much understood now. The guiding framework for linguistic theory . . . let's go back, say, to the 1950s. The basic theories in linguistics, such as they were, were procedural. That's European and American structuralism, which were basically the same in that respect. You had a corpus of data, you apply some procedures; you get units; you get some organization – and that's it. You can maybe believe that for phonemes, although it's tricky. But if you grant that, what are the next bigger units? Well, the next bigger units in terms of hierarchy are morphemes. But morphemes just can't be found by procedures, because procedures will allow you basically to find beads in a string – bigger collections of them, and so on – and morphemes just aren't like that. So the past tense in English isn't a bead on a string, it's more abstract; it fits into the system somehow at a more abstract level by some sort of generative process. So that forces you to take a different point of view, to abandon the procedural approach, and what seemed the natural assumption – or at least, my assumption – was that what universal grammar provides is a format for possible rule systems and a measure that picks the best instantiation of them. Given the data and given the format and given the measure, you can fix on a particular language. Well, that framework made it almost impossible to study the third factor, and the reason is that the format has to be rich and restrictive enough, and highly articulated enough, so that it will yield only a small number of potential grammars, given data. So it's got to be a very complex, language-specific format; and if it's language-specific and rich and highly articulated, the third factor isn't doing much. That looked like an impassible barrier.

Because I was writing about it, I recently went through some of the records of the biolinguistics conferences in the sixties and seventies, and it's always schema, plan, position – which is what's wrong. It's just impassible. Language just has a highly specific, highly articulated format, and that's the only way you can account for language acquisition. That looked to me, and to everybody, like a convincing argument. Well, when the principles and parameters framework came along, it undercut that argument. It didn't answer the questions, but it undercut the argument, by looking at everything in a different way. Acquisition was disassociated from the format for grammar. Acquisition is fixing the parameters, and the grammar is whatever it is. It is no longer part of the acquisition process, so it is at least conceivable that it's a best possible solution to other conditions. Then you can start worrying about the third factor.

JM: To pursue the parallel for the social sciences: at least in the case of linguistics, there was some target science to which linguistics could be accommodated. The thought was: well, it's got something to do with biology.

NC: OK, but biology didn't help at all. You didn't get anything. The most that biology provided was comparative ethology – which amounted to little more than saying that all these guys who were saying that everything is stimulus-response are wrong. What could you find in biology?

JM: Well, at least on the assumption that language is unique to human beings – this would incorporate the ethology facts too – it would seem that that must have something to do with the fact that it is a biological characteristic of the species . . .

NC: . . . an organ of some kind . . .

JM: an organ of some sort.

NC: But nothing was known about [mental] organs. Remember that the beginnings of the understanding of the visual system that we have today came in around 1960. So that was coming out of the same background of interests.

JM: Granted, you don't get any specific proposals of principles, or anything like that. But there was an appearance of universality and early acquisition, and a thought that that must be due to biology. Do you have anything like that for, say, economics? Again, in the case of the social sciences: I just don't know what would count as a target science . . .

NC: I just don't think you can count much on borrowing from other sources. It's just never worked. If you can get some hints from something else, well, then, ok: but you're lucky.

JM: But it did at least look like linguistics should be seen as a branch of biology. That's what posed the ‘what about a third factor contribution?’ problem. Why else would the format idea with its need for a high degree of language specificity pose a problem? . . .

NC: . . . that it could be incorporated in biology; but that might require a change in biology.

JM: . . . granted.

NC: Biology itself provided almost nothing.

JM: I must be very dense, but again: where would you go for the social sciences? Systems theory? What would you get?

NC: Well, that's also a part of biology. You study ant colonies; that's a part of biology.

You don't get free passes in this game.

JM: Agreed – fully. Many thanks, Noam. I won't take up any more of your time.

25 Linguistics and politics

JM: What is the relationship between – I know you've been asked this several times (including by me), and you as often have for various reasons dodged the question –

NC: . . . then I'll dodge it again; because I'm sure that the reasons still hold . . .

JM: Well, I'll try anyway: what is the relationship between your linguistic work and your political work?

NC: Well, it's principled, but it's weak . . .

JM: You've said that there's no deep intellectual connection; I've always read that as saying that there's no way of deducing . . .

NC: . . . there's no deductive connection. You could take any view on either of these topics, and it wouldn't be inconsistent to hold them . . . You know the line, and I don't have to repeat it. There's some point at which a commitment to human freedom enters into both. But you can't do much with that in itself.

Appendices

Appendix I: I-concepts, I-beliefs, and I-language

Chomsky's notion of an I-language was introduced in part (in 1986) by appeal to a contrast with what he called an “E-language” approach to the study of language. An E-language approach is one that studies language that is ‘externalized.’ One form that externalization might take is found in a philosophers’ favorite, the notion of a public language. What is a public language? David Lewis and Wilfrid Sellars, among many others, assume that a language is an institution shared by individuals in a population, taught by training procedures with the aim of getting the child to conform to the rules for word and sentence usage (for Lewis, “conventions,” and for Sellars, “practices”) of the relevant population. This view turns out to be hopeless as a basis for scientific research for reasons taken up in appendices VI and XI. It does, however, conform quite nicely to a commonsense conception of language.

Another version of an E-language approach is found in Quine, where he insists that there is no “fact of the matter” with regard to deciding between two grammars for ‘a language,’ so long as they are “extensionally equivalent.” To say that they are extensionally equivalent, each would have to generate all and only the same set of sentences, where a sentence is understood to be a ‘string’ of ‘words.’ To make sense of this, one must think that it is possible to identify a language for purposes of scientific investigation with a set – an infinite set – of strings. However, that belief is erroneous, for several reasons that become clear below; essentially, a language is a system in the head that has the competence to generate a potential infinity of sound–meaning pairs, where these pairs are defined by appeal to the theory, as is the recursive procedure that can yield them. What a person actually produces in various contexts during his or her lifetime is a very different creature: in Chomsky's terminology, it is an “epiphenomenon,” not a grouping of strings that can be the subject matter of a naturalistic scientific effort.

Still another way to construe a language ‘externally’ is to conceive of it as an abstract entity of some sort, located not in the head, but in some abstract realm. This view raises many questions unique to it – what is this abstract entity, where is it, how do people acquire it, how does it play a role in speech/sign production, how does it differ from the naturalistic description of the language organ, among others. Moreover, given a choice between an existing natural science of language with a good track record (Chomsky's) and a proposal that lacks evidence, serious theoretical proposals, or plausible answers to any of the questions mentioned, there is nothing to recommend it.

An I-language approach, in contrast, is a study of language that is “in the mind/brain.” I here stands for “individual, internal, and intensional” and – one could add – “innate and intrinsic.” This approach assumes that the target of the science of language is a system in a person's head that is a (developed, grown) state of a “mental faculty,” a mental faculty that can be investigated using the methods of the natural sciences, which – among other things – idealize and offer naturalistic and empirically supportable hypotheses concerning the natures of their subject matters. To offer an hypothesis is to provide a theory of what that internal system is and – since any individual's I-language is a developed state of an initial, universal state (called Universal Grammar) – one is committed to thinking of an I-language as a grown/developed biological ‘organ’ in a person's mind/brain, and to conceiving of the science of language in the form of a computational theory of system ‘in the head’ as an abstract version of biology – essentially, as an I-language. A satisfactory naturalistic theory of an I-language cannot limit itself to a single person's head at a specific stage of development and lexical store. Rather, a descriptively and explanatorily adequate science of language is a science that describes and explains the growth and biophysically possible final states of a system inside the head. To develop a theoretical under-standing of any such system – of any specific I-language – the only way is to construct a theory that will encompass it and all others. That requires a theory that hypothesizes a biophysically fixed “initial state” (Universal Grammar). With this theory and adequate theoretical descriptions of how, given experience (input), biology and other natural systems constrain growth/development from an initial state to a stable, final state, we would have a way to describe the growth of any I-language. That makes the I-language approach to language intensional: the theory says what a language can be/is, and any biophysically possible language is a recursive system in the head, not a set of sentences ‘out there’ in some sense, whether a set of practices of a population, a set of strings, or an abstract entity. The science of language offers a formal theory of the system and its possible states; in doing so, it specifies with a formal or mathematical function the developed state of any specific person's language faculty, a faculty that takes words (theoretically defined) as input and yields expressions/sentences (formally defined) as outputs. The function is specified “under intension,” not (per impossibile) via enumerating its (infinite) output. Thus, a language is internal; it is also individual (think of each person's state of their universal language faculty as something like an idiolect, even though that is a dubious notion); and it is intensional. It is also innate, by virtue of an assumption – that language is a biophysical system – that is warranted because the biophysical theories of it are successful. And it and its properties are studied not in their relationship to something else ‘outside,’ but in terms of their intrinsic properties. That is part of what Chomsky means when he says that his study of language, including the study of linguistic meaning, is “syntactic.” The point is explained in Appendix XI.

In addition to I-languages, one can speak of I-concepts and I-beliefs. Chomsky explains in the interchange below:

JM: I-concept and I-belief: what are they?

NC: Well, [I-] internal, individual, and intensional where intensional amounts here to ‘theory-defined’ . . . take me. I have some way of interpreting and thinking about the world, applying my actions, and so on and so forth, and we don't really know how it's done, but there are presumably some elements that enter into shaping ways of thinking about the world. Whatever they are, we call them concepts. It's like Newton saying that the smallest elements of the world are corpuscles. I don't know what they are, but there have got to be some. So whatever is there in the head that is used for shaping the ways we conceive and perceive the world, there are concepts. And we can presumably make more complicated constructions out of them, and those are what we call thoughts. Now some of them we have a degree of confidence in, and those we call beliefs. But as to what they are, that is a scientific question; it's a matter of finding out what the world is made up of.

I, then, just means ‘I.’

Now, the standard view of this is that these things – concepts, beliefs, and so on – are outside of people's heads in some kind of universe . . .

JM: Fregean abstract entities, perhaps . . .

NC: I don't see a reason to believe any of that. In fact, I think that historically a lot of those ways of thinking about things come from the fact that the work is mostly done in English and German, which happen to be very nominalizing languages. English in particular – take the word belief. It can't be translated into many other languages, except with a paraphrase involving a verb. These are English conceptions which have rough counterparts in other languages, but in most languages, there's no such thing as belief, and there's no such word as believe, it's think. Take Hebrew, for example. There is a word for I believe, and it means ‘I have faith.’ If you want to say I believe it's raining, you say I think it's raining. And most other languages are like that. Now, English goes beyond that and even nominalizes the notion of [thought]. If Wittgenstein and John Austin and so on taught us anything, it's at least not to do that.

JM: Not to mention some seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers. And I take it that the assumption is also that individuals – who happen to be, say, English speakers – don't necessarily share the same I-concepts.

NC: Any more than that they share the same language, or visual system. There's no English vision, or American visual system. There's my [I-]visual system.

JM: Again, what are I-beliefs?

NC: Whatever thoughts we have that we have some confidence in . . . whatever they might turn out to be. We don't know what they might turn out to be. I mean, we make the best guess we can, but we can't take it too seriously, any more than you can take the domain of corpuscles too seriously. There's something – there are some building blocks – but who knows what they are?

I was reading Science magazine last night; it has an interesting article on water. Apparently the H_2O molecule is one of the most complicated molecules there is because of its different states. There are different angles, different bonds, so different structures . . . [See Ruan et al. (2004) and Wernet et al. (2004), plus a follow-up article to both: Zubavicus & Grunze (2004).] Water assumes different configurations depending on different chemical environments, with different bond angles, and different bond lengths; it forms and reforms in various configurations while undergoing changes in temperature, substrate, pressure, etc. Its surface or ‘interface’ properties – those that play a crucial role in all sorts of processes, including critical biological and physiological ones – are variable and depend on a large number of internal and external factors. It's a very complex object which, the better techniques there are for studying it, the less confident we become that we understand it. So, what philosophers speculate about when they for various reasons identify water with H_2O . . .

JM: . . . well, nothing will stop them.

NC: No.

Appendix II: The several uses of “function”

To understand better what is at stake, it helps to taxonomize some of the several uses of the term “function.” Along the way, I speak to what appear to be features of Chomsky's views of science, of common sense, and of our access to the world through the concepts that we have available in common sense and that we can create in the sciences. While I cover these topics in other appendices in more detail, I raise them here too because the term “function” has different uses in the sciences than it does in the commonsense framework, and conflating the frameworks risks conflating the uses of the term. The two frameworks have very different orientations: they serve different kinds of human cognitive project. The kind of understanding one gets in common sense serves the interests of agents who must act to satisfy their needs and desires. Because of this orientation, it is no surprise that common sense and the concepts it makes available to understand the world and others – the concepts expressed in natural languages – have an anthropocentric focus. Nor should it be a surprise that the various metaphysical and epistemological ‘theories’ offered by the majority of philosophers from Plato on are anthropocentric. Consider, for example, Aristotle's universe with the earth at its core, Moore's commonsense philosophy, Wittgenstein and “ordinary language philosophy,” and the currently still-popular view of language as a social institution, made by humans to serve their epistemic interests, and transmitted in training procedures. The sciences – at least, the advanced mathematical ones – have developed slowly over centuries and increasingly won a struggle against the pull of common sense and its anthropocentric orientation. They are oriented toward objective description and explanation and, as scientists early in the seventeenth century soon found out, the picture the sciences paint of the world and of human beings is very different from that depicted in common sense.

Biology, a science of particular interest in the study of language, seems still to be in transition; it seems still to owe some allegiance to commonsense understanding. Darwin's view of natural selection (even supplemented with genes in what is now called “neo-Darwinism”) and the concept of adaptation built on it remains indebted to what Alan Turing and Richard Lewontin call “history,” not to mathematical formal theories of structure and form and to the constraints they impose on both potential modifications in and growth/development of organisms. Indeed, there are some naïve versions of selection and adaptation that appear in evolutionary discussions that are difficult to distinguish from historicized versions of behaviorism, a point B. F. Skinner emphasized in his Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971). Chomsky remarks on this in the main text. But the explanatory role of ‘history’ in biology is likely to diminish. “Evo-devo,” discoveries of a massive degree of conservation in genetic materials across all species, recognition of the crucial role of gene placement and of their timing mechanisms in explaining structure and its development, plus other work in biology – including Chomsky's contributions to the biology of language – have emphasized the role of other naturalistic sciences such as physics and chemistry, and accounts of formal constraints on development and growth that constrain naturally possible forms. In the case of biology, these impose constraints on biological structure and possible variations and modifications in biological systems, including individual mental ‘organs.’ This has had the effect of reducing the role of selection in the explanation of structure, making it less important: it ‘chooses’ which structures will survive, and does not always do so efficiently – as Chomsky points out in our 2009 update discussion on pages 51–52. It does not create or build structure in any interesting way; that is in large measure due to contributions to possible form mentioned above. For an overview of the many issues involved in what seems to be at least the partial dethroning of the role of natural selection in biological explanation, see Stephen J. Gould's monumental (2002) The Structure of Evolutionary Theory. See also Chomsky's views on the topic in the main text and writings, related to those found in Part I of Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini's What Darwin Got Wrong (2010).

II.1 Common sense and interest-dependent function

In our everyday lives, operating from a very early age within the commonsense framework as we do, we think and speak of the functions of things, systems, institutions, and the like, and assign these things and ‘things’ different functions (often equivalent to jobs, tasks, or roles). It is difficult to insist on a unique function for anything as it is conceived in this understanding of the world. Water as understood on one occasion is something that can be used to drink and slake the thirst; on other occasions, it is seen as something to cool us, to irrigate crops, to wash, to dilute spirits, to swim, to float boats, and so on. A government's function can be seen as introducing laws, but also as satisfying human needs, guaranteeing rights, controlling violence, engaging in defense, and so on. Words and sentences (as understood from within common sense, where these are taken to be artifacts, not natural objects) are used to classify, describe, refer, insist, cajole, make claims, and – a favorite of many, and often claimed to be essential in some way – communicate. A railroad carries freight, transports passengers, provides income to workers, etc. Organic entities and body parts too are seen as having various functions. The skin acts as a barrier to dirt and disease, serves as something to caress or be caressed, to cool the body, to provide for some kinds of communication, and so on. Tigers are objects of admiration, poaching, ecological balance, taxonomy, taxidermy, the sources of potions, etc.

Understood in this way, the functions of things as understood in common sense are functions-for-doing-something or functions-for-serving-an-interest. When we speak of a bird's wings as allowing it to fly, we understand the bird as agent satisfying needs, and when we see them in their display role in a mating dance, we see them as meeting an organism's needs by serving to communicate. When we speak of something as having a function for us in particular, we conceive it in our various efforts to deal with the world and speak about it and the people in it. To assign a function to something is to give it a role in solving some problem or carrying out some task that serves practical (not scientific theoretical) interests. We put the things and ‘things’ of the commonsense framework to various uses in our efforts to serve our interests by using these things to deal with various practical problems, problems often resolved by carrying out actions and procedures – putting out the dog, caring for a child or elderly relative, washing the clothes, describing what happened in a court of law, and so on. Remarkably, our commonsense concepts of these things – our nominal (noun-expressed) concepts of water, governments, skin, railroads, words, etc – seem to invite and even support this kind of flexibility in their use. It is not just that their use is a form of action, and action is free. In fact, the concepts themselves seem to be sensitive to human actions and interests, guiding our thoughts and intuitions about the things that they characterize. Consider the concept WATER, often an object case for Chomsky (1995a, 2000). Water ceases to be water when a teabag is put into it – an absurdity from the point of view of natural science, where there is no water, for the concept WATER is not to be found, only a compound of ‘normal’ hydrogen and oxygen atoms (not isotopes, as with deuterium and tritium, which have isotopes of hydrogen) with some very interesting properties that can only be defined and understood from within the sciences that deal with this compound (see above, p. 156). Neither water nor tea is found in science, but they are in common sense, along with an understanding of water as transformable into tea. That transformation and the substances involved matter to us in our everyday lives; they all serve our interests and actions. And rivers (as the discussion of the main text indicates) cease to be rivers when the water in them is subjected to a phase change that solidifies it and a highway divider line is painted in the middle of what is now solid. Chemical composition is irrelevant: water coming from a tap is water, even though it is filtered at the municipal water works through a tea filter and has exactly the same composition as the tea. That is because what comes from a tap from this source is water, period. It is not clear how concepts such as these can (and do) allow for and in their application are sensitive to the various interests that people have when they conceive of the things in question, employing them in different projects. However, the facts are reasonably clear. We gerrymander the functions for us of the entities and systems they allow us to classify and speak of in terms of our variable (although typically related in some way) projects and tasks and the interests they serve. And commonsense concepts of things appear to allow and support this, at least within limits – limits prescribed, presumably, by the features that make up the concept in question.

In a paragraph above I placed words and sentences among the things of the commonsense framework. That is how they are seen in this domain: they are ‘things’ that come from people's mouths, are written on pieces of paper, and do various jobs for us, serving interests in various ways. We think of them as tools; we “do things with words,” as J. L. Austin (1975) put it. There are important differences between ‘things’ like words and sentences and things like water, tables, and people. Words and sentences, unlike the others, are seen as tools that people use to describe, speculate, convince, classify, question, communicate, and so forth. They are seen as entities that humans use to refer and assert, complain and praise, and – anomalously, assuming that words come ‘out loud’ – silently think and ruminate. They are sometimes used to “speak of” or “refer to” – as is said – things and circumstances in the world. When successfully used in this way, one might say, they represent things and circumstances. They are when so used ‘about’ things and circumstances.

Notice that for this way of putting the matter, words and sentences are not ‘about’ things all by themselves. They have to be used in the relevant ways (successfully, on some accounts) and, in this sense, reference and ‘aboutness’ come about because that is how we happen to use some words and sentences, sometimes. Chomsky, unlike many who do semantics in philosophy and linguistics, takes this point seriously. It is one of the background assumptions of his naturalistic internalist approach to the mind's systems and their operations. His internalism is discussed elsewhere in this volume, as is the point about reference, so I do not pursue these matters here. It is, however, worth mentioning that his picture of language and the mind, a picture painted from the point of view not of common sense but of science, can make sense of why the scientist of mind should take the point seriously, and why if one takes it seriously, we can get some insight into how and why ‘the things of the commonsense world’ come to seem to have such variable functions-for-us. To be brief, assume first that natural languages ‘express’ commonsense concepts; for some discussion, see Chomsky (1975, 1995a, 2000). Part of what is involved in expressing such concepts is making them available to the rest of the mind. To make sense of what that involves, assume (as current science of the mind makes plausible) that the mind is made up of many different modules such as vision (perhaps parts of vision too), audition, and the language system, including its core computational system. Assume further – and again plausibly – that language's computational system combines lexical items (‘words’) consisting of ‘sound’- and ‘meaning’-specifying (or ‘concept’-specifying) features and combines these to make complexes called “expressions” (‘sentences’) that amount to a complex of phonetic features at phonetic/phonological “interfaces” PHONs and a complex of semantic or ‘meaning’ features at ‘meaning’ interfaces SEMs (or LFs). On the ‘other side’ of each interface are other systems that articulate and perceive (with the PHON interface), or ‘interpret’ and ‘understand’ with the SEM one. Focusing on the SEM or ‘meaning’ and conceptual interface and its work, assume that the relevant features ‘communicate’ with and ‘instruct’ various other systems, presumably including vision (connected in some way to object-configuration systems and likely separate visual-configuration systems), plus affective and attitudinal systems, social hierarchy systems, what is sometimes called “imagination,” spatial and temporal locations systems, and so on. Imagination might offer some resources for a kind of cognitive autonomy – several philosophers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries attributed imagination to animals, and said that this afforded them a limited kind of mental creativity – but perhaps the language system alone is capable of going virtually completely ‘off line’ to operate autonomously while still enabling use of the resources provided by other systems – giving humans the ability to speculate and wonder, take their thoughts to any situation at any time, fantasize, engage in all kinds of thought, and so on. We need not assume so, however, to acknowledge that in any case in which a SEM and its conceptual ‘information’ is used (that is, when it plays a partial role in interpretation or understanding), multiple systems come into play and that these can vary from case to case. If so, it is no surprise that the concepts or clusters of semantic information that are expressed at SEM can receive multiple applications, skewed to serve various human interests. So of course commonsense things are seen to have and serve various functions, for they are seen in different ways through the lenses provided by different, multiple systems interacting. Nor is it surprising that one gets a massive interaction effect, with no hope of a determinate, scientific theory of ‘what happens’ on the other side of SEM. Apparently, there is no central, integrating module, a system that does the job that terms such as “mind,” “agent,” and “homunculus” are asked to do.[1] Yet there is obviously some form of cooperation: people do succeed at consolidating what they have available to act and to understand one another, at least approximately. So it is likely that the best we can ever do as scientists of the mind is speak of how persons use language and the concepts it expresses to accomplish various things, including referring.[2] For some discussion, see McGilvray (2005b), the introduction and text of the 2009 edition of Chomsky (1966/2002/2009), and the discussion of linguistic creativity elsewhere in the current text.

Returning now to the discussion of functions-for-us, some artifact concepts might seem to be exceptions to the idea that there is no single, dominant use or function of a class of entities in terms of which a concept can be specified, and perhaps even defined. Not GOVERNMENT, clearly, but an artifact concept such as CHAIR might seem to specify something like a single essential use, so that even if we put chairs to various uses (to serve various functions related to our interests), the concept CHAIR nevertheless expresses a function that anything that can be understood in any way as a chair must serve. A chair must be something to sit on, we say. It is, after all, made by humans to do this job, we think. So could this be said to be a primary or essential function or role, and CHAIR defined in terms of this function? Aristotle tried something like this with his elements (earth, air, fire, water, ether): they had an essence definable in terms of what they were claimed to ‘do’ in his picture of the universe. Earth falls when released, because that is what it is ‘made’ to do. No one can take this seriously in the sciences now, of course: it presupposes that the things in the worlds described by the sciences are like artifacts. Hadrons would have to be thought to be artifacts not of humans, but of a god. But could it work for some of our artifact concepts – at least those where a maker's intention plays an important role, and there is also a plausible claim to the effect that a single intention is in question? Some have staked quite a lot on this idea: a fair amount of work on the identity of works of art, for example, assigns a heavy role to artist intentions in creating a work. As for chairs, one must grant that “something to sit on” is just one function of a chair among others. We who deal with chairs also conceive and understand them as serving, and use them to serve, all kinds of functions. We stand on chairs, use them to weigh down carpets and to cover their blemishes – or to cover gouges on a floor. We display them as signs of wealth, social status, or preference for a specific style, and so on. Still, although used in many ways to perform many tasks for us, is it not the intention of their makers that they be something to sit on, and if they failed to be something to sit on, they would not be chairs? This too is dubious: for what it is worth, my intuitions tell me a broken chair is a chair. Perhaps more obviously: a chair displayed in a museum with signs indicating that it may not be sat upon is a chair. Moreover, maker's intention with regard to function cannot be all there is to it. Benches, stools, sofas, and loveseats are also made to serve as things on which to sit. Also, one can sit on any number of things, including boulders and branches, and they serve this function, when so used. So there must be something more to defining the commonsense concept CHAIR than appealing to a single function, however ‘primary’ by virtue of the intention of their more utilitarian manufacturers it might appear to be. To return to Aristotle, perhaps at the very least one should speak to the other ‘causes’ of chair: the concept CHAIR should ‘say’ something about their geometry, appropriate materials from which they can be made, and indicate that chairs are (typically?) artifacts. Or consider Aristotle on HOUSE: it is something in which one can dwell (final cause), made of appropriate materials (material), constructed by humans (an artifact: efficient cause), etc. Perhaps adding this other information will satisfy some. But for the scientist of mind and language, it is not clear what the point of the exercise is. It does not succeed as definition as the scientist conceives it. It looks like, and is, an effort to catalogue a rather small group of cases where there is a fair degree of convergence in the ways a population thinks of and uses terms such as “chair.” It is an exercise in what Wittgenstein called “description of use,” rather than a description of the concept as found in the mind, joined to an account of how it developed or grew, and an account of just how it ‘affects’ its use. Perhaps that is what Aristotle was aiming at, rather than describing the use of a term. Perhaps as were later philosopher-scientists such as Ralph Cudworth, he was looking for a way to capture what the idea/concept HOUSE is, and how it ‘works’ (and develops).

Nevertheless, at least some theoretical interests are served by undertaking this and related exercises. For one thing, it highlights the fact that there is a great deal of variation in the application or use of language and that it is to all intents and purposes free, suggesting strongly that use or application of language is not a place to look for success in constructing theories. For another, it offers some data, data that the scientist of language and mind can and probably should take into account. It suggests, for example, that at least in the case of nominal expressions (not adjectives, adverbs, or verbs) and the commonsense concepts expressed in natural languages, one should take into account the fact that our minds tend to look for and expect answers to questions such as “What can it be made of,” “What is it for,” and “Is it an artifact or a natural object?” Julius Moravcsik (1975, 1990, 1998) made very useful contributions in this regard; James Pustejovsky (1995) incorporates some of his insights in a proposal for a theory of language processing. It might also be captured in terms of a view of concepts and their acquisition that ‘breaks them up’ into features – specifically, what Chomsky calls the “semantic features” that go toward specifying the ‘meaning’ side of a person's lexical entry. These matters come up on comments below.

More generally, data from cases such as these and many others got from observing how people use language joined with data from instrumentation of various sorts, language and other system impairment (for example, some of Elizabeth K. Warrington's works [e.g., Warrington & Crutch 2005]), plus neuropsychological and neurolinguistic data, and so on, provide evidence for and against various proposals concerning the architecture, operations, and inputs and outputs of the language faculty and other faculties-modules in the head. Placed in theoretical structures that are making progress, one can begin to understand what is going on in language, vision, object configuration, and so on. I mention these three in particular because there has already been considerable progress with them.

In line with the above, pointing out that there is no single function that language serves also helps undermine some efforts to construct what their proponents call “theories of language” (in one prevalent form, a ‘theory’ of linguistic meaning), efforts based on the misguided assumption that natural languages have a single use. There are philosophers, linguists, psychologists, and others who hold that language serves the single primary purpose of communication and – even more restrictively – communication of “information.” It is obvious why they want to do this. They conceive of languages not as natural systems, as I-languages or biophysically based systems in the head, but of languages in use – language as it appears in human “practices” and in the linguistic acts and actions of human beings. Looking at language in that way while also trying to construct what aims to be a systematic and unified theory of language, they have to hope that they can find a single canonical use of language. For if they can, they believe, it will display regularities in use and application. If so, perhaps these regularities in use can be made into the rules of language – a particularly tempting prospect to philosophers who would like to use their study of formal logic and inference as the basis for a theory of language. Their preferred strategy makes them look for a functional essence of language, one that they hope to capture by some uniform set of rules (of inference) or conventions that people invent in order to (say) communicate information to each other. Some of their efforts – e.g., those of David Lewis – are discussed below.

There is nothing wrong with describing use, of course. The problem is, as Wittgenstein pointed out long ago, you cannot find in these highly context-sensitive and variable descriptions of the ways in which people use language to serve all sorts of purposes the regularities that any serious form of theorizing requires. Lewis and others needed and need to be disabused of the illusion of uniformity in the use of natural languages and told that if they want to construct theories of language at all, they must look to language not in use, but to languages as natural objects that allow for use. Emphasizing multiple uses and functions helps undermine their (at best, social science – not natural science) approach to theorizing about language and its sounds and meanings. You could, of course, stipulate an ideal form for use; but if you hope to offer an empirical theory rather than a hope, you had better pay attention to the facts. And if you cannot find displayed in the ways people speak a genuine essence of language use, you cannot hope to construct a theory, even in the much less ambitious form of a social, not natural, science. A plausible theory even of that sort requires at the very least a determinate relationship between a word and its referent, assuming that there is such (for which there is no guarantee at all). That cannot be found, for people use language to all kinds of ends in all kinds of circumstance. Granted, the strategy of looking to uniformity in use or application might appear to work to a degree when one focuses on a community of those who are determined to avoid ambiguity and reject metaphor, plus devote their attention to doing at most one thing with their language. You find something like that uniformity in use in communities of mathematicians and natural scientists when they use their symbol systems to (for example) construct proofs or develop testable hypotheses. They avoid using their symbol systems creatively for a good reason. If they engaged in these or other forms of creativity, it would not allow them to prove or demonstrate to others. Nevertheless, even in those communities, reference is ‘determined’ only because people make themselves conform in their uses. People using natural languages would find this stultifying; people use natural languages creatively because they can. And they get satisfaction from doing so.[3]

Emphasizing that communication is far from being a central function of language also helps undermine the work of evolutionary psychologists such as Pinker and Bloom (1990) who tie an increasing capacity to communicate with a tale about how language must have evolved. That matter is discussed further in this appendix and elsewhere in the text.

II.2 Mathematics and natural science: formal functions

Enough of function-for-us and the temptations, problems, and opportunities it brings to the sciences of language and mind. Let us turn to the very different mathematical-scientific notion of a function. In mathematics and natural science, a function is assumed to be an operation that maps specific, stated domains of values (of a variable) into specific, stated ranges of values. The function addition applied to natural numbers, for example, maps pairs of natural numbers into a natural number: “N + M = X” takes arbitrarily chosen natural numbers N and M and returns the value X, which is their sum. Algorithms (mathematized or formalized rules, principles, or laws) in other fields accomplish the same. In Chomsky's recent linguistic work, the ‘external’ version of the operation Merge (“external Merge”) takes one lexical item (which is perhaps nothing but a cluster of “features” made into what Hagit Borer (2005) calls a “package”) and another and returns a new lexical item: X merged with Y yields {X, Y}. And Merge operates with more complex syntactic objects too. Assume Y has X inside it: Y = [. . . X . . .]. Internal Merge with this object yields {X, Y} = {X, [. . . X . . .]}; it amounts to what Chomsky used to call “Move” or “Displacement.”

In the relevant sorts of cases, function is usually well defined, so for a specific formal characterization provided by a theory, where there is a specification of what the theory takes to be its domains and ranges, one gets unambiguous, unique solutions to functions. Sometimes what is called an “extensional definition” of a function is available. Consider addition applied to a finite domain and range. For the natural numbers {1, 2, 3} and no others, the function addition yields three ordered pairs with the first set of values the domain and the second, the range: <{1, 1}, 2 >, <{1,1,1}, 3}>, <{1, 2}, 3 >. There are no others. Recursive functions, such as those found in mathematics’ successor function and in linguistics’ Merge yield infinite ranges, given finite domains. In such cases, speaking of extensional definition is moot; no one can produce a list of the relevant items in the function's domain. One's ‘access’ to the range can be fixed only by the function itself, thought of here as an explicit statement of domain, and algorithm(s) that link elements in the domain to possible elements in the range. Often, a function-statement in mathematics or a science is called an “intensional” specification of a function. This is an important convention for our purposes, because Chomsky's specification of an I-language, consisting of a grammar for the I-language, is an intensional one in this sense. That is why he speaks of I-languages as those that are individual, internal, and intensional (see Appendix I). Speaking of an I-language as an intensional specification is necessary because it is impossible to specify an individual's language at a time (a specific state of his or her language faculty) by listing the sentences in its (infinite) range. It can be done only by appeal to the theory that allows one to articulate the domain (the finite set of lexical items he or she has in his or her mental dictionary) and relevant functions/principles, with any (parametric) variability provided for the combinatory principles, or provided in some other way (“third factor” considerations) explicitly specified. These I-language grammars yield an intensional specification of the range (the infinite set of expressions/sentences that the relevant algorithms yield). And in doing so, they – if successful – adequately describe and explain the actual current state of an individual's mental grammar, a biophysical ‘entity’ that is otherwise inaccessible, having the status of what philosophers of science sometimes label as an “unobservable.” Generally, that is what scientific theories look like: they are statements of functions aimed at describing and explaining what there ‘is,’ where it is assumed that there ‘is’ something ‘there’ that can be captured by a theory, and is captured by the correct theory. Call these and other mathematized or formally specified function statements “formal” functions. Formalization allows for precision and explicit statement – features of the sciences that are apparently not available in the use of the commonsense concepts embodied in our languages.

I emphasize that an intensional or theoretical specification of an I-language may be a construct in the mind of a linguist, but for Chomsky, it is also a description of a ‘real’ state of an ‘organ’ in a human mind. That state is a developed state of UG, developed in accord with biophysical constraints on a possible language. An I-language so described is assumed to be ‘the real thing,’ the proper object of linguistics thought of as a natural science. The sentences produced by a person, necessarily with the aid of whatever ‘performance’ systems the language faculty cooperates with, is an epiphenomenon, and only that (Chomsky 1980: 82–93). The theory of language is a theory of a ‘real’ internal system. UG instantiated as a developmental procedure in the human genome, plus any other non-biological constraints on development, is a theoretical specification of the ‘initial state’ of the language faculty, what it has available to it to develop a steady state, given lexical items.

In line with a remark above, formal functions themselves thought of as sets of symbols and their theory-specified forms and specified allowed combinations are invented ‘objects,’ not natural ones. They amount to the ‘syntax’ of a formal symbol system, and those who are adept in the relevant formal ‘language’ apply the system's symbols in a regimented way. These symbols do not appear in any naturalistic science's object language of which I am aware. They do appear in the object languages of some formal accounts of formal functions: mathematics includes studies of the natures of functions. But these are not naturalistic theories, theories of the natural objects found in nature. They are rather accounts of some of the formal tools that we can and do construct, formal tools that humans employ in constructing natural sciences. If it should turn out that there are natural constraints on these and other functions – constraints revealed by some naturalistic theory of mind, presumably – perhaps we could begin speaking of a naturalistic science of functions, presumably an internalist science of the mind like Chomsky's theory of language. Perhaps such a science would help make sense of – among other things – how it is that humans seem to be able to construct formal systems and sciences at all and in the case of a science, manage to construct and entertain a very limited but plausible set of hypotheses for a set of phenomena, far fewer hypotheses than are logically possible. If there were such a theory, it would be illuminating. Perhaps we would have taken a step toward an account of what Charles Saunders Pierce used to call “abduction,” our capacity to construct hypotheses that turn out to be fruitful, unlike the potential infinity of the others. Perhaps then functions in the formal sense, at least those employed in the natural sciences, would turn out to be special sorts of natural things. It is an interesting idea, but one that we can ignore, at least at this point. As it stands, explicit and clear mathematical-formal production and specification of functions in this sense – either extensional or intensional – seem to be achievements of individuals, and so are artifacts.

Employing the tools of formal functions as they do, the natural sciences are capable of dealing with randomness and with objects that have what appear to be relatively stable, fixed natures and – in the case of biological entities – ‘channeled’ forms of growth. If so, we are lucky that nature seems to be populated with such objects and systems. They must be so populated, we believe; they must because the sciences we construct turn out to make progress, making improvements rather than circling aimlessly. It is no accident that the natural objects and systems we can understand are conceived of as having fixed natures, natures that allow for interactions and changes that the formal principles (laws) of the natural sciences can capture. These – and entirely random systems – are the ones our sciences can understand.

Of course, many formal objects such as numbers and operations such as calculations also seem to have fixed natures. When I speak of aleph-null, you know just what I have in mind, assuming you have the relevant kind of mathematical knowledge. One might be tempted, then, to think of aleph-null (or the number 3,447,209,531, for that matter) as having a kind of objective existence in the way we presume hadrons or chromosomes do. Philosophers have often thought along these lines, populating a world of abstract objects, and conceiving of mathematics and the like as ways of exploring that world, a world that some believe is more perfect than the one we deal with in ordinary life, at least. It is, I think, a good idea to resist the temptation. Taking into account what was said above, aleph-null has what appears to be a fixed nature because we – or rather those who have the relevant knowledge of mathematics – define the nature of the ‘object’ and in some sense agree to use the term “aleph-null” in the same way. The entities of the natural sciences such as electrons and mu-mesons, organisms, and chemical substances that are described and explained by our formal natural theories have fixed natures, we presume, not merely because we agree to use the terms in the same way and construct proofs according to agreed-upon procedures. We do not invent the objects and systems that the natural sciences describe and explain, unlike – it seems – those of advanced mathematics. That – and the success of the theory – is why we think it is reasonable to say of a theory of an I-language that it describes a ‘real’ instantiated system in an ‘organ’ in the human mind.

II.3 Biology: function-for-an-organism

Interest-dependent functions of the sort we began with are not good objects for scientific investigation. However, there are other notions of function that seem to involve interests in a way that makes them more reasonable candidates for scientific study. They are found in the biological sciences. Evolutionary scientists speak of adaptations, where an adaptation is a feature of a group of organisms – a feature such as an organ like the vertebrate eye – that is claimed to have the shape and complex structure that it does as the result of evolutionary processes, and that has its current transmissible form in the species, it is claimed, because it enhances the reproductive capacity of the creatures that have it.[4] Typically, one finds the assumption that reproductive success comes from some transmissible mutation serving some specific role in an organism's operations that is assumed to aid the viability of a species – in that sense, the species’ interests. At the least, it performs a function for an organism that enhances its ability to procreate. Pinker and Bloom (1990), for example, read in this way what they suppose is increasing communicative success of adaptations they claim appear in the evolution of language, and they believe that they can explain the ‘shape’ of natural language in this way. It is not at all obvious what evidence they have for their suppositions, or for those advanced by Pinker and Jackendoff (2005) in their critique of Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch (2002). All these appear on the face of it to be ‘just-so’ stories of the sort that Richard Lewontin sharply criticized in his (1998). However, it is not too difficult to find plausible examples with other organs – the eyes and the visual system, the ears and the auditory system, for example – cases that appear to be plausible because there is accumulated evidence (comparative, whether involving analogies or homologies) of improved viability of a species – although where such evidence is found, it is entangled with other factors, including contributions best understood only by appealing to non-biological sciences such as physics. In those cases where there is clear evidence of adaptation for survival, evidence gathered by investigating the evolutionary path of a species compared to others, one can speak of specific subsystems of an organism that serve a function in something a bit like the interest-dependent-function sense, although generalized to amount to something like “survivability for species x.” For it is assumed that the shape and structure one encounters in a species’ ‘adaptive’ system are what they are because they serve the reproductive interests (in some broad sense) that they are claimed to for the creatures that have them – that the selectional advantages of having such a structure explain (in the relevant sense) its evolution and current state. Vrba and Gould, for example, once suggested that use of the term “function” (in the evolutionary biological sense) be restricted to cases where there is some evidence of evolutionary ‘shaping.’ There is some danger in speaking of interest in this domain, for the evolutionary biologist does not – or should not – allow the notion of an agent's interests to play a role in science, and it can be difficult to disentangle that notion from one that is part of the explanatory toolbox of a field of scientific research. If the notion of interest enters at all, it should be a carefully defined notion, isolated from commonsense notions of agents and their projects and intentions in carrying out actions.

There are very significant challenges to the scope and validity of at least some adaptationist claims within biology itself. Darwin himself expressed doubts about the explanatory reach of selectional adaptation; the last sentence of the introduction of the third edition of The Origin of Species reads, “I am convinced that Natural Selection has been the main but not exclusive means of modification” (emphasis added). He was right to be cautious, as current understanding of ‘channeling’ of growth in ‘evo-devo’ (evolution-development) has abundantly shown. Wallace at Darwin's time pointed out that it is very unlikely that selection could explain the introduction of the capacity we humans alone have to do mathematics. That natural selection does not deal with everything in the way of explaining ‘shape’ and biological form – and perhaps deals with very little – was emphasized by D'Arcy Thompson in the early 1900s and Alan Turing in the mid-1900s. They pointed to a significant role for physiochemical explanation in dealing with structure and modification and emphasized that formal functions could explain form and its permissible variations in a way that brought into question the value of adaptationist and selectional explanations. Further, Waddington and more recent proponents of the developing field of evo-devo have pointed out that not all organic structure can be scientifically explained in this way, and perhaps very little. For one thing, there is the fact that modification requires mutation, and mutation can only proceed within the constraints set by physics and chemistry, among other sciences: possible structures and modifications of structure are limited by the laws of nature. Various structural features of organisms, for example, cannot be explained by genetic instruction sets alone, nor can the way phenotypical development takes place; ‘epigenetic’ factors play a crucial role in the latter. Scaling of skeletal structure (the genome cannot be thought to provide a complete specification of the sizes of each bone in a specific organism) and symmetry (the fact that each rib on the right has a homologue on the left, each wing of a butterfly the same pattern as the other . . .) are two examples. And there are issues that bear on structure and form that selectional adaptation does not speak to in any significant way: the fact, for example, that what have been called “control” or “master” genes are found in the same form in a large number of different species that cross biological clades. Walter Gehring has long pointed out that vision in all species in different clades must be linked to the fact that all species have homologous control genes – PAX-6, in the case of vision. This suggests that vision did not evolve separately in (say) fish, insects, and vertebrates, but that it is available to all creatures with PAX-6 (and other genes involved in introducing rhodopsin and putting its sensitivity to photons to use through various mechanisms), with variation depending on the rest of the structure of the organism, plus background conditions. Similar points can be made for other ‘organs’ and their distributions in species of organism.

As for the soundness of selectional adaptationist claims, several have pointed out that evidence is too often question-begging (just-so stories), or does not exist and cannot be found, making an adaptationist claim empty. Focusing on cognitive systems, Richard Lewontin (1998) raised serious doubts about the evidence claimed for selection of several cognitive capacities, including some that seem to be unique to humans, such as language. At the end of the article, he remarks in response to the volume's editors’ suggestion that he soften his criticism, “We should reserve the term ‘hypothesis’ for assertions that can be tested.” And at the very end of his remarks, he emphasizes his main point, that history provides virtually no evidence for change and adaptation in cognitive capacities. One of Lewontin's primary targets was Pinker and Bloom's view that selection alone can explain the introduction of a “complex system” such as language. His criticism of Pinker and Bloom resurfaces in modified and more precise form in Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (henceforth HCF) (2002). Some of the main points of the HCF article are raised elsewhere in this volume. HCF point out that while we might find at least some evidence for selectional adaptation of aspects of language that are outside the core in what HCF call “FLB” (for “faculty of language, broad”) as opposed to FLN (“faculty of language, narrow”), claims about the adaptive evolution of the core computational system of language FLN with its recursive character and capacity to link sounds and meanings over an infinite range have nothing to back them up. For discussion, see HCF (2002) and critical response from Pinker and Jackendoff (2005) followed in the same volume by Fitch, Hauser, and Chomsky's (2005) and Jackendoff and Pinker's further effort (2005). On the relevance of the Minimalist Program to this discussion, see the online Chomsky, Hauser, and Fitch (2004), available on Hauser's website. See also the discussion in the main text, and especially Chomsky's remarks on perfection and design in our 2009 discussion (pp. 50ff.).

Discussions of function, adaptation, and evolution are complicated by the fact that it is not clear what ought to figure in evolutionary theory. Is Turing's work on morphogenesis (which he thought is best located in chemistry or physics) in or out? What about Gould and Lewontin's spandrels? Should one admit Chomsky's saltational view (explained below) of how language came to be introduced into “evolutionary theory”? These decisions can be left to those working in the field, as can the explanatory status of natural selection. Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that the claim that adaptationist accounts can explain everything in the way of biological structure, development, evolution, and speciation is at an end – supposing, of course, that responsible scientists actually believed that they did in the first place.

While we can leave the issue of the precise explanatory status of selection, adaptation, and adaptive function to biologists, there is a simplistic view of selection and evolution that needs no expertise to reject out of hand. Perhaps in an effort to popularize evolutionary theory and/or present to lay audiences a readily-understood alternative to a theological explanation of why biological species are the way they are, some have exploited a connection between evolution and commonsense understanding's apparently default view of learning, a view found in behaviorism's and empiricism's view that we learn by coming to respond to input in the ‘right’ way by being trained to form the ‘right’ dispositions to respond. We shape our responses to the environment by having the ‘right’ responses rewarded, and the ‘wrong’ ones punished. Relying on this picture, many have treated evolution as an historicized version of learning so conceived: we and other creatures are the ways we are because each species has adapted in its structure and development to have an optimal strategy for its ecological niche; Skinner himself supposed this, revealing how little he understood of what evolution involves. Exploiting a connection to this view of learning is misguided strategy; one ends up defending something for which there is no warrant except that it appears to be all-encompassing. There is no modesty to this view – no recognition that selection's role is limited, if even that. Nothing is said about how evolution and phenotype development and growth must take place within the constraints set by physics, chemistry, biology, perhaps some form of information theory. There is no mention of the fact that many genes are conserved over species and clades. Epigenetic factors are ignored. ‘Happy accidents’ of the sort found in what Lewontin and Gould called “spandrels” are not mentioned. Too often – especially in the cognitive domain – there is only a minimal effort to find evidence for claims: just-so stories are common. Virtually all features within a species and their structures and behaviors are treated as though they were ‘selected’ over a long period, chosen by virtue of adapting to the environment in which a species is found. While there are gestures toward a role for the genome, nothing is said about its precise structure and how it works and one finds no mention of epigenetic factors. The genome's role on this naïve view of evolution – one too often popularized by those who should know better – is just to transmit from generation to generation successful ways for a species and its members to ‘solve problems’ in dealing with an environment. There is little or no disentangling of the notion of the interests and actions of agents from the ‘interests’ and ‘actions’ of genes. Compounding the error, genes are often presented as having some direct control over an organism's behavior, rather than providing an organism with various systems that it can use to deal with its environment, and – certainly in the case of humans – do a great deal more too. Like ‘learning’ for the behaviorist, the naïve but very popular view of ‘selection’ comes to be treated as an explanation of virtually every trait of an organism. And this kind of naïve simplification comes to assume the trappings of a metaphysical principle. Rather than God, one finds appeals to evolution (so conceived) alone as the explanation of why we are the way we are and act in the ways we do. Confusion and ideology are served, not clarity and reason – nor science.

Rejecting this notion of selection is not, of course, rejecting the explanatory power and scope of evolution, properly understood. But as indicated, it is not exactly clear what is to be included in the theory of evolution.

II.4 Biology: function-of-an-organ

With that caveat in place, and leaving aside the to-be-determined final status of the explanatory reach of adaptation and adaptive function in evolutionary theory, it is time to acknowledge that biology does seem to provide a place for functional explanation that several centuries of scientific research have convincingly excluded from most forms of physical science. By way of background, Ernst Mayr (2004) argues against reducing biological explanation to physical because, he suggests, biological theories are committed to speaking of function where physical theories are not. It is not clear what Mayr has in mind by the physical, nor – in a related vein – by biology offering an ‘autonomous’ mode of explanation. Granted, biology is not physics, but it – like linguistics, if Chomsky is right – is a naturalistic and thus in an important sense physical science. Ignoring, however, the issue of what is or is not physical, and focusing on the most plausible kinds of cases where functional explanation makes good contributions, let us look at a “system-within-an-organism” or “organ-within-an-organism” notion of function. It may not be quite what Mayr had in mind, but it looks reasonably close to it.

An “organ-within-an-organism” notion of function is interesting for our purposes for two reasons. One is that it allows for clearly stated and falsifiable hypotheses, unlike far too many claims made in dealing with issues of function in biology. And second, on the face of it, it suits Chomsky's conception of a computational theory of language, where language is thought of as an ‘organ’ – which is how Chomsky construes the language faculty – or at least, how he conceives its computational core and its specified ‘contributions’ to other mental systems. ‘Doing a specific job’ (fulfilling a function within the organism by interacting with specific other systems in specific ways over interfaces) seems to be built into the idea that a computational theory of language is a formal science of a system that “interfaces” with other systems by providing them information that they can use, and apparently even doing so in an optimal way, so that the design of the language faculty can be conceived as perfect – or at least, a lot closer to perfection than was thought not long ago. Language – using Chomsky's informal term – “instructs” production/perception and conceptual/intentional systems and, in order to do so, must provide them with ‘instructions’ (relevant forms of information) that they can ‘use’ or put to use – that is, come into operation in the way(s) characteristic of the relevant system(s). Note that ‘use’ here is not “use by creature” or “use by organism as a whole,” and especially not “use by agent.” It is “employment by other (designated) systems in specific ways,” which is what places this notion of function in the ranks of empirical investigation.

Plausibly, in fact, we could entirely abandon the term “function” in dealing with specific system-internal system transactions and thereby avoid the obscurity that this term seems to invite. That is probably the wisest strategy – but not one, apparently, that people are fully willing to adopt. It is not clear why, although I suspect one factor is that its use in what appears to be a reasonably well understood context attracts attention. A possible parallel is found in the following case, and numerous others. A recent article in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences uses words such as choose and move in speaking of the entirely chemical responses to environmental food sources for slime molds. The cost is confusion, but the reward is attention to an ‘amazing’ discovery.

So ignoring the matter of whether biology is “autonomous” in the way Mayr seems to think, and focusing on reasonably well-specified cases in sciences that deal with specific ‘organs’ (or at least their ‘cores’), and ignoring too the advice of the paragraph above, it might make no sense to speak of a biological ‘organ’ of this sort without introducing the relevant notion of a function – of what the organ ‘does’ for and with the systems with which it interacts. And if Chomsky accepts such a notion of function and – as indicated – this notion of function is not thought of in terms of adaptations to an environment, nor in terms of what an organism ‘does’ with what a system provides, one can make a plausible case for the language system serving a biological function in something at least reasonably close to what Mayr may have had in mind.

It is not altogether obvious, however, that Chomsky does accept this as an autonomous notion of biological function. Some reasons for doubt appear in the discussion of the skeleton example in the main text (see also Lewontin 2001); not only are there many plausible claims about functions for the skeleton (which is also an ‘organ’ of sorts in the body interacting with immune, circulatory, motor . . . systems), but some descriptions of its functions look very informal (giving structure to the body), with little prospect for making them precise within a naturalistic theory. Others appear in our 2009 discussions of the design and perfection of the language faculty on pp. 50–55. Likely the most significant of all appears two paragraphs above: for the relevant scientific purposes in question, why not abandon the term “function” entirely and instead speak in a well-understood way of an organ's ‘interfaces’? Ignoring all this, however, there is a case to the effect that Chomsky does acknowledge some notion of inter-organic function (cf. Epstein 2007).

Footnotes

1 Some (e.g. Carruthers [2006]) have tried to make the language system itself a – or even the – central coordinating system, the device that gives humans cognitive flexibility by taking contributions from various systems and integrating them. That move makes some sense because of Elizabeth Spelke's work (2003, 2004). And I do not doubt (McGilvray 2005b) that language contributes to human cognitive flexibility. I confess, though, that I find Carruthers's very complex claims difficult to take very seriously. For one thing, like some psychologists and others (including some of his critics), where Carruthers believes some mental ‘job’ needs to be done (with jobs specified, apparently, by assuming that humans are agents with minds that serve their actions, for that seems to be what he has in mind when he treats humans as “complex functional systems”), he introduces a module to perform it. The result is a boxological picture of the mind, with little or nothing offered concerning what is in the boxes. I admire his courage in tackling the issues he wants to deal with – describing and in some sense explaining how a ‘massively modular’ mind manages to integrate its components and produce coordinated actions, with special focus on the role of language. However, for reasons that go back to the creative aspect of language use, I doubt that these can be addressed in a scientific way, pace Fodor and his “representational theory of mind” and similar efforts on the parts of others. Commonsense folk psychology and belief-desire stories deal with the matter in some sense, no doubt, but they do not provide a science of mind and action; they depend on commonsense concepts and on conceiving of humans as essentially practical problem-solvers.

2 Some – such as Fodor – believe that they can salvage a representationalist theory of the mind by introducing a view of reference/denotation claimed to depend on natural laws. For discussion of such efforts, see the main text and references in it and my (2010).

3 One can to a degree ‘determine’ a referent with respect to a context by including in an account of ‘what is said’ a set of indices that specify time of speech, person speaking, context of speech, purpose of speech, and so on. Or rather, one can hope that something like this would succeed, for it surely cannot: the indices would have to be endless in number to cover all possible cases, and there would be no discourse-independent means of fixing even a single set of assignments, assuming – counterfactually – that that would suffice. Nothing like this appearance of progress can aid the efforts of those who want to construct an honest theory of language that has some degree of objectivity. For in the final analysis, one would have to have an index for “object of current concern” in a specific discourse context (or the like), and fixing that would require being in the circumstances in question employing whatever cognitive resources appear to be required and making then a reasonable guess about what someone intends. There are no ‘boundary conditions’ on what is or could be involved in coming to such a ‘situational’ judgment. In his “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs,” Donald Davidson concluded from this that there can be no theory of language. What he should have concluded is that there can be no theory of language as use – basically, Wittgenstein's point, made some forty years earlier.

4 Reproductive capacity may be the most generally accepted view of what ‘drives’ selection, but it would be very difficult to exclude other options.

Appendix III: On what is distinctive about human nature (and how to deal with the distinction)

There are at least two important points made here in the main text. One is remarked on elsewhere: that the evolution of language into its modern form could well have consisted entirely in a single mutation in a single individual – a mutation that allowed a human to construct complex thoughts.[1] The key is the introduction of a single operation, Merge, which gives a creature that has this operation the capacity to engage recursion to an in-principle unbounded extent. There is no need, as there is with the Pinker-Bloom story about language and its evolution, and other appeals to the selectional advantages of increased capacity to communicate, to suppose that language developed slowly over many millennia.[2] A single step would suffice, assuming that Merge provides the means to join concepts together to make complexes and to move them, and that conceptual (thought) systems and – when and where externalization begins to figure, which need not be at the start – articulatory and perceptual systems were in place. There is more to language and the conditions under which it can be acquired and operate than that, and more needs to be done to make sense of how language could be innate yet take so many forms. For more on these matters, see the discussion below of parameters and of what Chomsky calls the “third factor” in language development at both the species and individual levels. However, the basic point seems to remain: the hypothesis that Merge alone is sufficient for the recursive feature of language remains plausible, and its saltational introduction makes sense of how language came to be introduced into the species. (For a dissenting view, see Pinker & Jackendoff 2005 and for a response to them, Fitch, Hauser & Chomsky 2005.)

The other point is found in Chomsky's remark that our concepts and thought systems do not operate the way animals’ do. Part of the reason is that the concepts are just different; I return to that below. But another aspect of the matter recalls the point made above about stimulus freedom and other features of the creative use of language. Descartes in his 1637 Discourse, and a large number of others following him, were struck by the difference in ways in which animals use their conceptual/cognitive tools and the ways in which humans, able to combine concepts in complex forms of ‘perspective,’ employ theirs. (Arguably, it is this observation, no doubt only obscurely understood under rubrics such as “knowledge” or “reason,” that lie at the root of the myth of special creation for humans: we have language and flexible ways to combine concepts, other creatures do not.) At least two factors play a role in bringing about this difference. One is that our concepts are just different; there is more on that below. The other has to do with what a language faculty provides. It can in its use operate – so far as we can determine – autonomously, thereby supporting our ability to speculate and wonder about anything whatsoever, without regard to circumstances, external or internal. Stimulus freedom, already noted, is one factor in this. Another is “unboundedness”: by means of the operations of the language faculty, arbitrarily chosen concepts can be joined with others to form an endless number of complexes (‘expressions’). Elizabeth Spelke (2003) – among others – makes much of the combinatory capacity of language and what it affords humans alone; she could add: combinatory to an unbounded degree. Chomsky (2000) puts it this way: with language, we can produce novel cognitive “perspectives” that allow us to conceive in ways that are clearly unavailable to creatures that lack recursion. Still another factor – almost certainly related – is that human actions seem to be free. Perhaps that is an illusion, but it is not likely one we can overcome, or for which there is any evidence that we should overcome. Given the number of systems in our heads and the fact that the production of actions requires the coordination of at least several contributing mental, motor, and input systems (with different ones at different times) operating cooperatively over an interval, analyzing the causes of an action would be like trying to solve a massive multi-body problem where there are few if any constraints on what contributes when, and how. As extensive discussion of the n-body problem indicates, that is very likely beyond what we humans are capable of managing. So we might as well acknowledge now that we, with our scientific tools, are very unlikely to be able to produce a deterministic account of the much more complex phenomena of linguistic behavior, especially one that can be generalized to all individuals. However, instead of bemoaning the fact, we should recognize that – as Descartes emphasized – we have the evidence of experience that we feel free. Lacking also any evidence of science against ‘free will,’ and acknowledging the evidence of experience for it, perhaps we should celebrate our freedom instead.

The history of efforts to deal with the distinctiveness of human cognitive capacities is instructive. While few of them were as sharp in their observations as Descartes, many in both empiricist and rationalist schools followed him in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by attributing the differences seen in human cognitive powers to reason. Animals, it was thought, operate not by reason but by instinct. While there was agreement on this, however, the schools diverged in how they thought humans come by reason: rationalists assumed it was an innately endowed capacity, heavily dependent on the operation of several innate faculties. Descartes famously placed reason – the mind, or the mental – in a separate substance. Empiricists suggested that this supposedly distinctive feature of humans comes through exposure to the environment and – certainly by the time of Herder and the majority of the Romantics, and arguably before – to a large extent it comes by learning language and social practices from the community. The claim becomes in effect, then, that human invention, history, and culture make the difference between us and other creatures – that, and the supposed fact that must accompany this kind of explanation, that to a large extent the human mind is empty at birth, and that it has available a large area where some kind of generalized learning procedure operates, guided by training and experience, and shaped by learned habits and rules that are assumed to link some kind of input to some kind of output.

Chomsky's work advances the rationalist cause considerably by making reason into not just a consequence rather than an apparently independent explanatory principle, but a consequence, largely, of treating language – its growth/development and its internal operations – as an ‘animal instinct’ introduced by mutation into the human species. (The use of language, however, remains well within the domain of freedom.) Unlike Descartes, he accepts that our minds and the combinatory mechanism of language especially are apt objects for natural scientific research.[3] Moreover, unlike the empiricists, he maintains that what makes us human is not society, culture, and the training of a plastic mind, but the introduction of a special kind of instinct to our species. As an organ of the human body, language develops automatically and operates internally according to innate principles. And most of our commonsense concepts, at least, seem to be innate too – hence, the result of some kind of internal system or systems. The same can be said for the kinds of linguistic sounds that we can produce. However, by providing a way to put arbitrary concepts together in complex structures at arbitrary times in arbitrary circumstances, language surely provides humans with the essential tools for speculation, explanation, inference, and the like – certainly within the commonsense domain, at least. Making a contribution no doubt too to our capacity to create scientific theories – at the very least, assuming recursion came via Merge – it appears to yield the discrete infinities of natural numbers, so it has a role to play in the development of science. Chomsky remarks on that above and below in the text. In effect, then, the claim in its simplest form is that the introduction of recursion through the mutation that introduced Merge leads not just to the conceptually necessary operations of language (putting elements together, and moving them), but to what Jared Diamond called “the great leap forward,” the introduction to the species of the distinctive features of human cognitive capacity. That is not quite enough, as suggested above: human-unique concepts play a role too. But their distinctive nature may be the result of their being – at least in some measure – due to Merge or something like it too. The topic is taken up in the text and Appendix V.

The empiricist explanation has not changed substantially, nor has it advanced appreciably since its beginnings – ignoring in this regard contemporary redefinitions of empiricism as efforts to seek the best explanations. No doubt connectionism and the like provide pictures of what the area of the mind might look like, if something like the empiricist picture were correct. In this way, it is an advance over Locke's “blank slate” (assuming he actually believed that tale, which is less than obvious). But the rest of the story – and especially the dependence on some kind of training or learning – is unchanged. We differ from animals by having weak instincts, or perhaps lacking instincts altogether with regard to our higher cognitive operations. For these to become available, we need recurring experiences, acculturation, and (typically) training in order to bring shape to and constitute these operations and the conceptual materials on which they operate.[4] We must have large areas of our minds that allow for this. And reason continues to be celebrated as what makes us distinctive. Consider, for example, the work of Wilfrid Sellars and his followers – a group that includes several contemporary philosophical stars. In Sellars's essay “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man” in (1963a), he presents a sweeping picture – not unlike Hegel's – of how humans come to be what they are now, with advanced cultures, sciences, and institutions. In this picture, humans are portrayed as gradually being weaned from a framework in which they placed themselves at the center of the universe and had no inkling of science to our current epistemically advanced states and our sciences by continuous refinement in their ability to reason. Their ability to reason comes to be modified through greater and greater sophistication of common sense (Sellars's “original” and “manifest” images of world and humans in them), which eventually comes to be scientific understanding in its modern form. Improvement and greater sophistication are throughout treated in terms of ways of offering better and better ways to describe and explain the world and humans in it – that is, as improvements in our abilities to reason, provided by better and better ‘theories.’ And concepts are characterized by their contributions to reasoning – by their roles in reasoning about the world and ourselves. Concepts – like language itself – are treated as normatively governed, and the largely epistemic norms that do the governing are seen as inferential rules that Sellars calls “practices.” These rules are in turn portrayed as the rules of reason and language, conceiving of language in the way that Wittgenstein did as a game or set of games we ‘play.’ Crucially, unlike rationalist accounts of primitive cognitive systems, including for Chomsky language, we must learn to reason. To learn how to reason is largely a matter of learning how to infer (or play the game); and learning that is learning how to speak in accord with the rest of the specific community in which we find ourselves. We learn how to speak by being trained by our communities; our communities, in fact, are repositories of, and in a way constitute, the standards of correct reasoning. Communities train their children to produce the right words in the right circumstances. Once a child sufficiently meets community standards, he or she “knows a language” (a form of know-how), or masters it, and can teach it to others, because he or she has the relevant discriminative capacity to recognize divergence and conformity. The view of learning is basically behavioristic; indeed, Sellars acknowledged his behaviorism, and in fact celebrated a slightly sophisticated form of it as the proper and only science of mind. The slightly sophisticated form of it appears in essays in which Sellars treats the brain as a neural net that is modified by experience and training to emulate the inferential connections he thought constituted the rules of languages. These essays offer an early form of a connectionist model of the brain, one according to which the brain's pathways leading from sensory input to behavioral output are modified as training proceeds to produce the right outputs, given specific inputs. To have a language is to have a brain that yields what a community takes to be appropriate behavior (epistemically correct, etc.), given circumstances. And to have a concept is to have a node in the brain that yields the right outputs, given a specific input. It is remarkable that this Sellarsian picture of language, mind, brain, and reason continues to dominate philosophical (and psychological, etc.) study of language and mind. In philosophy, it is found in both the ‘analytic’ school and (although with less emphasis on learning, science, and the brain), the ‘continental.’ Both are empiricist in their assumptions, and differ largely in style and emphasis.

Chomsky's rationalist alternative to this empiricist account treats reason – exemplified in problem-solving in both science and common sense – as (at least for common sense) heavily dependent not on training and acculturation, but on our having the innate instincts we do. This very different perspective on the matter is found in earlier rationalists Chomsky discussed in his Cartesian Linguistics, such as Herbert of Cherbury, one of the Cambridge Platonists of the seventeenth century. Herbert noted that we have to have (innate) “common notions” in place in order to come to reason at all – that is, to describe and explain at all. These common notions are, essentially, the commonsense concepts typically expressed in our natural language use. Chomsky adds a further, and crucial, instinct or innate contribution to Cherbury's picture, a language organ and its combinatory powers. Given this, reason that is divorced from circumstances – and flexible cultures, human institutions, and individual styles, etc. – becomes possible.

So it turns out that the distinctive difference between humans and other primates lies largely in the fact that we have an instinct they do not: language. Introducing language allows reason to develop. We are also invited to rethink our view of animals, of course: they need not be conceived as deterministic natural machines, as Descartes thought – although incorrectly, because as Newton showed, there are no such things. No doubt many animals also have concepts, minds, freedom, intention, etc. However, they don't have what we have, language and recursion.

That said, keep in mind that it is quite possible, even likely, that it is not just the fact that we have language that accounts for the differences in human cognitive capacities (in “reason”), but that our concepts are just different from animals’. There is more on this in Appendix V. First, though, Chomsky clarifies what Merge amounts to, how it operates, and what it gives the human species. He begins with an account of the relationship between language and another cognitive benefit of recursion apparently unique to the human species – mathematics, especially the natural numbers. And he offers a very interesting explanation of one respect in which natural languages differ from another form in which humans employ ‘symbols.’ We produce and use invented, formal systems such as those found in advanced forms of mathematics and in the natural sciences. No other creature does, of course. And no doubt our capacity to invent these symbol systems depends in part on our having language. These formal systems differ from natural language not only in the fact that they are invented, that they are artifacts, where our languages and our concepts (and linguistic sounds) are not. They differ also in that at least some of them depend heavily on natural languages, at least with regard to making them learnable. Arithmetic is plausibly an exception, as hinted in the discussion in the main text. For arithmetic is as suggested there a product of internal Merge operating over a lexicon with a single element, and it is a very impoverished natural language. I thank Chomsky for pointing this out to me.

[1] In light of some matters discussed later and in the main text at pp. 26–28, I should emphasize that this story presupposes that human concepts were in place before this. As to their origin – assuming that they are in large measure unique to humans – that is something that is likely to remain a mystery. As Lewontin (1998) reminds us, there is little (that is, nothing) that one can offer in favor of or against any specific hypothesis.

[2] In fact, if it turns out (for discussion, see pp. 11–15) that communication is at best something that language allows for, rather than being central to it, their argument is completely irrelevant.

[3] Chomsky suggested to me that it is interesting to speculate about what Descartes would have agreed to, had he had available and held a competence/performance distinction. If he had had this available, he might have agreed that the computational operations of language are inherent in what he would have called “body.” In that regard, look at what he says about vision; I speculate on the matter in a section called “Descartes's Contribution” in my introduction to the third edition of Chomsky's Cartesian Linguistics. Keep in mind, though, that when Newton came along, Descartes's notion of body as a scientific concept had to be rejected.

[4] Hume, who often appealed to instinct (while insisting that its operations were and would remain obscure), is a partial exception. Like Descartes again, it is interesting to speculate about what he would have maintained, if he had had available a competence/performance distinction. His view of himself as a scientist of human nature makes the speculation even more interesting.

Appendix IV: Chomsky on natural science

Chomsky's discussions of Merge illustrate the fruitfulness of idealizing and simplifying in order to construct a successful science. The point is discussed further in several places in our interchange and very usefully in Norbert Hornstein's new preface to Chomsky's Rules and Representations (1980/2005), so I will not pursue it here. Instead, I want to make some further remarks about Chomsky's view of natural science as I understand it.

As suggested before, although humans constructing sciences get some help from whatever innate resources lead to our capacity to engage in what Peirce called “abduction” (see above and below), the sciences themselves – the explicit formal symbol systems that constitute theories – are largely artifacts. They are products of human ingenuity and effort, typically of people working together. And they advance, often, over centuries, leaving still many unanswered questions. They are artifacts put together to do a job because, in effect, science is a project. It is an attempt by humans to construct theories of various domains. In the case of the natural sciences, that job is reasonably well understood, and there is agreement, usually implicit, on the goals. There are, of course, differences between sciences in subject matters (in the ‘entities’ the sciences investigate), in specific research techniques and experimental devices, and – of course – in the laws and principles of the theories. Yet natural scientists generally aim toward a uniform goal. Their practices reflect what Chomsky calls “methodological monism” (2000). Abstracting from differences in experimental techniques, etc., there is sufficient uniformity in the goals of natural scientists, no matter what the science, that the term “monism” (implying a single approach to a domain) is called for. The goal – the “goal of science,” the project the scientist tries to carry out – is to produce a theory of a domain that offers descriptive and explanatory adequacy, that provides formalized (explicit, mathematical) statement, that is simple (in some rather hard to define sense), that aims towards objectivity, and that allows for accommodation to other sciences. Progress – and progress is necessary, for it is the sign of success – is measured by improvements in one or more of these desiderata.

The best theory at a time by these measures offers what counts as a true theory, and it can tentatively be assumed that the subject matter that the theory focuses on is correctly so described and explained. From this perspective, it is plausible to speak of the project of science as an effort to “seek the truth” about the natural world. Thinking of it as a project constrained by the tools that demonstrably yield success suggests that attempts to construct theories of domains where one or more of the desiderata cannot be satisfied – for example, attempts to construct theories of human action – or where one encounters continued lack of progress, should be abandoned. Failure in certain domains – perhaps those that are too complex, among others – should be no surprise, Chomsky notes. We are biophysical creatures, and there is no reason to expect that our cognitive powers are anything but limited, just as are those of other creatures. As emphasized in Chomsky (1988), that fact is of course to our advantage, for without limitation, there would be no growth, no knowledge . . .

Given the points about theories and truth, and given the shape of the theories that we have managed to construct, perhaps we can speculate to an extent about what the world ‘in itself’ is like. For one thing, with the otherwise-explainable exception of biological organisms that develop over time, the world (as we can understand it) seems to have entities and systems that remain quite stable, and to have (within limits) predictable states and consequences. Perhaps this stability depends on maintaining stable structures. For another, these states seem to stand in what for our mathematically and formally endowed minds appear to be simple relations to one another. The claims made by these speculations may, of course, be nothing more than artifacts of our theories. But the surprising – almost miraculous – success of our formal theory-construction techniques does suggest that our theories track how things are. Remarkably, moreover, the theory-construction goals that have yielded improving sciences in the ‘physical’ domain seem to be equally successful in the ‘mental’ domain. Examples include computational theories of language and vision. This point is emphasized again in later discussion.

Finally, a point about scientific concepts as opposed to those found in common sense. With scientific concepts, it makes no sense to say that somehow they succeed at (we think) tracking the way things are because they have their forms and characters as a result of some kind of evolutionary adaptation. Peirce thought that this sort of explanation was plausible. That might make some sense with our commonsense concepts (although see below) because they – or some of them, or (some of) the system(s) that yield them – might have been in place for millennia, allowing for evolutionary adaptation, perhaps through several species (Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch 2002). However, it makes no sense with concepts such as LEPTON or ALEPH-NULL and the like, or even concepts such as ENERGY, FORCE, or MOTION as these are understood and employed in physics. As suggested earlier in discussion, no adaptive forces could have yielded them. They are recent inventions by human beings, and having them apart from the frameworks in which they are lodged – themselves artifacts – could not have provided reproductive or other advantages to humans or other creatures beforehand. Some of the contributions of our minds to the capacity to ‘do science’ and construct scientific theories are no doubt innate, but that is far from claiming that we humans have ‘devoted’ systems yielding the concepts on triggering occasions. If that were the case, constructing adequate sciences would be a lot easier than it is, and in the case of physics, we would not have needed anything like the several centuries it has taken physics to get to the far from complete state it is now in.

Appendix V: Of concepts and misguided theories of them, and why human concepts are unique

V.1 Concepts and ways of going wrong

Almost everyone who allows that there are concepts agrees that word-like units express at least some concepts, that concepts are at least in part mental ‘entities,’ and that it is through concepts that minds gain access to the world. But there is not much else that people agree on.

Some approaches to concepts – those that adopt anti-nativist and externalist empiricist views – need mention only in order to reject them. A dominant version of an empiricist view is found in what is called “functionalism” in the philosophy of mind. Essentially, the functionalist maintains that concepts are the (epistemic) roles/functions of linguistic tokens in mental transactions that mediate perceptual/sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. Wilfrid Sellars's view of mind, discussed in several other appendices and at some risk of tedium, again below, is an example; he presents what is sometimes called a “conceptual role” view of words and the concepts they express. Words are seen not as Chomsky construes them – lexical items – but as ‘things’ of some sort (perhaps neural nodes, perhaps computer binary coding that is electronically instantiated) that function in computational systems that deal with the world and ‘solve problems’ in epistemically reliable ways. Functionalism can take several forms, including behaviorist and connectionist ones. The basic view is implicit in many psychological and philosophical works, including some of the most famous. Moreover, it is popular not just in the philosophy of mind but the philosophy of language. Because functionalists suppose that the mind/brain is something like a causal system that takes perceptual inputs, subjects them to computational operations thought of in terms of (epistemic) rule-following programs that yield reliable answers to environmentally set problems in order to yield successful behaviors or actions, it is easy to see their empiricist pedigree. One studies the mind as if it were a reliable mediator of external inputs and outputs (a version of externalism). And one conceives of the mind as gaining its capacity to act in a reliable way by virtue of habituating oneself to a linguistic community's settled epistemic habits, a rejection of nativism. Having begun with these assumptions about mind and how to proceed, one is invited to adopt others popular among empiricist approaches – that identifying a concept is a ‘holistic’ matter so that to identify a specific one, you must know its ‘place’ (role, function) in a cluster of concepts; that understanding is a matter of knowing/having a (holistic) theory about the world; that having a language is a kind of know-how; that learning a language is developing a (good, reliable) theory of the world; that learning a language is being trained to produce what the community takes to be correct behaviors/responses; and so on. While these kinds of views dominate philosophical and psychological discussion, they solve no problems. In fact, because they begin with the wrong assumptions about how to proceed in studying the mind and its contents, they create puzzles and mysteries. The empiricist approach commits the error that Wittgenstein warned against, trying to construct a theory of highly variable and heavily context- and user-dependent use or application of language. By attempting this anyway, empiricist philosophers and psychologists end up pursuing one or another form of Wittgensteinian Scheinstreit. Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations pointed out that philosophical problems are not problems; there is no solution to them. They are presented and understood in such a way that solution is impossible. Thus, discussion and dispute is not just endless, but useless. Chomsky appears to be suggesting the same (at least of functionalism and related current philosophical dogmas, such as representationalism and physicalism [Chomsky 1996]), and tying this suggestion to a further one: if you want explanations and evidence rather than speculation and the mining of mixed and flexible intuitions that are based on unsupported and unsupportable assumptions about the mind and how to study it, employ the tools of naturalistic research – natural science – and, using these tools, look inside the head, not at heads and worlds and relations between them. That seems to be the only workable “game in town,” to use Jerry Fodor's phrase, but for a different end than his representationalist-externalist effort.

Because Fodor's (1998) view of mind and concepts assumes nativism, it is a useful counterpoint to Chomsky's views. He offers a variation on a Fregean account of words and the concepts they express. Words express what Frege called “senses,” and these in turn refer to or denote things or properties. Senses can differ even though they denote the same things. Think of Fregean senses as ways in which denotations can be “presented.” A denotation can be the same even though it is differently presented – it is denoted by different senses. A standard example is this: the words “morning star” and “evening star” denote the same thing (Venus), but differ in how they ‘present’ Venus; they differ in sense. Fodor psychologizes Frege's senses and calls them “modes of presentation,” or MOPs. What, then, is a concept? One might think that a concept is a MOP. It is, after all, what is in the head; it also develops automatically (Fodor 1998, 2008). However, Fodor with his externalist inclinations – clearly visible in his “representational theory of mind,” among other manifestations – wants to identify concepts in terms of their “wide content” which is, essentially, what he believes he can show MOPs are of or refer to (their denotations). Essentially, he claims that the MOP for, say water develops automatically in a person as a result of some kind of causal informational relationship to – or predominantly to – water ‘out there,’ and that this causal relationship also establishes an inverse semantic relation, denotation, so that the water-MOP denotes the property being water ‘out there’ (and, he insists, being H_2O ‘out there’ too). Some of the errors with this view are taken up in the discussion in the main text. There is nothing wrong with holding that MOPs are acquired by some kind of causal relationship; any nativist account holds that concepts develop as a result of some kind of ‘triggering’ relationship. But there is no reason to believe that a semantic relationship of denotation piggybacks on the world–head causal triggering relationship. For further discussion, see my (2002a and 2010). In any case, because both MOP and (supposed) denotation figure in Fodor's account, we can for our purposes think of Fodor as identifying a concept with a pair consisting of a MOP and some property ‘out there.’

So far as I can tell, Chomsky's view of concepts – one that is nativist like Fodor's but, unlike Fodor's, internalist – differs from Fodor's in three central ways. Unlike Fodor, he seriously doubts that denotations serve to individuate concepts. For reasons that were well explored by rationalists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, he holds that the only fruitful way to distinguish one concept from another is to look to the concepts in the head themselves and construct a naturalistic theory of them. That is, one should aim to construct a theory of something like Fodor's modes of presentation or MOPs, not of relations to what he claims are their denotations. For MOPs – as even Fodor grants[1] – have the natures they do not because of what causes them, but because the mind configures them in ways that suit its own machinery's agenda. If you want to know what a concept is, look at what the mind makes it be; nativism and its implicit internalism are fine, representationalism and externalism are not. Chomsky's view is tied to the idea, often presented and defended by him, that referring or denoting is something that people do – a form of (free) human action – not some kind of ‘natural’ relationship, as Fodor wants to believe. It is also tied to the view that human cognitive resources are limited, and that the only readily available ‘access to the world’ that all humans have available to them is provided by the biophysically based cognitive resources offered by innate concepts – in effect, by the commonsense concepts that children and others readily acquire, without training. No doubt at least some humans now do have other sets of concepts available to them, of course – those found in the various natural sciences, which are to a large extent human inventions, and by no means readily available to the child or even the adult unfamiliar with the theories in which the science's concepts are defined and configured. Pace Fodor (and Putnam, Kripke, and many others) these concepts and the access to the world that they afford reinforce the point that it does little good to try to individuate native commonsense concepts by appeal to denotations. H_2O, and even more tellingly the various structurally different states of it investigated by the sciences (see Chomsky on H_2O in Appendix I), is not at all what people are talking about when they speak of water, using the commonsense concept WATER. The problem lies in Fodor's externalist-representationalist hopes.[2]

Another major way in which Chomsky differs from Fodor is in his view of the need for introducing what Fodor calls a “language of thought,” or LOT (Chomsky 2000). Chomsky seems to have several reasons for doubting the value of postulating such a thing/system. One has to do with the complications that a LOT adds to the science of natural language and, presumably, other systems that contribute to concepts. If syntactically described elements at the language faculty's semantic interface must be linked to the ‘right’ concept(s) in a separate system – that is, the LOT – in order to say what a specific set of syntactic elements ‘means,’ the theorist must (1) say what this link is, (2) how it is established (how it is acquired/learned) and (3) what is ‘in’ the LOT to link to. If instead the ‘semantic contribution’ of the language faculty at SEM – expressed in theoretical terms in Chomsky's view by stating which semantic features appear there – is taken (as it is by Chomsky) to constitute what an expression ‘means,’ period, there is no linking, acquisition, or specification problem. In effect, a particular SEM becomes a particular complex sentential “mode of presentation,” or at least, the language faculty's contribution to such a MOP (with the rest of the MOP provided by the mental systems with which language interfaces, if any).[3] Further, given that the relevant ‘semantic information’ in the form of semantic features must be lodged in some way in the lexicon, and assuming that these features are taken to constitute (at least a major part of) the ‘semantic information’ offered in a commonsense concept, the issue of how one acquires the capacity to express the semantic resources contained in commonsense concepts of the sort that Fodor focuses on can be understood as the issue of what ‘semantic information’ can be placed in a lexical item, where an association between a linguistic ‘sound’ and ‘meaning’ (a set of semantic features) is assumed. And further still, assuming that one can state what the relevant features are, one also has a way of investigating, at least in principle, how human concepts differ from animals’ concepts, if they do; Fodor simply assumes that they are the same, for he assumes that we share the LOT with other creatures. One can do all this while maintaining the internalist principles that Chomsky holds, without any LOT – assuming there is such a thing, for all we have really been told is that the LOT is English (or French, etc.), and English, French . . . are themselves highly suspect entities, since their provenance is the commonsense notion of language, nothing at all like I-languages. Given all these advantages (economy, etc), for purposes of avoiding what appears to be confusion and the pursuit of dead ends, it is unfortunate that the science of semantic features is still in its early stages and so cannot yet be seen as the only plausible approach for the scientist of language to pursue. Nevertheless, there is some progress (noted below), and to anyone who has reason to believe on independent grounds that the internalist approach – as realized in some form – is the only plausible one, there is no alternative.

A third difference is that by assuming that ‘lexical’ concepts (those concepts expressed by words, not sentences) can be characterized by multiple semantic features, Chomsky allows for the idea that what Fodor calls “lexical” concepts are ‘analyzable,’ or ‘compositional’ rather than (as Fodor insists) ‘atomic.’ In essence, Chomsky allows that natural-language-expressed MOPs can be the targets of a compositional theory of concepts, an internalist one that develops the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century rationalists’ view that if you want to know what a concept is, look in the mind. Comments in the main text reflect an inclination to adopt concept complexity and compositionality. There are various ways of massaging both Fodor's atomic view of concepts and a Chomskyan (potentially) compositional one, but they can for our purposes be ignored. In any case, since semantic features figure heavily in the reconstruction above of Chomsky's view of concepts, I will assume that attempting to construct a theory of them and how they are ‘put together’ in accord with biophysical principles is a reasonable way to proceed in developing a naturalistic nativist and internalist theory of concepts.

While a science of concepts/MOPs expressed in terms of semantic features is in its early stages, it does appear to be a reasonable project. And there has been some progress. Features such as CONCRETE, ANIMATE, and the like have long been the focus of lexical concept research. They act as descriptive terms, efforts to capture differences in ‘readings’ of words and sentences. A descriptively adequate theory of semantic features must provide a way to distinguish differences in linguistically expressed concepts, here understood as MOPs.

Here is one way to conceive of terms such as CONCRETE and ANIMATE. Because they contribute to what Chomsky calls a “perspective” available to “other systems” at the semantic interface SEM, one can think of them in any given case as a contribution to one of a potentially infinite number of “ways of understanding” – understanding where language contributes. Sentences (“expressions”) express these ways; that is, sentences in the technical sense (“expressions”) offer in structured form at SEMs the semantic features of the lexical items of which they are composed. One can think of semantic feature terms as something like adverbial descriptions of how a person can think or conceive of ‘the world’ (including presumably a fictional or discourse or story or abstract world, however minimal) as presented by other systems in the head (cf. Chomsky 1995a: 20). The precise way in which semantic features do this is by no means clear; that is for a theory to decide, although I make some suggestions in Appendix XII. And there is danger inherent in saying that these features offer ways in which persons can understand, for persons do not figure in natural sciences; the way(s) the features ‘work’ at a semantic interface by providing ‘information’ to other systems is presumably unconscious; and “understand” is by no means a well-defined theoretical term. For the moment, though, it suffices: the relevant features surely have something to do with how people comprehend and think – with “understand” taken here to be a general term for all such cases. Edging a bit into the realm of theory, then, perhaps we can think of the ways lexical items' (LIs’) semantic features contribute as having something to do with the way in which they configure other systems – or perhaps provide instructions to them, offering the semantic information the features constitute.

A caveat: it is a mistake to think of these features as properties of things ‘out there,’ rather in the way that Fodor (2008) speaking of features does. They might appear to have that role in the case of a sentence that a person uses to refer to something, at least where this sentence is held-true of the thing(s) to which that person refers. But referring and holding-true are both acts that a person performs, not by any means something that semantic features ‘do.’ Further, while sentences used to refer and hold-true may have a prominent place in the thoughts of those who would like to maintain that this use is both dominant and paradigmatic, it is neither. And emphasis upon truth-telling distracts attention from the far more prevalent uses of language in thought and imagination, speculation and self-berating, etc. and the primary point that ‘telling the truth’ is at best one of many ways in which a semantic feature can contribute to understanding, and it distracts attention from the fact that where semantic features do contribute in any of these ways or others, it is constitutive of a way of understanding, and thereby possibly of ‘experience’ (cf. Chomsky 1966/2002/2009).

Continuing, what is the status of current terms such as ABSTRACT? One can think of these as provisional theoretical terms. Think of them as descriptive in the way indicated: not describing things in the world, but describing ways to understand. In addition, conceive of them as rather like dispositional terms in that – like the dispositional term “soluble” said of salt – they do not offer explanations themselves of how semantic features ‘work,’ but describe by a discernible or noticeable ‘result’: salt dissolves when placed in water, and ABSTRACT yields an understanding of an ‘object’ as abstract. When hearing “George is writing a book on hydrodynamics and it will break your bookshelf,” you ‘see’ George's book as at first abstract, and then concrete. (Presumably, your LI ‘contains’ both ABSTRACT and CONCRETE.) Looking at terms such as ABSTRACT in this way, one can take them then to be provisional theoretical terms that as part of a naturalistic theoretical effort have something like the status of a dispositional term that can be replaced in the vocabulary of an advanced science of semantic features by terms that describe what a semantic feature is and – with the aid of the theory – explain how they ‘work,’ how they and lexical items are acquired, and the like.

Color science offers an analogy of sorts. When we (as we say) “see a green patch” (or better, I suspect, to capture the adverbial character: “sense greenly patchly,” awful though that sounds), the greenness is actually contributed by our visual system/mind in response (usually) to photon impingements on our arrayed retinal cones. Our minds, through the operations of the visual system, configure shape- location- and color-sensation in colored ways, a specific green being one of those ways. Any specific green and its contribution to ‘color experience’ are captured in a complex of theoretical terms – hue, brightness, and saturation – where these are scalars in a theory of the operations of the visual system, and the theory shows how and why specific arrays of firing rates of retinal cones subjected to various forms of calculation yield triples with a specific set of HBS values for a specific ‘point’ in a retinotopic ‘visual space.’ A specific set of values of hue, brightness, and saturation describe and explain ‘how a person sees in a colored way’ on a specific occasion. The analogy to semantic features should be clear, but it is a limited one. For one thing, language, unlike vision, often – perhaps in the great majority of times – operates ‘offline’: it does not depend heavily as does vision on stimulation from other systems in the head or on ‘signals’ from the environment. Vision can go off line too: it seems to do so in the case of imagination and dreams, but presumably in such cases, this is due to internal stimulation, and the degree to which it can go off line is nothing like what one can, and routinely does, find with language. Another disanalogy: language is what Chomsky calls a “knowledge” system; vision is not. LIs store semantic and phonological information that – especially in the latter case – configure how we understand ourselves, our actions, and our world(s), not just a specific form of fully internal ‘sensory content.’

Notice that a view of this sort avoids any need to somehow link ‘words’ to semantic values, properties, elements in a language of thought, or anything else of the sort. Because of that, there is an immediate advantage: there is no need to add to a theory of linguistically expressed meanings an account of what meanings are, nor need for a theory to explain how the link to elements in a LOT takes place, nor need to tie or “lock” (Fodor's term) elements in a LOT to properties ‘out there.’ Issues of acquisition are located where they belong, in an account of semantic features, where they ‘come from,’ and how they come to be assembled. Because they are located there, it becomes a lot easier to understand how linguistically expressed concepts could come to be so readily acquired and accessible to anyone with the right ‘equipment’ in their heads: assuming that the features are universal and so too the assembly mechanism, the fact that a few clues usually suffices to yield a reasonable grasp of a concept that one has not needed before becomes a lot easier to deal with. Further, one gets what Chomsky takes to be an advantage: a parallel between the way(s) in which naturalistic theories of language deal with phonological and phonetic features and the ways in which they ‘work.’ The parallel is useful in indicating to convinced externalists that dropping the myths of referentialism and representationalism do not make it impossible for humans to communicate.

There are serious issues to resolve on the way to a theory of lexical semantic features and how they are acquired and do their work. One is whether the concepts that play a role at SEM are “underspecified,” allowing for ‘filling out’ by other systems. Or are they perhaps over-specified, so that some pruning is required at SEM? Another, related issue is whether there will prove to be a need to assign some uniquely identifying feature to a specific concept feature set in order to distinguish that set from the set for another concept. If it were required, one could ask why that feature alone could not serve to individuate a concept. A third is whether during the derivation of a sentential expression, one can allow for insertion (or deletion) of features. Chomsky seems to think so in (2000: 175 f.), where he notes that LIs such as who and nobody yield restricted quantifier constructions at SEM, and other LIs such as chase and persuade seem to demand a form of lexical composition where a causal action element (for persuade, “cause to intend”) and a resultative state (x intends . . .) appear to demand composition in the course of a derivation.[4] Nevertheless, he remarks, for “simple words” (2000: 175) that it is plausible to speak of their features simply being ‘transported’ intact to SEMs. Reading “simple words” as something like candidates for morphological lexical stems of open class words (not formal, such as formal versions of “of,” “to,” plus TNS . . .), the point seems to be that what might be called “morphological roots” such as house and real (each meaning the relevant cluster of semantic features, represented by HOUSE and REAL) are neither composed nor decomposed during the course of a derivation/sentential computation. I assume so in what follows. A view of sentential derivation that essentially builds this idea into a picture of the morphological and syntactic operations that ‘take place’ in the course of a derivation is available in Borer (2005). In part to keep lexical semantic roots together as “packages” of semantic features, I adopt her picture (see McGilvray 2010).

There is a good reason to do this, assuming it is not incompatible with the facts, so far as they are known. The reason lies in an argument that Fodor (1998) employed to reject the view that stereotypes could serve the purposes of meaning compositionality in the construction of sentences. For example, while most people have stereotypes for MALE (as used of humans) and for BUTLER, combining these stereotypes is very unlikely to yield a stereotypical male butler as the meaning of the two put together. More generally, Fodor argues against all ‘decomposed’ accounts of concepts with the exception of necessary and sufficient conditions, but – if there were such things – they serve purposes so far as he is concerned only because they are assumed to determine their denotations, which for Fodor (as “contents” of concepts, in his understanding of them) are ‘atomic.’ It is these that are supposed to do the work of compositionality. There is, however, a much simpler alternative account that remains entirely within syntax and morphology (inside the core of the language faculty) and does not require moving into properties of things ‘out there.’ It consists merely of pointing to the fact that the conceptual packages associated with morphological stems remain intact until they reach SEM. That is all the ‘atomicity’ that is required. Taking this route places on morphology and syntax the burden of describing and explaining how and why a package comes to be nominalized, verbalized, or made into an adjective, why and how a specific nominal comes to be assigned a role as agent, and so on. The results of computation will be grammatical in some intuitive sense, although there is no guarantee that they will be readily interpretable. That is, however, a harmless result: we humans use what we can, and overproduction actually aids the interests of the creative aspect of language use. Some views of causal verbs such as persuade and build might demand that what appears at SEM is a syntactically joined expression that includes (say) CAUSE and INTEND (for persuade) at one or more SEMs, but while this requires treating causal verbs as complex, it is a harmless result too. In fact, it has the advantage of making it apparent that some analytic truths are underwritten by syntax without recourse to pragmatic or like considerations. Fodor and Lepore (2002 and elsewhere) have objections to this kind of move, but they are, I think, avoidable.

As for over- or underspecification: that will have to await a fuller account of the theory than can be offered now. There are, however, some considerations that argue in favor of overspecification. Take metaphorical interpretation, a very common phenomenon in natural language use. A plausible account of metaphor holds that in interpretation, one employs a form of pruning that applies one or a few semantic features of an LI to characterize something else. To take a simple example, consider the sentence John is being a pig said in a context in which 7-year-old young John is at a table eating pizza. To characterize John as a pig is to take – likely in this case – the feature GREEDY from PIG and apply it to JOHN. Pruning of semantic features, where necessary, can perhaps be made the responsibility of ‘other systems’ on the other side of SEM and, ultimately, of the user and the interpreter (or perhaps just ‘the user,’ abandoning the work of other systems, for they would have to be far too context-sensitive to yield the kinds of results that a computational theory could possibly capture). For a procedure like this to make sense at all, one needs at SEM at least a rich set of features. Arguably, much the same holds for what are often called literal interpretations, where – again – there may be need for pruning.

There are several efforts to say what the features are, with varying success. A notable one is found in Pustejovsky's (1995). There are, I think, some problems with the computational framework that Pustejovsky adopts (see McGilvray 2001), but the feature descriptors – thought of as contributions to a theory of concepts – are quite extensive, and many are illuminating. Nevertheless, it is likely that there is a long way to go – assuming, at least, that linguistically expressed concepts are specified sufficiently fully to distinguish any one from any other. As for explanatory adequacy – a solution to Plato's Problem for lexical concept acquisition, for example – one must seek that too. By way of a start, one can look to evidence gathered by Kathy Hirsh-Pasek and Roberta Golinkoff (1996), Lila Gleitman (e.g., Gleitman & Fisher 2005) and others concerning the course of development of concepts and lexical items with children, including – in the case of Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff, pre-linguistic infants. The issue of concept acquisition is of course distinct, in part, from the issue of lexical acquisition. For it is obvious that children have (or are able to quickly develop) at least some versions of PERSON and action concepts such as GIVE, EAT, and so on, plus TREE, WASH, and TRUCK at a very early age. For they appear to understand many things said in their presence before they are able to articulate; and they clearly have an extremely early capacity to discriminate at least some things from others. Perhaps they do not have BELIEF and KNOW before they can articulate such concepts in language; perhaps, in effect, one needs at least some capacity to articulate before being able to develop such concepts. These are open issues. However, at least it is clear that children do develop some – remarkably many – concepts quickly, and that some of them seem to already have at least some of the characteristics that make them characteristic of our (adult) conceptual schemes. Thus, as with the concept PERSON, the child's concept DONKEY must have a feature amounting to something like “psychic continuity.” As Chomsky's grandchildren's responses to a story discussed in the main text reveals, the story donkey turned into a stone remains a donkey, and the same donkey, even though it now has the appearance of a stone. This also indicates that the feature ‘has psychic continuity’ must not only be innate, but that there must be some mental ‘mechanism’ that includes this feature in a child's concepts of humans, donkeys, and no doubt other creatures.

V.2 Are human concepts unique?

Having rejected empiricist views of concepts because they have nothing to recommend them and having dismissed the externalist misinterpretations of concepts found in Fodor's view, let us turn to Chomsky's claim that human concepts are somehow unique or different from those found with other organisms. Is he correct? Lacking a reasonably well-developed theory of concepts/MOPs, one must look elsewhere for reasons to hold this. First, is there a case for human concepts being unique? Intuition does suggest differences between human concepts and what we can reasonably say about animals. It seems unlikely that a chimp has the concepts WATER, RIVER, and HIGHWAY, for example, at least in the forms we do. Perhaps a chimp can be trained to respond in some way taken to meet some criterion of success established by some experimenter or another to cases of water, rivers, and highways, but it does not follow either that the chimp has what we have, or that it acquires these concepts in the way we do – if the chimp has them at all. Moreover, on other grounds, it is very unlikely that chimps have or can ever develop NUMBER, GOD, or even RIDGE or VALE. So there is a prima facie case for at least some distinctive human concepts.

That case is considerably improved by what Gallistel (1990) and several others interested in the topic of animal communication say about the natures of animal concepts – or at least, about their use and by implication, about their natures. They are, so far as anyone can tell, referential in a way that human concepts (at least, those expressed in our natural languages, which is for our purposes all of them) are not. They seem to be ‘tied’ to dealing with an organism's environment. Assuming so, in what does the difference consist? Exploring this issue gives us an opportunity to think about how one might construct a good theory of MOPs or internal concepts.

One possibility, mentioned in the discussion, is that our linguistically expressed concepts differ from those available to other creatures in use or application. Perhaps, then, we have concepts identical to those available to chimps and bonobos, to the extent that there is overlap – for we need not suppose that we have exactly what they have, or vice versa. The difference on this line of argument lies rather in the fact that chimps and bonobos do not have language, and so they do not have at least some of the capacities we have because our language system can run ‘offline’ – essential for speculation and wondering about what might happen if something having nothing to do with current circumstances were to take place. On this view, through the flexibility of use to which its resources can be put, language allows us to ‘entertain’ complex (sententially expressed) concepts out of context, where chimps and bonobos are constrained to apply concepts – and not, obviously, concepts that are structured as a result of linguistic composition. As the discussion indicates, Chomsky rejects this explanation. If there are differences, the differences are in the natures of the concepts, not the uses to which they are put.

Our uses of linguistically expressed concepts do, of course, provide evidence for or against differences in concepts. For example, one reason for thinking that our concepts differ from those available to other creatures is that ours provide support for the multiple uses to which they are put, including metaphor – which seems to require the capacity to ‘take apart’ concepts and apply only some discourse-relevant parts. Another reason lies in animal concept use: if Gallistel and others are correct, it is very plausible that whatever an ape is employing when it employs some analogue of our concept HOUSE, it employs something that is directly mobilized by some one or some group of features that the ape's relevant sensory system(s) yield. The concept's features and character will be of its nature devoted to yielding quick recognition and performance. It will lack not only features added to a concept in the course of a linguistic computation/derivation (for apes do not have language), but will lack non-sensory abstract features such as SHELTER, ARTIFACT, and SUITABLE MATERIALS that – as Aristotle and many others have noted – regularly figure in our concept HOUSE. I return to that, for it is compelling. First, though, I need to address a potentially misleading form of animal–human conceptual comparison.

It appears that at least some of our concepts differ from those available to animals in their internal structures. An interesting case is presented in PERSUADE and other causal verbs, verbs whose associated concepts have plausibly been held to provide support for one variety of entailment, yielding analytic truths that are presumably unavailable to apes. If John persuades Mary to go to the movies, then if it is true that he does persuade her to do this, she at that point intends to go. Whether she does eventually do so is another matter. It is not obvious, however, that this point gives us a persuasive way to describe the differences between an ape's concepts and ours. According to a plausible and much-discussed hypothesis (for a contrary position, see Fodor and Lepore 2002), entailments like this (assuming that “John persuades Mary” is taken to be true) depend on structure induced by the syntactic compositional operations of the language faculty. If that were the case, PERSUADE would turn out to amount to CAUSE to INTEND. And if so, our linguistically expressed PERSUADE would not be an ‘atomic’ concept, as are HOUSE, GROUSE, and RIDGE. Rather, it would have the character that it does because of the morphosyntactic operations of the language faculty. This suggests that if there is to be comparison of the ‘natures’ of animal concepts with ours, it is best to discount the contributions of morphology and syntax to concepts as they appear at language's semantic interface, where morphosyntax has contributed both internal and sentential structure. This point is illustrated, I think, in some of Paul Pietroski's recent work on matters of semantic structure and its interpretation.

Could it be after all that the difference between our concepts and those available to animals – especially apes, including chimps and bonobos – is entirely due to contributions of the language faculty? Paul Pietroski (2008) develops a version of this option, although not – I argue – one that addresses apparent differences in the natures of ‘atomic’ concepts. He suggests that differences lie in the ‘adicity’ requirements of the language faculty at its semantic interface. The adicity of a concept is the number of arguments it takes: RUN seems to require one argument (John ran), so has adicity −1 (it needs an argument with value +1 to ‘satisfy’ it); GIVE might seem to require three arguments, and if it does, it has adicity −3. Specifically, Pietroski adopts a variation of Donald Davidson's idea that the semantics of sentences should be expressed in terms of a conjunction of monadic predicates, that is, predicates with adicity of −1, and no other. In Pietroski's terms (avoiding all but the most primitive logical notation for the benefit of the general reader unfamiliar with it), John buttered the toast amounts to: there is an [event] e, BUTTERING (e) [read this as “e is a buttering”]; there is an x, AGENT (x), CALLED-JOHN (x); there is a y, THEME [patient] (y), TOAST (y). According to this account, “buttered,” which appears to have adicity −2 (to require two arguments) is coerced to have adicity −1 (to require a single argument), and “John,” which appears to have adicity +1 (to be an argument with a value +1 that ‘satisfies’ a predicate with adicity −1), is coerced to something like the form called John. (This is reasonable on independent grounds, such as cases where one says that there are several Johns at the party.) In effect, then, the name “John” when placed in the language faculty's computational system gets −1 instead.

There are several advantages to this “neo-Davidsonian” approach. One is that it seems to coordinate with at least some of the aims of Chomsky's Minimalist Program and its view of linguistic computation/derivation. Another is that it offers a very appealing account of some entailments that follow from overall SEM structure (or perhaps the structure of some form of representation on the ‘other side’ of SEM, in some interpretational system or another): from John buttered the toast quickly, it follows that he buttered. But as noted, it does not seem to address the prima facie difference in the natures of concepts noted above. It is unlikely that the difference between our linguistically expressed BUTTER and some chimp's BUTTER-like concept (assuming that there is such) consists solely in a difference in adicity; on Pietroski's view, BUTTER on application or use – that is, for humans, as it appears at the semantic interface as understood by Pietroski – has the adicity (–1), for by hypothesis, that is what it is assigned by the operations of the language faculty that lead up to it. Because they lack language and the resources it provides, however, there is no reason to say this of the adicity-in-application of BUTTER for an ape, whatever that might be. Since, then, the difference in question appears to be due solely to the operations of the morphosyntactic system that determines the adicity of a concept that – as in this case – is assigned the status of verb and given one argument place to suit Pietroski's view of interpretation and what it underwrites, and because it relies essentially on the fact that we have language and apes do not, it does not speak to the issue of whether a chimp has what we have when we have the ‘atomic’ concept BUTTER. Generally speaking, Pietroski's discussion of differences between animal and human concepts focuses on adicity alone, and does not really touch the issue of what a concept ‘is’ – of what its ‘intrinsic content’ or inner nature is, and how to capture this nature. It steers around the issue of what concepts are – perhaps to be investigated by looking at what they amount to in pre-computation ‘atomic’ form, where they might be described as a cluster of semantic features that as a package represent the ‘meaning’ contribution of a person's lexical item. It focuses instead on concepts as they appear (are constituted at? are ‘called upon’? are ‘fetched’?) at the language faculty's semantic interface. Because of this, it loses an opportunity to look for what counts as differences in concepts at the ‘atomic’ level, in the way a human's lexical conceptual store might differ from an ape's. And also because of this, it raises doubts, I believe, about whether Pietroski or anyone else is warranted in assuming that our concepts are in fact (adicity and other contributions of morphology and syntax aside) identical or even similar to what are available to other primates. There is, of course, a difference between us and apes. That is not in question: they do not have the computational system of language, and Merge and linguistic formal features in particular. However, that difference does not address the issue in question here.

If looking to differences in use and to contributions of morphology and syntax do not speak to the matter and the language faculty imposes no obvious processing-specific requirements on the intrinsic features of the concepts it can take into account, another place to look for a way to describe and explain the prima facie differences is to a distinctively human conceptual acquisition device. Might humans have such a device, procedure, or system? Associative stories of the sort offered by empiricists over the ages (for a contemporary version, see Prinz 2002) are little help; they amount to an endorsement of a generalized learning procedure that neither speaks to poverty of the stimulus observations (infants with complex concepts, among other facts) nor offers a specific proposal concerning a mechanism – crucial, if one is to offer a theory at all. Their stories about generalized learning procedures are not made precise, nor – where efforts of a sort are made – are they relevant. Pointing at connectionist learning stories does not help unless there is real reason to think that is the way human minds actually work, which infant concepts acquired with virtually no ‘input,’ among other things, deny. And so it appears that their explanation of human–animal differences (bigger, more complex brains, more powerful hypothesis formation and testing procedures, ‘scaled up’ operations, communal training procedures, etc.) are just forms of handwaving.

What, however, about appealing to a concept-acquisition mechanism that depends on a procedure that there is good reason to think only humans have? Specifically, could there be a concept-acquisition device that employs Merge, or at least some version of it? This seems promising. On independent grounds, Merge is unique to humans. However, the suggestion faces barriers. For one thing, it challenges an assumption basic to Chomsky's minimalist reading of evolution; on that reading, our human concepts must be in place before Merge and language's computational system are introduced. If this seems to rule out an appeal to Merge, there is a possible variant: perhaps the concepts in place at the introduction of Merge are those shared to an extent with some other primates, and the introduction of Merge not only provided for the construction of new and distinctively human ones, but also allowed for modifications in existing ones. That again looks promising, but it has other problems. Merge in its usual external and internal forms introduces hierarchies (unless there is another explanation for them), movement, and the like. There is no obvious need for these in dealing with concepts themselves, grammatically complex concepts such as PERSUADE aside. Perhaps there is a need for a distinction between the core features for a concept and more peripheral ones. Perhaps, for example, PERSON and DONKEY will have something like PSYCHIC CONTINUITY among their core features, but need not have BIPEDAL or QUADRIPEDAL. However, that does not appear to be a difference in hierarchy. It might even be an artifact of the way(s) in which the word person is used in majority environments, which would be irrelevant to a Merge-based account. Pair Merge, on the other hand – or something like it that provides for a form of adjunction – could provide aid here. By abandoning hierarchical structure and movement/copying, it has promise, assuming it could operate over features and allow for something that looks rather like concatenation of features to produce distinctive clusters, perhaps expandable to allow for additional experience. However, it has problems too. For one thing, if it yields something like adjunction (e.g., the big bad ugly mean nasty . . . guy), it depends on a single-element ‘host’ (here, “guy”) to which adjoined elements are attached, and it is not at all clear what that single element could be: lexical phonological elements will not do, and if there are ‘central’ features, they must by hypothesis allow for complexity. For another, it is more descriptive than explanatory: it does not help make sense of how concepts seem to develop automatically in ways that are (for core features at least) uniform across the human population, yielding conceptual packages that appear to be virtually ‘designed’ for the uses to which they can be put. And finally, it is hard to see why a procedure like the one discussed would be unavailable to animals (which also appear to have innate concepts, however different they might be), so the appeal to the human-uniqueness of the combinatory procedure fails to make sense of why human concepts are unique. That suggests that looking to uniquely human conceptual package acquisition mechanisms to make sense of why human concepts are different is the wrong strategy. Unless there is some naturalistically based combinatory procedure that is demonstrably unique to humans other than Merge – which at the moment does not look plausible – perhaps we should look elsewhere.

Keep in mind that there is nothing obviously wrong with assuming that human concepts are complex and composed in some way; that assumption cannot, as indicated, be ruled out on Fodor's grounds. It is also independently plausible because (ignoring for good reasons Fodor's (1998, 2008) very speculative and externalist-driven accounts of how ‘atomic’ concepts could be acquired) composition offers the only viable acquisition alternative. If so, let us assume some kind of ‘guided’ compositional clustering operation that, so far as we know, could be shared with animals. Then let us look elsewhere for an explanation of the uniqueness of human concepts. One plausible line of inquiry is looking to the features that make up human conceptual capacities (+/–ABSTRACT, POLITY, INSTITUTION, and so on) and inquiring whether at least some of them are likely to be duplicated in animals’ concepts. It is difficult to be confident when speaking of the conceptual capacities of animals, but there is, I think, reason to doubt that they do or that – if they do – they are capable of employing what they have. While humans might describe and think of a troop of Hamadryas baboons as having a single form of male-dominant ‘government’ in their social system, it is unlikely that the baboons themselves would think of their form of social organization at all, much less think of it as one of a range of possible forms of political/social organization – authoritarian patriarchic tribal hierarchy, cooperative democratic system, plutocracy, matriarchic statist-capitalist economy . . . Olive baboons are of their natures matriarchal; Hamadryas baboons are definitely not. And even if a troop of Hamadryas baboons should through loss of dominant males become matriarchal, it is not as if the remainder of the troop deliberated whether to become so, and chose to. It appears that they have nothing like the capacity for abstractness afforded routinely in our notions of social institution, or for that matter classes of fruit that include a wide range of different species. Nor could Hamadryas or olive baboons or any other ape think of their organization and the territory over which they have hegemony as we do. Where we can think of London as a territory and set of buildings or as an institution that could move to another region, nothing in ape behaviors or communicative efforts exhibits this ability to adopt either, or both, ways of thinking. Nor likely could any think of their territories in the following way: “London [the volume of air in its region] is polluted” or “London [its voting population] is voting Conservative this time.” Their concepts for their organization (assuming they have such) and for the territories over which they have hegemony just do not allow for this, nor would either be seen as a species of more general cases (POLITY?) that would invite speculation about whether they could re-organize in a different way, and plan to do so if they decide to. Further, and perhaps most important, if an ape should have or ever develop a concept analogous to our RIVER – say, RIVERB (‘RIVER-for-a-variety-of-baboon’) – its concept's features would very likely be restricted to those that can readily be extracted from sensory input, and its use would be restricted to meeting current demands, not allowing speculation about what one can expect to find in particular forms of geographic terrain. In a similar vein, it is hard to imagine a chimp developing a homologue to human concepts such as JOE SIXPACK, SILLIEST IRISHMAN, or – for that matter – SILLY and IRISHMAN. In addition, on at least some plausible views of the lexicon and the meaning-relevant information it contains, mental lexicons must provide in some manner what are called “functional features,” such as TNS for tense (thought of syntactically and structurally) and several others that play roles in the composition of sentential concepts. These, clearly, are not in an ape's repertoire, and they certainly count as ‘abstract.’

The scope of animal concepts appears to be restricted in the ways that animal communication studies of the sort found in the work of Gallistel and others indicate. To emphasize points made above: their conceptual features do not permit them to refer to the class of fruits, to forms of social institution, to rivers as channels with liquids that flow (distinct from creeks, streams, rivulets, etc.), to creatures such as humans, donkeys, and even ghosts and spirits with psychic continuity, to doors as solid and apertures, and so on. Rather, their concepts appear to involve ways of gathering and organizing sensory inputs, not abstract notions such as INSTITUTION, PSYCHIC CONTINUITY, and the like that have dominant roles in human concepts. No doubt they have something like a ‘theory of mind’ and can respond to the actions of conspecifics in ways that mirror their own action (and deceit, etc.) strategies and routines. However, there is no obvious reason to assume of them that they understand a conspecific in terms of its executing action plans (projects), deliberating what to do next, and the like. That requires symbol systems that provide for ways of organizing concepts in the ways humans can, given language. Do they think? Why not? We say computers do, and it is apparent that little but usage of the commonsense term “think” turns on that. But can they think in articulated ways provided by boundless numbers of sententially organized concepts? No. Their lack of Merge indicates that.

Another line of inquiry – suggested obliquely above – notes that human linguistically expressed conceptual packages allow for the operations of affixation in morphology, and for dissection when they appear at a semantic interface in a compositional sentential structure. The concept FRUIT expressed by the relevant morphological root gets different treatments when subjected to morphological variation: one gets fruity (which makes the associated concept abstract and adjectival), fruitful (dispositional notion), fruitiness (abstract again), fruit (verbal), refruit (produce fruit again), etc. So far as I know, no other creature has concepts that provide for the relevant kinds of morphosyntactic ‘fiddling.’

As for dissection: when one encounters sentences such as Tom is a pig (where Tom is an 8-year-old child), the circumstance of use and the structure of the sentence that predicates being a pig of Tom require for interpretation that one focus on a (usually small) subset of the features commonly taken to be piggish, treating these as the ones ‘called for’ by a specific state of Tom. If he is wolfing (another metaphor) down (still another) pizza, GREEDY is likely to be one of the features dissected from the others and employed in this circumstance. Human languages and the concepts that they express provide for this kind of dissection, and the desire for creativity in use routinely exhibited in metaphor depends on it. Perhaps animals have complexes of features for PIG. It is unlikely, though, that they have GREEDY (an abstract notion applied to more than pigs) or that their cognitive systems are equipped to easily dissect one part of their PIG concepts from others and apply that part to a situation, as is common with constructions that call for metaphorical readings. I assume that dissection applies only at an interpretational interface, SEM. Until that point, as indicated, a lexical item's semantic features can be thought of as carried along in a derivation as an atomic ‘package.’ Arguably, however, an animal's concepts remain functionally atomic all the way through whatever kinds of cognitive operations are performed on it. What is known about animal communication systems, and about the limited degree of flexibility in their behaviors, environments, and organization, suggests this.

The last two lines of inquiry, and to a degree even the first, point to the fact that the human conceptual materials contained in mental lexicons have properties that might be contributed by, but are certainly exploited by, the compositional operations of a uniquely human language faculty. Were these properties of human conceptual materials ‘there’ before the introduction of Merge, were they instead invented anew only once the system came into place, or rather do they consist in ‘adaptations’ of prior conceptual materials to a compositional system? I do not attempt to answer that question: I know of no way to decide it one way or another, or to find evidence for a particular proposal. Clearly, however, the concepts humans express in their languages – or at least, many of them – are unique to humans.

I should mention one endless class of concepts that plausibly does depend on Merge. Apes and other creatures lack recursion – at least, in the form found with language. If they lack that, then – as Chomsky suggests – they lack natural numbers. So NATURAL NUMBER and 53, 914, etc. are all concepts unavailable to other creatures.[5] There is plenty of evidence of this. While many organisms have an approximate quantity system, and their approximations respect Weber's Law (as do very young children's), only humans with a partially developed language system have the capacity to enumerate (assuming that they employ it: for discussion, see p. 30). Only humans have the recursive capacity required to develop and employ a number system such as that found in the natural number sequence. Specifically, many organisms can reliably and in short order distinguish sets of objects with 30 members from those with 15, and with accuracy that decreases in accordance with Weber's Law, sets of 20 from 15, 18 from 15, and so on. However, only humans can reliably distinguish a set with 16 from one with 15 members. They must count in order to do so, employing recursion when they do. The work of Elizabeth Spelke, Marc Hauser, Susan Carey, Randy Gallistel, and some of their colleagues and students offers insight and resources on this and some related issues.

To summarize: ‘exact’ number concepts aside, it is difficult to draw on the demonstrated human uniqueness of Merge as it is currently understood to explain why human concepts are unique. We found a more promising way to proceed in the apparently human-specific natures of many of the semantic features that compose human concepts – the fact, for example, that humans even at an extremely young age seem to have the feature PSYCHIC CONTINUITY built into their concepts for a wide range of organisms, and definitely for humans. Whether this approach ultimately proves successful and explains the difference is unclear. It is reasonably clear, however, that human conceptual resources are indeed unique.

[1] See Fodor (1998) for his view on “appearance properties.” As for why Chomsky's view of internal MOPs is only ‘like’ Fodor's: Fodor's MOPs are essentially clusters of beliefs, while Chomsky's are clusters of “semantic features” that are carried in a derivation/computation of sentence/expression from lexical items to a semantic interface SEM. Beliefs have no roles in this story, unless what is on the ‘other side’ of SEM includes systems of I-beliefs which themselves demand explanation and description in a naturalistic theory of another mental system.

[2] I should emphasize that Fodor's externalism is not the radical one found in the work of – among others – Michael Tye, where the “perceptual content” of a thing is the thing itself (really, commonsense thing – making the view even more puzzling) in its entirety. See Fodor's review of Tye's recent book Consciousness Revisited in the Times Literary Supplement, 16 October, 2009. But do not take too seriously Fodor's blaming Putnam for Tye's views. Putnam influenced Fodor's own externalism.

[3] See, however, below and Appendix XII.

[4] Commenting on this paragraph and the difficulties it mentions with determining what is at SEM and what its contents ‘do,’ Chomsky reminded me of the fact that since little (really, nothing) is known about what is on ‘the other side’ of the semantic interface SEM, it is worth mentioning the difference between this case and the phonetic one PHON, where there is at least some understanding of the relevant articulatory and perceptual systems involved, and thus some understanding of what PHON is, and where it should be placed in the mind's architecture. That is a useful reminder to not just me, but to anyone ‘doing semantics,’ whether the internalist variety I suggest pursuing where syntax and composition serve for compositionality and SEMs ‘configure’ understanding, the different variety of internalism found in Paul Pietroski's work, or various other flavors of internalist and externalist formalist, truth-conditional, Fodorian, and other efforts. That said, I suspect that there are good reasons for adopting an internalist approach, for placing ‘concepts’ in LIs, for relying on morphosyntactic processes for ‘semantic’ compositionality, and for treating SEMs as ‘acting’ in an adverbial form. For further discussion, see below, and Appendix XII.

[5] Obviously apes do not have REAL NUMBER either, but that is irrelevant: neither do most adult humans.

Appendix VI: Semantics and how to do it

VI.1 Introduction

Semantics (which I will gloss sometimes as the theory of meaning) is understood by most to be an attempt to construct theories that focus on word–world relationships, whether they be referential (Big Ben referring to a clock and the structure it is in/on) or alethic (based on truth and correctness), so having to do with the truth and correctness of sentences or perhaps propositions (The US invaded Vietnam). Chomsky questions the value of pursuing semantic theories if semantics is understood in this way. His criticism often focuses on those efforts to construct theories of meaning (semantic theories) that appeal to what the theoretician must suppose are regular word–world connections of the sort required to construct a theory at all. It would not do for theoretical purposes if mouse were to variably refer to – well, to what, exactly? It does no good to answer, “mice.” The question simply arises again, with an added complication: someone seems to have thought that they have provided an answer, even an illuminating one. The fact is, mouse (and the associated concept MOUSE) can be used by people in whatever context they happen to be in to serve any number of purposes, and to refer to any number of things – computer scrolling devices, a person, any member of any of several species of rodent, a lump of fluff, a toy, a . . . (I do not exclude metaphorical uses; there is no reason to.)

Moreover, to point to the relevance of the discussion of the section above: reference of the sort that human beings engage in routinely demands a form of ‘constructivism.’ The use of a concept such as MOUSE assigns to a small grey creature (perhaps mus musculus) envisaged in some discourse domain not the sensory features of mice (or not just these, as an animal's concept – adjusted to its sensory systems – might), nor properties that mice themselves might actually have in some biophysical science of mice, but the features that our commonsense concept MOUSE has. (Compare RIVER, HOUSE, etc.) We routinely assign properties such as psychic continuity to these creatures when we employ the relevant concepts in acts of reference, effectively ‘making’ them into creatures with that property, along with whatever other properties a use of a sentence with mouse in it might or might not assign. Nothing like that fact – which indicates a form of constructivism on the part of the human mind – is taken up in the usual views of semantics and how to do it. So how do those who attempt semantic theories of the usual sort proceed? I outline some of their aims and strategies and what is wrong with them.

Before proceeding, a caveat: objections to attempts to construct naturalistic semantic theories that involve word–world (head–world) relationships do not apply to all kinds of formal semantic theories, including some that introduce mental models conceived as domains (perhaps ‘worlds’) in which the sentences of an I-language are ‘true’ – essentially, true by stipulation. Similar points apply to efforts to construct “discourse domains.” There may be other objections to efforts like these, but on the face of it, they can be thought of as syntactic (internalist) attempts to ‘express’ the meaning of expressions and their elements, plus any of the formal relations they introduce (some varieties of entailment, for example). In effect, despite use of terms such as “true of” and “refer” or “denote,” they do not go outside the head. Because of this, an internalist can and often does appropriate a range of insightful work in what goes under the name of “formal semantics,” and even parts of pragmatics.

And a reminder: in remaining in the head, internalist semantics can and should be seen as a form of syntax. Whether internalist semantic efforts focus on the meanings of words and sentences, or on discourse as in “discourse representation theory” or “dynamic semantics,” the focus (whether practitioners of formal semantics, discourse representation theory, dynamic semantics, and the like concur or not) is on symbols and their potential for employment, not on their actual use by a person on an occasion to refer and say something that he or she holds-true. As indicated, one can introduce denatured versions of reference and truth to express the potential of a word, sentence, or discourse to be used. One can introduce mental models of varying degrees of complexity. In doing so, one can introduce a ‘relation’ that Chomsky (1986, 2000) calls “relation R.” It seems to amount to something like this: for each nominal in a referring position in a sentence, place a class of ‘entities’ in the model; for each verb with n arguments singular sets, or pairs, or triples . . ., and so on. ‘Reference’ in exercises like this is stipulative, as is truth. Why introduce them, then? Intuitively, they seem to respond to a virtually default view of how to understand the meanings of words, sentences, and discourses. I strongly suspect that this view of meaning appears to be the obvious one because of the constructivist contributions of the mind (with language) mentioned above. I suspect too that for theoretical purposes there are better ways of capturing what is at stake (ways that avoid the potential for being misled), but if handled carefully, a denatured notion of reference to things and situations in mental models has the advantage that it coordinates internalist (basically syntactic) semantics with formal semantic work that has been in place for a long time. As for ‘real’ reference and truth: for the former, keep in mind that it is something that people do, and do freely. It is not a good topic for naturalistic theorizing. For the latter, it is better to speak of truth-indications, as Chomsky does (see pp. 273–274).

The theoretical aims of semantic internalists such as Chomsky should be obvious by now, but in case they are not: they want to shift the attention of those who might wish to construct naturalistic theories of meaning from efforts to construct theories of language's use/application (which are bound to fail) to attempts to construct theories of the ‘internal content’ of words such as mouse and run and the complex expressions in which they appear – and so too for all other ‘words’ (lexical items) and expressions. Accounts that focus on the use of language introduce relations such as reference or denotation to things ‘outside,’ while naturalistic internalist accounts like Chomsky's focus on attempts to provide biophysical descriptions and explanations of the intrinsic ‘semantic’ (meaning-related as opposed to sound-and-sign-related) properties of linguistic expressions inside the head and the internal combinatory operations (computations) that combine these to form the complex intrinsic contents that sentences/expressions have. If one wants to keep the technical term “semantic theory” at all, they suggest, one must think of a semantic theory as a theory of the intrinsic contents of words and expressions in the head and the ways the language faculty combines them. In this regard, it is like phonology, another form of internalist syntax. No one (with some exceptions noted in the main text) thinks that phonology, however successful, begins to address, much less solve, the issues raised by acoustic and articulatory phonetics. Yet externalist semanticists think that they can both address and manage to speak in a responsible way to something similar but even more peculiar, to what is ‘out there’ and how our minds relate to it in a ‘representational’ way. If construed as a naturalistic project, it is hopeless; if not, it is at best a description of how people use language sometimes and, as Wittgenstein noted, cannot be turned into a theory of any sort. If either, it is – as Chomsky pointed out in comments to me when discussing these issues – an effort at what Russell called theft rather than honest toil. The aims of the internalist in contrast are remarkably modest, for they focus entirely on ‘what happens’ in an internal module that allows it to automatically yield intrinsic contents. If the term “intrinsic content” bothers you, substitute for it something like “‘information’ provided by a linguistic derivation at an I-language's ‘semantic’ interface with other systems in the head.” This simplified picture of semantics on internalist terms might need to be modified or changed to accommodate advances in the theory of language, of course. The point is to indicate the strategy, one that has led to some success.

VI.2 What is wrong with an externalist science of meaning: first pass

To many, including most defenders of semantics as it is usually conceived, semantic internalism seems absurd. Internalism is not rejected because there has been great success in constructing externalist semantic theories. On the contrary: the proposals for how to proceed to construct an externalist semantic theory that can claim to be a science remain programmatic at best with no sign of progress, or identical with internalist model-theoretic efforts, or clearly wrong – a serious fault after several centuries of externalist efforts, one that indicates that something is wrong with the strategy and its basic assumptions. Elementary issues are left untouched, or fobbed off in some manner. It is no surprise. An externalist semanticist with naturalistic scientific intentions cannot hope to deal with the meanings of RIVER, PERSON, MOUSE, CITY, BOOK, or any of the thousands of other concepts routinely expressed at language's semantic interface. Nothing that suits the kinds of features that compose these concepts is actually to be found ‘out there’ in the subject matters of natural sciences that deal with natural objects. For no naturalistic externalist could seriously hold that there is a London ‘out there’ that at the same time (and within the same sentence) is considered for movement upstream to avoid flooding and also seen as a valuable territory with buildings, bridges, streets that everyone (no doubt) will regret abandoning if a move should take place. This abstract/concrete alternation is not an issue for the internal concept/MOP LONDON: any polity concept invites both ABSTRACT and CONCRETE characterizations. Paul Pietroski nicely illustrates this (2002) with his sentence “France is hexagonal and it is a republic.” But externalist efforts continue, and are far more popular than any of several reasonable internalist options, at least at this point. Even the naïve and the neophytes prefer them. In effect, they are the default positions. Because they are, it is worth trying to state and undermine the assumptions that attract those who maintain externalist versions of natural language semantics. Otherwise, they will continue to attract and distract from serious work.

There is a clue to this popularity in the fact that the naïve and the neophyte are easily drawn to externalist views. It suggests the influence of commonsense realism. Keeping in mind that the aim is a natural science of linguistic meanings, and remembering that common sense and its practically oriented forms of problem-solving have time and again distracted from naturalistic scientific research much more than aiding it, this is no surprise. The concepts of common sense are the subject matter of the natural science of the meanings of natural language expressions, but the ways these concepts-meanings are used to think and speak of the world are not. In fact, as we have seen, their uses exhibit the flexibility and interest- and context-sensitivity that natural language concepts invite and underwrite – flexibility that happily supports the human desire for the satisfactions given by exercising linguistic creativity. Because of this, these concepts’ uses appear to be beyond the reach of objective naturalistic scientific research, however valuable observations of these uses might prove to be in offering evidence for an internalist and postulational natural science of these concepts. Nevertheless, it is simply a mistake for the natural scientist to look for the meanings of natural language expressions in the uses themselves to which words and sentences are put or the objects and situations that uses of natural language sentences help constitute. No doubt from the point of view of commonsense understanding and the world it envisages, London is a territory with structures and streets, and it can be moved without moving the territory and its structures and streets. For the practical problem-solving purposes of commonsense understanding, there is nothing wrong with construing a polity in both ways at once. It is in fact a great advantage; it helps underwrite (without exhausting by any means) the cognitive flexibility that dealing with everyday and social issues demands. However, the aim of a science of natural language semantics cannot be content with a London that can have two contrary properties at the same time serving as the natural science referent of the phrase “the meaning/referent of ‘London.’” No target of a natural science of objects outside the head can look like this, conundrums such as photons described as both waves and particles aside: that is just what photons are from the point of view of quantum mechanics, and the ‘puzzle’ is not a puzzle for the science, just a puzzle for commonsense notions of waves and particles. In contrast, a London ‘out there’ with contrary properties is a serious problem for science, however true or false mental models of this London might be. Natural language POLITY concepts inside the head, however, can contain these contrary ‘ways to construe’ in a package of lexical semantic features. And to say that these packages have both ABSTRACT and CONCRETE as semantic features is not to say that they – LONDON and the family of concepts such as TOWN, CITY, VILLAGE, STATE . . . to which it belongs – are all themselves both abstract and concrete. It is to say that when any one is employed, it and the others can be used to construe something as abstract, as concrete, and even as both in the same sentence (although perhaps in different clauses: “France is a hexagonal republic” is a bit odd). No problems of self-predication should arise either: to let them arise is mistaking what semantic features are, and what they ‘do’ at a sentence's semantic interface.[1]

Note that from the point of view of naturalistic scientific research, the things and events that constitute the domain of the best science available of a specific domain can be and are taken to exist. We have no better understanding of existence than that the claims of the relevant theory are the best that can be offered, so far as we know at a time. The alternative to this claim of existence for the objects and events of a good theory – some form of instrumentalism, perhaps – is just a way of insisting on the priority of the things and events of common sense joined to a translation scheme that after many tries never succeeds. Getting even more desperate, the phenomenalist tries to make some odd theoretical objects called “sense impressions,” “sensations,” or “sense data” into the subject matter not only of science, but common sense. Phenomenalism can be ignored, as can instrumentalism; both are at best hopeless efforts to translate sciences into supposedly more familiar notions. What cannot be ignored are the claims of commonsense realism; they held even Descartes and Newton (and many lesser scientists) in their grip. But by adopting a ‘two worlds’ view, these claims can be acknowledged and – so long as one does not let them infect the methods and entities of natural science – placed in their proper domain where their effect on science is neutralized. The world of common sense serves the purposes of commonsense understanding. The scientist, however, wants to find out what things are and how they came to be that way in an objective, well-controlled way. For the science of the meanings of natural language expressions, postulating a theory of phenomena found in the head yields this. The theory aims to describe and explain just what the human mind has available to it in terms of the conceptual resources of natural languages. In a way, too, it can help make sense of why the commonsense world has the shape and character it does. That fact underscores the differences between the frameworks, and so far as explaining why things seem to be the way they are in the commonsense domain goes, it clearly gives the priority to science and the internalist science of meaning in particular. If so, why again should anyone who wants a science of linguistically expressed concepts/meanings be attracted to externalist speculations?

One part of the explanation of the attractions of externalist semantics lies in incorrectly tying what seems to make language meaningful (its use) to the task of constructing a theory of linguistic meaning. This appears to suggest that the subject matter of a theory of meaning for natural languages be their uses. Instead, a theory's subject matter should be the internal cognitive capacities and systems that make the use of language in meaningful ways possible. Pragmatists such as Dewey helped create the illusion that the subject matter is use itself. They noted that it is in its use in preparing for and carrying out actions and projects that language becomes meaningful, intending by this that its significance for surviving and thriving becomes obvious. Note that if this were true of language, it should also be true of any form of cognitive capacity we have, if it were true at all. Our minds provide us with several cognitive resources, such as those found in the way it configures visual objects (cf. Biederman 1987). Add to this its ways of configuring tastes, sounds, human faces, actions, etc. Any of these cognitive resources can be meaningful or significant in this way too, for each is used by all of us to configure experience and understand the world and other persons and organisms, in order to survive and thrive. But no one sensible tries to offer a naturalistic theory of how the mind can help configure visual objects by making the subject matters of their theories a catalogue of how people use internally constituted resources. The sensible approach tries to say what the mind's cognitive resources are directly.

Perhaps another part of the explanation lies in the fact that internalist semantics is not just at an early stage of development, but that the way proposed for constructing such a science conflicts with some preconceived views of how to construct a naturalistic science of mind. Consider, for example, Patricia Churchland's (1986, 2002) view that one must look directly to the brain to construct a science of the mind. The internalist approach to linguistic meanings cannot currently look to neurons, axons, and neural firing rates. That is because unless one has a theory in hand of what neural systems ‘do’ – of the computations they carry out – looking directly at neurons is as sensible as groping in the dark, even though that is what some do, or at least propose. Moreover, there is no guarantee at all that current understandings of neural systems and how they operate are on the right track. Just as physics had to change in order to accommodate to chemistry (in order to deal with bonding), it is quite possible that study of neural operations will have to change to accommodate the best computational theories of parts of the mind. So there is no good reason to take seriously the idea that a computational theory of language's meanings with its internalist and nativist assumptions be rejected because it has not met someone's view that the only science of mind worth taking seriously now is one that begins with some current understanding of neural operations and tries to explain (typically by appeal to training) how to impose on what are usually supposed to be ‘plastic’ neural systems a specific set of operations. It is likely much more fruitful to construct a theory and then look for ways to ‘embody’ its operations.

To speak to both of the two potential blocks to looking inside the head outlined so far, internalists construct – postulate – modular and natively endowed computational systems in the head that take specific inputs, subject them to specified algorithms/operations, and yield specified domains of outputs. Their theories offer functions in the formal, mathematical sense that link elements to others and specify what the linked elements are. A computational theory of language and its meanings is a theory of this sort. To oversimplify, it takes lexical items that associate ‘sound features’ (phonological features) and ‘meaning features’ (semantic features), and specifies the combinatorial system that can combine them to yield at two interfaces with other systems (perceptual/production and conceptual/intentional) packaged phonetic and semantic ‘information’ that constitute the language faculty's contribution to the overall operations of the mind/brain. Marr-inspired computational theories of vision differ not in the basic assumption concerning how to proceed (in the methodology that can now best be employed in constructing a science of mind), but – unsurprisingly – in specified ‘inputs’ (arrayed input intensities), algorithms (‘Mexican hat’ mathematical formulae, among others), and ‘outputs’ (‘color’-‘position’, ‘textural’, etc. arrays). The ‘outputs’ are the ways that the visual system helps configure/plays a role in configuring the experience of the organisms that have such a system. Thought of from the different, non-scientific point of view of ourselves as experiencers and agents, rather than organisms, one can make sense of how the visual system, language, and so on help explain how we (as persons) conceive/perceive/sense/understand the world and others, and – especially with the contribution of language – in how we think. Continuing from within this point of view, no doubt we use the information that native internal systems provide us in order to survive and thrive; and this is part of what makes language and the other systems we have meaningful in Dewey's sense. But the naturalistic theory of a system is not a theory of how we use its output, or of why its contributions are meaningful to us. It is a theory of the ‘information’ it provides other internal systems, information that – returning to the personal point of view – we use. These points are as correct for language as for any other cognitive system.

In sum, a naturalistic theory of meanings for a language is a theory of the ‘tools,’ ‘concepts,’ ‘perspectives’ that language offers the organism. It is a theory of what they – these concepts: individually rich, collectively complex and structured – become when gathered systematically by the combinatorial system in expressions/sentences. It is a theory of what they are, of how they develop in individuals and the species, and of how they are put together. So again: if our use of linguistic tools/meanings in certain ways happens to make them appear particularly meaningful or significant, it does not tell us what these tools are. So one can grant that – in certain respects – language seems especially meaningful or significant to humans (in effect, its utility becomes obvious) where it aids our efforts to cooperate with others in order to successfully prosecute various projects aimed at solving practical problems, from shopping to deciding how to climb a mountain with others to figuring out how one is going to vote. But a theory of meaning for language, like a theory of the ‘tools’ that vision offers, is a naturalistic theory of an internal mental organ, not of how it is used, or why. These natively provided and endless numbers of meanings, offered to us in organized forms in the expressions of our languages, are needed in order to solve practical problems. The right way to look at the matter – the internalist points out – is to take the existence of these native resources as necessary conditions of understanding and prosecuting actions in the way humans do, and to focus one's ‘theory of meaning’ on them – on their natures, on how they compose, and on how they develop in the individual human and in the species.

Perhaps still another part of the explanation of the attractions of externalism lies in the commonsense concept LANGUAGE. From the naïve to the relatively sophisticated, if you ask someone what they think a language is, they are very likely to tell you – although not in these exact words – that it is a human invention, something like a rule-governed institution that people over millennia have put together in order to understand and deal with the world. And they will tell you that they learned language and came to participate in this supposed public institution because of training on the part of their parents and, more generally, the linguistic community in which they grew up. In some cases, they will believe this so strongly that they will deny obvious facts about how children do acquire language and conceptual resources and, if they are academics but remain wedded to the commonsense conception of language, they will devote a lot of time, effort, and research resources to trying to convince others that that conception of language must be right. We look at some such cases in the next subsection.

Finally, probably another part of the explanation – at least for those who are sophisticated enough – lies in the apparent success in mathematics of Fregean semantics, exemplified in Frege's Begriffschrift (1879/1976) and in a more informal way in his “Sense and Reference” (1952). Many have employed Frege's techniques in efforts to construct semantic theories for natural languages. But there is a problem with these efforts. It is revealed in the first few pages of “Sense and Reference.” There Frege states his assumptions concerning the ‘languages’ to which his semantic efforts apply. He says that these ‘languages’ (really, symbol systems) are those found in specific communities of users, such that for each member of the community and each such ‘language,’ there is a determinate and unambiguous relationship of each “name” to a single “sense” of the name, and for each such sense, there is again a determinate relationship to a specific “denotation.” The reverse is not correct: a specific referent can be the target of multiple senses, hence ‘names.’ He illustrates by saying that two different ‘names’ (“the morning star” and “the evening star”) have different senses, even though the two senses have a single denotation (the planet Venus). I use scare-quotes around the term ‘language’ because Frege's primary interest was in constructing an externalist semantics for mathematics, and with the possible exception of the natural numbers and elementary mathematics, it is very unlikely that mathematics has much in common with natural languages. Indeed, Frege agreed: natural languages are too much of a mess; later philosophers, such as Tarski, agreed too. In a way Quine did too: he insisted on ‘regimenting’ natural languages, attempting to turn them into something that they are not, and – I emphasize – cannot be. Returning to Frege: for one thing, mathematics in its advanced forms is invented, not a free gift of native resources. For a second, especially relevant one, mathematicians choose to be careful in their use of their ‘languages,’ and typically are so. Working mathematicians are concerned with proof and provability and so do their best to use the technical terms of their fields to refer unambiguously to a single item or class of items. That is why it is possible to ‘find’ determinate referential/denotational relationships in mathematics, and (a similar case) in specific natural sciences. That is because the relationships are made to be determinate: the community makes them so. The relationships are ‘established’ and have their determinate-seeming character by virtue of the efforts of mathematicians. One can even argue that the ‘objects’ of the mathematical enterprise – aleph-null, for example – are ‘made’ by the efforts of mathematicians. In contrast, it is hard to find users of natural language who – apart perhaps from circumstances where they too are engaged on a project where precision and explicitness are crucial – have any intention or need to strictly restrain the uses to which the terms of their natural languages are put. For some discussion, see Chomsky (1995a, 1996).

As mentioned, Frege himself recognized the limitations of his semantic efforts. While he illustrated his views of sense and denotation/reference with some natural language examples, he explicitly acknowledged that natural languages are not used in the way the symbols of mathematics are. This can be explained by pointing to the fact that the determinate mapping from name to sense to referent that his semantics relies on is found only where people are faithful in their efforts to use their terms in the same way. These efforts are found in mathematics and the practices of natural scientists who invent theoretical terms and apply them in what they try to make determinate ways. So in no case – whether in the use of the words of natural languages, or the invented symbols of mathematics and natural science – is a sign–thing relationship fixed in nature. ‘Fixing’ depends on the intentions and actions of the users of the relevant words and symbols.

Nevertheless, there have been various attempts to accommodate Fregean semantics to natural language use. Some have adapted the idea that there is a uniform word–sense or word–denotation relationship of the sort Frege demanded to different contexts of use by introducing indices to deal with context; the result is an attempt to make word(s)-in-contexts that people produce, not just words, period, into the initial elements of the Fregean word–sense–denotation/referent chain. It is an attempt to circumvent one of the reasons Frege himself gave when he warned readers against employing his semantics with natural language use. However, there are serious problems with it. Perhaps indexing works with times of utterance and individual who utters – assuming that there is some agreed-on way to index these. But it is hard to conceive of how to deal in a determinate way with contextual factors such as ‘the topic of current discourse.’ No doubt we humans, relying on familiarity and our natural cognitive resources, make reasonably good judgments in our discussions and conversations about what a topic of discourse is; we rely on similar I-languages, familiarity with another person, story backgrounds, and so on. In doing so, however, we depend not on some kind of agreed-upon scheme of indexation and mappings-in-contexts, but on whatever resources and background knowledge we can muster for the occasion. It may sometimes appear automatic, and even seem determinate. But it is not something that any science has been able to deal with; assigning a value to the index “current topic of discussion” is completely post hoc. No doubt one can propose that there is some system in the head that accomplishes this feat. So far as I can tell, however, the ‘system’ introduced amounts to something like a homunculus with the remarkable capacity to do what we do when we undertake to understand – probably only approximately, but often sufficiently adequately to succeed at carrying out whatever task is at stake – what another means or intends. That would not be sufficient in mathematics or theorizing within a natural science domain.

Efforts to turn Fregean semantics into a semantics for natural languages must confront other problems too. One must perform some sleight of hand to deal with the fact that fictional terms such as “Pegasus” and descriptions such as “the average Irishman” and “the square circle” make perfectly good sense to ourselves and to others when we speak and engage in conversation, even though the ‘world’ seems to lack average Irishmen and a winged horse named Pegasus. And square circles are particularly daunting. No one has difficulty using or understanding The square circle horrifies geometricians, even though square circles are ‘impossible objects.’ And then there is the problem of vagueness: bald (as in Harry is bald) does not have a determinate denotation/extension. And so on. I will not catalogue or discuss efforts to deal with these issues. No matter what restrictions, qualifications, and oddments of theoretical machinery are introduced, no general theory is on the horizon and, far more fundamentally, nothing provides a serious answer to (nor plausibly can speak to) what appears to be a fact, that reference is a matter of human use of terms and sentences, and that use appears to be free, and not written into natural events in a way that allows us to construct a theory. While Frege's views about how to proceed in doing semantics make some sense of the practices of mathematicians, he was right to say that they have limited application to natural languages or – more correctly – to the use of natural languages. And since the semantics he offers for mathematics depends essentially on the cooperation of groups of mathematicians in how they use their terms, his ‘semantic theory’ is not, and cannot be, a naturalistic science of meaning. The internalist demands nothing less than that.

But what about Fodor's attempt to construct an externalist (albeit partially nativist) theory of meaning for natural languages, a theory that purports to have senses that determine their denotations/referents, only in a ‘naturalistic’ way? Fodor, recall, has a view of what he calls “concepts” and semantic relationships to the world that according to him is based on causal principles and purports to be a naturalistic theory of natural language meaning. It focuses on his view that meanings must be public (similarity in concepts apparently will not do), and his assumption that in order for them to be public, meanings must be identified with their ‘wide contents,’ where these are taken to be properties of things ‘out there.’ This does not rule out entirely a contribution of the mind: the concepts that natural languages express are claimed to have a mental component too. Intuitively, Fodor holds that a concept is in part a mental entity consisting of a “mode of presentation” (a psychological/mental version of a Fregean sense) and a denotation, with the latter serving as the meaning of a natural language's term. And these concepts are claimed to be the topics of naturalistic theorizing. To explain: things ‘out there’ via the operations of causal impingements on the human sensory system bring about the acquisition of an internal representation in the form of a mode of presentation (MOP), which is what I have been construing as a lexically represented concept. So far, there is little to dispute; of course internal MOPs (or in the terminology above, the ways in which internal systems configure experience and understanding) develop or grow because of ‘input,’ and the input is informational in a good technical sense: the probability that a child/organism will develop a DOGmop from some impingements with doggish characteristics D is greater than from impingements with cattish ‘shapes’ C, where it is more probable that it will acquire a CATmop. What count as doggish characteristics? Fodor is not entirely clear about the matter, but on a reasonable interpretation, being doggish depends not on dogs, but on the nature of the internal MOP-production system and what it demands for specific ‘triggering’ inputs. Fodor assumes as much by saying that concepts such as DOG and all the others that figure in common sense are “appearance properties.”[2] The problem lies instead in believing, as Fodor seems to, that the mode of presentation in turn stands in a semantic-denotational relation to the thing(s) that serve as the distal cause of the relevant impingements. In effect, he claims that a MOP m caused by some distal entity or property stands in a denotational relationship to that entity or property, and represents the causing thing(s)/properties ‘out there,’ and that this denotation is somehow determined by the nature of the MOP and the human mind. In his (1998) Concepts, one finds very little on how this determination is supposed to take place: he says only that we have the kinds of minds that “generalize to” a specific denotation-external property. In his (2008) LOT 2, he tries to expand on that mysterious capacity of the mind by introducing the idea that the mind is so assembled that some specific MOP ‘falls into’ the right denotation/external content. The picture he draws is at best very speculative. Assuming MOP m is associated with the term “m,” these external properties/things constitute the meaning of the term “m” (a syntactic entity) that is linked to the MOP. In this way, the linguistic term is ‘about’ its denotation.

The story Fodor tells about determining denotation is not only implausible, but it is completely unnecessary. It is driven by externalist intuitions that have no merit and are undermined by Fodor's own assumption that the properties that figure in how to understand the roles of MOPs are what he calls “appearance” properties. To cut a longish story short (told in McGilvray 2002a, 2010) the idea that some kind of ‘informational’ causal relationship is involved in the acquisition of a concept is plausible; an infant is more likely to acquire the concept DOG in the presence of dogs than geese. But there is no obvious reason to think that there is a naturalistically responsible semantic reflex of this causal relationship, one that links in a denotational relationship a mode of presentation and its associated term to the distal ‘things’ that at some time in the child's past had a significant role in configuring the input to the child's mind that yielded the mode of presentation. Both during and after acquisition, these things are semantically relevant only in that some relevant form of ‘trigger’ is required to institute a MOP. Reference by use of a mode of presentation can occur only once the mode of presentation is in place and a person so uses it, but the ways it is applied/used by one or more speaking individuals could and often does have nothing at all to do with whatever distal entities played a role in precipitating the mode of presentation's acquisition. Reference is rather free – although when using a concept such as PERSON or MOUSE, and claiming literal (not metaphorical) truth for the expression employed, a person with his or her conceptual resources ‘makes’ a person or a mouse into something that has psychic continuity.[3] It also happens that the causal triggering relationship is likely to be a lot looser than Fodor's externalist-motivated picture would invite: dog-pictures and dog-toys are probably equally likely to suffice in specific cases; and there are, of course, less probable triggers that have no obviously doggy characteristics at all, such as dog-stories and dog-poems that could nevertheless trigger the relevant MOP by portraying in some discourse a creature with some relevant characteristics. Generally, since it is the internal system that sets the agenda for what counts as the needed patterns and other characteristics of the impingements, the ‘real’ natures of distal causes matter little. So long as they are provided at least some information of the sort they need to come into operation (and they determine what is the right input), that is what counts. So surely the resultant MOP, not some external causing thing or property, is the best place to look for the ‘content’ of a word or concept. That is the one relatively fixed factor. It is so by virtue of the fact that our minds are biologically much the same, sharing not only cognitive capacities, but interests and other factors that are likely to make certain features relevant or important for the kinds of creatures we are.

Fodor can have external contents of a sort, of course. But unfortunately for the prospects of a naturalistic theory of denotation, the only ones he can have with natural languages and their applications are those provided by the actions of individuals who refer, using whatever MOPs they employ: our minds constitute how the things of the commonsense world are, and how they appear to be. Or to look at the difficulties with Fodor's externalist efforts from another direction, even if one believed with him that a distal cause of the acquisition of a MOP somehow constituted the external content of the term associated with the MOP, an ‘external content’ introduced in this way would be irrelevant to how a person used the MOP, and the way the person uses a MOP would be the deciding factor, even though that offers no prospects for constructing a genuine naturalistic theory of denotation. Surely, then, if one is really interested in offering a science of meaning, one should focus one's efforts as natural scientist on the mechanisms and ‘outputs’ of the relevant systems in the head, those that yield the modes of presentation expressed in natural languages. There is reason to think that the mechanisms and outputs are near universal across the species (see the main text discussion), given appropriate stimulation. Given that, and given the failures of externalist approaches when they pretend to be contributions to naturalistic theory rather than sociological observations about what people doing certain things by their actions often refer to, that is the only plausible place to look.

There are other difficulties with Fodor's view that arise because he demands that linguistic syntax be mapped to the language of thought. Chomsky outlines the difficulties with this in the main text (see also Chomsky 2000), but I do not discuss them here.

Returning finally to a basic theme of this subsection: it seems that even elementary natural language concepts pose issues for the externalist that cannot be overcome. Our concepts of cities (London), states (France), towns . . . invite thinking of these ‘entities’ in both abstract and concrete terms. Remembering that the issue is what a science of meanings/semantics would look like on externalist terms, we would have to populate a world for a science with some extraordinary-looking entities. There is no reason to, given the internalist alternative. A science of linguistically expressed meanings is a science of our natively given concepts.

VI.3 What is wrong with semantic externalism: second pass

There are other versions of externalism. A popular version of meaning externalism is found in the work of Wilfrid Sellars and David Lewis and some of their progeny. I aim to show that their views of reference and compositional rules fail to do what they need to. Whether they and their progeny were reaching for a naturalistic theory of meaning or not is irrelevant. They do not even come close to satisfying the demands they place on their own accounts of ‘public’ meanings.

Wilfrid Sellars's and David Lewis's approach to language cannot be called naturalistic; neither believes that language is a natural system in the head or ‘out there,’ for that matter. No doubt Sellars's connectionist progeny would disagree; I speak to their claims below. Lewis's and Sellars's views of linguistically expressed meaning might perhaps be thought of as a sociolinguistic or game-theoretic view of language, although that is a stretch: they show no effort to engage in careful statistical sampling, or the like, and if the discussion below is correct, they would have been unhappy if they had. But to the extent that it is scientific-looking at all, theirs is an attempt at something like sociolinguistics or game theory. Representative examples of their efforts are found in Sellars's “Some Reflections on Language Games” (1951) and David Lewis's “Languages and Language” (1975). Their basic ideas (and the assumptions that go with them) have proven very influential, appearing in the work of McDowell, Brandom, Churchland, and many others. So far as I can tell, what I have to say about Sellars and Lewis applies, with little change, to the others.

Both attempt theories of linguistic meaning that amount to accounts of language use in populations of users. Both their accounts assume that speakers learn certain patterns of behavior and behave in accord with them. These, they believe, are the “rules” of language. These rules are basically patterns of inference, inferences that are thought to yield reliable understanding of the world. Specifically, their views focus on what Sellars called linguistic “practices” and Lewis, “conventions.” Both notions presuppose linguistic regularities in use.[4] They suppose that communities of speakers exhibit regular practices and conventions, and that these presumed patterned forms of linguistic behavior constitute the basic principles of semantic (and perhaps even syntactic) compositionality. Given the considerations discussed above, it is not clear why they believe that their approach is likely to lead to some set of inferential patterns genuinely shared across a population. Wittgenstein (1953) – a good observer of language use (and enemy of those who would make a theory of language use) – made the point some time ago. People do not play a single game when using language; they do all sorts of things with it. And there does not appear to be a single most fundamental game such as describing the environment or “telling the truth,” one on which all others are parasitic; this was another of Wittgenstein's points. There is at least one other reason to be worried too. Treating language as a social phenomenon and construing language's rules and principles as if they amounted to constraints on actions produced in public and subject to others’ critical scrutiny focuses on at most 2 to 3 percent of language use. Most language use takes place in the head, and there is no obvious social constraint on how it is used there. So taking either the game-theoretic or the social science route to provide insight into what languages and their uses ‘are’ seems to demand a considerable leap of faith, not a reasonable assessment of a hypothesis's chances for success. To compound the problem, Lewis and Sellars seem to depend on a combination of these two dubious strategies. They not only choose to pay sole attention to the possibly 2 to 3 percent of language use that is externalized, but they also assume that people play a single most fundamental ‘game,’ one of constructing a theory of the world, with – presumably – a much smaller segment of that 2 to 3 percent.[5] They focus on cases where individuals are likely to be careful in what they say and how they express themselves – and not for reasons of politesse or fear of punishment, but because they are construed as constraining themselves to be truth-tellers or protoscientists of a sort. Perhaps a few academics devote a fair amount of their 2 to 3 percent of externalized linguistic behavior to doing this, but I doubt that many other individuals do. Nevertheless, ignoring these rather daunting hurdles and – in the interests of charity – proceeding to take their project seriously, what can be said about its prospects for offering a semantic theory for a natural language? For this purpose, we can look at what they have to say about rules.

Rather than Sellars and Lewis separately, I look primarily at Sellars's views. Lewis and Sellars differ to an extent in specifics (admiration for possible worlds and possible world semantics in Lewis's case, for example), but not in their basic assumptions and strategies. In discussing their views, I ignore their more technical work and focus on fundamental claims. Sellars was introduced to the discussion earlier in a different but related connection, his adoption of a behaviorist view of language acquisition and the picture of language that goes along with it. What is said there is relevant to the current issue because Sellars, like many others (either explicitly or implicitly), takes behaviorist-connectionist training to be the way to provide individuals in a population with the practices in the use of language that they must learn and respect in order to “master” a language. He treats language's rules and principles as practices that enjoin individuals how to act, how to produce the kinds of linguistic behaviors that he takes linguistic statements/sentences to be. Specifically, Sellars treats linguistic behaviors as regular and regulated forms of activity across a population of individuals, activities that respect epistemic and other norms of a linguistic community, where the norms are epistemic in nature, uniform, and induced by training. They concern, among other things, what to say and believe, how to reason, and how to act, given certain sensory inputs. In effect, Sellars treats a linguistic community as a group of individuals who share epistemic practices by virtue of being trained to conform to these practices. Making practices out to be epistemic norms as he does, he also treats the languages of which these practices are the rules as constituting theories of the world. Natural languages, then, come to be seen (wrongly) as uniform theories of the world shared across a population, and speakers proto-scientists, although apparently rather poor ones, given Sellars's views of what we are given when trained to speak: commonsense ‘folk’ theory, not much simpler (formally speaking) particle physics and biology. Sellars's ‘semantic theory’ amounts, then, to the idea that a natural language serves as a public and uniform theory of the world, and that the rules of language are those that are conceived to be reasonable guides to getting around in this world. Lewis's approach is similar.

To clarify: there is nothing wrong with ‘folk theories,’ when understood as parts of the commonsense understanding of the world. Folk biology focuses on organisms and plants, folk physics on movement and effort (and apparently underlies Descartes's contact mechanics – and Galileo's, Huygens's, Newton's, Leibniz's, etc.), and so on. They no doubt reflect patterns of belief and action found not in just certain linguistic populations, but across the species. Plausibly, they have the characters they do because of the natures of the commonsense concepts with which we are endowed, concepts that are expressed in our use of natural language. But these ‘theories’ are not learned, they are innate in the way our concepts are. They by no means offer or underlie the compositional rules/principles of our natural languages. And they are hopeless as naturalistic sciences.

To cut then to the chase, what Sellars has in mind by practices and Lewis by conventions have nothing to do with the kinds of rules and principles that do constitute the syntactic–semantic combinatory principles of natural languages. As Chomsky (1980/2005) points out in his criticism of Lewis's version of what amounts to the Sellars–Lewis view, “conventions” (only slightly different from Sellars's practices) not only say nothing about why “The candidates wanted each other to win” has about the same meaning as “Each candidate wanted the other to win,” but are silent on why “The candidates wanted me to vote for each other” makes no sense at all. To take another example drawn from Pietroski (2002), conventions/practices make no sense of why “The senator called the millionaire from Texas” can be understood with the call from Texas, or the millionaire from Texas, but not the senator from Texas. Any serious theory of language's ‘rules’ must be able to speak to these elementary syntactic–semantic points, and endless numbers of others. Chomsky's linguistic principles describe and explain these facts and a wide range of others concerning what sentences can and cannot mean. Simple examples like these and the lack of answers from Sellars and Lewis and their followers on these matters (and the absence of theoretical and objective descriptions of the structure of the relevant examples and all others) indicate that trying to make sense of what a language is and how it is related to its understanding by looking to behavioral practices and conventions and by relying on unreasonable assumptions about what we ‘do’ with language is a failed strategy. It is not a failure of effort: no effort along the lines of what they have in mind, no attempt to modify, to try to modify in some way their views of conventions or practices, or the like can help. The approach is fundamentally flawed not only when treated as an attempt at natural science, but even as just a reasonably accurate description of what people do with language and the concepts they employ.

I do not claim that there are no practices at all. Lexical items’ sound–meanings associations can be seen as practices of a sort, but they are irrelevant: these associations are not rules of use in anything like the required sense. There are some examples of ‘rules of use.’ In English-speaking communities, for example, there is a practice of sorts of saying “hello” when greeting someone. But there is also hi, good to see/meet you, howdy, hey there, and several others, including a current favorite in some groups, dude. However, there are very few such cases and the many variations make them not just dubious, but useless as rules. Variations are clearly welcomed and even encouraged; flexibility is encouraged, even proving rewarding for the “spirit” (Kant's term) that it displays. None of the cases like these can do the job they need to do. For the purpose of constructing a general theory of meaning and use, they appear trivial, and they are. So apparently, Sellars and Lewis do not quite ignore the facts entirely, for there are some linguistic practices of a sort. But they seem to be irrelevant to constructing not even a science of meaning, but a reasonably plausible description of phenomena that support their approaches to language and its meanings. There are no regularities of the sort that they need. That is because they are looking in the wrong place. They should look inside the head and abandon too their focus on language use.

What if it turned out that they were at least somewhere near the mark; could a view of natural language use that observed regularities provide some kind of science of concepts and meanings? Generally, natural languages are nothing like naturalistic theories of the world with invented concepts and practitioners who try to be careful in how they employ the symbols of their theories. Natural languages serve entirely different purposes that not only do not demand determinate uses of the sort found in the practices of mathematicians and natural scientists (the uses that Fregean approaches depend on) but rather support flexibility in use. Natural language concepts allow considerable scope for freedom in use, and people routinely exercise that freedom, getting satisfaction from doing so. So it is hopeless to even begin to look for a semantic theory for natural languages that presupposes regimentation in use. There is, to be sure, some kind of relationship between what languages offer humans and the ways they understand the world. For the concepts and perspectives natural languages offer allow us to develop ways to understand the world (the commonsense one, at least) and ourselves, and much else besides. And no doubt this contributes to making language meaningful to us; it makes it useful for solving practical problems. But there is nothing in this fact for a theory – a science – of linguistic meaning.

As for the connectionist's claim to turn a Sellars–Lewis view of language and its embodiment in the brain into what purports to be a natural science (cf. Morris, Cotterell & Elman 2000), consider Chomsky's criticism of the much-hailed success of a recent connectionist form of Sellars's behaviorist-connectionist account of language learning. By way of background, the connectionists have learned some lessons since Sellars's time. Unlike Sellars (and Lewis), they have in recent years come to devote effort to trying to show that their training procedures operating on what they take to be computer models of ‘plastic’ neural nets (“simple recurrent networks” or SRNs in Elman's case) can yield behavioral analogues of Chomsky's linguistic principles. It is not obvious why. Their efforts are puzzling in the way the Sellarsian and Lewisian efforts were, but also for another reason. In choosing what to train SRNs to produce in the way of outputs, they choose behaviors that conform to some rule statement or another that has appeared in the work in the Chomskyan tradition. They devote considerable time and experimental resources to trying to get a computer model of a plastic neural net (more realistically, very many of them going through massive training sessions in various ‘epochs’ of training, sometimes with the best performers subjected to other epochs in an attempt to simulate a [naïve: see Appendix II] view of evolution, and so on) after a long process of training to duplicate in its/their outputs some range of a set of ‘sentences’ (thought of here as sets of binary code, not as internal expressions) chosen from a linguistic corpus and thought to represent behavior that accords with the chosen rule. The connectionists clearly have no intention of adopting Chomsky's naturalistic approach to languages themselves, and appear to ignore the background facts, assumptions, and methods that led to the improving degree of success that Chomskyan linguistic theory has had in recent years, the theories that include the rule- or principle-statements. They refuse to treat the rule/principle they focus on at a time as a rule/principle of derivation/computation of a natural ‘organ,’ one that does not produce linguistic behavior itself but that offers anyone who has such a system that can derive any of the infinite number of expressions that their I-languages make possible. They seem to think that the facts of language acquisition and creative language use must be wrong, and while they do take Chomskyan rules/principles into account in the superficial way indicated, their concern is to attempt to show that neural nets can be trained to produce behaviors that they believe indicate that the net has ‘learned’ the rule/principle. One way to measure how successful they have been in their efforts is found in Elman's (2001) claim that he got a neural net to deal with the common phenomenon of nested dependencies in natural languages. An example of nesting is center-embedded clauses in sentences; dependencies include subject-verb number agreement. They are important, for dependencies are closely related to linguistic structures and to constraints on them; they play a central role in syntax-semantics. As for Elman's claim to be successful, Chomsky remarks (in comments in personal correspondence that also appear in the third (2009) edition of Cartesian Linguistics): “No matter how much computer power and statistics . . . [connectionists] throw at the task [of language acquisition], it always comes out . . . wrong. Take [Jeff] Elman's . . . paper[s][6] . . . on learning nested dependencies. Two problems: (1) the method works just as well on crossing dependencies, so doesn't bear on why language near universally has nested but not crossing dependencies. (2) His program works up to depth two, but fails totally on depth three. So it's about as interesting as a theory of arithmetical knowledge that handles the ability to add 2+2 but has to be completely revised for 2+3 (and so on indefinitely).” Details aside, the point is clear. Those convinced that language is a learned form of behavior and that its rules can be thought of as learned social practices, conventions, induced habits, etc. that people conform to because they are somehow socially constrained, are out of touch with the facts. They are so because they begin with assumptions about language and its learning that have nothing to do with natural languages and their acquisition and use, refuse to employ standard natural science methodology in their investigation, and so offer ‘theories’ of language and its learning that have little to do with what languages are and how they are used.

Enough, then, of externalist or ‘representationalist’ and clearly non-naturalistic efforts to deal with language and its meaning. In a bit more detail, how does one proceed to construct a naturalistic theory of meaning for natural languages? Some of the details are in the main text; some prospects for ways to proceed are also found in Appendix V. In the interests of not prolonging an already overly long discussion, I will just outline some plausible-looking steps to take. They are plausible-looking in part not just because they do try to take the facts about language and its acquisition into account and adopt standard naturalistic scientific methodology, but because there has already been some progress on the way to constructing such a ‘science of linguistically expressed meaning.’

1. An early step is settling on the methods to pursue and facts to take into account in constructing a science of meaning. The methods, as suggested, are those of naturalistic scientific research: to aim for descriptive and explanatory adequacy, objectivity, simplicity (where available), and possible accommodation to another science (here, surely biology and any physiochemical, physiological, and computational constraints that might apply to linguistically expressed meanings and their growth/development in a human). And one must over time make genuine progress in one or more of these dimensions. No other standards are worth pursuing if one wants anything like a genuine theory, and no other is worth attempting, judging by the unfortunate results of insisting that in studying the mind and language, one must do something else – default to some form of behaviorism. Its sole ‘advantage’ is that anyone can understand it; it is not simple in the way scientific theories are, however, but simple in a considerably less complimentary way. Surely the right course is to pursue a methodology that has yielded good results in the science of mind elsewhere (vision, for example), and in linguistic syntax, morphology, phonology, formal semantics (construed in an internalist, syntactic way), phonetics, and aspects of formal pragmatics – particularly since at least syntax and morphology are directly involved in determining linguistically expressed meaning at the language system's semantic interface. The methodology applied to the mind is internalist: it apparently works only where one focuses on the internal operations and ‘outputs’ of internal systems that develop or grow automatically (because they are natural ‘organs’) and that ‘interface’ with other internal systems. The methodology apparently does not work with the acts and actions of a person. As for the relevant facts, at a general level, they include the creative aspect of language use observations as well as the poverty of the stimulus ones, the latter not only for the progress made in syntax and phonology by respecting them and deciding to not only look for a ‘natural’ system located in the head, but because the rate of acquisition of lexical items is remarkably swift with no apparent training involved, and because infants clearly understand many of the concepts expressed in natural languages before they can speak or sign (express) the concepts themselves. At a finer-grained level, the facts include the richness and human interest-focused natures of commonsense concepts (making their swift acquisition all the more remarkable), the open-ended nature of concept and lexical acquisition and the ease with which individuals (including the very young) manage them, an apparent difference between human and non-human concepts, the degree of flexibility that our conceptual systems have available in them (due perhaps in part to morphological operations), the apparent universality (assuming acquisition) of remarkably rich concepts, the facts of polyadicity and its limits, and the like.

2. The next two stages consist of choosing how to place the study of meaning within an existing naturalistic research enterprise. Assuming that the theory at issue aims to offer a naturalistic account of linguistically expressed meanings, start by coming to an understanding of what the fundamental ‘atoms’ of meanings are. Any scientific effort – perhaps because of the natures of our minds, as mentioned in the main text – proceeds by looking for fundamental elements and assigning them the properties they need to have to provide an adequate theory. At the same time, come to an understanding of how these elements are put together to yield the complex meanings that sentences express. As it stands, doing the latter amounts to adopting an adequate version of the architecture of the language faculty. One of the simplest and easiest to understand is found in the idea that meaning ‘information’ is lodged in ‘words’ or lexical items (or some other technical notion with similar effect) in some way and that syntactic operations (Merge, at least) combine these to provide the complex form of meaning ‘information’ in sententially expressed ‘concepts’ provided at what Chomsky calls the “conceptual-intentional interface.”

Then decide on the scope of the theory in a way that respects the poverty and creativity observations, and any other basic facts that a serious theorist must take into account. To this end, choose an internalist approach. That is why I put scare-quotes around ‘information’ in the last paragraph. The word invites in many people's minds an intentional reading, which for them implies a referential reading. Fodor, mentioned above, is one. To try to avoid that implication, it might help to use Chomsky's technical-sounding term “semantic feature,” although this too can invite a referential reading because of ‘semantic.’ And “meaning feature” can do the same. So in what follows, I stipulate: ‘semantic feature’ and the other terms mentioned here are to be read non-intentionally, and ‘computation’ does not track truth or truth-conditions, as some insist it should; it must only somehow meet the conditions that the systems which language ‘interfaces’ set, and the semantic interface(s) in particular. Thus, these terms are to be read as semi-technical terms that, at the least, serve to distinguish the kind of information that – if a computation/derivation is successful – plays a role at the “semantic interface(s)” SEM rather than the “phonetic interface” PHON. Intuitively, then, semantic, phonological, and formal ‘information’ is placed in lexical items, or in some other way inserted into a sentential computation, and the computation/derivation offers the relevant kinds of information at the relevant interfaces to other systems.

3. That much is basic; the decisions in (2) are difficult to reverse because that would risk abandoning assumptions that have worked and proven fruitful in advancing naturalistic research into the mind so far. After that, decisions about what kind of theory to construct – which hypotheses to offer and find data concerning – reflect issues disputed by those working in the framework chosen in (2). For example, should one adopt what Hagit Borer (2005) calls an “endoskeletal” account of computation, where the relevant ‘information’ concerning a computation and how it proceeds is contained in some selection of lexical items, or instead adopt as I did above an “exoskeletal” account that assigns a ‘package’ of semantic features a status as noun or verb as computation proceeds, and if verb, assigns an adicity (the number of ‘arguments’ or nouns in “referring positions” (meaning by this in positions in sentences where they could be used to refer/where they have a case assignment)). Choosing one over another, one must make other choices consistent with one of the options. On an exoskeletal account, for example, the semantic information in a package of semantic features will be something that can in one form of computation get read as having the form of a noun, and in another, the form of a verb. And so on. Another decision to make is whether one treats the semantic information in a lexical item as compositional itself, or whether to conceive it as essentially ‘atomic,’ a morphological root that even in an account of concept/lexical semantic feature acquisition is not put together out of more basic features, but is one of the many thousands of ‘root’ concepts that humans can acquire. If one chooses the other option, one can explore the possibility that although from the point of view of syntax/morphology a lexical semantic root is treated as atomic, from the point of view of acquisition, it is composed. There is some discussion of this in the main text. Then there is the matter of how to conceive of the way in which semantic composition takes place. Does it have recourse in a fundamental way to notions such as truth, or does it proceed in a fully internalist manner? “Functionist” accounts are popular (Heim & Kratzer 1998) and many of them do seem, at least, to give a central role to truth, making them less than desirable for someone who wants to proceed in an internalist way,[7] and they also have problems in explaining why there seem to be limits on the adicity of natural language verbs. There are alternatives that are more nearly internalist, and that do speak to other problems with the functionist approach. One is found in Pietroski's (2005) internalist version of Davidsonian-based event semantics joined to Boolos-style second-order quantification. Another possible move is to adopt one or another form of functionist semantic theory and model-theoretic work but denature them of any of their (supposed?) representationalist aspects. For reference, Chomsky (1986) pointed to a denaturing move mentioned above: adopt a model-theoretic way of saying what ‘appears’ at SEM in the way of semantic information, and continue to use terms such as “refer,” but read them as “Relation R,” where R is “reference,” but taken to be a ‘relation’ defined over mental models. It is not clear what to do about truth if one wants to keep anything like ‘real’ truth (likely impossible, I suspect). Model theory allows it to be denatured too: truth becomes largely stipulative. And there is an advantage in denaturing both: one gets an easy way to conceive of how to appropriate much of the machinery of formal semantics and appropriate the insights – and they are real – of the many who work in formal semantics now. But one can do that in other ways too. I will not mention other disputed issues.

4. The last stage (and really, the idea that there are stages or steps involved is a fiction; theory-construction is usually a matter of proceeding on all fronts at once, although attending to what must be dealt with at any given time) is trying to speak in at least a preliminary way to basic questions that no one has much of a clue about yet. Chomsky in the text says this of human concepts, and he is right: they are, as we have seen, a puzzle. However, the naturalistically inclined theoretician can do at least some things. For one, restricting discussion to linguistically expressed concepts focuses attention on what appears at the semantic interface, and what is needed at that place where a sentence/expression offers information to other systems (or places, if one adopts a staged or “phased” conception of computation). By assuming this, and by assuming (see pp. 28–29 and commentary) that the semantic interface works much as the phonetic one does, so that there is no need to link linguistically expressed meaning information to a separate concept (in the manner of Fodor with his “language of thought,” for example), we could call the semantic information at SEM a “linguistically expressed concept,” period. In a connected vein, another thing to do (also anticipated above) is acknowledge that while from the point of view of morphology and syntax a lexical concept is ‘atomic,’ from the point of view of the acquisition of the concepts expressed in lexical items themselves, they could be treated as decomposable. Neither of these moves says what the basic elements of concept acquisition are, what human linguistically expressed concepts in general are, and how either of these might have evolved. As Chomsky points out in the text in connection with the question of the evolution of language, these are very likely matters that we cannot now even begin to address. We cannot because – unlike the state of “narrow syntax” in its minimalist form, which is sufficiently strong to begin to address these matters – there really are no respectable theories of concepts yet in place.

In addition, even when we can try to address issues for the study of linguistically expressed concepts in a reasonable way, lying in wait are the kinds of problems that Richard Lewontin emphasized in his (1998). With the possible exception of a plausible saltational account of evolution of the sort that Chomsky discusses in the main text, where it is possible to gather at least some paleoanthropological and archaeological evidence (and the like), it is extremely difficult to conceive of how one could gather any evidence for the evolutionary development of human conceptual capacities – capacities that on the face of it are very different from those available to other creatures.

I am very grateful for discussion of these issues not only to Chomsky, but to Paul Pietroski and Terje Lohndal at the University of Maryland, and to some students at McGill: Oran Magal, Steve McKay, Lauren de la Parra, Lara Bourdin, and Tristan Tondino.

[1] Pietroski puts the basic point in a different way in his (2002) and elsewhere. He construes semantic features as instructions to build concepts. “Instructions to build concepts” might appear to some less worrisome than a concept/MOP that has alternate features. But the concept so built raises the same issues: lexical + morphosyntactic instructions to build a concept at a sentence's semantic interface or other ‘transfer’ place still builds a (complex sentential) polity-type concept displaying a France that is hexagonal and a republic. It also raises puzzles: what is an “instruction to build a concept”? To whom or what is it directed? Not a person, surely; is it then a module? If so, what is the nature of that module: how does it operate, what does it take as input, how does it produce its output? Does it produce its output by duplicating morphosyntactic processing? If so, why not have the sentential MOP and its constituents at a semantic interface serve as the complex concept itself? I prefer to place both semantic features in a cluster of semantic features that constitute a lexical MOP that then becomes (a part of) a sentential MOP. This allows also for a different and I think preferable view of interpretation: features do not give instructions, but (help) configure understanding and experience. See below, Appendix XII.

That said, I am aware that Pietroski has strong reasons internal to his well-developed and impressively defended semantic theory (2005) and a complementary account of the lexicon (forthcoming) to adopt the ‘instruction giving’ account that he does. I would like to find a way to adopt both his account of concepts and mine.

[2] They are not appearance properties, of course, if that means properties such as colors and sounds that might themselves constitute an animal's DOGmop. They are human-specific, and include features such as NATURAL OBJECT and presumably some kind of function-for-us. That said, like colors conceived of as ways in which the visual system configures visual experience, the basic assumption is that these features partially configure experience (here, of dogs). That is just what MOPs ‘do’. See Appendix XII.

[3] Cases such as dog-pictures are not very interesting: that is part of what PICTURE does. Dog-toys are more interesting cases. Children do often invest their toys with psychic continuity, as well as other properties of living creatures. As I mentioned: interpretation is probably beyond the reach of science. But the potential contributions of various cognitive systems are not.

[4] Perhaps there is a measurable probability that people will greet each other in English by uttering “hello.” But there are few other such cases. Their view is on the face of it absurd. But it has attracted many others. Showing it is absurd in a way that will convince these others may be impossible, but perhaps it is worth the effort.

[5] These statistical measures indicate again that their view is not driven by any actual assessment of probabilities, but by dogma.

[6] I add an ‘s’ to ‘paper’ because – apparently – Chomsky was wrong to think that the view expressed is in a single paper. The relevant papers include Weckerly and Elman (1992), Elman (1990, 1991, 1993), and Elman and Lewis (2001).

[7] It is difficult to believe that their efforts really do have anything to do with truth except for something like ‘truth in a model’ (a very different thing). Chomsky remarks that their approach works as well for brains in a vat.

Appendix VII: Hierarchy, structure, domination, c-command, etc.

The sentences of natural languages all display hierarchical structure. Structure is often represented in a tree; a tree for a simple sentence such as Harry saw a house drawn in a way that reflects a fairly recent version of generative syntax might look like this:

The labels on the diagram are explained below.

I briefly address two questions: (i) where do linguistic hierarchical structures ‘come from,’ and (ii) what is their significance for understanding the way that language ‘works’?

On the first question, it is important to recognize that it is difficult to avoid hierarchy. The successor function for generating the natural numbers introduces it, and in fact any finite state grammar introduces hierarchy: each additional element added in generating a string of words or other elements yields a larger set of which the prior-generated set is a subset. If one adds the operation of associativity, one can make the hierarchy disappear and end up with a string, but that requires an additional operation – and justification for introducing it. I do not mention a finite state grammar because it introduces the right hierarchy for natural languages. Chomsky demonstrated long ago that it did not (1957; see also Chomsky & Miller 1963). The issue is not how some kind of hierarchy is introduced, but rather how the ‘right’ kind is – the kind of hierarchy found in natural languages. The ‘right’ kinds of grammar yield this.

Answers to this question have changed over the last sixty years or so, demonstrating progress in developing the study of language into a natural science. To illustrate, consider two stages on the way to the minimalist program approach to explaining structure, the earliest (1950s on) ‘phrase structure grammar’ one and the later (beginning about 1970) X-bar theory approach. Historically speaking, these are not distinct stages; it is better to think in terms of evolving views. However, for purposes of explication, I compress and idealize. During the first stage, linguistic structure in the derivation of a sentence was attributed primarily to phrase structure rewrite rules that included some like this:

S → NP + VP (‘Sentences’ [more carefully, abstract descriptions of structures and LIs] consist of Noun Phrases followed by Verb Phrases.)

VP → V + NP

V → V + AUX

V → {leave, choose, want, drink, fall. . .}

. . . and so on, in very considerable detail, tailored to specific natural languages. These rules, it was thought, and a few “obligatory” transformations, yielded Deep Structures. The Deep Structures then could be subject to “optional” transformations that would (for instance) move elements around and perhaps add or subtract some in order to (for instance) change a declarative structure into a passive one. Basically, though, transformations depended on the basic structure established by the phrase structure grammar. So to the question, where does structure come from, the answer is: the phrase structure component of a grammar, modified where appropriate and needed by a transformational component. Notice that this kind of answer is not very different from answering the question of where the structures of molecules come from by saying “this is the way atoms combine” with no further explanation of why atoms do so in the ways they do. In effect, phrase structure grammars are descriptive, not explanatory in any illuminating sense. Segmenting linguistic derivations into a phrase structure component and a transformational one simplifies things a bit, and phrase structure grammars greatly reduce the number of rules that a child is conceived of as required to learn to acquire a language. However, that is a long way from offering a workable answer to how the child manages to acquire a language in the way the poverty of stimulus observations indicate. So phrase structure grammars do not do much more than begin to speak to the issue of acquisition: because structure differs from language to language (a prime example is the verbal auxiliary system), rewrite rules are far from universally applicable, making it difficult to understand how specific grammars could be acquired under poverty of stimulus conditions. They also leave wide open the question of how language came to have the hierarchical structure it does. They offer no way to trace language's structure to biology and/or other sciences, and do not speak at all to the question of why only humans seem to have the structure available to them – structure that is, furthermore, usable in cognition in general, including thought and speculation. Indeed, because so many variants are required for different languages, they make it even more difficult to imagine how they could have a biological basis.

The second, X-bar approach made some progress. There are a couple of ways of looking at X-bar theory. One is this: instead of appearing as in phrase structure grammars to try to build structure top-down, move instead from lexical items up. Assume that lexical items come already placed in a small set of possible categories, where each item in each category has a set of features that in effect say what the relevant lexical item can do in a derivation/computation. Thus, as a lexical item ‘projects’ up through the structure, it carries its features with it, and these determine how they can combine, where, and how they will be read. The categories are N (for noun), V (verb), A (adjective/adverb) and – with some dispute concerning its fundamental character – P (post/preposition). The projected structures are reasonably close to being common to all languages. The structures that are built consist of three ‘bar levels’ – so-called because the original way of representing the level of the structure took an N, say, and represented the first or “zero” level of structure as the lexical item itself (N), the next level as an ‘N’ with a single bar written on top, and the third an ‘N’ with two bars. A more convenient notation looks like this: N^0, N^1, N^2 or this: N, N′, N″. The number of primes corresponds to the number of ‘levels” to be found in a hierarchical structure that looks like this, for a noun:

Phrases of other types can stem from the N′ position; when they are found there, they are “adjuncts.” A hierarchical drawing for the green house with the adjective (A) green as an adjunct would place a branch of the tree stemming from the diagram's N′ down to the left (for English) to an AP, which would then go to an A′ and in turn to an A, and finally to green. ‘Det’ is short for “determiner”; determiners for noun phrases include the and a (in English). The position occupied by ‘Det’ in the diagram is the “specifier” position. X′s have specifiers; a specifier for a sentence (now an “inflectional phrase” to capture the idea that “inflections” such as tense need to be added to verbs to get sentences as we normally think of them) would normally be an NP.

Another way to look at X-bar structure is to conceive of it as required to conform to a set of three schemata. The schemata are:

1.
Specifier schema: XP → (YP) – X′

2.
Adjunct schema: X′ → (YP) – X′

3.
Complement schema: X′ → X – (YP)

X = any of N, V, A, P

P = phrase

(. . .) = optional

− = order either way

Details concerning X-bar theory and structure are available in many places; my aim is to speak to what its introduction accomplished. X-bar theory, however one conceives of it, simplifies the structure that phrase structure grammar once was used to describe a great deal. The schemata or projection principles capture all the possible phrasal structures of all languages, thereby making a case as linguistic universals; and joined to the early stages of the principles and parameters framework as it was after 1980, X-bar could accommodate at least the headedness parameter. To the extent that it reduced multiple rule systems into a relatively simple set of schemata or projection principles, it aided – at least to a degree – the task of speaking to the acquisition issue and the matter of accommodating the theory of language to biology (the genome). It still left a lot unexplained: why this form, why three ‘bar levels,’ and where did this structure come from? However, it did speak to the matter of simplicity, and also to another important issue that Chomsky emphasizes in comments on an earlier draft of this appendix. In phrase structure grammar, even more was left unexplained. Phrase structure grammar simply stipulates abstract structures as NP, VP, S and stipulates too the rules in which they figure. Because of this, it offered no principled reason for the rule V → V NP rather than V → CP N. X-bar theory eliminated the wrong options and the stipulated formal technology in a more principled way than did phrase structure grammar. Again, that represents progress.

Minimalism is a program for advanced research in linguistics. It is not a theory. It is a program that aims to answer questions such as the ones left unanswered by earlier attempts at dealing with linguistic structure. It became possible because linguists around the beginning of the 1990s could – because of a lot of evidence in its favor – rely on the principles and parameters framework, and particularly on parameters. They could afford, then, to set aside the explanatory issue that dominated research until that time, that of speaking to Plato's Problem. They could – as the discussion of the main text emphasizes in several ways – go “beyond explanation” (as the title of one of Chomsky's papers reads), meaning by that not by any means that they could consider the task of explanation complete, but that they could speak to other, deeper explanatory issues, such as those raised by evolution and the fact that language is unique to human beings, and by ‘Where does structure comes from?’, ‘Why this structure?’, and ‘What does the structure accomplish?’ For obvious reasons, Merge – its nature, its introduction to the human species, and what it can do – and third factor considerations came as a result to be placed at the forefront of research. Since the main text and other appendices speak to what this new focus provided (the structure introduced by Merge and the variants in structure offered, possibly, by third factor considerations alone), I do not repeat it here. I just emphasize that even coming to the point where minimalism could come to be taken seriously as a scientific program of research represents great (but definitely not finished) progress on the way to making linguistics a naturalistic science. Only once it is possible to initiate it can one begin to see how the theory of language and of linguistic structure could be accommodated to other sciences.

The second issue concerning structure is what it is for – what linguistic structure does. In what follows, keep in mind again that any grammar introduces structure and hierarchy; the crucial issue is what is the right structure and grammar (and getting principled answers to this question, ultimately by appeal to biology). In the same vein, one should keep in mind that what is commonly called “weak generative capacity” (the capacity of a grammar to yield a set of unstructured strings) is a less primitive operation than strong generation (yielding strings with structures – in the case of language, stated in terms of structural descriptions or structural specifications). Weak generative capacity involves a second operation – perhaps associativity, as indicated above.

As for the (connected) issue of what structures do: there have been several answers, but also a degree of agreement. Structures constitute phrases, and phrases are domains that play central roles in determining what can move where, and what the various elements of a phrase ‘do’ – what kind of theta role a noun phrase might have, for example. I illustrate in a very small way by looking at the notion of c-command – how it is defined over hierarchical structures and some of the principles in which it is involved. For ‘c,’ read ‘constituent,’ hence “constituent command.”

To understand c-command and a bit of its roles, consider the following hierarchical linguistic structures:

Now introduce the notion of domination, which is intuitively defined over a hierarchical structure of the sort illustrated. In the first figure above, B immediately dominates A and C, B dominates A in the second. Given this intuitive notion, we can now define c-command this way: X c-commands Y if X does not immediately dominate Y or vice versa and the first branching node that dominates X also dominates Y. Thus for the first structure above, A c-commands C, D, and E; B does not c-command anything; C c-commands A; D c-commands E; E c-commands D. And for the second, A c-commands D, E, and F.

C-command figures in several central linguistic principles, principles that govern the ways in which sentences and the expressions within them can/must be interpreted/understood. One example is found in “binding theory,” a set of three principles that for all natural languages describes the syntactically determined binding/co-indexing properties of referential expressions, pronouns, and anaphors. An example of an anaphor in English is a reflexive pronoun, such as herself . . . Harriet washed herself. Clearly, herself must be coreferential with Harriet, unlike Harriet washed her, where her clearly cannot be used/understood to corefer with Harriet. An informal way to express this is to say that anaphors must be bound within the minimal (smallest) domain containing a subject: Harriet watched Mary wash herself is fine, but herself must be used to corefer with Mary, not Harriet. A more formal and theoretically useful way – more useful because c-command plays a central role elsewhere too, and in capturing a linguistic universal allows the theoretician to consolidate – is this: an anaphor's antecedent must c-command it. This is “Condition A” of binding theory.

The Minimalist Program illuminates why c-command plays an important role, and how it does so. The minimalist picture of sentence derivation/computation, at least on certain assumptions that are rather technical and that cannot be discussed here, offers an elegant picture of c-command and how it comes to have the properties it does. Minimalism treats a derivation as a matter of Merge – either internal or external. Consider an internal merge; it places an element that is already a part of a derivation “at an edge” – in effect, at the front of a set in which it leaves a copy [or a copy of A is put at the edge . . .]. For example,{A {B. . . {A. . .}}}. This portrays c-command in a nutshell: the ‘fronted’ element c-commands all the other elements, on the assumption – one that is well motivated – that the copy/copies of A will not be pronounced. C-command becomes precedence – being a ‘later’ Merge. For some fairly non-technical discussion, see Boeckx (2006).

Minimalist efforts to eliminate ‘artifacts’ from theories of grammar suggest that one should not take c-command as a primitive of linguistic theory. It is a useful descriptive tool but – as the paragraph above suggests – it might be eliminable in favor of features of internal and external Merge. As Chomsky (2008) argues, Condition C and Condition A of binding theory can be dealt with in this way. One point of the Minimalist Program is, of course, to eliminate items that cannot be justified by “principled explanation” and to aim toward conceiving of the language system as perfect. The discussion above illustrates some progress in that regard.

Appendix VIII: Variation, parameters, and canalization

The naturalistic theory of language must speak not only to ways in which languages are the same (principles, UG), but also to ways in which languages can differ. A descriptively and explanatorily adequate naturalistic theory of language should have the resources available to it to describe any given I-language and, to do that, it must have the theoretical resources to describe any biophysically possible I-language.

Some differences between I-languages are, however, beyond the reach of naturalistic study. People can and do differ in how they pair ‘sound’ information with ‘meaning’ in their lexicons (Chomsky 2000). To one person, the sound “arthritis” is associated with JOINT AILMENT; to another, perhaps with LIMB DISEASE (or with whatever else a person understands the sound “arthritis” to mean). These pairings are from the point of view of the natural scientist simply irrelevant; they are examples of what Chomsky calls “Saussurean arbitrariness.” Natural science must ignore the pairings because they are conventional, social, or idiosyncratic. They are not due to natural factors, to the way(s) that nature “cuts things at the joints,” paraphrasing Plato. This is not to say that these differences are unimportant for practical purposes: if you want to communicate easily with another person, your pairings better overlap the other person's. It is only to say that the pairings are a matter of choice, not nature, and so irrelevant to a natural science of language.

To put the point in another way, the natural science of language focuses on what is innate. So it focuses on the lexicon, but not on the pairings found in a particular person's head. It focuses (or should) on the sounds and meanings that are available for expression – that is, for pairing in the lexicon, and for appearance at relevant interfaces. These sounds and meanings are innate in that they are built into whatever kinds of acquisition mechanisms make them available, at the same time limiting the ones that are available, for a mechanism can only yield what it can. Its possible variants are built into it.

There seem to be limits on the sounds that are available within any specific natural language. Chomsky remarks (1988) that while “strid” could be a sound in English, it cannot in Arabic. On the other hand, “bnid” is available in Arabic, but not in English. To deal with what is or is not available in the class of I-languages that are sometimes called “natural languages,” one appeals to parameters. Parameters, it is assumed, are built into the acquisition mechanisms. They might be biological in nature (built into the genome), or due to other factors, those that Chomsky labels “third factor” contributors to acquisition/growth mechanisms.

Far more attention is paid, however, to the parametric differences in ‘narrow syntax,’ to the different ways available for different natural languages (taken here to be classes of I-languages that are structurally similar) to carry out computations. The conception of parameters and their settings has changed since their introduction with the Principles and Parameters program in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The original conception – and the one that is easiest to describe and illustrate, so that it is useful for explication in texts like this – held that a parameter is an option available in a linguistic principle (a universal ‘rule’). The “head” parameter is often mentioned. Beyond lexical features and morphemes, the next most basic units of language are phrases. Phrases are understood to consist of a “head” (a lexical item of a specific category, such as N(oun) or V(erb)) and a “complement” which may be another phrase, such as an adjective/adverb phrase. So one might have a Verb Phrase (VP) amounting to wash slowly with a V head followed by an adjectival/adverbial complement, an AP reduced to an A. Rather, that is what you would find in English and many other languages. That is because these are “head first” languages. In others, such as Japanese or Miskito, the order is reversed. Phrases in these languages also have the structure of a head and a complement, but in these languages, the head appears after the complement. Stating the relevant parameter with options included ‘in’ the parameter, it is:

P is ‘phrase,’ and the variables X and Y can have the values N, V, or A, and (on earlier views) P (for pre/postposition). The dash (–) is unordered, allowing X to be before YP, or YP to be before X. The dash allows for initial (X-YP) or final (YP-X) heads. In this sense, the parametric options are ‘in’ the formal statement of the “phrase principle.”

More recent discussion of parameters reconceives them in two significantly different ways. One is due to the suggestion that all parametric differences between languages are found in what are called “functional categories.” A functional category amounts to any category of (oversimplifying here) lexical item that indicates a difference not in content, but in the ‘shape’ of a grammar. Relevant differences arise in verb phrase structure, in complementation (that . . ., which . . .), and in the forms of ‘auxiliary’ operation that determine subject–verb agreement, and the like. A functional category might be expressed in different languages in different ways. In English, some prepositions (such as of) express a grammatical or functional difference, others (such as under) a lexical content one. By assuming that some lexical items express functional categories or grammatical information alone (and not lexical ‘content’ information), and by assuming further that parametric differences between languages are different ways the language faculty has available to it to meet the “output conditions” set by the systems with which it must ‘communicate’ at its interfaces, it came to be assumed that parametric differences are lodged in “function words,” rather than in the principles themselves, as was assumed in the early account.

The other major line of development is due largely to the work of Richard Kayne (2000, 2005), who pointed to many more parameters than had been thought to be required before. He called them “microparameters,” thereby turning the older parameters into “macroparameters.” Microparameters detail relatively fine-grained differences between aspects of what are usually claimed to be closely related languages (“closely related” is not always clearly defined). The microparameter thesis came to be wedded also to the idea that all parametric differences are located ‘lexically’ (although some might be unpronounced). That idea also became a significant assumption of much work in the Minimalist Program, thereby effectively abandoning the early idea that parameters are ‘in’ principles. Discussion continues, and focuses on topics that one might expect: can macroparameters be analyzed in terms of microparameters? Is there room for an unqualified binary macroparametric distinction between languages such as that expressed in the head parameter? If so, how does one conceive it? And so on. The answer to the next-to-last question, by the way, seems at the moment to be “no,” but perhaps major features of the old conception can be salvaged. On that, see Baker (2008). The discussion continues, but I do not pursue it further here. Chomsky adds something in the 2009 supplement (see pp. 54–55), however – among other things, the possibility that there are infinitely many parameters.

Parameters continue as before to have a central role in discussions of language acquisition or growth. Imagine a child growing up in an English-speaking environment, and take the headedness macroparameter as an example. He or she – or rather, his or her mind, for this is not a conscious decision – will set the “headedness” switch/parameter to “head initial.” The same child's mind in a Miskito-speaking environment will automatically set the parameter to “head final.” The details of how the setting take place are a matter for discovery; for interesting discussion, see Yang (2004) and the discussion in the main text.

Canalization is a label for what is on the face of it a surprising phenomenon. Humans and other organisms seem to manage to develop into a relatively uniform ‘type’ despite different environments, ‘inputs,’ and genetic codings. It is not at all clear what explains the observations, although there are suggestive ideas. One is that “control” or “master” genes play a role. Waddington, who first used the term, spoke of epigenetic factors influencing development. Another possible factor is the limited set of options made available, given non-genetic physiochemical, ‘processing,’ and other constraints. Since these limit possible mutation too, it would not be surprising if they limited possible organic structures and operations. Canalization is discussed further in the text.

Appendix IX: Simplicity

Seeking simplicity (elegance, austerity, beauty, optimality . . .) for one's theory of a system or phenomenon, it has often been pointed out, is a crucial aspect of scientific investigation and has a prominent place in natural science methodology. Some aspects of it are discussed elsewhere in this volume: an insistence on seeking ‘atoms’ or what Newton called “corpuscles,” Galileo's focus on inclined planes and not on how plants grow, and Goodman's nominalism and constructive systems, as well as his effort to find a completely general conception of simplicity. Simplicity of several sorts (theory-general, computational, optimization, efficiency) is exhibited – remarkably, given earlier work and the complications that were a part of the ‘format’ picture of grammars found until the introduction of the principles and parameters framework – in Chomsky's Minimalist Program conception of the language faculty. This conception, as indicated, suggests that linguistic structure and possible variants in it amount to Merge and the developmental constraints built into parameters, where these could be based on the genome or third factor contributions. It also suggests that the human language system is a perfect (or as close to perfect as possible) solution to the problem of linking sounds and meanings over an unbounded range – or at the least, putting together complexes of concepts that we can think of as thoughts, or perhaps as language's contribution to thoughts. If the minimalist approach continues to make progress, we can with some confidence say that the language faculty appears to be an oddity among biological systems as they are usually conceived. They are usually kludges: “bricolage,” in François Jacob's phrase (cf. Marcus 2008). They are seen to be the result of the accidents of history, environment, and adventitious events: they are functioning systems that come out of millennia of gradual change, as conceived in the usual selectional story about evolution. However, the language faculty appears to be more like a physical system, one that exhibits elegance and simplicity – for example, atomic structure and the structured table of elements that it underwrites.

Getting this kind of result might have been a desideratum in Chomsky's early efforts to construct a theory of language, but it could not have been more than a dream at the time. The focus of early work (e.g., Aspects of the Theory of Syntax) was to find a theory of language that would be descriptively adequate – that is, provide a way to describe (with a theory/grammar) any possible natural language – while also answering the question of how a child could acquire a given natural language in a short time, given minimal input which is often corrupt and without any recourse to training or ‘negative evidence.’ The acquisition issue – called in more recent work “Plato's Problem” because it was the problem that confronted Plato in his Meno – was seen as the task of providing an explanatorily adequate theory. Taking a solution to the acquisition problem as the criterion of explanatory adequacy might seem odd, but it is plausible: if a theory shows how an arbitrary child can acquire an arbitrary language under the relevant poverty of the stimulus conditions, we can be reasonably confident that the theory tracks the nature of the relevant system and the means by which it grows in the organism. Unfortunately, though, early efforts to meet descriptive adequacy (produce a theory of language with the resources that make it able to describe any of the thousands of natural languages, not to mention the indefinitely large number of I-languages) conflicted with meeting explanatory adequacy. If we all had a single language and its structure were simple so that we could understand how it developed quickly in the human species, and if our theory of it and of how it develops in an individual within the relevant time constraints were fully adequate, we would have a theory that meets both requirements. However, this counterfactual has nothing to do with the facts.

It was thought at the time that the only route available to the theoretician is to conceive of the child as being endowed with something like a format for a possible language (certain conditions on structure, levels of representation, and possible computations) and a relative optimization routine. The child, endowed with a format for a possible language and given input from his or her speech community, would automatically apply this routine so that the rules of his or her language faculty somehow converged on those that contribute to speech behaviors in the relevant community. The format would specify ways of ‘chunking’ linguistic data (word, phrase) and tying it together (rule, general linguistically relevant computational principles such as what was called “the principle of the cycle” . . .) and the routine would yield a measure of simplicity in terms of, say, number of rules to encompass the data. This routine, one that is internal to the system as conceived by the theory, yields a way of speaking of how one grammar is better than another, neighbor one: ‘better’ is cashed out in terms of a relative simplicity measure. Chomsky called this routine an “evaluation” procedure. The child's mind is conceived to have some devoted (language-specific) relative optimization principle available, one that within the relevant time period comes up with the (relatively) best theory (grammar) of the rather thin data set that the mind is offered. It was an intuitively obvious way to conceive of acquisition at the time for – among other things – it did appear to yield answers and was at least more computationally tractable than what was offered in structural linguistics, where the alternatives found in structural linguistics could not even explain how that child managed to get anything like a morpheme out of data. But the space of choices remained far too large; the approach was theoretically implementable, but completely unfeasible. It clearly suffers in comparison to the new version. Moreover, it blocked progress by making it very difficult to conceive of how the specification of a format, and of UG as conceived this way, could have developed in the species. UG – thought of as that which is provided in the way of language-specific genetic information – would have to be rich and complex, and it was difficult to see how something both devoted and rich and complex could have developed in the human species.

To solve the acquisition problem and meet the condition on explanatory adequacy (understood as solving Plato's Problem), it is far better to have a theory that provides something like very few universal, invariant principles, plus language-universal acquisition algorithms that automatically return the ‘right’ language/grammar, given a set of data. That would be a selection procedure, a procedure that yielded a single solution without weighing alternatives. It – or a reasonably close approximation – became a prospect with the introduction in the late 1970s and early 1980s of the principles and parameters view of the language faculty. Intuitively, the child is provided through UG at birth with a set of principles – grammatical universals or rules common to all languages. Among these principles are some that allow for options. The options are parameters. The parameters – conceived originally as options ‘internal’ to a principle – can be ‘set’ with minimal experience (or at least, with the amount of experience actually afforded children in the relevant developmental window). (See Appendix VIII on parameters and their role.) Setting them one way as opposed to another would determine one class of possible natural languages as opposed to another. This was real progress on the road to meeting explanatory adequacy. Moreover, with the Minimalist Program's growing acceptance of the idea that Merge is all that one needs in the way of an exceptionless principle, and the further suggestion that parameters might even amount to general constraints on development constituted by – and set by – the non-biological factors included in what Chomsky calls “third factor” contributions to language growth and the shape that a language takes, the burden placed on the language-specific instruction set included in the human genome becomes less and less. Maybe the only genetically specified language-specific contribution is Merge. If this were the case, it would be much easier to understand how language came to be introduced into the species at a single stroke. It would also make it easy to understand how and why language acquisition is as quick and automatic as it appears, while allowing for different courses of development. And it would allow linguists such as Chomsky to begin to raise and provide tentative answers to questions such as what is biologically crucial to language. We would begin to have answers to ‘why things are the way they are.’

With this in mind, where Chomsky speaks of biolinguistics (a term first introduced by Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini in 1974 as the title for a joint MIT-Royaumont Foundation conference, held in Paris), perhaps we should speak instead of “biophysical linguistics” or perhaps “bio-compu-physical linguistics,” so that it becomes clear that the set of possible natural languages and I-languages depends not just on genetic coding but also on other factors – all, though, conceived of as somehow built into nature and the ways in which it permits development/growth. And if UG is thought of as what we are provided by biology alone (i.e., genomic specification), perhaps UG becomes nothing but the specification for Merge.

Interestingly, the principles and parameters framework seems to allow us to abandon the theory-internal conception of simplicity that played such an important role in early efforts. If the child's mind knows what the switches or options are, relative optimization of simplicity plays no role. You can think of the language acquisition matter as solved (at least for narrow syntax) and turn to other explanatory matters. That is no doubt part of the reason why in a recent paper Chomsky speaks of minimalism as going “beyond explanation” – part of the reason, not the whole, for third factor considerations appear to begin to allow answers to questions concerning why principles X rather than alternatives Y, Z . . . Explanation in the sense of solving Plato's Problem remains crucial, of course, but with parameters, solving Plato's Problem no longer need be the single, central goal of linguistic explanation.

Theory-general conceptions of simplicity continue as they have for centuries to guide the scientist's (not a child's mind's) construction of theories of various sorts of various domains, of course, including the linguist's theories of linguistic phenomena. And in the theory-general domain, it is hardly likely that nature has provided the scientist with an automatic selection device that does the job of coming up with a good theory of whatever phenomena the scientist aims to describe and explain. We do seem to have something; we have what Descartes called “the light of nature,” and what Chomsky calls the “science-forming capacity.” It is a gift given to humans alone, so far as we know, although not a gift to be attributed to God, as Descartes suggested. It is somehow written into our bio-physical-computational natures. Because of this capacity, we can exercise what Peirce called “abduction” and contemporary philosophers are fond of calling “inference to the best explanation.” It is very unlike other kinds of inference; it is more like good guessing. Probably some internal operation that seeks simplicity of some sort or sorts is a part of it. In any case, with it and other mental contributors, we miraculously but typically manage to converge on what counts as the better/improved description or explanation for some set of phenomena.

Appendix X: Hume on the missing shade of blue and related matters

Getting a better way to look at Hume's missing shade of blue problem requires abandoning Hume's very strong empiricist principles. His color problem, and the more general issue of novel experience and novel judgment, can only be dealt with satisfactorily by appealing (as Chomsky suggests) to theories of the internal systems that yield the kinds of ways we can cognize, and the limits that those systems set. It is clear that Hume was aware of the general issue; as indicated, he recognized that the mind can (and does) understand and make judgments about novel moral circumstances. It is also clear that he recognized that the limits of our capacities to understand and experience must be set by internally (and – while he did not like the fact – innately) determined ‘instincts.’ Further, he thought that understanding how these instincts work lay outside human powers. But on that, he was quite obviously wrong. Through computational sciences of the mind, they are now coming to be understood. As Chomsky emphasizes elsewhere in our discussions, one of the aims of cognitive science is coming to understand the natures of these cognitive instincts.

Note that modern theories of color and other visual artifacts (borders, shading, depth . . .) assume that they are products of internal machinery that both yields and, by having specific ranges and domains, sets limits on what can be sensed by the human visual system. (Bees can and do respond to photon input in the ultraviolet energy range with what we must assume are some kinds of internal visual representation, presumably something like colors. We, however, cannot respond to, nor produce [‘represent’] colors as a result of this kind of stimulation.)[1] While these systems are not recursive in the way that the language system is and do not yield discrete infinities of output, it is still plausible to speak of the color system of the human mind ‘generating’ colors and other visual artifacts by relying on algorithms that have no ‘gaps’ of the sort Hume pointed to in their ranges, nor in their output domains. They have no problems with novel input and pose no puzzles about how a novel output could be produced. Hume's specific puzzle supposes novel output without novel input, of course, but it is not at all clear how he could even pose his puzzle in actual cases. One reason, as we now know, is that the human visual system is capable of producing between 7.5 and 10 million different colors – that is, yielding discriminable combinations of hue, brightness, and saturation. What, then, would count as a Humean unique color? How would it be specified or individuated without a well-developed theory of what the human visual system can produce? How would one decide whether a person's system was or was not producing that specific color when presented with an array of closely matched stimuli? How does one take into account fatigue, color blindness, accommodation, etc.? Hume now would be able to answer these questions, but unfortunately for his empiricist views and his reluctance to believe that one can investigate mental instincts, he could answer them – and pose them in a reasonable way – only because there is a plausible theory of the internal instinct that yields colors in place. Given the theory and its success, one can even ask how seriously we should take philosophical thought experiments like Hume's. Surely at this stage, the existing theory counts as a better guide to which questions about what we can see and experience are reasonable to continue to raise.

Hume's insight, that our cognitive efforts are largely a matter of instinct, has now lots of evidence in its favor. Existing theories of vision and language indicate that he was on the right track in pointing to instinct as the source of our mental operations – pointing, that is, to the automatically developing biophysical machinery that makes discrimination in various modalities and judgment possible. The point generalizes: we can engage in science at all only because we can rely on some kind of ‘instinct’ that offers us something that Peirce labeled as “abduction.” Chomsky makes this point in the main text.

There are other lessons in this detour into color. An obvious one is that the internalist approach – approaching the issue of what the human cognitive system can or cannot do in this and likely other cases by looking inside the head and constructing a theory of how a system operates and develops – is supported by points like these. Another is that theory and the abstraction and simplification that is characteristic of and likely necessary to theory-construction trumps lists and compilations of ‘raw data.’ Data can be understood – and as the color case indicates, really only gathered – only when there is a theory that is making progress in place. Further, as with language, so too with color: commonsense views of both not only can be, but are in fact, misleading. If you want to know what a language or color is – or rather, want to have an objective and theoretically viable conception of a language or a color – look to how the best extant theories individuate them. In the case of a language, look to how to specify an I-language, and in the case of color, look to triples of hue, brightness, and saturation or rather, to the internalist theory that makes these the dimensions along which colors vary.

[1] No one should assume that there is a one-to-one matching of color experiences and spectral inputs. In fact, one of the most convincing reasons to construct a theory of the internal operations of the visual system is that they seem to modify and ‘add’ a great deal to the input, to the extent that one should abandon the idea that vision somehow accurately ‘represents’ input and its distal cause/source. For example, three ‘monochromatic’ (single-wavelength) light sources of any of a range of different wavelengths (so long as they provide light within the normal input range of each of the three human cone systems) can be varied in their intensity and combined to produce experience of any spectral color. Three fixed wavelengths, any color. If so, at some risk of confusion, we can say that colors are in the head. They are because they are ‘produced’ there. This commits one to something like a ‘projectivist’ view according to which what and how we see owes a great deal to what the mind contributes to our vision. Chomsky's view of the roles of human concepts and the language faculty is a version of projectivism. The ways in which we experience are due to a large extent to the ways in which we can experience, and these depend essentially on what our various internal systems provide in the way of ‘content,’ much of which must be innate.

Appendix XI: Syntax, semantics, pragmatics, non-Chomskyan and Chomskyan

The proposal offered here will puzzle many. Chomsky proposes treating semantics as a variety of syntax. Or to put it in a different way: a theory of linguistic meaning is a theory of what is in the head (and of how it can configure experience). In fact, as other appendices such as VI point out, his view is stronger still: what is called “linguistic semantics” or “formal semantics” is syntax, which is for Chomsky the study of (linguistic) symbols inside the head which are intensionally (theoretically) described and explained. Semantics in the traditional referential sense probably does not exist. Reference – a form of human action – appears to be out of reach of science.

By way of background and to settle on the relevant ways to understand the terms “syntax,” “semantics,” and “pragmatics,” I review Charles Morris's (1938) now more-or-less standard distinction between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics and then take up Chomsky's modifications in it. Focusing first on the standard view and especially contemporary understandings of it allows us to see why Chomsky's proposal seems surprising and also allows me to highlight the modifications Chomsky proposes.

Morris offered his distinctions – derived to a large extent from distinctions Charles Saunders Peirce advanced before him and that Carnap and others were advancing in the 1920s and 1930s – as a contribution to what he thought of as the scientific study of signs or symbols. He suggested that syntax be understood as the study of what might be called the intrinsic properties of signs, those that are internal to them. This could include at least some relational properties, such as ‘after’ said of a sign that follows another, where some ordering is specified (temporal, left–right . . .). Sometimes sets of signs and their relevant properties are both stated (lists, etc.) and created – as with the syntactic items found in formal logical systems. Semantics is the study of how such symbols relate to ‘things’ and sets of things. Semantics focuses, then, on syntax and some set of objects and their states. It appears to be a two-term relationship, although Frege and others made it a three-term relationship between sign, sense, and object(s). Pragmatics includes still another entity, the speaker. Pragmatics deals with the use of signs by a speaker to deal with ‘things.’ Morris simply assumed that the signs he had in mind are marks on a page (orthography) or perhaps sounds thought of as somehow ‘out there.’ This is a common assumption among logicians and others who invent and employ symbol systems. Natural language symbols, of course, are in the head.

Formal logic and logicians’ thoughts about it and its aim played an important role in shaping many researchers’ views of signs and how they operate. Consider a formally defined set of symbols such as those that appear in first-order predicate logic. A first-order logic text stipulates that various varieties of marks that appear in the textbook – for example, capital and small letters in some font or another (a, b, c, . . . P, Q, R . . .), parentheses, perhaps some specially created marks such as ├, ≡, or the familiar tilde (~) for a negation operator – constitute the syntax of the calculus. The usual aim is to make the semantically relevant roles of the stipulated signs clear and explicit: some logic text, for example, might stipulate that the complex sign ‘(x)Fx’ is to be read as a universal quantifier ‘(x)’ appearing before the predicate sign ‘F’ and a variable sign ‘x,’ the Fx constituting an “open sentence” with a variable, and the whole with quantifier is a proposition/statement to the effect that F is a property that all individuals x have. Generally speaking, the signs chosen are arbitrary and the reasons for their choices are transparent: logicians care most not about the niceties of syntax, so long as the stipulated elements are ‘perspicuous’ about their jobs. Their job is aiding semantics as they conceive it. Logicians put together some syntax that can highlight the properties and relations that they take to be semantically important. They are primarily interested in truth and reference and the truth-preservingness of various inferences and argument structures. The signs in terms of which a calculation is carried out are designed to help ensure explicitness and provide a way to avoid ambiguities. The users of signs are typically ignored.

With this kind of focus, the standard view of semantics becomes the study of signs syntactically characterized, but conceived of as items outside the head, and treated in terms of their (supposed) relations to things and circumstances ‘outside’ the sign, usually thought of as things and circumstances in the world or perhaps in a model. Semantic discussion generally, then, focuses on what traditionally have been called matters of truth (for sentences) and reference (for terms), thus on aspects of what philosophers call “intentionality.”

As mentioned in another connection, many who do natural language semantics work within a picture of how a semantic theory should be constructed introduced by Gottlob Frege's efforts at the end of the nineteenth and into the twentieth century to construct a semantics for mathematics. Frege introduced a third element besides sign and circumstances and things (for him, ‘entities’ in a world of mathematical abstract entities). He introduced what he called “senses,” where these are conceived of as mediating between words and things. His reason for introducing them depended on the observation that what he called “proper names” (which in his “On Sense and Reference” included any singular term – term that refers to a single entity – and thus included definite descriptions too) could have the same referent while differing in meaning, or what he called “sense.” For example, the singular terms “the morning star” and “the evening star” both are said to refer to Venus, but to differ in meaning, or sense. A mathematical example might note that “√9” and “3” have the same referent, but differ in sense again. Frege viewed a sense as an abstract object. Others turned it into a psychological entity (Fodor 1998) or turned it into a function from a sign to a referent, offering mildly different views about what that function might be, and what it involves. Introducing senses complicated matters a bit, but the primary focus remained as before: semantics studies a relation (perhaps mediated, perhaps not) between word and ‘things’ – perhaps abstract, perhaps concrete.

As remarked earlier again, Frege himself seems to have had serious doubts about applying his picture of a semantics for mathematics to natural languages. It is easy enough to see why. He assumed that within a community, a sign expresses a unique sense (no ambiguity can be allowed), and that each sense “determined” a unique referent (in the case of a sentence, a truth value). Ignoring senses, semantics-as-usual assumes a sign–thing relationship of some determinate sort. Nothing like these one–one mappings of sign to referent(s) is met in the uses of natural languages, even though the conditions for such mappings are reasonably closely honored in the practices of mathematicians.

It is a very different matter with Chomsky's view of natural language syntax and semantics. The basic assumptions about semantics outlined above remain more or less in place, but only with strict qualifications. Natural language syntax deals with properties internal to ‘signs,’ as usually assumed. However, these signs are inside the head, and their syntax is not the syntax of formally constructed systems. Signs have something to do with meaning; but it turns out to be non-relational, and meanings and the signs themselves remain inside the head, even ‘inside’ the sign in the form of semantic features. Clearly, the study of signs is not the study of marks on a page (nor those supposed entities, public linguistic sounds), but items in the mind. Their study is not the trivial orthographic study of chosen marks on a page and their invented combinatory operations nor – for that matter – the study of chosen sets of binary codings in a machine ‘language.’ Rather, their syntactic study is a form of naturalistic study of varieties of state/event of the sorts that figure in linguistic computations – that is, of anything that is involved in yielding sound–meaning pairs. Such study reveals that the relevant kinds of signs are found in human heads. Perhaps there are aspects of them in other organism heads, as discussed earlier, but there must also be distinctively human phonological and semantic features of ‘words’ and/or other elements. Neither phonological/phonetic nor ‘semantic’ features are referential. The standard view of the semantic study of signs invites thinking in terms of intentionality, so that a sign is a sign of something and saying what the ‘semantic value’ or ‘content’ of the sign is is saying what its “referent” is, where its referent is distinct from the sign. Chomsky holds instead that it is not only perfectly possible to specify what he calls the meaning of a sign without introducing anything like standard semantics, but that because of all the evidence against the existence of anything like a referential semantics for human languages (see the text and Appendix VI), it is the only way to proceed.

A plausible way to conceive of what he proposes is to say that he adopts something like Frege's notion of a sense, but denies that the sense or meaning of a sign/expression is a separate entity – perhaps an abstract entity as Frege seems to have believed. A sense is instead intrinsic to the sign/expression itself, the sign is located inside the head, and the sign and its sense can be studied by naturalistic scientific means. A sign is in fact a mental entity – a state/event located in the head that figures in a linguistic computation and provides ‘information’ with its features to other systems. And meaning features or ‘semantic’ features plus phonological features (and perhaps formal ones) are not just features of internal linguistic signs themselves, but they constitute such internal signs: semantic features are partially constitutive of lexical items. They are the features that as a result of a linguistic derivation/computation end up at the “semantic interface” (SEM or, sometimes, “LF” for “logical form”) and they there constitute the semantic ‘information’ or what can be called “internal” or “intrinsic content” of a sentence/expression. Or to put it in a Fregean way: they serve as modes of presentation.

As for reference of the word–world variety, for Chomsky it becomes a matter of use by people, and thus an issue in pragmatics, not his version of semantics. Can the study of pragmatics be, or turn into, a science? First, let us agree that pragmatics or the study of language use is part of a general ‘theory of language’ (see Chomsky 1999) in some broad sense. But that is not at issue; the issue is whether the use of language by humans can be a naturalistic science that one can investigate using the tools of natural scientific research. In the case of language, those tools assume some degree of biologically based regularity. However, with some exceptions, that is not to be found in the linguistic actions of humans; the creative aspect of language use provides a great deal of evidence to the effect that there are no causal principles that tie environmental or brain stimuli to specific forms of linguistic behavior. It is an empirical question, and cannot be definitely decided now, or ever. But the weight of evidence at the moment is very much against there being such causal principles. For ample discussion, see the main text and Appendices V and VI. However, if one includes under the title of ‘language use’ certain forms of inference that people draw, one can find cases where inferences are at least licensed by the structures and semantic information found in SEMs and the computations that lead to them. From assuming the truth of Jane's brown cow isn’t producing, one can infer that Jane has a brown cow, and from her having a brown cow that she has a cow. An important ‘conjunctivist’ view of why this follows is found in Pietroski (2005). And from you may have cake or ice cream, there is at least an implicature to your being permitted to have one or the other, but not both; see Pietroski and Crain (2005). Are these inferences determined by narrow syntax, the core system of the language faculty and its output at SEM? That is a stretch; assuming so would include these inferences in the computational resources provided by Merge. Still, they are sanctioned by the computations of the language faculty and by the semantic information these make available at SEM in a way that many inferences that people draw are not.

Appendix XII: An internalist picture of how concepts ‘work’

In comments on the discussion in the text, I spoke of concepts as ‘configuring’ experience and imagination; the terminology is repeated in earlier appendices. This puts in a different way views expressed by Chomsky (1966/2002/2009): “The strong assumptions about innate mental structures made by rationalistic psychology and philosophy of mind eliminated the necessity for any sharp distinction between a theory of perception and a theory of learning. In both cases, essentially the same processes are at work; a store of latent principles is brought to the interpretation of the data of sense. There is, to be sure, a difference between the initial ‘activation’ of latent structures and the use of it once it has become readily available for the interpretation (more accurately, the determination) of experience” (2009: 102). There is an obvious problem with this statement, apparent in the conjunction of the two sentences. The triggering system that relies on perceptual/sensory input to yield a concept might make a specific concept available, one that is not – however – sensory/perceptual. Whether perceptual or not, it does not fix its employment or use. However, this does not affect the crucial point. The crucial point for present purposes is that innate conceptual, linguistic, sensory, and other forms of internal ‘cognitive’ machineries partially determine experience in that they – not the ‘world outside’ – fix how one can see and understand. Taking this seriously, I suggest that SEMs, which are construed here as complexes of lexically specified innate concepts, do their ‘work’ in an ‘adverbial’ way. They fix – or with other systems contribute to fixing – the ‘hows’ of experience: the various manners or ways in which one can conjecture, understand, imagine, and experience. Interpretation is not a matter of searching for the right concept or right description to fit some ready-formed experience, but a matter of ‘making’ the experience, here understood as participating in a cooperative exercise involving several mental systems, each with its unique form of contribution. This point was anticipated in discussion above, but it needs to be addressed in some detail because it is so easy to start down a hopeless road.

The basic idea comes from discussion several decades ago by philosophers of what was called an adverbial account of visual sensation. (For the record, it was ignored more than rejected, in part – I suspect – because it conflicted with the commonsense-driven externalist and anti-nativist intuitions that dominate much philosophical discussion of sensation and perception.) This account of sensation was introduced to undermine the grip held on accounts of sensation and perception offered by two incorrect – according to the adverbialists – views of visual sensation. One was the “sense datum” view, the idea that the visual system (“the mind”/“the brain”) produces things called “sensations” or “sensa,” that these sensations (for example, color sensations) are mental objects of some sort, and that their role is to serve as the “immediate objects” of sensation and perception – not the ‘things outside.’ They in turn – on some views – mediate perception of things ‘out there’ or – on others – even constitute the total content of visual experience. The other was the view that sensations can only be classified and individuated by appeal to what they are of or about, so that to say what a sensation of red is, is to say what it is about – generally assumed to be a property of a surface of things ‘out there.’ The danger that lies in the first, sense datum, view is that it seems to depend on what must surely be an incorrect view of the sensory contents of the mind, one that seems to require that when I have a green sensation, that I (or something) sense something green in my mind/brain. The danger in the second is that it seems to support an externalist view of sensory states and events – suggesting that to say what they are, one must speak of things ‘outside’ and their properties, and making the internal states and events mere “re-presentations” of various things out there, with no evidence that anything ‘out there’ corresponds to the way that sensation portrays it. This is one of the points Locke and others were making when they spoke of “secondary qualities” – not that I am endorsing their account of them, nor of the difference claimed between secondary and “primary” qualities.

The adverbial account offered an alternative account of sensation – that is, of the mind/brain's role in sensory experience. It suggested that instead of thinking of the mind as a theater populated by green sensations at which some internal homunculus (or the person, for that matter) stares, one should think instead of the mind as ‘containing’ various sensory events – ‘sensings’ – and that these events differ from one another in ways that are determined by the nature of the mind/brain's sensory mechanisms. These events might require stimulation of some sort, either external via impingements on the eye (assumed to be the usual case) or internal, but given that stimulation, they participate in building a visual or imaginative scene populated with what the mind makes out as colored surfaces. Intuitively, where a person might be inclined to say that they sense green or see green, he or she should when careful resist and say rather that their visual system/mind/brain senses greenly – that is, that the relevant mental system functions on an occasion in one of the ways that is characteristic of an organism with the relevant kind of mental machinery, machinery that constitutes visual scenes. A minimal visual scene can be thought of as a particular assignment to values of coordinates of a retinocentric six-dimensional volume.[1] Each of the points in this volume has a specific set of ‘spatial’ and ‘color’ coordinate values, the spatial coordinates being (visual) depth, altitude, and azimuth and the color coordinates hue, brightness, and saturation. Think of a specific set of stimulus-derived assignments to these coordinates as a representation in the internalist sense. It does not re-present; the organism as a whole ‘uses’ it to do that, virtually automatically in the case of visual experience. It is a representation in the way that a linguistic SEM or PHON is a representation, a complex mental event described in theoretical terminology that in the theory of mind is treated as a specific configuration of an interface with other mental systems. The advantage for the internalist to this way of construing the matter is that it places colors not ‘on’ sensations, whatever they might be, but makes them out to be specific assignments of color values, specific output values of a subsystem of the mind. Think of these 3-D output values as describing particular complex mental events that momentarily constitute a minimal visual space, where the latter is understood as what the mind produces. They are theoretical ‘objects,’ the varieties of which are specified by a theory that offers a way to describe and explain how a system of the mind/brain works, and its contributions to an organism's mental operations. As for SEMs, a specific assignment in the case of a SEM amounts to a structured set of specific semantic features that help ‘make’ a way to understand and, specifically in cooperation with vision and other relevant systems (for example, object configuration), to perceive things in the world as such-and-such.

Looked at from the point of view of the organism as a whole and its experience and actions, the science of vision provides a way to think of how the visual system partially constitutes experience, ‘making’ colored, located visual ‘objects.’ Because visual experience in cooperation with other systems such as object- and facial-configuration systems usually proves reliable to an organism and offers partial but not necessary ‘output’ that with contributions from other systems generally proves sufficient to allow the organism to navigate and identify nutrients and enemies in its efforts to get along ‘in the world,’ the ‘things’ that are assembled (in part) through the contributions of an internal sensory system and many others are treated as ‘really out there,’ even though the properties and surfaces and classifications of such things as people and friends, or apples and food, are created by the mind. They can be thought of as ‘projections’ of the mind. Returning to color, the adverbial account claims that from the point of view of the science of color (as opposed to the commonsense conception of color and the entities of the commonsense world), colors are forms of mental event, ways of sensing and perceiving that differ from one another in ways determined by the nature of the visual system. They are not properties of things ‘out there,’ however reliable the objects created in visual experience prove to be for practical purposes, and however tempting the commonsense view of the world with its colored objects might be. Nevertheless, it serves the practical interests of an organism to see and think of the colors as properties of objects ‘out there.’

The visual system typically contributes to ‘experience’ – normally understood as an organism's reaction to distally caused input. Sometimes it contributes to imagined scenes. The language faculty, in contrast, only sometimes contributes ‘online’ to experience – to conceiving of something seen or heard as such-and-such having such-and-such functions, for example, and thereby constituting ‘it’ as a thing with those functions and other properties. It often contributes ‘offline’ to cases of imagining, speculating, proposing, thinking, etc. – ways of understanding and conceiving. It is a competence system, not an input system. Nevertheless, one can think of SEMs and other forms of mental entities as working in an adverbial way too. So construed, they do not ‘exist in the mind’ as conceptual objects inspected and perhaps manipulated and used as tools by some kind of internal homunculus ‘understander’ and agent, thereby paralleling the way that the sense datum theory construed the entities of the visual system. Rather, they can be seen as specific kinds of ways in which a person can – perhaps with contributions from other systems – understand, imagine, classify, ‘think about’ things and events, and the like. They are mental events that differ from one another in the ways determined by the language faculty and what it provides at SEM. Those ways are described and explained by a theory of the language faculty and its possible SEMs, and given any specific I-language (that is, parameter settings and lexicon). Assuming they contribute along with other systems in some way, the features of ‘interface values’ that the language faculty and other faculties make available at their interfaces contribute to human cognitive capacities.

Incidentally, one can grant that at least some of the ways that the mind configures experience, thought, etc. are provided – at least in the case of sensory systems that are virtually identical to those found in some other primates, not language – by systems that the organism's mind has available to it as a result of receiving it from a common ancestor or ancestors several millions of years ago, perhaps even from a whole class of organisms that employ rhodopsin in vision, if Gehring is right. One can also grant that the systems that offer these ways to configure experience would not prove as useful for practical purposes as they have without such an origin while, however, denying that the ways that the mind configures experience somehow map the way things ‘out there’ really are, or rather, how they are from the point of view of sciences of the relevant entities. The science of color vision provides a useful reminder of how misleading it can be to conclude that since commonsense objects appear to have the properties our minds assign to them (specifically, some of them appear colored), and since the framework proves so useful to serving our practical interests, that commonsense objects and their properties – not the minds that harbor and assign the properties – are both ‘real’ and must be, at least in part, the targets of a science of color. The point should be even more obvious with the concepts and complexes of concepts expressed in the sentences of human natural languages. As Chomsky points out in discussion in the main text, if you want to find out what the objects of common sense ‘are’ and can be, forget about looking outside. Instead, construct a science of the concepts (here thought of as ways of configuring and constituting thought, imagination, and experience) that we have available and that we employ in our thoughts, speculations, and dealings with the world. To do that, look inside the head. If you want to know what persons are, look at the internal and mental-system-provided concept PERSON with its rich and interest-serving characteristics, characteristics that enable flexible applications by humans when they speak and employ this concept, in a wide range of cases. Do not focus on specific applications of the concept – specific ways in which it configures. The concept, or at least similar versions thereof, may well be universal across the human species because it is fixed by the system(s) involved in bringing it into the mind. However, its uses by multiple cognitive systems and (seen from another point of view) by humans are anything but fixed. And in looking inside the head, you can also avoid the apparently tempting idea (at least to many philosophers – although not Locke or Hume) that the concept of a person is some kind of re-presentation of a person, or persons.

Why is the idea that our minds represent the world such a tempting view – so tempting that Fodor and others simply default to it, treating it as an axiom that cannot be challenged? An answer is implicit in what is said above: commonsense objects (with their visual-spatial and color properties, all assigned by the mind) prove useful. But they do so for practical purposes only. They do not serve the interests of the scientist.

Before continuing, a comment on the terminology that Chomsky often employs when he speaks of the systems on the other side of SEM. He speaks of them as “conceptual-intentional” systems to which SEMs “give instructions.” That way of putting it can, I think, mislead; see footnote 2 in Appendix VI. In the discussion and comments on it, I make SEMs out to be complexes of (lexical) concepts themselves, organized collections of the semantic information offered in lexical items. That is a way to avoid the suggestion in Chomsky's term, “conceptual-intentional.” His terminology suggests that SEMs, whatever they are, are items that relate to concepts ‘in’ other systems, or perhaps – as Pietroski sometimes says – instructs other systems to build concepts. This way of talking invites taking seriously notions such as a Fodorian language of thought, the locus of concepts. I suggest it be avoided. For good reasons, I believe, Chomsky explicitly rejects Fodor's view in the main text discussion, and implicitly in (1996, 2000) and elsewhere. The adverbial account offers a way to avoid that suggestion, and to think of SEMs as I suggest, as complexes of lexical concepts – concepts understood as ways of configuring experience, etc. that are articulated in terms of semantic features (here a technical term). More carefully, think of SEMs, as above, as the language faculty's contribution to a human's conceptual (configurational) capacities. The contribution is partial, as noted: the language faculty's semantic information provides “perspectives” from which to view “aspects of the world as it is taken to be by other cognitive systems” (Chomsky 2000). This way of stating it acknowledges that the semantic information that SEMs provide cognition should be seen only as a partial contribution to the ways our minds shape thought, imagination, and direct experience. Occasions on which a single faculty operates in isolation are likely to be rare, at least in actual, not experimental cases. Nevertheless, as the discussion also emphasizes, language's contributions are plausibly unique, and therefore in principle separable – as are the contributions of vision and other faculties. If so, it is possible to divide language's specific contributions to cognition and understanding from those of vision, audition, and so on.

Rationalist internalists have always thought of the proper location of concepts (one variety of what Descartes called “ideas”) as the mind, not things ‘out there’ and their properties. They have, however, been plagued by the locution (in English and some other languages) “concept of . . . (or “idea of . . .” “thought about . . .,” etc.), a locution which invites and excites externalist intuitions, making it appear that to say what a concept is, one must say what it is ‘about’ or ‘of.’ The adverbial account of a concept and more generally of the contributions of various mental systems, like the adverbial account of a color, undermines that intuition by treating a concept as a way of understanding and experiencing and of its status in the theory of mind as a configuration (stated in theoretical terms) of a system's interface. Undercutting externalist intuitions, this fact is, I think, a reason to adopt the adverbial account, and to think of SEMs as linguistically expressed concepts and ways of understanding. More carefully, the semantic information brought to SEM by linguistic computation is ‘put to use’ by other systems not in the way that people put a language to use to solve practical problems, or anything like that. Rather, the information constitutes a partial – but for humans, crucial (and uniquely human) – contribution to our cognitive resources, resources that – to switch to the agentive mode of speaking ruled out in the science of mind – we use to say and do what we want and need to say and do.

This view is also attractive for another reason, I believe. It nicely places the study of linguistic meaning – of language's contribution to human ways of understanding – directly in syntax, and specifically in the syntax of the language faculty. In effect, as Nelson Goodman suggested several decades ago with regard to what he called linguistic “meanings,” to avoid being misled, do not say “concept of X,” but say instead “X-concept.” More specifically for language, for what appears at SEM, do not say “SEM of X,” but say “X-SEM.” This bears on what follows in the discussion in the main text.

[1] Its color-space volume is not a ‘map of the world at a time’. It is a form of representation, understood internalistically. It can be ‘used’ to deal with the organism's current environment. But ‘using’ it is not a matter of inspecting some internal scene and employing it to navigate. That way of thinking of its use is a variation on the sense datum theme.

Commentaries

Chapter 1

Page 11, On uses of the word function

The term “function” has several uses, including those in its everyday commonsense employment and its use in mathematics and natural science. There also appear to be some uses specialized for certain kinds of project in biology. An outline of some of the various uses of this term is found in Appendix II.

Page 13, On creative options and their role

These last remarks on the “creative options” that the introduction of language affords us (and us alone) reflect an important strain in Chomsky's thinking. I comment here briefly on the idea that human language use is ‘free’ and gives us humans cognitive advantages unavailable to other creatures that lack language.

Unlike what appears to be the case with animal communication systems, human language production (in the head or externalized) does not depend in any discernible way on causal antecedents, can take unboundedly many forms, and yet generally remains appropriate to discourse circumstances. We can and do produce (usually in our heads alone) any number of sentences and fragments thereof, with no causal explanation to be found in environment or elsewhere in the head, and yet manage to be ‘rational’ in what we produce. As Descartes's follower Cordemoy and others put it, internal and external circumstances can incite or prompt us to say or think what we do, but they do not cause. No doubt when tortured or subjected to threats against life people can often be coerced to confess or utter all sorts of things. Nevertheless, they can and sometimes do choose not to – although at very considerable cost.

Freedom from causal antecedence (“stimulus freedom”), unbounded flexibility in what is produced (“unboundedness,” “innovation”), and coherence and rationality (“appropriateness”) are the three elements in what Chomsky calls the “creative aspect of language use.” In work that goes back to at least his Cartesian Linguistics in 1966 (the roots were in place before that, including his 1959 review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior), Chomsky explores the implications of the fact that everyday language use can be and often is not only uncaused (by either current external or internal circumstance), but also virtually boundless (unbounded) in possible ‘output,’ and yet nevertheless (while uncaused and unbounded) generally appropriate to whatever the circumstances of conversation and thought might happen to be. Speech production or action seems to be a free yet reasonable – not random – form of action. Even in a court of law, where one is supposed to constrain what one says and provide an objective description of a single event, fifty witnesses will come up with fifty different descriptions utilizing many more than fifty different sentences to describe “the same thing” – and they would no doubt do so, no matter what they were asked to describe. All their sentences express the way they see the circumstance, and there appears to be no upper limit on what counts as appropriate for this one event, even where all try to converge in the interests of objectivity.

The impact of the creative aspect of language use on the study of language and, more generally, cognitive science (or better, what that impact should be) is discussed at some length in my introduction to the third edition of Cartesian Linguistics (2009). For the moment, it is enough to point out that it was quite likely the introduction of language to the human species that led to what Jared Diamond called the “great leap forward” in human cognitive range, giving humans unique means to “solve problems.”

Page 14, On what is distinctive about human nature (see also Appendix III)

Appendix III takes up the issue of what is distinctive about human beings and discusses two prominent ways to try to explain it, the rationalist-biolinguistic approach endorsed by Chomsky and supported by his theory of language as a natural object and an empiricist approach adopted by the large majority of contemporary psychologists, philosophers, and social scientists.

Page 15, How to get elementary mathematics from the operation Merge

Here is one way to express how Merge restricted to an element that is merged again can yield the natural number system. Start with 0; if you merge it, you get {0} [in effect, 1]; merge it again and you get {0,{0}} [2]; merge it again and you get {0,{0,{0}}} [3], and so on.

Page 16, On external and internal Merge

For a linguistic example of external Merge, with the lexical items eat and apples you make {eat, apples}, often represented as

Internal Merge arises in (and helps constitute) linguistic derivations/computations. Consider a derived question: what (John) eat what. Here we find internal Merge yielding what used to be called “movement” or “displacement” of the ‘what’ inside a derived structure to its ‘edge’; the ‘earlier’ merged ‘what’ that appears at the right does not actually move; nor is it ‘erased’ from the position it originally occupied as a result of an external merge. It remains ‘there’ and is “copied” at the ‘edge’ of the constructed set but – for reasons consistent with the Minimalist Program that would require considerable additional explication – it is not pronounced, the copy is. We do not hear it (or see it, if dealing with sign), although ‘the mind’ does. So internal Merge – Move in an earlier instantiation of the Minimalist Program – is Chomsky's Minimalist Program substitute for a transformation. It does the jobs that transformations in the earliest and middle days of Chomsky's work for the last fifty years were asked to do, but with very much less additional – and now it appears, gratuitous – machinery required. The gain in economy of computational machinery is part of the reason for the label ‘minimalist’ for the new way of proceeding Chomsky outlines (2005), the focus of a large part of our discussion. Internal Merge not only – as suggested – plays a role in making sense of why the derived structure being used in this illustration is ‘sounded out’ in the form What did John eat, it also helps explain why the “what” on the left side is treated as a quantifier (what thing) which binds a variable x in such a way that the variable x (the residual and unpronounced “what”) is interpreted (understood) as the direct object of the verb eat. So while one hears What did John eat? one's mind ‘sees’ or understands John as eating something (x), the first-merged “what.” Representation of the relevant structure and the ‘movement’ of the element often takes this form in linguistics:

As indicated, there is no actual movement.

There is considerable discussion of internal Merge in the linguistic literature. Some argue that it is faulty and should be abandoned, some that it undermines other assumptions, some that still other forms of Merge should be introduced, including Chomsky (2001), who wants “pair merge” to deal with what linguists call “adjunction.” I do not go into details; there are several technical matters and often quite deep issues in the background, worth exploring if the reader has some understanding of the technical matters. A search for ‘internal merge: linguistics’ on the internet will give an idea of what various individuals think is at stake. For current purposes, the emphasis is on seeing that for Chomsky, internal Merge and thus transformations have come to be seen as parts of the ‘conceptually necessary’ machinery of linguistic computation. Internal Merge makes movement and transformations less of a mystery than they had earlier appeared. And if Merge in its various forms is all that is needed for language, assuming that one is given lexical items (‘elements’ in the above) with at least semantic features, perhaps not phonological, it makes it easy to understand how language and complex thought could have been introduced by a single mutation. It also contributes to the idea that language is a ‘perfect’ solution to the ‘design problem’ that can be conceived of as confronting a biological engineer – that of taking lexical items as sound and meaning features (or perhaps meaning features alone, if we assume that the original mutation did not involve any linkage to production and perception [‘sound’ or ‘sign’] systems) and combining them to yield a potential discrete infinity of sentences (or at the very least, structured sets of semantic features) each of which can be understood.

There is risk in speaking of a biological engineer solving a design problem; it can invite creationist claims. No claims of that sort are supported by Chomsky's proposals. In essence, he holds that the core computational system of language, found in Merge in its available forms, is the result of a biologically transmissible mutation in an individual somewhere between fifty thousand and a hundred thousand years ago, a mutation that proved advantageous to the mutant and his or her progeny, to the extent that the progeny soon (in evolutionary time) dominated. For Merge provided the means to engage in all-important complex thought and, where/when linked to sound/sign, it offered means to communicate, plan, and organize to carry out non-kin projects.

Page 18, Galilean science and simplicity

For a good discussion of how Chomsky employs idealization in his work in linguistics, see Norbert Hornstein's new introduction to the second edition of Chomsky's Rules and Representations (1980/2005).

Page 19, On simplification, idealization, and explanation

Chomsky's points concerning the need for simplifying and idealizing are central to naturalistic scientific research of the sort that postulates ‘hidden’ entities in order to (among other things) explain observed phenomena. This topic comes up several times, including the pages where our discussion turns to Chomsky's relationship to a mentor, Nelson Goodman. Goodman emphasized the tight connection between science and simplicity, and Chomsky's efforts to respect idealization and simplification are hallmarks of his approach. Chomsky's view of natural science is discussed in Appendix IV.

Chapter 2

Page 20, On biology as more than selectional evolution

Kauffman, D’Arcy Thompson, and Turing (in his work on morphogenesis) all emphasize that there is a lot more to evolution and development than can be explained by Darwinian (or neo-Darwinian) selection. (In fact, Darwin himself acknowledged as much, although this is often forgotten.) Each uses mathematics in studying biological systems in different ways. Some of Kauffman's more surprising suggestions concern self-organizing systems and the use of statistical modeling in trying to get a grip on how timing of gene protein expression can influence cell specialization during growth.

Page 22, On Plato's Problem and its explanation

The term “I-language” is explained – along with “I-belief” and “I-concept” – in Appendix I. For discussion, see Chomsky (1986) and (2000).

“Plato's Problem” labels an issue that any linguist constructing a science of language must speak to: saying (by offering a theory that constrains language growth and thus explains the relevant poverty of the stimulus phenomena) how any child given minimal input can acquire a natural language (or several) quickly, going through approximately the same developmental stages as other children acquiring a language, and without apparent training or “negative evidence.” It is called “Plato's Problem” because it is a bit like that faced by Plato/Socrates in Plato's dialogue Meno: a slave boy without training and given only prompting (not being told what the answers are) manages to come up in short order with the basic principles of the Pythagorean Theorem. He does not state the formula, of course; he does not have the tools. However, with what he has, he can go on to produce correct solutions to the length of the hypotenuse of various right triangles. So too the child with language: the child gets no training and is exposed to a limited data set, but has no difficulty displaying adult linguistic competence by around 4. The child cannot state the principles by which he or she speaks either, of course; that would require the child to have a science of language available. But lack of an articulate way to say what he or she knows by no means gives a reason to hold that therefore language must be a kind of know-how, gained by intensive training and familiarization.

Plato's ‘explanation’ of the slave boy's capacity consisted in appealing to a myth of recollection, one in which the ‘soul’ had received knowledge before birth, and this knowledge came to be recollected as a result of experiential input of the relevant sort. Chomsky's explanation is, of course, a quite different naturalistic one that appeals to efforts to understand how automatic and ‘channeled’ development proceeds.

Page 24, On recursion and its forms

Marcus Tomalin correctly points out (2007) that there are various formal ways (lambda calculus, computability, general recursion, Peano-Dedekind [arithmetical] induction . . .) to define recursion, and it is important to say precisely what kind, for not all functions are definable in each. He argues that the preferable one is induction, for it yields what is needed for what is claimed in Chomsky's work, it is the least tied to a specific formalism, and it emphasizes a connection between linguistic recursion and mathematics. So he recommends speaking of (mathematical) induction, not recursion. While his point would be a reasonable one if the issue were that of defining recursion, that is not the case. The issue when dealing with Merge and its introduction to the human species focuses on an extremely simple subset of recursive functions that appear in the inductive and all other approaches to offering a general definition of recursive functions. One would need empirical evidence that indicates that more complex approaches to recursion such as those Tomalin considers are relevant.[1]

Keep in mind that the issue of how to define recursion of the sort needed in the study of language (and perhaps ‘native’ parts of mathematics) is a matter for empirical research, not convenience or stipulation.

Page 24, On human concepts

There are several central points here. One is that our concepts (RIVER, HOUSE, PERSON . . .) do not seem to have – as Locke might have put it – “resemblances” in the natures of things in the world. They seem to be constructed – not by persons, but by their minds. Locke, an empiricist, had little of value to contribute to saying how the construction took place. A better answer, offered by a rationalist working at the same time, came from Ralph Cudworth, who said that the concepts we have available are provided by an “innate cognoscitive power” that takes ‘occasions’ of input to put together concepts that happen to serve our cognitive interests. While he offered no specific proposal for a mechanism, he did at least recognize that concept-acquisition is virtually instantaneous and cannot be explained in the empiricist manner, so that it demands a devoted internal “power.” In effect, our minds yield concepts, and they in turn can shape the ways we experience and understand, without being shaped by them.

Another is that our concepts do not seem to be tied by some kind of one-to-one correspondence to events or states of the world outside, nor to inner states. Gallistel calls these correspondences “functioning homomorphisms,” which are partial ‘samenesses’ in abstract mathematical form; environmental maps employed in insect navigation are examples. See Gallistel (1990) and (2008).

A third is that they (along with a capacity to produce sounds/signs) might well have been – and probably were – in place before the introduction of language, at least where language is conceived of as a capacity to take associations of sound and concepts (‘words’ or lexical items) and, starting with a finite cluster of these, combine/concatenate them with others to yield, in principle, an unlimited number of those forms that we call “sentences,” and that Chomsky calls “expressions” consisting of paired sound and meaning instruction sets.

A warning is in order for those who have read Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch's “The Faculty of Language” in Science (2002) and who might have developed the impression from it that Chomsky entirely endorses the idea that human conceptual resources are quite like those found in other organisms – probably primates, in particular. Apparently, the difference was discussed in earlier versions of the paper, but a lot was cut out by the editor, including the discussion of concepts and almost everything about linguistics. In comments on the MS for this volume, Chomsky remarks: “About all that remained [on concepts in the article] was ‘Even for the simplest words, there is typically no straightforward word–thing relationship, if “thing” is to be understood in mind-independent terms.’”

One possible way of making sense of how there might be some overlap (as it appeared in the article) but also very considerable difference is to begin by noting that so far as one can tell, human conceptual resources differ little from those of other primates until about age 1, but after that diverge. Some claims made by Elizabeth Spelke (2003, 2004, 2007) and her colleagues suggest this. If such a suggestion is on the right track, we must ask just how human conceptual resources come to diverge – what mechanisms are at work and what triggers or activates them. I doubt anyone has a really good idea, but here is one possibility: perhaps a distinctively human conceptual acquisition mechanism of some sort comes ‘online’ at this age, perhaps sooner. Perhaps that system incorporates a version of Merge, which we have seen on independent grounds to be distinctively human. Perhaps Merge assembles more primitive ‘parts’ that are shared with other creatures. Or perhaps a mechanism that ‘manufactures’ distinctive human concepts was in place before the introduction of language; that would suit Cudworth, among others. But this is speculation.

Independently of a specific hypothesis, however, it is plausible to speak of mechanisms and not something like acculturation as a way to make sense of divergence because there is good reason to think that uniquely human conceptual resources are shared across the whole population of humans, without regard to culture and environment, and that word acquisition (that is, pairing of sounds and meanings in lexical items in a way that makes them available for the computational system to operate) is both effortless and automatic – requiring that the conceptual and ‘sound’ resources are operational before association, and even before speech production (to explain comprehension before production). In effect, the sound and meaning (conceptual) resources relevant to language (its articulation and understanding) must be innate, and all that is required for lexical acquisition is pairing of readily activated concepts and sounds. The issues are taken up in more detail in Appendix V.

Page 26, On reference; limiting the study (including meaning) to syntax

Chomsky sees the study of linguistically expressed meaning and sound as a form of syntax. The basic idea is that syntax is the study of the ‘intrinsic’ properties and combinatory principles of ‘signs.’ If you think, as he does, of words and sentences not as what comes from people's mouths (not sounds at all, but frequency- and amplitude-modulated ‘signals’) or marks on a piece of paper or other medium (orthographic marks, for example, and surely irrelevant), but as mental states or events, the study of linguistic syntax becomes the study of the intrinsic properties of what a mentalistic theory of language takes as its subject matter. Syntax becomes, then, a study of linguistic mental states/events in the mind – their properties, how they are ‘computed,’ and what they do at interfaces. Chomsky's approach to language is not just syntactic, but internalist. Granting that, it is still useful to keep in mind that much of the study of language in linguistics so far, and the primary focus of much of Chomsky's own work, is syntax in a narrower sense, where it is understood as the study of the basic (or core) computational (lexical + combinatorial) mechanism. To distinguish this kind of study from other forms of syntactic study, it is often called “narrow syntax”; it includes the study of morphology, phonology, and linguistic meaning where these are thought to be included in the core language computational system and what it yields at its ‘interfaces’ with other mental systems. Core syntax corresponds to what in Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002) is called the “FLN” (“faculty of language, narrow”). “FLB” (faculty of language, broad) includes FLN and the various ‘performance’ systems that constitute the perceptual, articulatory, and “conceptual-intentional” systems on the other side of the core system's interfaces.

Just how far does linguistic syntax extend? One way to answer is to point out – reasonably, given the areas where naturalistic/scientific research into language has proven successful so far – that one reaches a point in investigating a phenomenon where, while it remains focused on the mind, it ceases to be a study of what is occurring in the language faculty itself (in that mental system, narrowly or broadly conceived). Fodor's study of meaning passes that point; he places a substantial part of the study of linguistically expressed meaning in what he calls a “Language of Thought” (LOT). His concepts go even further afield; they go outside the mind too, taking them out of the reach of syntax, however broadly conceived; see Appendix VI. Chomsky does not take even the first of Fodor's steps, and for good reason: fobbing off the work of the study of linguistically expressed meaning/semantics onto other systems in the head (relations to things ‘outside’ are excluded from the subject matter of theories by the internalist for other reasons) complicates matters, and apparently unnecessarily. They require adding to such a theory a detailed account of another system, and of the precise relations (element to element, presumably) between the language system and the other. That is one of Chomsky's points in the discussion immediately below this. Chomsky's much more austere account of linguistically expressed meanings includes it in the states, elements, operations, and growth of the core language faculty. And as it happens, that kind of study is possible; see Appendices V and VI. As for studies of the rest of the mind and of relations between the components of mind: that can be included in syntax in a still broader sense, so long as that kind of study excludes from its subject matter things ‘outside’ (whether abstract as Frege's senses and numbers were or ‘concrete’), and relations to these, if any.

Page 27, On Chomsky's view of meaning and interpretation

The analogy between phonology/phonetics and (internalist) semantics is developed in detail in Chomsky (2000: 175–183). There and elsewhere, he speaks of the language faculty offering through its ‘meaning’ (semantic) information at SEM and the complex of resources it brings to that interface ways of understanding or configuring how human minds can understand and – where this is an issue (such as cases of perception and thought about the world – understand and configure our experience and thought about the world. Specifically, he says that “the weakest plausible assumption about the LF [SEM] interface is that the semantic properties of the interface focus attention on selected aspects of the world as it is taken to be by other cognitive systems, and provide intricate and highly specialized perspectives from which to view them, crucially involving human interests and concerns even in the simplest cases” (2000: 125). By “other cognitive systems,” he presumably means – for perception – vision, facial configuration, taste, audition, and the like and – more generally – imagination, and other auxiliary systems. The precise status and role of the semantic ‘information’ provided at SEM is unclear. He offers an example that helps a bit, one where the linguistically expressed concept HOUSE (which we can think of as a component of the complex of semantic information offered in a sentence at SEM) plays a role. He continues, “In the case of ‘I painted my house brown’ the semantic features impose an analysis in terms of specific properties of intended design and use, a designated exterior, and indeed far more intricacy.” His point can be put in terms of the kinds of assumptions humans are likely to develop, and the coherence of the discourse and stories that they would be likely to accept, given the conceptual resources that this sentence brings to bear. We would assume that the brown paint went on the outside of the house, for example, and if the sentence appeared in a longish story about how to get to my house, we would be entitled to be upset if the brown paint went on the inside walls because we would be expecting the outside to be brown. Moreover, with the exception of the realtor's “Do you want to see this house?” (where ‘see’ is read as inspect/take a look at), one cannot see a house while on the inside. House – sometimes called a “container word” – in sentential complexes like the one here focuses attention on exterior surfaces, not interior. Another illustration is found in Locke's discussion of the concept of a person, which is mentioned as the discussion continues immediately below: in effect, the concept PERSON assigns to persons to which it is used to refer a notion of personal identity of a complex and legally and morally relevant sort. It includes psychic continuity, and underwrites assigning responsibility to people for acts committed and promises made – and so on. In this connection, Locke says that the concept of a person is a “forensic” one: it is one that is designed for understanding people as agents with commitments (promises and contracts) and responsibilities to meet them.

Any identity conditions on things to which a person refers that are imposed by the concepts expressed at SEM by natural languages – and those that come about as results of complex interactions between language and other cognitive systems – are unlikely to be well defined and characterizable independent of context, unlike what one would be likely to find – or rather, what scientists strive to maintain – in the concepts for objects and events of mathematics and the natural sciences. Chomsky's brief discussion of the traditional Ship of Theseus thought experiment later (pp. 125–6) illustrates this. When Theseus rebuilds his wooden ship by replacing over time one plank and beam after another and throwing the discarded planks and beams in the dump where his neighbor gathers them and builds a ship that has the same planks and beams in the same configuration as the original ship, we do not assume that the ship built with the discarded parts is Theseus’, even though its composition is the same as the one with which he began. That is because ships and other artifacts portrayed in this kind of way have ownership by specific individuals or quasi-persons such as corporations built into their descriptions. Under other descriptions, telling different stories, we are not sure, or we have different intuitions.

Philosophers in recent years have constructed thought experiments in which persons – or their bodies or their minds – are fissioned or fused and placed in varying circumstances to explore intuitions about when “we” would say that person P at time t is the same or different from person P’ at a different time. Nothing is settled: intuitions can be pushed one way or another and someone can be persuaded to give a firm answer at one time under one story, and persuaded in another way with a different story. This should be no surprise; commonsense concepts are rich and flexibly used, but still have limitations. The richness and complexity of the commonsense concepts expressed in our natural languages allow them to serve human interests and reach reasonable resolutions to practical problems in a variety of circumstances. But not all: there is no reason to think that a commonsense concept should be able to offer answers to every question posed. There is clear evidence of this in the obvious failures found in trying to put commonsense concepts to use in the sciences. However, they reveal their limits in other ways too, such as the thought experiments mentioned above. There is no disadvantage in any of this. Because of their richness and complexity, commonsense concepts can support the extraordinary degree of flexibility displayed in their application by persons when they use language – a flexibility that has proven very advantageous in the practical domain, although not at all in the scientific and mathematical. And while they yield answers to only some kinds of questions and not others – because, presumably, they are innate products of acquisition mechanisms ‘devoted’ to yielding what they can – this too is an advantage. For if innate, they are readily available even to the young and can thereby enable the child to quickly develop an understanding of people and their actions and things and what they can be expected to do.

The illustrations of the richness and complexity of commonsense concepts – and Chomsky offers many in his writings – do not say how the conceptual/meaning resources brought to SEM ‘work.’ A compelling naturalistic answer requires a science, one that does not exist and, for various reasons explored elsewhere in the discussion, may never exist. Given the extent to which externalist intuition can distort and mislead an account of perception and thought ‘about the world,’ however, it is worthwhile developing an internalist alternative picture of how they ‘do their job.’ Chomsky makes some suggestions when he speaks of (internal) sentences yielding “perspectives,” cognitive ‘tools’ with which a person can comprehend the world as portrayed by other mental systems. I add some suggestions in Appendix XII.

Page 28, On what the “semantic interface” provides

That is, the language system provides what its ‘design’ (a term that must be treated cautiously, as indicated on pages 50ff.) allows for with regard to the use of language in thought, understanding, and the like. To scotch a possible misunderstanding: does language (the language system) assert and declare? No. It offers the opportunity to do so; it provides the means for individuals to express an assertion – as we would say in the commonsense domain. This is, I think, the way in which one should understand Hinzen's (2007) view of a syntactic, internalist approach to truth.

Chapter 3

Page 30, Chomsky on representation, computational theories, and truth-indications

When Chomsky calls his derivational theory of linguistic syntax a “computational theory” and offers by means of it a compositional account of linguistic meaning that is not only internalist, but focused on operations in the language faculty, it is obvious that he is not – unlike Rey and Fodor – adopting a computational theory of a re-presentationalist sort. This point is connected to his effort to avoid reference (and truth) in constructing an account of linguistically expressed meanings.

That said, he does say of SEMs – of language's contributions at the “conceptual-intentional” interface – that they can be seen as offering “truth-indications.” The relevant quotation appears in Chomsky (1996) immediately after pointing out that what he calls the “referentialist thesis” (that words like water refer by some kind of ‘natural’ relationship to a substance ‘out there’) must be rejected, because “language doesn’t work that way.” It does not, we have seen, because people make reference to things; language does not ‘directly refer.’ Indeed, even if someone does use a word to refer, and succeeds for an audience in doing so, no referential relationship comes to be established in a way that makes it of interest to the empirical and naturalistic science of language. What he has to say about truth and truth conditions seems to parallel this:

We cannot assume that statements (let alone sentences) have truth conditions. At most they can have something more complex: “truth-indications,” in some sense. The issue is not “open texture” or “family resemblance” in the Wittgensteinian sense. Nor does the conclusion lend any weight to the belief that semantics is “holistic” in the Quinean sense that semantic properties are assigned to the whole array of words, not to each individually. Each of these familiar pictures of the nature of meaning seems partially correct, but only partially. There is good evidence that words have intrinsic features of sound, form, and meaning; but also open texture, which allows their meanings to be extended and sharpened in certain ways; and also holistic properties that allow some mutual adjustment. The intrinsic properties suffice to establish certain formal relations among expressions, interpreted as rhyme, entailment, and in other ways by the performance systems associated with [the] language faculty. Among the intrinsic semantic relations that seem well established on empirical grounds are analytic connections between expressions, a subclass of no special significance for the study of natural language semantics, though perhaps of independent interest in the different context of the concerns of modern philosophy. Only perhaps, because it is not clear that human language has much to do with these, or that they capture what was of traditional interest. (1996: 52)

In brief compass, Chomsky dismisses major features of contemporary philosophy of language as of little or no relevance to the science of language and the science of natural language meaning in particular. He also emphasizes that linguistic meaning (of a sort that can be investigated by the science of language) is intrinsic to expressions themselves and sufficient to establish certain ‘formal relations’ (in effect, those pointed to earlier in the discussion where “relational” expressions were mentioned, and again in the next section); the study of these relations is a “shadow” of syntax. As for open texture, here is his explanation (p.c. January 2009): “By saying that expressions – say ‘river’ – have open texture, I just mean that their intrinsic linguistic properties do not in themselves determine all circumstances of appropriate use to refer. Such complex human actions as referring can and do take into account all sorts of other features of human life. For example whether I’d call something a river or a creek depends on complex historical and cultural factors. If the Jordan river happened to be displaced, precisely as it is, in central Texas, people would call it a creek (often a dry creek, since most of its water has been diverted into the Israeli water carrier).” This does not deny that it is possible to introduce a technical sense of ‘refer’ for a version of model theory; see in this regard Chomsky (1986, 2000), and particularly the discussion of ‘relation R’ in the latter. But reference in this sense is stipulative. Similar points can be made about truth-in-a-model.

Chapter 4

Page 33, On human concepts, native and artifact, and theories of them

Two remarks. First, as indicated in a comment of mine above, the distinction between truth conditions and truth-indications is an important one, reflecting as it does the idea that the natures of the concepts (semantic information) that the language faculty makes available to “conceptual-intentional” systems at the SEM interface do not determine the ways in which these linguistically expressed concepts can – much less, should – be employed by persons, even arguably by ‘other systems,’ given that the relations between language and them are likely not determinate. The linguistically expressed concepts do, however, ‘instruct’ in their distinctive ways those other systems on the other side of the interface, and by extension, they provide ‘indications’ for how they can be used by people. Note in this respect that English speakers use HOUSE differently than (say) HOME. The differences in the ways in which we use these concepts indicate something about the natures of the concepts themselves – thus, the kinds of ‘instruction’ that they give. Nevertheless, nothing like determination is relevant here. Nor, of course, should anyone be tempted by the idea that the natures of the concepts themselves are fixed by the ways in which they happen to be used – contra the popular “conceptual role” view of (linguistically expressed) concepts found explicitly in the work of Sellars and others, and implicitly among many more. Rather, they have the natures that they do because that is the way they developed/grew in that individual, assuming that the set of concepts that can develop (and the possible ways that they can develop) is (are) more or less fixed. Being fixed, they might be finite in number, but depending upon how they develop, the issue of how many of them there might be remains open.

The concepts expressed in natural languages are not, however, those found in the sciences. In the case of scientific concepts, it makes sense to speak of them as at least in part human inventions, creations, artifacts. No doubt there are innate constraints on the construction of hypotheses and theories, constraints attributable to the natures of our science-formation capacities (about which we know virtually nothing). There are also constraints of a sort set by ‘the world’; science is, after all, an empirical form of study that aims to provide an objective description of the things of the world. But that does not change the fact that they are ‘made.’

Second, it does not follow from the discussion of the atomicity of concepts that Fodor's DOORKNOB (see Fodor 1998) is an atomic concept, nor even that DOOR and KNOB (and HOUSE and HOME, and so on) are atomic. All the concepts (or more carefully, the “mode of presentation” aspect of a Fodorian concept) that Fodor takes to be atomic could be composed of more primitive ‘meaning’ elements, where the composition takes place in the automatic operations of some kind of internal system or systems. That way, both elements (atomic, but at a different level) and products would still count as innate, and if the system(s) were distinctively human, one might be able to account for the distinctiveness of human concepts. All that follows is that our minds when doing science are ‘set up’ to seek the most primitive elements, and these are what get seen as atomic – at least until a more primitive set is found. This tendency is likely attributable to the science-forming capacity, a capacity that is unique in the animal kingdom about which we know little, except through its effects and the methodology it appears to demand.

Chapter 5

Page 35, Agency; the language faculty and what it provides

Chomsky is not claiming in this discussion, and never has claimed, that there is a homunculus. However, there is no doubt that that is the way we humans think and talk about how the mind works. We apparently need some way to understand what appears to be a fact, that when people act, they manage to bring an extraordinary amount of information from different systems to bear in a coordinated way to produce what we think of as actions that a unified person does.

Chomsky's remark about the ‘global’ nature of fixing intonational patterns is self-explanatory. For those unfamiliar with binding theory and Condition C, an informal discussion appears in Language and Problems of Knowledge (1988) and a more formal but still readily understood one in Knowledge of Language (1986). Some informal and also technical definitions and discussions can be found on the internet. Readers should not confuse Condition c of binding theory with what is called “c-command.” On the latter (an important matter concerning the structure of the computational system) see Appendix VII.

A caveat: since views of binding and of variables are often provided by linguists and philosophers and others who in writings and in semantics, philosophy of language, and logic classes cheerfully speak of pronouns and nouns referring and of binding as binding variables to things, keep in mind that Chomsky takes the working assumption of the theoretician of language to be that binding is syntactic, although (as indicated above in the discussion of global facts involving interpretation) perhaps syntactic in a broad sense. It is explained by what is inside the head, including, among other things, Condition c. Whether this is strictly linguistic, or not, is not clear – as Chomsky indicates. However, it is still syntactic (internal, and intrinsic properties of “signs” or mental representations generally) and requires no appeal to anything outside the head. Taking this seriously, one should speak not of pronouns and nouns referring, but of them being in “referring positions” in sentences. Placing this in a broader context, think of people referring, and of their using what language offers them – including nouns and pronouns in referring positions – to refer.

Chapter 6

Page 37, On parameters and canalization

I discuss variation in languages and parameters’ role in it in Appendix VIII; parameters appear too several times in the main text. Principles are the ‘natural laws’ of the language faculty, universal across the human species. Canalization – the fact that development yields a robust and distinct phenotype despite differences in gene, environment, and ‘input’ – is discussed briefly in Appendix VIII too, and is taken up again in the text below.

What might parameters have to do – if anything – with canalization? Using for simplicity's sake the headedness macroparameter, assume, as is reasonable, that the child's language faculty's initial state, UG (as specified in the genome), for whatever reason, allows for either option. Assume further – as indicated – that choice is automatic, a result of some kind of ‘triggering’ (which may, however, involve something like experimentation). Assume, finally, that the options described by parameter descriptions are ‘written into’ either UG (in the genome), or into developmental constraints of other sorts fixed by nature, including physical, chemical, computational, and informational constraints. If so, the genetically determined initial state allows still for several courses of development and final state. In this sense, it restricts development to a limited set of courses. And thus parametric options, so long as they are written into the genome, or into other nature-based constraints, could play a role in canalization. That was the reasoning behind my question.

André Ariew (1999) has suggested that claims about innateness should be read as claims about canalization. See also Collins (2005); Collins makes useful points against anti-nativist efforts on the parts of Cowie (1999), Prinz (2002), and Samuels (2002). The basic claims in favor of canalization are useful tools in the effort to say how language develops, although it should be kept in mind that canalization is not just a biological phenomenon, if one means by “biological” under control of the genome. As Chomsky's third factor constraints on growth and development make clear, there are almost certainly non-biological constraints on development/growth.

Page 37, Parametric difference and understanding

A film, Windtalkers, exploited the fact that different parametric settings yield languages of different groups and if one's parameters are set one way during development, very different settings can make a language appear out of reach to adults. The film dealt with the role of Navajo speakers in combat against Japanese forces in World War II. Although the Japanese could monitor US forces’ field radio communications with ease, the Japanese radio operators and translators in the field could not understand, nor get translations for, communications in Navajo by native Navajo speakers that were then translated by the Navajo into English for the US forces. The parameter settings for Navajo are too distant from those exploited in Japanese (or English, for that matter), although not for the Navajo infant growing up in an environment with both English and Navajo.

Page 39, On Universal Grammar

Universal Grammar, or UG, if identified with what biology (the genome) specifies, might be very small and remarkably simple (unlike earlier ‘format’ models of UG) – perhaps Merge alone. What about parameters? Perhaps some or all are due to non-genetic, physical and informational constraints – constraints that control and channel the way(s) in which the mind develops as it grows. Because it is not clear what is genetically fixed and what is due to other, ‘third,’ factors, it is not clear what UG is. Nevertheless, these other non-genetic factors can be said to be included in the assumption that language is innate. As Christopher Cherniak (2005) has pointed out, one must allow for a non-genetic notion of innateness.

To provide a label for all those aspects of language that can plausibly be taken to be innate, whether genetically fixed or by other means – that is, all those aspects except for those due to what Chomsky calls the “second factor” (the role in growth of experience or ‘input’) – one might invent a label, such as “UG+.” It just puts a label on a set of phenomena and mechanisms, some of them very poorly understood, but it does provide a general term that can cover innate linguistic sounds and concepts, plus non-Merge notions.

Page 41, On the difference between ‘meaning’ computation and ‘sound’

A characteristic feature of several recent views of grammar in the Chomskyan naturalistic project is that they construe the nature of the computations that proceed from a selection of lexical items to the production of a complex ‘concept’ at the semantic interface to be uniform – in current terminology, Merge through-and-through. The same is not true of the computations that lead to the phonetic/sign interface. There are alternative ways to construe this difference, or represent it in the shape of the grammar or computational system one devises. According to one construal – perhaps the easiest to understand, and one that I implicitly assumed in other explications – lexical items in some sense ‘contain’ the features relevant to determining the set of phonetic/sign features that provide instructions to other systems that produce a sound or a sign (or perceive one). They also ‘contain’ the semantic features that lead to the semantic interface. But the lexical features (phonological features) that are relevant to the production of sound/sign are at some point stripped off and fed to a separate computational stream that leads to the production of phonetic/sign features. The point at which they are stripped off Chomsky calls “Spell Out.” Beyond Spell Out (or multiple Spell-Outs, should they be involved), the kinds of algorithms (Merge) that operate in ‘semantic’ computation no longer apply. In recent minimalist versions of grammar (Chomsky 2001, 2008), there might be several stages (“phases”) of computation in the construction of a sentence/expression, and at the completion of each of which both semantic and phonological information is transferred to the relevant interfaces.

After Spell Out, sound/sign computation is different from that leading to the semantic interface. It is assumed to remain uniform in the semantic stream, which continues to utilize the two (or three, or . . .) forms of Merge. Because of this, it seems reasonable to suppose that – as Chomsky points out in the discussion above – sound/sign production is not an essential feature of the language computational system. Merge and the compositionality of thought that it provides is.

For a recent summary of Chomsky's reasons to maintain that there are important differences between computation to SEM and computation to PHON, along with reflections on the secondary roles of communication and articulation in the evolution of language, see Berwick and Chomsky (2011).

Page 42, On canalization: likely the third factor

Chomsky seems to treat canalization as a third factor matter. It is not entirely clear what exactly Waddington had in mind by way of an explanation of canalization, although one dominant theme is his appeal to “buffering” due to epigenetic ‘networks’ – intuitively, interactions between alleles and the environment. A prominent example is the transformation of stem cells (which can be ‘made into anything,’ as the popular press puts it) into cells of a specific sort: their DNA remains the same, and the environment ‘specializes’ them. Are epigenetic factors “third factor” contributions? Plausibly, yes: they involve more than DNA coding.

The phenomena themselves are in general obvious enough. ‘Canalization’ captures the remarkable fact that despite genetic variation and mutation within a genome and considerable environmental variation, plus a lot of variation in specific ‘input,’ the result of development is a stable and clearly distinct phenotype. It is generally agreed that canalization depends on fixed pathways of development. Waddington invented the term “chreodes” for these. Developmental biologists have not adopted his term, nor his related term “homeorhesis,” for biologically expressed processes that constitute such pathways of development. A lot has happened since Waddington's early (1940, 1942) work on canalization with drosophila wings and a ‘heat stress’ gene; the field draws a lot of attention now, and research continues. For a fairly recent review of developments and issues, see Salazar-Ciudad (2007).

The contemporary research program known as “evo-devo” indicates clearly that development and growth are due to more than the genetic instructions contained in what are called “master” genes, the genes that specify that a creature will have, say, vision, or that some pattern will appear on butterfly wings, etc. The non-‘master’ parts of the genome, plus various environmental factors, physical constraints, etc., play a crucial role in timing of development, and in placement, symmetry, modularity of components, and other ‘form’ (and phenotype) factors. For an engaging and illuminating informal introduction to evo-devo, see Sean B. Carroll (2005). For a very useful review of the current state of evo-devo and its role in the understanding of evolution, see Müller (2007). For a useful although rather compressed discussion of the relationship between evo-devo and Waddington's early 1940s to 1960s thoughts about development and canalization, see Gilbert (2000). For an engaging overview of what difference the study of evo-devo makes in the study of organisms and minds, see Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini (2010). For some discussion of Chomsky's notion of perfection and its relation to some evo-devo theses, see his “Some Simple Evo-devo Theses: How True Might They Be for Language?” (2010). See also Chomsky (2007c).

Chapter 7

Page 43, On ‘master’ or ‘control’ genes

Gehring was one of the first to emphasize how improbable it was that the eye (or some kind of visual detection system that depends on rhodopsin) could have evolved independently in so many clades. It does not evolve separately, he claimed; it evolved once, and takes different ‘shapes’ in different species because of other features of the organism involved and the way vision and these other factors develop. His work on the role of the ‘master’ or ‘control’ gene PAX-6 has helped emphasize the importance of looking for genetic coding that appears in many species (that is “conserved”) and contributes to the development of some organ/trait or another that serves much the same function in each species.

Chapter 8

Page 48, On hidden or unconscious thought and free will

These comments may raise in some readers’ minds doubts about whether humans have free will, as Chomsky assumes we do. For if decisions are unconscious, how can it be that a person makes them? Unconscious decisions seem to be out of a person's control, even though they appear to the decision-maker to be choices that he or she undertakes freely, and sometimes with difficulty. Notice, however, that there is no reason to believe that even if decisions of an organism are unconscious, that they are determined. To have reason to believe this, one would have to have in hand a decent naturalistic theory of an organism's decision-making, and getting that is extremely unlikely. As pointed out elsewhere, the mind's various systems operate relatively independently and have multiple inputs and outputs. Constructing a deterministic theory of an organism's action/behavior would require coming up with a solution to an n-system problem. This is a far more complex task than coming up with a solution for the extremely simple cases found with the systems discussed in n-body problems. There are far more variable factors, assuming even that we had a completed list of the mental systems involved and their specific contributions.

The disconnect between our usual assumptions concerning action, planning, deliberation, and decision-making and the descriptions and explanations offered by naturalistic sciences of the mind may continue to bother the reader in the discussion that follows. If we are biological creatures, as we seem to be, we have limited cognitive resources. We know we have common sense and science; if we have others, they have not made an appearance of which I am aware. If limited to these two resources, very likely we cannot overcome the disconnect. The concepts that we have for speaking of the actions of whole organisms are those provided by common sense, a conceptual scheme virtually ‘designed’ to serve the interests of speaking of agents (actors) and agency. Those available to the sciences are those created by scientists when they invent theories of systems that are construed – generally – as deterministic. Some philosophers such as Fodor with his “computational theory of mind” seem to believe that the gap can be overcome. It is not clear to me that he addresses the basic problem created by what appear to be very different ways of understanding the world. Common sense places agency front and center and it deals with an endless number of anthropocentric concerns; natural science of the sort available to us appears to completely lack the tools to deal with it. Fodor (1998, chapter 7; 2008) broach the issue. However, he continues to follow Putnam and others in declaring that the property WATER is identical with the science-defined property H_2O.

Page 52, What's wrong with externalist dogma (again)

No one should assume that Chomsky expects that the theory that can accomplish this is a learning theory based on some kind of generalized learning procedure. It will be a theory of the (largely) ‘devoted’ machinery, the operations of which explain how the child's mind recognizes relevant patterns in the speech of (mostly) other children and manages to bring these patterns to bear in the child's own speech production. Speak of imitation if you wish, but keep in mind that that is just a label for a job to be done, one that develops a theory of the relevant system(s) that takes into account the biological, physical, computational . . . considerations that constrain development. For recent discussion of some current efforts to undermine the nativist foundations on which biolinguistic study proceeds, see Berwick and Chomsky (2011).

Chapter 9

Page 56, On inclusiveness as a computational principle

Inclusiveness is the principle that after selection (technically, “numeration”) of a set of lexical items (with their features) as ‘input’ to a linguistic computation, nothing new is introduced until the computation yields a complex sound–meaning pair, or the computation crashes. It can be thought of as an aspect of one version of modularity: that a computation cannot draw on outside information, systems, or principles to make a linguistic computation come to the ‘right’ outcome, or crash. It is also – as pointed out by Chomsky below – an aspect of simplicity, for it incorporates a notion of computational economy. The label “inclusiveness” was first introduced by Chomsky (1995b), but in various forms (such as ‘lexical projection’), it has long played a role in Chomsky's view of a linguistic derivation (the computation of a sentence or complex expression). For an introduction to the issue of complexity and simplicity in linguistics, see Appendix IX.

Page 57, On making up new words

“Making up new words” can amount to several things. One is the trivial and theoretically uninteresting matter of changing associations – associating the sound “arthritis” with the concept STOMACH DISEASE, for example (see “Internalist Explorations” in Chomsky [2000] for discussion). Another is making up new – new to an individual or to the community, or in history – sounds or concepts. New sounds are constrained by any parameters that might apply: “strid” is ok for English speakers (it is a possible English-appearing sound), but not for Arabic speakers. There may be fewer or more constraints on novel (in either way) concepts; no one knows, because we don’t know much about what concepts are, as noted. It is clear we introduce new ones: COMPUTER (in the sense understood these days by child and adult, perhaps something like “artifact (something made) that is used (TOOL) for . . .)”) was introduced at a time, and is readily understood or acquired by anyone. We can surely introduce others, such as ones for which we have no use now, but might later. And we should expect some kinds of internally and/or third factor determined constraints, for otherwise we would not come to develop the virtually universal conceptual resources (capacities to quickly mobilize concepts) we seem to have. In any case, at least at this stage of inquiry, the possibility of introducing novel words on an occasion does not figure in discussion of linguistic computation. That is, one assumes that a computation ‘starts’ with established lexical items or packages of phonological, semantic, and formal (including parameters) ‘information.’ Distributed morphology (depending on what that amounts to) introduces variants on the theme, but does not address novel introductions.

Chapter 10

Page 59, Chomsky's efforts to convince philosophers

See Chomsky (1975, 1980/2005, 2000) for his efforts to convince philosophers. See also the discussions in Appendices III, V, and VI.

Page 61, On connectionism and behaviorism

Connectionism is in part a thesis concerning the architecture of brain wiring: that brains are interconnected neurons wherein the firing rates of individual neurons serve through their connections to other neurons to increase or decrease the firing rates of those other neurons. However, this is arguably not the central theme of those who call themselves connectionists. The central theme seems to amount to a learning thesis – a thesis about how ‘connections’ come to be established in the (assumed) architecture. The learning thesis is a variation on behaviorism and old-style associationism. Training procedures involving repetition and (for some accounts) ‘backpropagation’ (or some variant) lead to differences in ‘connection weights’ in neural pathways, changing the probability that a specific output will occur, given a specific input. When the network manages to produce the ‘right’ (according to the experimenter) output for a given input and does so sufficiently reliably under different kinds of perturbations, the network has learned how to respond to a specific stimulus. Chomsky seems to focus on the architectural thesis of connectionism in the discussion here. His views on the learning thesis amount – so far as I can tell – to his negative views of behaviorism.

On the behaviorist/connectionist learning thesis: it is remarkable how much those who devote large amounts of their intellectual work to pushing that program as far as they can have been able to accomplish while working with quite simple ‘neural’ models (computer models simulating the supposed architecture and endowed with one of several possible statistical sampling algorithms). The work of Elman and his students and colleagues gives some idea of what has been accomplished with what he calls “simple recurrent networks” (SRNs). That said, the accomplishments give no reason, at least at the moment, to abandon the rationalist nativist research strategy in favor of connectionist or other empiricist ones with regard to language or other internal systems that appear to be innate. Specifically, there is no empirical reason, for there is no reason to think that the connectionist learning thesis offers anything that could count as an adequate view of the child's course of linguistic development. To say this is not to deny that the ‘choice’ procedure that a child's mind carries out in setting parameters might rely on what looks to be a form of statistical sampling like that noted above and remarked upon in what Chomsky says about the work of Charles Yang, mentioned before. But that is irrelevant, for the set of possible options seems to be fixed – and fixed by either biology (the genome) or third factor matters – we don’t know yet which (although there are independent reasons to place them in third factor considerations). That fact rules out pursuing a strategy that assumes from the start something like Joos's and other empiricists’ view that variation is unconstrained. See also Appendix VIII, and note Chomsky's (2009) remark about the possibility that there are infinite numbers of parameters. If there are any parameters at all, there are ‘choice’ points with fixed options.

Chapter 11

Page 66, Chomsky's linguistic rules vs. those of (many) philosophers

There are many philosophers who endorse the idea that ‘the mind’ does indeed ‘follow rules,’ although without in any way taking ‘mind’ and ‘rule’ to be anything like ‘rule’ and ‘mind’ as Chomsky conceives them. Sellars and his followers, for example, think of the mind as a neural net that has been trained to follow the “rules of language,” where these are understood in epistemological terms. That is, the net is trained to follow what a community of language-users take to be the epistemically correct language-entrance (perceptual), language-exit (action-related) and language-internal inferential rules that a particular community endorses as “the rules of the language game.” For Chomsky, rules are principles embodied in the operations of the language faculty, the language faculty is a naturally occurring biophysical organ, and there is no sense in asking if the rules/principles it observes are the epistemically correct ones for dealing with the world. For further discussion, see Appendix VI. For the moment, the important point is that Sellars essentially takes the commonsense notion of people following rules (which for him is readily understood) and applies it to the idea of training people to follow rules (in the behaviorist manner, again readily understood) to (he believes) establish inferential “connections” in a neural net. He makes the same mistake that those who believed that action must be understood in terms of a contact mechanics did: he believes (without, of course, acknowledging to himself that he is doing so) that commonsense notions suffice for understanding “the mind.” Chomsky's view is that language and its rules must be understood in terms of the nature and operations of a biophysical system, and they can only be understood by appealing to the methods of the natural sciences – a view that he sometimes calls “methodological monism,” opposed to methodological dualism (adopting a different methodology – here drawn from common sense – for the study of mind). Behaviorists and their offspring make the same error.

Sellars also held (in his “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man”) that the concepts that figure in our ‘ordinary’ languages are artifacts, inventions over millennia of social beings – people – and that these concepts have the characters that they do because of the roles of the correlative terms, with the roles fixed by the rules of usage. The concept PERSON is what it is because of the way the term “person” is used in those languages. Concepts – ways of understanding the world – and prominently the concepts PERSON and AGENT as creatures of the “original” and “manifest” images that humans have invented – will inevitably conflict with the “scientific image” of the world that emerges in the developing sciences. So he would to an extent agree with Chomsky who, later in this discussion, endorses the idea that the commonsense concept PERSON is not one that can sustain scientific investigation – as too the commonsense concept LANGUAGE, and so on. But the agreement is superficial. Chomsky's commonsense concepts are innate, products of some kind of system or systems (perhaps including the language faculty) that are themselves biophysically based. And Chomsky sees no difficulty in holding that PERSON and LANGUAGE (as understood in folk psychology) will continue to have their uses in our commonsense thoughts and dealings with the world even though the sciences of mind do not have these concepts, and give them no roles to play. Metaphysics (and in particular Sellars’ eliminativist form of scientific realism) gets no grip.

Chapter 12

Page 71, ‘Meaning’ computation vs. ‘sound’: Chomsky's intellectual contribution

One point Chomsky makes here is to emphasize that the operations involved in providing ‘information’ (primarily semantic features) to the semantic interface don’t need to rely on linearity. That is needed only when dealing with the phonetic interface, where linguistic signals have to be produced and perceived in a temporal, linear fashion. On the meaning side, processes can proceed “in parallel.”

On Chomsky's intellectual contribution more generally, note that he begins by revitalizing and placing in the much broader context of how to go about making sense of language as a biological organ his 1959 devastating review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior. He earlier construed his contribution as not only the construction of a plausible theory of language within the rationalist tradition, but a criticism of empiricist dogma about how to construct theories of the mind. The criticism of behaviorism is generalized now to criticism of the naïve form of evolution one finds in at least some views of the role of selection and adaptation, backed up by a developed biolinguistic (or as indicated elsewhere, bio-physico-computational linguistic) account of language, its evolution in the species, and its development/growth in individuals. See also Appendix II.

Chapter 13

Page 72, Chomsky, simplicity, and Goodman

It is useful to read this section and the next (on Chomsky's relationship to Nelson Goodman) together, for Chomsky got some of his formal techniques from Goodman's “constructionist” project (one that goes back to Carnap and his Aufbau) and his appreciation for and pursuit of the notion of simplicity from Goodman. There are important differences, of course, primarily having to do with Goodman's behaviorism and refusal to countenance the nativist foundations that his ‘solution’ to projection (an aspect of induction) and his account of simplicity clearly needed. These points are anticipated in the discussion immediately below.

For one view of the connection between Chomsky's ‘internal’ simplicity measure and the Minimalist Program (and also Chomsky's debt to Goodman), see Tomalin (2003). Chomsky comments on these and related matters below. Tomalin draws from Chomsky's 1970s introduction to the published version of his The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory (1955) – surely the best place for readers interested in Goodman's and others’ influences on Chomsky's early work to start. For a historical study focusing on the influence of formal sciences on the emergence of transformational grammar, see Tomalin (2006).

Chapter 15

Page 87, On creativity and its basis in a fixed nature; the puzzle of empiricism

Evo-devo, canalization, etc. emphasize the point at the developmental level in ways that might have surprised – but also gratified – Descartes and his rationalist followers, all of whom, with the addition of a few of the Romantics (Wilhelm von Humboldt, A. W. Schlegel, Coleridge) seemed to have some kind of recognition that individual and cultural diversity and creativity required fixed natures. Chomsky offers an illuminating historically oriented account of the point and its implications in his Cartesian Linguistics, and I touch on these matters in my introductions to the second (2002) and third (2009) editions of this important work. Given how obvious the point is, the popularity of the empiricist view of a plastic mind is a puzzle. At times (see Chomsky 1996, for example) Chomsky suggests that the ‘solution’ is not argument, but Wittgensteinian therapy-for-philosophers (and similarly inclined psychologists and linguists). Wittgenstein held that philosophical problems are hopelessly confused conundrums created by the oddities of the ways we speak of ourselves, time, the world, etc: “ordinary usage” is fine for solving practical problems, but hopeless for theoretical purposes – a conclusion Chomsky endorses. The only way to get ‘solutions’ to these philosophical ‘problems’ is to stop insisting on trying to solve them. There are no solutions; the problems are Scheinstreiten (pseudoproblems).

Page 89, A possible moral faculty

Marc Hauser has published some of the work he and others have done on the topic (2006). Mikhail should be given the credit for pioneering much of this work in his Cornell PhD thesis in philosophy, completed with some direction from Chomsky. (See www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/mikhail/.)

Chapter 17

Page 98, On Hume, the missing shade of blue, and the study of human nature

Hume seems to have held that the colors we can array and order – given his assumption that every ‘simple’ idea in the mind must be derived from a simple ‘sense impression’ – must include only those that have actually been experienced. If someone has not experienced a specific shade of blue, then, he or she should not – strictly speaking – be able to form an idea of that blue when presented with a spectrum with that specific blue missing. Yet he or she can. To deal with the apparent counterexample to his assumption, Hume in effect dismissed it, saying it was singular and not worth considering modifying his basic view of ‘simple’ ideas, of where they come from, and of how they ground further experience. He likely dismissed it because of his empiricist views. If they are abandoned, it allows for an appeal to ‘instinct’ and thus for the operation of innate internal systems (although he did not believe that these could be investigated, unlike Chomsky and others who pursue the task of constructing theories of the mind on nativist assumptions). For further discussion, see Appendix X.

Page 99, Some cross-references

Truth-indications (as opposed to truth conditions) are discussed on p. 273. For an outline of differences between Chomsky's naturalistic views of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics and those found in standard approaches, see Appendix XI. For further justification, see VI.

Chapter 18

Page 100, On universalizing moral principles

Chomsky and I appear to be speaking of different things. I was wondering whether, in denying universality (of a moral principle), someone refuses to treat others as humans. He understood me as asking whether there are people who deny universal application of a moral principle. Of course there are – people like Kissinger, who does it openly, and racists of various sorts, who may do it less openly. Nevertheless, Chomsky points out, even while denying that one must apply the same moral standards to one's own actions as one applies to others, Kissinger is likely to endorse a further universal principle: the USA always acts in the best interests of a majority of humanity, or perhaps even the interests of those against whom aggression is committed. Whether such a universal claim can be justified on moral grounds – or factual ones, for that matter – is a very different question.

On a related matter, see Chomsky's remarks about John Stuart Mill below and ‘humanitarian intervention’; note also his article (2005b) and, more recently, his address to the UN general assembly thematic dialogue on the responsibility to protect (2009). On universalizing one's moral assessments and its connection with the responsibility of the intellectual, see Chomsky (1996, Chapter 3) and the reprint of his early article on the responsibility of intellectuals (1987) and elsewhere. Intellectuals for Chomsky include all those who gather, assess, and distribute information; it includes, then, academics and media personnel.

Chapter 19

Page 104, Chomsky on ‘faith in reason’

Apropos what follows, note Chomsky's response to James Peck's (Chomsky 1987) interview question, “Do you have a deep faith in reason?” Chomsky said, “I don’t have a faith in that or anything else.” To Peck's query “Not even in reason?” Chomsky continues, “I wouldn’t say ‘faith.’ I think . . .. it's all that we have. I don’t have faith that the truth will prevail if it becomes known, but we have no alternative to proceeding on that assumption, whatever its credibility may be.” Chomsky apparently sees faith as the abrogation of reason. Its role in maintaining the “state religion” is a continuing theme in his political work.

Page 108, On methodological dualism

Methodological dualism is the thesis – it's rarely stated explicitly, but it's obvious in the practices of many – that the scientific (naturalistic) study of mind, and especially language, requires a different methodology from the scientific study of anything else, such as the natures of helium atoms. Chomsky sometimes mentions Quine's work when providing examples. Quine held that in the study of language, “behaviorism is necessary.” Language, a crucial aspect of mind, can’t be studied in the way the heart can: you can’t “look inside” or postulate an internal system that allows humans, but not other creatures, to speak. Other examples include Wilfrid Sellars and many of his followers and contemporary connectionist studies of language and other mental capacities. There are many symptoms of the attitude. For example, language is assumed to be a ‘public’ phenomenon, a set of practices within a community, something that people made and continue to remake – an artifact. It cannot then be understood as an organ in the head that grows automatically. It cannot be seen as innate, but must be seen as a social artifact, to be studied as a form of behavior governed by socially instituted training and education procedures. The same applies to the ethical domain: values are taught as ought-to-dos that a social group and its institutions (schools, parents, religious institutions, governments . . .) instill in the young born into that social group.

Chapter 20

Page 111, On differences between natural language(s) and natural sciences

Note that the discussion of the ship of Theseus, of the concept PERSON, of WATER, and the like are within the scope of what Chomsky thinks of as syntax, broadly conceived. They focus on the mind and what it natively provides (its contents and its capacities), not – per impossibile – on the way the world ‘really is’ (or is not) for some science or another. They also quite obviously recall a discussion concerning the limits of the human mind and skepticism that goes back to Descartes and before. A particularly interesting twist in the discussion appears where Chomsky proposes that cognitive science take at least as part of its task the investigation of these limits. As it stands, that is an unusual view of cognitive science.

Chomsky's point about the difference between natural languages and the symbol systems of formal science and mathematics (and the related point about the difference between commonsense understanding and view of the world compared to those offered by science) should not, I think, be thought of along the lines of the dispute in the philosophy of science about the commensurability of (say) Newtonian mechanics and quantum mechanics. That dispute concerns the extent to which a scientist who understood quantum mechanics could understand Newtonian (not the other way around, surely) and, to my mind, I would be surprised if he or she could not. Like too many philosophical disputes, it is often stated in terms that appear to require deep reflection that invites continued dispute, with no way to decide the matter. The gap between natural languages and the symbol systems of the sciences is another kind of issue; it concerns an empirically decidable question that can be stated in various ways. One of them is: can the child (or adult without learned background in particle physics, or ancient Greek, or Cro-Magnon individual) understand RIVER? Can he or she understand (as opposed to mouthing) HADRON? If the answers are respectively ‘yes’ and ‘no,’ that is evidence of a gap. So are differences in syntax, differences between native system and invented symbol system (an artifact), etc.

Chapter 21

Page 115, Externalist study and semantics again

Chomsky's point here seems to be that of course one can have externalist intellectual projects involving language; studies of language use, of communication, of cooperation, and the like are externalist and – as it turns out – they are in the domain of pragmatics. Whether these studies are or yield sciences is another question: perhaps, perhaps not. On the project of an externalist semantics, as indicated already, Chomsky is clear: so far as we can tell, there is no viable project of that sort. Its practitioners seem to want it to be a contribution to science, but its subject matter is the use of language, and it is not likely that we will ever be able to offer a science of the application of language. One explanation of its failure as such a project lies in lack of recognition of the creative aspect of language use.

Chapter 22

Page 116, On externalist study and semantics again

The banter reflects a serious point that Chomsky has often made, that because we are biological organisms, we have limited cognitive capacities. Philosophers have made the point often by speaking of human finitude. And, generally, they have offered nostrums and worse on how to reconcile oneself to or come to terms with the fact: our lives are tragic but . . .; maybe we can never know, but we can have the certainty of faith (and authority); we’re finite, so we suffer from lack of knowledge, but if we’re good (or at least try very hard), we’ll be rewarded with Nirvana, heaven, seeing the Good, escaping reincarnation, everlasting contemplation . . . Chomsky's apparent view is unusual and refreshing: embrace our limitations; it makes life interesting and challenging.

Keep in mind that Chomsky sees his work on language as a natural science – one that reveals the remarkable (and undoubtedly useful) capacities of a system with which we alone seem to be endowed. And likely it is not the only one. One candidate is a moral faculty. Another is an aesthetic one.

Chapter 24

Page 123, On the mind's operations

We cannot prove that the mind does not work by deterministic principles. But there is no proof that it does, either.

There is, however, Descartes's observation: we think we are free to choose alternatives. It is an observation that should be taken seriously, even if it is not proof, by any means. And there is the historical and anthropological evidence that Chomsky mentions below. Along with that, if it is plausible that the mind is made up of multiple systems and action is the result of a massive interaction effect (this is not certain, of course, but it is reasonable, given what we think we know), it is very unlikely that we will ever demonstrate that human action is determined. We have, then, commonsense reasons from observations of our own decision-making and the actions of others to believe that we are free, plus no scientific evidence that we are not, and good reason to think that – because our minds are limited – we will never be able to prove otherwise.

[1] I am grateful to Chomsky for clarifying this point for me in comments on the MS.

Glossary

Aitiational semantics

From Greek aitia: responsible/explanatory factor. As developed by Julius Moravcsik (1975, 1990, 1998) and James Pustejovsky (1995), the basic insight of aitiational semantics can be traced to Aristotle's view of how we view the things of what we take to be ‘our world’ – the world as we experience it. Natural objects – water, trees, animals – are conceived by Aristotle as subject to four ‘causes’ or means of explaining what they are. The explanations/causes are material, efficient, formal, and final. The material explanation says what something is made of, the efficient how it came about (most nearly approximating the usual notion of a cause), the formal its structural description, and the final its end or purpose. For Aristotle, these causes are inherent in objects and our minds ‘abstract’ them from experience. For internalists such as Chomsky, they are due to the ways in which our minds conceive, where these are fixed by the nature of the mind. How they conceive is due to the ways human minds develop or grow. In effect, our commonsense concepts of natural things are native to us, and structure the ways we conceive of ‘our’ world (where this is opposed to the world of science). If something is seen as having a purpose, it is because that is what we take its purpose or function to be.

Anomalism

In discussion of the mind, the term “anomalism” is typically understood in the context “anomalism of the mental.” Donald Davidson in his “Mental Events” (1970) claimed that while we can and do think of “physical events” as subject to causal laws with reasonably well-understood “boundary conditions” (restrictions on their applications), and while we think of “mental events” as causing and being caused by physical ones, mental events are not seen as subject to causal laws with well-understood boundary conditions. Chomsky has quite a different view of the mental, “the physical,” and the notion of mental causes.

Biolinguistics

The current name for the internalist and naturalistic study of language undertaken by Chomsky and others. Earlier descriptions for this methodology include “Cartesian linguistics,” “naturalistic approach” and “methodological monism.” As these names suggest, those who adopt this methodology assume that language is a system in the head that is innate in some sense (grows/develops as other mental systems do) and is to be studied in the same ways as any other natural phenomenon, according to the usual desiderata for naturalistic scientific research. The assumptions appear to be reasonable ones: they and the methodology yield good theories of the language faculty.

Brain in a vat

Terminology that developed as a result of a thought experiment: imagine that you are not as you think you are, a person with a body that lives and acts in the world, but are instead a brain in a vat of sustaining fluids that is wired up in such a way that an experimenter feeds your brain the inputs needed to make you believe that you live and act in the world. This thought experiment is a contemporary variation of one of Descartes's: imagine that the mind is controlled by a malin génie (sometimes translated as ‘evil demon’) that deceives a person to an even greater extent, one that could raise doubts about whether 2+2=4.

Canalization

C. H. Waddington's term for the fact that phenotypes seem to develop robustly despite variations in various factors that contribute to growth or development. See p. 279.

C-command

“Constituent command”: a constraint on the permissible ‘shape’ of a sentential structure. See Appendix VII.

Compositionality

Usually appears in the context “compositionality of semantics.” The basic idea is that the meanings of a finite set of words come to be combined by the application of explicitly stated compositional principles (rules, ‘laws’) to yield an unlimited set of sentential meanings. For Chomsky, linguistic semantic compositionality is syntactic and does not involve any relations to things in the world.

Conceptually necessary

Intuitively, ‘without which, not conceivable.’ Applied to what one must assume or presuppose in the study of language, it is usually thought that language must be a system that somehow links together sounds and meanings over an infinite range. In theoretical terms, it amounts to the idea that a theory of language must introduce certain “levels of representation,” these being at least (in current Chomskyan understandings of the system) SEM or a semantic interface to “conceptual and intentional” systems, and PHON or a phonological/phonetic interface to perceptual and articulatory systems.

Condition C

One of the three conditions in “binding theory,” where binding theory is a statement of the principles that govern whether a pronoun, anaphor (such as herself), or “R-expression” can/must be “bound” by a noun or noun phrase in a sentence. If bound (required to refer to whatever the noun or noun phrase is used to refer to), the anaphor, pronoun, or R-expression can only be used to refer to the same thing as the noun or noun phrase. If not bound, it is “free,” and can or must be used to refer to something or someone else. Condition A says that an anaphor must be bound in the (minimal) domain of a subject, Condition B that pronouns (including she, he, it . . .) are free (although they might be bound), and C that R-expressions must be free. There is no theory-independent way to say what an R-expression is. It is easy to present an example of a violation of Condition C, however. She in the following bad sentence is an R-expression that is construed as bound by Jane: *Shei thinks that Janei is easy to please. See Chomsky (1981, 1986) and Appendix VII.

Copy theory

Appears in the context “copy theory of movement.” Chomsky's first efforts to construct theories of language (grammars) introduced what were called “transformational rules” (both obligatory and optional) that “moved” elements of a derived linguistic structure from one position to another in the computation/derivation of a sentence. The terminology of movement (“displacement”) remained through the early stages of the development of the Minimalist Program, where a principle called “Move” was introduced and distinguished from Merge. Chomsky, as the main text indicates, for a long time thought that while Move was a necessary part of a theory of language, it was an anomaly, not a “virtual conceptual necessity.” However, in later minimalist efforts, it is absorbed into (internal) Merge, and is no longer seen as anomalous. Given internal Merge, the copy theory of movement (introduced in Chomsky 1993) falls into place. There is no actual movement of an element; rather, a ‘copy’ (which can be seen as an element that was merged ‘before’ it is re-merged in internal Merge) remains in place. It is ‘seen’ there at the semantic interface, although it is not ‘sounded out’ – it does not appear at PHON.

Corpuscularism

As used in this volume, any theory that postulates a set of elements that are taken as primitives for the purposes of whatever combinatory principles the theory deals with. The theory states how these elements can be put together to make complexes. For chemistry, the primitives are atoms, the complexes molecules. For computational linguistics, the primitives are (combinable) lexical items and the complexes are sentences/expressions.

Distributed morphology

Any of several versions of ways to conceive of how words might in the course of a derivation be put together out of theoretically defined primitives to yield the complexes we hear or (with sign) see. Generally, those who defend a version of distributed morphology hold that there is no lexicon as conceived in many theories of language, including Chomsky's until at least his (1995b), where a lexicon includes semantic, phonological, and perhaps formal information in the form of lexical “features,” and these features might simply pass through the derivation to appear at an interface (plausible with semantic features), or they are subject to further rules/principles, or they guide the course of derivation. Distributed morphologists hold instead that while one might start with some kind of package of semantic information, the rest of the material placed in the lexicon gets added in the course of a derivation.

Edge effect

Generally, effects that arise at contrasting boundaries. It is used in biology and ecology to focus attention on the effects brought about at boundaries or interfaces between items such as forests and surrounding plains. In current linguistic work, it is given specialized uses in phonology. In syntax it could be used to speak of the effects of Merge. If a lexical item (LI) is merged to a syntactic object (SO), the SO becomes the complement of the LI. One could also speak of the effects of Merge at interfaces. At the phonetic interface, internal Merge yields “movement” or “displacement.” (An internal merge takes an LI ‘inside’ an SO and ‘copies’ it to the SO's edge (see Edge feature and Copy theory).) As for the semantic interface, SEM, an internal Merge yields scope and discourse effects such as topic and new/old information. An external Merge yields argument structure and hierarchy. See the main text (pp. 15ff.) and Chomsky (2008).

Edge feature

Lexical items (LIs) have properties called “features.” Features characterize the effect of an LI in a computation or at an interface. In a sense, they specify combinatory properties and an LI's “internal” (or “intrinsic”) content – the kind of information it carries, or its character. Most LIs can combine: they combine with other LIs and with derived/generated and checked combinations of LIs that can be called “syntactic objects” (SO)s. Those LIs that can combine can do so because they have some property that ‘says’ that they can. That is their “edge feature.” Why ‘edge’? Assume a derived (generated) SO. When an LI merges with it, one gets this: {LI, SO}. The LI is at the edge of the SO. The result is phrasal structure. The SO becomes what is called a “complement” of the LI, and the LI is the “head.” As a result, the head-complement structure of linguistic phrases reduces to a property of Merge.

Some LIs lack an edge feature. They do not combine with others and are read/interpreted as interjections, such as “ouch.”

One way to conceive of what edge features of LIs ‘do’ is to think of LIs with this feature as ‘atomizing’ an LI. LIs with this feature are atoms so far as the machinery of Merge is concerned. If LIs are ‘composed’ in some way (perhaps only as members of a set of features) as a result of some kind of combinatory or agglomerative procedure, LI features themselves would be seen as primitives (atoms, corpuscles) of a different order, the ‘elements’ that combine in accord with the principles of LI-formation, whatever they might be.

Eliminativism

The position of those who hold that the principles and ‘objects’ of one theory or framework are eliminable in favor of the principles and objects of another. For example, several philosophers have held that chemistry (including biochemistry) is eliminable because it is reducible to the principles and objects of physics. Chomsky often remarks that “accommodation” might be the better term. And he points out that in point of fact, physics in the 1920s and 1930s had to be modified in order to accommodate it to chemistry – not the other way around. Accommodation is motivated by methodological considerations: it is a goal of naturalistic scientific research. Chomsky's theories aim toward accommodation with biology. Eliminativism is typically motivated by a metaphysical goal: the belief that there is just one kind of “stuff.”

FOXP2

There was some enthusiasm for a while for the idea that the FOXP2 gene – and in particular the human variety of it – could be taken to be at least one of the “language genes.” It is apparently involved in the growth not of the central computational system – the crucial one for explaining the distinctiveness of human language – but in the growth of articulatory capacities. Human FOXP2's homologues in other species are involved in the production of fine motor control systems. And the human family in which FOXP2 anomalies were found lacked not just full articulatory capacity, but had deficits in fine motor control in other domains.

I-language

The state of a person's language faculty. See Language below and Appendix I.

Inclusiveness

The motivation behind Chomsky's view that a linguistic computation be inclusive is that of making grammar (the theory of language) compact – that is, closed to outside influence. It is related to the notion of modularity: a modular language is one that relates to other systems only at output and (possibly) input layers. Methodologically, inclusiveness is very desirable: it restricts the domain with which the theory of language (grammar) must deal. One way to maintain it in grammar is to ensure that a computation ‘begins’ with a set (“numeration”) of lexical items and with this ‘information’ and no other generates a single expression (PHON-SEM pair), or else crashes.

Internalism

Chomsky has for decades adopted a methodology for the study of mind and other mental systems that can be called “internalist.” In effect: if you want to construct a science of the mind, look for (innate) mental systems that seem to operate autonomously, and ignore any supposed relations between states of the system and things ‘out there,’ focusing instead on relations to other systems, where applicable. Internalism is related to a modular view of the mind and its systems. The basic idea traces back to Descartes, not to Descartes's view (if he actually held it) that one can directly inspect the contents of one's own mind, but to his views of innateness, skepticism, and what Chomsky calls the “creative aspect of language use.” Details are beyond the scope of this glossary.

Label

A technical term in grammar. Consider an external Merge of the LI clothes and the LI wash. The result is {wash, clothes}. Then the issue arises: what does further narrow syntactic computation need in the form of ‘information’ about this pair in order to carry out further Merges – to join this syntactic object to another LI, for example? The answer we got in the days of X-bar theory is that further computation is needed to ‘know’ that this is a verb phrase with wash as ‘head.’ One aim of grammars developed within the minimalist project is to eliminate extraneous and otherwise unexplained structure, such as that introduced automatically by X-bar theory – in effect, to eliminate what X-bar theory called “bar levels.” To accomplish this, minimalist accounts – following the idea that phrase structure should be “bare” – assigns one member of a merged pair as label of the pair. For {wash, clothes}, the label is “wash.” One gets the effect of the label “XP” (here, VP) that X-bar theory introduced as a matter of course for all categories of lexical item; but we get this without the need for introducing X-bar theory. It comes ‘for free.’And the bar level V′ between V and VP, which was introduced in X-bar theory to allow for adjunction, is eliminated; it is dealt with by the sequence of merges.

Language

For naturalistic study, a language is an “I-language” – essentially, any of the biologically, computationally, and physically possible states that a mature language faculty can assume. The goal of the science of language is to provide in a natural science the descriptive and explanatory tools that allow for the definition of “possible human language.” See Appendices I and III.

Language faculty

Chomsky has used the term “language faculty” for decades to speak of the language system, including (often) both the core computational system (linguistic competence) as well as performance systems such as those involved in interpretation – whether articulatory-perceptual or conceptual-intentional. In Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002), the language faculty is said to consist in the narrow computational system (FLN or “faculty of language, narrow”) and the broad system that includes FLN and performance systems (FLB, or “faculty of language, broad”). See also: Narrow syntax, Third factor.

Machian

As used in the text, “Machian” describes Ernst Mach's view that only “phenomena” (what one directly experiences) are real, and his rejection of the existence of the atom. Mach was also a physicist, physiologist, and psychologist.

Merge

According to current minimalist forms of grammar, the basic combinatory mechanism of the language faculty and possibly the sole component of UG. Merge comes in at least two forms, external and internal. For explanation and discussion, see the text, pp. 13–18.

Modularism

Methodologically, a view of mental systems that maintains that they and their operation can fruitfully for the purposes of scientific inquiry be divorced from consideration of other systems, with the possible exception of loci where systems ‘communicate’ or interact. See also: Internalism.

Narrow syntax

Narrow syntax is the study of the core computational system of the language faculty – in current terminology, of the operations between a numeration of LIs and the semantic (SEM) and phonetic (PHON) interfaces. It contrasts with broad syntax, which in the study of language is usually taken to include study of what ‘happens’ in relations between language and other systems in the head, and in those systems themselves. In its broadest form syntax is the study of the cognitive operations of the mind/brain, excluding relations between any cognitive/mental states/events and ‘things in the world.’ Whether broad or narrow, syntax is the study of the intrinsic, internal properties of mental states/events.

Nominalism

There are several varieties of nominalism, but all more or less agree that whatever exists must be concrete and ‘individual.’ The form of nominalism most relevant for the discussion in the main text is one due to Goodman and Quine (1947). Among other things, they attempted to eliminate dependence on sets, taking them to be equivalent to their members, so that {a, b} is the same as {b, a} and also {b, {a, b}}, etc. Respecting this principle is respecting the “principle of extensionality.”

The name “nominalism” derives from the Latin word for name. Intuitively, the nominalist is happy enough to say that predicates and abstract terms (terms that might appear to denote abstract entities) exist, but refuses to say that abstract entities and universals exist (although some might insist on a distinction between abstract entities and universals). Could a ‘projectivist’ view such as that adumbrated in Appendix XII count as nominalist in this sense, at least if one assumed that mental entities are in fact singular mental events? Possibly aspects of it could, although it refuses to adopt an assumption of nominalist and realist alike. There is no reason to suppose a genuine referential relationship between a mental entity such as a specific SEM and anything, whether universal or particular. Reference/denotation is something that people do. Realizing that demands that the metaphysical issues at stake between nominalist and realists need to be rethought along with many discussions of ‘realism’ of various flavors. This point is independent of Chomsky's suggestion in the text that getting rid of the sets to which the current version of Merge is committed is a “project for the future.”

Parameter

As originally conceived at the advent of the “Principles and Parameters” research program early in the 1980s, a parameter was an option provided for in a universal principle (q.v.) that explained structural differences between languages (in syntax, phonology, and perhaps semantics). Parameters are set in language growth/development, leading to a child developing (say) Miskito as opposed to French. In more recent work, the original conception of a parameter has come into question and many “microparameters” have been introduced. Moreover, these now are traced not to options on principles, but to the contributions of “third factor” considerations. See Appendix VIII and the main text, especially pp. 45–46; 82–83.

PAX-6

PAX-6 is a ‘control’ gene that has been demonstrated to play a crucial role in the development/growth of visual systems in a variety of organisms in various clades. It has other roles too, and there is clear evidence that other genes also participate in vision growth, such as the NOTCH gene. See also FOXP2.

PHON

Along with SEM, one of the two kinds of interfaces between the language system's (faculty of language's) core computational system and other systems in the head. PHON is the phonetic interface: it provides information (in the form of phonetic features) to articulatory and perceptual systems. Chomsky sometimes speaks of PHON (and SEM) as “instructing” or “providing instructions to” the relevant systems with which it communicates or interacts.

Principle

Until the 1980s, a popular and generally used term for a principle (law) of the language system was “rule.” Rule proved problematic, however, for – among other things – several philosophers (John Searle is an example) insisted, despite being told otherwise, on taking rules as Chomsky understood the term to be rules for behavior or action, giving them a normative cast. Having begun down this path, it also became very tempting for philosophers and others to believe that the rules of language are learned somehow by some kind of habituation procedure. See the discussion of Sellars and Lewis in Appendix VI. Speaking of principles rather than rules helped undercut this error. Chomsky's principles (and what were often called “rules” before the 1980s) do not govern action or behavior, nor are they in any way normative. They are instead the (natural) laws of linguistic computation.

Principled explanation

Chomsky (2008: 134) says: “We can regard an explanation of some property of language as principled, to the extent that current understanding now reaches, insofar as it can be reduced to the third factor and to conditions that language must meet to be usable at all – specifically, conditions coded in UG that are imposed by organism-internal systems with which FL interacts. Insofar as properties of I-languages can be given a principled explanation, in this sense, we move to a deeper level of explanation, beyond explanatory adequacy.”

Projectibility

Nelson Goodman in his Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (a draft of which was developed in some of the classes that Chomsky took with him) not only set up his famous “grue” argument concerning the projectibility (successful application or use) of predicates such as green as opposed to grue (“green until time t and blue thereafter”), but offered what he thought was a solution: that the projectible predicates are those that are projected (in/by a community of language users). Chomsky in that class and later objected that this is no answer, and that one would have to assume that green (or rather, GREEN) is somehow innate and influences (not controls) language use in order to get a reasonable answer to the skeptic's question: why green and not grue? Goodman rejected innateness out of hand, adopting a strong version of behaviorism instead.

Projection problem

The issue of why we employ the words (or rather the concepts) we do in order to speak of and classify things in ways that we hope will be reliable. The projection problem is a version of the traditional “problem of induction.” Efforts to solve it are related to various efforts to undercut skepticism, or “answer the skeptic.” See Projectibility.

SEM

One of the core language computational system's two ‘interfaces’ with other systems in the human head. The general term for the systems with which language communicates at the SEM interface is “conceptual and intentional” systems. SEM is short for “semantic interface,” although one should not suppose that ‘semantic’ here has its usual use, where that amounts to “word–world” relationships.

Third factor

In recent work, Chomsky has distinguished three factors involved in the ways in which a child's language faculty develops. One is a biological contribution, often called “UG” and traced to the genome. A second is ‘experience,’ or what might better be called the language-relevant ‘data’ that a child receives. The third, the “third factor,” Chomsky (2005a: 6) describes in this way:

3. Principles not specific to the faculty of language.

The third factor falls into several subtypes: (a) principles of data analysis that might be used in language acquisition and other domains; (b) principles of structural architecture and developmental constraints that enter into canalization, organic form, and action over a wide range, including principles of efficient computation, which would be expected to be of particular significance for computational systems such as language. It is the second of these subcategories that should be of particular significance in determining the nature of attainable languages.

The second factor is relatively unimportant. Note, for example, that the first factor must provide a means for the human mind during language growth to select only linguistically relevant data and make it, and not a virtually infinite set of extraneous considerations, relevant to the ways in which language can develop.

Triggering

A term introduced by Jerry Fodor to speak of the automatic (in his terminology, “causal”) means by which a concept or other mental entity comes to be activated or perhaps shaped. Triggering is assumed to be due to some kind of mental machinery that is stimulated by some kind of input. Fodor assumed that the input must be some source outside the head, and he tries in his work (1998 and others) to base an account of denotation of things outside the head on an ‘informational’ account of causal input. A more general view of triggering would allow that the source need not be outside the head, nor need the activation result from a single stimulation. Further, the ‘control’ of what comes about need not be due primarily to the stimulation, proximal or distal, but due instead to the nature of the mental machinery. Internal ‘control’ seems to be part of Chomsky's internalism: he notes that if you want to understand what persons ‘are,’ you should look to the concept PERSON that appears to be innate. See the main text, pp. 30–33 and the discussion of growth or development. Fodor considered the possible disconnect between stimulus and concept produced a problem (his “doorknob/DOORKNOB” problem), but so far as I can tell, it is a problem only if you insist on his versions of informational semantics and realism.

UG

Short for “Universal Grammar,” and generally assumed to be biology's (the human genome's) contribution to the uniquely human mental system known as the language faculty. As explained in the text, UG used to be thought to be complex and rich, but in minimalist form it may amount to Merge alone. See Merge, language faculty.

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Index

abduction 168, 183, 246, 248

acquisition of language 225, 244

adequate explanation of 22, 60, 149, 235, 244, 245, 246

behaviorist view of 222, 224

and biological development 59

and canalization 39

early timing of 55, 56

and the format of language 82

and grammar 24

and linguistic theory 24

and parameters 97

and poverty of the stimulus 23

and semantics 193

study of 84

universal principles of 245

activism 119

adaptation 157, 169

evidence for 170, 172

adaptationism 68, 171, 172

adjunction 201, 234, 264

agency 124–128

algorithms 64, 166

altruism 104, 106

animal communication systems 12, 20, 33, 197, 262

animals, and concepts 26, 30, 33, 203

Ariew, André 277

Aristotle 26, 162, 163

articulatory system 69

Austin, John 129, 160

baboons 143, 202

Baker, Mark 39, 55, 83, 241

bees 20, 106

behavior, study of 138–151, 286

behaviorism 66, 89, 186, 285

criticism of 285

and evolution 173

and language acquisition 222, 225, 282, 284

and learning 180

belief 138, 140

I-beliefs 153–156

irrational 140

religious 141

study of 139

Berkeley 127

Bilgrami, Akeel 113

binding theory 37, 237, 238, 276, 290

biolinguistics 5, 91, 246

biological limits 133–137

biological systems, properties of 22

biology 157

autonomy of 175

explanation in 158

folk biology 223

function-for-an-organism 169–174

functions in 174–175

Bloom, Paul 166, 170, 172, 176

Boltzmann, Ludwig 18

Borer, Hagit 166, 194, 229

Boyle, Robert 67

Bracken, Harry 114

Braille 44

brain 60

See also cognitive faculties

evolution of 49

size of 54

structures of 48

bricolage 24, 243

British Empire 121, 122

Brody, Michael 83

Burge, Tyler 130, 289

Butterworth, Brian 16

Byrd, Robert 123

c-command 79, 232–238, 276

canalization 39–45, 96, 239–242, 278, 279, 286

and parameters 45, 276–277

Carey, Sue 72, 97, 128

Carnap, Rudolf 250

Carroll, Sean B. 279

Carruthers, Peter 162

causation 141, 193, 198

chemistry 19, 65, 73, 88, 156

Cherniak, Christopher 60, 277

children

acquisition of language 56, 244–246

dysarthria 43

language capacities of 70

speech production 281

Williams Syndrome 46

Chomsky, Carol 44–45

Chomsky, Noam

influence of 2

intellectual contribution of 76–79, 285

on natural science 183–185

and Nelson Goodman 86–92

personal relationship with Goodman 91–92

role of simplicity in his work 80–85

Church, Alonzo 64

Churchland, Patricia 212

cognitive development 70

cognitive faculties 1, 154, 179, 202, 212, 259, 260, 267, 271, 280

biological basis of 103, 172

distinctiveness of human 178

evolution of 78

limits of 97, 133, 134, 146, 184, 189, 247, 289, 290

predetermination of 98

and truth 136

cognitive science 127, 247

Collins, John 277

color 247–248

adverbial account of 258, 260

science of 192, 247, 257, 259

common sense 73, 124–128, 180, 189, 209, 211, 259, 280

concepts 161, 271, 272, 284

understanding of functions 158–166

communication 11–20, 44, 50, 51, 164, 166, 176

animal communication systems 12, 20, 33, 197, 262

evolution of 20, 58

computation 31–32, 65, 161, 174, 195, 213, 281–282

efficiency of 39, 60, 61, 148

linguistic 265

optimal 62

phases of 278

concepts 26, 202, 267

acquisition of 200, 230, 268

adverbial account of 260

of animals 203

artifact concepts 162, 284

atomic 34, 275

Chomsky's views on 188

common sense 267

commonsense concepts 126, 161, 267, 271, 284

complexity of 201

compositional character of 190, 194, 268

errors in thinking about 186–196

and externalism 220

I-concepts 153–156

innateness 284

and internalism 198, 255–257

intrinsic content of 199

lexical concepts 190

linguistic expression of 197, 203, 230

location of 260

nature of human 77, 177, 230, 268, 274, 284

origin of 26

properties of 40, 204

and reasoning 180

relational 35

scientific 184, 279

theories of 186–194, 196

under- or overspecification of 193, 195

uniqueness of human concepts 21–30, 33–35, 196–205, 263

conceptual intentional systems 14

conceptualism 130

Condition C 37, 238, 275

conjunctivism 254

connectionism 67, 179, 180, 186, 200, 220, 225, 282

consciousness 98

constructivism 87, 206, 208, 285

conventions 221, 223

cooperative societies 103, 105

corporations, CEOs of 147

Crain, Stephen 254

creative aspect of language use 5, 6, 204, 210, 253, 262

impact on the study of language 227, 263

origin of 97

Cudworth, Ralph 40, 163, 267

culture 121, 178

Dalton, John 88

Darwin, Charles 171

Davidson, Donald 35, 112, 139, 140, 141, 166, 198

Dawkins, Richard 105

debating 116

decision 52

Deep Structures 233

democracy 118

denotation 188, 215, 218

See also meaning, reference

derivation of sentences 193, 238, 281

Descartes, René 74, 246, 286, 289

animals 124, 177

linguistics 63, 178

reason 124, 139, 178

description 90, 134

design 50–58, 139, 172, 175, 265

connotations of the word 50

desire 138

determinism 141, 280–281, 290

development 46–49, 59, 73, 158, 279

constraints on 245

epigenetic factors 242

phenotypical 171

Dewey, John 212

discourse domains 207

displacement 25, 108

dispositional terms 192

dissection 203

dissociation 16

dominance hierarchies 143, 237

dualism, methodological 288

Dummett, Michael 57

dysarthria 43

economics 144

Elman, J. L. 225, 283

empiricism 6, 187, 247, 267, 283

attractions of 286

cognitive capacities 178, 180

criticism of 285

functionalism 186

epistemology 133–137, 157

Epstein, Samuel 83

ethology 21

Everett, Dan 30

evidence for theories of 143

evolution 12–15, 23, 41, 53, 60, 173, 266, 279, 285

See also human evolution

and behaviorism 67, 76

and human nature 103–107

minimalist reading of 78, 200

natural selection 58, 76, 104, 143, 157, 172

evolution of language 20, 53, 170, 172, 176

speed of 24, 44–45, 103

study of 51, 77, 105

evolution–development (evo-devo) studies 158, 171, 279, 286

experience 148

explanation 96, 132, 136, 174

adequacy of 244, 245

best theory 96, 135, 148, 184, 246

in biology 158

and description 90

scientific 128

externalism 130, 153, 189, 260, 273, 289

attractions of 214

criticism of 209–231

eye, evolution of 46, 105, 279

facial recognition 69

faculty of language 36, 74, 172, 177, 243, 260, 270

adicity 198, 199

broad 36, 172, 269

narrow 36, 172, 269

perfection of 50

Ferguson, Thomas 145

first factor considerations 45, 96, 148

Fitch, W. T. 60, 170, 172, 268, 269

Fodor, Janet 55

Fodor, Jerry 189, 195, 228, 259

computational theory of mind 280

concepts 34, 201

denotation 191, 218, 219

evolution 58, 279

language of thought 27, 71, 189, 190, 220, 230, 269

meaning 194, 217, 269

modes of presentation (MOPs) 187, 190, 217, 218, 219, 275

nativism 187, 188

formal languages 16, 17, 289

Foucault, Michel 120

freedom 143, 152, 177, 280–281, 290

Frege, Gottlob 155, 215, 251

semantics 214, 215, 251, 252

senses 251, 253

functions 11–20, 157–170, 262

in biology 169–174

concept of 11

definition of 167

formal functions 166–169

function-of-an-organ 174–175

intensional specification of 167

interest-dependent 158–166

in mathematics and natural science 166–169

Galileo 18, 88

Gallistel, C. R. 26, 33, 197, 203, 268

Gandhi, Mahatma 114, 144

garden path sentences 50

Gauss, Carl F. 127

Gehring, Walter 46, 171, 258, 279

genes 46–49, 148, 173

master genes 279, 280

and Merge 49

PAX-6 46, 280

universal genome 53

Gleitman, Lila 196

Godwin, Richard 123

Golinkoff, Roberta 196

Goodman, Nelson 81, 83, 88, 261, 285

behaviorism 89, 285

and Chomsky 86–92

constructivism 285

nominalism 87, 91

personal relationship with Chomsky 91–92

Gould, Stephen J. 158, 170, 172, 173

grammar 277–278

and acquisition of language 24, 60

artifacts in theories of 238

extensional equivalence of 153

finite state 232

generative 63, 85, 91, 96, 99

generative capacity 236

phrase structure 233, 235

structure and hierarchy 236

transformational 25

‘great leap forward' 13, 70, 179

growth 40, 73, 77

cognitive growth 121

developmental constraints on 41, 45, 158

Haldane, J. B. S. 51, 53

Hale, Kenneth 17, 62

Halle, Morris 21

Hamilton, William D. 104

Harman, Gilbert 100

Harris, Zellig 38, 80, 81, 86

Hauser, Marc 100, 109, 286

evolution of communication 12, 58

faculty of language 60, 170, 172, 268, 269

hearing 48

Helmholtz, Hermann von 73, 97

Herbert of Cherbury 181

Higginbotham, Jim 129, 130

Hirsh-Pasek, Kathy 196

homunculus 37, 290

Hornstein, Norbert 29, 183, 265

human behavior 138–151, 286

human evolution 2, 13, 71

developmental constraints on 41

‘great leap forward' 13, 70, 77

human nature 95–102, 108–112

and biological capacities 95

Chomsky on 95–102

determined and uniform 95, 99

distinctiveness of 176–179

enlightenment conception of 142

and evolution 103–107

‘great leap forward' 179

moral agency 101

plasticity of 121

humanitarian intervention 121, 122, 287

humans, genetic variation 13

Hume, David 26, 90, 99, 106, 179

color problem 247–248, 286

theory of moral nature 63, 99, 109

Huxley, Thomas 23

I-beliefs 153–156

definition of 156

I-concepts 153–156

definition of 155

I-language 81, 153–156, 164, 239, 258, 266

intensional specification of 167

imagination 70, 161

inclusiveness 62, 281

induction 88, 90, 95

inference 73, 165, 221

information 208, 213, 218, 228, 229, 254

pragmatic 30

semantic 29, 260

innateness 39–45, 60, 89, 91, 255, 267, 284

innatism 123

innovation 71, 74, 95, 177, 178, 185, 282

technological 145

insects, study of 147

instinct 96, 143, 178, 181, 247, 248, 287

instrumentalism 211

intention (see also nativism) 163

internalism 6, 228, 248, 262–263, 269, 287

and concepts 188, 190, 209, 255–257, 260, 272

intuitions 125, 126

island sentences 50

Jackendoff, Ray 170, 172

Jacob, François 24, 53, 60, 243

Joos, Martin 145

justice 120

Kahneman, Daniel 140

Kant, Immanuel 90

Kauffman, Stuart 21, 22, 266

Kayne, Richard 55, 84, 241

Keller, Helen 45

Kissinger, Henry 101, 107, 113, 287

Klein, Ralph 111

knowledge 70, 193

See also information

Kripke, Saul 126

Kropotkin, Peter 103, 111

language

and agency 124–128

as an animal instinct 178

and arithmetical capacities 16

and biology 21–30, 80, 235, 284

biophysical explanations of 208

and brain morphology 46

capacity for 70, 164

characteristic uses of 11–12

cognitive benefits of 2

competence and use 63

and complex thought 1

complexity of 52, 146

compositional character of 37

computational theory of 174, 272

and concepts 71, 198

conceptual resources of 212

displacement property 16

distinctive features 22

domination 232–238

expectations for 54

externalization of 52, 78, 79, 153, 222, 278

flexibility 95, 162, 197, 210, 224, 227

formal languages 16, 17, 289

formal theory of 21–30

functions of 11–20, 164, 165

generative capacity 49

head-first 240

hierarchical structure 232–238

I-language 153–156, 164, 239, 258, 266

interface conditions 25

internal 37

internal, individual and intensional 37, 154, 167

internal use of 52, 69, 124, 153, 160, 197, 262–263, 272–274

a ‘knowledge' system 187, 193

localization of 46, 59, 69–74

and mathematics 181

modularity of 59

movement property 16, 85, 108, 264–265

as a natural object 2, 7

nominalizing languages 155

open texture of 273

and other cognitive systems 271

phonetic features 42

phonological features 42, 57

precursors of 43, 77

properties of 22, 37, 60, 62

public language 153, 288

purposes of 224

and reason 181

result of historical events 84

rules of 165, 221, 223, 224, 225, 283, 284

and science 124–128

sounds available in 282

structural features of 42

structure of 236, 277–278

study of 36, 76, 79, 154

See also linguistics

theories of 164, 193, 239, 243, 285

unboundedness 177, 262

uniqueness to humans 150

variation in the use of 164, 239–242

language faculty 74, 172, 177, 243, 260, 261, 270

adicity requirements of 198, 199

perfection of 50

language of thought 27, 71, 189, 190, 220, 230, 269

Lasnik, Howard 85

learning 95, 180, 200, 226, 281, 282

empiricism and 173, 179

learning a language 187, 225, 226

Lenneberg, Eric 21, 43, 47, 59

Lepore, E. 195

Lewis, David 153, 165, 220, 222, 223, 224

Lewontin, Richard 58, 157, 170, 172, 173, 175, 231

lexical items 62

categories of 234

origin of 46

liberalism 98

linguistic communities 222

linguistic development 39

See also development

linguistic practices 221, 223

linguistic principles 237, 276

linguistics 19, 36, 82, 145

and biology 150

first factor considerations 45, 96, 148

and natural science 38

and politics 152

procedural theories in 149

second factor considerations 148, 277

structural 80

theories of 87, 265

third factor considerations:

separate entry

Locke, John 26, 125, 267

personal identity 31, 271

secondary qualities 256

logic, formal 251

Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory 84–85

Lohndal, Terje 57

Lorenz, Konrad 21

Marx, Karl 122

mathematics 127, 165, 214, 215, 266

capacity for 15, 136

formal functions in 166–169

and language 181

semantics for 251, 252

Mayr, Ernst 174

meaning 29, 98, 199, 206, 250, 252, 270, 273

computational theory of 213

construction of a science of 226–230

externalist science of 209–220

methodology for a theory of 226, 227

study of 261

theories of 221

theory of 212, 214, 217, 226

Mehler, Jacques 55

Merge 16, 77, 91, 181, 236, 243, 263, 279–280

centrality of 41, 60, 62, 176, 245

consequences of 17

and edge properties 17, 41

Merge, external 17, 166, 201, 238, 263

Merge, internal 16, 25, 29, 85, 201, 238, 264

mutation giving rise to 43, 52

origin of 14, 15

Pair Merge 201, 264

and psychic identity 28

uniqueness to humans 25, 200, 205

metaphor 195

metaphysics 125, 157

Mikhail, John 63, 99, 100, 109, 129, 286

Mill, John Stuart 121, 122, 287

Miller, George 81

mind

as a causal mechanism 138

computational sciences of 247

computational theory of 280

philosophy of 186, 255

place of language in 69–74

representational theory of 162, 188

science of 138–151, 212, 288

theory of 14

Minimalist Program 24, 83, 84, 233, 235–236, 237, 245, 246, 264

and adaptationism 172

aim of 42, 199

simplicity and 80, 243, 285

modes of presentation (MOPs) 187, 190, 217, 219, 275

roles of 218

morality 99, 100, 109, 287

character of 110

conflicting systems 114

generation of action or judgment 110

moral truisms 101, 102

theories of 110, 135

trolley problems 109

and universalization 113–117

Moravcsik, Julius 164

morphemes 81, 149

morphology 52, 54, 195

distributed 27

and syntax 200

Morris, Charles 250

Move 108

mutations 14, 43, 170, 171

survival of 51, 53

mysterianism 97

Nagel, Thomas 98

Narita, Hiroki 57

nativism 187, 217, 283

natural numbers 204

natural sciences 18, 38

natural selection 58, 76, 104, 143, 157

Navajo language 277

neural networks 225

neurophysiology 74

Newton, Isaac 66, 67, 72, 88, 127, 134

alchemy 67

nominalism 87, 91

non-violence 114

Norman Conquest 84

objective existence 169

optimism 118–123, 288

parameters 39–45, 54, 239–242, 277, 282, 283

and acquisition of language 241

choice of 45, 83

developmental constraints in 243

functional categories 240

head-final 55, 240

headedness macroparameter 241, 276

linearization parameter 55

macroparameters 55

microparameters 55, 84, 241

polysynthesis 55

and simplicity 80

Peck, James 288

Peirce, Charles Sanders 96, 132, 184, 250

abduction 168, 183, 246, 248

truth 133, 136

perfection 50–58, 172, 175, 263–264, 279

person, concept of 125, 126, 271, 284

‘forensic' notion of 125

persuasion 114, 116

Pesetsky, David 30

Petitto, Laura-Ann 48, 78

phenomenalism 211

philosophers 129–131, 282, 283

contribution of 129

contribution to science 129

philosophy 181

accounts of visual sensations 255–257

of language 35, 273

of mind 186, 255

problems in 286

and psychology 140

phonemes 81

phonetic/phonological interfaces 161, 194, 253, 278

phonology 28, 40, 52, 54, 57, 109, 208

physicalism 187

physics 19, 65, 106, 144

and chemistry 65

folk physics 72

theoretical 18, 65, 73, 100

Piattelli-Palmarini, Massimo 140, 246, 279

Pietroski, Paul

concepts 47, 199, 200, 209

semantics 198, 211, 223, 229, 254

Pinker, Steven 166, 170, 172, 176

Pirahã language 30

Plato 115

Plato's Problem 23, 195, 236, 244, 246, 266

Poincaré, Henri 65

politics 116, 119, 145, 146, 152

poverty of the stimulus observations 5, 23, 40, 177, 200, 227, 233, 262

power 120

pragmatic information 30

pragmatics 36, 130, 250–254, 289

definition of 250

and reference 253

principles and parameters approach to linguistic theory 24, 53, 235, 236, 240, 245, 276

language acquisition 60, 82, 83, 149

and simplicity 246

progress 118, 145, 183

projection problem 83, 89

prosody 37

psychic continuity 26, 205, 207, 271

psychology 219

of belief and desire 138, 141

comparative 21

evolutionary 103–107, 111

folk psychology 72, 141

and philosophy 140

rationalistic 255

scientific 140

psychology, comparative 21

public intellectuals 122

Pustejovsky, James 164, 195

Putnam, Hilary 95, 126, 138

Quine, W. V. O. 32, 68, 89, 153, 215, 273, 288

rationalism 5, 178, 181, 260, 283

rationality 114, 140, 142, 178, 180, 181, 265

scientific 105, 123

Rawls, John 129

realism 209, 211

reality, psychological 73

recursion 51, 62, 64, 77, 167, 176, 179, 204, 267

See also Merge

reference 28, 29, 34, 160, 215, 220, 250

Chomsky's views 188, 253, 268, 269–270, 273

and concepts 206, 219

and truth 191, 207, 230, 251

Reinhart, Tanya 79

relation R 207

relativism 121

religious fanaticism 123

representation 31–32, 160, 162, 187, 257, 259

discourse representation theory 207

internal 32

phonetic 32

Republican Party 119, 140

responsibility to protect 287

Rey, Georges 32, 273

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 142

Russell, Bertrand 65, 134

Salazar-Ciudad, J. 279

Schlegel, A.W. 63

science 18, 38, 75, 124–128, 165, 183, 211, 290

achievements of 74, 183, 184

best explanation in 96

capacity to do 19, 72, 90, 128, 133, 134, 246

Chomsky's views on 183–185

cognitive faculties 127

concepts in 184

concepts of 279

data-orientated character of 65–68

evidence for theories of 66

experimental method 147

formal functions in 166–169

formal theories in 18–19, 289

goal of 88, 183

‘great leap forward' 72

history of 108

innovation in 74

limits of 105, 106

Machian tradition in 65

methodology of 243

of the mind 280

problems in 65–68

rationality in 116, 123

regulative ideal of 90

and simplicity 88, 246, 285

social implications of 98

syntax of 72

theories in 73, 167

and truth 184

second factor considerations 148, 277

Sellars, Wilfrid 153, 179, 220, 284

behaviorism 180, 222, 284

concepts 279, 284

linguistic practices 223, 224, 239

meaning 220

mind 186, 283

semantic features 164, 211, 228, 253

lexical 193

science of 190

semantic information 29, 189

semantic interface (SEM) 54, 189, 191, 194, 255, 258, 259, 270, 272, 278

features at 161, 257

information provided at 29, 161, 260, 270, 285

production of concepts at 278

status and role of the information provided at 270

and syntax 40, 79

semantics 35, 36, 160, 193, 206–229, 250–254, 287

Chomsky's views on 206

definition of 250

dynamic 207

externalist 208, 212, 215, 220–231

Fregean 216

functionist theory 229

internalist 208, 212, 227, 270

mathematical 251, 252

mental models 207

science of 210

as the study of signs 251

and syntax 207

theoretical aim of 208

senses 187, 215, 251

sensory experience 255–257

adverbial account of 256, 260

configuration by the mind 258

sensory-motor systems 14, 42, 48, 51, 78, 203

adaptations of 77

and parameters 54

ship of Theseus 125, 271, 288

simple recurrent networks, Elman 283

simplicity 59–64, 86, 89, 243–246, 265, 281

in Chomsky's work 80–85

different notions of 87

internal 80, 82, 285

internal notion of 87

in the language faculty 61

theoretical 80

Skinner, B. F. 67, 76, 158, 173, 285

slavery 118, 119, 143, 144

slime molds 175

Smith, Adam 106

social sciences 100, 138, 144, 145, 146

sociobiology 103–107

Spelke, Elizabeth 70, 100, 109, 177, 268

Spell Out 278

stereotypes 194

storytelling 27, 128

superior temporal gyrus (STG) 48, 78

Suppes, Patrick 88

syntax 36, 54, 112, 195, 250–254, 261, 288

definition of 250

generative 232

mapping to the semantic interface 40

and morphology 200

narrow 79, 240, 269

and reference 269

and semantics 207

study of 269

Tarski, Alfred 215

teaching 115

theory of mind 14, 31

third factor 45, 46, 80, 82, 132, 167, 245, 277, 278, 283

and language acquisition 59, 96

study of 147, 149, 236

Thompson, D'Arcy 21, 137, 171, 266

Thompson, Judith 100

thought 15, 44

See also cognitive faculties, mind

Tinbergen, N. 21

Tomalin, Marcus 267, 285

Trivers, Robert 105, 106

trolley problems 109

truth 114, 206, 221, 229

conditions for 273, 274

objective 135, 136

and reference 191, 207, 230, 251

and science 133, 184

truth indications 273, 274, 287

Turing, Alan 157, 171, 266

computation 32, 266

morphogenesis 23, 76, 137, 172

Tversky, Amos 140

understanding 132, 192

See also cognitive faculties, mind , thought

Universal Grammar 30, 39–45, 54, 99, 149, 154, 167, 245

biological character of 23, 24, 154, 277

and Merge 246

nature of 41

principles of 80

simplicity and 59–64

unboundedness 82

universality, principle of 101, 111, 113–117

vision 48, 171, 192, 247, 255–257

computational theories of 213

computational theory of 74

science of 257

theories of 248

visual systems 69, 247, 258

von Humboldt, Wilhelm 62, 63

Vrba, Elisabeth S. 170

Waddington, Conrad H. 39, 45, 171, 242, 278, 279

wage labor 118, 120

Wallace, Alfred Russell 15, 97, 136, 171

Warlpiri people 17

Warrington, Elizabeth K. 164

water, concept of 159

Weber's Law 204

Weyl, Hermann 88

Williams Syndrome 46

Windtalkers 277

Wittgenstein, Ludwig 89, 134, 135, 163, 165, 187, 273

philosophical problems 286

uses of language 221

X-bar theory 234–235

schemata 235

Yang, Charles 56, 95, 283